Monday 31 October 2016

Confidential government papers show how taxpayers could pick up massive costs of Hinkley nuclear waste storage


This Observer article is based on documents grudgingly released to me at the 11th hour by the Energy Department after an FOI application went through three stages of appeal, having been rejected each time. What is really disturbing is that the Information Commissioner's Office inexplicably took the side of Government and a private foreign nuclear company (EDF)  in backing secrecy.
 
Secret government papers show taxpayers will pick up costs of Hinkley nuclear waste storage

Documents show steps Whitehall took to reassure French energy firm EDF and Chinese investors


Observer, Sunday 30 October 2016


 



Taxpayers will pick up the bill should the cost of storing radioactive waste produced by Britain’s newest nuclear power station soar, according to confidential documents which the government has battled to keep secret for more than a year.

The papers confirm the steps the government took to reassure French energy firm EDF and Chinese investors behind the £24bn Hinkley Point C plant that the amount they would have to pay for the storage would be capped.

The Department for Business, Energy & Industrial Strategy – in its previous incarnation as the Department for Energy and Climate Change – resisted repeated requests under the Freedom of Information Act for the release of the documents which were submitted to the European commission.

“The government has attempted to keep the costs to the taxpayer of Hinkley under wraps from the start,” said Dr Doug Parr, Greenpeace chief scientist. “It’s hardly surprising as it doesn’t look good for the government’s claim that they are trying to keep costs down for hardworking families.”

But, earlier this month, on the very last day before government officials had to submit their defence against an appeal for disclosure of the information, the department released a “Nuclear Waste Transfer Pricing Methodology Notification Paper”. Marked “commercial in confidence”, it states that “unlimited exposure to risks relating to the costs of disposing of their waste in a GDF [geological disposal facility], could not be accepted by the operator as they would prevent the operator from securing the finance necessary to undertake the project”.

Instead the document explains that there will be a “cap on the liability of the operator of the nuclear power station which would apply in a worst-case scenario”. It adds: “The UK government accepts that, in setting a cap, the residual risk, of the very worst-case scenarios where actual cost might exceed the cap, is being borne by the government.”

Separate documents confirm that the cap also applies should the cost of decommissioning the reactor at the end of its life balloon.



Hinkley Point C developers face £7.2bn cleanup bill at end of nuclear plant's life

French and Chinese developers will be the first nuclear operators in the UK that will have to pay to decommission the site

Read more

The level of the cap is unclear. But Dr David Lowry, a senior research fellow at the Institute for Resource and Security Studies in Cambridge, Massachusetts, who made the FoI request, said it was clear that the risk of footing the bill for a significant cost overrun had been transferred from Hinkley’s operator to the taxpayer.

“This shows that the government cares more about the economic future of a foreign power generator than British taxpayers,” Lowry said.

In return for the cap, the document reveals that Hinkley’s operator will pay the government a risk fee which “is expected to be relatively low, reflecting the high level of confidence that the cap will not be breached”.

But Lowry pointed out that the nuclear industry had form when it came to sizable cost over-runs. He warned that an accident that could force the closure of the reactor, either because of problems with it or at another plant, as happened in Japan, would leave the taxpayer having to pay billions of pounds for the clear-up years after it ceased generating revenues.
A government spokesman said: “All operators of new nuclear power stations in the UK are legally obliged to meet the full costs of decommissioning and their full share of waste management and disposal costs. They will also pay the UK government to dispose of the waste produced at the end of a plant’s life




Waste costs for UK new build

09 December 2011


 

Disposing of waste from new UK nuclear power plants will cost operators a maximum of 71p per MWh of power produced, less than 1% of the cost of delivered electricity.

 

UK leaders have been clear for several years that they wish to facilitate private companies in building new nuclear power plants, but not to subsidise the technology. A key aspect of this is fairness in paying for a single waste disposal facility to hold the new privately produced radioactive waste as well as similar wastes from the former national program and everything from research and weapons programs.

 

Yesterday, energy and climate change minister Chris Huhne announced to parliament a framework for this, including a charging mechanism meant to give cost certainty for new plant builders and protect taxpayers at the same time. It came after a consultation that ran from October 2010 to March this year.

 

The framework is complex, but at its core is an estimate of the expected cost of the required geologic disposal facility. At present this is highly speculative - without a site or design firmly in mind - and so this will be revised every five years until the facility comes into operation in 15-30 years.

 

From the start of generation, operators of new nuclear power plants will be required to set aside enough money to meet this expected cost. A cap has also been set, giving operators certainty of the maximum that they would pay, and this is set at about three times the current estimate.

 

However, the government is responsibile for building the disposal site and wants to cover the risk it is taking that costs could escalate further. For that reason it will add on certain risk premiums set so that the UK taxpayer would not lose out unless the cost of building the disposal facility grew by over five times the current estimate.

 

What this boils down to is a charge per unit of electricity generated. An operator can expect to pay £0.20 ($0.31) per MWh if the facility is built to current cost estimates with a cap of £0.71 ($1.11) per MWh. These compare to current prices of electricity for a large industrial user of about £83 ($130) per MWh.

 

The UK government said its objective "is to ensure the safe disposal of intermediate level waste and spent fuel from new nuclear power stations without cost to the taxpayer and to facilitate investment through providing cost certainty." It added that it "is not seeking to make profits over and above a level consistent with being compensated for the level of risk assumed, but does expect operators to meet their full share of waste disposal costs."

Thursday 27 October 2016

John Ainslie: nuclear WMD researcher in chief, gone, but never forgotten




Arthur West, Chair of  Scottish CND, had clearly filed his ‘Voice of Scotland’ article “Trident: A scandalous waste of public money, “ (MStar, 25 October, http://www.morningstaronline.co.uk/a-83e2-Trident-A-scandalous-waste-of-public-money#.WBH4weQzWM8)  before  the untimely death last Friday ( 21st October) of John Ainslie, co-ordinator of Scottish CND for over 25 years.
I only met John twice in person, but his legend lives by his remarkable collection of research documentation, which attests to hi contribution as the best and most assiduous and rigorous independent British-based researcher on nuclear weapons of mass destruction, making full public service use of his degree in International Relations.
John also ran the Scottish CND office for many years and he was a  tireless organiser of events and activities all aimed at making the case for a nuclear weapons free world. 
Here are some extracts from Joh’s masterly evidence on Trident and nuclear disarmament to the Scottish Affairs Select Committee oral hearing on 16 July 2012

“What we are looking at is disarmament not just as an abstract concept, but as a real practical possibility and how it could be brought about. The initial step is that Trident could be deactivated, in a sense, so that it cannot be used within a matter of days. There is a trigger that the weapons operating officer presses and the captain turns a key. If you take away the triggers and the keys and you take the submarine off patrol, there are components of the missile that can be removed within a period of a day. That deactivates it in a sense so that it cannot be used in anger within a matter of days. Within a period of about eight weeks or so, you could remove all the warheads and store them at Coulport [near Glasgow], which again is a further step. They are still there, but the system has been taken apart. Then it would take two years to physically move those warheads out of Scotland, which is based on frequency of convoys in the mid - ’90s.
The actual dismantlement of warheads at Burghfield might take as long as four years. Having said that, Bruce Blair, the leading world expert on de-alerting nuclear forces in America, basically said that this programme is credible. His own studies show that these various steps can be done in half the time, but that the proposal that I am putting forward is therefore a safe and reasonable way of doing it. You could in fact do it more quickly is what Bruce Blair was saying, but because this is not as quick as possible, that then builds more of an element of safety in the process.
In response to Lindsay Roy MP question:What are the main limiting factors that prevent this [disarmament] happening within two years? John Ainslie explained: The safety of moving the warheads. They used to take three days to drive up and three days to drive down, so it was at least a weeks operation every time. They are now quicker, but, even so, we have to allow time for the crew and for training. That would be having the vehicles operationally on the road for possibly a week every month and then three weeksbuild up. There are clearly lots of safety and security concerns about moving nuclear warheadsthis is moving nine or 10 a month over 24 months. The current stockpile is 225.
John later added: One of the areas of research that I have been working on is international archives, particularly the Polaris track decision between 1977 and 1982. There are now several thousand pages of declassified files on that decision-making process. Part of what I am saying here is based on that information, which at the time was top secret. In that period, they looked at possibly basing them at Kings Bay. Frank Cooper, the permanent secretary at the Ministry of Defence at the time, basically said it was not feasible or viable to build a replacement for Coulport on any greenfield site. If he is saying it was not viable at that point, at the height of the cold war-before Chernobyl and before Fukushima-then I would think it is less viable now than it was back then.
..I was at the [Nuclear Non-Proliferation] NPT PrepCom earlier this year, there are a lot of countries around the world that are on the disarmament side-Australia, Canada, New Zealand, Germany or Scandinavian countries. We would be trying to move towards nuclear disarmament, concerned about nuclear proliferation. If you have one country trying to insist that another country continues to host its nuclear weapons, I think that the international context might well be international support for Scotlands position, rather than for the UKs position.
 
A few weeks ago on 13 October, Alison Johnstone MSP, submitted this important resolution in the Scottish Parliament, inspired by Johns work.
That the Parliament welcomes the recommendation from the UN Security Councils Open-Ended Working Group on Nuclear Disarmament (OEWG) calling for a UN conference in 2017 to negotiate a treaty to ban nuclear weapons and lead to their complete elimination; deeply regrets the UKs absence from the OEWGs talks; considers that the Scottish Parliament and citizens of Scotland have stood against the possession of nuclear weapons, including opposing the recent Trident renewal; regrets that Scotland is unable to participate in the OEWGs negotiations; supports action by states such as Ireland, Austria, South Africa, Nigeria and New Zealand to submit an additional supporting resolution to the First Committee of the UN, and recognises that the Scottish Government's efforts to dissuade the UK Government from supporting Trident are in line with the majority of states participating in the OEWG.
 
Labour leader Jeremy Corbyn - who chaired Parliamentary CND for a decade - tweeted last  Saturday: Very sad news indeed, such a well informed and intelligent peace campaigner who did so much for CND in Scotland as well as the wider peace community. My sympathies and regards to all his family and many friends.

And so say many of us

Tuesday 18 October 2016

Atomic Siamese twins: how the UK promoted the birth of nuclear proliferation


 

 
This week will see the 60th anniversary of the opening of the Calder Hall nuclear production facility at Sellafield  on 17 October 1956.

Indeed, the Beacon Museum in Whitehaven, a short distance along the coast from Sellafield in Cumbria is holding month long celebration exhibition of the Calder Hall plant.( https://thebeacon-whitehaven.co.uk/project/calder-hall-60-years-through-the-lens/)

The Beacon's Calder Hall exhibition

Calder Hall opened by the young Queen Elizabeth on 17 October 1956, but it was never a “commercial” civil nuclear plant. Her script writer penned the following for Her Majesty to say from the podium: “This new power, which has proved itself to be such a terrifying weapon of destruction, is harnessed for the first time for the common good of our community."

It was hailed as an "epoch-making" event by then Lord Privy Seal, Richard Butler. It was, however, a gross deception of the public

 

http://www.realscience.lancsngfl.ac.uk/images/library/queen_opening_calder.jpg

The Queen opening Calder Hall


 

In fact it was clearly stated at the time of the plant’s opening, in a remarkable little book entitled Calder Hall: The Story of Britain’s First Atomic Power Station, written by Kenneth Jay, and published in October 1956 by the Government’s Atomic Energy Research Establishment at Harwell to mark Calder’s commissioning.  Mr Jay wrote:

“Major plants built for military purposes such as Calder Hall are being used as prototypes for civil plants . . . the plant has been designed as a dual-purpose plant to produce plutonium for military purposes as well as electric power . . . it would be wrong to pretend that the civil programme has not benefitted from, and is not to some extent dependent upon, the military programme."

Calder Hall atomic clock

An atomic "clock" registered the first generated nuclear power

Calder Hall was closed in March 2003, fifty years after its construction bagan. Interestingly, the first – nominally commercial - reactor at Hinkley, the Magnox ‘A’ plant, was operated for military production purposes too.

The first public hint came with a public announcement on 17 June 1958 by the Ministry of Defence, notably not the Ministry of Fuel and Power that oversaw the civilian nuclear programe -  on:  “the production of  plutonium suitable for weapons in the new [nuclear ] power stations programme as an insurance against  future defence needs…” in the Hinkley reactor. .

A week later in the UK Parliament, the Conservative Cabinet minister Paymaster General, Reginald Maudling  told MPs: At the request of the Government, the Central Electricity Generating Board has agreed to a small modification in the design of Hinkley Point and of the next two stations in its programme so as to enable plutonium suitable for military purposes to be extracted should the need arise.

The Government made this request in order to provide the country, at comparatively small cost, with a most valuable insurance against possible future defence requirements. The cost of providing such insurance by any other means would be extremely heavy.”


The first nuclear power plant on the Hinkley Point site in Somerset was built in the 1960s.

The first nuclear power plant on the Hinkley Point site in Somerset was built in the 1960s.

This was challenged by Mr Mason, who asked:

“Is the Paymaster-General aware that, as far as I am concerned, it is a disgusting imposition on what was primarily termed a peaceful programme in nuclear energy? Of course, I am pleased to hear that it does not interfere with the atomic energy programme prepared by the Government—although I accept that with some measure of reservation? Was this really necessary, in view of the fact that we are producing, perhaps at a slow rate, plutonium from our present]—although we are producing plutonium from our present….Particularly having regard to the fact that the Dounreay atomic breeder is coming into production very soon, was this imposition on our peaceful atomic power programme really necessary?

The minister retorted:

“The hon. Gentleman says that it is an imposition. The only imposition on the country would have arisen if the Government had met our defence requirements for plutonium by means far more expensive than those proposed in this suggestion.”

The headline story in the Bridgwater Mercury, serving the community around Hinkley, on that day (24 June} was:

 “MILITARY PLUTONIUM To be manufactured at Hinkley”

The article explained:

“An ingenious method has  been designed  for changing the plant without  reducing the output of electricity…”

CND was reported to be critical, describing this as a “distressing step” insisting

 “The Government is obsessed with a nuclear militarism which seems insane.”

Sadly, with the blinkered push to replace Trident today, not much seems has changed in the 58 years since!

The left wing Tribune magazine of 27 June 1958 was very critical of the deal under the headline

‘Sabotage in the Atom Stations’:

“For the sake of making more nuclear weapons, the Government  has  dealt a heavy blow at the development of atomic power stations.

And warned:

“Unless this disastrous decision is reversed, we shall  pay  dearly in more  ways than  one for the sacrifice  made on the grim alter of the H-bomb.”

The late Michael Foot, that great inveterate peace-monger, who later became Labour leader, was then the Tribune editor.

Then, on 3 July 1958, the United Kingdom and United States signed a detailed agreement on co-operation on nuclear weapons development, after several months of  Congressional  hearings in Washington DC, but no oversight whatsoever in the UK Parliament!  As this this formed the  basis, within a mere five years, for  the UK obtaining the Polaris nuclear WMD system from the UK, and some 20 odd years later for the UK  to buy American Trident  nuclear WMDs , the failure of Parliament to  at least appraise the   security merits of this key bilateral atomic  arrangement  was unconscionable.

A month later Mr Maudling told backbencher Alan Green MP in Parliament that:

“Three nuclear power stations are being modified, but whether they will ever be used to produce military grade plutonium will be for decision later and will depend on defence requirements. The first two stations, at Bradwell and Berkeley, are not being modified and the decision to modify three subsequent stations was taken solely as a precaution for defence purposes.”

adding

“It in no way reflects any change in the assessment of the economics of the British nuclear power stations, and there is therefore no reason whatever why the sale abroad of British nuclear equipment should be in any way affected.”


Following  further detailed negotiations, the Ango-American  Mutual Defense Agreement on Atomic Energy  matters (defence is spelled with an “s” even in the UK version of the Treaty, demonstrating the origin of the drafts!) , to  give it  its full treaty title, was amended on  7 May 1959, to permit the exchange of  nuclear explosive material including  plutonium and enriched uranium for military purposes.

The Times  science correspondent  wrote on 8 May 1959 under the headline

‘Production of Weapons at Short Notice’

“The most important technical fact behind the agreement is that of civil grade -  such as will be produced in British civil Click and drag the image to move around the pagenuclear power stations- can now be used in weapons…”

(Click and drag the image to move around the pagehttp://www.thetimes.co.uk/tto/viewArticle.arc?articleId=ARCHIVE-The_Times-1959-05-08-12-010&pageId=ARCHIVE-The_Times-1959-05-08-12)

Within a month, Mr Maudling in Parliament told Tory back bencher, Wing Commander Eric Bullus who had asked the Paymaster-General what change there has been in the intention to modify three nuclear power stations to enable plutonium suitable for military use to be extracted should the need arise.

“Last year Her Majesty's Government asked the Central Electricity Generating Board to make a small modification in the design of certain power stations to enable plutonium suitable for military purposes to be extracted if need should arise. Having taken into account recent developments, including the latest agreement with the United States, and having re-assessed the fissile material which will become available for military purposes from all sources, it has been decided to restrict the modifications to one power station, namely, Hinkley Point.” (emphasis added)

(HC Deb 22 June 1959 vol 607 cc847-9; This was challenged by Mr Mason, who asked:

“Is the Paymaster-General aware that, as far as I am concerned, it is a disgusting imposition on what was primarily termed a peaceful programme in nuclear energy? Of course, I am pleased to hear that it does not interfere with the atomic energy programme prepared by the Government—although I accept that with some measure of reservation? Was this really necessary, in view of the fact that we are producing, perhaps at a slow rate, plutonium from our present]—although we are producing plutonium from our present….Particularly having regard to the fact that the Dounreay atomic breeder is coming into production very soon, was this imposition on our peaceful atomic power programme really necessary?

The minister retorted:

“The hon. Gentleman says that it is an imposition. The only imposition on the country would have arisen if the Government had met our defence requirements for plutonium by means far more expensive than those proposed in this suggestion.”

The headline story in the Bridgwater Mercury, serving the community around Hinkley, on that day (24 June} was:

 “MILITARY PLUTONIUM To be manufactured at Hinkley”

The article explained:

“An ingenious method has  been designed  for changing the plant without  reducing the output of electricity…”

CND was reported to be critical, describing this as a “distressing step” insisting

 “The Government is obsessed with a nuclear militarism which seems insane.”

Sadly, with the blinkered push to replace Trident today, not much seems has changed in the 58 years since!

The left wing Tribune magazine of 27 June 1958 was very critical of the deal under the headline ‘Sabotage in the Atom Stations’:

“For the sake of making more nuclear weapons, the Government  has  dealt a heavy blow at the development of atomic power stations.

And warned:

“Unless this disastrous decision is reversed, we shall  pay  dearly in more  ways than  one for the sacrifice  made on the grim alter of the H-bomb.”

The late Michael Foot, that great inveterate peace-monger, who later became Labour leader, was then the Tribune editor.

Then, on 3 July 1958, the United Kingdom and United States signed a detailed agreement on co-operation on nuclear weapons development, after several months of  Congressional  hearings in Washington DC, but no oversight whatsoever in the UK Parliament!  As this this formed the  basis, within a mere five years, for  the UK obtaining the Polaris nuclear WMD system from the UK, and some 20 odd years later for the UK  to buy American Trident  nuclear WMDs , the failure of Parliament to  at least appraise the   security merits of this key bilateral atomic  arrangement  was unconscionable.

A month later Mr Maudling told backbencher Alan Green MP in Parliament that:

“Three nuclear power stations are being modified, but whether they will ever be used to produce military grade plutonium will be for decision later and will depend on defence requirements. The first two stations, at Bradwell and Berkeley, are not being modified and the decision to modify three subsequent stations was taken solely as a precaution for defence purposes.”

adding

“It in no way reflects any change in the assessment of the economics of the British nuclear power stations, and there is therefore no reason whatever why the sale abroad of British nuclear equipment should be in any way affected.”


Following  further detailed negotiations, the Ango-American  Mutual Defense Agreement on Atomic Energy  matters (defence is spelled with an “s” even in the UK version of the Treaty, demonstrating the origin of the drafts!) , to  give it  its full treaty title, was amended on  7 May 1959, to permit the exchange of  nuclear explosive material including  plutonium and enriched uranium for military purposes.

The Times  science correspondent  wrote on 8 May 1959 under the headline

 ‘Production of Weapons at Short Notice’

“The most important technical fact behind the agreement is that of civil grade -  such as will be produced in British civil Click and drag the image to move around the pagenuclear power stations- can now be used in weapons…”

(Click and drag the image to move around the pagehttp://www.thetimes.co.uk/tto/viewArticle.arc?articleId=ARCHIVE-The_Times-1959-05-08-12-010&pageId=ARCHIVE-The_Times-1959-05-08-12)

Within a month, Mr Maudling in Parliament told Tory back bencher, Wing Commander Eric Bullus who had asked the Paymaster-General what change there has been in the intention to modify three nuclear power stations to enable plutonium suitable for military use to be extracted should the need arise.

“Last year Her Majesty's Government asked the Central Electricity Generating Board to make a small modification in the design of certain power stations to enable plutonium suitable for military purposes to be extracted if need should arise. Having taken into account recent developments, including the latest agreement with the United States, and having re-assessed the fissile material which will become available for military purposes from all sources, it has been decided to restrict the modifications to one power station, namely, Hinkley Point.” (emphasis added)


 

And so it may be seen that the UK’s first civil nuclear programme was  used as a source of  nuclear  explosive  plutonium for the US military, with Hinkley Point A the prime provider.

Two decades later, Wales national daily, the Western Mail, on 8 October 1984  reported that the largest Magnox reactor  in the UK, at Wylfa on Anglesey, had also been used to  provide plutonium for the military. Plutonium from both reactors went into the UK military stockpile of nuclear explosives, and could well still be part of the UK Trident warhead stockpile today.

Subsequent research by the Scientists Against Nuclear Arms, published in the prestigious science weekly journal, Nature and presented to the Sizewell B Public Inquiry  in 1983-4 and Hinkley C Public  Inquiry in 1989,  has demonstrated that  around 6700 kilogrammes of plutonium, was shipped to the United States under the military exchange agreement, which stipulates explicitly that the material must  be used for military purposes by the recipient county.

To put this quantity into context, a nuclear warhead   contains around 5 kilos of plutonium so this is a very significant quantity

Earlier this month, a commentary article by Oxford University academic, Dr Peter Wynn Kirby, in The New York Times ( “Britain’s Nuclear Cover-Up,” October 11, http://www.nytimes.com/2016/10/11/opinion/britains-nuclear-cover-up.html?_r=1) discussed  the possibility that the first newbuild nuclear reactor to be built in 20 years in the UK, at Hinkley C, also has military links, this time not to nuclear explosives production, but to nuclear reactor propulsion.

As Dr Kirby states: “A painstaking [100-page] study of obscure British military policy documents, released last month by the Science Policy Research Unit at the University of Sussex, demonstrates that the government and some of its partners in the defense industry, like Rolls-Royce and BAE Systems, think a robust civilian nuclear industry is essential to revamping Britain’s nuclear submarine program.” (https://www.sussex.ac.uk/webteam/gateway/file.php?name=2016-16-swps-cox-et-al.pdf&site=25)

Nuclear deception has a long and undistinguished history: it seems we have come full circle 60 years after  the birth of nuclear power as the Siamese twin of military nuclear technology six decades after Calder Hall’s opening.