tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-51773809125572357262024-03-19T03:11:04.751-07:00Dr David Lowrydrdavidlowryhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/05942986736046792589noreply@blogger.comBlogger826125tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5177380912557235726.post-37390527580401824592021-04-13T07:43:00.003-07:002021-04-13T07:43:38.902-07:00Dumping diluted detritus is dangerous: radioactive contaminated water release plan by Japan provokes international outrageThe Japanese Cabinet has endorsed a draft bill permitting the release into the Pacific Ocean of 1.25m tonnes radioactively contaminated water stored in around 1,000 tanks at the Fukushima nuclear site in the ten years since the major accident at the nuclear facility in March 2011.
Japan’s prime minister Yoshihide Suga told reporters it was the “most realistic” option, and “unavoidable in order to achieve Fukushima’s recovery”.
The radioactive water will be discharged in about two years after being diluted.
Environmental groups including Friends of the Earth Japan and the Citizens' Commission on Nuclear Energy said this week that they have collected more than 64,000 signatures from 88 countries and regions in a petition to the government against the decision to dump Fukushima wastewater into the sea.
Prime minister Suga said: "We will aim to ensure safety that is higher than existing standards. The government will make all-out efforts to deal with unfounded rumors, "adding "This is a path that we cannot avoid in order to realize Fukushima's regional reconstruction and decommission the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power plant. We will execute it only after ensuring the process is safe. Negative rumors must not stand in the way, or extinguish the hopes of people in Fukushima for recovery. The government will put out information based on science. We will do the best we can. It's all hands on deck." (NHK, 13 April 2021
https://www3.nhk.or.jp/nhkworld/en/news/20210413_24/
Almost uniquely, President Biden’s United States administration supported the move. “We thank Japan for its transparent efforts in its decision to dispose of the treated water from the Fukushima Daiichi site,” Secretary of State Antony Blinken tweeted.
State Department spokesman Ned Price also emphasized in a press release that the United States was aware that the Japanese government examined several options related to the management of the processed water, and Japan has been “transparent about its decision” and “appears to have adopted an approach in accordance with globally accepted nuclear safety standards.” (https://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2021/04/13/national/fukushima-water-reactions/)
The UN nuclear watchdog, the Vienna-based International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) also offered Japan support for the radioactive water release.
(“IAEA Ready To Support Japan On Fukushima Water Disposal, Director General Grossi Says,” 13 April 2021, https://www.iaea.org/newscenter/pressreleases/iaea-ready-to-support-japan-on-fukushima-water-disposal-director-general-grossi-says)
But from Governments in the region- especially China and South Korea- there have been howls of protest.
KBS reported that senior official Choi Young-sam of the South Korean Foreign Ministry portrayed the decision as “sudden and unilateral.” The same official said South Korea’s Nuclear Safety and Security Commission had requested Tokyo to provide information regarding the release but has yet to receive essential information, including the initial date of the planned release, its duration and the quantity of water to be disposed.
Seoul reportedly brought up the issue to Japanese Ambassador to South Korea Koichi Aiboshi after the ministry summoned him to lodge a complaint on the decision. (http://world.kbs.co.kr/service/news_view.htm?Seq_Code=160817&lang=e)
Koo Yun Cheol,Seoul’s minister for government policy coordination, said "The decision...was a unilateral move made without enough discussion or understanding from us, South Korea, which is the closest country geographically..” He added that "The government will never tolerate any actions that could be harmful to our people's health," South Korea has banned imports of fisheries products from Fukushima and several other areas. Koo said Seoul will decide whether to expand the measure by taking into consideration the situation when Japan releases the water.(“Japan's neighbors react strongly to Fukushima water release decision,” Mainichi Japan, April 13, 2021; https://mainichi.jp/english/articles/20210413/p2g/00m/0na/061000c)
The plan has been facing strong opposition from the Japanese fish industry and the public, with fishery industry representatives saying it would undo years of work to restore their reputation. "We are dead against a release of contaminated water to the ocean as it could have a catastrophic impact on the future of Japan's fishing industry," Hiroshi Kishi, head of Japan’s national federation of fisheries cooperatives known as JF Zengyoren, told a meeting with government officials last October.
(“Strong opposition, serious concerns raised as Japan decides to dump Fukushima contaminated water into sea,” Xinhua, April 13, 2021; http://en.people.cn/n3/2021/0413/c90000-9838634.html)
Nor was this the first time Seoul had expressed concern over these plans. Last autumn Jung-han, director-general for Asia and Pacific affairs South Korean foreign ministry highlighted Seoul’s “grave awareness and serious concern about the issue of the Fukushima reactor contaminated water,” when senior officials from the close neighbours met for talks in Seoul for their first time since Japan’s new prime minister, Yoshihide Suga, took office in September 2020, the ministry revealed in a statement.
(“South Korea expresses ‘serious concern’ over any Japanese radioactive water dump,”
Asahi Shimbun, October 30, 2020; http://www.asahi.com/ajw/articles/13885187)
Several civic groups held a rally in Seoul protesting Japan's decision, calling on Tokyo to scrap the plan. "The sea is not a trash can. The Japanese government has no right at all to dirty the waters," said one member of a group at the rally.
China’s Foreign Ministry in Beijing said : “The Fukushima nuclear accident is one of the most serious in world. The leak of large amounts of radioactive materials has had far-reaching implications on the marine environment, food safety and human health.
“Despite doubts and opposition from home and abroad, Japan has unilaterally decided to release the Fukushima nuclear wastewater into the sea before exhausting all safe ways of disposal and without fully consulting with neighboring countries and the international community. This action is extremely irresponsible, and will seriously damage international public health and safety, and the vital interests of people in neighboring countries.
“We strongly urge the Japanese side to face up to its responsibility, follow the science, fulfil its international obligations and duly respond to the serious concerns of the international community, neighboring countries and its own people. It should reevaluate the issue and refrain from wantonly discharging the wastewater before reaching consensus with all stakeholders and the IAEA through full consultations.”
Meanwhile, Joanne Ou, a spokesperson for Taiwan’s foreign ministry said “The Foreign Ministry will continue to express our concerns to Japan in the future and closely monitor related developments in this matter. The Japanese government had informed us before it made an official decision, and it has promised to follow the guidelines given by ICRP (International Commission on Radiological Protection) to dilute, filter, purify before the discharge, and to continue to provide information to the international society.”
(“Countries react to Japan’s plans to release Fukushima water into ocean
Asahi Shimbun, April 13, 2021; http://www.asahi.com/ajw/articles/14329966)
Taiwan's Atomic Energy Council added that the decision was “regrettable.”
A German oceanic research institute had earlier pointed out that contaminated waste water will pollute more than half of the Pacific Ocean in 57 days from the date of discharge, and will spread to the global waters 10 years later, as the Fukushima coast has one of the strongest ocean currents in the world. (“Japan's unilateral decision to discharge waste water from Fukushima nuclear complex into the ocean is extremely irresponsible: FM,” Global Times, April 13, 2021; https://www.globaltimes.cn/page/202104/1220910.shtml)
A study by the Kahoko Shinpo newspaper reported that levels of iodine-129 and ruthenium-106 exceeded acceptable levels in 45 out of 84 samples collected in 2017. Iodine-129 has a half-life of 15.7 million years and can cause cancer of the thyroid, while ruthenium-106 is produced by nuclear fission and high doses can be toxic or carcinogenic when ingested.
Tepco subsequently confirmed that levels of strontium-90 were more than 100 times above legally permitted levels in nearly 65,000 tons of water that had already been treated and were 20,000 times above safety levels set by the government in several storage tanks at the site.
Shaun Burnie of Greenpeace said the Japanese government had been “very effective” in focusing debate on the contaminated water on the presence of tritium, which is less harmful than the other nuclides, and made no mention of the other contaminants.
That narrative had been assisted by the Japanese media, which had largely chosen to accept the government’s statements at face value, he said.
“They have managed to put the focus on tritium, which is still an issue, but 72 per cent of the water that is presently stored in tanks at the site – that is around 800,000 cubic metres of water – still has to go through the ALPS [Advanced Liquid Processing System] procedure because they have not been able to meet the standards required for discharge,” he said.
Data from Tepco on 2,000 cubic metres of water indicated lower levels of strontium, iodine-129 and other contaminants, but these were still well above the “non-detect” levels that were previously promised before the government would release the water.
Burnie said there were still “huge uncertainties” surrounding the Fukushima site. He said his previous experience of discharges from other nuclear plants suggested there would be levels of carbon-14 and technetium, both of which can build up rapidly in life forms. However, he added, neither had been mentioned by Tepco or the Japanese government.
BACKSTORY
This is a selection of press coverage
Strong opposition, serious concerns raised as Japan decides to dump Fukushima contaminated water into sea
(Xinhua) 14:23, April 13, 2021
http://en.people.cn/n3/2021/0413/c90000-9838634.html
Photo taken on Feb. 20, 2012 shows destroyed No.3 reactor building of Tokyo Electric Power Co. (TEPCO)'s tsunami-crippled Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power plant in Fukushima prefecture, Japan. (Xinhua/Pool)
-- The Japanese government has decided to discharge contaminated radioactive wastewater in Fukushima Prefecture into the sea;
-- The plan has been facing strong opposition from the Japanese fish industry and the public;
-- The plan also raised concerns from neighboring countries about possible negative impact on people's health and fishery businesses.
TOKYO, April 13 (Xinhua) -- Japanese Prime Minister Yoshihide Suga said on Tuesday that his government has decided to discharge contaminated radioactive wastewater in Fukushima Prefecture into the sea amid domestic and international opposition.
Suga made the announcement after convening a meeting of relevant ministers to formalize plans to release the radioactive water accumulated at the plant into the Pacific Ocean.
Struck by a magnitude-9.0 earthquake and ensuing tsunami that hit Japan's northeast on March 11, 2011, the No. 1-3 reactors at the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear plant suffered core meltdowns.
The plant has been generating massive amount of radiation-tainted water since the accident happened as it needs water to cool the reactors. The plant's operator Tokyo Electric Power Company Holdings Inc. (TEPCO) said it will take around two years for the release to start.
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) inspection team members watch No.3 reactor of the crippled Tokyo Electric Power Co.(TEPCO)'s Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power plant in Fukushima Prefecture, in this handout photo taken and released by TEPCO on May 27, 2011. (Xinhua)
The water has been treated using an advanced liquid processing system, or ALPS, to remove most contaminants. However, things like tritium, a radioactive byproduct of nuclear reactors, are hard to filter out.
According to some marine experts, traces of ruthenium, cobalt, strontium, and plutonium isotopes in the wastewater also raise concerns.
The plant has been struggling to store the contaminated water in tanks at its facility where more than 1.25 million tons of contaminated water are currently stored in huge tanks, and the space is expected to reach capacity next year.
TEPCO claimed that the whole decommissioning process will be hampered if it needs to keep building storage tanks within the plant's premises.
Japan had considered evaporating or storing underground the tritium-laced water from the plant as an alternative. However, from the perspective of cost and technical feasibility, the Japanese government decided to dilute the contaminated water and discharge it into the sea.
The plan has been facing strong opposition from the Japanese fish industry and the public, with fishery industry representatives saying it would undo years of work to restore their reputation.
"We are dead against a release of contaminated water to the ocean as it could have a catastrophic impact on the future of Japan's fishing industry," Hiroshi Kishi, head of the national federation of fisheries cooperatives known as JF Zengyoren, told a meeting with government officials last October.
Japanese workers try to clear radioactive emissions on the roof of a house in Onami, Fukushima Prefecture, Japan, on Oct. 25, 2011. (Xinhua/Kenichiro Seki)
According to Kishi, the release of radioactive water could trigger other countries to tighten restrictions on imports of Japanese fishery products, reversing a recent trend toward loosening.
Currently, a number of countries and regions continue to impose restrictions on Japanese agricultural and fishery products as a result of the Fukushima crisis amid continued concerns about the safety of the produce.
During a meeting with Suga last week, Kishi reiterated his organization's ardent opposition to the idea of dumping the radioactive water into the sea.
"It is inevitable that there would be reputational damage regardless of how the water will be disposed of, whether into the sea or into the air," he said. "I want the government to clarify how it intends to respond to such reputational damage."
Japanese Economy, Trade and Industry Minister Hiroshi Kajiyama said last Friday that while working on the concerns of the fisheries industry, the government hopes to seek cooperation of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and other global organizations, while maintaining transparency over the matter.
The Japanese government had initially hoped to make a decision on the release of the water last October. However, it delayed the decision due to fierce opposition from local fishermen.
According to a survey conducted by public broadcaster NHK late last year, 51 percent of respondents said they are "against" or "quite against" the idea of discharge the wastewater into the sea, while only 18 percent said they are in favor of the plan.
The sign of Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power plant is seen in the district of Okuma, Fukushima Prefecture, Japan, March 7, 2015. (Xinhua/Liu Tian)
Another poll conducted by Asahi Shimbun newspaper in January showed that 55 percent of respondents are against the government's plan to discharge contaminated radioactive wastewater in Fukushima into the sea, while 32 percent said they support it.
Yukio Edano, the leader of Japan's main opposition party the Constitutional Democratic Party of Japan (CDPJ) strongly condemned the plan on Saturday, saying the government's decision is unacceptable and a complete disregard for the voices of the people of Fukushima.
Some environmental groups including Friends of the Earth Japan and the Citizens' Commission on Nuclear Energy said on Monday that they have collected more than 64,000 signatures from 88 countries and regions in a petition to the government against the decision to dump Fukushima wastewater into the sea.
The environmental groups called the government's decision a "crude way of deciding" without adequate discussion and called for it to be withdrawn.
The plan also raised concerns from neighboring countries about possible negative impact on people's health and fishery businesses resulting from the discharge.
China on Tuesday once again expressed serious concerns about Japan's decision to discharge contaminated water from Fukushima nuclear station by releasing it into the Pacific Ocean.
On Monday, China expressed its grave concerns through diplomatic channels, with Foreign Ministry spokesperson Zhao Lijian saying that China urged the Japanese side to take a responsible attitude and treat the issue of nuclear waste disposal with caution.
Zhao stressed that proper disposal of nuclear waste is related to international public interests and the vital interests of neighboring countries. It should be handled carefully and properly to avoid further damaging the marine environment, food safety and human health.
Meanwhile, South Korea on Monday also voiced "grave concerns", with foreign ministry spokesman Choi Young-sam saying "It will be difficult to accept if the Japanese side decides to release the contaminated water from the Fukushima nuclear power plant without sufficient consultations."
"Our government expresses grave concerns as the decision can have direct and indirect impact on the safety of our people and the surrounding environment," he added.
Japan's neighbors react strongly to Fukushima water release decision
April 13, 2021 (Mainichi Japan)
https://mainichi.jp/english/articles/20210413/p2g/00m/0na/061000c
Environmental activists wearing a mask of Japanese Prime Minister Yoshihide Suga and protective suits denounce the Japanese government's decision on Fukushima water, near the Japanese embassy in Seoul, South Korea, on April 13, 2021. (AP Photo/Lee Jin-man)
SEOUL/BEIJING (Kyodo) -- China and South Korea on Tuesday expressed opposition to Japan's decision to release into the sea treated radioactive water that has accumulated at the crippled Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power plant, with Beijing calling the move "extremely irresponsible."
The South Korean Foreign Ministry summoned Japanese Ambassador to South Korea Koichi Aiboshi and lodged a protest after Koo Yun Cheol, minister for government policy coordination, said Seoul "firmly opposes" the Japanese decision.
The strong reactions from some of Japan's neighbors followed the decision by the government of Prime Minister Yoshihide Suga earlier in the day to start discharging the treated water into the Pacific in around two years' time.
The decision had followed years of discussions on how to dispose of the water used to cool melted fuel at the plant in northeastern Japan, which was hit by a massive earthquake and tsunami in 2011.
China, South Korea and Taiwan have all kept restrictions on food imports from Japan in the wake of the nuclear disaster. The latest decision is likely to delay the lifting of restrictions still in place.
China's Foreign Ministry said in a statement that Japan had made the decision "unilaterally," saying that releasing the water would "hurt the interest of the people in neighboring countries."
Tokyo "should not arbitrarily start to release (the water) until it reaches an agreement with related countries and the international community," the ministry added, suggesting China could take measures against Japan's move.
Meanwhile, the United States showed understanding of the Japanese plan, saying shortly after the Japanese announcement that Tokyo's decision-making process was "transparent."
"We thank Japan for its transparent efforts in its decision to dispose of the treated water from the Fukushima Daiichi site," Secretary of State Antony Blinken tweeted, adding that the United States looks forward to Japan's continued coordination with the International Atomic Energy Agency.
State Department spokesman Ned Price emphasized in a press release that Japan has worked closely with the U.N. nuclear watchdog to manage the aftermath of the accident 10 years ago, including over cleanup efforts.
Noting that the United States is aware that the Japanese government examined several options related to the management of the processed water, Price said Japan has been "transparent about its decision" and "appears to have adopted an approach in accordance with globally accepted nuclear safety standards."
Koo, the South Korean official, expressed his country's opposition at the outset of an emergency meeting of related ministries held to discuss responses to the Japanese decision. He later told reporters that Seoul finds the decision highly regrettable.
"The decision...was a unilateral move made without enough discussion or understanding from us, South Korea, which is the closest country geographically," Koo said at a press briefing, adding that South Koreans including lawmakers and civic groups are also strongly opposed to it.
"The government will never tolerate any actions that could be harmful to our people's health," Koo added.
South Korea has banned imports of fisheries products from Fukushima and several other areas. Koo said Seoul will decide whether to expand the measure by taking into consideration the situation when Japan releases the water.
In the capital Seoul, several civic groups held a rally protesting Japan's decision, calling on Tokyo to scrap the plan. "The sea is not a trash can. The Japanese government has no right at all to dirty the waters," said one member of a group at the rally.
Taiwan's Atomic Energy Council said the decision was regrettable, noting that legislators and others on the self-ruled island have opposed such a move.
The Fukushima Daiichi plant suffered core meltdowns in the wake of the March 2011 multiple disasters. Massive amounts of radioactive water have been generated in the process of cooling melted reactor fuel.
The water is treated at a processing facility on the premises to remove most contaminants but the process cannot remove tritium, a radioactive byproduct of nuclear reactors. The treated water, stored in tanks, has been building up, with storage capacity expected to run out from around fall next year.
Is Japan downplaying the danger Fukushima water poses to human health?
South China Morning Post, 13 April 2021
https://www.scmp.com/week-asia/politics/article/3129354/japan-downplaying-danger-fukushima-water-poses-human-health
• Tokyo’s decision to release over a million tons of contaminated water from the nuclear plant into the Pacific has angered China, fishermen and Greenpeace, but Japan insists safety standards are being met
• However, Tokyo’s focus on the nuclide tritium is disingenuous, campaigners say. Why the silence on strontium, rhodium, iodine and ruthenium, they ask
Julian Ryall
Tanks containing contaminated water at the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power plant which suffered meltdowns on March 11, 2011. Photo: EPA
Environmental groups incensed at Japan ’s decision to release more than a million tons of contaminated water from the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear plant into the Pacific Ocean are accusing the government of downplaying the true scale of the danger the water poses to human health.
After a cabinet meeting in Tokyo on Tuesday morning, Prime Minister Yoshihide Suga announced that, “Disposing of the treated waters is an unavoidable issue for decommissioning the Fukushima Daiichi plant.”
He said the water would be released into the Pacific “while ensuring that safety standards are cleared by a wide margin and firm steps are taken to prevent reputational damage” to the local fisheries industry.
People light candles to mark the 10th anniversary of the 2011 earthquake and tsunami that killed thousands and triggered the worst nuclear accident since Chernobyl in Futaba, Fukushima prefecture. Photo: Reuters
Fishermen are deeply unhappy with the decision, which they have long opposed on the grounds that it will decimate an industry already struggling to overcome perceptions that their catches have not been not safe for human consumption since the 2011 tsunami and earthquake that prompted a meltdown at the nuclear power plant. Most of the water Japan plans to release was used after the meltdown to cool the plant’s reactors. The Japanese government contends that, following treatment, the water is now safe to release but its claims have prompted widespread scepticism.
Hiroshi Kishi, the head of the national federation of fisheries co-operatives, said the decision was “extremely regrettable” and “utterly unacceptable”.
Suga’s decision was also criticised by some of Japan’s immediate neighbours, including South Korea
and China , and organisations concerned about the impact on the environment and residents of northeast Japan and further afield.
China has ‘concerns’ over plan to release Fukushima water into ocean
12 Apr 2021
“The government has repeatedly acted contrary to the promise it made that it would not take any action without the understanding of all concerned,” said Hideyuki Ban, co-director of the Tokyo-based Citizens’ Nuclear Information Centre. “It is an act that makes us lose confidence in the government’s promise not only for the present but also for the future.”
Countries that already ban imports of seafood and other products from northeast Japan would strengthen those regulations and other countries might introduce similar limits, which would deal another blow to the local fisheries, agriculture and tourism industries, said Ban.
He also pointed out that five United Nations experts, including the Special Rapporteur on toxins and
human rights and the Special Rapporteur on the right to physical and mental health, issued a statement as recently as March 11 this year saying that releasing contaminated water into the Pacific would increase the future health risks for children and be a violation of human rights.
Ryo Kimura tosses his daughter, Reni Kimura, in the air in an area hit by the 2011 tsunami, on its 10th anniversary, in Namie, Fukushima prefecture, Japan. Photo: Reuters
Shaun Burnie, senior nuclear specialist for Greenpeace, said the Japanese government and Tokyo Electric Power Co. (Tepco), the operator of the Fukushima plant, had still not permitted an independent analysis of the radionuclides that are contaminating the water, although a leaked Tepco document had shown that the vast majority of the water stored at the site was contaminated with numerous radioactive elements, including iodine, ruthenium, rhodium, antimony, tellurium, cobalt and strontium-90.
A study by the Kahoko Shinpo newspaper confirmed that levels of iodine-129 and ruthenium-106 exceeded acceptable levels in 45 out of 84 samples collected in 2017. Iodine-129 has a half-life of 15.7 million years and can cause cancer of the thyroid, while ruthenium-106 is produced by nuclear fission and high doses can be toxic or carcinogenic when ingested.
Tepco subsequently confirmed that levels of strontium-90 were more than 100 times above legally permitted levels in nearly 65,000 tons of water that had already been treated and were 20,000 times above safety levels set by the government in several storage tanks at the site.
Burnie said the Japanese government had been “very effective” in focusing debate on the contaminated water on the presence of tritium, which is less harmful than the other nuclides, and made no mention of the other contaminants.
That narrative had been assisted by the Japanese media, which had largely chosen to accept the government’s statements at face value, he said.
“They have managed to put the focus on tritium, which is still an issue, but 72 per cent of the water that is presently stored in tanks at the site – that is around 800,000 cubic metres of water – still has to go through the ALPS [Advanced Liquid Processing System] procedure because they have not been able to meet the standards required for discharge,” he said.
Data from Tepco on 2,000 cubic metres of water indicated lower levels of strontium, iodine-129 and other contaminants, but these were still well above the “non-detect” levels that were previously promised before the government would release the water.
Burnie said there were still “huge uncertainties” surrounding the Fukushima site. He said his previous experience of discharges from other nuclear plants suggested there would be levels of carbon-14 and technetium, both of which can build up rapidly in life forms. However, neither had been mentioned by Tepco or the Japanese government, he said.
Burnie was also dismissive of the International Atomic Energy Agency’s decision to rubber-stamp the decision, saying, “The IAEA will of course approve the decision and provide scientific justification because its function is to promote nuclear power.
“I have never seen a discharge that the IAEA did not like the look of in all the 60 years the organisation has been around,” he added. “It’s no surprise they have been brought in to provide cover to the Japanese government, but they are only endorsing what the industry wants to do, so they cannot be considered a neutral observer.”
Tepco has previously insisted the water must be disposed of because the site is running short of space for storage tanks, but some critics have said this is disingenuous, as many hectares of surrounding farmland cannot be utilised for generations as it is contaminated by radiation from the accident at the plant, while space within the perimeter of the plant has also been set aside for storing the molten fuel debris once it is recovered from the three reactors that suffered meltdowns.
Burnie said that procedure was not going to happen for many years, and might never be achieved.
“This is the very core of the problem,” he said. “The whole time frame for the removal of the molten fuel – which they suggest will happen between 2040 and 2050 – is sheer fantasy. It’s utter nonsense. And in the meantime, they will be accumulating more than 450,000 tons of water. And they will want to release that as well.”
South Korea calls in Japanese ambassador to protest decision to dump Fukushima water into ocean
RT, 13 April 2021
FILE PHOTO: Storage tanks for contaminated water stand at the Fukushima Dai-ichi nuclear power plant of the Tokyo Electric Power Company (TEPCO) in Okuma town, Fukushima prefecture, northeastern Japan. © Tomohiro Ohsumi / Pool Photo via AP
South Korea’s foreign ministry summoned Tokyo’s ambassador on Tuesday to protest the Japanese government’s decision to release more than one million tons of contaminated water from the Fukushima nuclear power plant into the sea.
Tokyo’s ambassador, Koichi Aiboshi, and South Korea’s second vice foreign minister, Choi Jong-Moon, held talks within hours of Japan confirming that the country’s cabinet had backed the plan to release the contaminated water that has been held in tanks for the past two years.
Japan’s decision has been opposed by industries that rely on the surrounding water, and by countries in the region, including South Korea, due to concerns about the environmental impact of dumping the water into the Pacific Ocean.
Choi chastised the Japanese ambassador for not being completely forthcoming with details of the plan to release the water, including how much of the contaminated fluid would be dumped and how quickly it would be released, according to the South Korean foreign ministry. The second vice foreign minister also expressed disappointment over the lack of talks between Japan and neighboring countries before the decision was made on how to dispose of the water from Fukushima.
“Our position is that a decision should not be made unless there is a clear assessment on what impact it would have on people’s health and the marine environment,” a South Korean foreign ministry official said after the meeting.
Japan’s ambassador publicly responded to South Korea’s concerns in a statement released to local media, claiming that simulations show “it will not have an adverse impact on the marine environment in the neighboring countries.”
The decision was expected despite the opposition that has emerged to it, with Japanese Prime Minister Yoshihide Suga calling it the “most realistic” option and “unavoidable” if the area around Fukushima is to recover.
The meeting between South Korea and Japan comes after the Chinese government issued a condemnation of Tokyo’s plan for similarly failing to consult Beijing about dumping the contaminated water. Speaking on Tuesday, the Chinese foreign ministry called Japan’s actions “extremely irresponsible” and warned they will “seriously damage international public health and safety.”
Countries react to Japan’s plans to release Fukushima water into ocean
Asahi Shimbun, April 13, 2021
http://www.asahi.com/ajw/articles/14329966
A temporary site where bags filled with contaminated waste from the Fukushima nuclear accident were swept away during Typhoon No. 19 in Tamura, Fukushima Prefecture, in October 2019. (Asahi Shimbun file photo)
South Korea summoned Japan’s ambassador to Seoul on Tuesday to protest the Japanese government’s plan to release huge amounts of contaminated water that have built up at the wrecked Fukushima plant after treatment and dilution.
China also reacted with strong opposition to the plan and the following lists detailed reactions from Japan’s neighbors in Asia along with the U.S. and other parties. Japan often has testy relations with China and South Korea over historical and territorial issues.
KOO YOON-CHEOL, SOUTH KOREA’S OFFICE OF GOVERNMENT POLICY COORDINATION
“Our government expresses strong regret over the decision and will take all necessary steps with the safety of our citizens as the top priority.
“The decision can never be accepted and would not only cause danger to the safety and maritime environment of neighboring countries, it was also made unilaterally without sufficient consultations with our country, which is the closest neighbor to Japan.
“We will strongly demand Japan take concrete steps to ensure the safety of our citizens and prevent any damage to the maritime environment.
“Second, we will convey our government’s concerns to the international community, including the IAEA, and request it seek transparent information and international inspections over the entire process of handling the contaminated water.
“Third, we actively demand the Japanese government release relevant information based on our right guaranteed under international law, while working with the international community to thoroughly verify the entire water treatment process. We will never accept any behavior that could cause damage to our people.”
CHINA FOREIGN MINISTRY
“The Fukushima nuclear accident is one of the most serious in world. The leak of large amounts of radioactive materials has had far-reaching implications on the marine environment, food safety and human health.
“Despite doubts and opposition from home and abroad, Japan has unilaterally decided to release the Fukushima nuclear wastewater into the sea before exhausting all safe ways of disposal and without fully consulting with neighboring countries and the international community. This action is extremely irresponsible, and will seriously damage international public health and safety, and the vital interests of people in neighboring countries.
“We strongly urge the Japanese side to face up to its responsibility, follow the science, fulfil its international obligations and duly respond to the serious concerns of the international community, neighboring countries and its own people. It should reevaluate the issue and refrain from wantonly discharging the wastewater before reaching consensus with all stakeholders and the IAEA through full consultations.”
JOANNE OU, TAIWAN FOREIGN MINISTRY SPOKESWOMAN
“The Foreign Ministry will continue to express our concerns to Japan in the future and closely monitor related developments in this matter.”
“The Japanese government had informed us before it made an official decision, and it has promised to follow the guidelines given by ICRP (International Commission on Radiological Proctection) to dilute, filter, purify before the discharge, and to continue to provide information to the international society.”
U.S. STATE DEPARTMENT
“In this unique and challenging situation, Japan has weighed the options and effects, has been transparent about its decision, and appears to have adopted an approach in accordance with globally accepted nuclear safety standards.
“We look forward to the government of Japan’s continued coordination and communication as it monitors the effectiveness of this approach.”
INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY (IAEA)
“Today’s decision by the Government of Japan is a milestone that will help pave the way for continued progress in the decommissioning of the Fukushima No.1 nuclear power plant,” IAEA Director General Rafael Mariano Grossi in an emailed statement.
“Tanks with the water occupy large areas of the site, and water management, including the disposal of the treated water in a safe and transparent manner involving all stakeholders, is of key importance for the sustainability of these decommissioning activities.
“The Japanese Government’s decision is in line with practice globally, even though the large amount of water at the Fukushima plant makes it a unique and complex case.
“We will work closely with Japan before, during and after the discharge of the water.”
KAZUE SUZUKI, GREENPEACE JAPAN
“The Japanese government has once again failed the people of Fukushima.
“The government has taken the wholly unjustified decision to deliberately contaminate the Pacific Ocean with radioactive wastes. It has discounted the radiation risks and turned its back on the clear evidence that sufficient storage capacity is available on the nuclear site as well as in surrounding districts.
“Rather than using the best available technology to minimize radiation hazards by storing and processing the water over the long term, they have opted for the cheapest option, dumping the water into the Pacific Ocean.”
'Japan Did not Provide Sufficient Information on Release Plan'
2021-04-13 19:13:15/
http://world.kbs.co.kr/service/news_view.htm?Seq_Code=160817&lang=e
The government says Japan has not provided sufficient information before announcing its decision to release radioactive water from the Fukushima nuclear plant into the ocean.
A senior official of the South Korean Foreign Ministry relayed the stance in a meeting with reporters on Tuesday calling Tokyo’s decision sudden and unilateral.
The official said the Nuclear Safety and Security Commission had requested Tokyo to provide information regarding the release but has yet to receive essential information, including the initial date of the planned release, its duration and the quantity of water to be disposed.
The other essential information concerns methods of disposal, including how to take the contaminated water from the storage tank into oceans.
Seoul reportedly brought up the issue to Japanese Ambassador to South Korea Koichi Aiboshi after the ministry summoned him to lodge a complaint on the decision.
IAEA Ready To Support Japan On Fukushima Water Disposal, Director General Grossi Says
https://www.iaea.org/newscenter/pressreleases/iaea-ready-to-support-japan-on-fukushima-water-disposal-director-general-grossi-says
IAEA, 11/2021
Director General Rafael Mariano Grossi welcomed Japan’s announcement that it has decided how to dispose of treated water stored at the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station and he said the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) stands ready to provide technical support in monitoring and reviewing the plan’s safe and transparent implementation.
Japan’s chosen water disposal method is both technically feasible and in line with international practice, IAEA Director General Grossi said. Controlled water discharges into the sea are routinely used by operating nuclear power plants in the world and in the region under specific regulatory authorisations based on safety and environmental impact assessments.
“Today’s decision by the Government of Japan is a milestone that will help pave the way for continued progress in the decommissioning of the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power plant,” Mr Grossi said. “Tanks with the water occupy large areas of the site, and water management, including the disposal of the treated water in a safe and transparent manner involving all stakeholders, is of key importance for the sustainability of these decommissioning activities.”
He added: “The Japanese Government’s decision is in line with practice globally, even though the large amount of water at the Fukushima plant makes it a unique and complex case.”
“Nuclear safety is a national responsibility and it was for the Government of Japan to decide how to address the critical issue of water management. I’m confident that the Government will continue to interact with all parties in a transparent and open way as it works to implement today’s decision,” Director General Grossi said.
Japan has requested the IAEA’s cooperation in the disposal of the water by the IAEA dispatching international expert missions to review the country’s plans and activities against IAEA safety standards and supporting and being present at environmental monitoring operations there.
“We will work closely with Japan before, during and after the discharge of the water,” said Mr Grossi, who visited the Fukushima nuclear power plant last year. “Our cooperation and our presence will help build confidence – in Japan and beyond – that the water disposal is carried out without an adverse impact on human health and the environment.”
The IAEA and Japan have been cooperating extensively over the past decade to deal with the aftermath of the Fukushima Daiichi accident, in areas such as radiation monitoring, remediation, waste management and decommissioning.
Since the Director General took office in December 2019, he has offered IAEA support related to the Fukushima water issue in meetings with senior Japanese officials, including then Prime Minister Shinzo Abe during an official visit to the country in February 2020. Last month, he held a virtual meeting with Minister of Economy, Trade and Industry Hiroshi Kajiyama.
The IAEA’s safety reviews, and other technical support, are based on its safety standards, which constitute the worldwide reference for protecting the public and the environment from harmful effects of ionizing radiation.
South Korea 'firmly opposes' releasing treated Fukushima water
• A number of water storage tanks are seen at Fukushima No. 1 nuclear power plant. | KYODO
• KYODO, AFP-JIJI,
• April 13, 2021
https://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2021/04/13/national/fukushima-water-reactions/
A high-level South Korean government official said Tuesday that Seoul “firmly opposes” Japan’s decision to release into the sea treated radioactive water that has accumulated at the crippled Fukushima No. 1 nuclear power plant.
Koo Yun-cheol, minister for government policy coordination, made the remark at the outset of an emergency meeting of related ministries held to discuss responses to the Japanese decision. He later told reporters that Seoul finds the decision highly regrettable and said it was unacceptable.
The strongly worded reaction from South Korea followed the Japanese government’s decision earlier in the day to discharge the water into the Pacific, starting in around two years’ time, despite worries among local fishermen and neighboring countries.
China also hit out at Japan’s decision on Tuesday, calling it as “extremely irresponsible.”
China said Japan’s plan would be damaging to public health and complained Tokyo had decided to dispose of the nuclear waste water “without regard for domestic and foreign doubts and opposition.”
“This approach is extremely irresponsible and will seriously damage international public health and safety and the vital interests of the people of neighboring countries,” the foreign ministry said in a statement on its website.
Meanwhile, the U.S. government showed understanding of the Japanese plan, saying shortly after the Japanese announcement that Tokyo’s decision-making process was “transparent.”
“We thank Japan for its transparent efforts in its decision to dispose of the treated water from the Fukushima Daiichi site,” Secretary of State Antony Blinken tweeted, adding that the United States looks forward to Japan’s continued coordination with the International Atomic Energy Agency.
State Department spokesman Ned Price also emphasized in a press release that Japan has worked closely with the U.N. nuclear watchdog to manage the aftermath of the accident triggered by a massive quake and tsunami that hit northeastern Japan 10 years ago, including over cleanup efforts.
Noting that the United States is aware that the Japanese government examined several options related to the management of the processed water, Price said Japan has been “transparent about its decision” and “appears to have adopted an approach in accordance with globally accepted nuclear safety standards.”
The Fukushima No. 1 plant suffered core meltdowns in the wake of a devastating earthquake and tsunami in March 2011. Massive amounts of radioactive water have been generated in the process of cooling melted reactor fuel.
The water is treated at a processing facility on the premises to remove most contaminants but the process cannot remove tritium, a radioactive byproduct of nuclear reactors. The treated water, stored in tanks, has been building up, with storage capacity expected to run out as early as fall next year.
Japan's unilateral decision to discharge waste water from Fukushima nuclear complex into the ocean is extremely irresponsible: FM
https://www.globaltimes.cn/page/202104/1220910.shtml
Global Times, April 13, 2021
Photo:VCG
Japan's unilateral decision to discharge waste water from the Fukushima nuclear complex into the ocean is extremely irresponsible and will seriously damage international public health and the vital interests of the people of neighboring countries, China's Foreign Ministry spokesperson said Tuesday.
As a close neighbor of Japan and a stake holder, China expresses grave concern over this decision, the spokesperson said.
China strongly urges Japan to re-examine the disposal of the nuclear waste water and refrain from starting the discharge before reaching agreements with all relevant countries and the IAEA via full consultation, the spokesperson said.
The spokesperson stressed that the ocean is the common property of mankind, and the disposal of nuclear waste from the nuclear complex in Fukushima Prefecture is not a domestic issue in Japan. China urges Japan to adopt a scientific attitude, fulfill its international obligations, and respond to the serious concerns of the international community, neighboring countries and its own people.
China will continue to closely follow the development of the situation together with the international community and reserves the right to make a further response, the spokesperson said.
The comments were made after Japan announced its decision on Tuesday. The plan was approved during a cabinet meeting of ministers early Tuesday, which will allow Japan to release the radioactive water in two years. Japan depicted its decision as the best option despite strong objections from the international community, and especially neighboring countries.
The Fukushima nuclear leak was one of the most serious nuclear accidents in the world, resulting in the leakage of a large amount of radioactive materials, and has had a profound impact on the marine environment, food safety and human health, the Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesperson said.
According to the assessment of the IAEA, discharging the tritium-containing waste water from the Fukushima nuclear power plant into the ocean will have an impact on the marine environment and public health of the surrounding countries. The existing treated waste water still contains other radionuclides and needs further purification.
A report by the United Nations Scientific Committee on the Effects of Atomic Energy also believes that the impact of the nuclear waste water from Fukushima on the ecological environment in the ocean needs to be continuously tracked and observed.
A German oceanic research institute had earlier pointed out that contaminated waste water will pollute more than half of the Pacific Ocean in 57 days from the date of discharge, and will spread to the global waters 10 years later, as the Fukushima coast has one of the strongest ocean currents in the world.
Fukushima: Japan announces it will dump contaminated water into sea
Environmental groups and neighbours condemn plan to release more than 1m tonnes of contaminated water in two years’ time
• Explainer: everything you need to know about the water release
The storage tanks for treated water are seen at the tsunami-crippled Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power plant in Okuma town, Japan. Photograph: Sakura Murakami/Reuters
Justin McCurry in Tokyo and agencies
Guardian, 13 April 2021
Japan has announced it will release more than 1m tonnes of contaminated water from the wrecked Fukushima nuclear power plant into the sea, a decision that has angered neighbouring countries, including China, and local fishers.
Official confirmation of the move, which came more than a decade after the nuclear disaster, will deal a further blow to the fishing industry in Fukushima, which has opposed the measure for years.
The prime minister, Yoshihide Suga, told a meeting of ministers on Tuesday that the government had decided that releasing the water into the Pacific Ocean was the “most realistic” option, and “unavoidable in order to achieve Fukushima’s recovery”.
The plant’s operator, Tokyo Electric Power [Tepco], and government officials say tritium, a radioactive material that is not harmful in small amounts, cannot be removed from the water, but other radionuclides can be reduced to levels allowed for release.
“The Japanese government has compiled basic policies to release the processed water into the ocean, after ensuring the safety levels of the water … and while the government takes measures to prevent reputational damage,” Suga told reporters.
Work to release the diluted water will begin in about two years, the government said, with the entire process expected to take decades.
“On the premise of strict compliance with regulatory standards that have been established, we select oceanic release,” it said in a statement.
China denounced the plan as “extremely irresponsible”, and accused Japan of reaching the decision “without regard for domestic and foreign doubts and opposition”.
“This approach is extremely irresponsible and will seriously damage international public health and safety and the vital interests of the people of neighbouring countries,” the Chinese foreign ministry said in a statement on its website.
South Korea summoned Japan’s ambassador, Koichi Aiboshi, the broadcaster YTN reported, while a high-level government official said Seoul “firmly opposes” the move, a view also expressed by Taiwan’s Atomic Energy Council.
The US was supportive, describing Japan’s decision-making process as “transparent”.
“We thank Japan for its transparent efforts in its decision to dispose of the treated water from the Fukushima Daiichi site,” the secretary of state, Antony Blinken, tweeted.
The announcement drew swift condemnation from environmental groups.
Greenpeace Japan said it “strongly condemned” the water’s release, which “completely disregards the human rights and interests of the people in Fukushima, wider Japan and the Asia-Pacific region”.
“The Japanese government has once again failed the people of Fukushima,” said Kazue Suzuki, the group’s climate and energy campaigner.
“The government has taken the wholly unjustified decision to deliberately contaminate the Pacific Ocean with radioactive waste. It has discounted the radiation risks and turned its back on the clear evidence that sufficient storage capacity is available on the nuclear site as well as in surrounding districts.
“The cabinet’s decision failed to protect the environment and neglected the large-scale opposition and concerns of the local Fukushima residents, as well as the neighbouring citizens around Japan.”
About 1.25m tonnes of water has accumulated at the site of the nuclear plant, which was crippled after going into meltdown following a tsunami in 2011.
Fukushima fishermen concerned for future over release of radioactive water
Read more
It includes water used to cool the plant, as well as rain and groundwater that seeps in daily. The water needs to be filtered again to remove harmful isotopes and will be diluted to meet international standards before any release, the government said.
The radioactive water, which increases in quantity by about 140 tonnes a day, is now being stored in more than 1,000 tanks, and space at the site is expected to run out around next autumn. Tepco has argued that it will struggle to make progress on decommissioning the plant if it has to keep building more storage tanks at the site.
The International Atomic Energy Agency supports the decision, since radioactive elements, except tritium, will be removed from the water or reduced to safe levels before it is discharged. The IAEA has also pointed out that nuclear plants around the world use a similar process to dispose of wastewater.
Experts say tritium is only harmful to humans in large doses and with dilution the treated water poses no scientifically detectable risk.
“There is consensus among scientists that the impact on health is minuscule,” Michiaki Kai, an expert on radiation risk assessment at Japan’s Oita University of Nursing and Health Sciences, told Agence France-Presse before the decision was announced.
But local fishing communities say the water’s release will undo years of hard work to rebuild consumer confidence in their seafood.
“They told us that they wouldn’t release the water into the sea without the support of fishermen,” Kanji Tachiya, who heads a local fisheries cooperative in Fukushima, told public broadcaster NHK ahead of the announcement. “We can’t back this move to break that promise and release the water into the sea unilaterally.”
The decision comes about three months ahead of the postponed Olympic Games in Tokyo, with some events planned as close as 60km (35 miles) from the plant.
Japanese officials have objected to media descriptions of the water as “contaminated” or “radioactive”, insisting that it be described as “treated”.
Shaun Burnie, senior nuclear specialist with Greenpeace East Asia, said that claim was “clearly false”.
“If it was not contaminated or radioactive they would not need approval (to release the water) from Japan’s nuclear regulator,” he said. “The water in the tanks is indeed treated, but it is also contaminated with radioactivity. The Japanese government has been deliberately seeking to deceive over this issue, at home and abroad.”
Everything you need to know about the plan to release treated Fukushima water
Japan has announced it will dump 1m tonnes of contaminated water into the ocean, sparking controversy
• Fukushima: Japan announces it will dump contaminated water into sea
The storage tanks for treated water at the tsunami-crippled Fukushima nuclear power plant. They will be full by the second half of 2022. Photograph: Kyodo/Reuters
Agence France-Presse
Guardian, 13 April 2021
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2021/apr/13/everything-you-need-to-know-about-the-plan-to-release-treated-fukushima-water
Japan’s decision to release more than 1m tonnes of treated radioactive water from the stricken Fukushima nuclear plant into the sea has sparked controversy inside and outside the country. Here are some questions and answers about the plan, which is expected to take decades to complete.
What is the processed water?
Since the 2011 nuclear disaster, radioactive water has accumulated at the plant, including liquid used for cooling, and rain and groundwater that has seeped in.
An extensive pumping and filtration system known as Alps (advanced liquid processing system) extracts tonnes of newly contaminated water each day and filters out most radioactive elements.
Three stories of hope: 10 years on from Japan's triple disaster
Read more
The plant operator, Tepco, has built more than 1,000 tanks to hold some 1.25m tonnes of processed water at the site but they will be full by the second half of 2022.
The Alps process removes most of the radioactive isotopes to levels below international safety guidelines for nuclear plant waste water.
But it cannot remove some, including tritium, a radioactive isotope of hydrogen that experts say is only harmful to humans in very large doses.
The half-life of tritium – the time needed for one half the atoms of a radioactive isotope to decay – is 12.3 years. In humans, it has an estimated biological half-life of seven to 10 days.
How will it be released?
Japan’s government has backed a plan to dilute the processed water and release it into the sea.
The government says the process meets international standards, and it has been endorsed by the International Atomic Energy Agency.
“Releasing into the ocean is done elsewhere,” IAEA’s director general, Rafael Mariano Grossi, has said. “It’s not something new. There is no scandal here.”
The release is not likely to begin for at least two years and will take decades.
A government spokesman, Katsunobo Kato, said the dilution would reduce tritium levels to well below standards set domestically and by the World Health Organization for drinking water, with IAEA supervision.
Why is it controversial?
Environmental groups like Greenpeace, which opposes nuclear power, say radioactive materials like carbon-14 that remain in the water can “be easily concentrated in the food chain”.
They allege that accumulated doses over time could damage DNA, and want to see the water stored until technology is developed to improve filtration.
Local fishing communities worry that years of work to convince consumers that Fukushima’s seafood is safe will be wiped out by the release.
“The message from the government that the water is safe is not reaching the public, that’s the huge problem,” an official with the association of Fukushima fishermen unions told Agence France-Presse.
He said trading partners had warned they would stop selling their products and consumers had said they would stop eating Fukushima seafood if the water were released: “Our efforts in the past decade to restore the fish industry will be for nothing.”
What about Fukushima seafood?
The government says radioactive elements in the water are far below international standards, pointing out that waste water is regularly discharged from nuclear plants elsewhere.
Even releasing all the stored water in a single year would produce “no more than one-thousandth the exposure impact of natural radiation in Japan,” the foreign ministry said in a reply to a UN report.
For food, Japan nationally sets a standard of no more than 100 becquerels of radioactivity per kilogram (Bq/kg), compared with 1,250 Bq/kg in the EU and 1,200 in the US.
But for Fukushima produce, the level is set even lower, at just 50 Bq/kg, in an attempt to win consumer trust. Hundreds of thousands of food items have been tested in the region since 2011.
What do scientists say?
Michiaki Kai, an expert on radiation risk assessment at Japan’s Oita University of Nursing and Health Sciences, said it was important to control the dilution and volume of released water.
But “there is consensus among scientists that the impact on health is minuscule”, he told AFP.
Still, “it can’t be said the risk is zero, which is what causes controversy”.
Geraldine Thomas, chair of molecular pathology at Imperial College London and an expert on radiation, said tritium “does not pose a health risk at all – and particularly so when you factor in the dilution factor of the Pacific Ocean”.
She said carbon-14 was also not a health risk, arguing that chemical contaminants in seawater like mercury should concern consumers more “than anything that comes from the Fukushima site”.
On eating Fukushima seafood, “I would have no hesitation whatsoever,” she added.
Japan Govt Decides Ocean Release of Fukushima N-Plant Water
https://jen.jiji.com/jc/eng?g=eco&k=2021041300629
Tokyo, April 13 (Jiji Press)--The Japanese government on Tuesday decided the release into the ocean of treated radioactive water from the disaster-stricken Fukushima No. 1 nuclear power station.
The decision, made at a meeting of relevant ministers, came as the government of Prime Minister Yoshihide Suga aims to accelerate work to decommission the Tokyo Electric Power Company Holdings Inc. <9501> plant in Fukushima Prefecture, northeastern Japan, despite strong opposition from the fisheries industry, which is concerned about reputational damage to marine products from the water release into the sea.
The ocean dumping is certain to draw anger also from nearby countries, such as China and South Korea.
"Disposal of the treated water is an unavoidable challenge for the decommissioning of the plant," Suga said at the meeting. "The government concluded that the ocean release is a realistic method," he added.
The prime minister said: "We will aim to ensure safety that is higher than existing standards. The government will make all-out efforts to deal with unfounded rumors."
Govt. approves release of treated water into sea
NHK, 13 April 2021
https://www3.nhk.or.jp/nhkworld/en/news/20210413_24/
The Japanese government has officially decided to release treated water from the crippled Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power plant into the ocean. It will be discharged in about two years after being diluted.
The Cabinet has endorsed a draft bill on the matter. Prime Minister Suga Yoshihide is promising transparency as the process moves forward.
Suga said on Tuesday, "This is a path that we cannot avoid in order to realize Fukushima's regional reconstruction and decommission the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power plant. We will execute it only after ensuring the process is safe. Negative rumors must not stand in the way, or extinguish the hopes of people in Fukushima for recovery. The government will put out information based on science. We will do the best we can. It's all hands on deck."
The decision comes a decade after a massive earthquake and tsunami hit northeastern Japan, triggering a triple meltdown at the power plant.
Water is used to cool molten nuclear fuel. It's mixing with rain and groundwater flowing into damaged reactor buildings, accumulating at a rate of 140 tons per day.
The facility has enough tanks to hold about 1.37 million tons of wastewater. But it's already at 90 percent of capacity. The remainder is expected to fill up sometime next year.
The water is treated in order to remove most of the radioactive material, but still contains radioactive tritium.
The concentration will be diluted to one-40th of what is required under national regulations. That's equivalent to about one-seventh of the World Health Organization's standard for drinking water.
The government will ask the plant's operator, known by its acronym TEPCO, to secure equipment needed to release the treated water in about two years.
The plan calls for cooperation with the International Atomic Energy Agency to disseminate transparent and objective information at home and abroad.
It also pledges support for the local fishery, tourism and agricultural industries. If there is damage to the reputation of an industry, the plan calls for TEPCO to provide compensation.
TEPCO President Kobayakawa Tomoaki said, "We will work hard to fulfill our responsibility to strike a balance between regional reconstruction, and decommissioning the reactors throughout the lengthy decommissioning process."
In Fukushima, reaction from residents is mixed.
A resident said, "I think as long as it's within international standards, it can't be helped under the current circumstances."
Another resident said, "No one is satisfied with the decision. A few words from the prime minister, and the process is set in stone. This is wrong."
People in the fishing industry in particular have been strongly opposed to the plan. The head of a national industry group has released a statement protesting the decision and urging the government to clarify how it will alleviate safety concerns in Japan and abroad.
drdavidlowryhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/05942986736046792589noreply@blogger.com3tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5177380912557235726.post-14611098138738221162021-04-07T06:22:00.002-07:002021-04-07T06:22:46.208-07:00Whitehall Whitewash over GreensillOver the past month a major political scandal has been slowly emerging across Whitehall, involving former Conservative Prime Minister David Cameron and an Australian banker, Lex Greensill, who inveigled himself into Cameron’s inner s circle to such an extent that he was able to swan around Government departments ten years ago touting for business for his financing schemes, flashing his Business card that described him as ‘Senior Adviser, Prime Minister’s Office.’ (“Business card puts Greensill founder at the heart of Downing Street,” Guardian, 31 March 2021; https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2021/mar/30/business-card-puts-greensill-founder-at-the-heart-of-downing-street)
The Labour Party as the Official Opposition has finally woken up to the significance of the story, with shadow Cabinet Office Minister, Rachel Reeves - a former chairperson of the Business select Committee – belatedly calling for significant changes to lobbying rules. (“Labour calls for changes to lobbying law after Greensill row: Party says rules should be widened to include ‘in-house’ roles such as that carried out by David Cameron,” Guardian, 5 April 2021;
https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2021/apr/04/labour-calls-for-changes-to-lobbying-law-after-greensill-row)
Reeves and shadow chancellor Anneliese Dodds had earlier called for the Committee on Standards in Public Life to investigate the allegations about Cameron’s lobbying activities and the access Greensill was given to taxpayer-backed loans. Committee chair, Lord Jonathan Evans, a former director of spy agency MI5, said the advisory body “does not have a remit to investigate individual cases” but he suggested that CSPL’s ongoing Standards Matters 2 review could look at the concerns in a broader context, adding “As part of the review we are looking at the current rules and arrangements governing transparency and public appointments and we will be assessing what is working well and where there are gaps and weaknesses.”
Meanwhile, Labour Party leader Sir Kier Starmer called on Cabinet Secretary Simon Case to launch a full investigation into lobbying that took place for Greensill."I think the cabinet secretary needs to look at this again in the round and I also think it's time for David Cameron to come out of hiding and start answering some questions." (“Pressure mounts for probe into Greensill Capital lobbying of Whitehall: Standards watchdog insists it “has no remit” to investigate but pledges to feed concerns into ongoing ethics review,”Civil Service World, 31 March 2021 https://www.civilserviceworld.com/news/article/pressure-mounts-for-probe-into-greensill-capital-lobbying-of-whitehall
Business Secretary Kwasi Kwarteng asserted there was ‘nothing to see here’, suggesting to Sky News that, with Cameron having been cleared of breaking lobbying rules, people should now “just move on” from the issue, indicating his belief that “everything was above board” with the former prime minister’s connection to the financial services company which collapsed earlier in March. (“Greensill Capital: Minister tells public to ‘just move on’ from accusations of Cameron cronyism,” The London Economic, 30 March 2021;https://www.thelondoneconomic.com/politics/greensill-capital-minister-tells-public-to-just-move-on-from-accusations-of-cameron-cronyism-261789/)
The Sunday Times has led the investigative reporting, most recently last weekend in a detailed two page spread based on 15 pages of internal emails involving several Government departments. (“David Cameron, Jeremy Heywood, Lex Greensill and all that 'free money',” Sunday Times, 4 April 2021; https://www.thetimes.co.uk/article/david-cameron-jeremy-heywood-lex-greensill-and-all-that-free-money-slmdtxxnf; “Greensill: The Key Facts,” https://www.thetimes.co.uk/article/greensill-ten-things-you-need-to-know-z0fzdfdsk) In preceding weeks, the Times and Sunday Times carried several other detailed exposés.
(“David Cameron and the toxic banker Lex Greensill: the exclusive inside story,” 28 March 2021; https://www.thetimes.co.uk/article/david-cameron-and-the-toxic-banker-lex-greensill-the-exclusive-inside-story-sx09g098s; “David Cameron's multiple texts to Rishi Sunak to bail out Greensill,” 21 March 2021; https://www.thetimes.co.uk/article/david-cameron-lobbied-rishi-sunak-to-bail-out-failed-finance-firm-7hqq3xms3; “Gupta's eight £50m taxpayer Covid loans,” 14 March 2021; https://www.thetimes.co.uk/article/sanjeev-guptas-eight-50m-taxpayer-covid-loans-clmsdh33q; “Lex Greensill’s rags-to-riches story is unravelling,” 3 March 2021; https://www.thetimes.co.uk/article/lex-greensill-s-rags-to-riches-story-is-unravelling-fast-8s6twz5gn)
In a coruscating critique of Cameroonian ethics, political columnist Marina Hyde attacks Cameron’s aloof distancing of himself from accountability, writing “it has now been a full 35 days since the former prime minister first declined to take calls from the Financial Times [ which has been on Cameron’s trail with excellent revelatory reportage] on the collapse and mushrooming fallout of Greensill, the specialist bank for which he was an active payrolled lobbyist with what he hoped was $60m worth of shares.”
She points out that David Cameron is still allowed to claim up to £115,000 a year from the public purse to run his office, as a former prime minister, plaintively suggesting: surely that’s enough for someone in it to return a call.
(“David Cameron has ghosted Britain over Greensill. At least it's not the first time,”
Guardian, 6 April 2021; https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2021/apr/06/david-cameron-britain-greensill-access-lobbying)
Another Guardian writer, Nils Pratley, a business commentator, was on the ball a fortnight ago, with an excellent piece that raised a whole series of unanswered questions, which won’t be posed by the Treasury Select Committee, whose Conservative majority voted down an inquiry into Cameron’s dealings with Greensill just before the Easter Parliamentary recess.
Pratley rightly concluded that: “On the basis of what we know so far, the formal transparency demands look to be a joke.” (“Greensill Capital saga raises serious issues about politicians, officialdom and business,” Guardian, 23 March 2021; https://www.theguardian.com/business/nils-pratley-on-finance/2021/mar/22/greensill-capital-saga-raises-serious-issues-about-politicians-officialdom-and-business)
Pratley also points out that Lord Paul Myners, a former City minister, has been tabling detailed written Parliamentary questions in the Lords for the past two years on Cameron, Greensill and the GFG Alliance and companies associated with the steel firm’s owner, Sanjeev Gupta.
I have tracked own these questions – and the answers to them – along with some other questions posed by some other peers (and a couple of MPs more recently), and picked out the most interesting, as follows:
As long ago as 10 June 2019 Crossbench peer Lord Myners asked the Treasury whether they were investigating, or intend to investigate, the (1) management of, (2) investment valuations used by, and (3) relationships between managers and businesses invested in, the GAM Greensill Supply Chain Finance Fund
(GAM = Greensill Asset Management).
Lord Young of Cookham replied on 24 June 2019:
“The Financial Conduct Authority (FCA) is the conduct regulator for the financial services industry in the UK. The FCA will not normally make public the fact that it is or is not investigating a particular matter, in order to protect the effectiveness of any investigation it carries out. The FCA has been made aware of this Parliamentary Question. “(UIL16211) [emphasis added] [ in a later written answer on 30 March 2021 theTreasury noted that the FCA had acknowledged notification of this question, but gave no futher details of any action taken by the FCA (UIN HL 14288)]
On 22 June 2019 Myners again asked the Treasury whether they would investigate conflicts of interest in the promotion of trade finance bonds in association with Greensill.
A different minister, Lord Agnew of Oulton, on 6 July 2019, provided an identical reply to that given on 24 June (UIN HL6017)
Leap forward to 7 October 2020, and another Crossbench peer, Lord Macpherson of Earl's Court, first raised a specific question on the activities across Whitehall of Lex Greensill, asking the Cabinet Office on what occasions since 1 January 2012 Cabinet Office officials have met Lex Greensill.
Lord True answered on 13 November 2020 using an evasive construction that would become typical of the way ministers would respond to such probing questions on Greensill saying :
“In line with the practice of successive administrations, details of internal meetings are not normally disclosed. Details of Cabinet Office senior official (Permanent Secretary) meetings with external organisations are published on a quarterly basis, and are available on GOV.UK.(UIN HL 8878) [ emphasis added]
Lord Myners returned to his probing, asking the Business Department (BEIS) on 2 November 2020 what assessment they had made of whether Greensill Capital has extended Bounce Back Loans to companies that are part of, or associated with, the GFG Alliance (Gupta’s inter-connected companies); and whether these loans complied with the eligibility criteria set by the Bounce Back Loans scheme.
Lord Callanan answered on 16 November 2020:
“Greensill Capital is not a Bounce Back Loan Scheme accredited lender. A full list of accredited lenders can be found on the British Business Bank website.” (UIN HL9858)
On 26 November Myners followed up this question asking BEIS when they accredited Greensill to make loans under the Bounce Back Loan Scheme; how much has been lent by Greensill through that Scheme so far; and which Government department or entity is responsible for maintaining loans by Greensill under that Scheme to related entities and groups.
Lord Callanan answered 10 December 2020 with an identical reply to that given on 16 November 2020 (UIN HL10777)
Undeterred, Myners pursued a different tack, asking BEIS in a further question tabled on 15 December 2020 what value of loans extended by Greensill under the Coronavirus Business Interruption Loan Scheme had annual rates of interest of more than 10 per cent per annum; and what proportion of Greensill loans within the Scheme involved an arrangement fee of 3 per cent per annum.
Lord Callanan answered on 29 December 2020 (during the Christmas Parliamentary recess)
“We are unable to provide of a breakdown of Coronavirus Business Interruption Loan Scheme data by lender as this is commercially sensitive.”(UIN HL11480) (emphasis added)
A distinct smell of rodent whiffed.
Leap forward two more months, and Myners returned to the fro, asking the Treasury on 2 March 2021 whether (1) they, (2) the Financial Conduct Authority, or (3) the Prudential Regulation Authority, have taken any action in respect of the decision by Credit Suisse Asset Management to suspend dealing in supply chain finance funds managed by Greensill Capital because of uncertainties with respect to accurate valuation. He also asked which financial regulator has primary responsibility for supervising Greensill Capital and its affiliates?
Lord Agnew replied at some length on 16 March 2021, giving an identical reply to both questions, saying:
“Greensill is an international group of firms, including an Australian holding company and a German bank. There are two UK entities – Greensill Capital UK and Greensill Capital Securities Limited. Greensill Capital UK is not authorised by the UK financial authorities. It is registered under Anti-Money Laundering regulations, which means that the Financial Conduct Authority (FCA) supervises it for compliance with anti-money laundering rules, but not for wider conduct issues.
Greensill Capital Securities Limited is not authorised or supervised by the FCA but was an Appointed Representative of a regulated firm (Mirabella Advisers). An Appointed Representative is a firm or person who carries out regulated activities under the supervision of a firm directly authorised by the FCA (known as a principal firm). A principal firm is responsible for ensuring that its Appointed Representative complies with the requirements, rules and regulations of the FCA.
HM Treasury has been working closely with the FCA and PRA to monitor developments and assess the implications for the financial sector, and with other government departments to understand any impacts that these developments may have on linked UK-based companies and the services they provide.”(UIN HL 13826) (UIN HL13827)
On 3 March Myners also asked the Treasury four further questions: which financial regulator has primary responsibility for supervising Greensill Capital and its affiliates; and what steps (1) they, or (2) any regulators, have taken to check whether the insurance security offered to investors by Greensill Capital was reflected in the policies secured from insurers; and whether any such policies were written by related parties; whether they (1) are investigating, or (2) plan to investigate, matters related to a fund managed by GAM investing in securities packaged by Greensill Capital; and whether (1) they, or (2) any regulators, are investigating the impact on banks and asset managers of the suspension of dealing in funds managed by Greensill Capital, and in particular the effect on banks of (a) risk concentration limits, and (b) capital requirements.
On 16 March 2021Lord Agnew also gave the self-same omnibus answer to all four as he had to the previous two questions (UIN HL13827) (UIN HL13871) (UIN HL 13872) (UIN HL13873)
Trying a different tack, Myners also asked the Treasury on 2 March 2021 on how many occasions over the last six months ministers and civil servants in (1) the Cabinet Office, (2) HM Treasury, and (3) the Department for Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy, hosted meetings with (a) Lex Greensill, or (b) representatives of Greensill Capital; and whether David Cameron was present at any of the meetings.
Lord Agnew replied on 16 March 2021, but it barely constituted an answer:
“Senior officials and ministers routinely meet with a range of private sector stakeholders. There are robust transparency processes in place to ensure appropriate scrutiny of such meetings. Transparency releases are currently publicly available for meetings up to and including September 2020, which is in line with normal reporting timelines on disclosures. These are published on a quarterly basis, with the most recent release published in February 2021.”
Cryptically, he added “Mr Roxburgh’s transparency release from July-September 2020 will be published shortly, but there are no meetings with either Lex Greensill or representatives of Greensill Capital to report in this release.” (UIN HL13828)
Also on 2 March 2021, Myners further probed BEIS asking what is the (1) value, and (2) number, of Coronavirus Large Business Interruption Loans made through Greensill Capital or its subsidiaries and associates; what is the (a) value, and (b) number, which were at annual interest rates of 14.9 per cent or higher; and what the reasons are for Greensill having now been withdrawn from the list of government approved lenders?
Lord Callanan answered on 16 March 2021 stating:
“Greensill Capital were approved by the British Business Bank (the Bank) in June last year to provide finance through the Coronavirus Large Business Interruption Loan Scheme (CLBILS). All accredited lenders are subject to audit by the Bank to ensure their compliance with scheme rules. If serious non-compliance is identified, the Bank is entitled to take remedial action. Such action might include termination of the Guarantee Agreement or withdrawal of the Guarantee. It would not be appropriate to comment on individual cases given commercial sensitivities.
We are unable to provide of a breakdown of CLBILS data by lender as this is commercially sensitive. (UIN HL13829) (emphasis added)
At this juncture, Lord Macpherson of Earl's Court returned to the Greensill matter, asking pointedly whether any meeting took place between the then Cabinet Secretary and Lex Greensill on 7 November 2017; and if so, what record exists of that meeting?
Lord Agnew answered on 18 March 2021saying:
“The then Cabinet Secretary and Lex Greensill met on 7 November 2017, as detailed in the relevant transparency return.”
adding conveniently
“The Cabinet Office does not hold a written record of the meeting.” (UIN HL 13822) (emphasis added)
A fortnight later, Myners continued his probing asking BEIS on 15 March 2021, asking
which government agency is responsible for monitoring the activities of Greensill Capital under the Coronavirus Business Interruption Loan Scheme; and whether in their monitoring duties they involved or sought advice from any other government department or regulatory agency?
Lord Callanan answered on 29 March 2021 saying:
“All accredited lenders across the three Covid-19 loan schemes (the Bounce Back Loan Scheme, the Coronavirus Business Interruption Loan Scheme, and the Coronavirus Large Business Interruption Loan Scheme) are subject to audit by the British Business Bank to ensure their compliance with scheme rules. The British Business Bank has appointed KPMG and RSM to undertake annual audits of each accredited lender under the schemes.
The audit programme has been established to provide assurance as to whether the participating lenders are administering the schemes in line with guarantee agreements entered into with lenders, as well as other agreed rules and procedures of the schemes. An audit review panel within the British Business Bank has been established as the governing body that provides direction and subsequent actions based on findings from the audits. The panel’s responsibilities include reviewing all draft audit reports to determine remediation actions required by lenders. The panel also monitors auditor performance and agrees the strategy for the following year with respect to operational audits.” (UIN HL14228)
On the same day, 15 March 2021, Myners also asked BEIS which government department was responsible for approving Greensill Capital as a lender under the Coronavirus Business Interruption Loan Scheme; and whether in making this decision they took advice from any other government department or regulatory agency?
Lord Callanan answered on 29 March 2021 saying:
“The British Business Bank is responsible for accrediting lenders to the Coronavirus Business Interruption Loan Scheme (CBILS).Greensill Capital (UK) Limited were approved by the British Business Bank for CBILS and the Coronavirus Large Business Interruption Loan Scheme last year in accordance with its published guidance on accreditation.”(UIN HL14227)
On 16 March 2021, Myners spread his probing net wider, asking the Treasury what role the (1) Financial Conduct Authority, and (2) Prudential Regulation Authority, played in granting regulatory approval for Greensill Capital or its associates; and whether they advised BaFin in connection with the acquisition of Greensill Bank in Germany?
Lord Agnew answered on 30 March 2021stating:
“Greensill Capital (UK) Limited was not authorised by the FCA. It was a registered entity under the Money Laundering Regulations, which means that it was subject to FCA regulation only for compliance with Anti-Money Laundering rules, not for wider conduct issues. Greensill Capital Securities Ltd was an Appointed Representative of an FCA-regulated firm, under whose supervision it could conduct some regulated activities. However, it was not itself supervised or authorised by the FCA. Greensill Capital Securities Ltd is no longer an Appointed Representative.
At no time has the Bank of England authorised or supervised Greensill Bank AG, Greensill Capital (UK) Limited or any member of their group.
The UK Financial Authorities were not involved in the acquisition of Greensill Bank AG by Greensill Capital PTY in 2014.” (UIN HL 14287)
At this point, Labour shadow chancellor Anneliese Dodds woke up, belatedly recognizing there was indeed something here that should concern her in her important opposition portfolio, asking two questions of the Chancellor on 17 March 2021 (1) if his Department would publish the dates of the five most recent occasions any Minister in his Department met with (a) Greensill Capital or (b) representatives of Greensill Capital; and (2) what meetings (a) he or (b) Ministers in his Department had with (i) Greensill Capital or (ii) representatives of Greensill to discuss access to covid-19 support schemes in 2020?
Treasury minister John Glen replied on 22 March 2021 using an evasive construction that would be used in several subsequent replies to impertinently probing questions
“Ministers routinely meet with a range of private sector stakeholders. Transparency releases are published on a quarterly basis, and are currently publicly available for Ministerial meetings up to and including September 2020, which is in line with normal reporting timelines on disclosures.” (UIN 170732) (170730)
The identical evasive reply was used by Mr Glen on 25 March 2021 in responses to shadow business minister Pat McFadden’s questions to the Chancellor on 22 March 2021 asking if he would list the dates of his contacts with David Cameron in relation to Greensill Capital; if he would publish the notes made at the meetings between his officials and Greensill Capital.? (UIN 172949) (UIN 172947)
SNP MP Alison Thewliss got an identical unhelpful response from John Glen on 25 March 2021 to her question asked on 22 March 2021 enquiring of the Chancellor if he would publish the notes made at the meetings between his officials and Greensill Capital. (UIN 173073)
As did Myners, in four identical responses by Lord Agnew on 30 March 2021 to his questions of 16 March asking the Treasury whether (1) ministers, or (2) senior civil servants, have met either (a) Mr Lex Greensill, or (b) representatives of Greensill Capital or SoftBank, since 1 January; and if so, (i) who attended the meeting, and (ii) on what dates were the meetings held and his question submitted on 17 March 2021 asking further to the Written Answer by Lord Agnew of Oulton on 16 March (HL13828), what records they hold of (1) correspondence, or (2) telephone conversations, between ministers and officials in (a) Her Majesty’s Treasury, (b) the Cabinet Office, or (c) the Department for Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy about (i) Lex Greensill, (ii) representatives of Greensill Capital, or (iii) the Rt Hon David Cameron, on matters relating to Greensill Capital; and his questions tabled on 19 March 2021 asking further the Written Answer reply by Lord Agnew of Oulton on 16 March (HL13828), whether David Cameron attended any meetings with ministers or civil servants relating to Greensill Capital; and whether records at HM Treasury record or refer to any conversation since 1 January between David Cameron and ministers or senior civil servants relating to (a) Mr Lex Greensill, (b) Greensill Capital, or (c) Mr Sanjeev Gupta and his businesses; and if so, whether they will place copies of these records in the Library of the House? (UIN HL 14286) (UIN HL14333) (UIN HL14415) (UIN HL14414).
A Labour peer, Lord Sikka, got in on the Greensill probing act asking the Treasury on 22 March what record they have of (1) letters, (2) emails, (3) phone calls, (4) text messages, and (5) other communications, from former Prime Minister David Cameron to officials in (a) the Treasury, and (b) the Department for Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy, in connection with Greensill Capital? But only received the same standard response from Lord Agnew on 30 March 2021 as did Myners to his four multiple questions above (UIN HL 14469)
In a further question submitted on 22 March 2021 Pat McFadden asked the BEIS Secretary if he would list the amount and recipient of each loan made by Greensill Capital under the Coronavirus Large Business Interruption Loan Scheme?
Business minister Paul Scully evasively answered on 30 March 2021stating:
“Details of facilities made available under the Coronavirus Large Business Interruption Loan Scheme will be published where required via the European Commission’s Transparency Aid Module.”
In a further question tabled by Myners on 16 March 2021, he asked BEIS (1) when, and (2) for what reasons, they withdrew Greensill Capital’s approval as a Coronavirus Business Interruption Loan Scheme lender?
He was in reply told by Lord Callanan on 30 March 2021:
“The British Business Bank is tasked with administering the Coronavirus Business Interruption Loan Scheme (CBILS) to ensure compliance with its terms. The details of its compliance activity with individual lenders is a commercially sensitive matter.
While the Bank looks into Greensill’s position, it is not able to originate new lending that benefits from a Government guarantee.”(UIN HL 14285)
Myners returned to the fray asking the Treasury on 23 March what discussions they had with the Financial Conduct Authority (FCA) about Greensill Capital and anti-money laundering regulations; and on what dates the FCA visited Greensill Capital in relation to such regulations?
He was told by Lord Agnew on 31 March 2021:
“The FCA is the supervisor for firms registered as Annex 1 firms under the Money Laundering Regulations 2017.
Greensill Capital UK (Limited) was not authorised by the FCA. It was a registered entity under the Money Laundering Regulations, which means that it was subject to FCA regulation only for compliance with Anti-Money Laundering rules, not for wider conduct issues. Greensill Capital Securities Ltd was an Appointed Representative of an FCA-regulated firm, under whose supervision it could conduct some regulated activities. However, it was not itself supervised or authorised by the FCA. Greensill Capital Securities Ltd is no longer an Appointed Representative.”
Lord Agnew added unhelpfully:
“It would not be appropriate for HM Treasury to comment on the actions taken by an independent regulator regarding an individual firm.” (UIN HL14528)
Lord Sikka also asked the Treasury on 19 March 2021 what records they have of (1) the dates of meetings between the Financial Conduct Authority, the directors of Greensill Capital, and that company’s auditors, and (2) the details of matters discussed at any such meetings?
Lord Agnew told him on 31 March 2021 that: “This is a matter for the Financial Conduct Authority (FCA), which is operationally independent from Government. The question has been passed on to the FCA. The FCA will reply directly to the noble Lord by letter. A copy of the letter will be placed in the Library of the House.” (UIN HL 14425)
Lord Sikka then chipped in with another interesting question on 22 March 2021, asking the Treasury on what dates capital adequacy and stress tests were carried out on Greensill Capital; and what the outcome was of those checks?
Lord Agnew responded on 31 March 2021 saying
“Greensill Capital (UK) Limited was not authorised by the FCA. It was a registered entity under the Money Laundering Regulations, which means that the FCA supervised it but only for compliance with Anti-Money Laundering rules, not for wider conduct issues. Greensill Capital Securities Ltd was an Appointed Representative of an FCA-regulated firm, under whose supervision it could conduct some regulated activities. However, it was not itself supervised or authorised by the FCA. Greensill Capital Securities Ltd is no longer an Appointed Representative. (emphasis added)
At no time has the Bank of England authorised or supervised Greensill Capital (UK) Limited or any member of their group.
Given Greensill Capital was not authorised by the Bank of England or the FCA no capital adequacy or stress tests were required or carried out.” (UIN HL 14467)
This week Lord Myners has received further ministerial answers. In response to his question tabled to BEIS on 24 March 2021 asking which entities owned by Sanjeev Gupta did the British Business Bank extend the Coronavirus Business Interruption Loan Scheme; who was responsible for (1) credit assessment, and (2) due diligence; and from which accounts were any loans issued? Lord Callanan responded on 6 April 2021 again hiding behind commercial secrecy:
“We are unable to provide information relating to individual borrowers as it is commercially sensitive. However, details of facilities made available under the Coronavirus Business Interruption Loan Scheme (CBILS) will be published where required by the European Commission’s Transparency Aid Module in due course.
CBILS facilities are delivered through the British Business Bank’s accredited lenders, who are responsible for making credit decisions in accordance with the scheme’s rules.” (UIN HL 14590) ( emphasis added)
Myners also asked BEIS on 23 March 2021 why Greensill Capital remains listed on the British Business Bank website as an accredited lender?
Lord Callanan told him on 6 April 2021, again laced with secrecy, that:
“The British Business Bank is tasked with administering the Covid-19 debt guarantee schemes to ensure compliance with its terms. The details of its compliance activity with individual lenders is a commercially sensitive matter. (emphasis added)
While the Bank looks into Greensill’s position it is not able to originate new lending that benefits from a Government guarantee.” (UIN HL 14524)
There are a series of further written questions submitted due for reply after the Easter Parliamentary Recess
Bill Crothers and Lex Greensill
Question for Cabinet Office
UIN HL14589, tabled on 24 March 2021
Question by Lord Myners
To ask Her Majesty's Government who was responsible for the appointment of Lex Greensill as a Crown Representative in March 2014, including him being issued a Cabinet Office entry pass; whether Bill Crother's appointment to the UK Board of Greensill Capital was (1) reviewed, and (2) approved, by the Advisory Committee on Business Appointments; and, if so, when.
(Due for answer by 9 April 2021)
Lex Greensill
Question for Cabinet Office
UIN HL14526, tabled on 23 March 2021
Question by Lord Myners
To ask Her Majesty's Government whether Mr Lex Greensill had an entry pass (1) to Number 10 Downing Street, or (2) to the Cabinet Office; and if so, who made the request for the pass.
(Due for answer by 8 April 2021)
To be answered by the Cabinet Office
Lex Greensill
Question for Cabinet Office
UIN HL14525, tabled on 23 March 2021
Question by Lord Myners
To ask Her Majesty's Government who nominated Mr Lex Greensill as a Crown Representative in March 2014; whether Mr Greensill continues to hold this status; and if not, (1) when did he cease to be a Crown Representative, and (2) why.
(Due for answer by 8 April 2021)
David Cameron
Question for Cabinet Office
UIN HL14413, tabled on 19 March 2021
Question by Lord Myners
To ask Her Majesty's Government whether records held in (1) 10 Downing Street and, (2) the Cabinet Office, record or refer to any conversation since 1 January between David Cameron and ministers or senior civil servants relating to (a) Mr Lex Greensill, (b) Greensill Capital, or (c) Mr Sanjeev Gupta and his businesses; and if so, whether they will place copies of these records in the Library of the House.
(Due for answer 6 April 2021)
Lex Greensill
Question for Cabinet Office
UIN HL13870, tabled on 3 March 2021
Question by Lord Myners
To ask Her Majesty's Government what functions Lex Greensill performed as a Crown Representative; how long he held that position; which person or office he reported to; and who was responsible for his appointment to that position.
Awaiting response: due for answer by 17 March 2021
Greensill
Question for Treasury
UIN 175795, tabled on 25 March 2021
Question by Labour MP Nick Smith
To ask the Chancellor of the Exchequer, whether he had (a) discussions and (b) text communication with former Prime Minister David Cameron in Government support to Greensill Capital.
(Due for answer by 13 April 2021)
Greensill: Coronavirus Large Business Interruption Loan Scheme
Question for Department for Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy
UIN 174733, tabled on 24 March 2021
Question by Labour MP Dame Angela Eagle
To ask the Secretary of State for Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy, what recent assessment his Department made of the suitability of Greensill Capital to become an accredited lender under the Coronavirus Large Business Interruption Loan Scheme.
(Due for answer by 13 April 2021)
Greensill: Coronavirus Large Business Interruption Loan Scheme
Question for Treasury
UIN 174732, tabled on 24 March 2021
Question by Labour MP Dame Angela Eagle
To ask the Chancellor of the Exchequer, what discussions his Department had with the Department for Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy on the decision to make Greensill Capital an accredited lender under the Coronavirus Large Business Interruption Loan Scheme.
(Due for answer by 13 April 2021)
drdavidlowryhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/05942986736046792589noreply@blogger.com4tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5177380912557235726.post-31604831767389365112021-03-31T03:07:00.000-07:002021-03-31T03:07:00.958-07:00Cameron's connections: dodgy business friendship creating trouble for ex-PMLetter sent to the Daily Mail:
Your columnist Stephen Glover on Tuesday and news reports on Saturday, Monday and Tuesday this week (Daily Mail) raise a range of important questions over David Cameron's political and business friendship and partnership with Australian financier ( and former sugar cane farmer) Lex Greensill, CBE.
The detailed investigation published in The Sunday Times on 28 March also made it very clear just what an important networking role was played by former Cabinet Secretary, the sadly now late Sir Jeremy Haywood (lately Baron Heywood of Whitehall), who had worked with Lex Greensill when both worked for American investment bank Morgan Stanley before David Cameron became Prime Minister in 2010.
It was Sir Jeremy who paved the path for Greenhill to get a foot in - and then a significant presence behind - the Whitehall doors.
I therefore find it very odd that in David Cameron's 732-page door stopper of a political autobiography, "For the Record", published in 2019, despite there being eight specific mentions of Sir Jeremy in the book's index, there is no mention at all of Lex Greensill.
Was Mr Greensill such an insignificant figure in Mr Cameron's tenure as PM, or did he not want to bring attention to his pivotal role in his memoires? I think we should be told by Mr Cameron himself.
drdavidlowryhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/05942986736046792589noreply@blogger.com4tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5177380912557235726.post-33881057374340448522021-03-31T01:20:00.001-07:002021-03-31T01:20:15.518-07:00When the US had a plan in the 1960s to blast an alternative Suez Canal through Israel using 520 nuclear bombsWith the giant carrier ship Ever Given of the EverGreen fleet finally disloged from being laterally beached across the Suez canal for several stressful days, I found this story of a possible alternative Suez canal across Israel's Negev Desert, using hundreds nuclear bombs to clear the way intriguing!
The US had a plan in the 1960s to blast an alternative Suez Canal through Israel using 520 nuclear bombs
https://www.businessinsider.com/us-planned-suez-canal-alternative-israel-blast-with-nuclear-bombs-1960s-2021-3?amp
Marianne Guenot
March 25, 2021, 7:59 AM
ch
An annotated map of Egypt and Israel shows the placement of the existing Suez Canal and an approximation of plans for a canal through Israel that the US considered in the 1960s. Google Maps/Insider
• A declassified memorandum reveals a 1963 US plan to create an alternative to the Suez Canal.
• It would have excavated more than 160 miles through Israel's Negev desert with nuclear bombs.
The US considered a proposal to use 520 nuclear bombs to carve out an alternative to the Suez Canal though Israel in the 1960s, according to a declassified memorandum.
The plan never came to fruition, but having an alternative waterway to the Suez Canal could have been useful today, with a cargo ship stuck in the narrow path and blocking one of the world's most vital shipping routes.
According to the 1963 memorandum, which was declassified in 1996, the plan would have relied on 520 nuclear bombs to carve out the waterway. The memo called for the "use of nuclear explosives for excavation of Dead Sea canal across the Negev desert."
The historian Alex Wellerstein called the plan a "modest proposal for the Suez Canal situation" on Twitter on Wednesday.
The memorandum was from the US Department of Energy-backed Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory.
It suggested that an "interesting application of nuclear excavation would be a sea-level canal 160 miles long across Israel."
Conventional methods of excavation would be "prohibitively expensive," the memo said. "It appears that nuclear explosives could be profitably applied to this situation."
The memo added that "such a canal would be a strategically valuable alternative to the present Suez Canal and would probably contribute greatly to economic development."
drdavidlowryhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/05942986736046792589noreply@blogger.com4tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5177380912557235726.post-76045276179868485732021-03-29T06:30:00.005-07:002021-03-29T06:30:33.338-07:00How UK violates its nuclear non-proliferation obligationsLetter submitted to <i>Morning Star</i> newspaper:
Since the publication of the so-called Integrated Defence, Security and Foreign policy review on 16 March, the Morning Star has published several feature articles and readers’ letters – many of which I agree with – analyzing the document, which included the politically dangerous and diplomatically destabilising announcement that the Ministry of Defence plans to increase the “ceiling” of available atomic warheads from the current 225 to 260.
However, the letter from correspondent Alan Debenham of Taunton ( 25 March) contained a series of factual errors and contestable assertions.
He claims, wrongly, that “all countries remain tied to the previously agreed nuclear non- proliferation treaty (NPT) of 1968.” India and Pakistan, plus Israel, each a nuclear weapons state, have never signed the treaty. Cuba told the UN General Assembly on 14 September last year, after years as a hold- out state, it would accede to the NPT, and submitted its articles of ratification to the treaty in Moscow on 4 November.
North Korea did originally join the NPT in 1985, but announced its withdrawal - as any state is entitled to do so under treaty article 10, on 10 January 2003, justifiably citing non- compliance of the Article 6 nuclear disarmament obligation by the nuclear weapon state members.
Mr Debenham also asserts that the NPT “bans all new nuclear bomb provisions and activities.” Would that it did! Article 5 of the NPT is still active, and unbelievably permits “peaceful nuclear explosions”, stating:
“Each Party to the Treaty undertakes to take appropriate measures to ensure that, in accordance with this Treaty, under appropriate international observation and through appropriate international procedures, potential benefits from any peaceful applications of nuclear explosions will be made available to non-nuclear-weapon States Party to the Treaty on a non-discriminatory basis and that the charge to such Parties for the explosive devices used will be as low as possible and exclude any charge for research and development..”
However, Mr Debenham is correct to suggest that nuclear warhead co-operation between the US and UK (involving the nuclear weapons laboratories at Los Alamos in New Mexico and AWE Aldermaston and Burghfield in Berkshire) is illegal.
Article 1 of the NPT explicitly prohibits the “transfer to any recipient whatsoever nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices or control over such weapons or explosive devices directly, or indirectly…” ( emphasis added)
My recent blog article “[Nuclear War-] headed for trouble” ( 25 March; http://drdavidlowry.blogspot.com/2021/03/nuclear-war-headed-for-trouble.html)
shows up the utter hypocrisy of Defence Secretary Ben Wallace’s claim to MPs on 22 March that “we do not believe that the changes to the number of warheads in any way breach the nuclear non-proliferation treaty, and that advice is backed up by the Attorney General.”
He subsequently told Labour MP Rachael Maskell in the same Q&A session on the Defence White Paper that “Governments do not publish the Attorney General’s advice.” How convenient!
drdavidlowryhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/05942986736046792589noreply@blogger.com2tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5177380912557235726.post-12346608076968354772021-03-25T10:37:00.004-07:002021-03-25T10:37:32.248-07:00[Nuclear War-] headed for trouble
All the media briefing before the unveiling last week of the Integrated Defence, Security and Foreign policy review (“Global Britain in a Competitive Age: the Integrated Review of Security, Defence, Development and Foreign Policy”) indicated that the Government planned to announce a ceiling on nuclear warheads deployable from 180 to 260, a 44 % increase. ( eg “UK to expand nuclear stockpile in post-Brexit security review: Trident, counterterror and the union take centre stage in biggest foreign policy assessment since cold war, by Helen Warrell and George Parker
Financial Times, March16, 2021; https://www.ft.com/content/9784be23-8472-4268-9ea8-f1c0f8e23a24; reported:
“Downing Street is to raise the number of Trident nuclear warheads the UK can stockpile by more than 40 per cent in its integrated review of defence, security and foreign policy published on Tuesday. Boris Johnson, UK prime minister, is set to announce that the cap on the number of nuclear warheads will increase from its current level of 180 to 260, according to two people with knowledge of the document.”
Or The Guardian’s Defence and Security Editor, Dan Sabbagh, who reported a day earlier: “The increased limit, from 180 to 260 warheads, is contained in a leaked copy of the integrated review of defence and foreign policy, seen by the Guardian.”(“Cap on Trident nuclear warhead stockpile to rise by more than 40%- Exclusive: Boris Johnson announcement on Tuesday will end 30 years of gradual disarmament, Guardian, 15 March 2021; https://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2021/mar/15/cap-on-trident-nuclear-warhead-stockpile-to-rise-by-more-than-40)
But when the document was published, it said something significantly different. Under the sub-headline “The UK’s minimum, assured, credible nuclear deterrent” the Integrated Review stated:
"In 2010, the government stated an intent to reduce our overall nuclear warhead stockpile ceiling from not more than 225 to not more than 180 by the mid-2020s.
"However, in recognition of the evolving security environment, including the developing range of technological and doctrinal threats, this is no longer possible, and the UK will move to an overall nuclear weapon stockpile of no more than 260 warheads".
Former chairperson of Parliamentary CND, Green Party MP Caroline Lucas, asked the Defence Secretary on 17 March “with reference to the plans in the Integrated Review to increase the overall nuclear warhead stockpile ceiling from 180 to no more than 260, what proportion of the additional warheads will be low-yield warheads capable of tactical use?” She was told in a written reply by junior defence minister Jeremy Quin on 24 March: “The Integrated Review increased our nuclear weapons stockpile ceiling from no more than 225 to no more than 260. None of the United Kingdom's nuclear weapons are designed for tactical use during conflict. The nuclear deterrent exists to deter the most extreme threats to our national security and way of life, which cannot be deterred by other means.”(UIN 170597) (https://questions-statements.parliament.uk/written-questions/detail/2021-03-17/170597)
Owen Thompson, the Scottish National Party MP for Midlothian also asked the MoD three questions on the nuclear warhead stockpile
First, he asked “what assessment he has made of the compatibility of the Government’s decision to move to an overall nuclear weapon stockpile of no more than 260 warheads with trends away from conventional warfare towards cyber warfare?”.
Jeremy Quin answered: “The UK's independent, minimum credible, nuclear deterrent exists to deter the most extreme threats to our national security and way of life, which cannot be deterred by other means. These threats have not gone away with the emergence of cyberspace as a new sphere in which to conduct hostile or disruptive activities, and the nuclear deterrent remains essential in order to guarantee our security, and that of our NATO Allies. Setting a new warhead stockpile ceiling of 260 will allow the UK to maintain the minimum destructive power required to guarantee that the UK's nuclear deterrent remains credible and effective against the full range of state nuclear threats from any direction.”[169896]
Second and thirdly, he asked: “how many additional convoys will be required to maintain increases in stocks of nuclear weapons as a result of the Government’s decision to move to an overall nuclear weapon stockpile of no more than 260 warheads?” and “whether he has undertaken an impact assessment of any potential increase in nuclear convoy movements in the UK as a result of the Government’s decision to move to an overall nuclear weapon stockpile of no more than 260 warheads?” [169897] [169899]
Jeremy Quin responded “It is Ministry of Defence policy that we do not comment on the operational details and requirements for convoys transporting Defence Nuclear Material, for the purpose of safeguarding national security. Convoy movements are kept to the minimum necessary to meet operational requirements and are, and will continue to be, conducted by highly trained personnel to the most rigorous safety and security standards. ….The UK is a responsible Nuclear Weapons State and the safety of the public is of the highest priority. We have rigorous measures in place to ensure the safety and security of our nuclear weapon stockpile, irrespective of its size. All aspects of the warhead programme and weapon stockpile are subject to a robust assurance process including regulatory oversight.
(Daily Report: Written answers on Nuclear Weapons, Monday, 22 March 2021
http://qnadailyreport.blob.core.windows.net/qnadailyreportxml/Written-Questions-Answers-Statements-Daily-Report-Commons-2021-03-22.pdf)
Labour’s former front bench shadow defence spokesperson, Keven Jones, MP for North Durham, also asked: “pursuant to the increase in nuclear warheads announced in the Integrated Review on 16 March 2021, (a) how many extra Trident Missiles will be required, (b) at what cost and (c) by which date?”, to be told by Jeremy Quin on 24 March “The UK has sufficient Trident II D5 missiles for its needs. The recent announcement in the Integrated Review to limit our overall nuclear weapon stockpile to no more than 260 warheads does not change this.” (UIN 170558)
On Monday 22 March, Defence Secretary Ben Wallace unveiled his Integrated Review: Defence Command Paper to Parliament, then took several dozen oral questions from MPs on its contents (https://hansard.parliament.uk/commons/2021-03-22/debates/49173AD7-1180-4251-8F29-58EB9E9D1C75/IntegratedReviewDefenceCommandPaper)
The Secretary of State for Defence, Ben Wallace, opened his statement with the inclusion f these observations on ‘nuclear defence.’
“Let us be clear: the benefits and institutions of multilateralism, to which we have all become so accustomed, are an extension of, not an alternative to, our shared leadership and our hard power. UK diplomacy should work hand in hand with the UK armed forces abroad, and we will invest in our defence diplomacy network in order to strengthen the influence we can bring to bear…
The Government’s commitment to spending £188 billion on defence over the coming four years—an increase of £24 billion, or 14%—is an investment in the Prime Minister’s vision of security and prosperity in 2030. Previous reviews have been over-ambitious and underfunded, leaving forces that were overstretched and underequipped. This increased funding offers defence an exciting opportunity to turn our current forces into credible ones, modernising for the threats of the 2020s and beyond
To conclude, if this Defence Command Paper is anything, it is an honest assessment of what we can do and what we will do. We will ensure that defence is threat-focused, modernised and financially sustainable, ready to confront future challenges, seize new opportunities for global Britain and lay the foundations of a more secure and prosperous United Kingdom.
This was followed by a series of questions form MPs, which included the following on nuclear weapons and warheads.
Labour’s shadow defence secretary, John Healey (Wentworth and Dearne)
“Let me ask the Defence Secretary a series of questions.. On nuclear, Labour’s commitment to the renewal of our deterrent is non-negotiable, alongside our multilateral commitment to nuclear disarmament and greater arms control. The Secretary of State made no mention in his statement of reversing 30 years of proud non-proliferation policy in the UK under successive Governments, and the White Paper does not come close to explaining, let alone justifying, this change. Parliament, the public and our allies are owed a much fuller account of this decision from Ministers.”
Mr Wallace replied:
“On the nuclear deterrent, we do not believe that the changes to the number of warheads in any way breach the nuclear non-proliferation treaty, and that advice is backed up by the Attorney General. Of course, if the right hon. Gentleman is correct about his party’s new-found love of the nuclear deterrent since his previous leader, or indeed since the shadow Foreign Secretary voted against renewing it, he will of course agree with me that a nuclear deterrent should be credible; otherwise, it would just be a massive waste of money… I remember the former leader of the Labour party suggesting to the good people of Barrow that they would be allowed to continue to make submarines, and could maybe use them for tourism purposes. Maybe that is the true version of the Labour party’s manifesto on defence.
Philip Dunne (Ludlow) (Con) . “In light of the necessary decision to proceed with upgrading the warhead for the strategic deterrent, can my right hon. Friend explain to the House the rationale for increasing the number of warheads during the transition from one system to the next? Will the cost in developing the strategic deterrent absorb any of the welcome £6.6 billion R&D programme that has been announced”?
Mr Wallace
“My right hon. Friend laid the foundations for linking prosperity in a much more deliberate and thoughtful manner into defence and defence procurement… On the rationale of the deterrent, it cannot be taken from a one-sided view. We have to look at our adversary, Russia, and see the investments it has made, as well as its plans to both break the intermediate nuclear treaty, which was broken in 2018, and to invest in new weapon systems and missile defence. If we are going to keep it as credible, then we need to make sure that we do that.
On the R&D budget, I am not aware—I will write to my right hon. Friend with a correction if necessary—that the £6.6 billion is anything to do with the nuclear warhead programme or anything else. For clarity, the United Kingdom does not buy warheads from other countries. Under the nuclear proliferation treaty, warheads have to be developed within that very country itself.”
Jamie Stone (Caithness, Sutherland and Easter Ross) (LD)
“I should make it clear that neither I nor my party can agree with the proposal to increase the number of nuclear warheads. We also have grave doubts about some of the spending decisions the Government are making within the context of the defence budget.”
Geraint Davies (Swansea West) (Lab/Co-op) [V]
“Our strategic threats are from China, which grows stronger each day from manufacturing trade, and Russia, which is threatened by China and relies on fossil fuel exports. Instead of focusing on cutting one in eight soldiers and stockpiling nuclear weapons, what discussions has the Secretary of State had across Government about using COP26 to put a carbon tax on trade, in order to check Chinese power and to help transition Russia from fossil fuels towards a wood economy for construction, to tackle climate change, so that holistically, we can protect the world without escalating the risk of war and destruction?
Mr Wallace
“The hon. Gentleman actually raises an important point. At the beginning of the Command Paper is a chapter about the global trends and the direction.”
Rachael Maskell (York Central) (Lab/Co-op) [V]
“The Government have frequently confirmed their commitment to the non-proliferation treaty, which they recognise plays ‘an unparalleled role in curtailing the nuclear arms race and keeping the world safe.’—[Official Report, 1 June 2015; Vol. 596, c. 10WS.]
But this Government are now feeding, not ameliorating, nuclear risk. Will the Secretary of State publish the detail of the Attorney General’s advice to explain why he is seeking to break yet another international agreement, undermining our legal position, and why, rather than cutting nuclear warheads, as is his obligation, he is increasing them by 44%”?
Mr Wallace
“Madam Deputy Speaker, you will know, having been in the House for many years, that Governments do not publish the Attorney General’s advice. We do not believe in any way that we are breaking the nuclear proliferation treaty, and what we really need to do is make sure that we maintain a credible deterrent.”
Sir Bernard Jenkin (Harwich and North Essex) (Con)
:I thank my right hon. Friend for his Defence Command Paper, which I broadly welcome, in particular the integrated review, which looks forward to the modern threats we face and embraces the capabilities we need to develop to meet those threats. When it comes to the nuclear deterrent, we must remember that this is a bipartisan policy that has been supported by both sides of the House until now and that we want to maintain that consensus. May I echo what has been said about the need for discussion and exploration of why we need to increase the cap on the number of warheads? I am convinced that we need to maintain a credible deterrent, and I am sure that the Government would not be doing this unless there were very strong arguments for doing it to maintain the credibility of the deterrent.”
Mr Wallace
“Obviously, detail around development, use and, indeed, deployment of nuclear warheads is a very sensitive subject. However, I will see what I can do to provide further briefing to Members and to specific Committees, if that is a better way to furnish more detail in a secure environment.”
Marion Fellows (Motherwell and Wishaw) (SNP)
“As the UK Government announce billions more for Trident, while my constituents have been forced to turn to food banks, another poll—this time by BMG Research —has found that the majority of Scots want independence. Does the Secretary of State really think that prioritising yet more weapons of mass destruction, on top of the billions already being spent on them, is doing the so-called Union any favours, when the salaries of NHS workers and service personnel are either stagnant or being cut”?
Mr Wallace
“I am not quite sure whether the hon. Lady now belongs to a party that does want to belong to NATO or does not. If it does want to belong to NATO, which I think is its current position this week, it is, of course, a nuclear alliance and therefore she is tacitly accepting the existence of the defence provided by nuclear weapons. So there is a sort of sleight of hand there. She should also know that, despite the polls, in the last actual vote on being a member of the United Kingdom, the people in Scotland who wanted to stay in the United Kingdom won and the quote was “not for another generation”.
Dr Liam Fox (North Somerset) (Con)
“Does [he] agree that there has been a lot of uninformed hysteria in reaction to the announcement that we are increasing the cap on our number of warheads? If we are to have a nuclear deterrent, it must be credible. I appreciate the sensitivity of the subject, but with a number of warheads always having to be serviced, a cap of 180 is not credible. That is especially true if we see the debate in context: the French have around 300 warheads; the United States 3,800; and the Russians 6,800. More than half the nuclear weapons in the world are Russian at a time when Russia has shown its aggressive intent on other countries.
Mr Wallace
“[He] is absolutely right. There is nothing in what he has said that I disagree with. Let us put it in context. Of the declared nuclear powers, we have the lowest stockpile. We need to keep it credible. I fully respect people who do not want a nuclear deterrent or who are in favour of unilateral disarmament, but if people believe that a nuclear deterrent has helped to keep peace in this country and around Europe for 50 years, then we must make sure that it is credible. Not to do so is to make a laughing stock of the whole thing.”
Richard Thomson (Gordon) (SNP)
“I am anxious to allow the Secretary of State a chance to expand on that. What exactly is the new threat, or the change to the strategic environment, that the Government consider requires a stockpile of 260 warheads, rather than 180, to offer that minimum credible deterrent that was presumably offered before? Furthermore, how can that 45% increase in the number of warheads be reconciled in any way with a sincere, meaningful commitment to arms control, disarmament and this country’s obligations to nuclear non-proliferation”?
Mr Wallace
“Disarmament is achieved when both sides are credible in what they offer up. To offer up something that is not credible would see us get taken to the cleaners, and the other people would just carry on, especially with the completely unbalanced numbers of warheads around the world.”
Mr Barry Sheerman (Huddersfield) (Lab/Co-op)
“We want the modern technology—I have always believed that we need an independent nuclear force…”
Richard Burgon (Leeds East) (Lab)
“At a time when the Government say there is no money for a proper pay rise for NHS workers, they are going to give the military the biggest financial boost since the cold war and waste billions more increasing the number of UK nuclear weapons by 40%. Each UK nuclear warhead has an explosive power eight times that of the nuclear bomb barbarically dropped on Hiroshima at the end of the second world war, killing over 140,000 civilians. If we are going to spend billions more increasing the number of nuclear weapons, what is to stop others doing the same, in a new global arms race”?
Mr Wallace
“We are not going to spend billions increasing the number of nuclear weapons. In 2016, the House voted collectively for a nuclear deterrent—I am sure the hon. Member did not, and certainly the leader he used to follow did not either. That is what it believes, and I think the number of people who do not believe it are probably joining the hon. Member in the room where he asked the question.”
Mrs Emma Lewell-Buck (South Shields) (Lab)
“Last week, the Prime Minister was unable to state how the Government’s commitment to international law fitted with breaching article 6 of the nuclear non-proliferation treaty. The Defence Secretary has since said that the raising of the cap on the nuclear warhead stockpile is to ensure the UK has a credible nuclear deterrent in response to Russia and others, and that we will still have one of the lowest stockpiles. Will he explain for exactly how long our deterrent has not been credible? How does this increase—below others—make it now credible”?
Mr Wallace
“I am afraid that I cannot, at the Dispatch Box, tell people about the credibility of our nuclear deterrent in detail, because to do so would undermine its security. However, I can assure the hon. Lady that we keep it under review, and as we announced last week, it is important to increase the warheads in stockpile—which still makes us the lowest of the declared nuclear powers— to make sure it remains credible.”
Meanwhile, the Defence and Security Industrial Strategy (CP 410) was published on 23 March. It included this section that is relevant to the nuclear warhead and nuclear non-proliferation treaty (NPT) compliance question.
Strategic imperatives
“There are areas of industrial capability which are so fundamental to our national security, and/or where international law and
treaties limit what we can obtain from overseas, that we must sustain the majority of the industrial capability onshore. For instance, the ultimate
guarantee of our national security is nuclear deterrence which relies on us having a credible nuclear capability to deter the most extreme threats to the
UK and our Allies. As such, there can be no risk to our ability to deploy this without interference. The Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons prohibits nuclear weapons states from transferring nuclear weapons to other states, including other nuclear weapons states. Therefore, while we can acquire the ballistic missiles from
the US, the warheads themselves must be produced in the UK. In addition, maintaining the integrity of the broader platform and system that protects it is essential: all those capabilities unique to submarines and their nuclear reactor plants need to be retained in the UK, to enable their design, development, build, support, operation and decommissioning. More generally, the government needs to ensure that it can protect its national secrets and ensure that material marked ‘UK eyes only’ is indeed not compromised by other states.”
(https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/971983/Defence_and_Security_Industrial_Strategy_-_FINAL.pdf)
Then on Wednesday 24 March the Liaison Committee – which comprises the chairpersons of each of the House of Commons Select committees heard Oral evidence from Prime Minister Boris Johnson ( HC 1285; https://committees.parliament.uk/oralevidence/1944/default/), who was asked by committee chair, Sir Bernard Jenkin: “ The decision in the integrated review to raise the cap on the number of warheads came as something of a surprise. Continuous at-sea deterrence has always been a bipartisan policy based on quite a broad consensus. Of course there are dissenters, but it has been a bipartisan policy. What measures are the Government going to take to build the same kind of consensus around this more controversial decision about raising the cap on the number of warheads”?
The Prime Minister responded: “You obviously personally have a great deal of expertise in this field, and you are absolutely right to raise it. But it is crucial to stress that the number in question, which is in the integrated review, is a ceiling; it is not a target. We remain, as a Government, committed to the minimum credible deterrent, and it is very important for everybody to understand that as well.”
Further questions on the announced increase in nuclear warheads have been submitted by Caroline Lucas, and are due for reply today (25 March) and on 13 April, when Parliament reconvenes after the Easter recess.
Question for Ministry of Defence
UIN 174078, tabled on 23 March 2021
Question by
Caroline Lucas
Green Party
To ask the Secretary of State for Defence, with reference to paragraph 4.13 of the Defence in a Competitive Age White Paper, published on 22 March 2021, whether the specification type of the planned replacement nuclear warheads will include (a) Holbrook warheads of the type used in our existing nuclear arsenal, (b) warheads compatible with the W93 US nuclear weapons programme and (c) other specification types; and if he will make a statement.
Due for answer (25 March 2021)
To be answered by the Ministry of Defence
Question for Ministry of Defence
UIN 174806, tabled on 24 March 2021
Question by
Caroline Lucas
Green Party
Commons
To ask the Secretary of State for Defence, with reference to the Government’s Integrated Review of Security, Defence, Development and Foreign Policy, published in March 2021, what estimate he has made of the cost of the additional nuclear warheads; and if he will make a statement.
Due for answer in 19 days (by 13 April 2021)
drdavidlowryhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/05942986736046792589noreply@blogger.com3tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5177380912557235726.post-75298341552882178982021-03-19T04:34:00.003-07:002021-03-19T04:34:30.633-07:00British Atomic hypocrisyLetter sent to <i>The Guardian</i>:
In your report on the defence, security and foreign policy review (“ UK could use Trident to counter cyber-attack,” Guardian, 17 March 2021; https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2021/mar/16/defence-review-uk-could-use-trident-to-counter-cyber-attack ) your reporters cite an unnamed ‘insider’” ( it does not say inside what, but I will assume government) as a saying “If we have them (nuclear weapons), let’s not apologise for it, let’s own it.”
In answering MPs’ questions in the House of Commons following the release of the review, the prime minister asserted: “In particular, of course, we are concerned by the risk of Iran developing a viable nuclear weapon.* (Hansard, 16 March)
It was unsurprising, therefore to read that Iran’s Foreign Minister Mohammad Javad Zarif quickly accused prime minister Boris Johnson of “utter hypocrisy” on Twitter for announcing plans to increase Britain’s arsenal of weapons of mass destruction while chastising Tehran for its own nuclear programme.
Mr Zarif challenged Mr Johnson for making his critical concern over Iran’s alleged atomic aspirations on the very same day as announcing that “his country will increase its stockpile of nuclear warheads” adding “Unlike the UK and allies, Iran believes nukes and all WMDs are barbaric and must be eradicated.” (https://www.rt.com/news/518287-iran-zarif-johnson-nuclear-weapons/)
I think Mr Zarif has a sound point. drdavidlowryhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/05942986736046792589noreply@blogger.com7tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5177380912557235726.post-17191127428421127962021-03-16T08:51:00.004-07:002021-03-16T08:51:37.665-07:00Nuking disarmament diplomacyThe Cabinet Office ‘s Integrated Defence, Security and Foreign Policy Review (https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/global-britain-in-a-competitive-age-the-integrated-review-of-security-defence-development-and-foreign-policy) commits to increasing the number of nuclear warheads Britain has at its disposal for its Trident missiles to 260, reversing a move to retain the stockpile at 180.
The review asserts that a "minimum, credible, independent nuclear deterrent" remains "essential in order to guarantee our security".
However, the Review - without presenting any evidence - also asserts that with a "developing range of technological and doctrinal threats", it is not the time to press on with 2010 plans to lower the overall stockpile of nuclear warheads but increase them to "no more than" 260.
Ministers have long justified the UK’s alleged compliance with the 1968 nuclear non-proliferation treaty (NPT), which requires all signatory states to negotiate multilateral nuclear disarmament “ in good faith and at an early date, “by pointing to unilateral reductions in the UK’s nuclear warhead stockpile over the past 50 years.
Papers available in the National Archives in Kew show that on 23 January 1968, Fred (later Lord) Mulley, as the then Labour Government's disarmament minister, addressed the plenary meeting of the UN Committee on Disarmament (UN CD) explaining why nations should sign up to the newly negotiated NPT ( negotiated by the UK), telling the ministerial delegations:
".. my government accepts the obligation to participate fully in the negotiations required by [NPT] Article 6 and it is our desire that these negotiations should begin as soon as possible ... There is no excuse now for allowing a long delay to follow the signing of this treaty."
On 25 June 2007, Margaret Beckett made a valedictory speech as Labour foreign Secretary at the annual Carnegie Endowment Non Proliferation conference in Washington DC, where she said “What we need is vision - a scenario for a world free of nuclear weapons,” adding” “For more than sixty years, good management and good fortune have meant that nuclear arsenals have not been used. But we cannot rely on history just to repeat itself.”
US Secretary of State Blinken told the UN Conference on Disarmament on 22 February: “President Biden has made it clear: the United States has a national security imperative and a moral responsibility to reduce and eventually eliminate the threat posed by weapons of mass destruction.” (https://geneva.usmission.gov/2021/02/22/secretary-blinken-cd/).
On 10 March last year, to mark the Fiftieth anniversary of the NPT Dominic Raab as British Foreign Secretary and the Foreign Ministers of China, France, Russia, and the US issued a Joint statement which include the statement “We support the ultimate goal of a world without nuclear weapons with undiminished security for all.” (https://www.gov.uk/government/news/joint-statement-on-the-fiftieth-anniversary-of-the-treaty-on-the-non-proliferation-of-nuclear-weapons).
Prime Minister Johnson writes in his own foreword to the Review his support for the ‘rules of international order’ as follows:
“History has shown that democratic societies are the strongest supporters of an open and resilient international order, in which global institutions prove their ability to protect human rights, manage tensions between great powers, address conflict, instability and climate change, and share prosperity through trade and investment.”
But it is impossible to see what change in strategic threat could have been concluded by the integrated review of defence, security and foreign policy that could possibly justify an increase in nuclear warheads; or how this is compatible with UK obligations under the NPT, which will hold its review conference from 2-27 August at the United Nations in New York. (https://www.armscontrol.org/act/2020-11/news-briefs/npt-review-conference-postponed-again)
Background
Policy paper
Global Britain in a Competitive Age: the Integrated Review of Security, Defence, Development and Foreign Policy
Global Britain in a Competitive Age, the Integrated Review of Security, Defence, Development and Foreign Policy, describes the government’s vision for the UK’s role in the world over the next decade and the action we will take to 2025.
From:
Cabinet Office
Published:
16 March 2021
Documents
Global Britain in a Competitive Age: the Integrated Review of Security, Defence, Development and Foreign Policy
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Details
The Integrated Review is a comprehensive articulation of the UK’s national security and international policy. It outlines three fundamental national interests that bind together the citizens of the UK – sovereignty, security and prosperity – alongside our values of democracy and a commitment to universal human rights, the rule of law, freedom of speech and faith, and equality.
The Integrated Review concludes at an important moment for the United Kingdom. The world has changed considerably since the 2015 Strategic Defence and Security Review, as has the UK’s place within it.
The document, which is the product of over a year of work across government and of consultation with a wide range of external organisations and thinkers, sets out a vision for Global Britain. This includes:
• an emphasis on openness as a source of prosperity
• a more robust position on security and resilience
• a renewed commitment to the UK as a force for good in the world
• an increased determination to seek multilateral solutions to challenges like climate change
It also stresses the importance of deepening our relationships with allies and partners around the world, as well as moving more swiftly and with greater agility.
In this context, the Integrated Review sets out four overarching objectives:
1. Sustaining strategic advantage through science and technology, incorporating it as an integral element of national security and international policy to firmly establish the UK as a global S&T and responsible cyber power. This will be essential in gaining economic, political and security advantages.
2. Shaping the open international order of the future, working with partners to reinvigorate the international institutions, laws and norms that enable open societies and economies such as the UK to flourish. This will help our citizens and others around the world realise the full benefits of democracy, free trade and international cooperation – not least in the future frontiers of cyberspace and space.
3. Strengthening security and defence at home and overseas, working with allies and partners to help us to maximise the benefits of openness and protect our people, in the physical world and online, against a range of growing threats. These include state threats, radicalisation and terrorism, serious and organised crime, and weapons proliferation.
4. Building resilience at home and overseas, improving our ability to anticipate, prevent, prepare for and respond to risks ranging from extreme weather to cyber-attacks. This will also involve tackling risks at source – in particular climate change and biodiversity loss.
The Integrated Review sets out the government’s overarching national security and international policy objectives to 2025. These will inform future policy-making for all government departments. They will also inform future Spending Reviews, offering further opportunities to align resources with ambition over the long term. We will ensure all government’s instruments work together, coordinated by enhanced strategic capabilities at the centre, to achieve our objectives.
Access the government’s Integrated Review: call for evidence
Published 16 March 2021
Contents I. Foreword from the Prime Minister 3 The Prime Minister’s vision for the UK in 2030 6 II. Overview 10 III. The national security and international environment to 2030 23 IV. Strategic Framework 33 1. Sustaining strategic advantage through science and technology 35 1.1 Growing the UK’s science and technology power 35 1.2 Responsible, democratic cyber power 40 2. Shaping the open international order of the future 44 2.1 A force for good: supporting open societies and defending human rights 47 2.2 An open, resilient global economy 51 2.3 Extending an open international order in future frontiers 55 The UK in the world: a European country with global interests 60 The Indo-Pacific tilt: a framework 66 3. Strengthening security and defence at home and overseas 69 3.1 Countering state threats: defence, disruption and deterrence 70 The nuclear deterrent 76 3.2 Conflict and instability 79 3.3 Homeland security and transnational security challenges 80 4. Building resilience at home and overseas 87 4.1 Building the UK’s national resilience 88 4.2 Tackling climate change and biodiversity loss 89 4.3 Building health resilience 93 V. Implementing the Integrated Review 96 Annex A: Integrated Review priorities funded in Spending Review 2020 100 Annex B: Evidence and engagement 106 Annex C: Glossary 110
The nuclear deterrent
The UK’s independent nuclear deterrent has existed for over 60 years to deter the most extreme threats to our national security and way of life, helping to guarantee our security and that of our Allies. We have previously identified risks to the UK from major nuclear armed states, emerging nuclear states, and state-sponsored nuclear terrorism. Those risks have not gone away. Some states are now significantly increasing and diversifying their nuclear arsenals. They are investing in novel nuclear technologies and developing new ‘warfighting’ nuclear systems which they are integrating into their military strategies and doctrines and into their political rhetoric to seek to coerce others.
The increase in global competition, challenges to the international order, and proliferation of potentially disruptive technologies all pose a threat to strategic stability. The UK must ensure potential adversaries can never use their capabilities to threaten us or our NATO Allies. Nor can we allow them to constrain our decision-making in a crisis or to sponsor nuclear terrorism. The UK’s minimum, assured, credible nuclear deterrent The fundamental purpose of our nuclear weapons is to preserve peace, prevent coercion and deter aggression. A minimum, credible, independent nuclear deterrent, assigned to the defence of NATO, remains essential in order to guarantee our security and that of our Allies.
In 2010 the Government stated an intent to reduce our overall nuclear warhead stockpile ceiling from not more than 225 to not more than 180 by the mid-2020s. However, in recognition of the evolving security environment, including the developing range of technological and doctrinal threats, this is no longer possible, and the UK will move to an overall nuclear weapon stockpile of no more than 260 warheads.
To ensure that our deterrent is not vulnerable to pre-emptive action by potential adversaries, we will maintain our four submarines so that at least one will always be on a Continuous At Sea Deterrent patrol. Our submarines on patrol are at several days’ notice to fire and, since 1994, we do not target our missiles at any state. We remain committed to maintaining the minimum destructive power needed to guarantee that the UK’s nuclear deterrent remains credible and effective against the full range of state nuclear threats from any direction. We will continue to keep our nuclear posture under constant review in light of the international security environment and the actions of potential adversaries. We will maintain the capability required to impose costs on an adversary that would far outweigh the benefits they could hope to achieve should they threaten our, or our Allies’, security. UK nuclear weapons policy The UK’s nuclear weapons are operationally independent and only the Prime Minister can authorise their use. This ensures that political control is maintained at all times. We would consider using our nuclear weapons only in extreme circumstances of self-defence, including the defence of our NATO Allies.
IV. Strategic Framework
While our resolve and capability to do so if necessary is beyond doubt, we will remain deliberately ambiguous about precisely when, how and at what scale we would contemplate the use of nuclear weapons. Given the changing security and technological environment, we will extend this long-standing policy of deliberate ambiguity and no longer give public figures for our operational stockpile, deployed warhead or deployed missile numbers. This ambiguity complicates the calculations of potential aggressors, reduces the risk of deliberate nuclear use by those seeking a first-strike advantage, and contributes to strategic stability. The UK will not use, or threaten to use, nuclear weapons against any non-nuclear weapon state party to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons 1968 (NPT). This assurance does not apply to any state in material breach of those non-proliferation obligations.
However, we reserve the right to review this assurance if the future threat of weapons of mass destruction, such as chemical and biological capabilities, or emerging technologies that could have a comparable impact, makes it necessary. Working with NATO, the US and France NATO recognises that any employment of nuclear weapons against NATO would fundamentally alter the nature of a conflict. Therefore, as long as nuclear weapons exist, NATO will remain a nuclear alliance.
Since 1962, the UK has declared our nuclear capability to the defence of the Alliance. We will continue to do so, safeguarding European and Euro-Atlantic security. We will work with Allies to ensure that NATO’s nuclear deterrent capabilities remain safe, secure and effective, adapt to emerging challenges including the growing and diversifying nuclear threats that the Alliance may face, and contribute to the indivisible security of the Alliance.
Nuclear cooperation remains an important element of the relationship between the United States and the United Kingdom, enhancing transatlantic security. We will continue to work closely with the United States on nuclear matters, including nuclear deterrence policy. The 1958 Mutual Defense Agreement (MDA) has been central to our shared nuclear security goals and we are committed to its renewal in 2024.
Since 1995, France and the United Kingdom, Europe’s only nuclear powers, have stated that they can imagine no circumstances under which a threat to the vital interests of one would not constitute a threat to the vital interests of the other. We will continue our daily and unprecedented cooperation on nuclear issues, including our collaboration under the 2010 Teutates Treaty. Our future capability
Our independent nuclear deterrent is relevant not only for today but will also remain relevant for the immediate future. It is for these reasons that we have committed to a once-in-two-generations programme to modernise our nuclear forces. This investment in the future security of both the UK and our Allies demonstrates that the UK’s nuclear commitment remains undiminished. Parliament has voted to renew our nuclear deterrent and replace the Vanguard Class submarines with four new Dreadnought Class submarines.
The programme remains within budget and on track for the First of Class to enter service in the early 2030s.
To ensure we maintain an effective deterrent throughout the commission of the Dreadnought Class, we will replace our existing nuclear warhead. We will work with the Atomic Weapons Establishment to build the highly skilled teams, facilities and capabilities needed to deliver this, while also sustaining the current warhead until it is withdrawn from service. We will continue to work closely with the United States to ensure our warhead remains compatible with the Trident Strategic Weapon System, our cooperation underpinned by both the MDA and the 1963 Polaris Sales Agreement.
Delivery of the modernisation of the deterrent will be subject to the Government’s major programme approvals and oversight. We will continue to provide updates through an annual report to Parliament. We will work collaboratively across the defence and civil nuclear sectors to optimise the Defence Nuclear Enterprise for the future. This will ensure that the UK has a minimum, credible, independent nuclear deterrent for as long as is necessary. Arms control, disarmament and non-proliferation: our commitment to international treaties
We remain committed to the long-term goal of a world without nuclear weapons.
We continue to work for the preservation and strengthening of effective arms control, disarmament and non-proliferation measures, taking into account the prevailing security environment. We are strongly committed to full implementation of the NPT in all its aspects, including nuclear disarmament, non-proliferation, and the peaceful uses of nuclear energy; there is no credible alternative route to nuclear disarmament. The UK has taken a consistent and leading approach to nuclear disarmament.
The UK possesses the smallest stockpile of any of the nuclear weapon states recognised by the NPT. We are alone amongst those states in only operating a single nuclear weapon system. We will continue to press for key steps towards multilateral disarmament, including the entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty and successful negotiations on a Fissile Material Cut-Off Treaty in the Conference on Disarmament.
We will continue to take a leading international role on nuclear disarmament verification; this is an essential step for nuclear disarmament under strict and effective international control. The UK will continue to work internationally to reduce the risk of nuclear conflict and enhance mutual trust and security. We will champion strategic risk reduction and seek to create dialogue among states possessing nuclear weapons, and between states possessing nuclear weapons and non-nuclear weapon states, to increase understanding and reduce the risk of misinterpretation and miscalculation. The UK takes its responsibilities as a nuclear weapon state seriously and will continue to encourage other states to do likewise.
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Engagement 5. We designed engagement to bring in different perspectives and policy ideas from across the UK and around the world. We adapted the programme in light of COVID-19 to make full use of online platforms and we issued a public call for evidence. 6. International partners and stakeholders: the Cabinet Office and Foreign and Commonwealth Office, and later the FCDO, designed and delivered a virtual international engagement programme to which heads of mission, ministers and senior officials contributed. In particular, senior officials – including the Deputy National Security Adviser for the Integrated Review and the Prime Minister’s Special Adviser on Foreign Policy – held more than 100 engagements with over 20 countries across six continents, with a particular focus on key allies and partners. With support from Annex B: Evidence and engagement 107 Wilton Park, we convened 22 young leaders and emerging experts from 14 different countries to better understand young people’s perspectives on, and ambitions for, the future. 7. Departmental engagement: government departments and agencies consulted networks and stakeholder groups across the UK and the world to inform inputs to the Integrated Review. For example, the FCDO established a group of experts and hosted roundtables on key themes and GO-Science consulted established networks such as the UK Science and Innovation Network (SIN) to coordinate a range of inputs from external experts. Chief Scientific Advisers across government also played an important role in improving the standards of evidence use throughout the Integrated Review. This included support from the FCDO Research and Evidence Division (RED) to review the Integrated Review evidence base. 8. Public engagement: gaining perspectives from the public was vital to informing the Integrated Review, although the process was necessarily restricted due to COVID-19. New research was conducted to understand public perceptions of foreign policy and national security at home and overseas. On 13 August 2020, we launched a public call for evidence. Contributions were invited on a range of security, defence, development and foreign policy questions. We received more than 450 submissions from individuals and organisations. Organisational respondents included representatives of a range of industries, non-governmental organisations, international organisations, academia, think tanks, local government, LRFs, the media, religious organisations and fire and police organisations. We reviewed and catalogued the submissions, which we then shared with policy-makers and senior officials across government. 9. Parliamentary engagement: we made extensive use of reports by the relevant parliamentary committees. During the Integrated Review process, officials briefed the House of Commons Select Committees on Defence, Foreign Affairs and International Development. The Prime Minister gave evidence to the Liaison Committee on the Integrated Review. The Foreign Secretary and Defence Secretary also gave evidence to the relevant departmental select committees, the then-National Security Adviser gave evidence to the Joint Committee on the National Security Strategy, and Defence Minister (Lords) led briefing sessions for members of the House of Lords. 10. Experts and practitioners: with support from the Government’s Open Innovation Team and Wilton Park, we engaged academics and experts from more than 30 different institutions and 20 countries. This included five facilitated discussion sessions and three roundtables with senior officials. Senior officials conducted a virtual tour of established think tanks and new research bodies. During the Integrated Review, we closely tracked work in relevant journals, think tanks and other research bodies from across the world. This work included two focused reviews of expert opinion, involving input from 45 academics and practitioners, to gather perspectives on the UK’s role in the world over the next ten years, UK capabilities in relevant areas, and the extent to which current systems support their effective use.
drdavidlowryhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/05942986736046792589noreply@blogger.com2tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5177380912557235726.post-40827813555306287482021-03-10T14:31:00.002-08:002021-03-10T14:31:27.520-08:00Nuclear Fuk-ed“On 11 March 2011, Japan was struck by a massive earthquake, which initiated a tsunami that inundated a large portion of the east coast of Japan. The tsunami caused massive devastation and approximately 20 000 people were killed or were declared missing. The tsunami also led to one of the most severe nuclear power site accidents in history, at the Tokyo Electric Power Company (TEPCO) Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Plant. Three of the station’s six reactors suffered core melts and the entire facility was severely damaged. The Great East Japan Earthquake, the tsunami, the nuclear accident, and the resulting release of radioactive material led local authorities to initiate an evacuation of approximately 150 000 people. By deposition, the radioactive releases contaminated a large area of both the Fukushima Prefecture and others…”
These are the opening words to a new report - “Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Plant Accident, Ten Years On: Progress, Lessons and Challenges” - by the Paris–based global nuclear lobby group, the Nuclear Energy Agency (NEA).(https://www.oecd-nea.org/jcms/pl_56742/fukushima-daiichi-nuclear-power-plant-accident-ten-years-on)
It is one of several reports published to mark the tenth anniversary of the biggest accident involving a nuclear power complex this century; and was launched with an international webinar, one of several I have attended in the past 10 days dealing with different aspects of the accident and its long-running consequences.
In one, held on 27 February, titled “ 10 years of living with Fukushima,” (http://www.fukushima-disaster.de; https://m.youtube.com/user/IPPNWgermany/videos) pediatrician Dr Alex Rosen, a leading figure in the German branch of the International Physicians for the Prevention of Nuclear War (IPPNW) – who made a detailed presentation on the health impacts of the accident – said it was “luck and divine intervention” that wind from the west blew most of the radiological releases out over the Pacific Ocean, meaning the Fukushima accident released more radioactivity to the oceans than the Chernobyl accident and all the nuclear weapons tests together.
Another webinar I attended, on 9 March, was co-hosted by Northwestern University’s Roberta Buffett Institute for Global Affairs located in Evanston, Illinois, and the Bulletin for the Atomic Scientists, based in Chicago, to launch a new international interdisciplinary collaborative study on “Nuclear Disaster Compensation: Lessons from Fukushima: Interviews with Experts and Intellectuals, edited by anthropology professor Hirokazu Miyazaki (https://nuclear-compensation.northwestern.pub/).
Former US Nuclear Regulatory Commission chairperson, Allison McFarlane, now a professor and director of the School of Public Policy and Global Affairs at the University of British Columbia in Vancouver, pointed out in the webinar that the Fukushima accident has so far cost US$188billion, with projected final costs of US$740 bn.
Another contributor to the webinar, Hidenori Konno, a former resident of Tsushima, a district of Namie - the closest town to the Fukushima plant - vented his frustrations about his situation as an evacuee. He charged TEPCO and the Japanese Government of “robbing us of our lives,” asserting he and the other Tsushima evacuees “will never be satisfied however much money is offered in compensation.”
It is currently prohibited to live in this area- and many other villages and towns within the evacuation zone - due to the high radiation levels, but the Japanese government opened the main road (route 114) in September 2017, and plan to open a small area for people to return to in 2023 – despite the ineffectiveness of decontamination, and the fact that 70-80 percent of the region is forested mountain which has not been decontaminated ( https://media.greenpeace.org/archive/Namie-Citizen-Visits-his-Evacuated-Home-in-Tsushima-27MZIFJXYAW4N.html).
Greenpeace has been monitoring inside the evacuation zone for the past ten years, and this week released new report on its findings (“The decontamination myth and a decade of human rights violations: Fukushima Daiichi 2011- 2021 (https://www.greenpeace.org/static/planet4-japan-stateless/2021/03/ff71ab0b-finalfukushima2011-2020_web.pdf; Beyond Nuclear International, March 7, 2021; https://beyondnuclearinternational.org/2021/03/07/fukushima-daiichi-2011-2021/)
Following the catastrophic triple reactor meltdown at the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear plant in March 2011, several tens of thousands of square kilometres in Fukushima Prefecture (and further afield across eastern Japan) were contaminated with significant amounts of radioactive caesium and other radionuclides.
An area ranging between 24,000-34,000 square kilometres of mainland Japan received Cs-137 deposition exceeding 10,000 Bq/m2 / 40,000 Bq/ m2, according to the French Institute for Radiation and Nuclear Safety Research (IRSN) ( “Fukushima, one year later - Initial analyses of the accident and its consequences” Report IRSN/DG/2012-003, 12 March 2012)
Greenpeace report that their radiation expert team arrived in Fukushima on 26 March 2011, and their experts have since conducted 32 investigations into the radiological consequences of the disaster, most recently in November 2020. Their report claims that the government of Japan, largely under former prime minister Shinzo Abe, has attempted to deceive the Japanese people by misrepresenting the effectiveness of the decontamination program, as well as the overall radiological risks in Fukushima Prefecture. The latest Greenpeace surveys seeks to demonstrate that the contamination remains widespread, and is still a very real threat to long term human health and the environment.
The contaminated areas comprise rice fields and other farmland, as well as a large amount of forest. Many people who lived in these areas were employed as farmers or in forest, and the local residents gathered wood, mushrooms, wild fruits and vegetables from the mountain forests, and children were free to play outdoors in the woodlands and streams. Since the disaster, tens of thousands of people have been displaced from their ancestral lands. The harm extends far beyond the immediate threat to health – as well as destroying livelihoods, it has destroyed an entire way of life.
Greenpeace stresses that because of the Japanese government’s actions, many thousands of evacuees have been forced to make an impossible choice: to return to their radioactively contaminated homes or to abandon their homes and land and seek to establish a new life elsewhere without adequate compensation, which, they assert, amounts to economic coercion and may force individuals and families to return against their will due to a lack of financial resources and viable alternatives.
The Japanese government claims that, with the exception of the 'difficult-to-return' zones, decontamination has largely been completed within the Special Decontamination Area (SDA), which includes the municipalities of Namie and Iitate. However, Greenpeace say it has consistently found that most of the SDA, where the government has taken direct charge of decontamination, remains contaminated with radioactive caesium. Greenpeace srr tresses that analysis of the Japanese government’s own data shows that in the SDA an overall average of 15% has been decontaminated. In the case of Namie for example, of the 22,314 hectares that make up the municipality, only 2,140 hectares have been decontaminated - just 10% of the total. One major reason for this is that much of Fukushima prefecture is mountainous forest that cannot be decontaminated.
The Japanese government’s long-term decontamination target level is the same as the recommended maximum level for public exposure to radiation other than from medical or natural background exposure. Confronted with radiation levels that would result in annual exposure above this level, in April 2012 the government changed the recommended maximum to the same as the yearly average allowed for Japanese nuclear plant workers under normal circumstances. At no time since has the government given a timeframe for when ‘long-term’ targets are to be reached.
In its radiation surveys over the last decade, Greenpeace has consistently found readings well above the Japanese government’s decontamination target levels. The following data are a selection from the most recent surveys conducted in November 2020.
• At a home in Iitate (Mr Anzai’s house) every measurement taken in fi ve of the 11 zones surrounding the property still exceeded the government target of 0.23 µSv/h, with an average radiation level across all zones of 0.5 µSv/h.
• At a former school and kindergarten in the town of Namie, all of the 822 points measured in an adjacent forested area remained above the 0.23 µSv/h target and 88% measured above 1 µSv/h. In the area directly outside the school, 93% of all data points measured remain above the 0.23 µSv/h target. Nevertheless, this location has been open to the public since March 2017.
• In 70% of the points measured in Zone 1 along the Takase riverbank, radiation levels would give an annual dose of 3-5 mSv/year based on the Japanese government calculation method.
• At a home in the Namie 'difficult-to-return' exclusion zone (Ms Kanno’s house), which was previously subject to extensive decontamination efforts, dose rates for 98% of the points measured exceed the annual maximum exposure level of 1 mSv per year. For 70% of the points measured, dose rates could lead to an exposure of 3-5 mSv/y based on the government calculation method.
The strontium-90 threat Radioactive releases from the Fukushima Daiichi disaster and the contamination measured in 2020 are dominated by radio caesiums. But other isotopes were also released by the accident, including radioactive strontium-90 (Sr-90). which is a bone seeking radionuclide, and, if it is ingested concentrates in bones and bone marrow, increasing the risks of contracting cancer.
Greenpeace sampling and analysis of cedar needles collected from forests in areas of Fukushima Prefecture confirmed the presence of Strontium 90. Rather than conducting the large-scale and expensive Sr-90 laboratory analysis needed for accurate measurement, the Japanese government has used calculations based on an “anticipated constant ratio” between radioactive caesium and strontium.
Greenpeace argue that research published in 2015 warned that this approach is likely to result in error, and potentially underestimate the strontium risks
There are uniquely hazardous risks from current plans to decommission the Fukushima Daiichi reactors where this strontium and other radionuclides exist. A smaller but significant amount is also present in the 1.23 million tons of contaminated tank water stored at the site, and which the government is preparing to announce plans to discharge into the Pacific Ocean.
According to the Washington Post (A decade after Fukushima nuclear disaster, contaminated water symbolizes Japan’s struggles;” Washington Post, 6 March 2021; https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/asia_pacific/fukushima-japan-radioactive-water-anniversary/2021/03/05/b0515cd0-76b8-11eb-9489-8f7dacd51e75_story.html) beside the ruins of the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear plant, more than 1,000 huge metal tanks - containing nearly 1.25 million tons of cooling water groundwater seepage over the years — equivalent to around 500 Olympic-size swimming pools — most of it still dangerously radioactive – “loom in silent testament to one of the worst nuclear disasters in history..”
Running out of space to build more tanks, the Japanese government wants to gradually release the water into the sea — after it has been decontaminated and diluted — over the next three decades. TEPCO insist that an ocean release is their preferred solution and claim that it is “perfectly safe” – and “the only thing holding them back appears to be the Olympics and the bad publicity it could generate before the Games begin in July.”
But the idea of releasing the water has infuriated Fukushima’s fishing community, only now getting back on its feet after taking a battering in the wake of the 2011 disaster and the subsequent ocean contamination. “Recovery is the most important thing for us, and releasing the water will pull back the recovery process,” said Takayuki Yanai, head of the trawler fisheries cooperative association in the port of Onahama. The local fisheries industry is still only half as big as it was before the 2011 earthquake and tsunami, he said. “I really want them to stop. There must be other options.”
(“Stemming the tide 2020 The reality of the Fukushima radioactive water crisis", October 2020, https://www.greenpeace.org/static/planet4-japan-stateless/2020/10/5e303093-greenpeace_stemmingthetide2020_fukushima_radioactive_water_crisis_en_fi nal.pdf 3. Greenpeace Japan)
Greenpeace also claim that “Evacuation orders have been lifted in areas where radiation still remains above safe limits, potentially exposing the population to increased cancer risk- a particular hazard for children and women.” In 2020, further plans for the lifting of restrictions emerged, including the opening up an area of Iitate, a neighbouring community to Namie, that is currently part of the ‘difficult-to-return’ exclusion zone. Up until 2018, 13 million man hours of work had been applied in decontamination of the SDA, the majority by subcontractors. Greenpeace documented two years ago that that some workers are at risk from exposure to radiation above safety limits, and coerced into accepting hazardous working conditions because of economic hardship. They have also received inadequate training and protection. ("On the Frontline of the Fukushima Nuclear Accident: Workers and Children Radiation risks and human rights violations", March 2019, see https://storage.googleapis.com/planet4-japan-stateless/2019/03/b12d8f83-frontfksm_en.pdf)
The new Greepeace report records that during the past decade, the violations have been challenged by multiple United Nations human rights bodies, as well as UN Human Rights Special Rapporteurs, including Baskut Tuncak, who in his report to the UN General Assembly in 2018, charged that, “It is disappointing to see Japan appear to all but ignore the 2017 recommendation of the UN human rights monitoring mechanism (UPR) to return back to what it considered an acceptable dose of radiation before the nuclear disaster.” (United Nations Human Rights Office “Japan must halt returns to Fukushima, radiation remains a concern, says UN rights expert”, 25 October 2018, https://www.ohchr.org/EN/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID=23772&LangID=E)
According to Sonoda, a Japanese woman who made her own deposition to a side meeting of the UN Human rights council on internal displacement, hosted by the Office of the UN Human Rights Commissioner in June 2018, reported to a webinar hosted by the Berlin-based Heinrich Boell Stiftung on 9 March 2021(“10 years Fukushima, 35 years Chernobyl - Making the invisible visible: Still a long way from becoming history;
https://calendar.boell.de/sites/default/files/2021-03/Program_Overview_9%20March_Chernobyl_Fukushima_eng_0.pdf), the internal refugee status of the displaced Japanese citizens was recognized by the UN HRC.
In his report, Baskut Tuncak had urged the Japanese government to halt the ongoing relocation of evacuees, including children and women of reproductive age, to areas where radiation levels remain higher than that considered safe or healthy before the 2011 nuclear disaster. He also criticised the Japanese government’s decision to raise by 20 times the level of radiation exposure it considered acceptable, stating that it, “was deeply troubling, highlighting in particular the potentially grave impact of excessive radiation on the health and wellbeing of children.” (http://tbinternet.ohchr.org/_layouts/treatybodyexternal/Download.aspx?symbolno=CCPR/C/JPN/CO/6&Lang=En 5)
At the NEA webinar (bit.ly/2ZozGoy) organized on 3 March 2021 to complement the launch of the new report of Fukushima, ten years after the accident, Dr Claire Cousins, Chair of the International Committee for Radiation Protection explained how ICRP had organized in December 2020 an international webinar – with over 2000 participants- on recovery from nuclear accidents (https://www.icrp.org/page.asp?id=481), building on the earlier Fukushima Dialogue, a series of 22 meetings held in three phases across the past decade in Fukushima Prefecture, during which she said ICRP worked “with” affected people not “for” them. ( icrprecovery.org).
She gave the impression that the ICRP, with its focus on co-expertise, building on ICRP Task Groups (TG) 84 and 93, really resonated with the victims of the Fukushima accident. But the testimony of local people participating in several of the webinars attended, and documented in the new Greenpeace report, suggests the people of the evacuated communities do not believe they have had the real support they need, either from the Japanese Government, TEPCO, or international bodies like ICRP.
Indeed, two award-winning Japanese investigative reporters, Mako and Ken Oshidori, recently released a two hour-long investigative video on YouTube, compiling their very detailed research on the aftermath of the Fukushima accident across ten years.
Titled “Digging Behind the Headlines About the Fukushima Nuclear Disaster” (https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=EdQPZCf5iPE&feature=youtu.be), they claim, based on a comparative analysis of official data from the nuclear plant operators in Japan, that Fukushima’s wrecked nuclear reactors are still releasing in a single hour the equivalent amount of radioactivity released by similar sized nuclear plants in a year in normal operation.
A new paper, “New highly radioactive particles found in Fukushima” published in the Journal Science of the Total Environment on 17 February 2021 documents discovery new, large (> 300 micrometers), highly radioactive particles that were released from one of the damaged Fukushima reactors. (https://www2.helsinki.fi/en/news/science-news/new-highly-radioactive-particles-found-in-fukushima) The study involved scientists from Japan, Finland, France, the UK, and USA, led by Dr Satoshi Utsunomiya from the Department of Chemistry at Kyushu University.
Particles containing radioactive cesium (134+137Cs) were released from the damaged reactors, with small (micrometer-sized) particles (known as CsMPs) being widely distributed, reaching as far as Tokyo, 141 miles (227 km) away It recently became apparent that larger Cs-containing particles(>300 micrometers), with much higher levels of activity (~ 105 Bq), were also released from reactor unit 1 that suffered a hydrogen explosion. These particles were deposited within a narrow zone that stretches ~8 km north-northwest of the reactor site. But to date, little has been known about the composition of these larger particles and their potential environmental and human health impacts.
The particles, reported in the study, were found during a survey of surface soils 3.9 km north-northwest of reactor unit 1.From 31 Cs-particles collected during the sampling campaign, two have given the highest ever particle-associated 134+137Cs activities for materials emitted from the Fukushima plant (specifically: 6.1 × 105 and 2.5 × 106 Bq, respectively, for the particles, after decay-correction to the date of the accident).
The researchers say that the composition of the surface embedded micro-particles likely reflect the composition of airborne particles within the reactor building at the moment of the hydrogen explosion
Dr Utsunomiya observed “The new particles from regions close to the damaged reactor provide valuable forensic clues. They give snap-shots of the atmospheric conditions in the reactor building at the time of the hydrogen explosion, and of the physio-chemical phenomena that occurred during reactor meltdown,” adding “whilst nearly ten years have passed since the accident, the importance of scientific insights has never been more critical. Clean-up and repatriation of residents continues and a thorough understanding of the contamination forms and their distribution is important for risk assessment and public trust.”
Study co-author, Professor Gareth Law from the University of Helsinki added, “clean-up and decommissioning efforts at the site face difficult challenges, particularly the removal and safe management of accident debris that has very high levels of radioactivity. Therein, prior knowledge of debris composition can help inform safe management approaches”. Another co-author, Professor Rod Ewing from Stanford University in California stated “this paper is part of a series of publications that provide a detailed picture of the material emitted during the Fukushima Daiichi reactor meltdowns. This is exactly the type of work required for remediation and an understanding of long-term health effects”.
It was announced two days ago that the owners of the Fukushima nuclear power plant, TEPCO, is finally going to take a responsible position on managing the aftermath of the accident ( “TEPCO president vows to responsibly scrap Fukushima nuclear reactors,” Mainichi , 8 March 2021; https://mainichi.jp/english/articles/20210308/p2g/00m/0na/076000c)
The Kyodo news agency reported: “The president of Tokyo Electric Power Company Holdings Inc., the operator of the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear plant, has vowed to responsibly scrap the crippled reactors and revitalize the economies of its host communities ahead of the 10th anniversary of the accident.
In a recent online interview with Kyodo News, Tomoaki Kobayakawa said the utility is "making all-out efforts" in the decommissioning work and to achieve economic revitalization for the local communities. He also said radiation levels at the crisis-hit plant remain relatively stable.
Inside three of the Fukushima Daiichi's six nuclear reactors, however, melted fuel debris remains highly radioactive, leaving decommissioning a challenging task even 10 years after the world's worst nuclear disaster since the 1986 Chernobyl accident.
"I feel very sorry" for the fact that the nuclear crisis has left some land around the plant uninhabitable to this day and forced residents in the contaminated areas to evacuate, said Kobayakawa.
The president said he hopes work related to the Fukushima plant's decommissioning will become a major industry in the region and prompt local companies to join it.
The utility will place high priority on developing local human resources to engage in the scrapping of the plant, while promoting Fukushima products in the Tokyo metropolitan area to help expand their sales, Kobayakawa said.
He also said the company will thoroughly teach young employees who were not working at the utility at the time of the nuclear crisis about the lessons from the 2011 Fukushima nuclear disaster.
"It is important to learn why we failed to prevent the nuclear accident and what happened in the plant," Kobayakawa said.
The president said educating young employees about the issue will involve visits to the TEPCO Decommissioning Archive Center, which was set up in 2018 in Tomioka, Fukushima Prefecture, and catalogues how the nuclear accident unfolded as well as the latest status of decommissioning work.
Kobayakawa said he is aware that it will take a long time to regain public confidence in nuclear power generation in Japan and that TEPCO needs to show its commitment through its actions.
"Ultimately, it is we, the operators, who ensure the safety" of nuclear plants, he said. Trust will be retrieved "only after (Japanese) society recognizes what we have achieved."
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Backstory Annexes:
Fukushima 10 Years On – An Overview
Peace Boat, March 7, 2021;https://peaceboat.org/english/news/fukushima-10-years-on-an-overview
Dix ans après la catastrophe de Fukushima, plongée dans l'enfer de la centrale ravagée : "Je nous voyais tous morts"
Article rédigé par Robin Prudent
France Télévisions, Publié le 07/03/2021
https://www.francetvinfo.fr/monde/japon/fukushima/recit-dix-ans-apres-la-catastrophe-de-fukushima-plongee-dans-l-enfer-de-la-centrale-ravagee-je-nous-voyais-tous-morts_4310377.html
“Ten years after the quake: Between recovery and remembering;” Japan Times, March 8, 2021; BY ROBERT D. ELDRIDGE; https://www.japantimes.co.jp/opinion/2021/03/08/commentary/japan-commentary/ten-years-after-3-11-earthquake-operation-tomodachi/
“Legacy of the Fukushima nuclear disaster;”East Asia Forum, 7 March 2021; by Tatsujiro Suzuki, Nagasaki University; https://www.eastasiaforum.org/2021/03/07/legacy-of-the-fukushima-nuclear-disaster/
“Isolated and Alone”;Beyond Nuclear International, 7 March 2021; https://beyondnuclearinternational.org/2021/03/07/isolated-and-alone/
Nuclear energy, ten years after Fukushima; Nature, 5 March 2021; by Francesca Giovannini
https://www.nature.com/articles/d41586-021-00580-4
“Nuclear Disaster Compensation: Lessons from Fukushima” – report:
Meridian 180 Forums, Interviews with Experts and Intellectuals
Edited by Hirokazu Miyazaki
https://nuclear-compensation.northwestern.pub/
NUCLEAR DISASTER COMPENSATION: A CALL FOR ACTION
Nuclear energy provides 10% of electricity world-wide, a percentage that is likely to increase as nation-states work to fuel growing economies while limiting the devastating environmental effects of carbon-based energy sources. Yet, on the tenth anniversary of Japan's devastating triple disaster, we are reminded that nuclear energy imposes unique risks and burdens on citizens. Between 1979 and 2011, three reactor meltdowns, with distinct causes and effects, have forced communities to deal with the insidious consequences of radiological contamination. Radionuclides, in contrast to many other by-products of energy production, require the interventions of experts to sense and assess their danger. They cannot be readily smelled, tasted, heard, seen, or felt. The pathways of exposure, moreover, are multiple and include full body exposure, inhalation, and consumption of contaminated food sources. Many of these radionuclides linger in environments for decades, centuries, and even millennia in some cases. These features of radiological harm place people affected by radioactive fallout in a difficult position. They must rely on experts to regulate the risks of a disaster and, afterward, to assess its effects and provide a means of redressing their injuries. Across three major disasters—Three Mile Island in 1979, Chernobyl in 1986, and Fukushima in 2011—those affected by nuclear reactor meltdowns have been forced to navigate complicated administrative and legal compensation regimes in an attempt to rebuild their lives and communities. Tax-payers and power companies’ rate-payers, meanwhile, have borne many of the financial burdens of these disasters. When a major nuclear disaster occurs, its effects reach deeply into economy and society, and more often than not these effects extend to people far away from the accident's geographic location.
The fact that up until now, severe nuclear accidents have occurred only rarely, along with the stigma attached to anticipating and planning for nuclear catastrophe, means that public debate on nuclear disasters tends to recede into the background quickly. However, there are important issues that deserve to be addressed in more than an ad hoc fashion; one of them is compensation for victims of nuclear disasters. This report shows that compensation plans have not met the needs of victims of nuclear disasters for three primary reasons:
1. Compensation plans have been devised by unelected officials and without full public knowledge or participation.
2. Governments have often capped the liability of the owners of nuclear facilities, which distorts cost-benefit analysis and creates a moral hazard.
3. International conventions limit compensation and responsibility for nuclear disasters. Both Chernobyl and Fukushima demonstrate that these limits may be too low.
Due to the complexity of nuclear technology and our limited understanding of potential failures, our starting assumption is that there will be additional severe accidents at nuclear reactors in the future.1 In this context, we suggest that issues of compensation be part of nuclear emergency preparedness and response planning. In this report we call for the creation of a forum that enables laypersons and experts to engage in an ongoing conversation about nuclear disaster compensation issues before the next disaster occurs. The forum should include the many groups that are affected by nuclear power and disasters, including nuclear industry representatives, government officials, project finance specialists, political leaders, victims of past disasters, potential victims, taxpayers, and ratepayers. Many methods for enabling conversation between experts and their publics have been developed and so this forum may take a variety of forms, including as a consensus conference. It could take place online and/or include online components. With this report we invite your suggestions for methods of achieving this conversation, as well as your participation in this dialogue.
The final form of the forum must enable three goals. First, a deliberative conversation about nuclear disaster compensation must be anticipatory—that is, it must take place prior to the disaster occurring. Many dedicated professionals are working to prevent future disasters, but the case studies presented later in this report show that governments on the whole have not fully prepared for nuclear disasters before the disasters have occurred. In short:
• Plans have failed to anticipate the magnitude and types of harms that people experience after disasters, or precisely how people will be compensated.
• Some plans have created loopholes for “natural” disasters, which may not ensure that owners of nuclear facilities adequately prepare for environmental hazards.
• Organizational sociologists have shown that interactive complexity and tight coupling, as well as our limited understanding of system properties, make disasters “normal,” even with the best possible management and governance structures in place—and the real world is far from the best possible world.
• The problem of nuclear disaster compensation has often been marginalized by assurances that the probability of a disaster is very low. As a result, citizens have too often accepted plans for nuclear power because they are assured that a disaster is extremely unlikely, and citizens have not understood the possibly catastrophic consequences of a disaster. However, history shows that this assumption is flawed. Nuclear disasters have repeatedly occurred, and they will almost certainly continue to occur.
The tendency to explain each nuclear disaster as an anomaly—an unusual case of operator error, irresponsible governance, poor engineering, or all of the above—only serves to reinforce the misguided faith that nuclear disasters can be entirely prevented.
This leads to the second goal of a forum on nuclear disaster compensation issues: deliberations must be participatory—that is, they must include the ordinary citizens who have been impacted or are likely to be impacted by a nuclear disaster, as well as nuclear engineers, medical doctors, environmental scientists, and other experts who have specialized knowledge relevant to disasters. We recognize, though, that participatory governance of science and technology faces challenges, especially as experience with participatory governance shows that not all groups are able or permitted to contribute equally. Citizens who participate in decision-making about nuclear power are often economically disadvantaged. They do not “choose” to accept the risks of living and working in proximity to nuclear power and nuclear waste disposal. While those who work in the industry are eager for the jobs and economic opportunities that nuclear power and waste disposal are seen to offer, others are often constrained by financial and historical circumstances. Even when these citizens “participate” in nuclear decision-making, for example as rate-payers, they are rarely on equal footing with governments and corporations. The experts who play an outsized role in framing problems and solutions instead give citizens simple yes-or-no votes in otherwise complicated processes.
A truly participatory forum would recognize the extremely broad group of people who are affected by nuclear disasters and enable them to help frame problems and solutions. Nuclear disasters affect not only the people living close to nuclear facilities, but also everyone in the path of the fallout, which can spread around the entire globe. It affects the costs and reliability of electricity for all persons on the electrical power grid. And it affects the livelihood of agricultural workers and the supply of food that they provide. A participatory forum would also ensure that all of these citizens understand what they might lose in a nuclear disaster. The impacts of previous disasters must be fully visible to those considering accepting such risks. We can begin to create a more participatory forum by broadening conceptions of expertise to include forms of knowledge that have historically been marginalized in decision-making about nuclear power. This includes local knowledges about natural and built environments as well as economic practices and interdisciplinary knowledge about disaster response and recovery.
This leads to the third goal of a conversation about nuclear disaster compensation: it must be transnational because nuclear disasters do not respect national borders. Although methods for participatory governance have proliferated in recent years, most of these experiences have been confined to single nations or localities.2 Nonetheless, there are models for a transnational forum.3 Nongovernmental organizations often gather alongside intergovernmental meetings on climate change. A transnational conversation should include decision-makers and citizens from nations that are considering investing in nuclear power. Such nations should explicitly consider the risks of nuclear disasters in their planning. The costs of disaster compensation may go beyond compensating citizens in the state where a catastrophe occurs. Large-scale nuclear disasters may also impact neighboring nation-states, others in the international community, and international environments, such as the high seas. Again, current international agreements strongly limit compensation and responsibility for disasters.
In sum, we are calling for a dialogue that is anticipatory, participatory, and transnational to best enable wiser decisions about nuclear power and its many consequences. We invite your ideas about possible forums that can move the conversation forward.
• Yuki Ashina
• M. X. Mitchell
• Hirokazu Miyazaki
• Annelise Riles
• Sonja D. Schmid
• Rebecca Slayton
• Takao Suami
• Satsuki Takahashi
• Dai Yokomizo
________________________________________
1. See Downer 2011 ↩︎
2. See, e.g., Chilvers and Kearnes 2020, 347-380; Irwin 2006, 299-320; Laurent 2011, 649-666; and Lezaun, Marres, and Tironi 2017, 195-221 ↩︎
3. See Riles 2018, 175-185 for an articulation of a model of dialogue between experts and citizens.” ↩︎
BIBLIOGRAPHY
• Chilvers, Jason, and Kearnes, Matthew. “Remaking Participation in Science and Democracy.” Science, Technology, & Human Values 45, no. 3 (2020): 347-380.
• Downer, John. “‘737-Cabriolet’: The Limits of Knowledge and the Sociology of Inevitable Failure.” American Journal of Sociology 117, no. 3 (2011): 725-762.
• Irwin, Alan. “The Politics of Talk: Coming to Terms with the ‘New’ Scientific Governance.” Social Studies of Science 36, no. 2 (2006): 299-320.
• Laurent, Brice. “Technologies of Democracy: Experiments and Demonstrations.” Science and Engineering Ethics 17, no. 4 (2011): 649-666.
• Lezaun, Javier, Noortje Marres, and Manuel Tironi. “Experiments in Participation.” In Ulrike Felt, Rayvon Fouché, Clark A. Miller, and Lauren Smith-Doerr (eds). The Handbook of Science and Technology Studies. 4th edition. Pp. 195-221. Cambridge, MA, MIT Press, 2017.
• Riles, Annelise. 2018. Financial Citizenship: Experts, Publics, and the Politics of Central Banking. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.
Contents
• Preface — Hirokazu Miyazaki
• Report
o Introduction: Nuclear Compensation — Hirokazu Miyazaki
o The Compensation Scheme for the Nuclear Power Plant Disaster in Fukushima — Yuki Ashina, Satsuki Takahashi, Nobuyo Fujinaga, and Takao Suami
o Mapping Three Mile Island: Nuclear Liability and Compensation in the United States — M. X. Mitchell
o Nuclear Liability and Compensation Models after Chernobyl — Sonja D. Schmid
o Compensation for Transboundary Claims in Nuclear Disasters — M. X. Mitchell, Annelise Riles, and Dai Yokomizo
• Appendix One. Meridian 180 Forums
o Cry from the Scene — Naoki Kasuga, Cynthia Bowman, Grace Guo, Clark R. West, Tai-Li Lin, Grace Kuo, and Naoki Kamiyama
o A Grand Coalition for a Rise in the Consumption Tax is the Only Way — Yugi Genda, Naoki Sakai, Hirokazu Miyazaki, Shigeki Uno, Cynthia Bowman, Tom Ginsburg, and Annelise Riles
o Crisis of Relationality — Yugi Genda, Chika Watanabe, Shuhei Kimura, Anne Allison, Steffi Richter, Naoki Kasuga, Satsuki Takahashi, Shigeki Uno, Annelise Riles, Hiroyuki Mori, Hirokazu Miyazaki, John Whitman, Ghassan Hage, and Naoki Yokoyama
o Nuclear Energy and Climate Change — Hirokazu Miyazaki, Amy Levine, Satsuki Takahashi, Vincent Ialenti, Gabrielle Hecht, Haejoang Cho, Shuhei Kimura, Yuki Ashina, and Hiroyuki Mori
• Appendix Two. Interviews with Experts and Intellectuals
o The Role of Civil Society — Chika Watanabe
o The Role of Architects and Engineers — Shin Sakurai and Hirokazu Miyazaki
o Fukushima within the Configuration of the U.S. Cold War Strategy — Yuko Yamaguchi, Naoki Sakai, and Ichiyo Muto
o The Role of Lawyers in Nuclear and Natural Disasters — Yuki Ashina and Hirokazu Miyazaki
o The Role of Economists — Yuji Genda and Naruhito Cho
The Role of Civil Society
Chika Watanabe
This is the transcript of a presentation and an interview conducted in March 2012 as part of the Cornell East Asia Program symposium, “Japan’s Earthquake and Tsunami One Year Later: How Can We Bring Closure to Crises?”
CHIKA WATANABE “THE HISTORY OF INTERNATIONAL NGOS (INGOS) IN JAPAN”
Watch the video of the interview
The Role of Japanese International NGOs
The Japan NGO Center for International Cooperation (JANIC), a networking and information center for NGOs in Japan, identifies the first international NGOs (INGOs) in Japan as Christian medical groups that traveled to China in 1938 to provide care to refugees who were forced to flee by the Japanese military invasion (JANIC 2007). A couple of decades of inactivity followed due to the Second World War and its aftermath, but in the late 1950s, new aid activities began to emerge. By the 1960s, the first INGO-type organizations were established, such as the Organization for Industrial, Spiritual, and Cultural Advancement (OISCA, 1961), the Japanese Organization for International Cooperation in Family Planning (JOICFP, 1968), and the beginnings of the Asia Rural Institute (ARI or Ajia Gakuin) in 1960. The precursor to the government aid agency, the Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA), was also established in 1962 (under the name of Overseas Technical Cooperation Agency (OTCA)). In the 1970s, the growth of INGOs continued, particularly those with liberal and advocacy orientations. A number of them appeared in response to the large number of refugees from Indochina and Cambodia who arrived to Japan during this time period. Throughout the 1980s, development aid INGOs grew in number, as well as those addressing environmental, human rights, and other issues. The 1990s saw the greatest increase of INGOs, partly due to the impact of global calamities such as the wars in the former Yugoslavia and the Rwandan genocide, which raised public consciousness on the need for international aid interventions. The Kobe Earthquake of 1995 and the upsurge of volunteer activities afterwards also spurred the growth of nongovernmental and nonprofit organizations in general, particularly due to the creation of the 1998 Law to Promote Specified Nonprofit Activities (“NPO Law”), the first legal framework for nonprofits in Japan (Osborne 2003). This new law enabled groups to register as formal organizations, which facilitated their cooperation with other organizations and government agencies, the expansion of funding possibilities, and “a shift in state-society power balance” (Pekkanen 2003:53). Nevertheless, nonprofits in Japan remain operationally and financially small compared to Euro-American contexts: as of 2011, about half of the approximately 44,000 registered nonprofit organizations had an annual income of 50,000 USD or less (Cabinet Office 2013).
The late 1990s and early 2000s were also the beginning of professionalized emergency INGOs in Japan. In addition to INGOs that had been working with refugees in Southeast Asia since the 1970s and 1980s such as Shanti Volunteer Association (SVA), new organizations such as Japan Emergency NGO (JEN, 1994) and Peace Winds Japan (PWJ, 1996) appeared on the scene. These INGOs worked in war-torn countries such as the former Yugoslavia and Iraq, often in the midst of armed conflicts, and responded to natural disasters around the world. In 2000, Japan Platform was created out of the lessons learned in Kosovo, where Japanese INGOs realized that multi-lateral cooperation between NGOs, governments, the business community, media, and the academic community was essential for conducting effective aid activities. Thus, Japan Platform today is composed of members from NGOs, corporations, and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs who administer funds and resources that can be mobilized rapidly by member NGOs in times of disaster and emergency aid.
When a calamity strikes, the Japan Platform Board of Directors and INGO representatives meet within 24-48 hours, if not earlier. Interested domestic NGOs and INGOs submit proposals to conduct preliminary assessments and implement emergency relief activities, which are approved by the board (they are rarely rejected since consultations happen before decision-making). Funds are dispensed in a very short amount of time. Unlike Western-based INGOs such as World Vision and Save the Children, which tend to have extra funds for emergency situations, Japanese INGOs do not have extra resources that they can quickly tap into. Moreover, whereas other types of funds such as from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and corporations—the two biggest sources of funding for most Japanese INGOs—take time to process, the moneys available through Japan Platform has made rapid responses by Japanese INGOs possible. Although some observers are concerned about the links between corporate interests and NGO activities that became visible in the wake of the 2011 disasters (e.g., Robertson 2012), it is a fact that without such financial backing, either through or outside of Japan Platform, professional nongovernmental aid organizations in Japan would not be able to exist or respond to emergency situations. Moreover, if one follows the collaboration between corporations and INGOs ethnographically, it becomes clear that it is not simply the government and corporations that are setting the humanitarian agenda. Humanitarian and disaster aid in Japan is made up of a set of exchanges and deliberations that move between local people's concerns and state interests in complex ways.
Overview of JEN
Japan Emergency NGO (JEN) was established in 1994 in the midst of the armed conflicts in the former Yugoslavia. It began as a consortium of different Japanese INGOs to respond to the refugee crisis and other humanitarian needs in this region, but it eventually became one organization and expanded to projects worldwide. As of 2013, it conducts relief and rehabilitation efforts in Afghanistan, Iraq, Sri Lanka, Pakistan, South Sudan, Haiti, Japan, and Jordan for Syrian refugees. Its projects are funded by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and other government schemes, corporate donors such as UNIQLO and Ajinomoto, the UN, and individual donations. Although JEN is not a religious NGO, the Buddhist-based new religion, Risshō Kōsekai, has also been a long-term supporter, given the religious group's participation in the initial consortium in the former Yugoslavia.
JEN's activities include infrastructural projects such as the reconstruction of schools, but it focuses mainly on “soft aid” activities that enable “efforts [to restore] a self-supporting livelihood both economically and mentally” among people affected by conflicts and disasters. A characteristic activity was, for instance, a workshop for fishermen in Sri Lanka to make and mend fishing nets after the tsunami of 2004, which took away their livelihoods, family members, and even entire communities. Instead of handing out already-made fishnets, JEN provided the raw materials so that the fishermen could engage in an activity that helped them regain their sense of self-reliance. The men were able not only to create the material resources necessary to restart their fishing activities, but also to use the workshops as spaces of healing. To this end, JEN hired social workers to facilitate these activities and encourage conversations that might help the fishermen process their losses and strengthen relationships with their neighbors. All of JEN's activities aim in these ways to encourage both economic self-reliance and psychosocial care.
Although JEN's projects are usually outside of Japan, the organization has also conducted activities in Japan. The first was a rehabilitation project in Niigata, an area north of Japan, after the Niigata Chūetsu Earthquake in 2004. JEN focused on a small aging community in a rural area and sought to revitalize the community by tackling the effects of the earthquake, but more importantly, the long-term problem of depopulation. JEN and the villagers worked together to implement volunteer programs that brought urban participants to help with agricultural and other labor, and to encourage villagers that their village was worth keeping alive. Six years later, young people and families had moved to the village. The villagers decided to manage the volunteer and other revitalization programs on their own. Thus, in 2010, JEN closed its Niigata project, although it continues to maintain relations with the villagers. When the March 2011 disaster happened, people from this community were among the first to contact JEN to offer their help in the devastated areas of Tohoku.
Japanese INGOs in Tohoku after March 11, 2011
When the earthquake struck on March 11, 2011, Japanese INGOs quickly took action. Unlike in most other disaster situations in the developing world where the United Nations coordinates relief activities, in this case, the Japanese government facilitated nongovernmental and volunteer aid activities through the quasi-governmental Volunteer Centers of the Social Welfare Council (Shakai Fukushi Kyōgikai, or shakyō). Unfortunately, the administrators at the municipal and shakyō offices were themselves victims of the disaster, and the coordination of the various groups and individuals proved to be a challenge. As Leo Bosner, a former employee of the US government's Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) found in his research in Japan in early 2012, prefectural and municipal officials were expected to be the first responders to disasters, but they received almost no training in disaster response (Bosner 2012). Furthermore, he points out that “the government did not appear to have a plan for incorporating NPOs [nonprofits] or donation management into the disaster response” and it relied too heavily on news reports rather than information from on-the-ground specialists at disaster sites. This led to the misallocation of relief items, and in some cases, the government's rejection of goods that were in fact much needed on the ground. Bosner also found that the actual experts in disaster aid were found outside of the government agencies in charge of managing the response, such as in INGOs and the fire service, but the government did not draw on their expertise.
Staff members at INGOs such as JEN had ample knowledge managing and implementing large-scale disaster aid projects. However, seen in the same rubric as “volunteer groups,” the government relegated them to simple activities such as mud and debris removal through the Volunteer Centers. Thus, there was a general sense among INGO aid workers that their programmatic expertise from years of experience worldwide was not used to the fullest extent, echoing Bosner's findings.
Despite these challenges, as soon as the disaster hit, JEN staff prepared to go to the most severely affected regions of Sendai and Ishinomaki city along the coast in Miyagi prefecture. Although there were some delays due to the sudden threat of radiation coming from the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Plant, staff members from Tokyo were in the region by the thirteenth, distributing food, clothes, and other needed items identified through their assessments. On March 25, 2011, JEN established its Ishinomaki office and hired local staff members who have since been conducting a variety of livelihood assistance and other rehabilitation projects. As time has passed, JEN staffers have been able to cultivate trusting relationships with local communities, enabling the implementation of mid- and long-term projects beyond the tasks allowed by the government. Programs involving volunteers have also continued, similar to the Niigata projects that aim to address wider problems of rural depopulation in conjunction with disaster rehabilitation efforts.
The interview that follows is an excerpt from a conversation that took place at the JEN office in Tokyo with the Secretary General, Ms. Keiko Kiyama, in January 2012.
For more information please visit: www.jen-npo.org.
References
Bosner, Leo 2012 Can Japan Respond Better to its Next Large Disaster? The Asia-Pacific Journal 10(21)(1). Electronic document, http://www.japanfocus.org/-Leo-Bosner/3754, accessed May 25, 2012.
Cabinet Office 2013 “Let's Get to Know NPOs (Statistical Information)” [NPO wo shirou: tōkei jyōhō]. Electronic document, https://www.npo-homepage.go.jp/about/npodata.html, accessed December 8, 2013.
Japan NGO Center for International Cooperation (JANIC) 2007 NGO dēta book 2006: sūji de miru nihon no NGO [Data Book on NGOs 2006: Japanese NGOs Seen Through Numbers]. Tokyo: JANIC.
Osborne, Stephen, ed. 2003 The Voluntary and Non-Profit Sector in Japan: The Challenge of Change. London: RoutledgeCurzon.
Pekkanen, Robert 2003 “The Politics of Regulating the Non-Profit Sector” In The Voluntary and Non-Profit Sector in Japan: The Challenge of Change. Stephen Osborne, ed. Pp.53-75. London: RoutledgeCurzon.
INTERVIEW WITH KEIKO KIYAMA, INTERVIEWED BY CHIKA WATANABE
Note: In January 2012, when this interview took place, JEN had finished their work with emergency relief and had begun working on providing livelihood assistance and the renewal of community events like tea and coffee hours (ochakkonomi in local dialect) in the temporary housing established after the March 11disaster. At present, in the spring of 2015, they are involved in psychosocial care for children, livelihood assistance, and community revitalisation.
Could you tell us a little bit about the work JEN is doing in Tohoku?
On March 11, when the earthquake and tsunami struck, our first thought was that we had to get help out there. Naturally, we were also affected by the disaster, but on the eleventh we found ourselves busy getting things ready. The first group went out on the thirteenth. In the first few months, in what's known as emergency relief, the support we provided was primarily essential supplies and helping out with things. And by things I mean, for instance, dispatching volunteers to help clear the mud the tsunami had caked on to houses, that kind of thing. That's the kind of emergency relief with which we started, but now things are moving in the direction of getting things back to normal.
JEN also does work overseas. Has that been different to what you've been doing in Japan, or have they been similar?
They've been surprisingly similar. I felt the same way when we were providing relief during the Chūetsu Earthquake in Niigata in 2004 —that what we do overseas can be put to use domestically as is. When we go overseas, the assumption is that the cultures are different, so we should not impose our own ideas onto people. I believe that, since we are people who will eventually leave, success means being able to withdraw aid as soon as possible. When you try to achieve sustainable results, based on the idea that you're going to eventually leave, the important question is how to promote activities based on local people's agency and ownership. All of this was the case in Niigata, and it is now what we are attempting in Tohoku. While we're focusing on Ishinomaki in Miyagi at the moment, the environment in which the people of Ishinomaki originally lived and the one we lived in is different, and the culture that had developed there over time is different as well. Obviously we speak Japanese, but there are dialects and words particular to the region, and even if we get to talk to people, if we only do this while thinking about the kind of lives we lead in Tokyo, we'll never understand their needs. In the sense that the support we offer is to get people to become more actively involved, I think the work we've been doing overseas to make people self-reliant is exactly the same as what we're doing in Japan.
Is the earthquake in Tohoku comparable to the one in Chūetsu?
Obviously in Chūetsu the people the earthquake hit were severely affected, but in terms of the region and areas, I think the damage was more limited there than in this case. If there hadn't been a tsunami following the earthquake, I don't think as many people would have died as have at present. So many things have been damaged by both the earthquake and the tsunami that, in terms of degree and scale, the damage is different. But as the individuals involved are precisely that, individuals, even though in Ishinomaki alone almost ten thousand people have died and others remain unlocated, they each have a family. In terms of one-to-one involvement, I think they're the same.
When someone feels positive, it affects someone else, and I think that getting the entire region back on its feet is what happens when you make all the people inside it feel that way. Naturally, there are cases where people feel better because the area has been revitalised and such, but I think it's important to focus on both. It's obviously pointless to try and make all of Ishinomaki feel better, but by giving people back their lives, one person at a time, as things ease up, it eventually starts to spread, and I think that's when a town starts to get its spirit back.
What exactly do you think you do to make those affected by the disaster feel better?
While it pains me to say it, I don't think what those affected by the disaster lost is something they will ever get back. For the families that have lost loved ones, sad as it is, they'll never see them again. But even as you hold on to that sadness as you move forward, if you can get your hope for the future back, and if you can feel like you're not alone in this, you also feel like maybe you can keep on going.
Which isn't to say that there's nothing to be done, and we just give up on the people whose houses were washed away. But those people themselves have given up on the idea that there is anything to be done, and if they don't look toward something else, they'll remain trapped in that grief forever. They can't take the next step so long as they're stuck wondering why they had to lose these things. Because it's important for these people to accept this themselves, to come to terms with it, efforts have to be made that provide them with something that makes this possible. While JEN has, for a very long time, been talking about “psychosocial care and supporting self-reliance,” we believe that a certain amount of emotional recovery is an important prerequisite for the process of becoming self-reliant. In order to bring about that kind of recovery, it's necessary to feel that you've come together with the people around you to accomplish something. And that comes about when you feel that you are truly connected with other people, when you feel that other people understand the grief you're going through, that kind of connection. While people have been talking a lot about recovering kizuna for this sense of connection, we believe that it's absolutely vital that people get back this connection or kizuna as a psychosocial one.
There are, for example, movements in the temporary housing for this purpose. Particularly in the case of Ishinomaki, as the number of people affected by the disaster is exceptionally high, this meant that even the people at the municipal office were in an extraordinary state of disarray. It was terrible. While it would have been great for people who had become close in the evacuation zones to be relocated together when moved into temporary housing, there just weren't enough people at the city office to arrange it. And as a result, the relocation of people from the evacuation zones was all done by lottery to decide where each individual household should go. In these really small towns and cities, you want to listen to people who only move in community units and move them in those units, but in Ishinomaki this wasn't possible and the people who were moved into temporary housing together didn't know each other. Obviously, they said hello to each other, but it's part of the local culture to be unassuming, and we've heard that even if people wanted to invite someone over for tea, they were worried that it might seem like they were taking the upper hand in the situation. And so, JEN invited everyone to have a cup of tea together at an ochakkonomi, and they all came drink tea and introduce themselves in a more formal setting. After that they started going over to each other's houses, and then people became friends, and could share what was weighing them down. It seems that it was a matter of people meeting up to share what was getting to them.
I see. But the areas affected are very large, and there are limits to what a single person or group can do. How do you continue your work given those limitations?
That's also something that's been on my mind. That we're dealing with such wide area, with this many people, that it's this severe. If it had escalated gradually then people would have been prepared for it, but it happened so quickly that it ended up being the way it has. Everything changed overnight. And so we had to rush, because we wanted to support more people, quickly, over a wider area. We know that's not really possible. But I had a teacher once who used to tell me whenever I was struggling with a dilemma, “Light up even a corner of the world.” Whenever I heard this, I thought that there was truth in it, this idea of ‘lighting up even a corner of the world.’ When you want to help support people in the way they live their lives, a portion of time and materials is necessary. My little story isn't going to heal anyone's heartbreak but, even if we assume that it could, this would still only be limited to a certain number of people in a given area, and after I told them this story, they would all go to their own homes, where the same kind of life is waiting for them. If we assume there is a limit to the amount of people it can affect, even if measures are taken to change the way people do things, then there's nothing to do but do what you're doing now, with all your heart and soul, and believe that this will have a ripple effect. You do it all the while thinking that when you meet another person, that nothing exists apart from them. You do it that way, person by person, politely, properly. You light up even just a corner of the world. Even if, in this vast darkness, I can light up only one little corner of the world, then someone can carry on from there, in the space lit up, and can light up another corner. Convinced that if we kept it up then before we knew it things would light up, we stopped being in such a rush to fix things.
What can you do exactly to expand the effects of this ‘lighting up a corner of the world’?
What's important for JEN is, like we say, whether or not the project is about supporting self-reliance. Can the people involved in that project establish JEN's three watchwords for self-reliance, can they involve themselves in the community, and can they come up with solutions? This is actually something the people can do themselves, but because they find themselves in situations that make them think they can't, JEN is involved. I don't think the really big issues are ones that can be solved. But if you take those big issues and break them down, they become a more manageable size. You take what you can, bit by bit, and if people come along who feel like they can really solve one of the big issues, the community starts to work alongside them.
One example of this is fishing nets. We're giving support with fishing equipment right now, but it isn't just a matter of just handing it over, like ‘here you go,’ but of making sure that you show people how to use the equipment and how they can use it to get their livelihoods back while also trying to form a bond with them. If people's emotional state is any worse than it is already, then even if they want to really make a go of it with the fishing then there will still be days where nothing goes right, and days when they're just miserable. You have good days, and you have bad, but to have to suffer from a bad catch or a day when the fish won't bite, after you've already lost everything in the tsunami, makes people tend to give up and there's no point in them going on. This loss of self-confidence, this giving up, isn't something you can stop, but if people have strong bonds, if they have kizuna and people to look after them, and if you can make sure that they have friends, then I think it's easier for people to get back on their feet. And so it's not a matter of just giving fishing equipment, but annoying people by asking whether or not everyone's using the equipment they've been given together, or asking people to hurry up so we can eat their oysters. We end up being quite harsh. We expect people to engage with it out of a kind of resentment they feel toward us, a kind of, ‘I'll get you something to eat since you're bugging me so much’ attitude. We try to involve ourselves with the idea that, since they're the ones who grow the oysters, we're just people who want to eat them. For a start, we don't know the first thing about growing oysters; people have to develop methods of producing a better product by themselves, because they're the ones who have, from the get-go, been capable of doing this. And even when we do get to eat them, if the oysters aren't good, we have to just come out and say it. When we say it, we get people to try harder to produce something better. In the end, when they've managed to produce something truly delicious and they cry tears of joy, maybe it's because they realize that there was a reason for all the work they put into it. And when you put something wonderful out there that people all over the world can make use of, then the scope of the future you see in front of you sort of pans into widescreen. At first circulation comes back within Japan itself, and as a result that might lead to expanding globally. We are accompanists, and our partner performs the main role. It's important to us how our partner put things in motion, and when they do that and things go well, we're happy. To take joy out of this, or to put it in everyday terms, the joy we get out of something like being able to experience many successes, is, I think, connected very much to a sense of independence. That kind of involvement is something that can only be done with a limited number of people. When people keep that up, when they do things because they take an interest in it, the people around them begin to do the same. It's a small level of involvement, but still, I think it sets the light in motion.
Speaking of light, the impression I have of what JEN is doing in Ishinomaki is that the local staff take centre stage and are doing a variety of jobs shared between them. I thought that that kind of thing might be the reason why people are starting do so well there.
JEN began with the former Yugoslavia. There were no jobs for refugees and so we started from the idea of taking on as many refugees as possible. We didn't consciously do this to make them feel better. But we realized that just the very fact of being made refugees is extremely psychologically damaging. Through their work at JEN, these people began to do things for other people. That's what draws out psychological strength. What I'm always surprised at is that at the interview stage these people are completely depressed, pale, have no ambition, but after one or two months working at JEN, they begin to look much better. That is, just as you're saying, in doing things for other people, their own lives begin to light up. Because those affected are also emotionally devastated, what I want, and what JEN is actively devoted to achieving, is for them to start to feel better by doing things for other people.
There's still a world of possibilities out there for young and old alike, and it makes me happy if we can help draw those possibilities out. The ideal is that people start to get back on their feet while thinking that they've been given nothing by JEN. Obviously, we do a wide range of things, but I'm inclined to think that it's the people who can think to themselves that they're getting nothing from us that are probably most self-reliant. Because the support JEN provides isn't the kind that's given, but one that supports, the shortest way to get survivors to be self-reliant is to have a variety of voluntary projects that give them the sense that they're doing everything themselves. Even if you take people somewhere and have them to experience something, and they end up thinking this way on their own, then of course people will go, but it's not a matter of telling people they should go, but of putting it out there in a way that tells them that they should go if they might be interested in what's there. And, when people want to have a look at something because they find it interesting, and then decide that they want to do this thing or that thing, and can act on it, then this means that though the impetus may have come from JEN, the person decides for themselves what they want to do. They have a sense of ownership in what they go on to do. If they feel that sense of propriety, it's sustainable, they change things, and there's a high rate of success.
And what would you like to do following on from this?
While I really don't like the division of people who support and people who are supported, what we who have the opportunity to provide support have to remember is how necessary it is to have local people be in charge. At the same time, obviously getting things back to the way they were is what we try to do, but these places were already in the process of depopulation. Even if we could restore, 100%, how things were, all that lies beyond that is further depopulation. And so, if the local people have to hope for something, I think, fundamentally, that it would be better if they hoped to work together for a different future. They say that there are ‘three things’ necessary for village renewal — young people, outsiders, and idiots. Which means that you need the reckless energy of young people and the different viewpoint of outsiders, along with the blissful ignorance of idiots. If we can put those three things out there in some form, I think the end result is village renewal.
“Build back better” is a phrase used a lot in the world of emergency aid, but in places originally underpopulated, if you just build it back it's not going to get any better. The original meaning of build back better is to build a better place than before, but this unfortunately doesn't extend to making it an economically and materially better place. And that being the case, we outsiders think that there's nothing to do but create a different future. But to tell people whose heads and hearts weren't looking for it that now is the time for change, and that now, when people have been emotionally devastated by the disaster, that we should do something new, is extremely difficult. This is precisely the reason why local people must have an active role, and why I also think it's important to support people being able to shape their own future. What kind of future we can make together, for these places damaged by the disaster that have been emotionally and physically weakened, is the challenge facing those who support and those who are supported, the challenge facing everyone. And yet if we don't do this then nothing will change, and all that's left is hope. It's inconceivable for us to do nothing just because it's difficult, and so it's important that we take things one step at a time.
You often hear people in Tokyo say that disaster is a chance, and sometimes it feels as if people don't actually understand how difficult the situation is. I get the sense that maybe the fact that there are struggles, and that the local people are frustrated, is being ignored. I feel like maybe what's needed isn't necessarily just connections or kizuna... but what do you think?
I feel like it's the same as environmental issues. And incidentally, I think the expression “being kind to the earth” is a misunderstanding; we are alive because the earth is kind to us. Putting up with insufferable circumstances and living in horrible conditions doesn't necessarily mean that you have a keen sense of the environment. But if you're earth-friendly because you really want to do be, and because it's fun, then what you get out of that is people who are actually ecological, and a way of going about things that doesn't destroy the environment.
At the moment, people are being divided into those who support, and those who are supported, which means those ‘poor survivors’ of the disaster. But, as has been said before, if you take the country known as Japan as a single body, when the left hand is injured and no longer works, but the right still functions, it feels as if the whole body is healthy just because the right is. The entire system of Japan could only be put in motion so long as Eastern Japan was a part of that body. If it's damaged to the extent it has been, this doesn't mean there's no effect felt elsewhere, even economically. It's not true that just because the right hand is undamaged that nothing has happened. What the left has been holding on to comes to be placed on the right, and to think that this means the right hand has become more active in response is also a mistake. This is precisely why sustainable renewal of Eastern Japan is beneficial for the whole country. And so it's just not a matter of kizuna or ganbare, of connection or giving it your all, but of what we can do ourselves. Those of us in Tokyo, people in Kyushu — I want us to think about what we can do.
And I don't think this is just the case for Japan. If we expand this idea, that somewhere out there in the world there are people like this, dying, then you realize that it doesn't make any sense. You come to imagine people living together on the same planet. I think we can give more than a passing thought to imagining that we can change the way things are now, which tells us that just by virtue of being born in a poor country, people have to live with heartbreak. The idea that you can convert anything into money and put a price on things is a bad habit. Maybe the chance we have is to change that.
The people who live in Tohoku as well as the people who were there sightseeing, aren't finding any joy or value in something that's purely monetary through volunteering. It's a difficult thing to express, because it can't be converted into money. I think that though many people understand that this is a difficult thing to express, they just pretend that they don't. If this weren't the case, that people find something that isn't money in the volunteer effort, then the idea that so many would take pleasure out of volunteering in such a terrible situation, or would exhaust themselves for other people while putting up with bad food, would make no sense. People enrich their own lives by doing things for other people, for that support to be more direct makes the people who receive it happier too. Think every day about what you can do for someone far off, try doing what you can. Even if you fail, when you get it in your head to do it differently next time and try harder, I think that can change a person and society as a whole. I think that's caused this change in values.
In the wake of the present incident, a lot of things have been talked about under the bracket of ‘Japan.’ How do you think we can think about relief and this disaster from an international perspective?
In terms of the flow of information, and economically, Japan isn't isolated in the slightest. And so, if you look as Japan as a single person, it may seem like a matter of the left hand being injured, but if you look at the whole world as a person with a single body, Eastern Japan, and Somalia too, are injured. Haiti is still injured. The entire body is riddled with wounds. So in supporting places that we're involved in, first by using what we're directly involved with to positively influence the people around us, it's my hope that those people influence other people who influence other people, and that goes on to change the world. That's why, in that sense, I think Eastern Japan has become a wakeup call for a lot of people living in Japan. Looked at on a global scale, given that it was a large disaster that occurred in a developed country, I wonder if it hasn't been an important chance for an awareness to spread out through the developed world.
Everyone wants the people close to them to be happy. In English people often say, “I wish the best for you and your loved ones.” Who are these “loved ones”? They may be your family. Maybe your friends as well. The people who matter to your friends should also be important to you. And so, when you speak about just how far out your nearest and dearest are, then isn't a matter of that term extending to the entire world?
Is there anything else you'd like to add?
I feel like for relief, a lot of it comes from the feeling that people want to do something, and a lot of support comes from the desire to give support in a way that makes someone else happy. Superficially, for instance, you could give someone a sweet to make them happy. But when everyone has sweets it's impossible to eat all of them. In that case, I'd like people to think about what would make people happy whether or not they got a sweet or not. Maybe it's more the case that these people want to give other people sweets. This means it's not a matter of wanting to give, but of wanting to receive. That's the kind of support I want to give. The idea of getting to eat oysters I talked about earlier is part of that support. In other words, it's important to provide a role for people so that they can feel like they're doing something. There is no one who can't be useful, but, when they lose their faith in themselves, or are feeling down, then they get convinced that that's the case. There are many people who have lost their confidence simply from the experience of losing pretty much everything they had managed to get, loss of that degree. People might feel like, “Oh, I used to buy this and that by myself, with money I saved and put aside myself, but now I have to be given everything.” So in order to get people to believe in themselves again, it's important to support without giving. It's support, but it's a strict kind of support. Presenting people with requests like, “Do this for me, please” — I think that's probably a good way to go about giving aid.
The Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Plant Accident, Ten Years On: Progress, Lessons and Challenges
This year marks 10 years since the Great East Japan Earthquake on 11 March 2011 and the subsequent Fukushima Daiichi nuclear accident. On this occasion, the Nuclear Energy Agency (NEA) will launch a report that surveys the aftermath, lessons, and achievements in Japan and the global nuclear community in the decade since the accident. The report also analyses the current challenges stemming from the accident, and makes policy recommendations to the international nuclear community in nine different areas.
The NEA will host an expert roundtable discussion on 3 March 2021 to present its new report, review the effects of the accident and reflect on future perspectives. The discussion will be chaired by NEA Director-General William D. Magwood, IV.
Discussants
• Claire Cousins, Chair, International Committee for Radiation Protection (ICRP)
• Ingemar Engkvist, Chief Executive Officer, World Association of Nuclear Operators (WANO)
• Olivier Gupta, Director General, the Nuclear Safety Authority (Autorité de Sûreté Nucléaire – ASN)
• Richard Meserve, Senior of Counsel, Covington & Burling, LLP, and former Chairman of the United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC)
• Hajimu Yamana, President, the Nuclear Damage Compensation and Decommissioning Facilitation Corporation (NDF)
• Rosa Yang, EPRI Fellow, the Electric Power Research Institute (EPRI)
• Mike Weightman, Consultant; former Chief Inspector of Nuclear Installations and Chief Executive Officer, the United Kingdom Office for Nuclear Regulation (ONR)
Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Plant Accident, Ten Years On
Progress, Lessons and Challenges
https://www.oecd-nea.org/jcms/pl_56742/fukushima-daiichi-nuclear-power-plant-accident-ten-years-on
Much has been learnt in the ten years since the Great Eastern Japan Earthquake and the subsequent accident at the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Plant, but significant challenges still remain.
This report presents the current situation at the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Plant and the responses by Japanese authorities and the international community since the accident. It will assist both policymakers and the general public to understand the multi-dimensional issues stemming from the accident. These include disaster recovery, compensation for damages, nuclear safety, nuclear regulation, radiation protection, plant decommissioning, radioactive waste management, psycho-social issues in the community and societal resilience.
Building on two previous reports released by the OECD Nuclear Energy Agency in 2013 and 2016, the report examines the plant’s future, that of the affected region and population, as well as outlining areas for further improvement and how the international community can help.
Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Plant Accident, Ten Years On: Progress, Lessons and Challenges
NEA No. 7558
Much has been learnt in the ten years since the Great Eastern Japan Earthquake and the subsequent accident at the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Plant, but significant challenges still remain.
This report presents the current situation at the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Plant and the responses by Japanese authorities and the international community since the accident. It will assist both policymakers and the general public to understand the multi-dimensional issues stemming from the accident. These include disaster recovery, compensation for damages, nuclear safety, nuclear regulation, radiation protection, plant decommissioning, radioactive waste management, psycho-social issues in the community and societal resilience.
Building on two previous reports released by the OECD Nuclear Energy Agency (NEA) in 2013 and 2016, the report examines the plant's future, that of the affected region and population, as well as outlining areas for further improvement and how the international community can help.
Foreword
The purpose of the OECD Nuclear Energy Agency (NEA) is to foster co-operation among its member countries and many partners around the world to advance policy, safety, technology, and science related to nuclear technology. The NEA serves as a forum for sharing and analysing information and experience; supports the development and maintenance of knowledge and the development of human resource capacities; and provides policy analyses relevant to nuclear energy. The NEA has supported its members in understanding and responding to new developments in the nuclear field for more than 60 years. Typically, this work involves addressing changes in technology and policy; and often it involves absorbing operating experiences related to nuclear facilities around the world. The 11 March 2011 accident at the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Plant is but one example, but it is an experience with significant global policy and regulatory impact. The NEA published reports on the accident in 2013 (The Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Plant Accident: OECD/NEA Nuclear Safety Response and Lessons Learnt) and in 2016 (Five Years after the Fukushima Daiichi Accident: Nuclear Safety Improvements and Lessons Learnt). Those mainly discuss safety improvements and legal matters. This new report covers more comprehensively the effects of the accident and future perspectives. It provides information about the achievements of the international community and the NEA, gives analyses on current challenges and suggests future activities of international programmes of co-operation. As the work of decommissioning the power station and remediating radiological effects and socio-economic impacts on the affected areas continues, there are many areas for international communities to learn, assist Japan and support each other. This report is intended to provide clear information to policy makers involved in providing clean energy, a clean environment and healthy societies through the peaceful use of nuclear energy, as well as any member of the general public wishing to engage and understand the accident and its aftermath. William D. Magwood, IV Director-General Nuclear Energy Agency
Acknowledgements This report was prepared under the overall guidance of Mr William D. Magwood IV, Director-General of the Nuclear Energy Agency (NEA). The NEA wishes to express its gratitude to the following principal authors of the contents of this report: Dr Len Creswell (United Kingdom), Dr Randall Gauntt (United States), Mr Victor M. McCree (United States) and Dr Mike Weightman (United Kingdom). The NEA team of experts was led by Mr Nobuhiro Muroya, NEA Deputy Director-General, with contributions from Mr Shin Morita, Senior Advisor to the NEA Deputy Director-General, Ms Yeonhee Hah, Head of the Division of Radiological Protection and Human Aspects of Nuclear Safety (RP-HANS), Ms Ximena Vásquez-Maignan, Head of the Office of Legal Counsel (OLC), Dr Tatiana Ivanova, Head of the Division of Nuclear Science (SCI), Ms Véronique Rouyer, Head of the Nuclear Safety Technology and Regulation Division (SAF), Ms Rebecca Tadesse, Head of the Radioactive Waste Management Division (RWMD), Dr Edward Lazo, Deputy Head of RP-HANS, Mr Andrew White, Deputy Head of SAF, Dr Jacqueline Garnier-Laplace, Deputy Head of RP-HANS, Dr Martin Brandauer (RWMD), Dr Didier Jacquemain (SAF), Ms Florence Maher (RP-HANS) and Dr Yuji Kumagai (SAF). Ms Claire Mays and Ms Valentine Poumadère served as editors of the final version. Mr Laurie Moore, Ms Elisabeth Villoutreix and Ms Fabienne Vuillaume (Central Secretariat) were in charge of the production and layout of the report. The NEA also wishes to thank the following senior experts and nuclear leaders from around the world for their valuable insights and the generous time they spent in discussions with the team: Dr George Apostolakis (Head, Nuclear Risk Research Center of Japan [NRRC]), Dr Nobuhiko Ban (Commissioner of the Nuclear Regulation Authority of Japan [NRA] and Chair of the Working Group on Safety Culture of the Committee on Nuclear Regulatory Activities [CNRA]), Mr Michael Boyd (Director of the Center for Science and Technology in the US Environmental Protection Agency’s Radiation Protection Division and Former Chair of the Committee on Radiological Protection and Public Health [CRPPH]), Dr Claire Cousins (Chair of International Commission on Radiological Protection), Mr Roland DussartDesart (Retired Head of the Legal Service of the Belgian Ministry of Economy and Chair of the Nuclear Law Committee), Dr Toyoshi Fuketa (Chair of NRA), Mr Taro Hokugo (Director for Atomic Energy and International Affairs Bureau of Science, Technology and Innovation, Government of Japan Cabinet Office and Nuclear Law Committee Bureau member), Mr Toshio Kodama (President of Japan Atomic Energy Agency), Mr Tom Mitchell (Chair of the World Association of Nuclear Operators), Mr Ho Nieh (US Nuclear Regulatory Commission and Former Head of NEA SAF), Dr Jean Christophe Niel (Director General of the Institute for Radiological Protection and Nuclear Safety of France and Chair of the Committee on Safety of Nuclear Installations), Mr Akira Ono (Chief Decommissioning Officer of Tokyo Electric Power Company Holdings), Dr Kemal Pasamehmetoglu (Executive Director of the Versatile Test Reactor Project at the Idaho National Laboratory and Chair of the Nuclear Science Committee), Dr Thierry Schneider (Director of the Nuclear Protection Evaluation Center [CEPN] and Chair of CRPPH and of Expert Group on Recovery Management), Mr Tatsuya Shinkawa (Director-General for Nuclear Accident Disaster Response of the Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry), Ms Haidy Tadros (Director General, Directorate of Environmental and Radiation Protection and Assessment of Canadian Nuclear Safety Commission and Chair of the Committee on Decommissioning of Nuclear Installations and Legacy Management), Mr Petteri Tiippana (Director General of the Radiation and Nuclear Safety Authority of Finland and Chair of CNRA), Dr Hiroyuki Umeki (Executive Director of Nuclear Waste Management Organization of Japan and Chair of the Radioactive Waste Management Committee), Mr William E Webster (Chair of Japan Nuclear Safety Institute), Prof Hajimu Yamana (President of the Nuclear Damage Compensation and Decommissioning Facilitation Corporation) and Dr Rosa Yang (EPRI Fellow, Electric Power Research Institute).
Executive summary
On 11 March 2011, Japan was struck by a massive earthquake, which initiated a tsunami that inundated a large portion of the east coast of Japan. The tsunami caused significant devastation and loss of life. The tsunami also led to a severe accident at the Tokyo Electric Power Company (TEPCO) Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Plant. Post-accident analyses have verified that the radiation from the accident has not led to any direct impact on human health. However, the health and well-being of more than 150 000 people living in surrounding areas was affected to different degrees (including some early deaths) as a result of evacuations from the area due to both the tsunami and the nuclear accident, lack of access to health care or medicines, stress-related problems, and other causes. The accident also caused disturbance to the daily life of many people and businesses and other activities. In the immediate aftermath and during the ten years since the accident, Japanese authorities have undertaken very challenging work to address the on-site and off-site consequences, and rebuild the social and economic fabric of the areas impacted by the earthquake and resulting tsunami and the nuclear accident. The global community has come together with Japan to both offer assistance and draw lessons to further improve nuclear safety worldwide. This endeavour has been greatly facilitated by the openness of the Japanese government and industry leaders as well as the co-operation of international organisations, governments and companies. The present report, the third in a series of major studies on the aftermath of the Fukushima Daiichi accident by the Nuclear Energy Agency (NEA), surveys the research initiatives and the expanding knowledge and action made possible by such openness and co-operation. The operating reactors at the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power plant quickly and effectively shut down as designed when the earthquake struck on 11 March 2011. However, the tsunami generated by the earthquake inundated the site approximately 50 minutes later to devastating effect. Primary and auxiliary reactor cooling circuits and electrical power were lost. Over the course of three days the cores of Units 1, 2 and 3 (which had been in full operation before the earthquake) overheated and much of the nuclear fuel in the reactor cores melted. The high temperatures led to chemical reactions that released significant amounts of hydrogen gas, which exploded and caused structural damage to Units 1, 3 and 4 (the latter of which on 11 March was in a planned outage). The accident was categorised at Level 7 of the International Nuclear Event Scale due to high radioactivity releases. Addressing the considerable challenge of decommissioning the complex nuclear clean-up site, the Japanese government’s flexible Mid-and-Long-Term Roadmap reflects both the priority for safety and the implementation system. The 2019 (fifth) revision focusses on managing the contaminated water and the treated water stored on site and other radioactive waste, as well as on removal of both stored fuel and fuel debris. Environmental remediation is performed to allow wherever possible the safe return of the population to affected off-site areas; the decontamination in the Special Decontamination Area had been performed as planned by the end of March 2017, and the work in the Intensive Contamination Survey Area was completed in March 2018.12
Institutional shortcomings uncovered in the aftermath of the accident prompted the government of Japan to completely redesign its approach to nuclear regulation and oversight. It established the Nuclear Regulation Authority (NRA) and assured its organisational, cultural, financial and political independence. The NRA quickly established new regulatory requirements to assure the safe operation and improved resilience of Japanese facilities in the face of conceivable events. The NRA continues to learn and is currently adopting a new risk-informed oversight process whose implementation includes essential discussions and interactions with operators. Japan has also adapted or supplemented legislation as needed in order to enhance safety, emergency preparedness and the nuclear liability framework enabling compensation. At the international level too, much has been learnt. NEA projects supported by participating member countries and the government of Japan, as well as other NEA joint efforts, have delivered cross-cutting safety research. A common understanding of the accident has led to improved tools to support decommissioning and a better quantification and understanding of plant safety margins. Potential improvements have been identified in several areas such as fuel designs that are more tolerant of accidents and electrical power systems that are more robust. Comprehensive safety reviews were done across NEA countries to assess readiness for severe accident conditions, and have identified plant and process improvements to mitigate the potential impact of external hazards. As highlighted in the 2016 NEA report Five Years after the Fukushima Daiichi Accident: Nuclear Safety Improvements and Lessons Learnt, many such measures have been implemented. To address near-term challenges in handling very low-level post-accident radioactive waste, the NEA examined how to develop a complex waste characterisation and categorisation process. NEA activities have also focussed on post-accident recovery management, including balancing decisions in radiological protection, as an important pillar of ensuring public health and well-being. Human aspects of nuclear safety, such as regulatory safety culture and broader stakeholder involvement in decision making, have been a significant focus of NEA activities. This report details the range of such initiatives and the lessons learnt. The activities of other international organisations are acknowledged and referenced as well. Significant issues remain to be faced as Japan continues the difficult, long-term effort to clean up the Fukushima Daiichi site and revitalise the surrounding communities impacted by the earthquake and resulting tsunami and nuclear accident. Technical challenges concern, inter alia: fuel debris removal; decontamination methods; environmental remediation; and related waste issues. Regulatory and legal challenges include, inter alia: regulation under uncertainty; reinforcing institutional nuclear safety systems; legal preparedness; holistic optimisation decisions; and effective regulatory engagement with a broad range of stakeholders including licensees and the public. The ongoing task of rebuilding and revitalising communities and local economies should benefit from a guidance framework outlining a consensual process to facilitate recovery and enable the communities to develop greater societal resilience. Reflection and action will be needed on preserving intergenerational knowledge and experience, and also on clarifying ethical values and challenges. This report finds that significant progress was achieved by Japan in vigorously addressing the accident through actions and reforms at both the technical and institutional levels. With co-operation from the NEA and other international organisations, the technical understanding of the accident event has progressed significantly, thereby aiding all countries to improve safety and preparedness. Environmental, social, political and economic aspects, including safety culture, must be a continued focus if nuclear power is to play its part in addressing the world’s need for clean, safe, reliable energy. This report concludes by noting that the NEA will continue its strong support for the long process ahead to address the aftermath of the Fukushima Daiichi accident and continue developing knowledge that can be gleaned from the experience the accident has generated.
Recommendations are offered in nine areas, with advice on how to pursue and enhance: • effective and balanced regulatory transparency, openness and independence; • systematic and holistic approaches to safety; • participation in international development of decommissioning technologies; • well-planned waste management and disposal; • improvements to damage compensation practices; • stakeholder involvement and risk communication; • recognition of mental health impacts in protective action and recovery; • opportunities for economic redevelopment; and • knowledge management. These key areas highlight the many opportunities for Japan to provide important and needed leadership on the international level.
Introduction
On 11 March 2011, Japan was struck by a massive earthquake, which initiated a tsunami that inundated a large portion of the east coast of Japan. The tsunami caused massive devastation and approximately 20 000 people were killed or were declared missing. The tsunami also led to one of the most severe nuclear power site accidents in history, at the Tokyo Electric Power Company (TEPCO) Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Plant. Three of the station’s six reactors suffered core melts and the entire facility was severely damaged. The Great East Japan Earthquake, the tsunami, the nuclear accident, and the resulting release of radioactive material led local authorities to initiate an evacuation of approximately 150 000 people. By deposition, the radioactive releases contaminated a large area of both the Fukushima Prefecture and others. While post-accident analyses have verified that the radiation from the accident has not led to any direct impact on human health,1 the series of events impacted the well-being of individuals and the community, and the evacuation is reported to have resulted in early deaths from the lack of health care or medicines, stress-related problems, etc. (ICRP, 2016). After nine months, the immediate risks posed by the damaged reactors were brought under control by achieving cold shutdown of the facility. In the years since, Japanese authorities have undertaken very challenging work to address the on-site and off-site consequences, take forward the decommissioning of the site, conduct the remediation of the affected areas in the Fukushima Prefecture and neighbouring prefectures, and rebuild the social and economic fabric of the areas impacted by the earthquake, the tsunami and the nuclear accident. During and after the accident, the global community has come together with Japan to both offer any needed assistance and draw lessons to further improve nuclear safety worldwide. This endeavour has been greatly facilitated by the openness of the Japanese government and industry leaders as well as the co-operation of international organisations, governments and companies.
This is the third major report by the Nuclear Energy Agency (NEA) on the Fukushima Daiichi accident. In 2013, the NEA published its first report, “The Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Plant Accident” (NEA, 2013d). This document focused on the NEA’s and its member states’ immediate response to the accident. The second major NEA report, “Five Years after the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Plant Accident” (NEA, 2016b), discussed the measures taken or in progress in NEA member states to improve further the safety of nuclear facilities in line with the underlying principle of “continuous learning and improvement.”
All high-risk industries, including nuclear, strive to learn and improve from all experience. The accident at Fukushima Daiichi has highlighted the need to ensure the lessons learnt are broadly shared and addressed now and in the future. This report is intended to assist Japan’s recovery from the accident for a better future for all, and more generally enhance the safe use of nuclear energy worldwide. It summarises, in a ten-year retrospective: the circumstances of the accident, the initial response in Japan and worldwide, and the societal impact (Chapter 2); the current status of the Fukushima Daiichi site, including the progress on its decommissioning and the environmental remediation of the surrounding areas, the technical issues associated with these combined activities, and the wider social and political aspects (Chapter 3); the activities of the NEA, other international organisations and NEA member countries (Chapter 4); the global impact and lessons learnt (Chapter 5). Looking forward, Chapter 6 addresses further challenges and, finally, Chapters 7 and 8 identify conclusions and make policy recommendations.
This report, as did the other major reports, seeks to complement the work of other international and national organisations including the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and the World Association of Nuclear Operators (WANO) which have also contributed greatly to further understanding and safety improvements stemming from the accident at Fukushima Daiichi.
This report has been written using available information and the insights gained from interviews conducted with a broad group of experts and nuclear leaders in Japan and from around the world. While the report may be of interest to a wide range of individuals and organisations, including the general public, it is intended to be useful in particular to policy makers and leaders involved in assuring a healthy and safe society through the peaceful use of nuclear energy. Even more fundamentally, this report may assist those leading the rebuilding of society and communities after major catastrophic events, such as the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear accident, and in developing effective recovery plans.
1. The United Nations Scientific Committee on the Effects of Atomic Radiation (UNSCEAR) assessed radiation exposures of the public, workers and non-human biota that resulted from the accident at the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Plant. Findings, including discussion of health implications, were presented to the General Assembly of the United Nations in 2013 (UNSCEAR, 2014; (www.unscear.org/unscear/en/fukushima.html, accessed 22 October 2020). UNSCEAR has gone on to discuss more detailed analyses and new information that subsequently became available (UNSCEAR, 2015; 2016; 2017); a revised report is in preparation (UNSCEAR, forthcoming).
The International Conference on Recovery After Nuclear Accidents: Radiological Protection Lessons from Fukushima and Beyond was an on-line event organised by the International Commission on Radiological Protection (ICRP), hosted by Japan Atomic Energy Agency (JAEA), and in association with several Japanese, International, and other organisations.
The objective was to share experiences and lessons related to radiological protection aspects of recovery from the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear accident, the Chernobyl accident, and other events to improve international understanding of the current state of recovery in Japan, consider strategies that may accelerate recovery, and improve preparedness for recovery from possible future major nuclear accidents.
From 1 to 18 December 2020, attendees experienced 4 days of livestreamed presentations and panel discussions, and on-demand content including video presentations, posters, exhibits, and virtual tours.
Thanks to the support of the organisations listed below registration was free, enabling more than 2500 people from over 100 countries to participate.
(https://www.icrprecovery.org/about-eng)
Nuclear Safety and Security After Chernobyl and Fukushima: Lessons Learned and Forgotten
https://www.belfercenter.org/event/nuclear-safety-and-security-after-chernobyl-and-fukushima-lessons-learned-and-forgotten
RSVP REQUIRED
PAST EVENT
Wed., Mar. 3, 2021 - Fri., Mar. 5, 2021
The Project on Managing the Atom will host a three-day virtual conference March 3-5 to mark the 10th and 35th anniversaries, respectively, of the Fukushima Daiichi and Chernobyl nuclear disasters. Experts and officials from around the world will provide reflections on progress made in nuclear safety, security, and governance in the years after these accidents and highlight evolving challenges in these crucial areas. The conference will feature a special session with IAEA Director General Rafael Mariano Grossi.
The Project on Managing the Atom is proud to present this conference as part of its 25th year of activities.
DAY 3: Friday, March 5, 2021
8:30 am ET: Welcome
Aditi Verma, Stanton Nuclear Fellow, Project on Managing the Atom & International Security Program, Harvard Kennedy School
8:45-9:45 am: Are We Ready for the Unimaginable: Ensuring Nuclear Safety Post-Fukushima
Rumina Velshi, President and CEO, Canadian Nuclear Safety Commission
Moderator: Aditi Verma, Stanton Nuclear Fellow, Project on Managing the Atom & International Security Program, Harvard Kennedy School
9:45 am-11:15 am: Panel 5 — Nuclear Governance
Messaoud Baaliouamer, Executive Secretary, African Commission on Nuclear Energy
Kyoko Sato, Associate Director, Program in Science, Technology, and Society, Stanford University
Christer Viktorsson, Director General at Federal Authority for Nuclear Regulation, United Arab Emirates
Julius Weitzdörfer, Junior Professor in East Asian Law, University of Hagen
Moderator: Ali Ahmad, Research Fellow, Project on Managing the Atom and International Security Program, Harvard Kennedy School
11:15-11:30am: Break
11:30am-1:00pm: Roundtable on Nuclear Frontier Issues: At the Interface Between Technology and Societies
Climate Change and the Resilience of Nuclear Power Plants
Ali Ahmad, Research Fellow, Project on Managing the Atom and International Security Program, Harvard Kennedy School
The Future of Nuclear Technology Innovation
Rita Baranwal, Chief Nuclear Officer, Electric Power Research Institute
Nuclear Energy: The Need for Radical Innovation
Jacopo Buongiorno, TEPCO Professor of Nuclear Science and Engineering, Massachusetts Institute of Technology
Nuclear Accidents and Compensation
Hirokazu Miyazaki, Kay Davis Professor of Anthropology, Northwestern University
Multi-level Governance and Disaster Response
Malka Older, Faculty Associate, Arizona State University School for the Future of Innovation in Society
Moderator: Francesca Giovannini, Executive Director, Project on Managing the Atom, Harvard Kennedy School
1:00-1:30 pm: Conference Lessons Learned (And Not to Be Forgotten)
Matthew Bunn, James R. Schlesinger Professor of the Practice of Energy, National Security, and Foreign Policy, Harvard Kennedy School
Aditi Verma, Stanton Nuclear Fellow, Project on Managing the Atom & International Security Program, Harvard Kennedy School
drdavidlowryhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/05942986736046792589noreply@blogger.com4tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5177380912557235726.post-25388878851705296692021-03-01T03:07:00.001-08:002021-03-01T03:07:45.880-08:00Needed: nuclear action not just wordsLetter sent to The Guardian newspaper:
You report that shadow defence secretary John Healey told defence think tank RUSI that Labour’s commitment to the UK’s nuclear weapons a is “non-negotiable”( “Labour backs deterrent and Nato - Healey”, 26 February 2021; www.theguardian.com/politics/2021/feb/25/labour-to-state-non-negotiable-support-for-uks-nuclear-weapons) he also asserted “we want to see Britain doing more to lead efforts to secure strategic arms limitation and multilateral disarmament.”( https://labour.org.uk/press/john-healey-speech-at-rusi-on-labours-core-principles-on-defence-and-security/)
This would seem contradictory, as something cannot be both non- negotiable and negotiable in multilateral negotiations at once. Unless the non-negotiable refers to holding an unchangeable policy in respect of others in his own party who hold a different perspective, such as many of the signatories to the full page advert you carried don 27 February under the banner headline :Stop Trident.”
But Labour’s record on putting British nuclear weapons into multilateral nuclear disarmament talks is also miserable.
Under one of Mr Healey’s distant predecessors in a Labour government, the 190-odd nation multilateral nuclear non-proliferation treaty (NPT) was agreed in 1968.
Papers available in the National Archives in Kew show that earlier that year, on 23 January 1968, Fred (later Lord) Mulley, as the Labour Government's disarmament minister, addressed the plenary meeting of the UN Committee on Disarmament (UN CD) explaining why nations should sign up to the newly negotiated NPT, telling the ministerial delegations:
".. my government accepts the obligation to participate fully in the negotiations required by [NPT] Article VI and it is our desire that these negotiations should begin as soon as possible ... There is no excuse now for allowing a long delay to follow the signing of this treaty."
On 25 June 2007, Margaret Becket made a valedictory speech as Labour foreign Secretary at the annual Carnegie Endowment Non Proliferation conference in Washington DC, where she said “What we need is vision - a scenario for a world free of nuclear weapons,” adding” “For more than sixty years, good management and good fortune have meant that nuclear arsenals have not been used. But we cannot rely on history just to repeat itself.”
US Secretary of State Blinken told the UNCD on 22 February: “President Biden has made it clear: the United States has a national security imperative and a moral responsibility to reduce and eventually eliminate the threat posed by weapons of mass destruction.”(https://geneva.usmission.gov/2021/02/22/secretary-blinken-cd/).
We need multilateral action not just warm words.
drdavidlowryhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/05942986736046792589noreply@blogger.com2tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5177380912557235726.post-9135095073477216632021-02-23T09:26:00.005-08:002021-02-23T09:27:12.958-08:00COVID contracts and Conservative cronyismLetter submitted to <i>The Guardian</i> newspaper:
Your reporting of the unlawful way in which the Department for Health and Social Care (DHSC) has placed medical support contracts during the pandemic (“‘Friend’ of Hancock in inquiry over Covid work,” 22 Feb; “Hancock acted unlawfully by not publishing Covid contracts within 30 days, high court rules,” 20 Feb.) is really revealing only the tip of a much bigger iceberg of contract cronyism, and the lack of political accountability over them being awarded.
Last October it was revealed that DHSC had awarded the global firm Boston Consulting Group (BCG) a £10m contract on test and trace (“Consultants' fees 'up to £6,250 a day' for work on Covid test system,” 15 Oct.2020; https://www.theguardian.com/world/2020/oct/14/consultants-fees-up-to-6250-a-day-for-work-on-covid-test-system)
Green MP Caroline Lucas immediately (on 16 October) submitted a parliamentary question to Matt Hancock on this, asking inter alia, for the contract to be published, and three months later finally received a written answer from DHSC. (Parliamentary rules state ministers must answer within five working days).
Exasperated, on 11th November, nearly three weeks after asking her original question, Ms Lucas had asked Matt Hancock when he planned to answer the original question. Junior health minister, Edward Argar, replied on 30 November: “We take parliamentary scrutiny incredibly seriously and it is fundamentally important that hon. Members are provided with .. timely information.” He closed by adding her question would “ be answered as soon as possible.(https://questions-statements.parliament.uk/written-questions/detail/2020-11-11/114133).
At Prime Minister's questions on Wednesday 25 November (Hansard at Column 818), Boris Johnson pledged “ the publication of all the details of all the contracts.” (https://hansard.parliament.uk/commons/2020-11-25/debates/FA145A50-F2C7-45C7-8CEF-51F0B5AF23D3/Engagements).
A week later, Mr Argar appeared before the House of Commons Procedure Committee to explain why his department had been so late in answering correspondence from MPs and PQs (https://committees.parliament.uk/committee/126/procedure-committee/news/136919/committee-questions-minister-on-department-of-health-performance-in-answering-parliamentary-questions/), telling the committee there were some 1500 written PQs that were still late being answered by Health ministers. The average delay peaked at 14.8 days in October, it rose to 20 days in November, and by early December had dropped again 13.3 days (https://committees.parliament.uk/oralevidence/1405/html/)
But Ms Lucas had to wait another 42 further days, until 18 January, on top of the delay to that date to receive her own reply from a different health minister junior heath minister, Helen Whately, who said: “[BCG] are an approved supplier on the Crown Commercial Service (CCS) framework contract...Value for money and capability were part of the assessment criteria. The contract award date was 24 April 2020..:” adding “The pay rates of individual consultants engaged from each supplier is commercially sensitive information. ..All the Departmental COVID-19 contracts are published on the GOV.UK Contract Finder Service”(https://questions-statements.parliament.uk/written-questions/detail/2020-10-16/104712)
I visited the Government’s Contract Finder site, to find out the details of this particular contract but it is not included at all in the 32 BCG contracts listed since April last year. (https://bidstats.uk/tenders/?q=boston+consulting+group&scope=supplier UK). After such an inordinate delay, I find that astonishing!
drdavidlowryhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/05942986736046792589noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5177380912557235726.post-45621544465830034282021-02-22T09:51:00.003-08:002021-02-22T09:51:19.912-08:00Explosive finale: energising EU-UK nuclear relations post-BrexitThis article is published today on the Energy Transition Blog, by the Heinreich Boell Foundation, Brussels-office:
Explosive finale: energising EU-UK nuclear relations post-Brexit
by Dr David Lowry
https://energytransition.org/2021/02/explosive-finale-energising-eu-uk-nuclear-relations-post-brexit/
22 Feb 2021
When the UK finalized a trade and security agreement with the European Commission on 24 December last year, it left with a set of arrangements governing future energy cooperation.
Here, Dr David Lowry looks at the background and reveals one extraordinary condition that could terminate the nuclear component of the deal.
(CC BY 2.0, John Fielding)
Background
An expert briefing by the House of Commons library in the UK Parliament set the context.
“On energy, although [EU] Member States remain ultimately responsible for security of energy supply to citizens, and for deciding their energy mix, the UK and EU energy sectors remain integrated through trade, legislation and interconnection of energy supply. Consequently, the future relationship between the UK and EU has the potential to affect the UK’s civil nuclear industry, including nuclear power and research, and the trade of electricity and gas through interconnectors. Additional areas that may be affected include the island of Ireland’s energy market, energy efficiency regulations, and general energy infrastructure through wider changes to trade and the movement of people.”
The British negotiating team set out its intended priorities in a document recently made public, in summary.
“The objectives of this Agreement are to recognise the [EU & UK] Parties’ respective commitments to combating climate change, to establish the bases on which the Parties shall trade natural gas, electricity and electricity interconnector capacity, to cooperate on trade in energy and to link their Emissions Trading Systems.”
“The UK’s future relationship with Euratom could have implications for the UK’s current nuclear operations, including fuel supply, waste management, cooperation with other nuclear states, and research..”
One of the complexities was the future arrangements for nuclear safeguards, which was addressed by a bilateral deal between the UK and European Commission, agreed in August 2018. Inter alia, it stated:
“ (…) This agreement is intended to replace an existing UK trilateral Voluntary Offer Agreement with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and Euratom (the trilateral Voluntary Offer Agreement) (…). A key part of this programme has been to conclude a new bilateral agreement with the IAEA… signed on 7th June 2018 [which] provides the basis for the UK to continue to discharge its international non-proliferation and safeguards commitments…”
“As a nuclear weapons state, the UK has voluntarily accepted the application of IAEA safeguards subject to exclusion for national security reasons only. (emphasis added)
The Nuclear Safeguards Act 2018 provided the UK with the necessary primary legislation to ensure that the obligations in the voluntary offer agreement can be complied with.
Alongside the 1200-page Brexit trade and security agreement the UK and EU agreed a self-standing 18-page accord on nuclear co-operation, which is strong on outlining the importance of nuclear safeguards, peaceful uses of nuclear materials and regulatory oversight.
There are several key sections dealing with nuclear materials, all of which are given a nuclear non-proliferation context by the preamble, includes the noting that the United Kingdom and all Member States of the Community participate in the Nuclear Suppliers Group;
The UK and EU agreed that “the objective of this Agreement is to provide a framework for cooperation between the Parties in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy on the basis of mutual benefit and reciprocity…the items subject to this Agreement shall only be used for peaceful purposes and shall not be used for any nuclear weapon or nuclear explosive device, nor for research on or development of any nuclear weapon or other nuclear explosive device or for any military purpose.”
The scope of nuclear cooperation] may take, but is not limited to, the following forms: the transfer of nuclear material…and exchange of information in areas of mutual interest, such as nuclear safeguards…
Article 6 cover Nuclear Safeguards, and explains that nuclear material subject to the Agreement shall be subject to inter alia to “the [UK] domestic safeguards system as implemented by the national competent authority”; and to the IAEA safeguards pursuant to the United Kingdom‐IAEA Safeguards Agreement (INFCIRC/263).
Over 600 UK withdrawals of nuclear explosives from safeguards
The key thing to understand is what is permitted action under INFCIRC/263. Importantly, this Tripartite Agreement states at Article 14, headlined:
EXCLUSIONS ON GROUNDS OF NATIONAL SECURITY
“If the United Kingdom intends to make any withdrawals of nuclear material from the scope of this Agreement for national security reasons in accordance with Article l(c), it shall give the Community and the Agency advance notice of such withdrawal. If any nuclear material becomes available for inclusion within the scope of this Agreement because its exclusion for national security reasons is no longer required, the United Kingdom shall inform the Community and the Agency thereof in accordance with Article 62(c).”
Nor was this provision a sleeping article, not applied by the UK, as the UK Government has stated in official disclosures that it has requested nuclear materials be removed from safeguards on more than 600 occasions since 14 August 1978, when the UK “voluntary” safeguards agreement entered into force.
Thus the new nuclear agreement between the UK and EU, allows the militarization of the entire 140,000 kilogramme stockpile of plutonium in store at Sellafield. For context, a nuclear warhead may be made with 5 kilogrammes.
Article 15 Administrative arrangements
The Parties, through their respective competent authorities, shall establish administrative
arrangements to implement this Agreement effectively. Such arrangements shall include the
procedures necessary for the competent authorities to implement and administer this Agreement.
Administrative arrangements established pursuant to this Article may be amended as
mutually determined in writing by the competent authorities.
Administrative arrangements may provide for the exchange of inventory lists in respect of the
items subject to this Agreement.
Administrative arrangements may set out the mechanisms for consultations between the
competent authorities.
The accounting of nuclear material and non‐nuclear material subject to this Agreement shall be based on fungibility (i.e. interchangeability) and the principles of proportionality and equivalence of nuclear material … as set out in the administrative arrangements established pursuant to this Article.
Then comes the most extraordinary Article in the entire agreement!
Article 22: Cessation of cooperation in case of serious breach. It states:
In the event that:
(a) either Party or any Member State of the Community is in serious breach of any of the material obligations under Articles 1 [Objective], 5 [Items subject to this Agreement], 6 [Safeguards], 7 [Physical protection], 9 [Transfers, retransfers and facilitation of trade], 10 [Enrichment], 11 [Reprocessing] or 15 [Administrative arrangements], or any other obligations under this Agreement as may be mutually determined by the Parties in writing after consultations in the Joint Committee; or
(b) in particular, a non‐nuclear weapon Member State of the Community detonates a nuclear explosive device, or a nuclear weapon Member State of the Community or the United Kingdom detonates a nuclear explosive device using any item subject to this Agreement, the other Party may, on giving written notification to that effect, suspend or terminate in whole or in part the cooperation under this Agreement.
(emphasis added)
In other words, the whole treaty can literally be blown up by a nuclear explosion!
The UK thus literally departed the EU with an atomic bang!
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
Guidance Published 24 December 2020
Nuclear Cooperation Agreements: implementation guidelines for operators from 2021
https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/nuclear-cooperation-agreements-implementation-guidelines-for-operators
Technical guidance for nuclear operators on reporting requirements related to Nuclear Cooperation Agreements from 1 January 2021.
Brexit transition: new rules for 2021
The UK has left the EU. This page tells you the new rules from 1 January 2021.
Documents
Nuclear cooperation agreements between the United Kingdom and international partners: implementation guidelines for nuclear operators
PDF, 348KB, 21 pages
UK-Euratom nuclear cooperation agreement – notice
The Nuclear Safeguards (EU Exit) Regulations 2019
https://www.legislation.gov.uk/uksi/2019/196/contents/made
drdavidlowryhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/05942986736046792589noreply@blogger.com1tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5177380912557235726.post-44347991257802482942021-02-19T03:31:00.004-08:002021-02-19T03:31:23.471-08:00A Rush to Judgment?Letter sent to <i>The Guardian n</i>ewspaper:
My first encounter with legendary extremist conservative radio show host, Rush Limbaugh (“Rightwing US talk radio host Rush Limbaugh dies, aged 70,” Guardian, 18 February 2021; https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2021/feb/17/rush-limbaugh-conservative-talk-radio-host-dies-70) came while driving during a holiday in Massachusetts in 2003. His syndicated radio show seemed to be on every point on the
On one of the radio affiliates that carried his show, the station management decided to balance out his right wing bile by following Limbaugh’s show with a liberal talk-show host.
One day a story had broken which was manna from heaven: Limbaugh announced on his own radio show that he was addicted to pain medication and he was checking himself into a treatment centre immediately.
Police sources revealed that Limbaugh's name had come up during an investigation into a black market drug ring in Palm Beach County, Florida, that law enforcement authorities were looking into the illegal purchase of the prescription drugs OxyContin and hydrocodone. (https://edition.cnn.com/2003/SHOWBIZ/10/10/rush.limbaugh/)
The liberal host, with glee, exposed Limbaugh’s obvious hypocrisy, by playing on a loop throughout his three-hour show this statement made by Limbaugh eight years earlier, on October 5, 1995, calling for illegal drug uses to be jailed.
“There’s nothing good about drug use. We know it. It destroys individuals. It destroys families. Drug use destroys societies. Drug use, some might say, is destroying this country. And we have laws against selling drugs, pushing drugs, using drugs, importing drugs. And the laws are good because we know what happens to people in societies and neighborhoods which become consumed by them. And so if people are violating the law by doing drugs, they ought to be accused and they ought to be convicted and they ought to be sent up.” (https://ethicsunwrapped.utexas.edu/case-study/limbaugh-drug-addiction)
Limbaugh also admitted he had tried to break his dependence in the past and had checked himself into medical facilities twice before. Three years later he was arrested again on prescription drug charges (New York Times, 28 April 2006; www.nytimes.com/2006/04/28/us/rush-limbaugh-arrested-on-prescription-drug-charges.html)
A fine role model indeed for conservative ethics!
Talk Radio Legend Rush Limbaugh Dies at 70
41,931 Mario Tama/Getty Images
JOSHUA CAPLAN
Breitbart, 17 Feb 2021
2:17
Conservative radio legend Rush Limbaugh died Wednesday morning at the age of 70 following a battle with advanced lung cancer, his wife Kathryn Limbaugh announced at the beginning of his Wednesday radio program.
“It is with profound sadness I must share with you directly that our beloved Rush, my wonderful husband, passed away this morning due to complications from lung cancer,” Kathryn announced.
“Rush will forever be the greatest of all time, she added.
Limbaugh, host of The Rush Limbaugh Show for 32 years, had been battling Stage 4 lung cancer since January 2020. Just days after announcing his diagnosis, Limbaugh was awarded the Presidential Medal of Freedom by President Donald Trump during the State of the Union on February 4, 2020 “Rush Limbaugh: Thank you for your decades of tireless devotion to our country,” Trump told the radio host during the address.
Limbaugh periodically updated his audience on his health condition, telling listeners during his final radio broadcast of 2020 that he outlived his prognosis and thanked them for their outpour of support.
“I wasn’t expected to be alive today,” Limbaugh said. “I wasn’t expected to make it to October, and then to November, and then to December. And yet, here I am, and today, got some problems, but I’m feeling pretty good today.”
Praise for Limbaugh from conservative lawmakers and media figures poured in moments after Limbaugh’s passing.
Rush Limbaugh revolutionized American radio. His voice guided the conservative movement for millions every day.
Rest In Peace, Rush.
— Kevin McCarthy (@GOPLeader) February 17, 2021
Rush Limbaugh was an American icon who brought conservatism into the mainstream—and our country is a better place because of his profound voice. He leaves behind an incredible legacy.
Please join me in praying for his family.
— Steve Scalise (@SteveScalise) February 17, 2021
Rush Limbaugh was a giant. With his straightforward, simple articulation of conservatism, he inspired millions. He was one-of-a-kind and he will be missed.
— Tom Cotton (@SenTomCotton) February 17, 2021
R.I.P Rush. A true American legend.
— Donald Trump Jr. (@DonaldJTrumpJr) February 17, 2021
Broadcast Legend Rush Limbaugh has died. His legions of fans will miss him, and his powerful and bright contribution to our national dialogue is a treasure that will endure for decades to come. Rush Limbaugh, a great American, dead at 70. God bless you Rush.
— Lou Dobbs (@LouDobbs) February 17, 2021
Limbaugh was born on January 12, 1951, in Cape Giradeau, Missouri. As a high school student, he landed his first job in radio at local station KGMO. Limbaugh attended Southeast Missouri State University in 1971 and dropped out after one year to return to the radio business. Limbaugh was first syndicated in 1988. At its peak, The Rush Limbaugh Show reached over 15 million listeners.
Limbaugh was inducted into the Radio Hall of Fame in 1993 along with the National Association of Broadcasters Hall of Fame in 1998. He is also five-time winner of the National Association of Broadcasters Marconi Award for Excellence in Syndicated and Network Broadcasting.
Limbaugh admits addiction to pain medication
Saturday, October 11, 2003
https://edition.cnn.com/2003/SHOWBIZ/10/10/rush.limbaugh/
(CNN) -- Rush Limbaugh announced on his radio program Friday that he is addicted to pain medication and that he is checking himself into a treatment center immediately.
"You know I have always tried to be honest with you and open about my life," the conservative commentator said in a statement on his nationally syndicated radio show.
"I need to tell you today that part of what you have heard and read is correct. I am addicted to prescription pain medication."
Law enforcement sources said last week that Limbaugh's name had come up during an investigation into a black market drug ring in Palm Beach County, Florida. The sources said that authorities were looking into the illegal sale of the prescription drugs OxyContin and hydrocodone.
Limbaugh, who has a residence in Palm Beach County, was named by sources as a possible buyer. He was not the focus of the investigation, according to the sources.
The radio talk show host said he first became addicted to painkillers "some years ago," following spinal surgery. However, he added, "the surgery was unsuccessful and I continued to have severe pain in my lower back and also in my neck due to herniated discs. I am still experiencing that pain."
He had tried to break his dependence in the past and has checked himself into medical facilities twice before, he said.
Limbaugh said that he is "not making any excuses" and that he is "no role model."
"I refuse to let anyone think I am doing something great here, when there are people you never hear about, who face long odds and never resort to such escapes. They are the role models," he said.
He would not provide details of his current problem, citing the ongoing investigation.
"At the present time, the authorities are conducting an investigation, and I have been asked to limit my public comments until this investigation is complete."
Sources said the investigation began nine months ago when Wilma Cline, a former housekeeper at Limbaugh's oceanfront Palm Beach mansion, approached authorities.
"I will only say that the stories you have read and heard contain inaccuracies and distortions, which I will clear up when I am free to speak about them," he said.
Limbaugh has not been charged with any crime.
Earlier this month, Limbaugh resigned from his position as football commentator on ESPN after making remarks that critics considered racist.
Limbaugh said he left the show "Sunday NFL Countdown" to protect the network from the uproar caused by his statement that Philadelphia Eagles quarterback Donovan McNabb was overrated because the media wanted to see a black quarterback succeed.
He did not apologize for the comments and does not consider them to be racist remarks, merely an observation of the media's reaction to McNabb's success.
The revelation about Limbaugh's possible addiction to OxyContin appeared the same week he resigned from ESPN. In the statement read by Limbaugh Friday, he did not name the pain medication he said he's addicted to.
Dr. Drew Pinsky, an addiction specialist in Pasadena, California, told CNN that if Limbaugh is addicted to OxyContin, "We're really talking about opiate addiction. The withdrawal is miserable and painful and it takes a long time to recover."
The disease is insidious, Pinksy said.
"It's a progressive disease, and when it progresses, the house of cards falls." Still, he said, "I've seen miracle recoveries."
Limbaugh is one of the most recognized talk show hosts in the nation and also one of the most controversial. In 2001, he signed a nine-year contract with Premiere Radio Networks, which syndicates his show to nearly 600 stations, for a total salary package reported to exceed $200 million.
It is estimated that nearly 20 million people listen to Limbaugh's show daily.
Also in 2001, Limbaugh learned he had a hearing problem. He was diagnosed in May and told his listeners in October that he was almost entirely deaf as a result of an autoimmune inner-ear disease. He said he had lost 100 percent hearing in his left ear and 80 percent in his right ear.
He successfully had a cochlear implant placed in his left ear to restore his hearing. He announced in January 2002 that he could hear his own radio show "for the first time in nearly four months via a medical marvel."
Until then, he relied solely on a TelePrompTer and his staff's assistance to understand his callers.
Story Tools
________________________________________
VIDEO
Rush Limbaugh admits his addiction to painkillers
• Limbaugh resigns over McNabb comments
• Statement of Rush Limbaugh
PRESCRIPTION ADDICTION
•Approximately 4 million Americans said they were currently using prescription drugs for non-medical purposes in a 1999 report.
•Commonly prescribed pain medications that can become addictive include: codeine, oxycodone, and sleep disorder drugs.
•Prescription drugs are the most common form of drug abuse among older people.
•Fastest growing group of new prescription drug abusers are 12- to 17-year-olds and 18- to 25-year-olds.
Source: National Household Survey on Drug Abuse
Limbaugh on Drug Addiction
https://ethicsunwrapped.utexas.edu/case-study/limbaugh-drug-addiction
Debates on the distribution, sale, and use of illegal drugs have been prominent in United States politics for the past several decades. Political commentator and talk show host Rush Limbaugh has become well known for his outspoken opinions on a number of political and social issues, including drug abuse.
During his talk show on October 5, 1995, Limbaugh stated: “There’s nothing good about drug use. We know it. It destroys individuals. It destroys families. Drug use destroys societies. Drug use, some might say, is destroying this country. And we have laws against selling drugs, pushing drugs, using drugs, importing drugs. And the laws are good because we know what happens to people in societies and neighborhoods which become consumed by them. And so if people are violating the law by doing drugs, they ought to be accused and they ought to be convicted and they ought to be sent up.” Limbaugh argued that drug abuse was a choice, not a disease, and that it should be combatted with strict legal consequences.
In October 2003, news outlets reported that Limbaugh was under investigation for illegally obtaining prescription drugs. Limbaugh illegally purchased hundreds of prescription pills per month over a period of several years. He engaged in the practice of “doctor shopping” by visiting different doctors to obtain multiple prescriptions for drugs that would otherwise be illegal. When this was disclosed, Limbaugh checked into a treatment facility. He said, “Over the past several years I have tried to break my dependence on pain pills and, in fact, twice checked myself into medical facilities in an attempt to do so…. I have recently agreed with my physician about the next steps.”
Rush Limbaugh Arrested on Prescription Drug Charges
New York Times, April 28, 2006
https://www.nytimes.com/2006/04/28/us/rush-limbaugh-arrested-on-prescription-drug-charges.html
WEST PALM BEACH, Fla., April 29 (AP) Â Rush Limbaugh was arrested today on prescription drug charges, with his lawyer saying he has reached a deal with prosecutors that will eventually see the charges dismissed if he continues treatment for drug addiction.
Rush Limbaugh, Talk Radio’s Conservative Provocateur, Dies at 70
A longtime favorite of the right, he was a furious critic of Barack Obama and a full-throated cheerleader for Donald J. Trump
• New York Times, Feb. 17, 2021, 12:35 p.m. ET
https://www.nytimes.com/2021/02/17/business/media/rush-limbaugh-dead.html
Rush Limbaugh in 1994. For more than three decades he led attacks on liberals, Democrats, feminists, environmentalists and many others. Credit...Eddie Adam/Briscoe Center for American History, The University of Texas at Austin
By Robert D. McFadden
Rush Limbaugh, the relentlessly provocative voice of conservative America who dominated talk radio for more than three decades with shooting-gallery attacks on liberals, Democrats, feminists, environmentalists and other moving targets, died on Wednesday. He was 70.
His wife, Kathryn, said the cause was lung cancer. Mr. Limbaugh had announced on his show last February that he advanced lung cancer. A day later, President Donald J. Trump awarded him the Presidential Medal of Freedom, the nation’s highest civilian honor, during the State of the Union address.
Mr. Limbaugh soon resumed his broadcasts, and his adoration for Mr. Trump. As the Covid-19 pandemic swept the nation, he likened the coronavirus to the common cold. And in October, as Election Day neared and Mr. Trump recuperated from the virus himself, he joined Mr. Limbaugh on the air for a two-hour “virtual rally,” largely devoted to his grievances.
“We love you,” Mr. Limbaugh assured the president on behalf of his listeners. But 10 days later, Mr. Limbaugh told his audience that his cancer had grown worse and, despite treatments, was “going in the wrong direction.”
A darling of the right since launching his nationally syndicated program during the presidency of his first hero, Ronald Reagan, Mr. Limbaugh was heard regularly by as many as 15 million Americans. That following, and his drumbeat criticisms of President Barack Obama for eight years, when the Republicans were often seen as rudderless, appeared to elevate him, at least for a time, to de facto leadership among conservative Republicans.
Such talk became obsolete in 2016 with the meteoric rise of Donald J. Trump, who, after several flirtations with presidential races that were never taken very seriously, suddenly burst like a supernova on the national political landscape. Mr. Trump became president and Mr. Limbaugh, off the hook, became an ardent supporter.
“This is great,” Mr. Limbaugh, sounding positively giddy, said of his new champion in the White House. “Can we agree that Donald Trump is probably enjoying this more than anybody wants to admit or that anybody knows?”
Like dreams coming true, Mr. Limbaugh hailed the president’s efforts to curtail Muslim immigration, cut taxes, promote American jobs, repeal Obamacare, raise military spending and dismantle environmental protections.
As for opposition to the Trump agenda and allegations of Russian interference in the American elections in 2016, Mr. Limbaugh had a ready explanation.
“This attack is coming from the shadows of the deep state, where former Obama employees remain in the intelligence community,” he said. “They are lying about things, hoping to make it easier for them and the Obama shadow government to eventually get rid of Trump and everybody in his administration.”
After House Democrats impeached the president for the first time, Mr. Limbaugh attacked with relish: “Why is Trump really being impeached?” he said. “He’s being impeached because he’s too successful,” adding: “Donald Trump is being impeached because he’s standing up for the Second Amendment. He’s being impeached because he’s lowering taxes. He’s being impeached because he’s resurrecting the economy.”
Blisteringly sarcastic, often hilarious, always pugnacious, Mr. Limbaugh was a partisan force of nature, reviled by critics and admired by millions, a master of three-hour monologues that featured wicked impersonations, slashing mockery, musical parodies and a rogue’s gallery of fools, knaves, liars and bleeding hearts.
In the Limbaugh lexicon, advocates for the homeless were “compassion fascists,” women who favored abortion were “feminazis,” environmentalists were “tree-hugging wackos.” He delivered “AIDS updates” with a Dionne Warwick song, “I’ll Never Love This Way Again,” ridiculed Michael J. Fox’s Parkinson’s disease symptoms, and called global warming a hoax.
He was not above baldfaced lies. During the debate over Mr. Obama’s 2009 health care bill, he fed the rumor mills over its provisions to have Medicare and insurers pay for optional consultations with doctors on palliative and hospice care, saying they empowered “death panels” that would “euthanize” elderly Americans.
Unlike Howard Stern, Don Imus and other big names in shock radio, Mr. Limbaugh had no on-the-air sidekicks, though he had conversations with the unheard voice of someone he called “Bo Snerdly.” Nor did he have writers, scripts or outlines, just notes and clippings from newspapers he perused daily.
Alone with his multitudes in his studio, he joked, ranted, twitted and burst into song, mimicry or boo-hoos as “The Rush Limbaugh Show” beamed out over 650 stations of the Premier Radio Networks, a subsidiary of iHeartMedia (formerly Clear Channel Communications). In his alternate-universe-on-the-air, he was “El Rushbo” and “America’s Anchorman,” in the “Southern Command” bunker of an “Excellence in Broadcasting” network.
To faithful “Dittoheads,” his defiantly self-mocking followers, he was an indomitable patriot, an icon of wit and wisdom — Mark Twain, Father Coughlin and the Founding Fathers rolled into one. His political clout, they said, lay in the reactions he provoked, avalanches of calls, emails and website rage, the headlines and occasional praise or wrath from the White House and Capitol Hill.
To detractors he was a sanctimonious charlatan, the most dangerous man in America, a label he co-opted. And some critics insisted he had no real political power, only an intimidating, self-aggrandizing presence that swayed an aging, ultra-right fringe whose numbers, while impressive, were not considered great enough to affect the outcome of national elections.
In any case, he was a commercial phenomenon, taking in $85 million a year. Married four times and divorced three times with no children, he lived on an oceanfront estate in a 24,000-square-foot mansion. It featured Oriental carpets, chandeliers and a two-story mahogany-paneled library with leather-bound collections. He had a half-dozen cars, one costing $450,000, and a $54 million Gulfstream G550 jet.
Dropping $5,000 tips in restaurants, affecting the grandiloquence of a proud college dropout, he was himself easily caricatured: overweight all his life, sometimes topping 300 pounds, a cigar-smoker with an impish grin and sly eyes, the stringy hair slicked back from a mastodon forehead. He moved his bulk with surprising grace when showing how an environmentalist skips daintily in a woodland. But his voice was his brass ring — a jaunty, rapid staccato, breaking into squeaky dolphin-talk or falsetto sobbing to expose the do-gooders, dazzling America with his inventive, bruising vocabulary.
Robert D. McFadden is a senior writer on the Obituaries desk and the winner of the 1996 Pulitzer Prize for spot news reporting. He joined The Times in May 1961 and is also the co-author of two books.
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drdavidlowryhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/05942986736046792589noreply@blogger.com1tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5177380912557235726.post-556402712803108902021-02-16T14:21:00.003-08:002021-02-16T16:39:59.374-08:00Green New Deal and nuclear politicsOn Monday, the London-based Conservative think tank Centre for Policy Studies published new 27-page long pamphlet- titled the ‘Northern Big Bang’ - jointly with the Northern Research Group of MPs. (“PM must repay the North’s faith by unleashing a new ‘Northern Big Bang’, built around private investment,” 15 February 2021 https://www.cps.org.uk/media/press-releases/q/date/2021/02/15/pm-must-repay-the-north-s-faith-by-unleashing-a-new-nor/)
The publicity material sets out the report’s aims and conclusions thus:
• The North of England was once the powerhouse of the British economy, but today it has some of the least productive areas in Europe.
• Ministers need to match the radical spirit of those in the North who voted Brexit in 2016 and Tory in 2019, and repay their faith, by making it home to a modern ‘Northern Big Bang’.
• This means making the North irresistibly attractive to private investment – both global and domestic – through new investment incentives, planning reforms and other pro-growth measures.
• These measures could unleash tens of billions of pounds worth of private sector investment to create high-quality jobs in high-productivity industries, for example in green technology, making the North the natural home for the Green Industrial Revolution.
Billions of pounds of private sector investment could be unlocked in the North of England and create an economic Big Bang for the region, argues a new report from the Centre for Policy Studies and Northern Research Group of MPs.
In recent decades, the report argues, London and the South East have monopolised investment, talent and attention. At present the Northern economy, measured by Gross Value Added per capita, is three quarters the size of England's average.
The primary authors, Jake Berry MP, Chair of the Northern Research Group of MPs, and Nick King, CPS Research Fellow and former Government advisor, call on the Prime Minister to mirror the radicalism of Thatcher’s Big Bang in the 80s, and reward the voters who lent him their vote and contributed to the Conservative majority in 2019.
‘A Northern Big Bang’sets out a series of recommendations on how to “stimulate private sector investment and create a globally recognised, economic powerhouse in the North of England.” The aim would be to replicate the impact of the 1980s Big Bang, which unlocked billions of pounds of investment in London and the South East, but with a set of measures which reflect the North’s existing strengths and future potential.
The report calls for a new Initial Investment Incentive – a cash payment to attract new investments and global capital to the region. This could be focused explicitly on green growth and meeting Net Zero, for example by incentivising investment into new gigafactories which would help spur a Green Industrial Revolution.
Other recommendations include leveraging UK Infrastructure Bank investments to unlock private sector investment where possible, creating a new Northern Infrastructure Bond aimed at attracting global investors, and introducing full expensing for businesses nationwide, or at least allowing all capital expenditure by Northern businesses to be written-off for two years.
The paper also calls for automatic approval for planning applications which create more than 100 permanent new jobs in the region when they have not been determined within two months, and an optional, alternative, fast-track planning process for investors planning to plough £20 million into the local economy, or whose investment will unlock over 250 jobs.
To ensure local decision-making remains at the heart of this regeneration project, Berry and King are advocating for the creation of a new Growth Board for the North, to help steer investment, and a Northern Recovery Bond, to encourage local investment in local economic growth.
The report recognises that such measures could also be applied nationwide, or in other regions that have fallen behind, but argues that the North is especially well positioned to benefit from them.
Berry and King argue that the Government should aim to unleash a torrent of investment into the Northern economy, to deliver the productivity gains, economic growth and higher wages that are so desperately needed.
Jake Berry MP, Chairman of the Northern Research Group, said:
“At the last election millions of Northern voters broke with tradition by voting for the Conservative Party, in many cases for the first time. The Prime Minister needs to recognise that they did so not only to deliver Brexit, but to voice the systemic disadvantages felt in many communities that were tired of being neglected in favour of London and the South East.
“The measures we have put forward will help the Prime Minister and this Government to ‘level up’ the economy and help make the North build back better as one of the most investable places in modern times."
Nick King, Research Fellow at the CPS, said:
"This Government has taken positive steps to deliver more public investment in infrastructure, but what the North needs is the scale of investment – and dynamism – that only the private sector can bring.
"There is a huge amount of domestic and global capital ready to be invested. Our recommendations are designed to make the North of England one of the most investable places on the planet and to unleash this capital through a Northern Big Bang."
About the Authors
Jake Berry has been the Conservative MP for the Lancashire seat of Rossendale & Darwen since 2010, a role he combines with leading the Northern Research Group in Parliament.
After serving in a number of junior Government roles, Jake was promoted to Northern Powerhouse Minister in 2017. A close ally and friend of Boris Johnson, he worked with him on his leadership campaign, during which Jake authored the ‘Renaissance of the Regions’ policy paper that became the Government’s levelling up policy agenda. The Prime Minister made Jake ‘Minister for
The Northern Powerhouse and Local Growth’ in his first Cabinet.
In his Ministerial roles he introduced radical changes to level up, including devolution deals with new metro mayors, as well as designing and delivering the new Towns Fund and Future High Streets Funds, bringing £3.6bn of direct investment into the regions. He also led on policies to encourage
local growth and improve Northern infrastructure, with the aim of closing the North/South divide.
[The Northern Research Group is a pressure group of dozens of Conservative MPs, including David Davis, Esther McVey, David Jones and David Mundell.]
Nick King is a Research Fellow at the Centre for Policy Studies, a role he combines with running his own strategy consultancy, Henham Strategy. He hails from Lancaster.
Nick was a Special Adviser in Government between 2012 and 2018, working for two Secretaries of State in three different Departments – the Department for Culture, Media and Sport, the Department for Business, Innovation and Skills and the Department for Communities and Local Government.
In each of these, he worked on policies to encourage local growth and economic rebalancing, including devolution, infrastructure investment, the launch of the Northern Powerhouse and the Midlands Engine (with which he still works), the creation of metropolitan mayors, distribution of the Local Growth Fund and the establishment of various Enterprise Zones.
(Acknowledgements: Special thanks to Lloyds Banking Group for their generous support of this report.)
Here are some selected extracts from the report, highlighting its proposals for green industrial investment. Interestingly, despite there being several nuclear sites in the North of England, they do not propose investment in nuclear.
“There is a particular opportunity to make the North the home of the Green Industrial Revolution which the Prime Minister, Boris Johnson, has called for. The innovation and technology which will allow us to achieve our Net Zero ambitions need to be inculcated somewhere, and the North of the England is the most obvious place, given its manufacturing strengths and industrial pedigree.
These efforts, and the measures we put forward, will help the Prime Minister and this Government to level up the economy. These ideas are meant to help make the North one of the most investable places on the planet.
Our recommendations include updating pension scheme rules to encourage more investment into Northern infrastructure; allowing the writing-off of all capital expenditure; creating a new Initial Investment Incentive to help spur a Green Industrial Revolution; making major planning decisions in weeks not years; & creating a new Northern Infrastructure Bond aimed at global investors..
The North of England has always been home to a spirit of restless radicalism. It was this radicalism that saw people vote for Brexit in their millions. And it was this radicalism which, a little over a year ago, saw a swathe of Northern constituencies vote Conservative for the first time in a generation. They felt let down by a political Establishment, and a Labour Party, which had taken them for granted for too long – and done too little to improve their lives.
In November[2020], the Government announced the creation of a new Office for Investment, headed by Lord Grimstone, to attract foreign capital to Britain.13 Yet the Treasury – perhaps due to the distractions of the pandemic – has yet to fully outline how it intends to unlock private sector investment in the name of the levelling up agenda.
The time has come to set out such an agenda. Today, with the signing of a free trade agreement with the European Union, our post-Brexit future is a more certain one. And the widespread rollout of various Covid-19 vaccines, means we are all looking forward to a brighter 2021. It is therefore time to make good on the promise to level up the economy – and to produce a Northern Big Bang focused on investment.
The UK is in an enviable position when it comes to the assets held, and managed, by pension funds and the wider asset management industry. It is consistently one of the most favoured countries in the world when it comes to attracting Foreign Direct Investment. The challenge is to get this investment deployed, at scale, into the North and those other parts of the country which need levelling up.
This is particularly important given the impact that spending on infrastructure can have, delivering a greater return per pound spent than almost any other form of fiscal stimulus or other public spending.
We therefore recommend three steps to unlock a deluge of investment into Northern infrastructure:
1. A requirement that all projects funded by the new UK Infrastructure Bank operate on a ‘private sector unlock’ investment basis where possible
2. The creation of a new Northern Infrastructure Bond, issued by the Government and aimed at global investors
3. Updating rules around UK pension schemes, particularly Defined Contribution schemes, and developing approaches to make investment into Northern infrastructure more commonplace
Some might question the need for a specific Northern Infrastructure Bond, given that the Government can borrow money and direct it towards such spending in any case. But its value comes from its specificity of purpose: in much the same way as the recently announced ‘green gilts’ have to be spent on environmental projects, this Bond would be focused entirely on the North and its infrastructure.
In 2018 gross capital formation made up 17.4% of UK GDP compared to 24.3% in Japan, 23.9% in France, 21.8% in Germany and 21% in the United States (in expanding Asian economies such as India and South Korea it is above 30% and in China above 40%). In the OECD only Greece has a lower level of investment as a percentage of its economy.18
Of course, the tax treatment of capital expenditure can only explain part of this divergence. But it is unlikely to be a coincidence that the Tax Attractiveness Index, compiled by the Institute for Taxation and Accounting at LMU Munich, ranks the UK 98th out of 100 on its depreciation regime for fixed assets.19 The US-based Tax Foundation, similarly, ranks the UK 33rd out of 36 in terms of its capital allowances, with average cost recovery of 57.1% compared to an OECD average of 68.6%.
Foreign Direct Investment has long been a success story for the UK, but the uncertainty following our vote to leave the European Union, compounded by the recent impact of the Covid-19 pandemic, has reduced capital inflows.
The Initial Investment Incentive – or ‘the Triple I’ – should be available to any business making a material new investment in the North and would offer a Government-funded incentive of 10 per cent of the capital costs of new investments to reduce risk and increase potential profitability margins. The Triple I should have a ceiling – perhaps offering a maximum of £25 million per investment – and would need a floor investment level of, say, £20 million to ensure it is targeted at the most significant of investments. We would recommend that the Triple I was put in place for the next five years to incentivise investment spend as soon as possible.
If this proposal were to be limited to certain parts of the economy, we would suggest it should be focused on delivering Net Zero and green growth – helping ensure the North of England is in the vanguard of taking forward the Green Industrial Revolution which this Government has made clear its determination to bring about.
The recent publications of the Government’s 10 Point Plan,23 its Energy White Paper24 and the Treasury’s Net Zero Review interim report25 each signal the direction for Government policy in this regard, and act as staging posts in the journey to COP 26 specifically and to Net Zero more generally. But our efforts to lead the way on green issues and to build the green jobs and industries of the future need to be rooted in place as much as in policy.
Just as the 1980s Big Bang helped the City become a global leader in finance, and billions of pounds in research spending helped create the globally leading life sciences cluster around Cambridge, a concerted effort can now put the North of England at the heart of our Green Industrial Revolution. Because many of the companies and industries which will help deliver Net Zero will be new, they can be incubated in a new place. These companies can benefit from networking benefits and agglomeration effects like those which exist in any other sector – but for that to happen they need to be rooted in a place.
Those clusters of development and excellence should find a natural home in the North of England. It seems to us, capitalising on the research strengths of its universities, the manufacturing base which already exists there and various other pre-existing factors, it would be an obvious place to develop, for example, the gigafactories which are so important to the future of the UK automotive industry and the hydrogen technologies which can help unlock our future green growth.
The North led the world during the Industrial Revolution, cradling the innovation, attracting the investment and implementing the approaches which would lead to widespread growth, jobs and opportunities. It can also lead the way on the transition to Net Zero – developing the innovation and technology needed whilst being propelled by the private sectr investment which is so clearly necessary.
This can create a new economy, which will be able to take advantage of the North’s relative advantages – more affordable land, its industrial heritage, and the investment incentives of the sort outlined in this report – and which can compete in global markets for talent and capital for decades to come.
It is all well and good offering to create the conditions for investment, but if the activity which that investment seeks to unlock is stymied from the outset then it will come to nothing. That is why the UK’s sclerotic and ineffective planning system deserves further attention.
The inherent issues within the planning system have been recognised by this Government. Its recent planning reforms are an important attempt to address some of those issues. Despite the disappointing suggestion that there will be moves away from the more radical parts of the paper, the Government’s intention to introduce a new zonal system, with large tracts of land designated for ‘growth’, is likely to unlock new development and commercial opportunities right across the country.
But we remain concerned that the local planning system will remain open to delay, exaggerated politicking and a prevailing sense of NIMBY-ism, including around important industrial developments. Speaking to those who have tried to get permission for schemes off the ground, there is astonishment at how long it takes to start
building foundations in the UK compared to other countries, in particular because decisions are often made by low-level council bodies which prioritise peace and quiet over the economic needs of the wider area.
It is true that there is a separate regime for ‘Nationally Significant Infrastructure Projects’ (NSIPs) in England and Wales. But its application is limited, as it is set up to consider infrastructure projects relating to energy, transport, water or waste. Moreover, a rudimentary glance at the website outlining projects being taken through the NSIP regime shows that many of the applications take well over a year to determine. This is despite the fact that one of the fundamental purposes of the regime is to ‘streamline the decision-making process for major infrastructure projects’.
The flaws in the system were recognised by the Government’s recent ‘National Infrastructure Strategy’ which said that ‘the NSIP regime… is currently not being implemented as effectively as possible, leading to slower delivery times and more uncertainty.
On the weekend, the <i>Sunday Times</i> published a 12-page broadsheet supplement on Sustainable Investment, under the Raconteur imprimateur.(www.raconteur.net) One article was on the new Biden administration’s likely approach to green energy investment .(“Does Biden’s presidency signal a shift in the green finance landscape?”
14 February 2021; https://www.raconteur.net/finance/investing/does-biden-signal-a-green-light-for-green-finance/)
The article, by Alasdair Lane, reported “.. domestically, the president has a fight on his hands. ‘The system is polarised in America. There are people who still don’t accept that climate change is real,’ explained Heather Slavkin Corzo, head of US policy, United Nations Principles for Responsible Investment. ‘I’m afraid there will be people who question the need to move the US economy in a more sustainable direction. But we can’t allow those questions to stifle progress.’
Biden seems highly unlikely to include the full radical Green New Deal package in his early spending plans. He is joined in his caution over the GND by digital business guru, the multi-billionaire Bill Gates, founder of Microsoft, in his new book, “How to Avoid a Climate Disaster”, (Allen Lane/Penguin) published on 16 February.
Gates secured much pre-publication publicity for his new tome, including an interview in the Guardian Weekend Magazine, which wrote “Of the Green New Deal, the proposal backed by Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez [the Congresswoman who has promoted the merits of the GND in the US] that raises the goal of carbon neutrality in a decade, he is flatly dismissive, with Gates telling the interviewer. “Well, it’s a fairytale. It’s like saying vaccines don’t work – that’s a form of science denialism. Why peddle fantasies to people?”
Gates also opined: “I’m not a survivalist.” Instead his version of survivalism is to fund innovation, the reporter noted. “I’m putting money into carbon capture and nuclear fission” Gates told her. (Bill Gates: ‘Carbon neutrality in a decade is a fairytale. Why peddle fantasies?’, Guardian, 13 February 2021; https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2021/feb/15/bill-gates-carbon-neutrality-in-a-decade-is-a-fairytale-why-peddle-fantasies)
Indeed, his book is laced with positive, if inaccurate, mentions of nuclear power. For example, he asserts on page 84, in a section on “Making Carbon-Free Electricity”, uns der a sub-section titled ‘ Nuclear Fission’ he writes: “”Here’s the one sentence case for nuclear power: It’s the only carbon-free energy sources that can reliably deliver power day and night, through every season..” Later on page 190, he repeats the fake fact, asserting “Nuclear is the only carbon-free energy source we can use almost anywhere.
It is worrying that Gates can be so poorly informed he can believe such demonstable fake information, and repeat is, using it as a cornerstone for his pro-nuclear arguments.
His editors at Allen Lane surely should have told him when he presented draft text that this information is incorrect, and should be removed. Gates should have known the following: Nuclear power will not provide any useful dent in curbing harmful emissions, when the carbon footprint of its full uranium ‘fuel chain’ is considered- from uranium mining, milling, enrichment ( which is highly energy intensive), fuel fabrication, irradiation, radioactive waste conditioning, storage, packaging to final disposal.
Recent analysis by Mark Jacobson, professor of civil and environmental engineering at Stanford University, in a detailed study “Review of solutions to global warming, air pollution, and energy security (https://web.stanford.edu/group/efmh/jacobson/Articles/I/ReviewSolGW09.pdf) demonstrates nuclear power's CO2 emissions are between 10 to 18 times greater than those from renewable energy technologies. Gates should read it pronto.
Gates is not an energy specialist (evidently), but clearly cares hugely about the global threat of climate change. He is, however, an enormously wealthy philanthropist, and says in his new book (on pages 8-9 ) “I put several hundred million dollars into starting a company [ TerraPower] to design a next-generation nuclear plant that would generate clean electricity.”
Beforehand, he says, he “met with experts” (unnamed). Clearly the wrong ones.
For a man who must have the contact phone numbers of presidents and premiers on speed dial, it is a pity this commendable venture into solutions to the climate change challenge, is so poorly founded.
On Gates’ Breakthrough Energy web site, he says that he has assembled “analysts, experts and advocates working to advance smart public policy.” On nuclear, Gates’ approach is just dumb!
drdavidlowryhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/05942986736046792589noreply@blogger.com4tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5177380912557235726.post-75313746799552579052021-02-09T09:53:00.007-08:002021-02-09T09:53:50.876-08:00How UK universities and nuclear power companies got into bed with the Chinese nuclear military establishmentOn Sunday, the Mail on Sunday ran three pages of sensationalist revelations on British universities’ military relations with China. Under a strapline reading “China in the Dock”, the MoS banner headline over its investigation read “MI6 fears over universities’ links with Beijing goons.” They were reporting the essential findings of a new 115-page research report published yesterday by a conservative London-based think tank, CIVITAS, titled “Inadvertently Arming China? The Chinese military complex and its potential exploitation of scientific research at UK universities”
(Inadvertently Arming China?: The Chinese military complex and its potential exploitation of scientific research at UK universities: 8 February 2021; https://www.civitas.org.uk/publications/inadvertently-arming-china/)
Civitas argues that there is a “pervasive presence of Chinese military-linked conglomerates and universities in the sponsorship of high-technology research centres in many leading UK universities.” It media release records “In many cases, these UK universities are unintentionally generating research that is sponsored by and may be of use to China’s military conglomerates, including those with activities in the production of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMDs), including intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) as well as hypersonic missiles, in which China is involved in a new arms race and seeks ‘massively destabilising’ weaponry.”
Much of this research is entirely based at UK universities, Civitas says, while other research outputs include cooperation with researchers in China, often at the military-linked universities or companies sponsoring the UK research centre. Many of the research projects will have a civilian use, and, the report asserts “UK-based researchers will be unaware of a possible dual use that might lead to a contribution to China’s military industries”
The report’s authors are Dr Radomir Tylecote, Director of the Defence and Security for Democracy (DSD) Unit at Civitas. He is also Research Director of the Free Speech Union and a Fellow of the Institute of Economic Affairs. He has a PhD from Imperial College London and an MPhil in Chinese Studies from the University of Cambridge. Robert Clark is a Defence Fellow at the Henry Jackson Society (another conservative think-take, named after the former, whose research interests include defence technologies, alliance-building and the Transatlantic partnership, and authoritarian threats to the global order. He served in the British Army for nine years - including in Iraq and Afghanistan - and has an MA in International Conflict Studies from King's College London.
The report finds that at least 15 UK universities have “productive research relationships” with Chinese military-linked manufacturers and universities, and reveals that much of the research at the university centres and laboratories is also being sponsored by the UK taxpayer through research councils, Innovate UK, and the Royal Society.
The authors argue that this trend should be seen in the context of China’s stated aim to equal the US military by 2027; and to use advanced military technology to leapfrog the US by 2049, the centenary of the founding of the People’s Republic of China (PRC).
This report analyses the relationships that at least 15 UK universities have established with 22 Chinese military-linked universities as well as weapons suppliers or other military-linked companies. Many of these Chinese universities are deemed “very high risk” by the Australian Strategic Policy Institute (ASPI).
The authors find that “The methods by which the UK monitors and controls Chinese involvement in UK university research are, we suggest, inadequate.” The report spells out “a picture of strategic incoherence” suggesting that “China is demonstrating rapid technological-military development and growing force-projection capabilities.” To risk financing and enabling these developments suggests a lack of strategic coordination, the authors conclude.
“This points to the need for a strategic reassessment for new rules for scientific research with PRC universities and companies, some of which should be applied directly to the UK’s research councils and universities, while some may require legislation.Other rules are needed for scientific research in wider potentially sensitive scientific fields generally and in universities in particular.”
The authors also suggest the UK set up a new government organisation similar to the Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States (CFIUS), whose role would include monitoring and assessment of university sponsorship.
Those measures should form part of an urgent reassessment of the security implications of the so-called ‘Golden Era’ policies towards China and the strategic assumptions that underpinned them.
The authors explain the context of Chinese military expansionism and civil-military fusion thus:
“Beijing has recently declared that China aims for the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) to be on a par with the US military by 2027. This would have deep and far-reaching consequences for security for the UK, other democracies, and UK allies. The rapid technological development of the PLA should also be set against the wider background of the increasingly hawkish strategy of and strategic thinkers around President Xi Jinping, as well as the authoritarian entrenchment of the state in China. Scholars have described Xi’s adherence to the concept of the ‘100-year marathon’, a strategic attempt to become a global hegemony by 2049, the centenary of the founding of the People’s Republic of China (PRC). 1 Research and development in next-generation military technology should be understood in this strategic context. Since the late 1990s, defectors have referred to new military technologies under development by the PLA for use ‘beyond Taiwan’. The aim, discussed by senior Chinese military figures, is to use advanced military technologies to leapfrog the United States in particular.2 This includes the capacity to launch devastating pre-emptive strikes or counterattacks aimed at destabilising enemy forces’ radar systems, orbital satellites, and command and control systems, including through the possible use of unconventional weapons and electronic warfare. This is underway amidst apparent ongoing confusion in British strategic thinking. While UK taxpayers fund research at universities that risks contributing to the development of China’s military, the UK’s R&D spending on its own defence is anaemic: Volkswagen alone spends more on R&D than the entire UK defence sector. Driving the Chinese growth in military technology is the mandated integration and joint development of military and civilian technology sectors, or ‘civil-military fusion’ , which Beijing hopes will give the PLA a leading edge in adapting emerging technologies in order to utilise them for military purposes, across technological fields. This means it is especially difficult to know that research for an apparently civilian business unit of a military-linked Chinese conglomerate, or for an apparently civilian-oriented department of a military- backed university, will not ultimately be put to military use. China has a long history of weapons proliferation to unstable, authoritarian regimes that systematically abuse human rights, a challenge which may be growing. China has supplied military materiel to the Syrian regime throughout the Syrian civil war; it has routinely supplied Burma with materiel including FN-6 surface-to-air missiles,4 107mm surface-to surface rockets,JF-17 aircraft, armoured vehicles, and possibly drones. In Afghanistan, Chinese weapons consistently make their way to the Taliban, including surface-to-air missiles and anti-aircraft guns. Chinese entities and companies are believed to have been involved in nuclear proliferation to Pakistan, Iran and North Korea. China’s military force-projection capacity is growing, and its military committing more resources to researching highly-destabilising materiel, such as directed-energy weapons and hypersonic missiles. China’s development of a surveillance state is already leading to systematic human rights abuses. The findings of this report do not detract from the value of the international scientific collaboration in which British universities participate and frequently lead, including with Chinese nationals, and should not be used to cast suspicion on Chinese researchers in the UK. However, that the Chinese military is liable to exploit some of the scientific research at UK universities that we describe, research which is often also sponsored by the UK taxpayer, demonstrates a lack of strategic coordination that is against the British national interest.”
One Chinese research collaboration is with Cranfield University at Shrivenham, which is the home to Cranfield Defence and Security, a secure military site whose partners include the Atomic Weapons Establishment (AWE). A researcher at Cranfield’s Centre for Electronic Warfare, Information and Cyber (CEWIC) has a Chinese-funded project developing automated camera surveillance of people showing physical symptoms of stress. An expert in 12 Ibid. 18 Electro-Optics, he is a visiting professor at Nanchang HangKong University, where optoelectrics is a designated area of military research.
Surrey University, based in Guildford, has partnered with the China Academy of Space Technology (CAST), a subsidiary of CASC, to develop 5G technology. Its parent company is a major part of China’s nuclear weapons programme. This formal relationship appeared after Max Lu became Vice Chancellor at Surrey. When she was Prime Minister, Theresa May subsequently appointed Lu to the Council for Science and Technology; he also sits on the boards of UKRI, the National Physical Laboratory and Universities UK, giving him considerable potential influence over UK research funding.
Investigation at King’s College London has drawn attention to two pieces of Imperial College London research that it states will “certainly be of interest for military aircraft designers, as well as in civilian applications. These were ‘Structural Integrity Assessment of Additive Manufactured Products’ and ‘Impact testing of laminated glass and composites’, which used a high velocity gun system ‘relevant for nuclear weapons development’. Meanwhile, Imperial College told the Civitas researchers “We do not conduct any classified research.”
Dr Xianwen Ran of the Chinese National University of Defense Technology (NUDT ) is described as a “productive researcher” with a professor who the University of Cambridge states is a Bye-Fellow of Gonville and Caius – a constituent college of the University of Cambridge – but not an employee of the University itself. Dr Ran recent papers (not in cooperation with the professor at Gonville and Caius) include: In December 2019, A method to optimize the electron spectrum for simulating thermo-mechanical response to x-ray radiation (‘The X-ray pulse originating from high altitude nuclear detonation (HAND) is mainly soft X-ray and its intensity is high enough [to] lead to severe thermo-mechanical deformation of unpenetrated material… It is possible to simulate [this] using the optimized electron spectrums. (https://www.researchgate.net/publication/338205287_A_Method_to_Optimize_the_Electron_Spectrum_for_ Simulating_Thermo-Mechanical_Response_to_X-ray_Radiation).
The Bye-Fellow who is Ran’s research partner in separate fields is an “Associate member of the Cavendish Laboratory “, and a “Research Fellow at Imperial College London”, and is a “Distinguished Visiting Professor of NUDT” (his CV lists this position as having been from 2014 to 2017, however, at the time of writing, his online profile states that this continues). He remains a High-Level Foreign Talent, a position awarded by Beijing (this ‘comes with a long-term visa’), having been awarded membership of the so-called ‘1000-Talents plan’ in 2015. He remains a Distinguished Visiting Professor of China’s Central South University (he states that at CSU he carries out ‘research with engineers on better transportation systems and vehicles’). Before 1996, he was also a Fellow at the US defense research and development base at Los Alamos National Laboratory, run by the US Government’s Department of Energy.
The 1000-Talents Plan exists to bring scientific expertise and knowledge to China, primarily by returning Chinese nationals: ‘The US Department of Energy… has been heavily targeted to this end… According to one report, “so many scientists from Los Alamos have returned to Chinese universities and research institutes that people have dubbed them the ‘Los Alamos club’”, according to Stephen Chen in ‘America’s hidden role in Chinese weapons research’, South China Morning Post, 29 March 2017.
Another project sees Glasgow University having established a joint college with a major military-backed PRC university whose collaborations include with a Chinese nuclear warhead manufacturer, the Chinese Academy of Engineering Physics.
One area that the authors do not highlight is the intended collaboration between nuclear weapons builder, China General Nuclear (CGN), on a giant nuclear power plant at Bradwell in Essex, called Bradwell B, modelled on the Chinese reactor design Hualong-1.
There are clearly security–related issues raised by using a contractor-designer –financier- operator company, CGN, from China, which is intimately involved in its nuclear weapons programme, in a so-called commercial nuclear power plant development in the UK.
There is an intriguing background to this UK-China nuclear collaboration.
Nick Timothy, ex British Prime Minister Theresa May’s former joint chief of staff, was an open critic of David Cameron’s “golden era” relations with Beijing, who raised his concerns saying Chinese investment in sensitive sectors created security concerns. (”UK decision to delay Hinkley Point plant catches China by surprise,” The Guardian 30-31July 2016) He highlighted this potential problem originally in autumn 2015 on a Conservative web site blog( “The Government is selling our national security to China; 20 October 2015; (www.conservativehome.com/thecolumnists/2015/10/nick-timothy-the-government-is-selling-our-national-security-to-china.html)
But the nuclear security problem is not at all theoretical.
On 13 July 2016, in a coruscating critique of the ballooning costs and unreliability of UK nuclear power, the national financial watchdog, the National Audit Office issued report Nuclear power in the UK, (HC 511 SESSION 2016-17), in which it include the following observation in a section headed The challenges of nuclear power at para 2.11 “There are specific challenges in ensuring that nuclear power is on an equal footing in the market with other low-carbon technologies: Nuclear power plants have very high upfront costs and take a long time to build. Costs have increased in recent years given the extra safety considerations following the Fukushima disaster and increasing terrorist threats(emphasis added) ( https://www.nao.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2016/07/Nuclear-power-in-the-UK.pdf)
A week earlier, on 7 July 2016, to no media attention at all, the official UK nuclear safety and security regulator, the Office for Nuclear Regulation, published its annual progress report. In a section headed Civil Nuclear Security (pages 37-38) it revealed : “
Overall, the civil nuclear sector met its security obligations. There are areas where the duty holder’s security arrangements did not fully meet regulatory expectations. (emphasis added) (http://www.onr.org.uk/documents/2016/annual-report-2015-16.pdf)
ONR has since declined to elaborate what the problem is, on security grounds.
However, in late July 2016, Mrs May’s former department, the Home Office, issued a report CONTEST, UK strategy for countering terrorism: annual report for 2015 with a section included on Resilience of Critical Infrastructure. Paragraph 2.57 of this report - which must have been prepared and signed off while Mrs May was still in charge of the Home Office - states: “We assess all risks to our Critical National Infrastructure, from flooding to cyberattack to terrorism, and work with operators to enhance our infrastructure security. We are reviewing infrastructure policing to ensure that the UK has the right capability to protect our national infrastructure and address national threats: which include nuclear power plants. (https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/539684/55469_Cm_9310_PRINT_v0.11.pdf)
In Europe too, the nuclear terrorist spectre has been regularly raised by Europol, the EU’s Dutch-based counter- terror agency. In its 2016 annual report - issued on 20 July 2016 - it revealed under the chapter headed Chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear (CBRN) substances:
“Nuclear power plants and nuclear weapon facilities in the EU also remain potential targets for terrorists.” (https://www.europol.europa.eu/content/211-terrorist-attacks-carried-out-eu-member-states-2015-new-europol-report-reveals)
So what on earth was going on to provoke Mrs May, an incoming British Prime Minister, to start questioning a newly-established industrial partnership between the UK and China on nuclear technology, cultivated in the previous two years by her predecessor, David Cameron, and his Chancellor George Osborne ( who May sacked immediately on coming into office)? Nick Timothy wrote the following on on the ConservativeHome web site in October 2015, when he was still working for a conservative think tank:
“Security experts – reportedly inside as well as outside government – are worried that the Chinese could use their role to build weaknesses into computer systems which will allow them to shut down Britain’s energy production at will. For those who believe that such an eventuality is unlikely, the Chinese National Nuclear Corporation – one of the state-owned companies involved in the plans for the British nuclear plants - says on its website that it is responsible not just for “increasing the value of state assets and developing the society” but the “building of national defence.” MI5 believes that “the intelligence services of…China…continue to work against UK interests at home and abroad.’” ( http://www.conservativehome.com/thecolumnists/2015/10/nick-timothy-the-government-is-selling-our-national-security-to-china.html)
Ironically, at the beginning of September 2016, the United States Chamber of Commerce issued 116 page report on threats to international free trade in information technology, highlighting the role played by China’s national security laws to exclude US ( and others’) companies from selling into the Chinese market. The report notes:
“While globalization of the ICT sector has been one of the most powerful drivers of global economic welfare during the past several decades, a number of factors—particularly at the policy level—are now threatening to slow or even reverse that trend.
In particular, some national governments, by intentionally or unintentionally defining security concerns in an overly broad manner, are applying intense pressure on the ICT sector to localize rather than globalize. Such pressures are manifesting in laws and regulations that expressly require the indigenization of R&D, manufacturing, and/or assembly of products or localization of data, or that otherwise effectively preference products and services that localize assembly, source code development and storage, or the storage of data.” (Preventing Deglobalization, 1 September 2016 https://www.uschamber.com/sites/default/files/documents/files/preventing_deglobalization_1.pdf)
The report states on national security threats: “The Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress (“NPC”) passed the country’s most comprehensive piece of national security legislation in July 2015, a sweeping National Security Law that establishes an expansive framework on security and that describes in broad terms how the country’s leadership understands its security interests.
The new law’s breadth is evident in its assertion that China’s security interests extend far beyond its physical borders, even into the depths of the oceans, the Arctic, outer space, and, of course, cyberspace.102 It describes national security as encompassing political security, military security, social and cultural security, ecological security, agricultural security, and much more……
At the end of December 2015, the NPC Standing Committee enacted a Counter-Terrorism Law, which went into effect on January 1, 2016. Drafts of the law were originally released in November 2014 and February 2015 and attracted significant controversy. The Counter-Terrorism Law reinforces the government’s broad powers to investigate and prevent incidents of terrorism, and requires citizens and companies to assist and cooperate with the government in dealing with such matters. It also imposes new obligations on companies in certain sectors. Non-compliance or non-cooperation can lead to significant penalties, including fines on companies and criminal charges or detention for responsible individuals.”
Writing in the The Wall Street Journal on 7 September 2016, Andrew Browne observed:” China plays by its own rules nowadays…. It bullies Washington’s regional friends and allies.. China is using national-security laws and other means to exclude U.S. technology companies from swaths of its vast market..” (“China’s Subtle War Against U.S. Dignity”; http://www.wsj.com/articles/chinas-subtle-war-against-u-s-dignity-1473151399)
In light of the Chinese Government’s own stated security concerns and enacted law, it is worthwhile recalling how China abused s other states’ own security laws with its extensive overseas spying apparatus.
A month earlier, the press extensively reported on an industrial espionage case involving a Chinese nuclear engineer. One report explained “In a 17-page indictment, the US government said nuclear engineer Allen Ho, employed by the China General Nuclear Power Company, and the company itself had unlawfully conspired to develop nuclear material in China without US approval and ‘with the intent to secure an advantage to the People’s Republic of China’”. (“Nuclear espionage charge for China firm with one-third stake in UK's Hinkley Point,” Guardian, 11 August 2016; https://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2016/aug/11/nuclear-espionage-charge-for-china-firm-with-one-third-stake-in-hinkley-point)
Two months earlier, the US Justice Department had issued a press release, which recorded in part:
“Kan Chen, 26, of Ningbo, China, in Zhejiang Province, was sentenced to 30 months in prison and three years of supervised release for conspiring to violate the Arms Export Control Act and International Traffic in Arms Regulations; attempting to violate the Arms Export Control Act and International Traffic in Arms Regulations; and violating the International Emergency Economic Powers Act.
On June 16, 2015, Chen was arrested by HSI agents on the Northern Mariana Island of Saipan following an eight-month long investigation into his illegal conduct and has remained in custody. He pleaded guilty to the offenses listed above on March 2, 2016.
“The United States will simply never know the true harm of Chen’s conduct because the end users of the rifle scopes and other technology are unknown,” said U.S. Attorney Oberly. “No matter their nationality, those individuals who seek to profit by illegally exporting sensitive U.S. military technology will be prosecuted. It is important that we take all necessary steps to prevent our military technology and equipment from being exported and possibly used against our service members and our allies overseas.”
(“Chinese National sentenced to 30 months in prison for smuggling high tech US military hardware to China,” : June 29, 2016; https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/chinese-national-sentenced-30-months-prison-smuggling-high-tech-us-military-hardware-china
But this is not a recent phenomenon: 21 years ago, the New York Times revealed under the headline “China Stole Nuclear Secrets For Bombs, U.S. Aides Say”, ( 6 March 1999; http://www.nytimes.com/1999/03/06/world/breach-los-alamos-special-report-china-stole-nuclear-secrets-for-bombs-us-aides.html) that “Working with nuclear secrets stolen from an American Government laboratory, China has made a leap in the development of nuclear weapons: the miniaturization of its bombs, according to Administration officials.”
The New York Times published a detailed update on 26 September 2000, stating in part:
“On March 6, 1999, The New York Times reported that Government investigators believed China had accelerated its nuclear weapons program with the aid of stolen American secrets. The article said the Federal Bureau of Investigation had focused its suspicions on a Chinese-American scientist at the Los Alamos National Laboratory. Two days later, the government announced that it had fired a Los Alamos scientist for ''serious security violations.'' Officials identified the man as Wen Ho Lee. Dr. Lee was indicted nine months later on charges that he had transferred huge amounts of restricted information to an easily accessible computer. Justice Department prosecutors persuaded a judge to hold him in solitary confinement without bail, saying his release would pose a grave threat to the nuclear balance. This month the Justice Department settled for a guilty plea to a single count of mishandling secret information. The judge accused prosecutors of having misled him on the national security threat and having provided inaccurate testimony. Dr. Lee was released on the condition that he cooperate with the authorities to explain why he downloaded the weapons data and what he did with it.”
The story was followed up by the Guardian’s sister Sunday paper, The Observer, ran a detailed revelation headlined: "China steals US nuclear secrets,” 7 March 1999) with a follow up in August 1999 (“China Crisis, 22 August 1999; https://www.theguardian.com/theobserver/1999/aug/22/life1.lifemagazine2)
In between times, the London Evening Standard ran a front page revelation from Washington on 25 May 1999 headlined “China’s army of spies in U.S.”- which unveiled China controlled several thousand ‘front companies’: “The 700-page [Congressional committee] document describes a massive and voracious theft of American know-how in addition to the recently well-publicised espionage that succeeded in stealing nuclear secrets from a supposedly secure weapons laboratory run by the US Energy Department. President Clinton has falsely claimed he was not told about the spying.
The report discloses that China uses an extensive network of small and large businesses operated by Chinese nationals in the US to penetrate civilian technology centres. There may be more than 3,000 such firms, mainly concentrated in California and Massachusetts, which are connected to the Chinese espionage apparatus.
China requires, as normal practice, that many of the thousands of students, tourists and other Chinese visitors to the US seek out information that might be used for military purposes. Christopher Cox, chairman of the committee which issued the report, says Chinese espionage has been going on for two decades, and continues.”
Contemporary concerns over China undermining nuclear security thus have a detailed history.
Regulating Nuclear Security
The UK nuclear regulator, the Office for Nuclear Regulation (ONR), says it has “carefully considered the information” in Generic Design Assessment (GDA) – ‘Step 1 Entry Readiness Evidence Pack’ - and “judge that it is sufficient to demonstrate that GNS is ready to commence step 1 of GDA. GNS have put in place arrangements that should help ensure an effective and efficient start to a GDA of the UK HPR1000 reactor design and is committing resources consistent with our expectations. We therefore judge that the project appears viable and warrants the deployment of regulatory resource.”
HOW DID ONR REACH ITS CONCLUSION OF READINESS?
In the ONR document ‘New nuclear reactors: Generic Design Assessment Guidance to Requesting Parties’ (http://www.onr.org.uk/new-reactors/ngn03.pdf) [ONR-GDA-GD-001 Revision 3, dated September 2016], it states the following in an extract on Security documentation
Security Assessment Principles (SyAPs)
*SyAPs and associated supporting TAGs – as published in March 2017 - replace the National Objectives, Requirements and Model Standards. These will form the basis of ONR judgement of the GSR (Generic Security Report)
Taking account of overseas regulator assessments
167 If a reactor design has been subject to assessment by nuclear regulators in other countries, ONR sees great value in being able to draw on such experience, as well as sharing its own experiences. This is an extension of the normal information exchanges that take place between national nuclear regulators through bilateral arrangements and via organisations such as the IAEA, the International Nuclear Regulators Association (INRA), and the Nuclear Energy Agency (NEA) of the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), in particular through its Committee on Nuclear Regulatory Activities (CNRA). In addition, ONR is participating in the work of the Multinational Design Evaluation Program (MDEP – see www.oecd‐nea.org/mdep)
WHAT EXPERIENCE HAVE INRA AND NEA OF SECURING NUCLEAR SECURITY INFORMATION FROM CHINESE NUCLEAR COMPANIES?
168 Throughout the GDA process ONR will seek to take advantage of information arising from regulatory assessments of the design undertaken in other countries. ONR assesses on a sampling basis and therefore the availability of information from assessments carried out elsewhere may enable ONR to concentrate its attention on areas of the design specific to Great Britain.
169 However, it should be noted that it is the responsibility of the RP (= Requesting Party, ie CGN) to demonstrate the safety and security of its design, including highlighting and directing ONR to previous outputs and assessments of regulators in other countries, not for ONR to seek out and assemble information from such sources.
170 IAEA guidance states that even if a similar design has been authorised in another member state, the national regulatory body should still perform its own independent review and assessment (Ref. 17, paragraph 3.37; 17 Review and Assessment of Nuclear Facilities by the Regulatory Body. GS‐G‐1.2 IAEA 2002; www‐pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/Pub1128_scr.pdf). The Convention on Nuclear Safety, to which the UK is a signatory, states that each country must undertake safety assessment of its own nuclear facilities and make its own regulatory decisions about the safety of those facilities. In line with these international expectations, ONR therefore undertakes its own assessment of the generic safety case and comes to its own judgements.
171 ONR will not necessarily accept that a matter it judges to be of regulatory concern can be considered to be resolved simply because an overseas regulator has considered a similar issue and agreed its resolution. ONR may, as it considers necessary, test the robustness of such claims. ONR's position on this international context is given in Ref. 18.( 18 New nuclear power stations: Safety assessment in an international context June 2008. www.onr.org.uk/new‐reactors/ngn05.pdf)
ANNEXES
Summary • This report draws attention to the little-analysed but pervasive presence of Chinese military-linked conglomerates and universities in the sponsorship of high-technology research centres in many leading UK universities. • In many cases, these UK universities are unintentionally generating research that is sponsored by and may be of use to China’s military conglomerates, including those with activities in the production of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMDs), including intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) as well as hypersonic missiles, in which China is involved in a new arms race and seeks ‘massively destabilising’ weaponry. • Much of this research is entirely based at UK universities, while other research outputs include cooperation with researchers in China, often at the military-linked universities or companies sponsoring the UK research centre. • Many of the research projects will have a civilian use, and UK-based researchers will be unaware of a possible dual use that might lead to a contribution to China’s military industries. • This report illustrates how 15 of the 24 Russell Group universities and many other UK academic bodies have productive research relationships with Chinese military-linked manufacturers and universities. Much of the research at the university centres and laboratories is also being sponsored by the UK taxpayer through research councils, Innovate UK, and the Royal Society. • This should be seen in the context of China’s stated aim to equal the US military by 2027; and to use advanced military technology to leapfrog the US by 2049, the centenary of the founding of the People’s Republic of China (PRC). • Beijing’s strategy of ‘civil-military fusion’ means an integration of military and civilian industry and technology intended to give the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) a leading edge in adapting emerging technologies. We suggest that the existence of this strategy makes any claim to be able to reliably cooperate only with the civil branches of Chinese military-linked companies and universities less credible. • This report analyses the relationships that at least 15 UK universities have established with 22 Chinese military-linked universities as well as weapons suppliers or other military-linked companies. Many of these Chinese universities are deemed ‘Very High Risk’ by the Australian Strategic Policy Institute (ASPI). • This report includes statements from the UK institutions analysed: we are determined to be as fair to them as possible, and, provided they responded to our enquiries, the position of each is represented. We have also told those institutions we did not hear from that we will update the online version of this report, if and when they contact us. • Again in the interests of accuracy and fairness, we state here that a number of UK institutions took issue with our analyses. We have duly included their comments and reiterate that even so, in our view there remains the danger that research, which is carried out in good faith, may be co-opted and exploited by the Chinese military. 3 • We also wish to make clear that none of the academics, researchers, or other s staff whose research at UK universities or centres is discussed in this report are accused of knowingly assisting the development of the Chinese military, of knowingly transferring information to that end, or of committing any breach of their university regulations. Nor are they accused of any other wrongdoing, or breach of national security, or any criminal offence. • Sponsorship of high-technology research in UK universities covers areas such as: ▪ Metals and alloys; ▪ Aerospace physics and hypersonic technology; ▪ Ceramics, piezoelectrics and rare earths; ▪ Drones and radars; ▪ Shipbuilding; ▪ Data science, AI, and facial recognition; and ▪ Robotics (land, sea and space). Conclusions China has a long history of weapons sales to regimes that carry out grievous human rights abuses including Iran, Syria, Burma and North Korea. In addition, China’s development of a surveillance state is already leading to systematic human rights abuses, with its treatment of the Uighur minority described as genocide. The methods by which the UK monitors and controls Chinese involvement in UK university research are, we suggest, inadequate. The companies sponsoring UK-based research centres include China’s largest weapons manufacturers, including producers of strike fighter engines, ICBMs, nuclear warheads, stealth aircraft, military drones, tanks, military-use metals and materials, and navy ships. At its simplest, for the UK government and taxpayer to fund and assist the technological development and possibly the force-projection capabilities of the military of the People’s Republic of China is not in the British national interest. This is a picture of ‘strategic incoherence’. China is demonstrating rapid technologicalmilitary development and growing force-projection capabilities. To risk financing and enabling these developments suggests a lack of strategic coordination. This points to the need for a strategic reassessment for new rules for scientific research with PRC universities and companies, some of which should be applied directly to the UK’s research councils and universities, while some may require legislation. Other rules are needed for scientific research in wider potentially sensitive scientific fields generally and in universities in particular.
Almost 200 academics from more than a dozen British universities could face jail amid probe over fears they inadvertently helped China develop weapons of mass destruction
• Academics, from 20 universities, suspected of breaching Export Control Order
• Law is designed to prevent sensitive intellectual property going to hostile states
• The law carries a maximum 10 year prison sentence for those who breach it
By JAMES ROBINSON FOR MAILONLINE and IAN BIRRELL and GLEN OWEN
MAILONLINE: 13:12, 8 February 2021
https://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-9236123/Almost-200-academics-British-universities-face-jail-sending-information-China.html
A group of almost 200 British academics from more than a dozen UK universities could face jail, as officials probe whether they may have unwittingly helped the Chinese government build weapons of mass destruction.
Officials are investigating the academics amid suspicion they may have breached laws designed to protect national security and human rights.
The academics, who are from 20 UK universities, including some of the most prestigious in the country, are suspected of breaching the Export Control Order 2008.
The law carries a maximum 10 year prison sentence for those who breach it.
It is intended to prevent intellectual property in highly sensitive fields - including military and security - from being sent to hostile states.
Pioneering technology on aircraft, missile design and cyberweapons may have been sent to China, according to the Times.
Officials are preparing to send around 200 enforcement notices to those suspected of breaching the rules, the reports add, though this has since been denied by a Government source.
Meanwhile, a source told the Times: 'We could be seeing dozens of academics in courts before long.
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A group of almost 200 British academics from more than a dozen universities could face jail, as officials probe whether they may have unwittingly helped the Chinese government build weapons of mass destruction. Pictured: Library image showing A Dongfeng-41 intercontinental strategic nuclear missiles group formation
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Officials at HMRC (pictured: The HMRC Headquarters in London) are investigating the academics amid suspicion they may have breached laws designed to protect national security and human rights
'If even 10 per cent lead to successful prosecutions, we'd be looking at around 20 academics going to jail for helping the Chinese build super-weapons.'
Boris Johnson's senior aide in conflict of interest row over China's new embassy
A top aide to Boris Johnson has been caught up in a conflict of interest row over claims he helped broker a deal for China's new embassy on behalf of the Government while being paid by two of the companies involved.
Lord Udny-Lister helped the Foreign Office lead talks with China over its £255million deal to buy Royal Mint Court - near to the Tower of London.
But while working on the talks, which took place between 2017 and 2018, the-then Sir Edward Lister also worked for two of the companies involved in the deal, according to the Sunday Times.
Lord Lister, 71, who is now Mr Johnson's chief strategy adviser in Downing Street, worked as a paid consultant for American commercial real estate giant CBRE.
The company were hired by China to identify and buy a site for its new embassy.
He was also a paid adviser to London property firm Delancey, who owned the Royal Mint Court, while the talks were in place, according to the Sunday Times.
Both companies told the paper Lord Udny-Lister took no direct part in the negotiations.
A spokesperson for CBRE told MailOnline: 'Sir Edward Lister did not have any involvement with CBRE on the Royal Mint Court transaction.
'He was employed as consultant with CBRE between October 2016 and December 2017.'
A Government spokesperson told MailOnline: 'Sir Eddie Lister undertook this work as a Non-Executive Director of the FCO at the request of the government. There was no conflict of interest.'
A Government spokesperson today told MailOnline: 'Exporters of military goods and those engaged in the transfer of military technology specified in the Export Control Order 2008 - including universities and academics - require a licence to export or transfer from the UK.
'It is their responsibility to comply with the regulations.'
It comes as the Mail on Sunday revealed how the academics could be hit by 'enforcement notices' - imposed by Her Majesty's Revenue and Customs - over alleged breaches of export controls in their dealings with Beijing.
It is understood the security services fear some academics have been sharing pioneering British technology could be facilitating the dictatorial Communist government's repression of minorities and dissidents.
The MoS has agreed not to identify the universities at the centre of the inquiry on the grounds of national security.
The security service investigation, led by HMRC, was launched amid growing concern in Downing Street that academics were engaged in a 'new gold rush' to strike deals with the Chinese over cutting-edge scientific breakthroughs.
'Exporters of military goods and those engaged in transfer of military technology specified in the Export Control Order 2008 – including universities and academics – require a licence to export or transfer from the UK,' said a Government spokesman.
'It is their responsibility to comply with the regulations.'
Last week, Manchester University cancelled an agreement with a Chinese military technology company after being warned that it supplied technology platforms and apps used by Beijing's security forces in mass surveillance of Uighur Muslims.
The university said it was unaware of China Electronics Technology Corporation's alleged role in the persecution of Uighurs until receiving a letter pointing out the links from the Commons foreign affairs select committee.
Tom Tugendhat, chairman of the committee, writes in today's MoS that 'some in Britain's universities have lost their moral bearings and are not promoting academic freedom, but undermining our strategic interests.'
The Tory MP argues that Britain is making a mistake to open up universities too much. 'We are handing over the secrets that will help an often-hostile country become the greatest military power of the 21st Century.'
The Government investigation came after a report by the Henry Jackson Society last October criticised the Government for failing to prosecute any academics for export control violations.
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The study by think tank Civitas accuses 14 of the 24 top universities in the UK of having ties with Chinese weapons conglomerates and military-linked research centres involved in nuclear weapons schemes and developing futuristic technology. Pictured: A hyper-sonic test missile is launched by the US Navy
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Chinese troops take part in marching drills ahead of an October 1 military parade to celebrate the 70th anniversary of the founding of the People's Republic of China at a camp on the outskirts of Beijing, China, in 2019
Terrifying missiles so high-tech it's almost impossible to stop them
HYPERSONICS
China is spending huge sums to create hypersonic missiles that will go so fast (up to twenty times the speed of sound) that military chiefs believe they will be invulnerable to any form of defence.
Indeed, some analysts fear that human capability to respond to such lethal weapons will be inadequate and that the only way to protect against them would be to rely on artificial intelligence and computer systems.
Travelling several miles a second as they deliver surprise attacks within minutes of being launched, they have been described as a 'game-changer' for warfare.
Although America, too, has such Star Wars-style weapons in development, General John E. Hyten, commander of US Strategic Command, told a Senate committee three years ago: 'We don't have any defence that could deny the employment of such a weapon against us.'
Such missiles, capable of carrying nuclear warheads, would deliver precision attacks on people, vehicles and buildings.
To test such weapons, the Beijing government said three years ago it was building a wind tunnel that simulated conditions up to 25 times the speed of sound. And a contractor has said it has carried out a six-minute test flight for a hypersonic missile.
The complexities of developing hypersonics – using sophisticated sensors, guidance systems and innovative propulsion methods – have been compared to building the atomic bomb.
GRAPHENE
This is a revolutionary material with enormous defence and manufacturing potential. One atom thick and the thinnest and lightest material known to man, it conducts heat, absorbs light, stretches and is 200 times stronger than steel.
It was invented by researchers in 2004 at Manchester University – with China's President Xi Jinping having made an official visit to their lab.
Among its military applications are as coatings on ballistic missiles, wiring in hypersonic vehicles exposed to high temperatures, camouflage of vehicles and body armour for troops.
Chinese reports suggest that the Z-10 attack helicopter – a rival to Boeing's Apache – has been equipped with graphene armour developed at the Beijing Institute of Aeronautical Materials. The institute has ties to three universities in Britain, where it collaborates on two centres specialising in research into the use of graphene in the aerospace industry.
Chinese media have reported plans to use graphene coatings on military installations on artificial islands built in the South China Sea, an area where Beijing has controversially deployed Jin-class ballistic missile submarines armed with nuclear missiles.
SPY TECHNOLOGY
One of the most sinister recent trends in China has been the creation of a surveillance state that seeks to control 1.4 billion citizens through a constant watch over their movements, thoughts and words.
People are tracked via a massive network of street cameras, facial recognition technologies, biometric data, official records, artificial intelligence and monitoring of online activities as mundane as things like shopping and takeaway food ordering habits.
The most extreme example is in the Western province of Xinjiang, where Uighurs and other Muslim minorities are under 24/7 surveillance.
Much of the network was developed by the state-owned China Electronics Technology Group Corporation, which supports work at four Chinese universities with ties to seven British universities.
CHINESE UNIVERSITIES
As part of President Xi's bid for China's global supremacy, he has employed a so-called 'military-civil fusion' strategy that involves universities playing a central role in maximising the country's military power.
China's constitution also stipulates that all new technologies, even if developed by the private sector, must, by law, be shared with the People's Liberation Army.
A key research institution is the National University of Defense Technology, in Hunan, which is controlled by the military and specialises in hypersonics, drones, supercomputers, radar and navigation systems.
It has links with eight British universities, including a formal collaboration with one world-renowned seat of learning.
Eight other UK universities have ties with the Beijing University of Aeronautics and Astronautics, which spends 60 per cent of its research budget on defence activities.
Another important centre is the Harbin Institute of Technology. It has a joint research lab with the nation's leading ballistic missile manufacturer and has links with three British universities.
DRONE SWARMS
The Beijing government is developing swarms of 'suicide' drones to hover in the sky as they locate their target – while communicating with each other and co-ordinating their movements without any human input.
This marks the next era of robotic warfare, with autonomous weapons replacing current drones that have to be pre-programmed or are remote-controlled. The United States and Israel are also working on such technology, while Britain, too, tested a swarm of 20 drones last month with sorties from RAF Spadeadam in Cumbria.
The advanced technology uses computer algorithms – often modelled on biological studies of insects and fish – to create self-navigating drone squadrons.
NUCLEAR WEAPONS
In total, China is estimated to have 350 nuclear warheads, including 204 on operational long-range missiles fired from landbased launchers, 48 on submarines and 20 'gravity bombs' to be dropped from aircraft. A recent Pentagon report warned that, in its bid to catch up with Russia and the US, Beijing plans to double its nuclear arsenal over the next decade as part of President Xi's drive towards global dominance.
Many of these weapons are being developed by China Aerospace Science and Technology Corporation, a massive state-owned conglomerate that has links with at least five UK universities.
Independently, a report released tomorrow will expose the astonishing extent of collaboration taking place between British universities and Chinese academic centres, many with deep research links to the People's Liberation Army.
The study by think tank Civitas accuses 14 of the 24 top universities in the UK of having ties with Chinese weapons conglomerates and military-linked research centres involved in nuclear weapons schemes and developing futuristic technology.
It suggests scientific discoveries by our universities risk boosting China's drive for military supremacy by assisting its development of hypersonic missiles, radar jamming systems, robotics, spacecraft and stealth vehicles.
British taxpayers are paying for research that might unintentionally help China's military soon attain a potentially dominant position,' said Radomir Tylecote, the study's lead author and a former Treasury official. 'This is strategically incoherent – especially when UK spending on research for its own military needs is so anaemic.'
Civitas reveals the China Electronics Technology Corporation – which has admitted its purpose is to 'leverage' civilian electronic systems for the benefit of China's armed forces – backs work at four military-linked universities in the People's Republic with ties to seven British universities.
The giant firm is seen as one of the main architects of Beijing's sinister surveillance state.
The think tank report – entitled 'Arming China? The Chinese military complex and its potential exploitation of scientific research at UK universities' – examines the relationships that 20 UK universities have with 29 military-linked universities and nine military-tied firms, which include some of the country's biggest arms suppliers.
A dozen of the Chinese universities have been deemed 'very high risk' by the Australian Strategic Policy Institute, while another ten are termed 'high risk'.
Civitas, which stresses that all the British universities have benevolent intentions, turns the spotlight on some of the country's most famous academic institutions as concerns grow over China's increasing belligerence.
The universities all insist their work is for wider benefit to society, that many research results are openly published in scientific literature and that they make strenuous efforts to comply with all rules designed to protect security and intellectual property.
Cambridge University, the Civitas report says, has co-operated with the National University of Defense Technology, a military-run research institution that has been sanctioned by the US.
Beijing has boasted this collaboration will 'greatly raise the nation's power in the fields of national defence, communications and… high precision navigation'.
A Cambridge spokesman told the MoS: 'All of the university's research is subject to ethics governance and export control regulations.' Imperial College, another world-leading British scientific centre, has three research units sponsored by major Chinese weapons manufacturers. 'Science is a global endeavour, and we are proud to work with our peers in academia and industry all over the world,' said a spokesman.
Civitas accuses Manchester University of having provided 'China's main nuclear missile conglomerate with a UK taxpayer-funded research centre'. A subsidiary of this firm – under US sanctions – also funds a unit at Strathclyde University, which plays a leading role in British space research.
Manchester also co-operates with Chinese funders to exploit graphene, the revolutionary new material that won two of its researchers the Nobel Prize and is seen as having huge military potential given its immense strength and flexibility. Both Manchester and Strathclyde insist they work closely with relevant authorities to ensure they are fully compliant with all policies and export protocols.
Queen Mary University of London has established a 'collaborative partnership' with China's Northwestern Polytechnical University (NPU), praising the 'particular strengths in aerospace and marine engineering' of a university that describes itself as 'devoted to improving and serving the national defence science and technology industry'.
NPU has at least 13 defence laboratories into areas such as jet propulsion, space technology and torpedo guidance. 'We are proud of our transnational educational and research partnership with NPU,' said a Queen Mary spokesman, adding it followed 'rigorous procedures' regarding security and ethics.
Southampton, according to the Civitas report, has links with Harbin Engineering University that were praised for helping the Chinese institution build a 'world class' position in naval architecture. It plays a key role in China's ambitions to build the world's biggest and best-equipped navy.
A Southampton spokesman said their collaborations had 'potential to create wide-ranging societal benefits', adding that they followed Government advice and the Harbin partnership simply replicated their undergraduate studies. Harbin is also one of 15 Chinese civilian universities that have been implicated in cyber-attacks, illegal exports or espionage operations. China has a long history of weapons sales to some of the world's most repressive regimes such as Iran, Myanmar and North Korea.
Lianchao Han, a former Chinese government official and now leading pro-democracy activist, said Beijing had long seen academic exchange programmes as a way to modernise its military through exploitation of open Western research institutions. 'China has invented all kinds of programs from inviting Western professors to lecture in the country through to hiring them for consulting work and funding joint research projects between universities. These schemes enable it to acquire dual-use technologies for both civilian and military gain and build a formidable army. Sadly, most Western universities and research institutions are shortsighted and still fail to see China's strategic intent.'
British universities have looked increasingly to China as a source of income, having more Chinese students than any other country, paying £1.7 billion a year in tuition fees, and for research funding as they developed a network of academic links in both nations.
Yet concerns have grown over such ties since hardline President Xi Jinping took power in 2013. He has ramped up nationalist rhetoric, spent massively on armed forces, silenced dissidents, unleashed genocide in Xinjiang and showed far more foreign policy aggression – as seen with China's brutal crackdown in Hong Kong.
Many leading Chinese universities have long been linked to the military, whether through their own research labs or via funding from conglomerates – often state-owned – that dominate the country's weapons industry.
These ties have been strengthened under Xi through a policy called 'military-civil fusion' designed to maximise military power. This includes a constitutional obligation for all new technologies to be shared with the 2,250,000-strong People's Liberation Army.
China's Communist leadership is intent on matching US military might within six years – and then use advanced technology to win the battle for global supremacy by 2049, centenary of the founding of the People's Republic of China.
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The Beijing government is developing swarms of 'suicide' drones (file image) to hover in the sky as they locate their target – while communicating with each other and co-ordinating their movements without any human input
The Civitas report calls for a register of Chinese firms and institutions with military ties that should be barred from supporting research in Britain, an audit of university sponsorship policies and a new agency to monitor academic relationships.
One British defence contractor, who has removed all Chinese-made parts from his firm's products as a precaution in case of conflict, said he thought some universities might be missing the key point of rules designed to stop misuse of technology.
'People fall into the trap of arguing that they only designed the product for civilian use, neglecting the fact that the regulations say 'can be' used for military purposes.'
TOM TUGENDHAT: Our academics are prostrating themselves to a Chinese regime guilty of genocide
By Tom Tugendhat for Mail on Sunday
China's ambassador to Britain, Liu Xiaoming, recently bade farewell to this country in characteristic style. Dwelling on golden memories of his time here, he recalled his 'humble part' in President Xi Jinping's state visit in 2015 and New Year's Eve parties on the banks of the Thames.
He also mentioned the happy days when he was awarded honorary degrees in ceremonies at the Universities of Huddersfield and Nottingham. The details were telling. What had the Chinese ambassador done to merit these garlands?
Here was a man who represented a country accused of genocide by our closest ally, the United States; whose state broadcaster has been refused a licence to disseminate propaganda in the UK; and whose companies are connected to an army that targets our innovations. He was certainly no natural friend to Britain.
Sickening details of the persecution of Uighur Muslims – involving concentration camps, torture, sterilisation, brainwashing and rape – have been emerging for years.
Yet Beijing's ambassador to Britain would blithely argue – albeit unconvincingly – that video footage allegedly showing vast numbers of blindfolded, shackled and shaven-headed Uighurs waiting to be led on to trains, was an everyday prisoner transfer. The next minute, he'd be given the red-carpet treatment by British universities.
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China's ambassador to Britain, Liu Xiaoming, recently bade farewell to this country in characteristic style
Huddersfield University gave him an honorary doctorate in 2019 when a new Confucius Institute there opened, 'in partnership with the East China University of Science and Technology in Shanghai'. The focus of this tie-up was 'innovation in science and technology'.
Meanwhile, His Excellency became an honorary Doctor of Law from Nottingham, urging his young audience to 'consolidate the China-UK Golden Era' and to 'handle differences with wisdom'.
Such snapshots – and the murky web of financial deals they hint at – look increasingly like a sham.
Why have Britain's universities been prostrating themselves so enthusiastically to the Chinese state that denies freedom of thought?
The ugly truth is that some of our universities, a fundamental part of the UK's innovation-based economy, have been motivated by a mixture of naivety and greed.
Among the most prestigious institutions in the UK are some which have been topping up their income with sponsorship from Chinese military and tech firms which, it should not need saying, have aims that run fully counter to our own. And these universities have been doing this while in receipt of billions in British taxpayer cash.
The Commons foreign affairs committee, which I chair, has noted that despite 100,000 Chinese students at British universities, there has been precious little debate about China's influence on campuses, despite evidence that it is undermining academic freedom and closing down free debate on subjects such as Tibet and Taiwan.
Even Universities UK, which represents our 140 universities, has warned of 'misappropriation of research output, including the seizing of research data and intellectual property'.
Has UK-based research been used in the repression of minorities and democracy activists in China? I fear it is all but certain our universities have, perhaps only in part, become enablers in the crushing of dissent.
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Huddersfield University (pictured) gave him an honorary doctorate in 2019 when a new Confucius Institute there opened, 'in partnership with the East China University of Science and Technology in Shanghai'
Three examples stand out from new research by Civitas. There are Cambridge's ties to China's National University of Defense Technology – an organisation sanctioned by the US over nuclear missile development.
Also, Imperial College's research units, sponsored by Chinese weapons suppliers, including the Aviation Industry Corporation of China, which is designing the latest generation of stealth fighters.
Finally, there are the Scottish centres, one of which is researching radar jamming with a military-linked laboratory in China.
Make no mistake: these are some of the best universities not just in Britain, but in the world. They are at the cutting edge of research and attract the world's brightest students and teaching.
Universities should collaborate with the private sector in research. For example, millions of us will benefit from the partnership between Oxford and AstraZeneca to produce a vaccine for Covid-19.
But in the race to stay ahead, it is obvious some in Britain's universities have lost their moral bearings and are not promoting academic freedom, but undermining our strategic interests.
In opening the doors of our universities to China, we are bargaining away our competitive advantage – and, for a price, handing over the secrets that will help an often-hostile country become the greatest military power of the 21st Century.
University leaders must recognise that the great hope of the past two decades – that China was steadily opening up politically as its economy became more competitive – has been dashed. A Maoist personality cult has been established around President Xi, with his personal 'thought' inserted into China's constitution, to be studied by all.
He has allowed what Foreign Secretary Dominic Raab has called a 'grievous attack on Hong Kong's rights and freedoms' by ordering the mass arrest of politicians and activists. Freedom is being crushed so blatantly that the UK is giving many of Hong Kong's residents – all British passport-holders – the right to live and work here.
Universities need to wake up to these abuses.
The Government must introduce rules that govern the research British higher education institutions carry out with Chinese involvement, sponsorship or support. Particular attention must be paid to science and technology, where it is clear our competitive advantage is being handed to a strategic adversary.
It seems Xi has learned from Lenin – the capitalist really will sell you the rope you use to hang him. Or in our case, design it.
drdavidlowryhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/05942986736046792589noreply@blogger.com2tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5177380912557235726.post-1338990046668971182021-02-08T09:13:00.002-08:002021-02-08T09:13:17.551-08:00Nuclear daylight RABeryLetter sent to the <i>Daily Express</i> newspaper:
The <i>Daily Express</i> is to be congratulated on launching its important new Green Britain Revolution campaign (front page and inside, 8 February 2021; https://www.express.co.uk/news/nature/1394652/Green-Britain-campaign-daily-express-pollution-wildlife-nature-boris-johnson).
One issue overlooked is nuclear, which ministers are promoting on the spurious grounds that it saves carbon dioxide emissions.
Nuclear power plants use uranium as a fuel. This has to be mined, processed at site called milling (usually very far away from the UK), transported thousands of miles, enriched ( to make it more energy "potent") fabricated into fuel, and after irradiation in a reactor, actively stored at the reactor site to let the very hot fuel cool down, then transported to a long term storage site, conditioned, made into a radioactive waste package, and stored for a very long-time or disposed of in a giant underground series of interconnected caverns, called a repository.
At each point in this production and use chain, very significant quantities of carbon dioxide is emitted in the industrial processing. To describe this as "zero -carbon" is both an abuse of the term and the intelligence of British voters and Express readers.
Ministers are on record as suggesting the may “invest” tens of £billions taxpayers money in the Wylfa Newydd, a nuclear project in North Wales abandoned by Japanese company Hitachi last month because it was far too expensive (at £25 billion) or Sizewell C in Suffolk, where the French Government company EDF (Electricité de France) is pressuring the UK government to agree to a so-called Regulated Asset Base (RAB) method of funding, which means the people who pay for the electricity first pay out the £ billions investment money up front, thus taking all the risk, while EDF earns all the profits!
Green entrepreneur Dale Vince is right that the big climate conference (COP26 ) in Glasgow in November will be an excellent opportunity for the UK to showcase British green energy technology. Nuclear is not one of them!
drdavidlowryhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/05942986736046792589noreply@blogger.com1tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5177380912557235726.post-75312880155675828182021-02-04T05:12:00.004-08:002021-02-04T05:12:48.829-08:00Climate confusion in UK GovernmentLetter submitted to The Times newspaper:
The headline over your environment editor’s article on the House of Commons’ Public Accounts Committee (PAC) report (Feb3) on <i>Achieving government’s long-term environmental goals</i> read
"Defra ‘lacks clout to lead on climate’.”
This was misleading. The PAC did not say what your headline writer placed in inverted commas; they have compressed an actual quote for convenience.
What the PAC actually wrote was: “The Department for Environment, Food & Rural Affairs (Defra) has the policy responsibility for the environment, but not the clout to hold other departments to account or manage trade-offs between policy areas.” (paragraph 2, page 5)(https://committees.parliament.uk/publications/4513/documents/45674/default/).
Defra is not the lead government department on climate change: this is the Department for Business, Energy and industrial Strategy (BEIS), although with the recent creation of the stand-alone President of the Conference of Parties (COP26) for the UN Convention on Climate Change, in the person of former Business secretary Alok Sharma, currently embedded within the Cabinet Office, it may be argued there are three departments – each underwritten by the Treasury - now taking forward UK climate policy.
drdavidlowryhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/05942986736046792589noreply@blogger.com1tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5177380912557235726.post-5255780061472816002021-02-03T05:49:00.001-08:002021-02-03T05:49:16.646-08:00Saving Planet Earth from CatastropheLast evening I participated in an international webinar hosted by the University of Victoria, British Columbia, Canada, with the most prominent public intellectual on the planet, Professor emeritus Noam Chomsky of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), now resident in sunny Arizona.
At 92, he still has an acutely spritely mind, and a laser-like ability to analyze the great global issues of the day. In the webinar, titled “The Fate of the Human Experiment”- in a series banner- headlined “Values for a New World”, Chomsky veered between extreme pessimism in analysis (“It IS time to panic! We are in deep trouble”) and optimism in his proffered solutions ( Academics need to educate people on their own and global history).
Chomsky present a world facing security and ecological catastrophe, due to the twin threats of nuclear weapons and climate change. He warned critical voices were in danger of being “drowned in silence.” Humankind has created a new Age: the Anthropocene, which brings with it the capacity to destroy humanity, and along with it most life on Earth.
Chomsky warned there is no “plan B’ for humankind. Arguing we have driven ourselves ever closer to the “irreversible tipping point”, Chomsky referred to the recently update ‘Atomic Doomsday Clock’ of the international Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists whose hands have moved ever closer to the catastrophic midnight hour, as the most recent warning to pay heed..( https://thebulletin.org/doomsday-clock/current-time/)
By chance, earlier in the same day, a huge 606-page door stopper of a report, the Independent Review on the Economics of Biodiversity led by Professor Sir Partha Dasgupta of Cambridge University, was issued by the UK Treasury. The Guardian newspaper headed its report
Economics' failure over destruction of nature presents ‘extreme risks’
New measures of success needed to avoid catastrophic breakdown, landmark review finds
(https://www.theguardian.com/environment/2021/feb/02/economics-failure-over-destruction-of-nature-presents-extreme-risks)
Treasury Exchequer Secretary Kemi Badenoch said in a written statement publishing the report (https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/final-report-the-economics-of-biodiversity-the-dasgupta-review) that the Government “welcomes its publication as a strong example of UK thought leadership on an important environmental issue with clear – but often overlooked – economic consequences. The government will examine the Review’s findings and respond formally in due course. (Statement UIN HCWS752, 2 February 2021; https://questions-statements.parliament.uk/written-statements/detail/2021-02-02/hcws752)
The Treasury media release – under its headline “Nature is a blind spot in economics that we ignore at our peril, says Dasgupta Review” - said powerfully: “A fundamental change in how we think about and approach economics is needed if we are to reverse biodiversity loss and protect and enhance our prosperity,” (https://www.gov.uk/government/news/nature-is-a-blind-spot-in-economics-that-we-ignore-at-our-peril-says-dasgupta-review)
The review, it said, “presents the first comprehensive economic framework of its kind for biodiversity. It calls for urgent and transformative change in how we think, act and measure economic success to protect and enhance our prosperity and the natural world, “ adding “Grounded in a deep understanding of ecosystem processes and how they are affected by economic activity, the new framework presented by the Dasgupta Review – which was commissioned by Treasury - sets out the ways in which we should account for nature in economics and decision-making.”
Its author, Professor Dasgupta, observed: “Truly sustainable economic growth and development means recognising that our long-term prosperity relies on rebalancing our demand of nature’s goods and services with its capacity to supply them. It also means accounting fully for the impact of our interactions with Nature across all levels of society. COVID-19 has shown us what can happen when we don’t do this. Nature is our home. Good economics demands we manage it better.”
Globally respected environmental film maker, Sir David Attenborough, said: “The survival of the natural world depends on maintaining its complexity, its biodiversity. Putting things right requires a universal understanding of how these complex systems work. That applies to economics too.This comprehensive and immensely important report shows us how by bringing economics and ecology face to face, we can help to save the natural world and in doing so save ourselves.The Review argues that nature is our most precious asset and that significant declines in biodiversity are undermining the productivity, resilience and adaptability of nature. This in turn has put our economies, livelihoods and well-being at risk. The Review finds that humanity has collectively mis-managed its global portfolio of assets, meaning the demands on nature far exceed its capacity to supply the goods and services we all rely on.”
The UK Prime Minister Boris Johnson added: “As co-host of COP26 and president of this year’s G7, we are going to make sure the natural world stays right at the top of the global agenda.”
Kemi Badenoch also said: “Protecting and enhancing our natural assets, and the biodiversity that underpins them, is crucial to achieving a sustainable, resilient economy. That is why the UK is already investing more than £600 million in nature-based climate solutions, such as tree planting and peatland restoration.”
UK Environment Secretary, George Eustice pitched in asserting: “If we want to realise the aspiration set out in Professor Dasgupta’s landmark Review to rebalance humanity’s relationship with nature, then we need policies that will both protect and enhance the supply of our natural assets.”
The Treasury media release asserts that: The Review makes clear that urgent and transformative action taken now would be significantly less costly than delay and will require change on three broad fronts:
• Humanity must ensure its demands on nature do not exceed its sustainable supply and must increase the global supply of natural assets relative to their current level. For example, expanding and improving management of Protected Areas; increasing investment in Nature-based Solutions; and deploying policies that discourage damaging forms of consumption and production.
• We should adopt different metrics for economic success and move towards an inclusive measure of wealth that accounts for the benefits from investing in natural assets and helps to make clear the trade-offs between investments in different assets. Introducing natural capital into national accounting systems is a critical step.
• We must transform our institutions and systems – particularly finance and education – to enable these changes and sustain them for future generations. For example, by increasing public and private financial flows that enhance our natural assets and decrease those that degrade them; and by empowering citizens to make informed choices and demand change, including by firmly establishing the natural world in education policy.
The UK Government commissioned Professor Dasgupta to lead an independent, global Review - supported by an Advisory Panel, drawn from academia, public policy and the private sector - on the Economics of Biodiversity in Spring 2019, and an interim report was issued in April 2020.
Guardian journalists, economics editor, Larry Elliott, and environment editor, Damian Carrington, wrote on 2 February that “ The world is being put at “extreme risk” by the failure of economics to take account of the rapid depletion of the natural world and needs to find new measures of success to avoid a catastrophic breakdown, a landmark review has concluded.”
They pointed out that a similar Treasury-sponsored review in 2006 by (Lord) Nicholas Stern, a professor of economics athe London School of Economics, is credited with transforming economic understanding of the climate crisis.
The Dasgupta review said that two UN conferences this year – on biodiversity and climate change – provided opportunities for the international community to rethink an approach that has seen a 40% plunge in the stocks of natural capital per head between 1992 and 2014.
TheGuardian reported that “Humanity’s impact on the natural world is stark, with animal populations having dropped by an average of 68% since 1970 and forest destruction continuing at pace – some scientists think a sixth mass extinction of life is under way and accelerating. Today, just 4% of the world’s mammals are wild, hugely outweighed by humans and their livestock.”
The Dasgupta review urged the world’s governments to come up with a different form of national accounting from GDP and use one that includes the depletion of natural resources. It would like to see an understanding of nature given as prominent a place in education as the “three Rs”, to end people’s distance from nature.
Dasgupta also called for new supranational institutions to protect global public goods such as the rainforests and oceans. Poorer countries should be paid to protect ecosystems, while charges for the use of non-territorial waters should be levied to prevent overfishing.
The report said almost all governments were exacerbating the biodiversity crisis by paying people more to exploit nature than to protect it. A conservative estimate of the global cost of subsidies that damage nature was about $4tn-$6tn (£2.9-£4.4tn) a year, it said. “Humanity faces an urgent choice. Continuing down our current path presents extreme risks and uncertainty for our economies.” the review said.
“The Dasgupta review shows we are running down our natural capital fast, and we will pay the price,” said Lord Stern, adding . “Reversing these trends requires action now, and as the review stresses, to do so would be significantly less costly than delay. Crucially, it would [also] help us to reduce poverty.”
Prof Bob Watson, who led the UN assessment, said: “The most important thing is that the Dasgupta review was commissioned by the UK Treasury ministry, not the environment department. Hopefully this will mean that finance ministries around the world will acknowledge that the loss of nature is an economic issue, not simply an environmental issue.”
Jennifer Morris, head of the Nature Conservancy, said: “In the same way the Stern review proved transformational in raising awareness of climate risk for business and financial markets, the Dasgupta review is likely to represent a watershed moment for how we value the contributions made by nature across nearly every aspect of our lives.”
In a further analysis, Carrington wrote (“Economics of biodiversity review: what are the recommendations?https://www.theguardian.com/environment/2021/feb/02/economics-of-biodiversity-review-what-are-the-recommendations): “Biodiversity is declining faster than at any time in human history and the review aims to create a new economic framework, grounded in ecology, that enables humanity to live on Earth sustainably.
”Our economies, livelihoods and wellbeing all depend on our most precious asset: nature. We are part of nature, not separate from it.” These are the opening lines of the Dasgupta landmark review of the economics of biodiversity. Dasgupta highlights that most governments pay people more to exploit nature than to protect it and that destructive farming subsidies cause damage costed at $4tn-$6tn (£2.9tn-£4.4tn) per year.
Humanity’s growing population must also be tackled, Dasguptas stresses, saying: “Addressing the shortfall [in women’s access to education and family planning] is essential, even if the effects may not be apparent in the short-term.” It is less costly to conserve nature than to restore it, so expanding and improving protected areas also has an essential role to play, according to the review.
For ecosystems that provide global benefits, such as the Amazon forest, nations should be paid to protect them, the review says. For ecosystems outside national boundaries, such as the high seas, those who exploit them should pay for their use.
Nina Seega, at the University of Cambridge’s Institute for Sustainability Leadership, said: “The review’s focus on completely rewiring mainstream economic and financial models is key to moving the nature debate on to the agenda of governments, financial regulators and individual financial firms. It is especially pertinent to take the opportunity presented by the Covid-19 crisis to align the underpinnings of our economic and financial system with a sustainable future.”
The Dasgupta review concludes: “To detach nature from economic reasoning is to imply that we consider ourselves to be external to nature. The fault is not in economics; it lies in the way we have chosen to practise it. Transformative change is possible – we and our descendants deserve nothing less.”
Meanwhile, the British Government in a classic example of a lack of joined-up thinking, butressed by total diplomatic hypocrisy, has continued to defend its support for possession and deployment of nuclear weapons of mass destruction, demonstrating perfectly the argument made by Chomsky .
As it happens, on Monday, the UK Defence Secretary Ben Wallace MP, was answering oral defence questions in the House of Commons on Monday afternoon (1 February 2021) . Two Scottish National Party (SNP) MPs Patricia Gibson (North Ayrshire and Arran) and Patrick Grady (Glasgow North) asked “What recent assessment he has made of the effectiveness of the treaty on the prohibition of nuclear weapons?
(https://hansard.parliament.uk/commons/2021-02-01/debates/EACF13DF-2887-4466-80DA-C5D406342276/OralAnswersToQuestions)
Mr Wallace responded saying predicably: “The Government have been clear that we will not sign the treaty on the prohibition of nuclear weapons….”
Ms Gibson retorted: “The Secretary of State will be aware of the deep disappointment and frustration felt across Scotland and much of the UK because the UK Government did not join 85 other countries and sign up to the treaty on the prohibition of nuclear weapons on 22 January. Can he explain why the UK has failed to support this treaty, and how this is consistent with its strategic objectives and obligations under article VI of the nuclear non-proliferation treaty to make attempts in good faith to move towards the eventual abolition of nuclear weapons programmes?
Defence secretary Wallace, ducked the question, asserting: “The Government did not sign up to it because we do not think it is an effective way of dealing with this. We do think that the nuclear non-proliferation treaty is a more effective way of reducing both the spread and, indeed, the number of nuclear weapons on the planet, and that is why we favour gradual multilateral disarmament negotiated through a step-by-step approach.”
Grady pointed out that: “It seems as if global Britain is running in the opposite direction of global consensus on this issue. Rather than just hoping that nuclear weapons will never be used and working for some eventual point in the future when they might be eradicated, why will the Government not take the bold steps of signing this treaty and, for that matter, removing Trident from the shores of this country?”
Mr Wallace responded with a highly fatuous ramble, saying: “It may have missed the hon. Gentleman’s attention that other countries, those much less democratic and with much less regard for human rights, are working in the other direction and developing nuclear weapons. One reason we felt that nuclear weapons are important to the United Kingdom, when other regimes such as, potentially, North Korea and others develop them, is as a deterrent. We will continue to believe that, and seek ways to reduce nuclear holdings around the world in a multilateral, not a unilateral way. If I think that some of those adversaries care about some of those countries having nuclear weapons or not, the world might be slightly different, but it is not. We should be careful and protect our friends. We are a provider of a nuclear deterrent for NATO and for Europe. That has kept the peace for 50 years, despite some very aggressive nuclear powers.”
For a much more nuanced, honest and expert assessment, I recommend reading the new 36-page research paper written by Steven Hill, an Associate Senior Policy Fellow at the Institute of Security and Global Affairs, Leiden University, released last week by international think tank, Chatham House, titled:
NATO and the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons
( 29 JANUARY 2021) ISBN: 978 1 78413 441 9
(https://www.chathamhouse.org/2021/01/nato-and-treaty-prohibition-nuclear-weapons)
Hill has recently completed a six-year term in office as the chief legal counsel to NATO secretaries general Jens Stoltenberg and Anders Fogh Rasmussen. His paper asks: What does the entry into force of the TPNW mean for NATO and its member states?
Background: The Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW) entered into force on 22 January 2021.
As part of a project examining NATO obligations and how they interact with nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament law and policy, this paper focuses on what the entry into force of the TPNW should mean for members of the NATO Alliance.
NATO has long maintained a strong unified position in opposition to the new treaty, meaning that under current circumstances it is unlikely that any NATO member will join the TPNW. But the reality for NATO, its members and partners is that the TPNW is now here to stay.
There is a risk that if the Alliance maintains an intense focus on opposing the TPNW, this may obscure NATO’s broader long-standing commitment to global nuclear disarmament, and may undermine the potential for NATO and supporters of the TPNW to work together to advance the common goal of nuclear disarmament.
Contents
• Summary
• 01 Introduction
• 02 NATO nuclear policy
• 03 NATO’s concerns about the TPNW⌄
o Background: TPNW negotiations and approval at the UN
o Concerns set out in the NAC statements
o Other potential NATO concerns
• 04 The TPNW and customary international law
• 05 NATO’s ADN policy
• 06 Conclusions
• About the author
• Acknowledgments
Summary
• The Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW) entered into force on 22 January 2021. The treaty had been opened for signature at United Nations Headquarters in New York on 20 September 2017, and the threshold of 50 deposits of instruments of ratification, required for the TPNW to enter effect, was reached on 24 October 2020.
• As part of a project on understanding NATO obligations and how they interact with nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament law and policy, this paper focuses on what the entry into force of the TPNW should mean for the 30 NATO member states (Allies). NATO has maintained a strong unified position in opposition to the TPNW. Several NATO partner countries have joined the treaty; others have decided not to join, often citing the potential effect on their security and ongoing cooperation with NATO as grounds for this decision.
• The reality is that the TPNW will now be here to stay. Even if the prospect of a NATO Ally becoming a party to the TPNW may be currently assessed as unrealistic, a too intense focus on opposing the TPNW may obscure NATO’s broader long-standing commitment to global nuclear disarmament.
• Having set out the basic principles of NATO’s nuclear policy, and its delicate balance between nuclear disarmament and deterrence, this paper asks a number of critical questions in the context of the entry into force of the TPNW. What are the core arguments that NATO Allies have advanced against the TPNW? Do these arguments hold weight in response to various criticisms that have been levelled them against? Can the TPNW create customary international law? If so, is the ‘persistent objector’ strategy adopted by NATO Allies an effective one? And what can NATO now do to strengthen its support for arms control, disarmament and non-proliferation?
• The paper concludes with recommendations as to how NATO can position itself on these issues in the future. It also suggests that TPNW supporters could do more to engage NATO and like-minded states on ways to advance the common goal of nuclear disarmament.
Hill concludes: “The current state of the debate on the TPNW is highly polarized. Given the nature of Allies’ objections to the TPNW, it is unlikely that NATO will change
its position as expressed in the 2017 and 2020 NAC (North Atlantic Council, the political arm of NATO) statements. There is a strong feeling that TPNW supporters in civil society focus their energies on democratic countries and do not focus on other states that are exacerbating the current threat environment. TPNW supporters make good-faith arguments that often feature sophisticated legal interpretations aimed at addressing NATO’s concerns. However, these arguments are likely to remain unpersuasive in so far as they focus on legally available options and ignore political realities. It would be unfortunate if the current spirit of polarization around the TPNW were to have a negative impact on the overall propensity for cooperation – which is clearly needed by the international community.”
ANNEXES:
Independent report
Final Report - The Economics of Biodiversity: The Dasgupta Review
Final Report of the Independent Review on the Economics of Biodiversity led by Professor Sir Partha Dasgupta.
Published 2 February 2021
From:
HM Treasury
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The Economics of Biodiversity: The Dasgupta Review – Abridged Version
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The Dasgupta Review is an independent, global review on the Economics of Biodiversity led by Professor Sir Partha Dasgupta (Frank Ramsey Professor Emeritus, University of Cambridge). The Review was commissioned in 2019 by HM Treasury and has been supported by an Advisory Panel drawn from public policy, science, economics, finance and business.
The Review calls for changes in how we think, act and measure economic success to protect and enhance our prosperity and the natural world. Grounded in a deep understanding of ecosystem processes and how they are affected by economic activity, the new framework presented by the Review sets out how we should account for Nature in economics and decision-making.
The final Review comprises the Full Report, an Abridged Version and the Headline Messages. Final Report documents (above).
Press Notice including external reactions to the Review:
• The Economics of Biodiversity: The Dasgupta Review – Press Notice
• The Economics of Biodiversity: The Dasgupta Review – Reactions (document above)
General enquiries and feedback should be directed to the Independent Review team biodiversityreview@hmtreasury.gov.uk
Our economies, livelihoods and well-being all depend on our most precious asset: Nature.
We are part of Nature, not separate from it. We rely on Nature to provide us with food, water and shelter; regulate our climate and disease; maintain nutrient cycles and oxygen production; and provide us with spiritual fulfilment and opportunities for recreation and recuperation, which can enhance our health and well-being. We also use the planet as a sink for our waste products, such as carbon dioxide, plastics and other forms of waste, including pollution.
Nature is therefore an asset, just as produced capital (roads, buildings and factories) and human capital (health, knowledge and skills) are assets. Like education and health, however, Nature is more than an economic good: many value its very existence and recognise its intrinsic worth too.
Biodiversity enables Nature to be productive, resilient and adaptable. Just as diversity within a portfolio of financial assets reduces risk and uncertainty, so diversity within a portfolio of natural assets increases Nature’s resilience to shocks, reducing the risks to Nature’s services. Reduce biodiversity, and Nature and humanity suffer.
We have collectively failed to engage with Nature sustainably, to the extent that our demands far exceed its capacity to supply us with the goods and services we all rely on.
We are all asset managers. Individuals, businesses, governments and international organisations all manage assets through our spending and investment decisions.
Collectively, however, we have failed to manage our global portfolio of assets sustainably. Estimates show that between 1992 and 2014, produced capital per person doubled, and human capital per person increased by about 13% globally; but the stock of natural capital per person declined by nearly 40%. Accumulating produced and human capital at the expense of natural capital is what economic growth and development has come to mean for many people. In other words, while humanity has prospered immensely in recent decades, the ways in which we have achieved such prosperity means that it has come at a devastating cost to Nature. Estimates of our total impact on Nature suggest that we would require 1.6 Earths to maintain the world’s current living standards.
The Review calls the imbalance between our demands and Nature’s supply the ‘Impact Inequality’. Those demands are affected by the size and composition of our individual demands, the size of the human population, and the efficiency with which we both convert Nature’s services to meet our demands and return our waste back into Nature. Nature’s supply is affected by the ‘stock’ of natural assets and its ability to regenerate.
Our unsustainable engagement with Nature is endangering the prosperity of current and future generations.
Biodiversity is declining faster than at any time in human history. Current extinction rates, for example, are around 100 to 1,000 times higher than the baseline rate, and they are increasing. Such declines are undermining Nature’s productivity, resilience and adaptability, and are in turn fuelling extreme risk and uncertainty for our economies and well-being. The devastating impacts of COVID-19 and other emerging infectious diseases – of which land-use change and species exploitation are major drivers – could prove to be just the tip of the iceberg if we continue on our current path.
Many ecosystems, from tropical forests to coral reefs, have already been degraded beyond repair, or are at imminent risk of ‘tipping points’. These tipping points could have catastrophic 2 The Economics of Biodiversity: The Dasgupta Review – Headline Messages
consequences for our economies and well-being; and it is costly and difficult, if not impossible, to coax an ecosystem back to health once it has tipped into a new state. Low income countries, whose economies are more reliant than high income countries on Nature’s goods and services from within their own borders, stand to lose the most.
Reversing these trends requires action now. To do so would be significantly less costly than delay, and would help us to achieve wider societal goals, including addressing climate change (itself a major driver of biodiversity loss) and alleviating poverty.
At the heart of the problem lies deep-rooted, widespread institutional failure.
Nature’s worth to society – the true value of the various goods and services it provides – is not reflected in market prices because much of it is open to all at no monetary charge. These pricing distortions have led us to invest relatively more in other assets, such as produced capital, and underinvest in our natural assets.
Moreover, aspects of Nature are mobile; some are invisible, such as in the soils; and many are silent. These features mean that the effects of many of our actions on ourselves and others – including our descendants – are hard to trace and go unaccounted for, giving rise to widespread ‘externalities’ and making it hard for markets to function well.
But this is not simply a market failure: it is a broader institutional failure too. Many of our institutions have proved unfit to manage the externalities. Governments almost everywhere exacerbate the problem by paying people more to exploit Nature than to protect it, and to prioritise unsustainable economic activities. A conservative estimate of the total cost globally of subsidies that damage Nature is around US$4 to 6 trillion per year. And we lack the institutional arrangements needed to protect global public goods, such as the ocean or the world’s rainforests.
The 15th Conference of the Parties to the Convention on Biological Diversity (COP15) and the 26th Conference of the Parties to the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (COP26) provide important opportunities to set a new, ambitious direction for the coming decade, and establish the right environment to deliver on commitments made and the institutional arrangements needed to ensure those commitments are met.
The solution starts with understanding and accepting a simple truth: our economies are embedded within Nature, not external to it.
While most models of economic growth and development recognise that Nature is capable only of producing a finite flow of goods and services, the focus has been to show that technological progress can, in principle, overcome that exhaustibility. This is to imagine that, ultimately, humanity is ‘external’ to Nature.
The Review develops the economics of biodiversity on the understanding that we – and our economies – are ‘embedded’ within Nature, not external to it. The Review’s approach is based firmly in what we know from ecology about how ecosystems function, and how they are affected by economic activity, including the extraction of natural resources for our production and consumption, and the waste we produce through these activities, which ultimately damages ecosystems and undermines their ability to provide the services on which we rely. This approach helps us to understand that the human economy is bounded and reshapes our understanding of what constitutes truly sustainable economic growth and development: accounting fully for the impact of our interactions with Nature and rebalancing our demand with Nature’s capacity to supply. The Economics of Biodiversity: The Dasgupta Review – Headline Messages 3
We need to change how we think, act and measure success.
Humanity faces an urgent choice. Continuing down our current path – where our demands on Nature far exceed its capacity to supply – presents extreme risks and uncertainty for our economies. Sustainable economic growth and development requires us to take a different path, where our engagements with Nature are not only sustainable, but also enhance our collective wealth and well-being and that of our descendants.
Choosing a sustainable path will require transformative change, underpinned by levels of ambition, coordination and political will akin to, or even greater than, those of the Marshall Plan. The change required should be geared towards three broad transitions.
(i) Ensure that our demands on Nature do not exceed its supply, and that we increase Nature’s supply relative to its current level.
Food production is the most significant driver of terrestrial biodiversity loss. As the global population grows, the enormous problem of producing sufficient food in a sustainable manner will only intensify. Technological innovations and sustainable food production systems can decrease the sector’s contribution to climate change, land-use change and ocean degradation; reduce environmentally damaging inputs and waste; improve production system resilience, through methods such as precision agriculture, integrated pest management and molecular breeding techniques; and are likely to have a positive economic impact, including the creation of jobs. Demand for energy is a major contributor to climate change and resulting biodiversity loss. Decarbonising our energy systems is a necessary part of balancing demand and supply.
But if we are to avoid exceeding the limits of what Nature can provide on a sustainable basis while meeting the needs of the human population, we cannot rely on technology alone: consumption and production patterns will need to be fundamentally restructured. Breaking the links between damaging forms of consumption and production and Nature can be accelerated through a range of policies that change prices and behavioural norms, for example enforcing standards for re-use, recycling and sharing, and aligning environmental objectives along entire global supply chains.
Growing human populations have significant implications for our demands on Nature, including for future patterns of global consumption. Fertility choices are influenced not only by individual preferences, they are also shaped by the choices of others. As well as improving women’s access to finance, information and education, support for community-based family planning programmes can shift preferences and behaviour, and accelerate the demographic transition. There has been significant underinvestment in such programmes. Addressing that shortfall, even if the effects may not be apparent in the short-term, is essential.
Conserving and restoring our natural assets will sustain and enhance their supply. It is less costly to conserve Nature than to restore it once damaged or degraded, all else being equal. In the face of significant risk and uncertainty about the consequences of degrading ecosystems, in many cases there is a strong economic rationale for quantity restrictions over pricing mechanisms. Expanding and improving the management of Protected Areas therefore has an essential role to play. Multi-functional landscapes and seascapes that provide ecosystem goods and services, and protect and enhance biodiversity, are also important. Large-scale and widespread investment in Nature-based Solutions would help us to address biodiversity loss and significantly contribute to climate change mitigation and adaptation, not to mention wider economic benefits, including creating jobs. As part of fiscal stimulus packages in the wake of COVID-19, investment in natural capital has the potential for quick returns. Moreover, natural capital forms the bulk of wealth in low income countries, and those on low incomes tend to rely more directly on Nature. And so conserving and restoring our natural assets also contributes to alleviating poverty. 4 The Economics of Biodiversity: The Dasgupta Review – Headline Messages
(ii) Change our measures of economic success to guide us on a more sustainable path.
Nature needs to enter economic and finance decision-making in the same way buildings, machines, roads and skills do. To do so ultimately requires changing our measures of economic success. As a measure of economic activity, Gross Domestic Product (GDP) is needed for short-run macroeconomic analysis and management. However, GDP does not account for the depreciation of assets, including the natural environment. As our primary measure of economic success, it therefore encourages us to pursue unsustainable economic growth and development.
The Review demonstrates that in order to judge whether economic development is sustainable, an inclusive measure of wealth is needed. By measuring our wealth in terms of all assets, including natural assets, ‘inclusive wealth’ provides a clear and coherent measure that corresponds directly with the well-being of current and future generations. This approach accounts for the benefits from investing in natural assets and illuminates the trade-offs and interactions between investments in different assets.
Introducing natural capital into national accounting systems would be a critical step towards making inclusive wealth our measure of progress. Frameworks for natural capital accounting and assessment exist and are at different stages of development, and while significant problems of design and measurement remain, this should not deter governments and businesses from supporting and embracing them. Increased investment in physical accounts and valuation would improve the quality of natural capital accounts. Standardisation of data and modelling approaches, and technical support, would make it easier to embed natural capital accounting in national economic accounts, and, above all, use the information to improve decision-making at scale around the world.
(iii) Transform our institutions and systems – in particular our finance and education systems – to enable these changes and sustain them for future generations.
Information required for managing ecosystems is asymmetrically distributed: much is uniquely understood and best managed by local communities, but important perspectives are also held among national governments, international organisations and along global supply chains. Institutional arrangements that enable sustainable engagement with ecosystems are ‘polycentric’. They pool knowledge and perspectives among and across different levels – global, regional, national and local – and from different organisations, communities and individuals. In doing so, they enable relevant information to flow, and allow for collaborative planning, participation and coordination.
Ecosystems that are global public goods raise problems, the solutions for which transcend national seats of governance. The Review points to the need for supra-national institutional arrangements. There are two broad classes of cases to consider. For those ecosystems (biomes, more accurately) that are located within national boundaries (for example, tropical rainforests), a system of payments to nations for protecting the ecosystems on which we all rely should be explored. For ecosystems that lie outside national boundaries (for example, the oceans beyond exclusive economic zones), imposing charges, or rents, for their use (for example, ocean traffic and ocean fisheries) and prohibiting their use in ecologically sensitive areas should be instituted. It may even be that the revenue generated from the latter system of international governance is able to pay for the former system of international governance.
Enabling the changes we need will also require collective and sustained action to transform the systems that underpin our engagements with Nature, above all our financial and education systems. Our global financial system is critical to supporting a more sustainable engagement The Economics of Biodiversity: The Dasgupta Review – Headline Messages 5
with Nature. Financial flows devoted to enhancing our natural assets are small and are dwarfed by subsidies and other financial flows that harm these assets. We need a financial system that channels financial investments – public and private – towards economic activities that enhance our stock of natural assets and encourage sustainable consumption and production activities. Governments, central banks, international financial institutions and private financial institutions all have a role to play.
Financial actors can also help us manage and mitigate the risks and uncertainty that result from our unsustainable engagement with Nature. Businesses and financial institutions can do this by accounting for dependencies and impacts on Nature in their activities; and through the measurement and disclosure, not only of climate-related financial risks but Nature-related financial risks too. And central banks and financial regulators can support increased understanding by assessing the systemic extent of Nature-related financial risks. What is ultimately required is a set of global standards underpinned by credible, decision-grade data, which businesses and financial institutions can use to fully integrate Nature-related considerations into their decision-making, and assess and disclose their use of, and impact on, Nature.
However, relying on institutions alone to curb our excesses will not be enough. The discipline to draw on Nature sustainably must, ultimately, be provided by us as individuals. But societal change – particularly growing urbanisation – has meant that many people have grown distant from Nature. Interventions to enable people to understand and connect with Nature would not only improve our health and well-being, but also help empower citizens to make informed choices and demand the change that is needed; for example by insisting that financiers invest our money sustainably and that firms disclose environmental conditions along their supply chains, and even boycotting products that do not meet certain standards. Establishing the natural world in education policy is therefore essential. The development and design of environmental education programmes can help to achieve tangible impact, for example by focusing on local issues, and collaborating with scientists and community organisations.
Transformative change is possible – we and our descendants deserve nothing less.
At their core, the problems we face today are no different from those our ancestors faced: how to find a balance between what humanity takes from Nature and what we leave behind for our descendants. While our ancestors were incapable of affecting the Earth system as a whole, we are doing just that.
The transformative change needed in choosing the sustainable path requires the sustained commitment of actors at all levels. It also involves hard choices. Standard economic models view our choices as self-centred. There is growing evidence, however, that our preferences are affected by the choices of others – they are ‘socially embedded’. Since we look to others when acting, the necessary changes are not only possible, but are likely to be less costly and less difficult than often imagined.
The success stories from around the world highlighted throughout the Review show us what is possible. They also demonstrate that the same ingenuity that has led us to make demands on Nature that are so large, so damaging and over such a short period, can be redeployed to bring about transformative change, perhaps even in just as short a time. We and our descendants deserve nothing less.
The Economics of Biodiversity: Advisory Panel
An expert Advisory Panel has been established and held its inaugural meeting to support the independent global review on The Economics of Biodiversity
HM Treasury 19 September 2019
https://www.gov.uk/government/news/the-economics-of-biodiversity-advisory-panel
An expert Advisory Panel has been established to support the independent global review on The Economics of Biodiversity, led by Professor Sir Partha Dasgupta. The Panel held its inaugural meeting at HM Treasury on Monday 16 September.
The Advisory Panel, made up of leading individuals from public policy, science, economics, finance and business, will provide expert insight and challenge to support Professor Sir Partha Dasgupta deliver the Review’s objectives.
The Panel members are:
• Inger Andersen - Executive Director, United Nations Environment Programme
• Juan Pablo Bonilla - Manager of the Climate Change and Sustainable Development Sector, Inter-American Development Bank
• Sir Ian Cheshire - former Chair, Barclays Bank UK PLC
• Dominic Christian - Global Chairman for Reinsurance Solutions, Aon
• Kemi Badenoch MP (Panel Chair) - Exchequer Secretary to the Treasury
• Sir Roger Gifford - Chairman of the Green Finance Institute
• Professor Cameron Hepburn - Professor of Environmental Economics, Oxford Martin School
• Professor Justin Lin - Director of New Structural Economics, National School of Development, Peking University
• Professor Georgina Mace - Professor of Biodiversity and Ecosystems, University College London
• Professor Henrietta Moore - Director of the Institute for Global Prosperity and Chair in Culture, Philosophy and Design, University College London
• Professor Cosmas Ochieng - Global Director, Governance Centre, World Resources Institute and formerly Director, Africa Natural Resource Centre, African Development Bank African Development Bank
• David Hill* - Director General for Environment, Rural and Marine, Department for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs
• Dame Fiona Reynolds - Master of Emmanuel College, Cambridge University
• Charles Roxburgh* - Second Permanent Secretary, HM Treasury
• Lord Nicholas Stern - Professor Economics and Government, and Chair of the Grantham Research Institute on Climate Change and the Environment, London School of Economics
• Kristian Teleki - Director of Sustainable Ocean Institute, World Resources Institute
• Professor Sir Robert Watson - Director of Strategic Development, Tyndall Centre for Climate Change Research, University of East Anglia
• Kate Wylie - Global Vice President of Sustainability, Mars
*Ex Officio
In addition, Sir David Attenborough has agreed to act as an Ambassador for the Review.
Background
In Spring 2019, HM Treasury asked Professor Sir Partha Dasgupta to lead an independent global review on the Economics of Biodiversity. The Review will aim to (i) assess the economic benefits of biodiversity globally; (ii) assess the economic costs and risks of biodiversity loss; and (iii) identify a range of actions that can simultaneously enhance biodiversity and deliver economic prosperity.
The Review will be based on a thorough consideration of robust, relevant, up-to-date evidence and a Call for Evidence was launched on 14 August 2019. The Call for Evidence will run until 6 November 2019. Responses to any, or all, of the questions can be sent to: biodiversityreview@hmtreasury.gov.uk.
The Review will report to the Prime Minister, the Chancellor and the Secretary of State for the Environment, Food and Rural Affairs, ahead of the 15th Conference of the Parties to the Convention on Biological Diversity taking place in October 2020 in China.
NATO and the Nuclear Weapons Ban Treaty: Options for the Biden Administration
https://www.justsecurity.org/74366/nato-and-the-nuclear-weapons-ban-treaty-options-for-the-biden-administration/
by Kjølv Egeland
Just Security, January 28, 2021
The Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW) entered into force on Jan. 22. While supporters such as U.N. Secretary-General António Guterres have praised this development as an important milestone in the struggle against the bomb, critics like the Trump Pentagon have argued that the treaty could undermine the unity and security of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). But whether the TPNW becomes a problem for NATO is entirely up to the allies.
As always with the Atlantic alliance, much will depend on the United States. Excluding the option of America itself joining the TPNW, the Biden administration is left with two alternative strategies. The first would be to continue to resist and make an issue of the treaty, raising the dickens to deter allies from signing. The second would be to kill the TPNW’s supposed negative externalities with kindness, accepting the treaty’s emergence while seeking to make the best of it.
What is the TPNW and Why Does It Matter to NATO?
The TPNW was adopted by 122 states in July 2017 and prohibits any development, possession, and use of nuclear arms. Promoted by a transnational coalition of states and NGOs, the treaty is designed to give institutional weight to the vision of a world without nuclear weapons and, by extension, to build pressure for disarmament over the long term. Unsurprisingly, the nuclear-armed states and many of their allies have been skeptical of the treaty, arguing that it might delegitimize the policy of nuclear deterrence or foster “polarization” in the international community. While NATO officially supports the goal of nuclear disarmament, none of the allies have so far joined the agreement. This could easily change over the next few years, however, as a number of political parties and electoral coalitions in NATO member states appear determined to capitalize on strong public support for ratification.
NATO has referred to itself as a “nuclear alliance” since 2010, but the uniquely nuclear aspects of allied cooperation are in practice limited to the deployment of a combined 150 U.S. B61 nuclear gravity bombs to Belgium, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, and Turkey, participation in the annual nuclear drill “Steadfast Noon” by the five nuclear hosts mentioned above and two or three others, a few relatively equivocal paragraphs in NATO’s policy documents, and infrequent, choreographed “consultations” on allied nuclear policy in the NATO Nuclear Planning Group and its subsidiary organs. Three members – Britain, France, and the United States – have their own nuclear arsenals. Each nation’s head of government enjoys “sole authority” over their country’s nuclear arms. Now they must decide what to do about the TPNW. With the United States remaining the dominant force in NATO, the diplomatic strategy of the Biden administration will be of particular importance.
Option 1: Raising the Stakes
Broadly corresponding to the general approach adopted by the Trump administration following the 2017 adoption of the Treaty, the strategy of raising the stakes would involve publically threatening allies and partners considering signature with various political and diplomatic reprisals (as Team Trump did with Sweden), to raise concern about verification arrangements and the TPNW’s alleged undermining of other disarmament instruments, and to frame the new agreement as “dangerous,” “destabilizing,” and “incompatible with NATO strategy.” This tack might help delay what some have described as the long-term “inevitability” of a NATO member joining the treaty – several allies are already under increasing domestic pressure to sign – but at a substantial risk. Indeed, the strategy has at least three significant downsides.
First, the repeated harping on purported negative externalities associated with the TPNW risks fostering self-fulfilling prophecies. After all, publically claiming that allied support for the TPNW will inexorably “undercut security in Europe,” “weaken NATO,” or generate exploitable “divisions in the alliance” is tantamount to sowing doubt about the United States’ willingness to come to the aid of allies that have joined the TPNW, thus emboldening adversaries and potential aggressors. Taking a stance perceived to be unnecessarily hawkish or hostile to nuclear disarmament and the TPNW could also serve to turn public opinion against NATO and the United States, thereby fostering the very division the opponents of the TPNW say they are determined to prevent.
Second, a strategy of opposition draws attention not only to the TPNW itself but also to America’s de facto opposition to what has effectively been a declared ambition of successive U.S. governments, namely a reduction in the salience of nuclear weapons and a strengthening of the norms constraining nuclear arms. Effectively declaring that a general security guarantee is insufficient – that the NATO security umbrella must be overtly “nuclear” – also sends a troubling signal to other states: to be secure in the twenty-first century, you either need your own nuclear arsenal or an express nuclear security guarantee from an ally with a large and flexible nuclear force.
Third, the persistent promulgation of a series of technical objections to the TPNW that former IAEA director Hans Blix has described as vicarious and “strained” weakens Washington’s credibility and ability to lead on other issues. In summary, raising the stakes around potential allied support for the TPNW is no doubt tempting as a means of dissuading allies from joining, yet it has detrimental impacts on other goals and inescapably increases the agony if or when the gamble fails.
Option 2: Playing It Cool
The alternative strategy – playing it cool – would invite Team Biden to reverse the Trump administration’s overt campaign against the TPNW, ceasing attempts at persuading others not to sign and playing down the alleged negative externalities associated with the agreement. While this strategy would be fully compatible with proclaiming that the United States itself will not sign the treaty for the foreseeable future, and that America will retain a “safe, secure and effective arsenal to deter any adversary,” the U.S. government would under this approach make it clear, tacitly or explicitly, that it will not punish or withdraw the general NATO security guarantee from allies that decide to join the TPNW. To do so, U.S. officials would simply make clear the United States’ enduring commitment to the security of each of its allies and to Article V of the NATO pact – irrespective of individual allies’ position on the legality of cluster munitions, landmines, nuclear arms, or other specific means of war.
This approach might hasten the process of at least some non-nuclear allies joining the treaty – some appear to have refrained from signing primarily due to concerns about U.S. reprisals – but would effectively do away with the prospect of the TPNW undermining meaningful military cooperation in NATO, undercutting security, or becoming a wedge between the allies.
After all, whether the security guarantee is sapped or military exercises are cancelled is largely up to the United States. Most TPNW-supporters in countries such as Germany, Norway, and Spain are eager to adhere in a way that involves as little disturbance to existing military and alliance arrangements as possible. For example, the Norwegian Liberal, Christian Democratic, and Center parties all combine explicit support for Norwegian signature of the TPNW with enthusiastic approval of NATO and the U.S. alliance, including through longstanding backing of Norwegian contributions to allied operations in Afghanistan and elsewhere. Few TPNW supporters in U.S.-allied countries are looking to cease participation in intelligence sharing, military drills, or joint military operations.
It’s important to note that, legally, such cooperative activities are compatible with ratification of the TPNW. As emphasized in the Oxford Commentary on The Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons, the agreement does not proscribe membership in alliances with nuclear-armed states or participation in joint drills or operations with such states so long as the state party in question stops short of actively “assisting” or “encouraging” the use or possession of nuclear arms.
Why Option 2 is the Better Path
Support for the TPNW is hardly radical or contrary to support for transatlantic cooperation. A number of former leaders in U.S.-allied nations have come out in favor of the TPNW, including two former NATO secretaries general. Former U.S. Secretary of Defense Bill Perry supports the agreement. According to former U.S. official Lawrence Korb, “If Reagan was still alive, he would be taking a leadership role, along with Pope Francis, in trying to get other nations, especially those with nuclear weapons to ratify the TPNW.”
The TPNW could even have some benefits for the United States over the long term. The overall aim of the states and organizations backing the TPNW is to weaken the prestige value of nuclear weapons and to over time build pressure for nuclear disarmament through the stigmatization of nuclear arms. On the one hand, such normative entrepreneurship could be interpreted as a long-term challenge to America’s strategic autonomy and, ultimately, the credibility of U.S. central deterrence. Evidently, any deterrent threat loses its credibility if its enactment is rendered unacceptable. On the other hand, the United States has repeatedly promised to reduce its reliance on nuclear weapons and to seek their eventual elimination. Owing to America’s conventional military superiority, a lower salience of nuclear weapons in global affairs would, all other things being equal, favor the United States.
Permitting non-nuclear allies to join the TPNW could also be of considerable value to those in a Biden administration who are eager to promote measures of nuclear restraint such as decreased funding for certain elements of the ongoing nuclear modernization effort, U.S.–Russian negotiations on further nuclear reductions, the phasing out of land-based ICBMs, or a shift to a no-first use or “sole purpose” nuclear posture. At present, the central argument against all of this is that America’s allies would never accept it. Indeed, virtually all observers, including industry-aligned hawks, accept that the United States does not need a first-use policy or enormous nuclear arsenal for its own national defense. These instruments are necessary, so goes the argument, to “reassure” unspecified “allies and partners.” Non-nuclear allies joining the TPNW would help take the sting out of this often-overegged sales pitch.
One more question remains: Would the TPNW effectively outlaw extended nuclear deterrence? While the TPNW does not prohibit the individual or collective use of force by conventional means, parties to the TPNW would be prevented from explicitly calling on the United States or other allies to use nuclear weapons on their behalf, for example in a conflict involving Russia. Yet ever since the 1950s, when the Soviet Union developed long-range nuclear forces capable of doing immeasurable damage to the United States, it has been widely acknowledged that, unless America’s own vital national interests or survival were at stake, no U.S. president would authorize use of nuclear arms against Russia. As former national security advisor and Secretary of State Henry Kissinger reportedly put it, “great powers do not commit suicide for their allies.” U.S. threats to use nuclear weapons in response to minor conflicts or conventional aggression in Europe are therefore not believable and consequently of little value as deterrents.
To the extent that extended nuclear deterrence has any credibility at all, this credibility resides, first, in the prospect that a U.S. president might on their own terms come to the conclusion that any use of a nuclear weapon by another state would warrant a nuclear response and, second, in the possibility that initially local conflicts could escalate to a point where America became fully invested. Yet U.S. allies’ ratification of the TPNW would not legally foreclose American use of nuclear weapons in either of these scenarios; adherence to the TPNW by Norway, Germany, or Spain would not prevent discretionary use of such weapons by the United States.
Shifting from an explicit “nuclear umbrella” to an unspecified “security umbrella” would arguably have little if any impact on NATO’s overall defense posture. Everyone – including those in the Kremlin – would know that the United States possesses nuclear weapons and that America might use them if its perceived national interests so dictated. It would, however, strip proponents of nuclear primacy and increased spending on nuclear weapons of access to the lazy yet potent argument that any step towards nuclear restraint would be incompatible with NATO’s status as a “nuclear alliance.” Basing NATO’s security on an unspecified, general security guarantee would also have historical precedent: In NATO’s early history, between 1949 and 1954, Denmark refused to allow explicit references to NATO use of atomic weapons in the alliance’s strategic documents.
Conclusion
As long as allies stay silent, the most conservative forces in and around NATO and the U.S. military-industrial complex will continue to have free reigns to present America’s “allies and partners” as a monolithic bloc of countries that oppose no-first use and are desperate for the United States to spend hundreds of billions of dollars on new ICBMs, new “low-yield” nuclear weapons, new ground-launched intermediate-range forces, and new nuclear-tipped cruise missiles deliverable from the air and sea. In fact, for many TPNW supporters in U.S.-allied nations, the disinclination to have one’s country used as a rhetorical bludgeon in the service of nuclear vested interests is precisely one of the reasons for supporting the TPNW.
If a progressive U.S. agenda on nuclear weapons is to succeed, it needs allies, partners, and civil society outriders to push the envelope. Those eager to support such an agenda must help shift the political center ground, expand the scope of political action, and allow Joe Biden to continue being a moderate.
IMAGE: Anti-nuclear activists of ICAN (International Campaign to Abolish Nuclear Weapons) and other peace initiatives stage a protest with 51 flags of countries that ratified the UN Treaty to Ban Nuclear Weapons and a nabber reading “Nuclear weapons are forbidden! More than 50 states joined. Germany didn’t”, in front of the Chancellery in Berlin, on January 22, 2021. The UN Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons came into force on January 22, 2021. (Photo by TOBIAS SCHWARZ/AFP via Getty Images)
drdavidlowryhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/05942986736046792589noreply@blogger.com1tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5177380912557235726.post-35463188574797388542021-01-31T14:16:00.001-08:002021-01-31T14:16:06.993-08:00Ministers confused over contradictions between trade and climate change policiesLetter sent to <i>The Guardian</i> newspaper:
International trade secretary Liz Truss was all over the airwaves on Sunday selling the merits of her advanced plans to join the 11-nation trans-Pacific partnership (https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2021/jan/30/uk-to-apply-to-join-free-trade-pact-with-nations-on-other-side-of-world)
Meanwhile, global climate change conference ( COP26) President Alok Sharma, the former business secretary, has himself been pressing the UK case for wide-ranging initiatives to address the looming problems of climate change, most recently his video speech to the World Economic Forum business 'virtual Davos 2021' conference last Friday on “'Mobilizing Climate Action (“Race to Zero Breakthroughs launched,, 29 Jan.;https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/race-to-zero-breakthroughs-launched)
But there is a clear disconnect between Truss and Sharma, and a lack of joined up government thinking.
The media to promote the Comprehensive and Progressive Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP)(https://www.gov.uk/government/news/uk-applies-to-join-huge-pacific-free-trade-area-cptpp) makes much of the benefits to UK exports of eliminating tariffs to these Pacific rim nations, stressing that UK trade with the group has been growing by 8% a year since 2016, and was worth was worth £111 billion in 2019.
But the physical exports to such countries many thousands of miles away, whether by cargo plane or ship, with have a significant carbon footprint, something Ms Truss does not mention at all. Indeed, international shipping is a significant contributor to global carbon emissions, that barely receives any political or media attention.
To be sure the CPTPP deal’s modern digital trade rules will also allow data to flow freely between members, which will not incur a negative carbon credit.
Prime Minister, Boris Johnson is reported to have said of the proposed CPTPP deal that it “demonstrates our ambition to do business all over the world and be an enthusiastic champion of global free trade.”
But how is this aim compatible with his also stated aim for the UK be a global leading light in promoting sustainable measures to combat climate change?
drdavidlowryhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/05942986736046792589noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5177380912557235726.post-7768972482271225952021-01-26T09:56:00.003-08:002021-01-26T09:56:54.443-08:00Nuclear Disarmament: how much longer must we wait?Letter sent to The Guardian newspaper:
Your defence and security editor quotes an anonymous Foreign Office official as asserting that rather than supporting the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (“the Ban treaty”) the UK Government supports “gradual multilateral nuclear disarmament.” (“UN nuclear arms treaty comes into force today,” 22 January 2021).
Foreign office minister Lords Ahmad of Wimbledon re-inforced this position when he told peers in a mini-debate on the Ban treaty in the Lords on 20 January “ [the Ban treaty] fails to offer a realistic path to global nuclear disarmament and, importantly, risks undermining the effective non-proliferation and disarmament architecture that we already have in place, in particular the work that has already been achieved with key partners on the NPT [multilateral nuclear non-proliferation treaty]”
(https://hansard.parliament.uk/lords/2021-01-21/debates/DCB6C09F-E381-42B2-AA59-7DCA1984D34C/ProhibitionOfNuclearWeapons)
Papers I discovered at the UK National Archives in Kew show that on 23 January 1968, Fred (later Lord) Mulley, as the UK Labour Government's minister of state for foreign affairs, addressing the 358th plenary meeting of the Eighteen Nation Committee on Disarmament (ENDC) in Geneva, ( the predecessor committee to the current UN Committee on Disarmament) explained to ministerial delegations why nations should sign up to the newly negotiated NPT:
"As I have made clear in previous speeches, my government accepts the obligation to participate fully in the [nuclear disarmament] negotiations required by [NPT] Article 6 and it is our desire that these negotiations should begin as soon as possible and should produce speedy and successful results. There is no excuse now for allowing a long delay to follow the signing of this treaty." (emphasis added)
Shortly after, on January 26 1968, a confidential memo by Mulley for the cabinet defence and oversea (sic) policy committee laid out Britain's position on the key nuclear disarmament clause, which became NPT article 6, commented: " It will be essential to follow the treaty up quickly with the further disarmament measures if it is to be brought into force and remain in force thereafter."
A few days afterwards, on 30 January 1968, and the NPT was presented to the cabinet for its endorsement. A supportive foreign office memo stated: "a lot of the thinking behind the treaty, and some of the language, originally came from us."
On 27 June that year, the NPT, including the key article 6 obligation on nuclear weapon signatory states, to negotiate nuclear disarmament in good faith, was presented to parliament as Cmnd 3683.
In the fifty years since the multilateral NPT came into force, not one British nuclear weapon or nuclear warhead has been withdrawn from service or dismantled as a result of multilateral nuclear disarmament negotiations.
How much longer should we wait for ”speedy” results?
drdavidlowryhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/05942986736046792589noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5177380912557235726.post-16291770026634614022021-01-22T12:53:00.001-08:002021-01-22T12:53:14.186-08:00Banned! The day Nuclear WMDs became illegal globallyToday, across the globe, it is a day of international celebration. For the first time since the very first nuclear device was exploded in the early hours of 16 July 1945 near Socorro in New Mexico, nuclear weapons became illegal under international law!
The Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW) – the “Ban Treaty” - entered into force today, three years after being negotiated at the UN General Assembly ( when it was backed by 122 nations) and 90 days after the 50th country joined the Treaty on 24 October 2020 (my birthday). This important multilateral treaty completes the project to ban all three categories of weapons of mass destruction after biological weapons were banned in 1975, and chemical weapons in 1997.
But not all is sweetness and light. The British Government – just as all those states with nuclear weapons of mass destruction - rejects the Ban Treaty
Foreign office minister Lords Ahmad of Wimbledon made the UK position clear when he told peers in a mini-debate on the Ban treaty in the Lords on 21 January this week “[the Ban treaty] fails to offer a realistic path to global nuclear disarmament and, importantly, risks undermining the effective non-proliferation and disarmament architecture that we already have in place, in particular the work that has already been achieved with key partners on the NPT [multilateral nuclear non-proliferation treaty]
(https://hansard.parliament.uk/lords/2021-01-21/debates/DCB6C09F-E381-42B2-AA59-7DCA1984D34C/ProhibitionOfNuclearWeapons)
Papers I discovered at the UK National Archives in Kew show that on 23 January 1968, Fred (later Lord) Mulley, as the UK Labour Government's minister of state for foreign affairs, addressing the 358th plenary meeting of the Eighteen Nation Committee on Disarmament (ENDC) in Geneva, ( the predecessor committee to the current UN Committee on Disarmament) explained why nations should sign up to the newly negotiated NPT, told the ministerial delegations:
"As I have made clear in previous speeches, my government accepts the obligation to participate fully in the [nuclear disarmament] negotiations required by [NPT] Article VI and it is our desire that these negotiations should begin as soon as possible and should produce speedy and successful results. There is no excuse now for allowing a long delay to follow the signing of this treaty." (emphasis added)
Shortly after, on January 26 1968, a confidential memo by Mulley for the cabinet defence and oversea (sic) policy committee laid out Britain's position on the key nuclear disarmament clause, which became NPT article 6, commented:
" It will be essential to follow the treaty up quickly with the further disarmament measures if it is to be brought into force and remain in force thereafter."
A few days afterwards, on 30 January 1968, and the NPT was presented to the cabinet for its endorsement. A supportive foreign office memo stated: "a lot of the thinking behind the treaty, and some of the language, originally came from us."
On 27 June that year, the NPT, including the key article 6 obligation on nuclear weapon signatory states, to negotiate nuclear disarmament in good faith, was presented as a formal treaty document to parliament as Cmnd 3683.
In the fifty years since the multilateral NPT came into force, not one British nuclear weapon or nuclear warhead has been withdrawn from service or dismantled as a result of multilateral nuclear disarmament negotiations.
In the Lords debate on “Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons” Lord Ahmad told the Bishop of Coventry, who initiated the debate:
“the Government have been clear that they will not sign the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons. We do not believe that this treaty will bring us closer to a world without such weapons. The Government believe that the best way to achieve our collective goal of a world without nuclear weapons is through gradual multilateral disarmament, negotiated using a step-by-step approach. We must take account of the international security environment and work under the framework of the nuclear non-proliferation treaty.”
The Bishop of Coventry pointed out that “as of 22 January the TPNW will be no less a reality for the UK than for countries that support it. It will be no less a reality for states that possess nuclear weapons than for those that do not. The UN Secretary-General has described this new treaty as ‘a further pillar of the disarmament regime,’ and asked “since the new treaty and its underlying humanitarian motivations will loom large over any future discussion of our non-proliferation responsibilities, what preparations are being made by the Government to engage with it constructively? Will they commit to attend, as an observer state, the first meeting of states party to the treaty, as Sweden and Switzerland are doing?
Lord Ahmad of Wimbledon failed to answer the question about observer status, but widened his opposition to the Ban treaty replying to Labour peer Baroness Blower:
“There are major challenges with this treaty, including the fact that it does not look at the existing security architecture, including our obligations to NATO. It does not look at how we deal with the threats from nations such as the DPRK.”
In other words, as NATO is fundamentally a military Alliance based on nuclear weapons, ministers have no intention of negotiating away its nuclear WMDs, multilaterally or bilaterally. Indeed, he later told Liberal Democrat peer Baroness Miller of Chilthorne Domer: “We remain very committed to a minimum but credible independent nuclear deterrent.”
Somewhat surprisingly, a Conservative peer, Lord Bates, then challenged the minister, (after pointing out first resolution of the UN General Assembly, held 75 years ago this weekend across the road in the Methodist Central Hall called for nuclear disarmament) by asking “How could my noble friend use this anniversary to advance our declared ambition of the complete elimination of all these weapons of mass destruction before it is too late?
Lord Ahmad obtusely retorted: “.. Our commitment to our obligations and our adherence to the rules-based system of international law and the treaties that we are part of will ensure the very objective he seeks and I seek as well.”
Labour peer Lord Judd expressed skepticism over the genuineness of this stated commitment asking:
“does the Minister agree that any advance that has been made in any of the conventions on nuclear weapons so far has been achieved in the context of firm undertaking by nuclear powers, including us, to steadily reduce the number of nuclear weapons at their disposal? There seems to be quite a lot of room for doubt about the commitment of some nuclear powers at the moment. Is it not a priority for the British Government to get together with the new Administration in the United States, and indeed with the French, to discuss how we should be carrying the new situation forward?”
Lord Ahmad, obtuse once more asserted:“…we will continue to engage with the US and with the P5 process. “
The Ban Treaty contains important provisions to provide for the restoration of environmental and health rights of communities and peoples who have suffered from the development and testing of nuclear WMDs. This was highlighted inan excellent analytical article by historian Dr Kate Hudson, national secretary of CND, published today (“Light at the end of the nuclear tunnel,” Morning Star, 22 January 2021; https://www.morningstaronline.co.uk/article/f/light-at-the-end-of-the-nuclear-tunnel)
Also published this week is an insightful academic review of two of the island locations desecrated by British and US atmospheric nuclear tests in the South Pacific in the 1950s. https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/1758-5899.12913?fbclid=IwAR0c2caol8dyHNnXzHZcxkGSFJl9Mnfsl2_VTJdDiFdJdQ5S9ERx0CoKKrk)
Addressing the Humanitarian and Environmental Consequences of Atmospheric Nuclear Weapon Tests: A Case Study of UK and US Test Programs at Kiritimati (Christmas) and Malden Islands, Republic of Kiribati
Becky Alexis‐Martin
Matthew Breay Bolton
Dimity Hawkins
Sydney Tisch
Talei Luscia Mangioni
First published: 20 January 2021
https://doi.org/10.1111/1758-5899.12913
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Abstract
Between 1957 and 1962, the UK and USA conducted 33 atmospheric nuclear weapons test detonations at or close to Malden and Kiritimati (Christmas) Islands (total yield 31 megatons), formerly British colonial territories in the central Pacific region, now part of the Republic of Kiribati. Some 40,000 British, Fijian, New Zealand and US civilian and military personnel participated in the test program and 500 i‐Kiribati civilians lived on Kiritimati at the time. This article reviews humanitarian and environmental consequences of the UK and US nuclear weapons testing programs in Kiribati, as well as the policy measures that have addressed them. The authors contend that policy interventions to date have not adequately addressed the needs and rights of test survivors, nor ongoing environmental concerns. They argue that the victim assistance and environmental remediation obligations in the 2017 Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons offer an important new opportunity for addressing the consequences of nuclear detonations in Kiribati, by focusing policy attention and constituting a new field of development assistance.
Policy Implications
• Policy interventions to date have not adequately addressed the needs and rights of survivors of the UK and US nuclear test program in Kiribati, nor ongoing environmental concerns.
• The victim assistance and environmental remediation obligations in the 2017 Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons offer an important new opportunity for addressing the consequences of nuclear detonations.
• Humanitarian and human rights framing of the effects of nuclear testing offer an alternative both to denialism and the litigation and liability model.
• Victims of nuclear testing seek not only medical assistance, but also support for practices of recognition, acknowledgement and memorialization to address psycho‐social and cultural consequences of the test programs.
• Policy interventions should acknowlege the intrinsic value many Pacific peoples place on the environment, not only its instrumental worth.
Between 1957 and 1962, the UK and USA conducted 33 atmospheric nuclear weapon test detonations at Malden and Kiritimati (Christmas) Islands (see data Table S1, available online), formerly British colonial territories in the central Pacific region that are now part of the Republic of Kiribati.1. The total yield of all detonations was equivalent to 31,122 kilotons of TNT (Johnston, 2009) – approximately 865 times the total energy released by the atomic bombs dropped by the US on Japan in 1945. Some 40,000 British, Fijian, Aotearoa New Zealand and US civilian and military personnel participated in the test program. Their work cemented Britain’s status as a thermonuclear power but also placed them in harsh conditions with limited resources. About 500 i‐Kiribati civilians lived on Kiritimati at the time. Many test personnel and i‐Kiribati inhabitants claim their health was adversely affected by exposure to the blast, heat and radioactive energy released by the tests, as well as the psychosocial context in which they occurred. Some suggest their descendants have also suffered physically and psychologically. However, comprehensive analysis of the ongoing humanitarian and environmental impact of nuclear weapons testing at Kiritimati and Malden Islands has been inadequate. There has been little systematic radiological monitoring of the test sites and so the extent and significance of ongoing contamination is unclear. For a map of Kiritimati, see Figure 1.
igure 1
Open in figure viewerPowerPoint
FUS Defense Department map of Kiritimati Atoll, Republic of Kiribati Source: DNA (1983).
The Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW), adopted by 122 governments at the United Nations in 2017, is not just a categorical ban. It also obligates provision of assistance to victims of nuclear weapons use and testing and remediation of contaminated environments (Article 6). All states parties must engage in international cooperation and assistance to support such efforts by affected states parties (Article 7). Kiribati was among the first states to sign the new treaty in September 2017 and ratified in 2019. Along with other nuclear‐armed states, the UK and USA currently oppose the TPNW, as they remain committed to maintaining their nuclear arsenals. However, the other two states whose citizens participated in the tests, New Zealand and Fiji, are also states parties. The TPNW will enter into force 22 January 2021.
This article reviews humanitarian and environmental consequences of the UK and US nuclear weapons testing programs at Kiritimati and Malden Islands, as well as the policy measures and practices that have addressed these consequences, whether in Kiribati itself, or other jurisdictions where atomic veterans live. We contend the policy interventions to date have so far not adequately addressed the needs and human rights of test survivors, nor ongoing environmental concerns. We believe the TPNW offers an important new opportunity for addressing the consequences of nuclear detonations in Kiribati, by focusing policy attention on the issue and constituting a new field of development assistance.
We compile findings from separate but mutually reinforcing research projects on the consequences of test programs in Kiribati. Dr. Becky Alexis‐Martin has undertaken 144 semi‐structured interviews with British nuclear test veterans and their descendants and 15 open‐ended interviews with women from Kiritimati as part of her Nuclear Families and Atomic Atolls projects from 2016 to 2019. She has undertaken extensive ethnographic research of memorialization and the experience of nuclear warfare. (Alexis‐Martin, 2016a; Alexis‐Martin, 2016b; Alexis‐Martin, 2019a; Alexis‐Martin, 2019b; Alexis‐Martin, et al, 2019; Alexis‐Martin and Davies, 2017). Dr. Matthew Breay Bolton (2018a, 2018b) conducted field research in Kiritimati in 2018 and has also conducted related interviews and archival research in Australia, Cook Islands, Fiji, New Zealand and, with the help of Sydney Tisch, the USA, 2018–2019. This paper builds upon Bolton’s (2018a, 2018b) working papers that have circulated in policy arenas. Dimity Hawkins, at Swinburne University, has been engaging in an in‐depth project documenting Fiji’s intersection with the history of Pacific nuclear testing. Through a combination of extant literature and archival research as well as oral histories, her project explores the emergence of anti‐nuclear activism and government engagement around the time of Fijian independence and early Pacific decolonization. Talei Luscia Mangioni is a Fijian researcher in Pacific Studies at the Australian National University, her creative scholarship charts the Nuclear Free and Independent Pacific (NFIP) movement across Oceania through historical ethnography, film‐making and archiving.
Across all these research projects, there are noteworthy challenges in interdisciplinary qualitative research, due to its inherently subjective, extensible and complex nature. While interview‐based approaches offer rich insights into the human experience of the nuclear, the qualitative has an inherently intuitive element and has been described as an art rather than a rigorous scientific process (Miles et al., 2019). Regardless, there is considerable intrinsic value to the qualitative domain, as it can amplify the voices of people who may otherwise not be heard by the establishment and/or state (Weiss and Fine, 2004). For this reason, personal stories and testimonies of both islanders and veterans provide vital insights into the long‐term consequences of US and UK Pacific nuclear weapon testing.
There are additional complications involved in assessing health risks and health outcomes resulting from exposure to ionizing radiation. While a certainty is presented by the very detonation of the nuclear weapon tests themselves, a militarized culture of secrecy surrounds the extent, capacity for exposure and long‐term consequences to local inhabitants of the spaces used for testing – and the young men and women who undertook nuclear weapon testing work. The circulation of radioactive particles through ecosystems and human bodies occurs in complex and nonlinear ways. Ambiguities about risk are exacerbated by limited research and active denial by the governments that carried out the tests, especially the UK (see the Sanders‐Zakre and Van Duzer commentary in this Special Section for further comparison of the US and UK approaches to documentation, compensation and litigation; also, Maclellan, 2017a; Roff, 2018). Exposures have not been comprehensively assessed through all the potential pathways, including external exposure, inhalation and ingestion. Measuring multiple health conditions, each with changing multifactorial causation, accurately over long timeframes is difficult, and attribution even more difficult (UNSCEAR, 2015). This creates challenges for those seeking to establish clear lessons for policy and practice in victim assistance and environmental remediation. This article thus summarizes evidence the authors have been able to gather but in no way purports itself to be comprehensive in scope. Rather, we hope that our work prompts further, more in‐depth and technical efforts to understand and ameliorate the suffering resulting from the test programs.
A further concern arises from the colonial history of Kiribati and its relationship to military powers that have sought to use its ecosystems, oceans and people for their own ends. Nuclear test programs represented a nadir of Western scientific exploitation, with disastrous consequences for the environments and people in the marginalized zones chosen as sites of experimentation (Banivanua Mar, 2016; DeLoughrey, 2013; Teaiwa, 2008). The authors are not residents of Kiribati. We ourselves did not participate in the test program. We have sought to be conscious, reflexive and careful about the implications of our social locations by circulating drafts of our research widely with officials, scholars and civil society advocates in and from the region for feedback. We see the role of this article not as recommending policy per se, which must be the preserve of the people most affected, but rather highlighting concerns and offering potential tools for addressing them.
The next section provides background on the UK and US nuclear weapons test programs in Kiribati. This is followed by an overview of the humanitarian consequences of the test programs in Kiribati itself; among atomic veterans from the UK, USA, Fiji and New Zealand; and potential effects elsewhere in the Pacific. A similar section then considers the environmental consequences of the tests. We then outline the various policy responses to the humanitarian and environmental consequences to the tests, in Kiribati, as well as jurisdictions responsible for atomic veterans. We conclude with reflections on the potential contribution the TPNW might play in supporting effective policies.
Conclusion
Just over six years ago, in early December 2014, I attended the conference organized in Vienna by the Austrian foreign ministry, on The Humanitarian Impact of Nuclear Weapons (https://www.bmeia.gv.at/en/european-foreign-policy/disarmament/weapons-of-mass-destruction/nuclear-weapons/vienna-conference-on-the-humanitarian-impact-of-nuclear-weapons/), and a supporting conference organized by ICAN ( the International Campaign to Abolish Nuclear Weapons), who subsequently won the Nobel Peace Prize for their work done on the Ban Treaty. I made a near 50 page submission on the health and impact of uranium mining - for nuclear warhead production - on the communities and people involved, which was published as part of the Conference proceedings.( “ Uranium Exploitation and Environmental racism: Why environmental despoliation and the ignorance of radiological risks of uranium mining cannot be justified by the nuclear weapons states for the procurement of the raw stock material for their nuclear explosives,” Vienna, 8-9 December 2014 https://www.bmeia.gv.at/fileadmin/user_upload/Zentrale/Aussenpolitik/Abruestung/HINW14/Statements/HINW14_Statement_David_Lowry.pdf)
Backstory
The Ban Treaty coming into effect has received media coverage globally. Here are some reports from Hawaii, Japan, US, Geneva and UK
Today, Friday 22 January 2021, nuclear weapons became illegal under international law!
The Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW) entered into force today, three years after being negotiated at the UN General Assembly and 90 days after the 50th country joined the Treaty on 24 October 2020. UNA-UK welcomes this important multilateral Treaty which completes the project to ban all three categories of weapons of mass destruction after biological weapons were banned in 1975, and chemical weapons in 1997.
While the UK does not currently support this Treaty, pressure is mounting on the Government to engage constructively with it, and ultimately, to join it. Today, we are calling on UNA-UK supporters to assist this project. The International Campaign to Abolish Nuclear Weapons (ICAN) is running a Cities Appeal, asking cities and local authorities across the world to endorse the Treaty. So far cities and local authorities across the UK including Manchester, Edinburgh, Oxford, Brighton and Hove, Norwich and Leeds, have signed up to support the Treaty’s implementation. With your help we would like to dramatically increase the list.
Please ask your city or local authority to join the growing list!
Here you can access an adaptable template letter, which you can send to your city or local authority imploring them to endorse the Treaty and take a stand for nuclear disarmament. A full list of all cities and local authorities signed up so far can be viewed here, and you can access further resources and information on how the Appeal is impacting policy makers here.
The complete elimination of nuclear weapons remains the highest disarmament priority of the United Nations. UN Secretary-General, António Guterres, recognised the instrumental role of civil society in facilitating the negotiation and ratification of the TPNW and called on all states to work together to realise the ambition of a world free from nuclear weapons.
UNA-UK is a proud partner organisation of the International Campaign to Abolish Nuclear Weapons - the 2017 Nobel Prize laureate. Please join us in this campaign by urging your local authorities to take action.
Just as civil society was instrumental in advancing the entry into force of this treaty, civil society can also be instrumental in building support for the treaty and taking action to push their national governments to join.
This is it. We have made history. Today, the UN Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons enters into force, making nuclear weapons illegal under international law.
Getting here took decades of tireless work by millions of people from all over the world, and we would have loved to fill the streets to commemorate this huge victory with them and reaffirm our commitment to seeing a world free of nuclear weapons. Of course, today's reality is a little different, so we are filling social media with this wonderful news. We're already trending in ICAN's HQ Switzerland but we'd love the entire world to see this. Will you help us spread the world?
[amplify.icanw.org/campaign/B8AE84F5-A6F7-4BDE-92D0-24F66DD77A4D]Celebrate
We took the liberty of creating some tweets you can share on your own accounts, with just one click! If you don’t use Twitter, don’t worry, you can find a post and image for your social media of choice [amplify.icanw.org/campaign/B8AE84F5-A6F7-4BDE-92D0-24F66DD77A4D]here. And if you want to get some inspiration from what others are saying, and to see all the celebrations around the world, check out our live social media wall at icanw.org/entryintoforce
We did it! Today, nuclear weapons become illegal under international law as the UN Treaty on the Prohibitions of Nuclear Weapons - or #nuclearban treaty - enters into force. Join the celebrations all around the world:
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The big day is here! Today, nuclear weapons become illegal under international law. Join the celebrations all around the world using #nuclearban and watch our live event at 9PM CET: https://icanw.org/entryintoforce #nuclearban
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Thank you !
Beatrice Fihn
Executive Director
ICAN
OPINION: Japan and the nuclear ban treaty
https://english.kyodonews.net/news/2021/01/6213ad3afd94-opinion-japan-and-the-nuclear-ban-treaty.html
By Daryl G. Kimball, KYODO NEWS - Jan 21, 2021 - 14:51 |
For the first time since the United States' devastating atomic bomb attacks on the cities of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, nuclear weapons development, production, possession, use, threat of use, and stationing nuclear weapons in another country are all expressly prohibited by an international agreement: the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons, which enters into force Jan. 22.
The new treaty is a much-needed wake-up call that strengthens the international norm against nuclear weapons. It is consistent with the decades-long plea of the Hibakusha that never again should anyone experience "nuclear hell on earth."
Daryl G. Kimball. (Kyodo)
The treaty is also a powerful reminder that security policies that rely on nuclear deterrence -- which involves the threat of the use of nuclear weapons and death on a massive scale -- are immoral, dangerous, and unsustainable.
Because the leaders of the United States and its allies, such as Japan, still believe that the threat of using nuclear weapons is necessary for their defense, they have criticized the treaty.
However, the treaty, which was negotiated and is supported by a majority of the world's nations is now a reality. All states -- whether they oppose, support, or are skeptical of the treaty -- need to learn to live with it responsibly and find creative ways to work together toward their common objectives: preventing nuclear war and ridding the world of nuclear weapons.
Going forward, the new administration of U.S. President Joe Biden can and should publicly recognize the treaty as a constructive effort designed to help fulfill Article VI Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty disarmament obligations and build the legal framework for the elimination of all nuclear weapons.
The nuclear ban treaty should also prompt U.S. allies like Japan to reconsider whether nuclear deterrence is really necessary for their defense and how they can move toward an alternative, more sustainable, and less risky defense strategy. They must also be more energetic in pressing the nuclear-armed states to fulfill their NPT disarmament commitments.
Prime Minister Yoshihide Suga can start by directing the Foreign Ministry to work with nuclear ban treaty states and nuclear-armed states to forge agreement on a meaningful plan of action at the once-every-five-years review conference for the NPT in August. This plan of action could include:
-- deeper cuts in all types of the massive U.S. and Russian nuclear arsenals.
-- multilateral talks involving other nuclear-armed states, including China, to cap the size of their smaller but still deadly nuclear stockpiles.
-- a multilateral agreement on no first use of nuclear weapons.
-- securing the remaining ratifications needed to bring the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty into force.
-- agreeing, as presidents Ronald Reagan and Mikhail Gorbachev did in 1985, that "a nuclear war cannot be won and must never be fought."
They should also agree that nuclear ban treaty does not create a legal framework that competes with the NPT, but rather, it makes the existing universe of legal instruments around the NPT stronger.
The new treaty may not reduce the nuclear danger overnight, but it has already changed the conversation. Japan's leaders should recognize that the treaty can help move the world in the direction that all nations say they want -- a world free of the fear of another nuclear hell on earth.
(Daryl G. Kimball is executive director of the independent, nongovernmental Arms Control Association based in Washington)
The Treaty To Ban The Bomb Takes Effect
https://www.civilbeat.org/2021/01/the-treaty-to-ban-the-bomb-takes-effect/
Fifty-one nations have now ratified the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons. Will the United States sign?
By Helen Jaccard
January 21, 2021
________________________________________
About the Author
Helen Jaccard
Helen Jaccard is the project manager of the Golden Rule peace boat.
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Great news: On Friday, Jan. 22, 2021, the United Nations’ Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons goes into force.
Three and a half years ago, on July 7, 2017, the United Nations General Assembly approved the language of this treaty by a vote of 122 to 1.
The vote was a clear expression of the will of the world’s people and the treaty has now been ratified by 51 nations.
Under international law, nuclear weapons will join chemical weapons, biological weapons, cluster bombs and land mines as illegal weapons of mass destruction.
The Golden Rule anti-nuclear sailboat arrived in Hawaii on July 31, 2019 from San Diego, California. The 34-foot ketch, a project of Veterans For Peace, has now sailed to the islands of Hawaii, Maui, Lanai, Oahu and Kauai to promote the treaty.
The crew of the Golden Rule has presented to over 100 audiences on those islands and on Molokai about the dangers of nuclear weapons.
The Golden Rule Project has been welcomed by the Hawaii Legislature and the governments of each of Hawaii’s four counties. Mahalo, Hawaii, for your aloha spirit.
The nuclear missile attack scare in the islands three years ago compelled many of the people of Hawaii to join worldwide efforts to abolish nuclear weapons.
On Nov. 6, 2019, Honolulu County passed a resolution to welcome the Golden Rule and to urge the U.S. government to ratify the treaty and to take other measures to bring us back from the brink of nuclear war.
The Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons prohibits signatory countries from developing, testing, producing, manufacturing, acquiring, possessing, deploying, transporting, financing, using or threatening to use nuclear weapons and also from assisting or encouraging such acts.
The Golden Rule sails in the waters off Diamond Head last August.
The Nuclear Ban Treaty is a milestone in the long march toward nuclear abolition. This is a moment to urge all the nuclear powers to sign the treaty and begin the process of the de-nuclearization of the world.
Nowhere is this more important than in the United States, which holds almost half of the world’s nuclear weapons.
None of the world’s nine nuclear-armed nations have yet signed on to the treaty. These nuclear powers are in violation of the 50-year-old Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, which requires them to negotiate in good faith to reduce and eventually eliminate all nuclear weapons.
Instead, the United States and other nuclear powers are developing new generations of nuclear weapons, alarming many experts who believe the threat of nuclear war is greater than ever.
The United States government will spend over $1.7 trillion of our tax dollars over the next 30 years to “upgrade” its arsenal of nuclear weapons.
Powerful and influential corporations make billions of dollars from the nuclear programs and contribute to members of Congress, who vote to continue nuclear weapons production. These corporations make astronomical profits from weapons that would doom civilization.
Our nation can be a leader in the peace race, but only if our leaders hear a loud message from the people: Nuclear weapons are very dangerous for humanity and now they are also illegal.
We must have a future free of weapons of mass destruction. The United States must take immediate actions to stop the possibility of nuclear war and to show leadership in the worldwide effort to eliminate all nuclear weapons. The future of humanity hangs in the balance.
Political leaders need to hear from everyday people who are rightfully concerned about the very survival of human civilization. We must demand that the United States and all the nuclear powers sign the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons and begin the de-nuclearization of the planet.
The International Campaign for the Abolition of Nuclear Weapons was awarded the 2017 Nobel Peace Prize for its leadership in working to pass the treaty. Veterans For Peace and the Golden Rule Project were a part of that campaign and share in the Nobel Peace Prize.
Celebrate the nuclear weapons ban treaty and talk with friends, neighbors, relatives and your elected representatives about the treaty and the need to prevent the possibility of nuclear war.
Sign
The TPNW coming into force and the NPT RevCon
https://www.scrapweapons.com/the-tpnw-coming-into-force-and-the-npt-revcon/
The TPNW renders nuclear weapons illegal under international law, but what about the non-signatories?
Anant Saria
Research Manager, SCRAP Weapons
The Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW) has come into force on January 22, 2021, 90 days after achieving its 50th ratification from Honduras on 24th October, 2020. This essentially means that nuclear weapons will be rendered illegal under International Law as soon as the treaty comes into force. However, the biggest impediment is that no nuclear weapon state has signed or ratified the treaty, and therefore the treaty is not binding for such states. Nonetheless, it serves its purpose of setting a norm in international politics. There has been active resistance from the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) member states towards the treaty. Netherlands, the only NATO state present at the voting of the treaty, voted against it citing that it cannot ‘sign up to any instrument that is incompatible with our NATO obligations, that contains inadequate verification provisions or that undermines the Non-Proliferation Treaty.’ With the TPNW coming into force, what it typically means is that, although international law claims nuclear weapons are illegal, the ones that possess them do not agree in their illegality. This does trickle down to the enforceability of the illegality of nuclear weapons under international law. Two factors are intertwined in this case: 1) The establishment of a norm (like Responsibility to Protect – R2P) through international consensus; 2) the enforcement of such norms for states that probably did not ‘sign up to’ or agree with the norm. In practice, this entails that those states (and International Organisations, such as NATO) which already have a nuclear stockpile or a Foreign Policy involving the maintenance of a nuclear arsenal are very unlikely to accept this new treaty. However, international consensus around norms and treaties like R2P, the Convention on Cluster Munitions (CCM) and the Mine Ban Treaty (MBT) serves to highlight the impact that internationally agreed treaties and norms can have on states individually, whether or not they have subscribed to the norm in question. From this perspective, global pressure (largely coming from the states without a nuclear arsenal) can be relatively effective.
Although immense friction exists in the implementation of the TPNW due to the disagreement by NATO members, the TPNW will come to force in January 2021 and make nuclear weapons illegal under international law. This article is going to explore the different factors for consideration due to the TPNW coming into force with regard to the global disarmament discourse at the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) Review Conference (RevCon) 2021.
Leveraging the norm against nuclear weapons at the NPT RevCon
Although nuclear states have not signed and/or ratified the TPNW, the 50 ratifications that it has received hold great importance. That is the primary reason that most non-signatories have had to present and defend their stance against this treaty. The central principle of international law – ‘pacta sunt servanda – says ‘pacts or treaties must be respected and as provided for under the Vienna Convention of the Law of Treaties (VCLT). As such, an international treaty imparts some level of accountability in the international community.
Previous treaties on prohibiting weapons have been successful in curbing proliferation of those weapons and have forwarded a norm in the international community against Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMDs). The implementation of the TPNW would directly translate into a legal leverage for the Non-Nuclear Weapons States (NNWS) in the international community, especially at the NPT RevCon 2021. Apart from the legal leverage, as a treaty, the TPNW will also provide normative advantage to the NNWS. Harald Müller & Carmen Wunderlich have extensively discussed the challenge that the TPNW will pose to the four central norms of the existing nuclear order: constraints on use, political restraint, non-proliferation, and disarmament. This combination of a legal and normative challenge to the Nuclear Weapons States (NWS) is likely to lead to a huge boost to the nuclear disarmament discourse despite the NWS not having signed the TPNW. There is immense optimism in the disarmament community regarding the TPNW’s enforcement and its positive impact on the elimination of nuclear weapons, especially in light of the positive impact of the Convention on Cluster Munitions (CCM) and the Mine Ban Treaty (MBT).
The MBT, 1999 and the CCM, 2010 demonstrated the normative power of treaties in the international community. This was evident from the behaviour of the states that were not party to these treaties. For example, the CCM and MBT discouraged and hampered production and investment by companies in the respective weapons, even in the states not party to the treaties. This is illustrated by the disinvestment of companies like Textron and Orbital ATK from cluster munitions in the United States (US) after the CCM entered into force, despite the US not being party to the treaty. Similarly, Egypt’s policy against landmine production after the MBT despite not having acceded to the treaty illustrates the normative value of such international treaties. The treaties also impacted the trade of these weapons, significantly reduced their use, and attracted policies and investment away from such weapons. The TPNW is expected to attract similar normative effects against nuclear weapons. For example, ABP – one of the largest pension funds in the world announced divestment from nuclear production entities in 2018 due to the TPNW’s adoption. We are bound to see more financial institutions move away from nuclear weapons in the coming years.
Such normative and legal leverage has to be built upon by the NNWS in the upcoming NPT RevCon 2021. The TPNW will come into force months before the NPT RevCon. This gives the state parties of the TPNW an opportunity to convene before the NPT RevCon, and within the first year of the TPNW’s coming into force as mandated by the treaty. At the first meeting of TPNW states parties, the NNWS can possibly take decisive action and decisions, clarify TPNW’s functioning within the NPT, address verification issues and address possible roadblocks and objections that the NWS are bound to bring up at the RevCon. The illegality of nuclear weapons under international law should be leveraged by NNWS to lobby NWS to not only seriously tackle nuclear disarmament at first, but to also to invoke the more important commitment to ‘General and Complete Disarmament’ as stated under Article VI of the NPT.
NATO, TPNW and the NPT
NATO members have objected to the TPNW on several grounds. These include accusing the TPNW on undermining the NPT and noting that NATO member states cannot sign onto a treaty that is in conflict against NATO’s mission and obligations, as well as highlighting the inadequate verification mechanisms under the TPNW
NATO states have earlier adopted independent positions on Nuclear Weapons and relevant treaties, like the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT). However, when it comes to the TPNW, NATO seeks to ‘create the conditions for a word without nuclear weapons’ under its commitment to seek ‘a safer world.’ Notably, NATO states claim over 90 per cent reduction in the nuclear weapons committed to NATO since the peak of the Cold War. However, they are committed to hold onto Nuclear Weapons for as long as nuclear weapons exist for the purpose of security through deterrence and extended deterrence. Therefore, NATO states have pledged towards the eradication of nuclear weapons, but only under a ‘favourable security environment’ without signing onto a treaty that deems nuclear weapons illegal under international law.
‘Rogue’ states like North Korea and Iran are deemed to be the main proponents for the absence of the ideal conditions for nuclear disarmament. This is a major barrier to the normative effect of international treaties as established earlier, since a nuclear security dilemma – by which states engage in acquisition of greater security capabilities due to mutually perceived threat from the rising security capabilities of the other state – caused by nuclear weapons is less likely to be solved by international norms. What it requires is intentional and direct action in the direction of nuclear disarmament by the states that possess them.
Strategically, instead of opposing a treaty like the TPNW, the NATO member states should sign onto such a treaty and participate in the member state conferences. These states can work collectively towards the attainment of the most appropriate and effective verification regimes for the enforcement of the treaty. Under the NPT, nuclear disarmament was being continually postponed. This made the discourse rather weak and dangerous for the non-proliferation regime. With the entry of the TPNW into force, NNWS will have added momentum and an alternate legal instrument to affirm their non-proliferation commitment and further nuclear disarmament. NWSs will only add friction to this process by opposing it. The normative power of international treaties has been instated by the same western NWSs that are now opposing it. Instead, participating in the process to find solutions to the aspects that they identify as issues would further the disarmament initiative. But this is hindered by the belief that the NPT is the most important document for non-proliferation and disarmament, and that the TPNW seeks to undermine it.
It is worth noting that there are direct references to the NPT in the TPNW. The drafters of the TPNW took particularly great care to prevent any clash with the NPT. This is evident from the repetition of the mutually reinforcing nature of the two treaties in the TPNW text. The preamble of the TPNW also reaffirms the importance of the NPT as the cornerstone of the nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation for international peace and security. Apart from these direct references to the NPT, the TPNW also states that, ‘The implementation of this Treaty shall not prejudice obligations undertaken by States Parties with regard to existing international agreements, to which they are party, where those obligations are consistent with the Treaty.’ This is characterised by the NWS as undermining the NPT by virtue of inconsistency between the obligations under the two treaties. However, that is not the case as the two treaties are consistent in their legal obligation of not hosting or developing nuclear weapons.
Additionally, the NPT also calls on NWSs to pursue nuclear disarmament under Article VI. The TPNW only seeks to serve as an instrument to provide a major push to the nuclear disarmament discourse in the NPT negotiations. The TPNW also requires party states to maintain their existing safeguards with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in compliance with the NPT. A report from Wilton Park – United Kingdom (UK) Foreign Office also iterates that ‘Despite the significant mistrust between TPNW supporters and opponents, the Treaty is unlikely to have an overwhelmingly negative impact on the remainder of the 2020 NPT RevCon cycle.’
Conclusion
The resistance from NATO member states to an international treaty that essentially aligns with the goals and motive of NWSs and NATO, only serves to elongate the nuclear disarmament discourse and progress. There is a need to draw attention to the resistance towards an international treaty that is a result of a historic UN General Assembly resolution, from states that have hailed international institutions, norms, structures and treaties to formulate the International Order in the first place. The disagreements between NWS and the NNWS needs to be addressed using several international structures and organizations already in place. The use of verification instruments that efficiently work when several NATO member states advocate for keeping an eye on North Korea, or Iran, can be expanded to serve verification purposes on a global scale. A Middle East Nuclear Weapons Free Zone (NWFZ), which is a primary concern on the disarmament and NPT Agenda, can be expanded to include more NWFZs for trust building, alongside verification measures to build up to an international security environment conducive for nuclear disarmament. However, these measures and future possibilities for substantial progress towards a nuclear weapons free world will only continue to be delayed under active resistance from NWSs and the NATO member states. The only way to get rid of nuclear weapons is to start getting rid of them. Active participation from these key states in the discourse to solidify verification structures would boost the pace of the rather stagnant discussions at the NPT after the impetus provided by the TPNW as an international treaty. Active resistance would build disagreements and divide instead of making material progress to achieve a common global goal. The NPT RevCon 2021 will be strategically important since it will follow the coming into force of the TPNW in a world where nuclear weapons are illegal and defy the norm. NNWSs must capitalize on the legal and normative advantage that this provides them and the NWSs must recognize the compatibility and potential of the TPNW along with the NPT to attain substantial, mutually beneficial progress towards General and Complete Disarmament, starting with Nuclear Disarmament.
Campaigners Celebrate Nuclear Ban Treaty with Projections on iconic Edinburgh Buildings
Trident Ploughshares Press Release: 22nd January 2021
To mark the entry into force today of the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons campaigners have projected images and slogans onto key Edinburgh buildings, as part of the worldwide celebration.
The images were projected onto the Scottish Parliament, the government building at Victoria Quay, the Tron on the Royal Mile, and, as a special challenge to the UK government which has refused to acknowledge the Treaty, on the new Scotland Office building in New Street.
As well as “The World is No Place for Nuclear Weapons”, the images noted that the Treaty has outlawed nuclear weapons, and that the Scottish government supports it.
The TPNW prohibits the developing, testing, producing, manufacturing, otherwise acquiring, possessing, stockpiling, transferring, using or threatening to use nuclear weapons, assisting other states with these prohibited activities, stationing, deployment or installation of nuclear weapons belonging to other states on a state party's territory. The nine nuclear weapons states (including the UK) have not signed or ratified the TPNW but nevertheless it will affect their capabilities and, more importantly, as with other inhumane weapon prohibition treaties and conventions, it is already changing the global perception of what is acceptable.
Portobello resident and Trident Ploughshares member Margaret Bremner said:
“The Tron in Edinburgh has long been the place to welcome in the New Year. Today's welcome, written large, is for the UN TPNW; a cause for celebration around the world. A clear message of support also shone on the Parliament, the Scottish Office and the new UK government building, QE House: The World is No Place For Nuclear Weapons. Campaigners recognise that the Scottish government supports this Treaty, but pressure will need to continue to convince the UK to accede to its demands.”
Images available here. Please credit to Double Take Projections
Contact: Margaret Bremner on 07733366476
www.nuclearban.scot; www.icanw.org
Here it is – the wonderfully daft ICAN Can-Can, celebrating the nuclear ban treaty. Big thanks to all who contributed!
https://youtu.be/WyXrBYJuP1s
And here are some other videos singers have shared so far today celebrating the ban - enjoy and share the message!
Eileen Penman sings The Freedom Come All Ye: https://youtu.be/1stfCEjCQ0A
Kim Edgar sings The Freedom Come All Ye: https://youtu.be/H1pu-6S5JSQ
(more Freedom Come All Yes will be coming throughout the day - I'll send you the rest of the links later, but they're all going up here if you want to see them sooner: www.singlouderthanguns.com/nuclear-ban-treaty-songs/)
and here is Peggy Seeger's special Carry Greenham Home: https://youtu.be/xkuVT6iIr6I
The World is No Place for Nuclear Weapons – Scotland Resists
https://bellacaledonia.org.uk/2021/01/22/the-world-is-no-place-for-nuclear-weapons-scotland-resists/
22 January 2021
To mark the entry into force today of the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons campaigners have projected images and slogans onto key Edinburgh buildings, as part of the worldwide celebration. The images were projected onto the Scottish Parliament, the government building at Victoria Quay, the Tron on the Royal Mile, and, as a special challenge to the UK government which has refused to acknowledge the Treaty, onto the new Scotland Office building in New Street.
As well as “The World is No Place for Nuclear Weapons”, the images noted that the Treaty has outlawed nuclear weapons, and that the Scottish government supports it.
The TPNW prohibits the developing, testing, producing, manufacturing, otherwise acquiring, possessing, stockpiling, transferring, using or threatening to use nuclear weapons, assisting other states with these prohibited activities, stationing, deployment or installation of nuclear weapons belonging to other states on a state party’s territory.
The nine nuclear weapons states (including the UK) have not signed or ratified the TPNW but nevertheless it will affect their capabilities and, more importantly, as with other inhumane weapon prohibition treaties and conventions, it is already changing the global perception of what is acceptable.
As Trident Ploughshares member Margaret Bremner said:
“The Tron in Edinburgh has long been the place to welcome in the New Year. Today’s welcome, written large, is for the UN TPNW; a cause for celebration around the world. A clear message of support also shone on the Parliament, the Scottish Office and the new UK government building, QE House: The World is No Place For Nuclear Weapons. Campaigners recognise that the Scottish government supports this Treaty, but pressure will need to continue to convince the UK to accede to its demands.”
More details on the campaign here.
It’s time to end the nuclear era!
http://www.abolition2000.org/en/news/2021/01/15/its-time-to-end-the-nuclear-era/
January 15, 2021 | Blogroll, Nuclear Ban Treaty, United Nations
Today, January 15, 2021, in advance of next week’s two milestones of the entry into force of the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW) on January 22 and the 75th anniversay of UN General Assembly Resolution 1(1) two days later, the Coordinating Committee of the Aboltion 2000 Global Network to Eliminate Nuclear Weapons issued a statement to welcome the new treaty into the body of international law regarding the illegality of such weapons and to remind all states of their 75-year obligation to disarm.
The statement affirms that: “Despite the protests of nuclear weapons states, the TPNW is an important measure to support the abolition of nuclear weapons globally. Its preamble highlights the risks posed by the existence of nuclear weapons and the catastrophic humanitarian consequences that would result from their use. The states who have ratified the treaty and those who join later are affirming this understanding, demonstrating their commitment to a nuclear-weapon-free world, and accepting additional commitments to advancing this through national nuclear prohibition measures and international promotion.”
The statement highlights the work of civil society ever since 1945 when Hiroshima and Nagasaki were obliterated in a nuclear hecatomb which was entirely avoidable and undertaken for purely political purposes to establish the USA as a single global power after the end of World War II. The subsequent nuclear arms race has led to the possession of an estimated over 13,000 nuclear weapons by nine states which leaves the planet on the brink of disaster through war or accident ever since. Furthermore, the over 400 nuclear power stations stroon across the face of the planet, without which nuclear weapons couldn’t be made, are disasters on the scale of Chernobyl and Fukushima waiting to happen as a result of war, natural disaster and terrorism.
The TPNW makes unequivocal the illegality of nuclear weapons and any activity associated with them and the statement calls on states parties to implement legislation as soon as possible, especially concerning the areas of transit of nuclear weapons and the financing of their production, stating that, “Prohibiting transit would place additional restrictions on the current deployment of nuclear weapons. And if all of these countries and all the companies and institutions that operate within them were to end investments in the nuclear weapons industry, for example, it would make an even more significant impact on the nuclear arms race.”
The TPNW’s journey from idea to legally binding treaty has been opposed every step of the way by nuclear armed states and their military allies who have boycotted negotiations, put pressure on countries that advocated for a ban, and now they deny any obligation under it, yet, “they cannot escape their obligations to achieve nuclear disarmament. They agreed to this in the very first resolution of the United Nations, UNGA Resolution 1 (1) adopted on January 24 1946 by consensus.”
“Entry into force of the TPNW and the 75th anniversary of UNGA Resolution 1 (1) two days later provides an opportune time to remind all states of the illegality of the threat or use of nuclear weapons and of their nuclear disarmament obligations, and to call on them to implement these immediately.
“It’s time to wrap up the nuclear weapons era.”
To read the full statement click here.
January 15, 2021
Time to wrap up the nuclear weapons era!
Statement of the Abolition 2000 Coordinating Committee on the occasions of the Entry into Force of the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons and the 75th anniversary of UN Resolution 1 (1).
On January 22, the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW) will enter into force. It will specifically prohibit States Parties from developing, testing, producing, manufacturing, acquiring, possessing, deploying, using or threatening to use nuclear weapons, and from assisting or encouraging such acts. And it will reinforce existing international law obligating all states not to test, use or threaten to use nuclear arms.
Despite the protests of nuclear weapons states, the TPNW is an important measure to support the abolition of nuclear weapons globally. Its preamble highlights the risks posed by the existence of nuclear weapons and the catastrophic humanitarian consequences that would result from their use. The states who have ratified the treaty and those who join later are affirming this understanding, demonstrating their commitment to a nuclear-weapon-free world, and accepting additional commitments to advancing this through national nuclear prohibition measures and international promotion.
We encourage all ratifying states to develop and pass comprehensive implementing legislation that includes prohibitions on the transit and financing of nuclear weapons. Prohibiting transit would place additional restrictions on the current deployment of nuclear weapons. And if all of these countries and all the companies and institutions that operate within them were to end investments in the nuclear weapons industry, for example, it would make an even more significant impact on the nuclear arms race. And we encourage the ratifying states to establish ministerial positions and public advisory committees and disarmament education funds to facilitate public education and effective policy to further advance the objective of a nuclear-weapon-free world.
The TPNW has been achieved as a result of seventy-five years of nuclear disarmament activism by civil society—supported by mayors, parliamentarians, and like-minded governments—ever since the catastrophic humanitarian impact of nuclear weapons was demonstrated by the nuclear bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki.
Such action has been successful in the past in the achievement of treaties to prohibit nuclear testing, reduce nuclear weapons stockpiles, prevent the widespread proliferation of nuclear weapons and ban
them in over 110 countries through nuclear-weapon-free zones. It has also helped develop a taboo against the use of nuclear weapons and prevent their use in armed conflict since 1945. However, this taboo is flimsy, and the possibility that nuclear weapons will be used by accident, conflict escalation, miscalculation or malevolent intent remains so long as the weapons exist and are part of security policies.
Nuclear armed states may refuse to join the TPNW, but they cannot escape their obligations to achieve nuclear disarmament. They agreed to this in the very first resolution of the United Nations, UNGA Resolution 1 (1) adopted on January 24 1946 by consensus, which was adopted by consensus. Furthermore, Article VI of the Non-Proliferation Treaty requires States Parties to achieve nuclear disarmament. In addition, all States are bound by treaty and custom-based international law prohibiting the threat or use of nuclear weapons as affirmed by the International Court of Justice in 1996 and the UN Human Rights Committee in 2018.
Entry into force of the TPNW and the 75th anniversary of UNGA Resolution 1 (1) two days later provides an opportune time to remind all states of the illegality of the threat or use of nuclear weapons and of their nuclear disarmament obligations, and to call on them to implement these immediately.
It’s time to wrap up the nuclear weapons era.
Light at the end of the nuclear tunnel
https://www.morningstaronline.co.uk/article/f/light-at-the-end-of-the-nuclear-tunnel
The Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW), comes into force today. For the first time ever the production and possession of such weapons has been ruled illegal.
Morning Star, 22 January 2021 KATE HUDSON reports
DECADES OF RESISTANCE: Anti-nuclear weapons campaigners unfurl a banner on the arm of the Finniston Crane in Glasgow in June 2012
NEW treaties are not often greeted with the recognition and enthusiasm that they merit.
They can seem dry and legalistic, overladen with clauses and dusty formulations.
But the reality is that treaties are often the bringing into law of profoundly humanitarian principles, of significant advances in human rights, of steps towards peace and to protect all communities.
And they are often the result of years of campaigning, of lobbying, marching, and direct action.
The Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW), which comes into force today, is just such a treaty. The result of over 60 years of anti-nuclear campaigning it is a remarkable and path-breaking achievement.
The Treaty bans the use, production, possession and deployment of nuclear weapons, along with specific activities that could enable or assist anyone to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons.
For the first time, nuclear weapons are declared illegal under international law. In the past, the World Court ruled that their use would be unlawful under virtually all circumstances, but this is the first time that their production and possession — indeed their very existence — has been ruled illegal.
There can be no doubt that treaty has the potential to achieve a world without nuclear weapons but there is also much more to the treaty, in very human terms.
For the past decade, the work that was undertaken to achieve this treaty was based on profound concern, by states, campaigners and international bodies such as the Red Cross and Red Crescent, about the catastrophic humanitarian consequences that would result from any further use of nuclear weapons.
As discussions continued across the globe, it was acknowledged that complete elimination of such weapons was the only way to guarantee that they would never be used again under any circumstances.
The treaty that resulted from this process recognised the catastrophic consequences of nuclear weapons, that they “transcend national borders, pose grave implications for human survival, the environment, socioeconomic development, the global economy, food security and the health of current and future generations, and have a disproportionate impact on women and girls, including as a result of ionising radiation.”
The treaty also acknowledges the ethical imperatives for nuclear disarmament describing a nuclear weapon-free world as a global public good of the highest order, serving both national and collective security interests.
But one of the most moving sections of the treaty is that which recognises the unacceptable suffering and harm caused to the victims of the use of nuclear weapons (hibakusha), as well as of those affected by the testing of nuclear weapons. It explicitly recognises the disproportionate impact of nuclear-weapon activities on indigenous peoples, because of the choices made by nuclear powers for their testing sites.
Article 6 of the treaty is entitled Victim Assistance and Environmental Remediation. It requires each state party to the treaty to provide individuals who are affected by the use or testing of nuclear weapons, “with age and gender-sensitive assistance, without discrimination, including medical care, rehabilitation and psychological support, as well as provide for their social and economic inclusion.”
And it also covers land contaminated as a result of activities related to the testing or use of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices — states “shall take necessary and appropriate measures towards the environmental remediation of areas so contaminated.”
These two commitments are long overdue. The appalling death toll from nuclear weapons testing has never been adequately measured or addressed. Indeed, testing has so shocked generations of activists that it has been a powerful motivator in building our movement.
Looking back to the early days of anti-nuclear campaigning in Britain, it was primarily public outrage about nuclear testing that led to the founding of Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament (CND).
According to the UN’s Comprehensive Test-Ban-Treaty Organisation (CTBTO), the United States conducted 1,032 nuclear tests between 1945 and 1992: at the Nevada Test Site, at sites in the Pacific Ocean, in Amchitka Island of the Alaska Peninsula, Colorado, Mississippi, and New Mexico. Between 1951 and ’58, around 100 nuclear weapons tests were conducted in the atmosphere at the Nevada Test Site. The fallout from the tests was transported thousands of miles away from the site by winds. As a result, people living in the US during these years were exposed to varying levels of radiation.
Early testing by the Soviet Union took place on the steppes of Kazakhstan in what was then Soviet central Asia.
Tests were later conducted in the Russian archipelago of Novaya Zemlya, as well as in the Urals and at the Missile Test Range area in Kazakhstan. The CTBTO reports that the health impact on the local population includes genetic defects and illnesses, ranging from cancers to impotency to birth defects and other deformities.
Between 1952 and ’57, Britain conducted a total of 12 atmospheric nuclear tests on Australian territories at the Montebello Islands, and at Maralinga and Emu Field in South Australia.
The impact of British testing in Australia remains a matter of contention until today. Although the Montebello Islands were uninhabited, the atmospheric nuclear tests spread radioactivity across large parts of the Australian mainland.
Fallout from the testing at the Australian First People’s territories in Emu Field and Maralinga contaminated large parts of South Australia.
According to the UN, of the over 2,000 nuclear explosions detonated worldwide between 1945 and 1996, 25 per cent or over 500 bombs were exploded in the atmosphere: over 200 by the US, over 200 by the Soviet Union, about 20 by Britain, about 50 by France and over 20 by China.
For many decades, nuclear weapons tests have caused unacceptable harm across the globe.
Now, with the TPNW we have a huge opportunity, not only to eradicate nuclear weapons and secure our survival, but to right the historic wrongs that so many people have suffered at the hands of the nuclear weapons states.
We must work to ensure that Britain signs up to this treaty and makes full recompense to the Australian First Peoples — and to all those who have been affected by its disastrous obsession with nuclear weapons.
drdavidlowryhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/05942986736046792589noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5177380912557235726.post-12796113928080961312021-01-21T07:08:00.007-08:002021-01-21T07:08:48.759-08:00Credit to Corbyn where dueLetter sent to The Guardian:
Your important article(“WHO chief warns of ‘catastrophic moral failure ‘ over jabs distribution,” 19 January ) overlooks the fact that two days earlier former Labour Party leader Jeremy Corbyn made campaigning for what he called “vaccine equality” one of four policy priorities for his new radical “Peace and Justice Project” (https://thecorbynproject.com/projects/) reported only on line.(“Jeremy Corbyn to start global social justice project ‘for the many’ 13 December 2020; https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2020/dec/13/jeremy-corbyn-to-start-global-social-justice-project-for-the-many; and” Former Labour leader calls for ‘free and accountable’ media at launch of his Peace and Justice Project,” 17 January; https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2021/jan/17/jeremy-corbyn-campaign-murdoch-television-channel-peace-justice
Mr Corbyn stressed that “It is increasingly clear that very poor countries will have to wait years to access the [ vaccination] treatment and protect their people.. experts suggest nine out of ten people in poor countries will not receive a vaccine this year.. as distorted global economy is preventing recovery across the Global South.”
In closing the 90 minute long on line webinar launching his new project, globally respected public intellectual Professor Noam Chomsky, now 92, told the forum from his home in the US that he regarded Jeremy Corbyn’s “values as an inspiration to all of us,” adding he has” impressive integrity and fortitude.”
Considering the appalling media coverage Mr Corbyn received last year as he was hounded out of the parliamentary Labour party by its “new management”, it was good to hear some heartfelt truth from such a respected global campaigner for justice as Chomsky in support of Mr Corbyn.
drdavidlowryhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/05942986736046792589noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5177380912557235726.post-88855702234165424352021-01-19T09:29:00.001-08:002021-01-19T09:29:17.363-08:00The Incredible Disappearing Test & Trace Parliamentary AnswerYesterday Green MP Caroline Lucas received a written ministerial answer from the Department for Health and Social Care in response to her question on a contract awarded to the Boston Consulting Group (BCG) on test and trace, which the media had reported included paying individual consultants £7,000 per day. (“Test-and-trace consultants are being paid £7,000 a day,” The Times, 15 October 2020; www.thetimes.co.uk/article/test-and-trace-consultants-are-being-paid-7-000-a-day-ngl8vlqvw; “Coronavirus: Gove defends £7,000 day rate for test-and-trace consultants,” Sky News, 18 October 2020; https://news.sky.com/story/coronavirus-gove-defends-7-000-day-rate-for-test-and-trace-consultants-12107394)
It took the department three months to produce the reply. The Parliamentary rule of thumb is an answer should normally be provided within five working days.
On 11th November, nearly three weeks after asking her original question, Caroline Lucas asked the Health Secretary Matt Hancock, when he planned to answer the original question that had been tabled (submitted) on 16 October 2020 on BCG.
Junior health minister, Edward Argar, replied on 30 November:
“We take parliamentary scrutiny incredibly seriously and it is fundamentally important that hon. Members are provided with accurate and timely information to enable them to hold Government to account. We are working rapidly to provide all Members with accurate answers to their questions, as well as supporting the Government’s response to the unprecedented challenge of the COVID-19 pandemic.”
He closed by adding “The hon. Member’s (Lucas) question will be answered as soon as possible.(https://questions-statements.parliament.uk/written-questions/detail/2020-11-11/114133)
In between Dr Lucas asking this clarification questi0on and getting an answer, at Prime Minister's questions on Wednesday 25 November 2020 (Hansard at Column 818), Labour Leader Keir Starmer asked the following pertinent question:
“Where do I start on this one? Last week, we learned that suppliers with political connections were 10 times more likely to be awarded Government contracts, and this week The Sunday Times reports that the Health Secretary appointed one of his closest friends to a key advisory role.
This friend also is a major shareholder, as it happens, in a firm that specialises in lobbying the Government on behalf of its clients, and some of those clients have secured tens of millions of pounds of Government contracts during the pandemic. Was the Prime Minister aware of this apparent conflict of interest?
Prime Minister Boris Johnson answered, saying, inter alia, “In so far as there are any conflicts of interest, they will be evident from the publication of all the details of all the contracts.”
(https://hansard.parliament.uk/commons/2020-11-25/debates/FA145A50-F2C7-45C7-8CEF-51F0B5AF23D3/Engagements)
A week later, Mr Argar appeared before the House of Commons Procedure Committee to explain why his department had been so late in answering correspondence from MPs and PQs (https://committees.parliament.uk/committee/126/procedure-committee/news/136919/committee-questions-minister-on-department-of-health-performance-in-answering-parliamentary-questions/). He said to the committee there were some 1500 written PQs that were still late being answered by Health ministers. The average delay peaked at 14.8 days in October, it rose to 20 days in November, and by early December had dropped again 13.3 days (https://committees.parliament.uk/oralevidence/1405/html/)
But Dr Lucas had to wait another 42 further days, on top of the delay to that date to receive her reply. Her specific question had been:
“To ask the Secretary of State for Health and Social Care, for what reasons Boston Consulting Group (BCG) was chosen as a contractor to conduct consultancy work on test and trace; on what date the contract was signed; whether it was signed under special pandemic powers that bypass normal tendering processes; what the value is of the BCG contract; what the process was for agreeing the day rates in that contract; whether he plans to publish the BCG contract in line with Government procurement rules that Departments must publish a contract award notice within 30 days of agreement; and if he will make a statement?”(https://questions-statements.parliament.uk/written-questions/detail/2020-10-16/104712)
Junior Heath minister, Helen Whately - not Mr Argar for some reason- was the minister chosen to substantively respond. She said:
“Boston Consultancy Group are an approved supplier on the Crown Commercial Service (CCS) framework contract. They gained their place on the framework through fair and open competition via an Official Journal of the European Union procurement. Value for money and capability were part of the assessment criteria. The contract award date was 24 April 2020 and the contract start date was 27 April 2020.
The pay rates of individual consultants engaged from each supplier is commercially sensitive information. Payment rates are as per the CCS rate card with discounts attained depending on value and length of role. All the Departmental COVID-19 contracts are published on the GOV.UK Contract Finder Service, which contains information on the award criteria for each individual contract.” (emphasis added)
It does not seem such a very complicated answer that would demand three months of brain work of civil servants and a minister to compile. It is also inaccurate!
I visited the Government’s Contract Finder site, to find out the details of this particular contract that they had deemed able to be made public. The answer turns out to be absolutely nothing. The contract is not included at all in the BCG contracts. Below is the full list of BCG contracts listed since April 2020, the month n which Ms Whately claims the BCG contract was awarded. It does not appear!
So much for the inordinate three month delay - to reveal absolutely nothing. Astonishing and depressing.
https://bidstats.uk/tenders/?q=boston+consulting+group&scope=supplier
UK – Boston Consulting Group Contracts
Filters:
Refine Supplier report Found 32 notices in past year.
December 2020
Department of Health & Social Care
• Enablement Strategy
award: Boston Consulting Group
£357K
Department of Health & Social Care DHSC Test & Trace
• Programme Support to TTCE Area Phase 3
award: Boston Consulting Group
£6.3M
• 4PL and Lab Operational Support
award: Boston Consulting Group
£1.6M
November 2020
Cabinet Office Cabinet Office
• Retrospective
award: Boston Consulting Group
£693K
Department of Health & Social Care
• Boston Consulting Group - Mass Testing Strategic Support
award: Boston Consulting Group
£4.6M
• Boston Consulting Group - Strategic Delivery
award: Boston Consulting Group
£2.8M
• End to End Operational Process
award: Boston Consulting Group
£630K
October 2020
Cabinet Office Cabinet Office
• Consultancy Task Force
award: Boston Consulting Group
£1.6M
Department for International Trade
• Defend Phase 2
award: Boston Consulting Group
£2.4M
• Defend Phase 2
award: Boston Consulting Group
£2.4M
September 2020
Health Family
• Strategic Support for the COVID-19 Test, Track and Trace Programme
award: Boston Consulting Group
£5M
Health Family
• Digital Support for NHS Test & Trace Service
award: Boston Consulting Group
£5M
August 2020
DCLG
• Test, Track and Trace - PMO Support
award: Boston Consulting Group LPP
£355K
DEFRA Network Etendering Portal
• Support - Defra PEL 006C
award: Boston Consulting Group
£458K
• Support - Defra PEL 006C
award: Boston Consulting Group
£458K
• Support - Defra PEL 006C
award: Boston Consulting Group
£458K
• Support - Defra PEL 033C
award: Boston Consulting Group
£437K
Department for Business Energy & Industrial Strategy Department for Business Energy & Industrial Strategy
• UK Vaccine Taskforce - Advisory Support on Manufacturing Strategy & Delivery
award: Boston Consulting Group
£731K
Homes England the Name Adopted by the Homes & Communities Agency
• Homes England - CCS MCF - Transformation Business Case and Set-Up - BCG
award: Boston Consulting Group
£6.1M
Department for International Development
• Accelerated COVID Economic Support (ACES)
award: Boston Consulting Group
£4.5M
July 2020
MOD
• MOD Professional Services Support - FOR
award: Boston Consulting Group
June 2020
Crown Commercial Service
• Cabinet Office Consultancy Support for EU Exit
award: Boston Consulting Group
Department for International Trade
• Project Defend - Phase 1 Supply Chain Resilience for Non-Food Critical Items
award: Boston Consulting Group
£663K
May 2020
Cabinet Office Cabinet Office
• Consultancy for COP26 Support
award: Boston Consulting Group
£984K
March 2020
Coventry & Warwickshire NHS Trust UHCW University Hospitals
• 200000000.00
award: 57 suppliers
£200M
• Consultancy and Advisory Services
award: 45 suppliers
£100M
• Consultancy and Advisory Services
award: 19 suppliers
£25M
Coventry & Warwickshire NHS Trust UHCW University Hospitals
• Consultancy and Advisory Services
award: 24 suppliers
£25M
Ministry of Housing Communities & Local Government Ministry of Housing Communities & Local Government
• Grenfell Site Programme - Strategic Consulting Services
award: Boston Consulting Group
£5M
Coventry & Warwickshire NHS Trust UHCW University Hospitals
• Consultancy and Advisory Services
award: 19 suppliers
£30M
drdavidlowryhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/05942986736046792589noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5177380912557235726.post-25251514382977289932021-01-18T06:01:00.011-08:002021-01-22T03:51:33.126-08:00Was fugitive virus from Wuhan Institute of Virology research cause of worldwide COVID19 pandemic?A year ago tomorrow the National Health Service saved my life in a near six hour bowel cancer operation at St. Helier Hospital (https://www.epsom-sthelier.nhs.uk/) in Sutton, around fifteen minutes’ drive from my home.
I will be eternally grateful to the surgeons, doctors, nurses and other hospital support staff.
While I lay in bed recuperating, I recall watching on my tv an odd story from far away China, a report from a city called Wuhan ( with 12 million residents) of which I had never heard. The report was of a mysterious virus that had swept through the city, and the emergency action taken by the city authorities, including the construction of a brand new giant hospital in a week.
The day-to-day progress was beamed back to the UK, as first bulldozers cleared the site; then giant cranes were positioned on the concrete base, then the walls went up, and the inside was kitted out with medical equipment.
I wondered what was it about this virus that demanded such urgent action? And I a vaguely recalled an earlier viral outbreak in China, called SARS, from 17 years earlier.
After leaving hospital, I began to watch intently – and with increasing alarm - this developing story, as the virus escaped China and spread across the world.
How did this fugitive virus escape into Wuhan? The official story promoted by the Chinese government and the World Health Organization- following a report it received from Beijing on 31 December 2019- was that there had been a transfer of the virus from wild captured bats to pangolins, two sad creatures on sale at the wet live food market in central Wuhan, in a transfer process known as zoonosis.( A zoonosis (plural zoonoses, or zoonotic diseases) is an infectious disease caused by a pathogen (an infectious agent, such as a bacterium, virus, parasite or prion) that has jumped from a non-human animal (usually a vertebrate) to a human.)
But could there have been any other origin?
In public, the British Government showed a complete disinterest in this possibility.
For example, on 10th March a question (number HL1839) from Lord Alton of Liverpool asked ministers what assessment they had made of the number and location of microbiology laboratories in China that handle advanced viruses; and what assessment they have made of the role any such laboratories may have had in the initial spread of the Wuhan coronavirus?”
It was was extraordinarily answered by Lord Bethell with a brush off retort: “We do not hold this information.”
https://www.parliament.uk/business/publications/written-questions-answers-statements/written-question/Lords/2020-02-25/HL1839/
It was Lord Bethell’s second day as a minister. His previous role before becoming a Conservative peer and health minister was to run nightclubs in London.
Labour's youngest MP, Nadia Whittome, was similarly given a brush-off by junior health minister, Jo Churchill , on 26 March in a written answer (29268) to a question I suggested to her that she might usefully submit, saying "We have no plans to authorise research into the security control of viruses under investigation at the Wuhan State Institute of Virology."
Why was the UK Government so ignorant? In formation is readily available in the public domain.
Then on 5 April 2020, the Mail on Sunday published fascinating investigative article on the possible origin of the virus coming from a leak out of the Institute of Virology Research in Wuhan. It seemed plausible.
It reported: “that British Government Ministers had been briefed on intelligence which ‘did not rule out that the virus first spread to humans after leaking from a Wuhan laboratory’.”
The internationally respected science journal, Nature journal reported three years ealier that a major maximum-security biolab was being developed by the Chinese Government part of plan to build network of biosafety-level four (BSL-4 facilities) across China: the first was to be opened in Wuhan.
It was planned to focus on the control of emerging diseases, store purified viruses and act as a World Health Organization ‘reference laboratory’ linked to similar labs around the world. (“Inside the Chinese lab poised to study world's most dangerous pathogens,” Nature, 22 February 2017: www.nature.com/news/inside-the-chinese-lab-poised-to-study-world-s-most-dangerous-pathogens-1.21487)
Two years later, the US Centers for Disease Control issued a press briefing note in May 2019 (https://wwwnc.cdc.gov/eid/article/25/5/18-0220_article) on the ‘Biosafety Level 4 Laboratory User Training Program, China’ prepared by seven authors from the Wuhan Institute of Virology and the Chinese Academy of Sciences (Wuhan branch).
The authors stressed: “According to China’s “One Belt, One Road” initiative, the chance that exotic pathogens could be brought into the country has dramatically increased Our new BSL-4 facility will play an integral role in preventing and controlling highly pathogenic microbes.”
And concluded ominously “Microbes contained in BSL-4 laboratories pose a significant risk for transmission and are frequently fatal; most have no reliable cure.”
What went so catastrophically wrong? Last week the outgoing US Secretary of state Mike Pompeo, issued details of a report that seemed to confirm that the US had evidence of just such a leak that had been of so little interest to incurious British health ministers 8 months earlier.
It said: “The United States government has reason to believe that several researchers inside the WIV became sick in autumn 2019, before the first identified case of the outbreak, with symptoms consistent with both COVID-19 and common seasonal illnesses.”
(Ensuring a Transparent, Thorough Investigation of COVID-19’s Origin; Press Statement, US Department of State, January 15, 2021)
(https://www.state.gov/ensuring-a-transparent-thorough-investigation-of-covid-19s-origin/)
Full circle?
Backstory
America points finger at Chinese lab: US claims researchers at Chinese institute in Wuhan fell ill WEEKS before the world knew of Covid
• US Secretary of State Mike Pompeo said workers at the Wuhan Institute of Virology fell ill with Covid symptoms in autumn 2019, weeks before alarm raised
• He claimed scientists were experimenting with a bat Covid similar to one that causes coronavirus and worked on secret military projects
• Allegations come as WHO investigators land in Wuhan looking at Covid origin
By Glen Owen and Ian Birrell In Amsterdam For The Mail On Sunday
https://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-9155237/US-claims-researchers-Chinese-institute-fell-ill-weeks-world-knew-Covid.html
Mail on Sunday: 22:03, 16 January 2021 | Updated: 08:48, 17 January 2021
The Chinese government is under growing pressure to reveal the true origins of the coronavirus pandemic after US intelligence placed a Wuhan lab at the centre of the mystery.
American Secretary of State Mike Pompeo said workers at the Wuhan Institute of Virology fell ill with Covid-like symptoms in autumn 2019 – weeks before the alarm was raised about the contagion ravaging the city.
He also claimed its scientists were experimenting with a bat coronavirus very similar to the one that causes Covid, and had worked on secret military projects.
The Mail on Sunday first revealed concerns about the secretive lab on April 5 last year – some 287 days ago. Now the new allegations from the top of the US administration come as investigators from the World Health Organisation (WHO) land in Wuhan to look into the pandemic’s origins.
However, the team will be under the close scrutiny of Beijing officials and have no plans to visit the institute. They have also been accused of downplaying concerns that a leak was to blame.
Last night Tory MP Tom Tugendhat, chairman of the Commons Foreign Affairs Committee, called for full transparency, saying: ‘The secrecy surrounding Covid has cost millions of lives and destroyed people’s futures. It has to stop. It’s time we pushed for greater access from the WHO and joined others to sanction those keeping secrets.’
Mr Pompeo, who will leave office next week when Joe Biden succeeds Donald Trump in the White House, said: ‘Beijing continues to withhold vital information that scientists need to protect the world from this deadly virus, and the next one.’
The Wuhan site was one of just five laboratories in the world carrying out controversial ‘gain of function’ research, which artificially speeds up the evolution of viruses and, in some cases, enhances their ability to infect humans.
As The Mail on Sunday revealed last year, the scientists were manipulating corona–viruses sampled from bats in caves nearly 1,000 miles away – the same caves where Covid-19 is suspected to have originated.
In some cases they used a method of cloning that leaves no trace of lab engineering. This newspaper has also now unearthed minutes from a meeting of the Chinese Communist Party branch at the institute from November 2019 which warned that the lab was dealing with ‘highly pathogenic micro-organisms’ and states that ‘once the test tube containing the virus is opened it is like opening a Pandora’s Box’.
Matthew Pottinger, who stood down as Trump’s Deputy National Security Adviser this month, recently said the most ‘credible’ theory about the origin of this new coronavirus was that it escaped from a laboratory in China – and that the Wuhan institute was the most likely source.
The British Government has been cautious about speculating on the causes of the pandemic before the conclusion of the WHO investigation, which could take years
Yet critics have called the probe a ‘whitewash’ since its composition and access to data are dictated by the Chinese regime. Beijing has backed away from its original claim that the virus originated in Wuhan’s wet market, but no plausible alternative theory has yet emerged.
Many prominent scientists still think there was natural transmission from an animal. The US government does not believe the leak was deliberate, but was a catastrophic accident caused by poor safety procedures surrounding the high-risk experiments.
One of the leading Wuhan scientists, ‘Batwoman’ Shi Zhengli, admitted her first thought on hearing about the virus was to wonder if it was a leak from her lab.
A British security source said: ‘If the US claims can be substantiated, it would finally give the lie to the theory that a bat travelled 1,000 miles to infect a pangolin in a Wuhan wet market which then somehow jumped the species barrier to people – and just a few miles from the only laboratory in China which manipulates bat viruses to make them contagious to humans.’
In its statement released late on Friday, the US State Department said that it was ‘sharing new information’ about the lab, outlining its belief that ‘several researchers inside the Wuhan Institute of Virology (WIV) became sick in autumn 2019, before the first identified case of the outbreak, with symptoms consistent with both Covid-19 and common seasonal illnesses.
‘This raises questions about the credibility of WIV senior researcher Shi Zhengli’s public claim that there was “zero infection” among the WIV’s staff and students.’
The statement added that the institute has ‘not been transparent’ about its work on bat coronaviruses, and that far from being a purely civilian lab, it had ‘collaborated on secret projects with China’s military [and] engaged in classified research, including laboratory animal experiments, on behalf of the Chinese military since at least 2017’.
The statement criticised China’s clampdown on ‘doctors, scientists, and journalists who tried to alert the world’, and said vital data was still being withheld.
It concluded that the credibility of the WHO inquiry would suffer without unfettered access ‘to virus samples, lab records and personnel, eyewitnesses, and whistleblowers’.
Many experts now believe that the virus was brought into the Wuhan market by customers, rather than originating there. Despite intensive efforts, researchers have failed to find a clear ‘intermediate host’– an animal that would have allowed the virus to jump from bats to humans.
The WHO is still dismissive of suggestions the pandemic could have started with a lab leak. Peter Ben Embarek, head of the ten investigators who landed in Wuhan last week, insisted that Covid-19 ‘is clearly a natural virus’, and that the lab leak theory was ‘unlikely’ to be true.
He conceded his team would investigate the possibility of a leak, but his pre-emptive statement will fuel fears that the WHO, long criticised for its complacency and complicity with the Chinese regime, is engaged in a whitewash.
Lab we first spotlighted in April... and have been investigating ever Lab we first spotlighted in April... and have been investigating ever since
Fear that the pandemic may have originated with a leak from a laboratory first erupted on April 5 last year after The Mail on Sunday revealed that a government source believed this explosive concept was ‘no longer being discounted’.
This senior figure pointed out: ‘Perhaps it is no coincidence that there is that laboratory in Wuhan.’
Since then, the story has taken off around the world, despite being dismissed as a conspiracy theory by the scientific establishment and those with links to the Wuhan Institute of Virology.
Last April, we also exposed links between China and World Health Organisation boss Tedros Adhanom Ghebreyesus and his body’s complicity in Beijing’s initial cover-up of the pandemic.
The issue was picked up instantly by Donald Trump, who later severed funding from America, the WHO’s biggest financial supporter.
The following week, we revealed that the US government was backing high-risk research at the Wuhan Institute of Virology. Again, this led to the termination of funding, sparking huge debate. In May, we ran exclusive reports on a pair of landmark scientific studies that cast doubt on China’s claims that the new disease had erupted in a wild animal market. Later that month, the nation’s top scientist confirmed their theory was misplaced.
We have also obtained censored Chinese reports suggesting the disease started significantly earlier than claimed and disclosed how the head of biosecurity at the secretive Wuhan lab had confessed to serious safety concerns.
In recent weeks, we have disclosed how leading scientists closed ranks to dismiss ‘conspiracy theories’ over the idea of a lab leak, and revealed growing concerns over the Wuhan links of British scientist Peter Daszak, a member of the critical WHO inquiry into the origins of this pandemic.
We were also the first mainstream paper to set out the full theory of a Wuhan lab leak, the issue now being debated around the world.
Lab girl who has vanished from the face of the earth
A year-long hunt by The Mail on Sunday and Western intelligence officials for a Chinese lab researcher believed to be the world’s first Covid-19 patient has been thwarted by a suspected state cover-up. Huang Yanling, who worked at the Wuhan Institute of Virology, was named as Patient Zero in online reports that were widely shared inside China in the early weeks of the outbreak last February.
The revelation created a direct link between the pandemic and the lab suspected to have accidentally unleashed it while conducting dangerous experiments on bat coronaviruses.
'PATIENT ZERO’: The only picture thought to show missing former Wuhan lab worker Huang Yanling (left)
The reports did not say when she contracted the virus or if she survived. However, they support the US State Department’s belief she was the first of several researchers at the controversial institute who fell ill with Covid-19 in the autumn of 2019, before it was officially acknowledged.
Chinese government and lab officials stepped in swiftly to deny the reports at the time and remove them from the internet, claiming Huang was safe and well elsewhere in China.
A post purporting to be from Huang appeared on WeChat, China’s equivalent of WhatsApp, telling colleagues and teachers at the institute she was alive and insisting the reports were false.
The message read: ‘To my teachers and fellow students, how long no speak. I am Huang Yanling, still alive. If you receive any email [regarding the Covid rumour], please say it’s not true.’
A separate post by her former boss, Professor Wei Hong Ping, claimed Huang left the institute in 2015 and had contacted him by phone to deny the reports.
A day later, a Chinese news agency made a vague claim to have spoken to her new employer without providing details.
Inexplicably, however, Huang has disappeared from social media and has not been heard from since being identified as Patient Zero, while her biography and research history have been scrubbed from the institute’s website.
Almost one year on, the only trace of the student researcher is a grainy picture of her salvaged from the institute’s website and circulated on the internet.
Wuhan team bitten by bats
Scientists at the Wuhan lab admitted being bitten while collecting samples in a cave which is home to coronavirus-infected bats.
One researcher said one animal’s fangs went through his rubber gloves ‘like a needle’.
Researchers in thin overalls and rubber gloves handle bats while gathering samples in a clip filmed by a Chinese television crew
Staff inside the top-secret facility were also shown handling bats without gloves and working on ‘live viruses’ without masks in apparent breach of strict World Health Organisation safety rules on PPE, according to footage captured by a Chinese TV crew and broadcast in 2017.
The revelations will raise further questions for the WHO team which is investigating the origins of Covid-19 following months of wrangling with Beijing over access to the Wuhan site.
In the days after the initial reports, bloggers and internet users in China suspicious of officials’ denials pleaded with Huang to make a public appearance to prove she was alive. ‘To stop this rumour spreading, Huang should just come forward and do a blood test,’ said one. Another posted: ‘No matter where you live, Huang, you will be found.’
China’s internet censors quickly stamped out discussion of Huang, and extensive enquiries within the country by The Mail on Sunday, including messages to her former colleagues, have failed to turn up any trace of her.
Huang remains an enigma, the only picture of her showing a woman in her 20s with long hair, peeking out from behind a colleague. Her name is included among the writers of three scientific papers issued by the Wuhan institute between 2013 and 2015, including research into staphylococcus bacteria.
Western governments and intelligence agencies are also understood to have tried and failed to locate Huang amid a ferocious crackdown on any challenge to China’s official narrative that the outbreak has no link to the Wuhan facility.
In its statement yesterday, the US State Department complained that the Chinese Communist Party had prevented investigators and global health authorities from interviewing researchers at the Wuhan institute ‘including those who were ill in the fall [autumn] of 2019’
‘Beijing continues today to withhold vital information that scientists need to protect the world from this deadly virus and the next one,’ Secretary of State Mike Pompeo added.
China’s reluctance to produce Huang to quash the alleged rumours has fuelled the belief that she is either dead or is being held by the state to cover up the institute’s culpability for the pandemic. It has also generated lurid speculation about her fate, with some claiming Huang must have been hastily cremated. ‘Everyone on the Chinese internet is searching for Huang. Most believe she is dead,’ said one blogger.
In the same month that Huang was named as Patient Zero, a user of Chinese social-media platform Weibo, claiming to be a researcher in Wuhan, alleged the virus had leaked from the institute.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
MAIL ON SUNDAY COMMENT: The world needs to know exactly what happened in Wuhan
Mail On Sunday Comment , 17 January 2021
https://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-9155489/MAIL-SUNDAY-COMMENT-world-needs-know-exactly-happened-Wuhan.html
The mystery of Wuhan – did the Covid-19 outbreak originate in a state laboratory there? – has now reached a new level. The US Secretary of State, Mike Pompeo, has added his powerful voice to those asking for the truth.
The US State Department, in a document of great sobriety and caution, did not suggest that the virus was intentionally engineered or released on purpose.
Even so, it flatly accused China’s ruling Communist Party of systematically preventing a proper investigation into the origin of the pandemic.
It complained that China’s authorities have a ‘deadly obsession with secrecy and control’ and have chosen instead to ‘devote enormous resources to deceit and disinformation’.
The mystery of Wuhan – did the Covid-19 outbreak originate in a state laboratory there? – has now reached a new level. Pictured: Shi Zhengli works with other researchers in a lab at the Wuhan Institute of Virology in Wuhan in central China's Hubei province
Washington also suggested that the Wuhan Institute of Virology (WIV) has been involved in military work, even though it poses as a civilian institution.
The State Department said that the WIV had collaborated on publications and secret projects with China’s military and had done classified research, including animal experiments, on behalf of China’s defence sector.
It said it had ‘a right and obligation to determine whether any of our research funding was diverted to secret Chinese military projects at the WIV’.
This is extraordinarily tough language at such a high level. Mr Pompeo was careful not to make any specific allegations about what may have happened.
The US Secretary of State, Mike Pompeo, has added his powerful voice to those asking for the truth
But he revealed, in a major development, that the US has ‘reason to believe’ that several researchers inside the WIV fell ill in the autumn of 2019, weeks before the first officially identified case of Covid.
They had symptoms consistent with both Covid and common seasonal illnesses. US experts also claim that Wuhan scientists were working with a bat coronavirus that is 96.2 per cent similar genetically to the virus that causes Covid.
Could this autumn 2019 outbreak have been the first case of Covid? Could this have resulted from a laboratory accident or unintended cross-infection between animals in laboratories and human researchers?
It is vitally important that we should know, and high time, too.
The Mail on Sunday first reported on April 5 last year that British Government Ministers had been briefed on intelligence which ‘did not rule out that the virus first spread to humans after leaking from a Wuhan laboratory’.
Those who cast doubt on this revelation at the time have some explaining to do.
The evidence is now piling up that serious independent investigation is required. With a death toll of two million already, even the suggestion that this disaster may have had origins in human error must be pursued until we have clear answers.
The World Health Organisation is looking into events in Wuhan. But will this probe be adequate?
Questions have been raised about one of the inquiry members, Peter Daszak, who has been accused of important conflicts of interest.
The WHO team also cannot be sure of full co-operation from China. As of last night, there was no certainty that the team would even be permitted to visit the WIV itself. Shockingly, neither China nor the WHO will say exactly where they will go.
This is simply not good enough. The world needs to know exactly what happened in Wuhan. If it was a disastrous accident leading to a pandemic, then urgent steps must be taken as quickly as possible to prevent a repeat.
And China has to understand that, as a great and growing power, it needs to accept much higher standards of transparency and frankness than it has shown so far.
Ensuring a Transparent, Thorough Investigation of COVID-19’s Origin
Press Statement
https://www.state.gov/ensuring-a-transparent-thorough-investigation-of-covid-19s-origin/
MICHAEL R. POMPEO, SECRETARY OF STATE
JANUARY 15, 2021
The United States has repeatedly called for a transparent and thorough investigation into the origin of COVID-19. Understanding the origin of this pandemic is essential for global public health, economic recovery, and international security.
To assist the vital work of the World Health Organization (WHO) investigative team that arrived in China this week, the United States government is today sharing new information concerning the activities inside China’s government laboratories in 2019.
In particular, we urge the WHO to press the government of China to address the following:
1. Illnesses at the Wuhan Institute of Virology (WIV): The United States government has reason to believe that several researchers inside the WIV became sick in autumn 2019, before the first identified case of the outbreak, with symptoms consistent with both COVID-19 and common seasonal illnesses. This raises questions about the credibility of WIV senior researcher Shi Zhengli’s public claim that there was “zero infection” among the WIV’s staff and students of SARS-CoV-2 or SARS-related viruses.
2. WIV Research on “RaTG13” and “gain of function”: Starting in at least 2016, WIV researchers studied RaTG13, the bat coronavirus identified by the WIV in January 2020 as its closest sample to SARS-CoV-2 (96.2% similar). Since the outbreak, the WIV has not been transparent nor consistent about its work with RaTG13 or other similar viruses, including possible “gain of function” experiments to enhance transmissibility or lethality.
3. Secret WIV Links to Military Research: Despite the WIV presenting itself as a civilian institution, the WIV has collaborated on publications and secret projects with China’s military. The WIV has engaged in classified research, including laboratory animal experiments, on behalf of the Chinese military since at least 2017.
The COVID-19 pandemic was avoidable. Any responsible country would have invited world health investigators to Wuhan within days of an outbreak. China instead refused offers of help – including from the United States – and punished brave Chinese doctors, scientists, and journalists who tried to alert the world to the dangers of the virus. Beijing continues today to withhold vital information that scientists need to protect the world from this deadly virus, and the next one.
The United States reiterates the importance of unfettered access to virus samples, lab records and personnel, eyewitnesses, and whistleblowers to ensure the credibility of the WHO’s final report. Until the CCP allows a full and thorough accounting of what happened in Wuhan, it is only a matter of time until China births another pandemic and inflicts it on the Chinese people, and the world.
Fact Sheet: Activity at the Wuhan Institute of Virology
Fact Sheet
OFFICE OF THE SPOKESPERSON
JANUARY 15, 2021
HTTPS://WWW.STATE.GOV/FACT-SHEET-ACTIVITY-AT-THE-WUHAN-INSTITUTE-OF-VIROLOGY/
For more than a year, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) has systematically prevented a transparent and thorough investigation of the COVID-19 pandemic’s origin, choosing instead to devote enormous resources to deceit and disinformation. Nearly two million people have died. Their families deserve to know the truth. Only through transparency can we learn what caused this pandemic and how to prevent the next one.
The U.S. government does not know exactly where, when, or how the COVID-19 virus—known as SARS-CoV-2—was transmitted initially to humans. We have not determined whether the outbreak began through contact with infected animals or was the result of an accident at a laboratory in Wuhan, China.
The virus could have emerged naturally from human contact with infected animals, spreading in a pattern consistent with a natural epidemic. Alternatively, a laboratory accident could resemble a natural outbreak if the initial exposure included only a few individuals and was compounded by asymptomatic infection. Scientists in China have researched animal-derived coronaviruses under conditions that increased the risk for accidental and potentially unwitting exposure.
The CCP’s deadly obsession with secrecy and control comes at the expense of public health in China and around the world. The previously undisclosed information in this fact sheet, combined with open-source reporting, highlights three elements about COVID-19’s origin that deserve greater scrutiny:
1. Illnesses inside the Wuhan Institute of Virology (WIV):
• The U.S. government has reason to believe that several researchers inside the WIV became sick in autumn 2019, before the first identified case of the outbreak, with symptoms consistent with both COVID-19 and common seasonal illnesses. This raises questions about the credibility of WIV senior researcher Shi Zhengli’s public claim that there was “zero infection” among the WIV’s staff and students of SARS-CoV-2 or SARS-related viruses.
• Accidental infections in labs have caused several previous virus outbreaks in China and elsewhere, including a 2004 SARS outbreak in Beijing that infected nine people, killing one.
• The CCP has prevented independent journalists, investigators, and global health authorities from interviewing researchers at the WIV, including those who were ill in the fall of 2019. Any credible inquiry into the origin of the virus must include interviews with these researchers and a full accounting of their previously unreported illness.
2. Research at the WIV:
• Starting in at least 2016 – and with no indication of a stop prior to the COVID-19 outbreak – WIV researchers conducted experiments involving RaTG13, the bat coronavirus identified by the WIV in January 2020 as its closest sample to SARS-CoV-2 (96.2% similar). The WIV became a focal point for international coronavirus research after the 2003 SARS outbreak and has since studied animals including mice, bats, and pangolins.
• The WIV has a published record of conducting “gain-of-function” research to engineer chimeric viruses. But the WIV has not been transparent or consistent about its record of studying viruses most similar to the COVID-19 virus, including “RaTG13,” which it sampled from a cave in Yunnan Province in 2013 after several miners died of SARS-like illness.
• WHO investigators must have access to the records of the WIV’s work on bat and other coronaviruses before the COVID-19 outbreak. As part of a thorough inquiry, they must have a full accounting of why the WIV altered and then removed online records of its work with RaTG13 and other viruses.
3. Secret military activity at the WIV:
• Secrecy and non-disclosure are standard practice for Beijing. For many years the United States has publicly raised concerns about China’s past biological weapons work, which Beijing has neither documented nor demonstrably eliminated, despite its clear obligations under the Biological Weapons Convention.
• Despite the WIV presenting itself as a civilian institution, the United States has determined that the WIV has collaborated on publications and secret projects with China’s military. The WIV has engaged in classified research, including laboratory animal experiments, on behalf of the Chinese military since at least 2017.
• The United States and other donors who funded or collaborated on civilian research at the WIV have a right and obligation to determine whether any of our research funding was diverted to secret Chinese military projects at the WIV.
Today’s revelations just scratch the surface of what is still hidden about COVID-19’s origin in China. Any credible investigation into the origin of COVID-19 demands complete, transparent access to the research labs in Wuhan, including their facilities, samples, personnel, and records.
As the world continues to battle this pandemic – and as WHO investigators begin their work, after more than a year of delays – the virus’s origin remains uncertain. The United States will continue to do everything it can to support a credible and thorough investigation, including by continuing to demand transparency on the part of Chinese authorities.
drdavidlowryhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/05942986736046792589noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5177380912557235726.post-54386079346041932502021-01-16T06:37:00.001-08:002021-01-16T06:37:18.815-08:00The causes and courses of the right-wing insurgency in the USI have tried to make sense of the madness that gripped the crowd of mostly white insurgents- really pretty close to terrorists - who engulfed the US Capitol on 6 January this year.
In reading up on the background, I came across this shockingly revealing article, that unveils the perverse political mind-set behind some of the people who joined that mob. They include a Univeristy trained nuclear physicist who was covertly developing plans to blow up a nuclear power plant. Read on:
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Series: Documenting Hate
An Atomwaffen Member Sketched a Map to Take the Neo-Nazis Down. What Path Officials Took Is a Mystery.
Some experts and former officials see the case as part of a larger pattern, evidence that federal agencies are understaffed and out of position in confronting the threat of white supremacist terrorism — even as the FBI’s latest report shows a spike in hate crimes for the third straight year.
by A.C. Thompson,
Nov. 20, 2018, 10:45 a.m. EST
https://www.propublica.org/article/an-atomwaffen-member-sketched-a-map-to-take-the-neo-nazis-down-what-path-officials-took-is-a-mystery
Tampa police detective Kenneth Nightlinger, seated right, questions Atomwaffen member Devon Arthurs in May 2017. (Frontline)
Series: Documenting Hate
Tracking Hate Crimes and Bias Incidents
This story was co-published with Frontline PBS.
It was a grisly scene inside Apartment 3722 at the Hamptons, a gated community in Tampa, Florida.
One body lay face up on the floor, wedged between a wall and an air mattress. A handgun was stuffed in a holster on the dead man’s waist. The other body, clad in a black T-shirt and shorts, was slumped back on a futon, a shattered and bloody iPhone on his lap. A police investigator would later write that the two men had been “shot multiple times at close range with an assault rifle.”
There were some obvious clues that this was no ordinary double homicide. Tacked to the wall near the bodies was a large black-and-white flag bearing the insignia of the Schutzstaffel, or SS, Adolf Hitler’s elite paramilitary unit. On a nearby shelf was a black Stahlhelm, the distinctive helmet worn by Nazi soldiers during World War II. There were multiple copies of “Mein Kampf” and a prominent place was reserved for “The Turner Diaries,” the infamous novel of race war in America that has inspired generations of terrorists, among them Timothy McVeigh, the Oklahoma City bomber. A framed picture of McVeigh sat on a dresser.
About the Partnership
This story is part of an ongoing collaboration between ProPublica and Frontline. Watch “Documenting Hate: New American Nazis” on PBS on Nov. 20 at 9 p.m. Eastern, 8 Central, and online at pbs.org/frontline.
On that night in May 2017, the police quickly took two suspects into custody and developed a rough outline of what had happened. One of the suspects, Devon Arthurs, 18, said the victims were his roommates, and members of a neo-Nazi group called the Atomwaffen Division. Arthurs said that he’d decided to leave the group, and that he’d killed the men to keep them from carrying out what he said were their plans for violence.
The second suspect detained by police, Brandon Russell, also lived in the apartment. Russell told the authorities he’d just returned home from a weekend of training with the Florida Army National Guard. And then Russell revealed something that should have set off alarms among federal investigators assigned to track the growing threat from armed, violent right-wing extremists. He said, and the police quickly confirmed, that the single-car garage attached to the apartment was full of explosives.
Explosives experts from the Tampa Police Department and the local FBI field office soon found components of a crude pipe bomb as well as radioactive materials. The search turned up ammonium nitrate and nitromethane, the mixture used by McVeigh to destroy the federal building in Oklahoma City in 1995. There were sacks of explosive precursors, including potassium chloride, red iron oxide and potassium nitrate. There were homemade fuses fashioned from brass 5.56 mm rifle cartridges. In a closet, they found two Geiger counters.
And there was a cooler with the name Brandon scrawled on the lid in black marker. Inside, the investigators discovered HMTD — hexamethylene triperoxide diamine — a potent, highly volatile peroxide-based explosive. It has become a favored tool of terrorists both here and abroad, who cook it up in small batches using recipes circulating on the internet and in improvised weapons manuals.
At Tampa police headquarters, investigators put Arthurs and Russell in separate interrogation rooms. They wanted to know about the killings, about the neo-Nazi
group and about the explosives.
Arthurs said the apartment had served as a nerve center for Atomwaffen Division, a white supremacist organization of 60 to 70 people that has spoken openly of its hopes of igniting race war in the United States. If the authorities could access the group’s encrypted online chats, Arthurs said, “it’d be easy to track down each member.” The interrogation was videotaped, and a recording was obtained by ProPublica and Frontline.
“The things that they’re planning were horrible. They’re planning bombings and stuff like that on countless people, they’re planning to kill civilian life,” Arthurs said. A detective asked if Atomwaffen had drawn up a list of specific targets. “Power lines, nuclear reactors, synagogues, things like that,” Arthurs replied.
“I’m telling you stuff that the FBI should be hearing,” Arthurs said, adding that he thought lives could be saved.
To this day, it is unclear if the FBI talked with Arthurs or what steps it took to shut down Atomwaffen. The FBI declined repeated requests to discuss the case. But this much is clear: Within months of Arthurs’ warnings, Atomwaffen members or associates had killed three more people.
It is frequently argued that the white men who murder in the name of racial purity are lone wolves, radicalized by the echo chamber of the alt-right internet. No one can reasonably expect authorities to stop a seemingly law-abiding citizen like Dylann Roof, the young man who killed nine black church members in South Carolina.
But the Atomwaffen case seems a fair test of the country’s intelligence abilities. And a close look at it suggests that much more could have been done to investigate an organization one of its founding members, Arthurs, was begging the authorities to shut down and offering his help to do so.
The cooler containing Atomwaffen founder Brandon Russell’s HMTD explosive. (Exhibit from U.S. vs. Brandon Russell)
Some experts and former officials see the case as part of a larger pattern, evidence that federal agencies are understaffed and out of position in confronting the threat of white supremacist terrorism even as the FBI’s latest report shows a spike in hate crimes for the third straight year.
That concern intensified after the massacre of 11 Jewish worshipers last month at a synagogue in Pittsburgh. John Cohen and George Selim, former senior officials in the Department of Homeland Security, criticized what they say has been the disinvestment in programs and efforts meant to help protect against the threat of far-right attacks. Task forces have been disbanded, they said, and recent efforts to reconstitute what they termed an “intelligence infrastructure” for domestic terrorism have lagged.
The government’s own data underlines the threat. A 2017 Government Accountability Office report said “far-right extremism” was responsible for 62 of the 85 lethal extremist incidents in the U.S. from the day after 9/11 through 2016, while Islamist extremist violence was responsible for 23 of the incidents. The report said far-right extremism had killed 106 people over those years.
Contacted by ProPublica and Frontline, Cohen, now a professor at Rutgers University, said he stood by his public critique.
“We know what the problem is, but every time there’s another one of these attacks all we hear is, ‘Oh, this is shocking, this is horrible, our prayers are with the people, who would have imagined this ever would have happened?’” Cohen said. “No, it’s very imaginable because it’s happening on a regular basis in this country. We’re just not doing enough to stop it.”
The authorities dispatched to the Tampa apartment seemed unprepared to deal with this particular brand of terrorism. The police detectives and FBI agent who interviewed Arthurs and Russell appear to have given little credence to the evidence discovered in the apartment, or to Arthurs’ allegations that the group was plotting terrorist attacks and mass murders.
While Arthurs was taken to the county jail on homicide charges, police and FBI agents released Russell, who claimed that he used the explosives to power model rockets. An officer even drove Russell back to the murder scene so he could retrieve his car.
What happened next could well have been a disaster. Within hours, Russell acquired an AR-15-style assault rifle and a bolt-action hunting rifle. He loaded homemade body armor and more than 1,000 rounds of ammunition into his car, and set off for the Florida Keys with another Atomwaffen member. He was eventually arrested by sheriff’s deputies in Monroe County. They were shocked by the weapons and ammunition they found in the car. There was no luggage. No food. Russell didn’t seem prepared for an extended trip, they said.
“When we found all the weapons, we were convinced that we had just stopped a mass shooting,” recalled Deanna Torres, one of the deputies who captured Russell, who would eventually plead guilty to federal explosives charges.
Five former law enforcement agents spoke to ProPublica and Frontline about the
handling of Arthurs and Russell. Most said they were baffled by the decision to release Russell.
Tampa police and local prosecutors would not discuss the case.
Atomwaffen didn’t disband in the aftermath of the Tampa arrests. The group continued to recruit new members, staging “hate camps” in at least two states that included weapons training. And the group’s violence went unhindered.
In December 2017, a 17-year-old Atomwaffen follower was arrested on suspicion of murdering the parents of his ex-girlfriend after they ended their daughter’s relationship with the neo-Nazi. A month later, Samuel Woodward was charged with killing a gay Jewish college student in California. Woodward, ProPublica reported in the following days, had participated in weapons training with Atomwaffen members in Texas in the months after the Tampa slayings. Woodward’s fellow Atomwaffen members cheered online when he was arrested, calling him a “one man gay jew wrecking crew.”
In response to questions about DHS’s readiness to combat white supremacist violence, DHS Press Secretary Tyler Houlton issued a statement:
“The Department of Homeland Security is committed to combating all forms of violent extremism, especially movements that espouse racial supremacy or bigotry. DHS takes all threats to the homeland, both foreign and domestic, very seriously and to suggest otherwise is an affront to the men and women of DHS that work tirelessly every day to ensure the safety of the American people. We will continue to work hand-in-hand with our federal, state and local partners to carry out our mission of keeping our country safe.”
Brandon Russell met Devon Arthurs online, on a site called Tinychat that provides video chat services, Arthurs said. Both young men lived in Florida — Brandon in Tampa, Devon in Longwood, a suburb north of Orlando. Wearing headsets, the two would sit at their computers and talk deep into the night.
Eventually, their conversations moved over to Iron March, a now-defunct neo-Nazi forum with the tagline “race war now!” On Iron March, Russell posted photos of himself posing with a Mossberg shotgun while wearing a white T-shirt bearing the words “Natural Born Killers” and an image of a Nazi eagle. Online, he celebrated school shooters like Dylan Klebold and Eric Harris (Columbine High School) and Seung-Hui Cho (Virginia Tech); mass murderer Anders Breivik (a self-proclaimed National Socialist who killed 77 people in Norway); and Hitler.
In addition to his fascination with fascism and acts of violence, Russell had one more obsession: nuclear weapons. He posted instructions online for building improvised nuclear reactors — it's not clear how realistic these plans were — and studied nuclear physics as an undergraduate at the University of South Florida.
When Russell launched Atomwaffen in 2015, Arthurs was one of the first recruits to the group. Arthurs began gravitating toward Nazi beliefs at 13 or 14, according to his father, Alan Arthurs, who said he’s still mystified by his son’s interest in Nazism. “I don't get it. I don't get it. I don't know why,” he told Frontline and ProPublica.
Russell’s jail booking photo. He is currently serving a five-year prison term. (Frontline)
In the spring of 2017, Devon Arthurs and Russell moved into the Tampa apartment. Arthurs had dropped out of high school and had no job. But Alan Arthurs believes his son and Russell were making lengthy road trips to sell illegal firearms in states far from Florida.
In time, Russell and Arthurs were joined in the Tampa apartment by Andrew Oneschuk, 18, and Jeremy Himmelman, 22, two Atomwaffen members from Massachusetts.
Oneschuk and Himmelman were the dead men police discovered in the apartment on the night of May 19, 2017.
Alan Arthurs said his son called him after the shooting and confessed to killing the pair. Over the ensuing hours, Arthurs told a shifting series of stories about his motives. He told his father he’d killed them to head off Atomwaffen’s terrorist plans. He said something similar to investigators. But he also offered an even stranger version: that he’d converted to Islam and supported ISIS, and that he’d killed the two men because they mocked his newfound religion. A judge has since ruled Arthurs mentally incompetent to stand trial.
In his interrogation shortly after his arrest, Arthurs said he was aware of his mental health problems and wished he’d been hospitalized long before. He said that people might not think he looked like a terrorist, but that he had been engaged in dark and dangerous conduct.
And then, in quite composed fashion, he sketched out in great detail both the terrorist ambitions of Atomwaffen and the tactics law enforcement might use to infiltrate the group and bring it down. He warned the Tampa detective leading the questioning, Kenneth Nightlinger, against underestimating the group. Repeatedly, he tried to push back against what he seemed to regard as the detective’s skepticism.
Arthurs said Atomwaffen drew inspiration from The Order, a neo-Nazi terrorist group active during the 1980s. Led by Robert Mathews, the organization believed the U.S. had been taken over by a shadow government of powerful Jews. The Order bombed a synagogue and in 1984 assassinated Alan Berg, a prominent Jewish radio host who lived in Denver.
Russell and Atomwaffen “venerate” The Order, Arthurs said in his interview with detectives. “These people, they have no human empathy like we do.”
“These people ... they know exactly how to build, they knew exactly how to build bombs that could've destroyed this entire building,” Arthurs said.
Nightlinger often pressed for more information.
“Do you know about specific plans that these two individuals had?” the detective asked, referring to Oneschuk and Himmelman.
Arthurs said the men were planning on blowing up power lines near a major highway. They were going to use the HMTD to do it.
The detective pressed further.
“Did Brandon ever specifically talk about doing anything similar to that? To any government buildings?”
“Oh, absolutely. All the time,” Arthurs answered.
“Any specific ones?”
“Government offices, federal buildings,” Arthurs said.
The detective at one point tried to assure Arthurs that he and others would act on his information.
“This is absolutely serious stuff,” said Nightlinger, encouraging Arthurs to pass on “any information” that could be used to combat “these misguided individuals.”
Arthurs apologized for seeming flustered.
“I'm not trying to sound like a schizo cause I know that I'm trampling over words and stuff,” he said.
“No, no, you're in control, man,” Nightlinger said. “You're good, keep going.”
And Arthurs did.
Arthurs told the detective that Russell acquired guns and trained him and the other roommates in how to handle them. He said while Russell had joined the Florida Army National Guard, he’d used the American flag as a doormat to the apartment. He warned that if Russell was given the chance, he’d easily be able to reacquire the explosives that had been confiscated from the garage.
And repeatedly Arthurs offered to help law enforcement round up Atomwaffen members and dismantle the organization. He’d open up his computer. And he thought it would be easy to penetrate the computers of the others.
“You think having your computer, an FBI agent as you requested, sit down and go over this stuff, you think then you would open some eyes?” Nightlinger asked.
“Yeah, I definitely do,” Arthurs said. “I think that it would open some eyes to a much bigger thing than what happened today, and I think that I could definitely, basically save a lot of lives overall.”
Police and federal agents discovered HMTD and other explosive materials in Russell and Arthurs’ Tampa garage. (Exhibit from U.S. vs. Brandon Russell)
At one point, the detective seemed persuaded. Nightlinger suggested he would pass the word to the appropriate agents in the FBI.
“I mean they're actually going to be actually be made aware of this and they're going to do their homework,” he said. “Just to make sure you're not talking out your ass about something here in order to maybe gain some favorable treatment.”
The FBI would not answer questions about its handling of the Tampa case, saying that the investigation remains open. Agents have questioned former Atomwaffen members in at least two states, according to individuals with direct knowledge of the inquiry.
In a statement, the FBI said: “The FBI is not permitted to discuss any facet of the Brandon Russell investigation. The decision not to discuss this investigation was made in accordance with Department of Justice Guidelines and FBI Rules and Regulations.”
ProPublica and Frontline reviewed the crime scene photos and police reports from the Tampa apartment with Kerry Myers, a former FBI bomb tech who investigated the Oklahoma City bombing.
“They were making bombs,” Myers said. “This is a bomb maker's workshop.”
Myers added that the materials were enough “to blow up a car, blow up an airplane, blow up a bus. We have the same basic explosive kit here that the Boston Marathon bombers had.”
Alan Arthurs, who had watched his son’s involvement in Nazism develop over the years and seems to have been the first person Devon called after the killings, told ProPublica and Frontline he has never been interviewed by FBI agents. The local Tampa detectives didn’t question Alan Arthurs until June 5, 2017, more than two weeks after the crimes, according to Police Department records.
At the Tampa apartment, investigators recovered one of Russell’s notebooks, which contained a hand-drawn map of a quarry located between Orlando and Tampa. The map included GPS coordinates for the quarry and a description of its operations. Such facilities often use high-powered explosives to blast through rock. McVeigh
stole blasting caps from a mining operation before the Oklahoma City attack.
The quarry in Florida, a sand mine, is owned by E.R. Jahna Industries. Reached for comment, company executive Adell Jahna said that he had never heard of Atomwaffen and that the company had never been contacted by local law enforcement or the FBI in connection with the case.
During his interrogation, Devon Arthurs had not only warned of Atomwaffen’s violent ambitions, but said repeatedly that the organization had attracted U.S. military personnel as members and was aiming to recruit more.
Arthurs said Russell, the group's founder, had signed up for the Florida Army National Guard in part to get the kind of combat training he might put to use for Atomwaffen. Russell had been drilling in Pinellas Park with the 53rd Infantry Brigade Combat Team on the day of the murders. In his own interview with Tampa police, Russell said he expected his unit to be deployed in 2018 and was considering the Army as a career.
“He joined specifically for the knowledge and the training, and he wants to use that training against the government,” Arthurs said of Russell during his police interrogation. “These people join the military specially to get training. To get access to equipment.” The ultimate goal, Arthurs continued, was to become more equipped to kill people.
Defense Department directives and the regulations of each military branch bar service members from engaging in white supremacist activity. Service members can face criminal charges and expulsion from the military for violating these policies.
After Russell’s arrest, the Florida Guard mounted an investigation into his activities while in uniform. Three weeks after Russell was jailed, the Guard wrapped up its inquiry. In a report, the Guard listed some of the troubling things it had found:
•Russell had a tattoo of the Atomwaffen logo on his right shoulder. The investigator on the case noted that the U.S. military did not maintain a database of tattoos that might have been used to screen for troubling affiliations.
•Two of Russell’s superiors had warned him about his conduct after he repeatedly “vocalized his hatred for homosexuality and ‘faggots.’”
•Russell had “seemed very anxious to receive body armor, and keep his military issued gear.”
But the investigation concluded that Russell had not sought to recruit other soldiers for Atomwaffen, and that he “did not present consistent characteristics that would have led a reasonable person to suspect Russell held such radical beliefs.” Investigators determined there had been no negligence in allowing Russell into the Guard or in his continued presence in its ranks.
The two-page summary of the investigation, obtained by ProPublica and Frontline, contains no references to Arthurs’ statements to authorities about other possible Atomwaffen members in the military. Nor does it contain any evidence that the Guard had alerted officials in other military branches to the potential presence of Atomwaffen in their ranks.
Russell bought this rifle after he was released from custody by Tampa police and the FBI. (Exhibit from U.S. vs. Brandon Russell)
The Florida Army National Guard did not respond to repeated requests for an interview regarding Russell.
This year, ProPublica and Frontline identified seven Atomwaffen members with military experience, including Russell.
The Pentagon did not respond to detailed requests from ProPublica and Frontline to discuss Atomwaffen and its possible recruitment of current or former military members.
In a statement, a Pentagon spokeswoman, Maj. Carla Gleason of the Air Force, said: “The DoD uses a multi-level approach to learn as much as possible about potential new soldiers, sailors, airmen and Marines so we can assess whether they should be extended the privilege to serve in the military. While we can't guarantee that every person who enters the service will be free from holding extremist thoughts, various screening tools provide us the best opportunity to identify those who do not share our values.”
Kathleen Belew, an assistant professor at the University of Chicago, has studied the historic links between the white power movement and the U.S. armed forces. White power groups, she said, have long drawn from the ranks of the military. And former soldiers have become leaders of white supremacist groups over the decades.
Aryan Nations chief Richard Butler did a stint in the Army. KKK Grand Dragon Louis Beam served in Vietnam, as did White Patriot Party leader Frazier Glenn Miller. In 2014, after decades of involvement with white extremist groups, Miller murdered three people outside of a pair of Jewish institutions in Overland Park, Kansas. He was eventually sentenced to death and is awaiting execution.
Belew is careful to say that the members of the military who wind up affiliated with white supremacist groups constitute “a tiny, not even statistically significant percentage” of total service members. But those few, she said, have often played “an enormously important role” in organizing such groups and carrying out their bloodiest actions.
In the aftermath of the Vietnam War, Belew said, white power groups increasingly modeled themselves on the U.S. military and began to focus on recruiting “both veterans and active-duty troops in order to run boot camps” and “create paramilitary training facilities.” As the movement grew more extreme, she said, it sought out people who could build improvised explosives or accurately fire a submachine gun.
Atomwaffen has certainly embraced that tactic. Current and former soldiers have participated in what the group calls “hate camps,” secret weapons training conducted in a number of states around the country over the last two years.
Those who have studied the relationship between military service and white supremacist ideology say soldiers can become deeply disillusioned when fighting controversial wars with little in the way of clear victories. They may return angry and damaged, animated by a degree of nihilism.
One Atomwaffen member who saw combat in Afghanistan discussed his emotional demons in the group’s private online chats. The man wrote that he had “nightmares about seeing people i know blown up” and felt guilt about inadvertently killing women and children.
ProPublica and Frontline interviewed a former Atomwaffen member who had served overseas in the Army. He would only speak if his identity was not revealed and asked us to call him Jeremiah.
“There were a lot of people that were disenchanted with the mission. I'd say about half of the guys in my unit,” Jeremiah said. “I think a lot of guys, they’re lost and they want hope. They’re looking for answers.”
Somehow he found those answers on Iron March, the now-defunct online neo-Nazi hangout that Russell used to launch Atomwaffen. According to Jeremiah, Atomwaffen “definitely wanted to appeal to veterans.” Within the organization, “people looked up to the military guys,” he said.
He said he encountered other racial extremists during his time in the Army: “There’s a good amount of them. They keep quiet for the most part about it, especially when they're in because they can get in a lot of trouble.”
But it’s unclear how seriously the military is taking the matter. The former member said he’s never been contacted by military investigators.
ProPublica and Frontline interviewed more than 20 officials with direct knowledge of the military’s handling of felony-level criminal investigations. Most said racial extremists were a low priority for military police and detectives with elite military law enforcement units like the Army Criminal Investigation Division and the Naval Criminal Investigative Service, which polices the Navy and Marine Corps. Military investigators are more focused on street gangs operating within the armed forces, sexual assault and illegal drugs, the officials said.
Roughly a year after Russell’s arrest in Tampa, an Army investigator told ProPublica and Frontline that the Army’s CID unit had not opened an investigation into Russell and his neo-Nazi organization. Several military officials said Army CID had no jurisdiction in Russell’s case because he was a member of the Florida Guard and not an active-duty soldier.
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Have You Encountered White Supremacists or Neo-Nazis in the Military? Tell Us.
We want to know more about these service members. We want to know what the Army, Navy, Air Force and Marines are doing about them.
Ranks of Notorious Hate Group Include Active-Duty Military
A Marine took part in the violent assaults in Charlottesville last summer and later bragged about it online with other members of Atomwaffen, an extremist group preparing for a race war.
ProPublica and Frontline published their initial reporting on the nexus between Atomwaffen and the military in May. Since then, the Marine Corps has taken action against Atomwaffen member Vasillios Pistolis, a lance corporal on active duty. Pistolis, who had allegedly participated in assaults during the Charlottesville, Virginia, white supremacist rally in 2017, was court-martialed and ousted from the corps. In interviews, Pistolis admitted having been a member of Atomwaffen but denied being in Charlottesville.
In response to that earlier reporting, U.S. Rep. Keith Ellison, D-Minn., in May wrote a letter to Defense Secretary James Mattis requesting details on the Pentagon’s efforts to rid the ranks of white supremacists.
Replying to Ellison, the Defense Department said that it had received “27 reports of extremist activity (domestic) by Service members over the past five years.” Military investigators, the letter continued, had investigated 25 of these reports; ultimately, 18 service members from across the military had been disciplined or forced out of the armed forces.
Gleason, the Pentagon spokeswoman, said she couldn’t provide information on individual cases but stated, “Our standards are clear; participation in extremist activities has never been tolerated and is punishable under the Uniform Code of Military Justice.” She added that commanders are “encouraged to be preventive and pro-active, and they are doing that.”
We took the Pentagon’s letter to Ellison to retired Maj. Gen. John Altenburg, who served as the Army’s deputy judge advocate general, the second-highest-ranking JAG officer in the Army. Altenburg said he was persuaded that the military is taking proper action against offenders in its ranks.
“I’m pleased to see that they’re doing all this,” Altenburg said of the 18 cases of discipline handed down by the Pentagon. “This looks very thorough to me and looks like they’re on top of it.”
He noted that the Pentagon letter did not distinguish between white supremacists and other types of political extremists.
At the Southern Poverty Law Center, Heidi Beirich was skeptical of the Defense Department’s figures, calling them “laughable.”
“Hate groups are telling their people to join the military, and this was something that's been documented, both in FBI reports and in DHS reports,” said Beirich, who heads the center’s Intelligence Project. “There’s not only going to be 27 of them, in a military force of, I don’t know, one and a half to two million people in the United States, who are under arms.”
Last year, nearly 25 percent of active-duty service members surveyed by the Military Times said they’d encountered white nationalists within the ranks. The publication polled more than 1,000 service members.
Beirich questioned the Pentagon’s willingness to root out white supremacists. “We keep sending stuff to the military, examples of people, saying: ‘You should look at this guy. He looks like he might be in violation,’” she said. “Most of the time we never even hear anything back from them.”
Documenting Hate: New American Nazis
ProPublica and Frontline investigate a neo-Nazi group that has actively recruited inside the U.S. military.
Update, Nov. 20, 2018: This article has been updated to include a statement by the Department of Homeland Security.
Ali Winston, Joshua E.S. Phillips, Richard Rowley, Karim Hajj and Nick Verbitsky contributed additional reporting.
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