Monday, 18 March 2019

When terrorism breaks out down-under: the security failings behind the Christchurch mosque massacre


Rebecca Kitteridge, CVO, Director-General of Security for New Zealand (who was appointed to post in May 2014) told members of the Intelligence and Security Committee of the New Zealand Parliament in Wellington on 20 February 2019, in evaluating New Zealand’s ‘terrorism threatscape’ that “currently, the national terrorism threat level is set at ‘low’, which means an attack is assessed as possible but not expected.

She added ‘Low’ does not mean no threat. The threat level is continually under review and can change, and we need to be prepared for that.”(https://www.nzsis.govt.nz/news/speech-opening-statement-to-the-intelligence-and-security-committee/)

Less than three weeks later to most devastating terrorist attack, leaving at least fifty muslim worshipers dead in two mosques in Christchurch. (“Christchurch mosque shootings: In one day, more people were killed in New Zealand than usually murdered in a year,” NZ Herald, 15 March 2019; www.nzherald.co.nz/nz/news/article.cfm?c_id=1&objectid=12213233)

Ms Kitterigde – who has a background in law -  joined the New Zealand Security Intelligence Service (NZSIS) after six years as Secretary of the Cabinet and Clerk of the Executive Council, within the Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet, and has served under four Prime Ministers and four Governors-General in that role.

She is reported to believe that a ‘secure state’ and a well-informed government as fundamental in supporting and maintaining the New Zealand way of life.

But in an exclusive interview with the NZ Herald last May, she admitted to a hole in the law in a memo (dated 30 June 2017) to former NZSIS minister Chris Finlayson  "the NZSIS no longer had the power to apply for a visual surveillance warrant" or to use emergency power to act without a warrant in emergencies.”

 The same article alarmingly revealed “A law-making bungle deprived our spies of a key weapon against terrorism in the wake of classified briefings warning of "an increasingly complex and escalating threat environment" in New Zealand.NZ Security Intelligence Service documents revealed the blunder left our spies unable to use video surveillance tools to watch terrorism suspects in their cars, homes or workplaces for six months last year.

The documents, declassified and released through the Official Information Act, also revealed NZ spies had been involved in ‘high threat operations’.”

(“Our spies disarmed by legal blunder amid 'high threat operations' against terrorists”; NZ Herald, 8 May, 2018; www.nzherald.co.nz/nz/news/article.cfm?c_id=1&objectid=12046732

In her evidence to the NZ Parliament three weeks ago, Ms Kitteridge outline the key threats she believed New Zealand is facing and “what we are doing about them.”

Terrorism and Violent Extremism

At any one time, around 30 people are of particular interest to the NZSIS, she stressed But, this number is not static. As investigations into individuals of interest are resolved or their activities of concern diminish, other individuals of interest emerge. The overall number accordingly fluctuates over time, but during the reporting period the number of  more serious concern remained steady.

A small but concerning number of New Zealanders continue to engage with often violent online radical Islamist content and radical ideology which presents a risk to others, she added, going on to state:

“As I have said previously, there is a small number of New Zealand citizens – men and women, some of whom are dual citizens – who are likely in the conflict zone in Syria.  As you can imagine, it is very difficult to obtain accurate information about the fate of those individuals because the situation is very fluid.  We are working with international partners to obtain intelligence about any New Zealand person who may be involved in the conflict.”

But it was clear the main concern was Islamic terrorism. She emphasised that “In the event of a return of a foreign terrorist fighter or somebody who has travelled to the conflict zone to join ISIL, we would work closely with New Zealand Police and other agencies. That contingency planning has been in train for some time.Within the wider geographic region, extremist groups remain influential in Southeast Asia. There is an ongoing threat to travellers and Western interests in the region.”

Observing that “over the past three years, many Southeast Asian countries have experienced a second wave of extremist attacks, “ she pointed out  “Just last month (January 2019) ISIL claimed responsibility for the bombing of a church in Jolo, Philippines. The attack killed at least 20 people and injured over 100 others”.

Internationally, Al-Qaida retains influence and capability, particularly in the Middle East and North Africa, but with links elsewhere. Their capability has been degraded but not destroyed.

Finally she added -almost as an afterthought- that “Internationally the slow, but concerning rise of right wing extremism also continues.”

Yet it was this species of malevolent manic terrorism that devastated Christchurch last Friday morning.

After her Cabinet meeting on Monday 18th March, Prime Minister Jacinda  Ardern announced a new review of government agencies including the Security intelligence Service and Government Communications Security Bureau. (“Christchurch mosque shootings: Changes to gun laws coming, NZ Herald,19 March https://www.nzherald.co.nz/nz/news/article.cfm?c_id=1&objectid=12213986

This, despite the fact that just last August  Ms Ardern’s office announced publication of  the Performance Improvement Framework (PIF) follow-up review of the New Zealand Intelligence Community, 30 August 2018; www.nzic.govt.nz/assets/assets/SSC43-PIF-NZIC-31jul.pdf)

NZ’s Counter-Terrorism legislation under review

NZ’s intelligence chief told the NZ MPs’ intelligence public hearing  last month that as  “has been stated publicly, the Government is seeking to review New Zealand’s counter-terrorism legislative settings,” adding that NZ’s counter-terrorism legislative regime spans several statutes, and has evolved over time, often in response to significant events like 9/11. 

But, she stressed; the NZSIS does not lead policy work on legislation, but are actively working with the Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet, Ministry of Justice and Police to analyse the counter-terrorism legislation regime “to ensure that it is fit for purpose.” However, she qualified this with the cautious “As this work is still underway I am unable to comment further at this stage.  Outcomes will be reported to Ministers in due course”.

Protective security functions

Later, she added “In addition to our intelligence functions, NZSIS also has protective security functions for which it is responsible.Ensuring we have strong protective security settings across our public and private sector is a way we can help protect New Zealand from some of the key methods deployed ...”

She closed by asserting she was extremely proud of the “unwavering commitment” [of her staff]  to protecting the security of our country, and the safety of their fellow New Zealanders.

Through their hard work and dedication the Service has positively contributed to the ongoing security and wellbeing of New Zealand and New Zealanders.

In the annual Intelligence and national security report, which was evaluated in the hearing, Andrew Little, Minister Responsible for the New Zealand Security Intelligence Service it perspicaciously stated in his introduction:

"Overseas experience shows that it is possible for someone who is not known to security and intelligence agencies to move from radicalised to undertaking a terrorist attack or other action in a short timeframe, often with minimal forewarning. While the NZSIS and law enforcement counterparts work hard to identify and mitigate threats, it is possible that an isolated individual, unknown to these agencies, could be inspired to carry out a terrorist act in New Zealand "https://www.nzsis.govt.nz/assets/Uploads/2018-NZSIS-Annual-Report.pdf

 

The report also adds: “the world is becoming increasingly challenging and uncertain. The New Zealand Intelligence Community must be agile to adapt to this changing environment.

We must be alert to the risk of interference in New Zealand’s domestic affairs by hostile states inappropriately influencing New Zealand communities or seeking to access sensitive information and intellectual property for their own purposes. At the same time the threat posed by terrorism has not reduced and continues to evolve. Lone actors are being influenced by radical and violent ideologies online and may be mobilised to act, as we have seen in other countries.

Over the past year, I have seen the proactive efforts of the Directors-General of both the NZSIS and the Government Communications Security Bureau (GCSB) to increase public awareness about the work done by the intelligence organisations and the role they play in safeguarding our country and institutions. Sharing what they can is an important part of building and maintaining the trust and confidence of the New Zealand public and this is something we will continue to see.

New Zealand should be confident the work the New Zealand Intelligence Community undertakes to understand, mitigate and manage threats will continue to keep New Zealand and New Zealanders safe and secure. “

 

In her Director-General’s Overview, Rebecca Kitteridge said: “It is essential that our work is underpinned by a high level of public confidence and trust. New Zealanders should feel safe to go about their daily lives knowing that our institutions, infrastructure, and information assets are protected…”

 

She interpolated a sadly very accurate prediction:  The threat environment we operate in is changing and we need to remain agile and capable to respond to, and counter, the challenges ahead of us. One of our main priorities is to counter foreign actors seeking to advance their own interests to New Zealand’s detriment….”

 

The report itself stated: “The majority of leads identified during 2017/2018 were linked to ISIL. Most related to individuals allegedly viewing violent or objectionable extremist propaganda, supporting or seeking to support the activities of ISIL, or seeking to travel offshore in order to associate with extremist groups or terrorist entities. Upon receiving lead information, the NZSIS considers whether a national security threat exists and if the threat meets the threshold to trigger an investigation or a wider government response.”

 

It added: “With partners such as the Police, Customs, and Immigration New Zealand, the NZSIS works to ensure threats do not escalate to acts of violence and that New Zealanders do not become the perpetrators or victims of terrorism” (emphasis added)

 

Here are some conclusions from NZ spooks agency  most recent annual report, which in retrospect, read somewhat over-optimisticly.

Delivery Excellence

“The NZSIS aims to deliver high quality intelligence and security products and advice to inform enable decision makers to make the best decisions possible.

The NZSIS continues to work with our customers to ensure that the intelligence provided to them is impactful, meets their requirements and is delivered in a timely manner. We are constantly looking at our processes to see what can be done to improve the overall customer experience.

Investing in our Capability

Over the past four years, a number of initiatives have been underway to strengthen and build our capabilities. These initiatives were a result of the NZIC Performance Improvement Framework in 2014, the Independent Review of Intelligence and Security in 2015, the Strategy, Capability and Resourcing Review (SCRR) and subsequent Budget 2016 decisions, and the implementation of the ISA in 2017. Change has been necessary to ensure we are fit for purpose and significant resources have been devoted to improving our systems, policies, processes and organisational structures.” (emphasis added)

Last year the NZSIS continued to focus on building strong foundations for future growth. We have completed the second year of our four-year growth path and are now focused on lifting the operational   outcomes and impacts delivered by the agencies.

 


 

On its fiftieth anniversary, the Māori name for the New Zealand Security Intelligence Service [NZSIS] -established in 1956 -  Te Pā Whakamarumaru, which translates to The Sheltering Citadel, was adopted as part of its official emblem. It reads rather sickly now



Backstory:

Christchurch mosque shootings: In one day, more people were killed in New Zealand than usually murdered in a year


NZ Herald, 16 March 2019

When a gunman opened fire on a mosque in Christchurch yesterday, and a second mosque came under attack, the resulting death toll of at least 49 people meant that more were killed on one day than are usually murdered in an entire year in New Zealand.

Prime Minister Jacinda Ardern addressed the public last night, calling it "one of New Zealand's darkest days."

Three suspects are in custody, and one man, the only one so far charged with murder in the case, released a manifesto online hinting at the years-long relative peacefulness in New Zealand as one motive for the attack, which he suggested would show "that nowhere in the world was safe." His claim echoed remarks by an apparent role model, Norwegian far-right extremist Anders Breivik, who killed 77 people — many of them teenagers — in 2011. Norway has roughly the same population as New Zealand and an even lower murder rate.

In the coming days, debate over New Zealand's gun laws is likely to take place in response to the massacre.

"I can't imagine a country less likely to let this slide than New Zealand," said Philip Alpers, a New Zealander professor at the University of Sydney who founded a website that tracks gun policy worldwide.

"Jacinda Ardern is not likely to say 'our thoughts and prayers are with you' and then move on."

In New Zealand, gun owners must be licensed to carry guns and gun ownership is seen as a conditional privilege, but firearms do not have to be registered. Gun licenses are valid for 10 years, and Alpers said the interview process for licensing involves interviews with individuals who have intimate relationships with prospective gun owners, including spouses, ex-spouses and roommates.

Gun laws came under scrutiny in New Zealand in 1997, when retired High Court judge Thomas Thorp released a report that endorsed mandatory registration and said self-defense should no longer be considered reason enough for purchasing a gun. The report also recommended that the government buy back military-style assault rifles, among a number of other suggestions that were not adopted in legislation. Now, Alpers said, essentially all those measures will be back up for discussion, particularly regulation of assault weapons. "They are the choice of mass killers and they will be the focus of everybody's attention," he said.

Although New Zealand's gun laws have triggered tense but restrained debates in the past, the conversation isn't as heated and ideological as it is in the United States. By comparison, American civilians are estimated to own nearly 400 million firearms, or about 120 per 100 people. In New Zealand, civilians hold around 1.5 million firearms, averaging out to approximately one gun per three people in the country of around 5 million.

"New Zealanders see themselves certainly not as a gun-free nation but as a nation with fewer firearm problems than most," Alpers said. "They look on the U.S. as most of the world does ... with some degree of horror."

In his alleged manifesto, the suspect charged with murder in the mosque attack implicitly hoped for a gun debate.

"I chose firearms for the affect it would have on social discourse, the extra media coverage they would provide and the effect it could have on the politics of United States and thereby the political situation of the world," the manifesto says. The implied hope was that the debate may eventually escalate tensions between supporters of gun rights and opponents and result in civil-war-like violence that would cause more damage than one attacker or group could do alone.

Although some New Zealand residents have joined Islamist militant groups, the threat of terrorist attacks has consistently been regarded as low. The European debate over the cycle of crimes blamed on migrants and right-wing violence has largely been unknown in New Zealand, where the far right remains marginalised. Instead, authorities have predominantly focused on bringing down the number of incarcerated indigenous Maori people, who are disproportionately represented in the country's prisons.

Until recently, police in New Zealand had not felt the need to carry firearms on duty. Last month, however, the Canterbury district on New Zealand's southern island broke with that protocol after a series of incidents that left a shooting suspect on the loose.

At the time, New Zealand Police Association President Chris Cahill told Reuters that "more and more policemen are finding criminals with guns, so unless we find a way of stopping these firearms from reaching them, we will have no other choice but to arm our officers."


Analysis: Christchurch massacre - what did we miss and who missed it?

How did we miss this? The little we know asks questions of those who would keep us safe.

At first reports, New Zealand appeared to have a terrorist in the style of Anders Behring Breivik, the far right terrorist who killed 77 people in Norway in 2011.

Breivik was a "lone wolf" - someone who planned alone and carried out his attack alone.

This killer was something different. There are signs which point to an ugly rotten core in our society which could have been identified earlier.

In his online manifesto, he said he had recently come to New Zealand from Australia to plan an attack.

When he settled in, he decided New Zealand was the place to carry it out.


Something happened in Christchurch which changed his views. In his manifesto, he said "an attack in New Zealand would bring to attention the truth of the assault on our civilisation, that nowhere in the world was safe, the invaders were in all of our lands".

That sounds like he's been radicalised. And the fact the attack happened here suggests whatever influence there was on his thinking, it was domestic in origin. He found like minds.

Then there's the firearms.

He had multiple firearms and, of those he did have, witnesses report the shots sound like "firecrackers".

While some semi-automatic rifles can be bought with a basic gun licence, repetitive semi-automatic weapons with extended magazine capability of the sort witnesses describe need a special category of gun licence.

It is meant to involve extensive police checks and background inquiries of the prospective owner.

It seems unlikely a recent immigrant - Australian or where-ever - whose introduction to weaponry in New Zealand is getting the most restricted licence would raise a flag.

It seems far more likely the weapons were supplied by people already here.

As information emerged today, we learned four people had been arrested - three men and a woman.

Not only did they have extensive weaponry, they also managed to plant improvised explosive devices across the city.

It's one thing to fly beneath the radar as a lone wolf.

It's a completely different proposition to join and develop a functional and organised terrorist cell which can deliver compelling rhetoric to new recruits and then provide weaponry, and knowledge, to carry out an attack such as today's.

Cells operating as a group require communication and co-ordination which increases the number of points at which authorities can notice and disrupt their plans.

We have a number of security agencies in New Zealand which will face serious questions.

The easiest to contemplate is the firearms. Police Minister Stuart Nash is looking at firearms law now. He needs to look harder.

In Whangārei, we had murder committed by an angry man who bought weapons illegally with extraordinary ease. In Rotorua, we had a killer convicted on forensic evidence which owed little to police systems but to exceptional diligence by a lone police office and ground-breaking Australian forensic work.

That's only the firearms.

The real danger are the people who choose to carry them and commit acts such as we have seen today.

St John staff working to help those injured during the rampage. Photo / Supplied

The police force, which expends huge effort gathering and ordering intelligence on gangs, will need to consider whether it committed sufficient resource towards the increasingly polarised, hate-filled groups which have sprung up across Western nations.

Gangs largely prey upon themselves. Groups with extreme views prey upon the rest of us.

These groups have been responsible for a number of massacres in Western countries, which should have tripped warning bells.

There are hard questions for the NZ Security Intelligence Service. It has - like its Western counterparts - a strong focus on potential threats in the Islamic community.

Has it dedicated the same effort to other parts of society? It certainly used to. Pre-September 11 NZSIS tasking files pay huge attention to neo-Nazi, far right groups.

The NZSIS - and its electronic counterpart, the Government Communications Security Bureau - have more funding than ever, and almost double the staff numbers they had six years ago.


This attack isn't a call for new powers or greater funding. The spies have all they need in a society such as ours - even with the shocks of today.

Instead, we need to check how they have grown into that accelerated growth in funding and broader legislation.

It was only last year NZSIS director general Rebecca Kitteridge told the NZ Herald it had struggled to match its improved capability against its need.

She had told the former National Party spy minister Chris Finlayson in 2015 "in the context of the threat environment we are facing, the NZSIS capabilities will continue to be less than the demand on our services".

"We will need to continue making difficult prioritisation decisions about which targets we investigate [and for how long] and which we do not."

A Royal Commission - in public, with open evidence - needs to ask those questions. The country deserves evidence and answers. And let's not hear overblown claims of "classified information".

It also needs to check when the Inspector-General of Intelligence and Security should have funding and staff to match the agencies her office oversees.

There's a considerable gulf between what she has to work with and the work she needs to do.

There's nothing which sharpens the focus of a security service - unless it's an attack of this sort - than an oversight agency working hard to make sure it is doing its job properly.

NZ Herald journalist David Fisher is a member of a Reference Group formed by the Inspector General of Intelligence and Security intended to hear views on developments possibly relevant to the work of the oversight office. The group has a one-way function in offering views to the IGIS. It receives no classified or special information from the IGIS or the intelligence community. The information in this story was not sourced from Reference Group discussions.

Our spies disarmed by legal blunder amid 'high threat operations' against terrorists; NZ Herald, 8 May, 2018; www.nzherald.co.nz/nz/news/article.cfm?c_id=1&objectid=12046732

NZSIS director Rebecca Kitteridge.

NZSIS director Rebecca Kitteridge.

David Fisher

By: David Fisher, Senior writer, NZ Herald


A law-making bungle deprived our spies of a key weapon against terrorism in the wake of classified briefings warning of "an increasingly complex and escalating threat environment" in New Zealand.

NZ Security Intelligence Service documents revealed the blunder left our spies unable to use video surveillance tools to watch terrorism suspects in their cars, homes or workplaces for six months last year.

The documents, declassified and released through the Official Information Act, also revealed our spies have been involved in "high threat operations".

It did not state what those operations were and NZSIS director-general Rebecca Kitteridge, in an interview with the NZ Herald, would not elaborate other than to say they involved police assistance

She would not give details of the operations but said the NZSIS had taken active steps with the police to stop people who wanted to carry out terrorist attacks in New Zealand.

The details about the security situation in New Zealand is an unnerving backdrop to the blunder over warrants allowing visual surveillance.

Kitteridge revealed the hole in the law to former NZSIS minister Chris Finlayson last year.
In a memo on June 30, she said "the NZSIS no longer had the power to apply for a visual surveillance warrant" or to use emergency power to act without a warrant in emergencies.


The memo said warrants to allow visual surveillance were to "detect, investigate or prevent a terrorist act".

But she said the NZSIS was unable to do so for six months after the old law expired on April 1 2017 because the new Intelligence and Security Act did not apply until September 28 2017.

PIF follow-up review for core New Zealand Intelligence Community


 

Thursday, 30 August 2018


Friday, 15 March 2019

Nuclear no confidence: Fukushima 8 years on


 

 

Sometimes in my research work I come across outstanding research scholarship. This week, to mark the eighth anniversary of the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power plant accident in Japan, on 11 March 2011, two Paris –based researchers released a remarkable piece of extended research analysis.

 

Dr Christine Fassert of the advisory body (IRSN) for France’s official nuclear safety organization (ASN) and Japanese academic Reiko Hasegawa (of the Sciences Po médialab) in association with the Tokyo Institute of Technology- were the responsible authors. [Full disclosure: Christine is a friend and colleague of mine]

 

Their admirable report is titled: Shinrai (”Confidence”) Research Project: The 3/11 accident and its social consequences - Case studies from Fukushima prefecture (Rapport IRSN/2019/00178)


 

Below I have extracted some important and illustrative pieces of text from the 176 –page report,  and reproduced in full their conclusions and references.

 

I recommend everyone to read - and learn from - this unique study, that should inform all nuclear policy makers and emergency planners worldwide.

 

Abstract
This report summarizes the research result of the Shinrai project, which deals with social consequences of the Fukushima accident. Based on three case studies led in the Fukushima Prefecture, it analyses the loss of trust of citizens towards governmental authorities, and essential questions linked to return or non-return to the evacuated territories, offering a categorization of inhabitants according to their decisions.
It also deals with the dilemma to which governmental officials, medical doctors and radioprotection experts have been confronted, and focus on the role of Mayors. The report concludes by making some reflections on the normative foundations of post accidental policies, as currently defined by the institutions in charge of managing nuclear accidents, and on their confrontation to the Fukushima experience and to the international criticism made by some of the UN institutions.

 

1. INTRODUCTION

1.1 SCOPE

The Shinrai project was launched in the aftermath of the triple disaster faced by Japan in March 2011: earthquake, tsunami, and a Nuclear Power Plant (NPP) accident in Fukushima Daiichi. The authorities had to face a dramatic situation, most notably the radiological consequences of the nuclear accident for the population. This research proposes to focus on the nuclear post-accidental situation in Japan, and to examine the various social and political consequences of the nuclear accident.

The theoretical framework of this research is inscribed in the field of disaster studies, which are intrinsically multidisciplinary. The examination of public policies led after an accident, their inscription in international regulations and institutions, their consequences for residents, the reactions of and the decisions made by inhabitants as regards evacuation and return policies, the consideration of contaminated territories and their future, the management of waste produced, and so on, all mobilize political sciences as well as sociology and anthropology. Within such a framework, which evokes countless questions, the choice was made to focus specifically on issues of trust. In fact, in the aftermath of the accident, this issue appeared quite rapidly within public space, where the media soon denounced the “loss of trust” on the part of Japanese citizens towards the government in charge of dealing with the crisis. Under this main theme, this project will address various questions linked to expertise provided in crisis situations: What makes a public expert trustworthy? What is his/her role in situations of uncertainty and controversy? What is the accountability of experts in these situations? What specific role did “counter-expertise” play in post-Fukushima? And how do citizens make vital decisions after a nuclear accident (e.g. to stay or to leave their place of residence, heeding or ignoring governmental advice; to allow their children play outside or not; etc.) when confronted with divergent sources of expertise and scientific controversies (such as the risk related to ionizing radiations for children, low-dose effects, etc.)?

The issues of remediation and of compensation, and the disputes these inevitably trigger, also call for an examination of the juridical aspects. Moreover, in the case of a nuclear accident, long-lasting divides concerning evaluation of the health effects of ionizing radiations are instrumental in the difficulty of building widely accepted solutions. This is why the present analysis proposes a focus on Science, Technology and Society (STS) studies, examining the major issues related to knowledge production as concerns radiological risks, and its translation into recommendations, policies, and government decisions.

The research is based on an intensive field work led by a Franco-Japanese team, and comprises more than 120 interviews with government representatives at national and local levels, with scientists, residents of Fukushima prefecture, Non-Profit Organisation (NPOs), and others. Details on the field research are provided in the annexes.

The deliverables of the Shinrai project comprise:

- Report 1: « Revue de littérature sur les concepts de confiance et d’expertise », (October 2017, in French). The main theoretical elements of this report are briefly summarized in Chapter 5 when discussing the issue of trust.

- Report 2: Controversies and decision-making after the Fukushima Accident (to be published in 2020)

- Report 3: “Case studies analysis and synthesis” (the present report).

Rapport IRSN/2019/00178 Shinrai research Project: The 3/11 accident and its social consequences 10/165

Ce document est la propriété de l’IRSN et ne peut pas être communiqué, reproduit ou utilisé sans son autorisation écrite préalable. This document is the property of IRSN and shall not be disseminated, copied or used without its prior formal approval

 

1.2 OUTLINE OF THE REPORT

This report is divided into 7 chapters, including the present introduction (Chapter 1).

- Chapter 2 gives an overview of the government policies established in the aftermath of the nuclear accident in Fukushima Daiichi in order to deal with the consequences of the accident.

- Chapter 3 presents their actual implementation in three towns: Kawauchi and Naraha, two evacuated villages, and Watari, a district of Fukushima city which was outside the evacuation zones. Most of the interviews with inhabitants were conducted with residents of these places.

The chapter examines how government policy was actually implemented at this local level, the difficulties encountered, focussing more specifically on the role played by the mayors (Kawauchi and Naraha) and how they struggled to implement policy while taking into account the residents’ (divergent) interests and desires.

- Chapter 4 examines in detail the consequences of these policies for inhabitants and their decision whether or not to return to their evacuated village, after the evacuation orders were lifted. Six types of “decisions” have been identified; this categorisation allows for an account of the variety of inhabitant reactions and judgements regarding their situation after the nuclear accident.

- Chapter 5 provides a more general analysis of the social consequences of the nuclear accident. Beyond the question of “whether to return or not”, this chapter examines the main issues with which inhabitants were confronted. These issues are presented on a temporal basis: from evacuation in the immediate aftermath of the accident, to the situation six years later, when field work ended for the present research project. They combine data from this field work (interviews and observations) together with a number of analyses from scholars in the field, focusing on research projects with a strong empirical basis.

This chapter also elaborates on the notion of trust. Based on the results of Shinrai report 1, it examines who (or which institutions) people trust or do not trust, after the accident, while they were being confronted with overwhelming amounts of divergent information concerning radiological risks, and decisions to be made.

- Chapter 6 also provides a “synthesis analysis”, this time more focused on political and juridical aspects. It examines - at a general level - the consequences of post-accidental Japanese policy and its debatable points. It also addresses the juridical aspects and the rising number of lawsuits where affected populations collectively brought civil actions against TEPCO1 and the government.

1 Tokyo Electric Power Company Holdings, Inc. owner/operator of Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power plant Rapport IRSN/2019/00178 Shinrai research Project: The 3/11 accident and its social consequences 11/165

Ce document est la propriété de l’IRSN et ne peut pas être communiqué, reproduit ou utilisé sans son autorisation écrite préalable. This document is the property of IRSN and shall not be disseminated, copied or used without its prior formal approval

 

- Chapter 7 presents the conclusion of this report, drawing on lessons learned from the nuclear accident, and offers some perspectives on research questions that are still open.

- Annexes provide details concerning methodology and a list of interviews conducted.

Extracts:

Before the F1NPP accident, nuclear emergency planning was defined in the Prevention Measures related to Nuclear Facility Emergencies (1980)2 published by the Nuclear Safety Commission, one of the two major nuclear regulatory bodies at the time which were merged to create a Nuclear Regulation Authority (NRA) post-Fukushima. In the guidelines, the zone within the 8–10 km radius of the nuclear power stations was considered to be an Emergency Planning Zone (EPZ), targeted for nuclear disaster drills and preparations. The guidelines specified that an EPZ was defined “based on a hypothetical scenario which is almost technically impossible” and thus nuclear disaster preparation would be suffice to be implemented in limited areas within the EPZ and no further, by insisting that “(nuclear installations) are safe in normal circumstances and do not trouble any daily activities of residents” (p.15). According to Imai (2012), “this, indeed, constitutes the basis of the notion in public policy that nuclear power stations were accident-free3 (p. 24).

On the day of the accident, the first evacuation order concerning the 2 km radius from the F1NPP was issued by the Fukushima prefectural government. Even though the prefectural governor does not usually have the authority to issue evacuation orders, according to the Act on Nuclear Emergency, the order was largely considered to be valid and official under such exceptional circumstances and in the absence of State instructions. Following the prefectural order, the Nuclear Emergency Response Headquarter (Nuclear Emergency HQ)5 headed by Japanese Prime Minister, Naoto Kan, began issuing evacuation orders. As Imai (2014) comments, these evacuation orders were in fact the instruction for affected municipalities to issue evacuation orders for the residents, since such legal authority lay with the Mayors of municipalities.

Initially decided according to physical, radial distance from the F1NPP, Evacuation Zones (EZs) rapidly expanded beyond the envisaged EPZ: on the day after the accident, the Nuclear Emergency HQ instructed a compulsory evacuation of the area within a 20 km radius, which was then extended to the 20-30 km radius, four days later. These initial orders were thus issued without consideration of the actual radiological situation on the ground.

During the three months following the disaster, four different types of evacuation zone were created, as shown in the map below (Map 1). In all, a total of 13 municipalities were placed under various evacuation orders and recommendations.

 

 

NUMBERS AND CHARACTERISTICS OF NUCLEAR EVACUATION

The number of evacuees from Fukushima prefecture peaked at 163,000 in June 201213. Seven years after the accident (February 2018), 50,000 people were still displaced.

One of the distinctive aspects of the evacuation following the nuclear accident is that it triggered two patterns of displacement: mandatory evacuation under order from the government, and the spontaneous evacuation of residents living outside designated EZs who decided to flee of their own accord for fear of the effects of radiation, despite the government’s reassurances (Hasegawa, 2015). The proportion of spontaneous evacuation within the total number of evacuees remains unclear as so-called self-evacuees are rarely counted in official statistics and are accorded little recognition and assistance by the authorities.

…the government issued [another] policy paper concerning evacuation zones, in December 2013, entitled Accelerating the Fukushima Reconstruction from the Nuclear Disaster. The document detailed the government’s strategy to promote swift return of evacuees by creating additional compensation, increasing financial aid for local business and reconstruction projects, accelerating decontamination, and reinforcing risk communication. For the first time, it mentioned that the government would also help evacuees to start life over elsewhere (i.e. resettlement), especially for those from Red Zone, to which any prospect of return was considered slim. To support this, the [Jaspanese] government proposed a new compensation plan for house construction to those who wished to resettle elsewhere.

 

The second policy document also fixed the duration of compensation payment for psychological damage due to evacuation, paid to evacuees by TEPCO (about 800 euros/person every month), as up to one year following the lifting of the EO. This decision triggered criticism from evacuees, who saw it as a form of pressure, to make them return against their will and by default - because this compensation for psychological suffering would constitute de facto the financial assistance enabling them to sustain their life in refuge. In addition to the compensation, evacuees received temporary housing assistance offered by host prefectures of their refuge, thanks to which they could live for free in prefabricated shelters or public subsidized housing, or in private apartments where rent was subsidized. The temporary housing assistance was placed under the mandate of Prefectural Governors, to be managed by respective Prefectural Offices.

 

[The Government ]published a revised policy document in June 2015. The novelty of the policy was to extend the compensation payment to up to seven years after the accident, until March 2018, for residents from ‘Green and Yellow Zones.’

 

Decontaminating the area affected by the fallout of the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power plant (F1NPP ) accident was the policy which had been officially decided by the Nuclear Emergency HQ on 26 August 2011, five months after the disaster. From the official minutes of initial Nuclear Emergency HQ meetings, it is evident that the idea had been put on the table as early as May 2011, two months after the accident, to be consolidated in the following August.

On 30 August 2011, the National Diet of Japan then adopted ‘The Act on Special Measures Concerning the Handling of Environmental Pollution by Radioactive Materials Discharged by the Nuclear Power Station Accident Associated with the Tohoku District-Off the Pacific Ocean Earthquake that Occurred on March 11, 2011.

… The Japanese Ministry of the Environment [MoE] came up with the initial concept of decontamination activities on 11 November 2011, proposing a plan to divide the target area into two categories: Special Decontamination Areas (Special Areas) and Intensive Contamination Survey Areas (Survey Areas)…. The designation of target municipalities for each Special/Survey Area was made public in January 2012; a total of 102 municipalities over eight prefectures were included in the Survey Areas.

 

Liability avoided

Japan officially launched its civilian nuclear program in 1960 and enacted two liability laws to cover eventual nuclear damages in 1961: the Act on Compensation for Nuclear Damage (Compensation Act) and the Act on Indemnity Agreements for Compensation for Nuclear Damage (Indemnity Agreements Act). At the same period, nuclear liability regimes were adopted at the international level: the Paris Convention in 1960 and the Vienna Convention in 1963. Japan is not a party to any of these international conventions, but developed its own national liability regime. The country is also one of those States which have adopted unlimited liability, together with Germany and Switzerland (Vasquez-Maignan, 2012). In the case of the Fukushima accident, therefore, TEPCO is exclusively liable for the damage and its liability is unlimited.

The Compensation Act (Section 6) also stipulates that in any case where the operator cannot cover compensation payments, the government should intervene to provide financial assistance. Following this provision, the government set up the Nuclear Damage Compensation Facilitation Corporation in September 2001 to provide financial assistance to nuclear operators facing compensation payments of more than 120 billion Yen (880 million euros), which is the maximum amount covered by private insurance.

 

Following the accident, TEPCO was placed under State control on 31 July 2012. Currently TEPCO’s largest, controlling shareholder (50.1%), is the Nuclear Damage Compensation Facilitation Corporation, of which half is owned by the Japanese government. Since August 2014, the Corporation had also been also tasked with providing financial support to decommissioning operations, and was thus renamed the Nuclear Damage Compensation and Decommissioning Facilitation Corporation.

By December 2016, TEPCO had received a total of 8 trillion yen (62 billion euros) in financial aid from the State via the Compensation Corporation in order to pay compensation27. Thus, the compensation was in fact paid by the State, but administratively managed by TEPCO. In order to receive compensation, residents had to complete an application form, which initially contained 60 pages, and submit it to TEPCO with a significant number of supporting documents28. By 2 February 2018, TEPCO had paid a total of 62 billion euros in compensation for 2 million individual cases and 400,000 cases from corporations and business owners.

 

GENERAL CONCLUSION

This report aims at presenting the main results of the Shinrai project regarding the case studies analysed throughout an extensive fieldwork, led during eight missions in Japan, and comprising more than 120 interviews with different actors. Our main objective was –to quote the words of Michaël Ferrier speaking on the situation in the aftermath of Fukushima- “to enunciate, and not to denunciate365”. A comprehensive and detailed account of the consequences of the nuclear accident and of its “management” by the authorities allows to account for the many different and sometimes very opposite views on what happened –and is still happening- for affected residents. One of its specificities is to have listened to a number of persons who have been or are still in charge of dealing with the consequences of the accident (medical doctors, responsible of the ministries, Mayors, …) in order to understand how they have made sense of the situation, including the ethical stakes they had to face.

365 Interview on France Culture.

Some of the main findings from this field research can be summarized as follows:

Six categories of inhabitants were identified in relation to their decision to return - or not - to their home village after the Lift of Evacuation Orders, namely: 1. “Return and resist to a Culture of Radioprotection”; 2. “Return and control/comply”; 3. “Return and doubt”; 4. “Between return and resettlement”; 5. “Not returning now”; 6. “Not returning ever”. While recognizing the limit and potentially reductive nature of any form of categorization, this classification helps us grasp a panoramic view of the choices, feelings and judgements underlying decisions made by the population after a nuclear accident..

Mayors play a crucial role in implementing the policy defined by the government at the local level. They have limited margins for maneuver in organizing the Lifting of Evacuation Orders and the return of inhabitants. As long as particular groups of inhabitants (e.g.: seniors versus families with young children) had specific and opposed interests, it became difficult to act in the name of “general interest”. Each of the mayors justified his decisions by expressing what he considered most important: the right to return to, and eventually to die in one’s own home, or the right to “buy time” and not to come back, for those not satisfied with the life that coming back would offer.

Examining the question of “who trusts whom?” not surprisingly shows a deep divide between people who trust the “official/governmental” scientists and experts, and those who trust scientists not linked to governmental or nuclear institutions. Such a divide effectively renders “taboo” the question of ionizing radiations consequences on health, because of the potential divisive effects the question can have on communities.

 Risk communication was considered by the authorities to be a solution (to dissipate fear toward radiation among the population) while citizen considered it as a strategy employed by the authorities. The reflexivity of actors who were in charge of communication activities illustrates how the intention to “reassure” could be critically analyzed by citizens and by the experts themselves, when

Rapport IRSN/2019/00178 Shinrai research Project: The 3/11 accident and its social consequences 158/165

Ce document est la propriété de l’IRSN et ne peut pas être communiqué, reproduit ou utilisé sans son autorisation écrite préalable. This document is the property of IRSN and shall not be disseminated, copied or used without its prior formal approval

 

 

they were offered the opportunity to look back on their actions at the time of the accident.

Appraisal of the Japanese government actions offers accounts of the relatively low return rate and gives a number of reasons for this. This opens the way for addressing the issue of “reconstruction” and the question of “for whom” this reconstruction was promoted, as exposed in “Reconstruction Without Inhabitants” by Yamashita et al.

Examining the implicit normative framework used by the Japanese government when dealing with 3/11 event contributes to a process of “learning from an accident”. In fact, the Japanese government’s implicit framework was challenged in many ways by what happened afterwards. Therefore, in order to learn from what happened in Fukushima, the deep-seated, “invisible” aspects effectively revealed after the accident must be taken into consideration. The choice was made to focus on the following three narratives: “attachment to territories”, “commensurability of risks”, and “contained contamination”. In the current discussions on post-accident management, these implicit aspects still appear to be insufficiently identified, and have not been called into question.

Finally, frustrations and angers toward post-accident policies turned into legal proceedings led by a number of citizens against the authorities. At the time of writing, 31 group lawsuits, involving 12,000 plaintiffs from among evacuees and affected residents, have been filed against TEPCO and the government all over Japan. But these legal actions only play a partial role in repairing one’s life from the damage incurred by a nuclear accident. As in other cases of environmental damages compensation, symbolic aspects of these actions such as demand for apology and social recognition shall also be taken into account in the process of reparation.

 

A long-term opposition between experts and scientists of the nuclear sphere and non-institutional experts who have been opposing to them was abruptly “deconfined” after the nuclear accident. Its combination with a conflict of legitimacies –between nuclear-related institutions like ICRP and IAEA, and United Nations institutions - opens questions and challenges for the political and scientific spheres, as well as for SHS researchers.


https://www.sciencesetavenir.fr/assets/img/2016/03/22/cover-r4x3w1000-5c866e4e29731-fukushima-vue-d-avion.jpg
Depuis la catastrophe du 11 mars 2011, l’IRSN suit les évolutions de l’opinion des citoyens directement impactés. Revenir dans son ancienne ville après la décontamination n’est pas une ...
www.sciencesetavenir.fr

 

Les riverains de Fukushima n'osent pas revenir dans les zones officiellement décontaminées


Depuis la catastrophe du 11 mars 2011, l’IRSN suit les évolutions de l’opinion des citoyens directement impactés. Revenir dans son ancienne ville après la décontamination n’est pas une décision simple à prendre.


La centrale de Fukushima photographiée le 11 mars 2016, 5 ans après la catastrophe.

© NEWSCOM/SIPA


CONFIANCE. Ce programme qui alliel'Institut de radioprotection et de sûreté nucléaire (IRSN) et l'université japonaise Tokyo Tech s'appelle "Shinrai" soit "confiance" en japonais. Depuis 2014, il s'attache à comprendre les rapports qui se nouent entre les autorités en charge des conséquences de l'explosion des réacteurs nucléaires de la centrale de Fukushima et les habitants. Officiellement, tout se déroule au mieux. Selon la Préfecture de Fukushima, la zone d'évacuation totale n'est plus que de 371km² soit 2,7% de la surface de la Préfecture. De 165.000 évacués en 2012, on est tombé en décembre 2018 à près de 43.000 personnes qui ne peuvent toujours pas retrouver leur maison.

Au huitième anniversaire de la catastrophe, Shinrai publie un nouveau rapport qui montre combien le retour des populations dans leur ancien lien de vie est dans la réalité difficile. Les chercheurs suivent pas à pas 120 personnes via des entretiens personnalisés et recueillent leurs réactions aux décisions des autorités. Ils constatent ainsi que les retours vers la ville d'origine sont peu nombreux. En moyenne, 15% seulement des habitants sont revenus après la décontamination de leur quartier et l'autorisation des pouvoirs publics. À l'exception de la ville de Tamura qui a vu 80% de retour, d'autres agglomérations comme Kawauchi (28,5%) ou Naraha (31,8%) ont des taux bien plus faibles et dans des villes partiellement évacuées comme Tomokia et Namie, 4% seulement des habitants se sont réinstallés bien que les autorités assurent qu'il n'y a désormais plus de danger pour la santé.

Les anciens reviennent, pas les jeunes

MEDECINS. Le rapport Shinrai confirme ce que le gouvernement japonais redoutait. Le taux de retour des enfants des 9 municipalités concernées est de 8,6% seulement. La tendance est clairement identifiée par l'Agence publique de reconstruction : plus la personne concernée est jeune, moins elle a envie de revenir. Dans les entretiens, les maires semblent ne plus se faire d'illusions : les familles avec des enfants en bas âge ne se réinstalleront probablement pas. Le portrait du "revenant" est donc celui d'un homme d'environ 50 à 60 ans, en bonne santé, autonome, ayant une voiture, capable d'entretenir des relations de voisinage et dont les enfants sont adultes et vivent ailleurs.

Ceux de la même génération mais ayant des problèmes de santé choisissent d'ores et déjà de se réinstaller dans les villes où vivent leurs enfants et où ils trouveront un bon encadrement médical. Les médecins et les infirmières font en effet majoritairement partie de la génération plus jeune qui ne se réinstallera pas. Certains élus comme ceux de Naraha cités par le rapport, estiment qu'au mieux 50% des anciens habitants reviendront y vivre. Dès lors, les autorités essaient d'imaginer ce que deviendront ces agglomérations dans 10 ou 20 ans. La notion de "ville marginale" refait ainsi surface. Définie en 1991 par le sociologue Akira Ono, elle décrit le devenir de ces zones urbaines où la moitié de la population a plus de 65 ans, dans le contexte du vieillissement de la pyramide des âges du Japon.

La reconstruction économique de la région pourrait profiter à des populations extérieures

RISQUES. Le rapport bat ainsi en brèche l'idée très ancrée que les habitants sont attachés à leur région et rechignent à la quitter même en cas d'accident nucléaire. L'exemple de Fukushima montre le contraire. La majorité des riverains ne veulent pas revenir et ce, malgré les efforts des autorités pour les rassurer sur l'absence de risque sanitaire. Shinrai identifie les principales craintes à l'origine de cette décision : risque d'exposition aux radiations notamment pour les enfants, peur associée au voisinage de la centrale accidentée, manque de structures médicales et d'écoles, manque d'infrastructures commerciales et sociales, la forte présence des ouvriers de décontamination de la radioactivité contrastant avec l'absence des amis et des voisins qui ne sont pas revenus…

Les discours rassurants des autorités nationales comme régionales ne peuvent rivaliser face au constat que l’accident a profondément changé les structures de vie. La perte des relations sociales et familiales est ainsi mise en exergue pour expliquer cette volonté de ne plus revenir. Les auteurs du rapport soulignent par ailleurs que cela ne devrait pas s’arranger. Depuis mars 2018 en effet, l’électricien TEPCO ne finance plus les aides au relogement en dehors de la zone contaminée. Des familles qui pouvaient ainsi occuper deux habitations, devront désormais choisir car incapables de payer deux loyers. Et le nombre des départs devrait augmenter.

Quelle politique de reconstruction doit dans ce contexte mener les autorités japonaises? Les actions engagées visent en effet à revitaliser le tissu économique de cette région en favorisant l’installation d’entreprises et la création d’emplois. Le rapport souligne que pour les habitants le mot "reconstruction" signifie plutôt le retour à un environnement sain apte à préserver leur santé et ne sont pas demandeurs de ces activités économiques. Les auteurs redoutent ainsi que les emplois créés attirent des populations économiquement plus fragiles d’autres régions de l'archipel, accentuant ainsi la dépendance des villes locales aux aides des autorités nationales.

CONFIANCE. Ce programme qui allie l’Institut de radioprotection et de sûreté nucléaire (IRSN) et l’université japonaise Tokyo Tech s’appelle "Shinrai" soit "confiance" en japonais. Depuis 2014, il s’attache à comprendre les rapports qui se nouent entre les autorités en charge des conséquences de l’explosion des réacteurs nucléaires de la centrale de Fukushima et les habitants. Officiellement, tout se déroule au mieux. Selon la Préfecture de Fukushima, la zone d’évacuation totale n’est plus que de 371km² soit 2,7% de la surface de la Préfecture. De 165.000 évacués en 2012, on est tombé en décembre 2018 à près de 43.000 personnes qui ne peuvent toujours pas retrouver leur maison.

Au huitième anniversaire de la catastrophe, Shinrai  publie un nouveau rapport qui montre combien le retour des populations dans leur ancien lien de vie est dans la réalité difficile. Les chercheurs suivent pas à pas 120 personnes via des entretiens personnalisés et recueillent leurs réactions aux décisions des autorités. Ils constatent ainsi que les retours vers la ville d’origine sont peu nombreux. En moyenne, 15% seulement des habitants sont revenus après la décontamination de leur quartier et l’autorisation des pouvoirs publics. À l’exception de la ville de Tamura qui a vu 80% de retour, d’autres agglomérations comme Kawauchi (28,5%) ou Naraha (31,8%) ont des taux bien plus faibles et dans des villes partiellement évacuées comme Tomokia et Namie, 4% seulement des habitants se sont réinstallés bien que les autorités assurent qu’il n’y a désormais plus de danger pour la santé.

Les anciens reviennent, pas les jeunes

MEDECINS. Le rapport Shinrai confirme ce que le gouvernement japonais redoutait. Le taux de retour des enfants des 9 municipalités concernées est de 8,6% seulement. La tendance est clairement identifiée par l’Agence publique de reconstruction : plus la personne concernée est jeune, moins elle a envie de revenir. Dans les entretiens, les maires semblent ne plus se faire d’illusions : les familles avec des enfants en bas âge ne se réinstalleront probablement pas. Le portrait du "revenant" est donc celui d’un homme d’environ 50 à 60 ans, en bonne santé, autonome, ayant une voiture, capable d’entretenir des relations de voisinage et dont les enfants sont adultes et vivent ailleurs.


 

9 BIBLIOGRAPHY

Ackerman, G. (2016). Traverser Tchernobyl. Premier Parallèle.

Anasuma Brice, C. (2017). Une catastrophe sans fin. Retrieved juillet 2017, from Mediapart.

Asanuma-Brice, C. (2013). Fukushima, une démocratie en souffrance. Outre terre 1, 457 à 470.

Barbier, L., & Fassert, C. (2017). The Life Span Study and its criticisms, a socio-historical perspective. Paper presented at the Making the world nuclear after Hiroshima. May 2017, Stanford University.

Barthe, Y. (2017). Les retombées du passé. Le paradoxe de la victime. Seuil.

Blondiaux, L., & Sintomer, Y. (2004). L'impératif délibératif. Politix. 57(20).

Bocéno, L., Dupont, Y., Grandazzi, G., & Lemarchand, F. (2006). Vivre en zone contaminée ou les paradoxes de la gestion du risque. In G. Ackerman (Ed.), Les silences de Tchernobyl Paris : Autrement.

Boilley, D. (2014). Fukushima 3 ans après. Retour à l'(a)normal. Rapport ACRO.

Bournet, G. (2016). Franckushima. Lutopiquant.

Brown , K. (2017). Chernobyl's hidden legacy. Physics world .

Callon, M., Lascoumes, P., & Barthe, Y. (2001). Agir dans un monde incertain. Essai sur la démocratie technique: Seuil.

Centemeri, L. (2011). Retour à Seveso, la complexité morale et politique du dommage à l'environnement. Annales, histoire, Sciences sociales. Armand Colin, 213-240.

Centemeri, L. (2012). Seveso, une catastrophe sans victimes ?. In V. F.-M. Daubas-Letourneux, Santé au travail, approches critiques. La Découverte.

Ciccozzi, A. and Benadusi, M. Parola di scienza - Il terremoto dell’Aquila e la Commissione Grandi Rischi: un’analisi antropologica, DeriveApprodi, Roma, pp. 192. Maltese, G., Tecnoscienza - Italian Journal of Science & Technology Studies, vol 4 n°2 2013.

Ciccozzi, A. Forms of truth in the trial against the Commission for Major Risks- Anthropological notes”, in Archivio Antropologico Mediterraneo online, a cura di, M. Benadusi e S. Revert, anno XIX, no. 18 (2), pp. 16.

Clarke, L., & Chess, C. (2008). Elites and panic: more to fear than fear itself. Social Forces.

Claußen, Dr. Angelika, & Dr. Rosen Alex . (2016). Vivre 5 ans avec Fukushima: IPPNW report.

Collins, H. M., & Evans, R. (2007). Rethinking expertise. University of Chicago Press.

Couchot, H. (2016). Penser le temps avec Fukushima : chronique du temps suspendu Penser avec Fukushima. Ss la direction de : C. Doumet et M. Ferrier.

Dahl, Robert (1985), Controlling Nuclear Weapons: Democracy versus Guardianship, Syracuse University Press.

Dahl, Robert (1986), A Preface to Economic Democracy, University of California Press.

David-Jougneau, M. (2004). Semmelweiss, Bandajevski, des savants victimes de la répression scientifique. In Les silences de Tchernobyl. AUTREMENT.

Doi, T. (2015). Challenges on the Issues of Return and Education in Kawauchi (Original title: Kawauchi mura heno kikan to kyoiku wo meguru kadai), In: M. Yokemoto and T. Watanabe, (Eds). Why does nuclear disaster induce imbalanced reconstruction? : Toward “Reconstruction of Human Life” and Community Revival from Fukushima Accident. Minerva Shobo Rapport IRSN/2019/00178 Shinrai research Project: The 3/11 accident and its social consequences 160/165

Ce document est la propriété de l’IRSN et ne peut pas être communiqué, reproduit ou utilisé sans son autorisation écrite préalable. This document is the property of IRSN and shall not be disseminated, copied or used without its prior formal approval

 

Dupuy, J. P. (2008, Mars/Avril). Tchernobyl et l'invisibilité du mal. ESPRIT.

Friends Of Earth and Fukuro-no-kai, (2012). For establishing the “right for evacuation”: the frontline on the issues of self-evacuation and compensation, the case of the Watari district of Fukushima city (Original title: “Hinan no kenri” kakuritsu no tameni: jishutekihinan no baishomondai to hinanmondai no saizensen). http://www.foejapan.org/energy/news/p110909.html

Fassert, C. (à paraître) : « Choses qui se passent après un accident nucléaire : Revenir, Partir, se sacrifier : la montagne radieuse de Sokyû Genyû».Numero spécial de la Revue des Sciences Humaines. Ferrier, M. (Dir.).

Fassert, C. (2013). Des experts face à la crise. La cellule sanitaire du CTC de l’accident de Fukushima. Rapport interne IRSN. .

Fassert, C. (2017). Living in/with contaminated territories : an STS perspective. Technoscienza, pp. 103-128.

Fassert, C.(2017) Rapport Shinrai. Revue des concepts de confiance et d’expertise. En ligne sur le site IRSN.

Ferrier, M. (2012). Fukushima, récit d'un désastre. Gallimard.

Ferrier, M. (2014). Fukushima ou la traversée du temps : une catastrophe sans fin. ESPRIT, 405, Juin 2014.

Fishkin, J. (2012) Energy/kankyo no sentakushi ni kan suru torongata yoron chosa: kanshu iinkai hokokusho (Deliberative poll concerning energy and environment options: report of the supervisory committee), Cabinet Secretariat.

Fishkin, J.S. and Luskin, R.C. (2005). Experimenting with a Democratic Ideal: Deliberative Polling and Public Opinion. Acta Politica, 2005, 40. Palgrave Macmillan: 284-298

Frickel, S. V. (2007). Hurricane Katrina, contamination and the unintended organization of ignorance. Technology in society, 181-188.

Fujiwara, A. (2014) Tamura city, Fukushima: Lifting the evacuation order on 1 April. (The government) pushed through its judgement, “ministry officials are clever”. Mainichi Shimbun, 24 February.

Gaulène, M. (2016). Le nucléaire en Asie. Ed. Philippe Picquier.

Giddens, A. (1994). Les conséquences de la modernité. L’Harmattan, Paris,

Giddens, A. in Ulrich Beck, Anthony Giddens, Scott Lash, Living in a post traditionnal society. Reflexive modernization, Polity Press, 1994.

Gill, T. (2014). Radiation and responsibility. What is the right thing for an anthropologist to do in Fuskuhima ? Japanese review of cultural anthropology.

Grover, A. (2013). Report of the Special Rapporteur on the right of everyone to the enjoyment of the highest attainable standard of physical and mental health, Mission to Japan (15-16 November 2012), (A/HRC/23/41/Add.3). United Nations.

Hasegawa, R. (2013) Disaster Evacuation from Japan’s 2011 Tsunami Disaster and the Fukushima Nuclear Accident. Studies No.5/2013. IDDRI.

Hasegawa, R. (2015) Returning home after Fukushima: Displacement from a nuclear disaster and international guidelines for internally displaced persons. Migration, Environment and Climate Change: Policy Brief Series. Issue 4. Vo.1, September 2015: International Organisation for Migration (IOM)

Hasegawa, R. (2015). Returning home after Fukushima : Displacement from a nuclear disaster and international guidelines for internally displaced persons. IOM. Policy Brief Series. Issue 4. Vol.1.

Hasegawa, R. (2016). Five years on for Fukushima’s IDPs: Life with radiological risk and without a community safety net. Retrieved from Blog, Internal Displacement Monitoring Rapport IRSN/2019/00178 Shinrai research Project: The 3/11 accident and its social consequences 161/165

Ce document est la propriété de l’IRSN et ne peut pas être communiqué, reproduit ou utilisé sans son autorisation écrite préalable. This document is the property of IRSN and shall not be disseminated, copied or used without its prior formal approval

 

Hasegawa, R., Devès, M., Fassert, C. et Kaminski, E. (2017). Politics of Zoning: Making Risks (In)visible and Manageable in Disasters, submitted and presented at the 15th Science and Democracy Network (SDN) Annual Meeting, Harvard University, 29 Juin 2017, Boston, USA

Hawley, C.( 2013 ). Trust: A Very Short Introduction: Oxford University Press.

Hecht, G. (2012). Being Nuclear Africans and the Global Uranium Trade: The MIT Press.

Hiraoka, M. and Yokemoto, M. (2015). The System and Problems of Nuclear Compensation (Original title: Genpatsu baisho no shikumi to mondai ten). In: M. Yokemoto and T. Watanabe, (Eds). Why does nuclear disaster induce imbalanced reconstruction? : Toward “Reconstruction of Human Life” and Community Revival from Fukushima Accident. Minerva Shobo.

ICRP (2009), Publication 111: Application of the Commission’s Recommendations to the Protection of People Living in Long-Term Contaminated Areas after a Nuclear Accident or a Radiation Emergency, Volume 39, No.3.

Imai, A. (2012), Genpatsu saigai hinansya no jittai chousa (san-ji) (The Third Survey of Nuclear Evacuees), The Japan Research Institute for Local Government Monthly, Vol. 402, April 2012.

Imai, A. (2012). The Third Survey of Nuclear Evacuees (Original title: Genpatsu saigai hinansya no jittai chousa (san-ji)) (Vol. 402): The Japan Research Institute for Local Government Monthly.

Imai, A. (2014). Jichitaisaiken: genpatsuhinan to “idousuru mura” (Reconstruction of Municipalities: Nuclear Evacuation and “Mobile Town”): Chikuma Shinsho

Jobin, P. (2006). Maladies industrielles et renouveau syndical au Japon Editions de l'Ecole des hautes études en sciences sociales.

Jobin, P. (2012). Qui est protégé par la radioprotection ? EBISU n°47.

Jobin, P., & Tsai, Y.-Y. (2018). How much compensation is fair enough for repairing a toxic environment? A view from two class actions in Taiwan. Paper presented at the Repairing Environments: Post-Disaster Mobilisations, Experiences & Tensions, ENS, Paris.

Kendra Ulrich, “Unequal impact”. Greenpeace Japan. Edited by Ai Kashiwagi and Kazue Suzuki, Greenpeace Japan. March 2017.

Kimura, A. H. (2016). Radiation Brain moms and citizen scientists. The gender politics of Food contamination after Fukushima. . Durham and London: Duke University Press.

Kimura, A. H. (2018). Fukushima Ethos: post disaster risk communication, Affect, and shifting risks. Science as Culture, pp. 98-117.

Kitamura, I. a, M., Y. (2016). Research on the relation between rate of permanent return and community activities - Case of Kawauchi Village, Fukushima Prefecture. Journal of Center for Regional Affaires, Fukushima University, 27 (2), 52-60.

Kitamura, I. and Moritomi, Y. (2016), Research on the relation between rate of permanent return and community activities – Case of Kawauchi Village, Fukushima Prefecture -, Journal of Center for Regional Affaires, Fukushima University 27 (2): 52-60, Feb 2016.

Komendantova and Battagli (2016), Beyond Decide-Announce-Defend (DAD) and Not-in-My-Backyard (NIMBY) models? Addressing the social and public acceptance of electric transmission lines in Germany, Energy Research & Social Science, 22 (2016): 224–231

Kuchinskaya, O. (2014). The politics of invisibility. Public knowledge about radiation health effects after Chernobyl. PIT Press.

Kurokawa, S. (2017). The Invention of “Decontamination of the Mind”: why the advanced decontamination city stopped to decontaminate. Shueisha International.

Langer, E.J. (1983) The Psychology of Control. SAGE Publications, Inc; edition. Rapport IRSN/2019/00178 Shinrai research Project: The 3/11 accident and its social consequences 162/165

Ce document est la propriété de l’IRSN et ne peut pas être communiqué, reproduit ou utilisé sans son autorisation écrite préalable. This document is the property of IRSN and shall not be disseminated, copied or used without its prior formal approval

 

Lenoir, Y. (2017). Samuel Loewenberg, ‘Mikhail Balonov: understanding the legacy of Chernobyl’ in The Lancet , Volume 367, Issue 9519, (April 2006). Retrieved from Reporterre website.

Luhmann, N. La confiance, un mécanisme de réduction de la complexité sociale, Economica, 2006.

Machida, T. (2015). From “Virtual Town” to Reconstruction of Public Housing. (Original title: “Karinomachi” kara fukkoukoueijutaku he”. In: SAFRAN et al. (2015). White Paper on Nuclear Evacuation (In Japanese: Genpatsu Hinan Hakusho). Jinbun Shoin.

Mitchell, M. (28 Septembre 2018). The Cosmology of Evidence: Citizenship, Law, and Biological Knowledge after Three Mile Island Paper presented at the Repairing Environments: Post-Disaster Mobilisations, Experiences & Tensions, Ecole Normale Supérieure, Paris.

Mosneaga, A (2015). Tackling Prolonged Displacement, Policy Brief No.1, 2015, United Nations University.

Mosneaga, A. (2015). Tackling Prolonged Displacement: Lessons on Durable Solutions from Fukushima UNU-IAS Policy Brief Series (Vol. 1). Tokyo.

Murakami, K. (2016). Koukyouseisakukeisei to yoron no aratana stage (New step for the formation of public policy and public opinion). Housou media kenkyu (Studies of broadcasting and media) (13), 2016, NHK: 253-288

Murakami, K. (2016). New step for the formation of public policy and public opinion (Original title: Koukyouseisakukeisei to yoron no aratana stage ). , Housou media kenkyu (Studies of broadcasting and media) pp. NHK: 253-288

NAIIC (2012). Report : The Fukushima Nuclear Accident Independent Investigation Commission. The National Diet of Japan.

Naraha Town, Fukushima Prefecture, and Reconstruction Agency (2014). Resident Opinion Survey Result, 28 February. Available from http://www.reconstruction.go.jp/topics/main-cat1/sub-cat1-4/ikoucyousa/20140228_02_ikouchousa_sokuhounaraha.pdf

Nomura, T., Hokugo, T., and Tkenaka, C. (2012). Japan’s nuclear liability system. In OECD (2012). Japan’s Compensation System for Nuclear Damage: As Related to the TEPCO Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Accident. Nuclear Energy Agency (NEA). Paris: pp15-27

Nuclear Emergency Response Headquarter (2011). Step 2 no kanryou wo uketa keikaikuiki oyobi hinanshijikuiki no minaoshini kansuru kihontekinakangaekata oyobi kongono kentoukadaini tsuite (Principle Ideas and Further Issues relating to the Revision of Restricted Area and Evacuation Zones following the End of Step 2). 26 December 2011.

Nuclear Emergency Response Headquarter (2015) Revised Version: For Accelerating the Fukushima Reconstruction from Nuclear Disaster. 12 June 2015.

Nuclear Emergency Response Headquarter (2013) For Accelerating the Fukushima Reconstruction from Nuclear Disaster. 20 December 2013.

Ono, A. (1991). Aging mountainous villages and marginal villages (Original title: Sanson no koreika to genkaishuraku. Keizai, 1991. No.7: Shin Nihon Shuppansha

Pagnotta, A. (2012). Le dernier homme de Fukushima: Don Guichotte, Seuil.

Pena-Vega, A., & Grappe, M. (2015). Dans les yeux des enfants, la catastrophe de Tchernobyl. Centrales nucleaires, leçons de l'expérience mondiale. Interlings: FAP Brasilia.

Pestre, D. (2011). Des sciences, des techniques et de l'ordre démocratique et participatif. [On Science, Technology, and the Democratic and Participatory Order]. Participations, 1(1), 210-238.

Petryna, A. (2003). Life exposed. Biological citizens after Chernobyl. . Princeton Press. Rapport IRSN/2019/00178 Shinrai research Project: The 3/11 accident and its social consequences 163/165

Ce document est la propriété de l’IRSN et ne peut pas être communiqué, reproduit ou utilisé sans son autorisation écrite préalable. This document is the property of IRSN and shall not be disseminated, copied or used without its prior formal approval

 

Quéré, L. (2006). La confiance. Confiance et engagement. In Quéré, L. et Ogien, O. (Ed.), Les moments de la confiance. Connaissance, affects, et engagements. Economica.

Reconstruction Agency (2015). Residents Opinion Survey (Kawauchi, Kawamata), 20 February 2015

Reconstruction Agency (2016). Kawauchi Residents Opinion Survey,19 February 2016.

Reconstruction Agency (2017). Residents Opinion Survey (Kawamata, Minamisoma, Kawauchi, and Katsurao), 14 February 2017.

Revet, S. (2018). Les coulisses du monde des catastrophes "naturelles". . Le Bien commun.

Ribault, N. et T. (2011). Les sanctuaires de l'abime. Gallimard .

Roqueplo, P. (1997.). Entre savoir et décision, l’expertise scientifique. INRA.

SAFRAN et al. (2015). White Paper on Nuclear Evacuation (In Japanese: Genpatsu Hinan Hakusho). Jinbun Shoin.

Samuel, R. J. (2013). 3.11 Disaster and change after Fukushima. Cornell university Press.

Sato, K. (2018). Surviving the bomb: diverging visions and Japan nuclear's governance. Paper presented at the Revisiting the nuclear order Conf., Paris-Stanford project. Paris.

Sato, Y. (2016). Les faibles doses d’irradiation et le pouvoir de sécurité : du point de vue foucaldien sur le « pouvoir-savoir » In C. Doumet & M. Ferrier (Eds.), Penser avec Fukushima. Cecile Defaut ed.

Sato Y and Taguchi T (2016). Philosophie pour sortir du nucléaire (Original title : Datsugenpatsu no tetsugaku). Jinmon-shoin. Non traduit.

Topçu, S. (2014). Organiser l'irresponsabilité? La gestion (inter)nationale des dégâts d'un accident nucléaire comme régime discursif. Ecologie et politique , pp. 95-114.

Shimada Y, N. S. (2018). Balancing the risk of the evacuation and sheltering-in-place options: a survival study following Japan’s 2011 Fukushima nuclear incident. BMJ Open 2018;8:e021482. doi:10.1136/bmjopen-2018-021482.

Shrader-Frechette , K., & Persson, L. . (2002). Ethical, logical and scientific problems with the new ICRP proposals. journal of radiological protection, 22.

Slater, D., Morioka, R., and Danzuka, H. . (2014). Micro politics of Radiation Young mothers looking for a voice in Post-3.11 . Critical Asian Studies ,(46:3), pp. 485-508.

Sone, Y. (2012). Energy/kankyo no sentakushi ni kansuru tourongata yoronchousa: chousa kekka houkoku (Report of Survey Result: Deliberative Poll on Energy and Environment Choice), 22 August 2012, found at http://www.cas.go.jp/jp/seisaku/npu/policy09/pdf/20120822/shiryo5-3-2.pdf

Stirling, A. The crossing. Japan neglected nuclear lessons. https://stepscentre-thecrossing.blogspot.com. 16-th March 2011.

Sugita, K., & Augendre, M. (2012). Les déplacés de l'accident de Fukushima : Les conséquences sociales et sanitaires, et les initiatives citoyennes. . halshs-00967033.

Takahashi, H. (2009). One minute after the detonation of atomic bomb: the erased effects of residual radiation. International journal of the history of science society of Japan, 19(2);

Takahashi, H. (2018). Continuing nuclear tests and ending tuna inspections: politics, Science, and the lucky dragon accident in 1954. Revisiting nuclear orders. Paper presented at the Paris Stanford project.

Takahashi, H. (2018). Continuing nuclear tests and ending tuna inspections: politics, Science, and the lucky dragon accident in 1954. Revisiting nuclear orders. Paris Stanford project. . Rapport IRSN/2019/00178 Shinrai research Project: The 3/11 accident and its social consequences 164/165

Ce document est la propriété de l’IRSN et ne peut pas être communiqué, reproduit ou utilisé sans son autorisation écrite préalable. This document is the property of IRSN and shall not be disseminated, copied or used without its prior formal approval

 

Takahashi, T. (2014). ‘What March 11 Means to Me: Nuclear Power and the Sacrificial System’. The Asia-Pacific Journal | Japan Focus, 12 (19). doi: https://apjjf.org/-Takahashi-Tetsuya/4114/article.pdf

Tamura City, Fukushima Prefecture, and Reconstruction Agency (2013). Resident Opinion Survey Result, 5 February. Available from https://www.reconstruction.go.jp/topics/20130205_ikouchousa_sokuhoubettentamura.pdf

Tateno S. and Yokoyama H.M. (2013). Public anxiety, trust, and the role of mediators in communicating risk of exposure to low dose radiation after the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Plant explosion. Journal of Science Communication 12(2), June 2013. SISSA.

Thebaud Mony, A. (2014). La science asservie. La Découverte.

Ribault, T. (2014). Le désastre de Fukushima et les sept principes du national-nucléarisme. Raison Présente.

Topçu, S. (2014). Organiser l'irresponsabilité ? La gestion (inter)nationale des dégâts d'un accident nucléaire comme régime discursif. Ecologie et politique , pp. 95-114.

Topçu, S. (Mai 2016). Catastrophes nucléaires et « normalisation » des zones contaminées. Enjeux politiques, économiques, sanitaires, démocratiques et éthiques. Les notes de la fondation d’Ecologie Politique.

Tuncak, B. (GENEVA 25 October 2018). Declaration of the Special Rapporteur. United Nations Rights. Office of the high commissionner. Retrieved from United Nations Rights. Office of the high commissionner website

United Nations (1998). Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement. E/CN.4/1998/53/Add.2, February 11.

United Nations (2000) General Comment No. 14. Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights. E/C.12/2000/4, 11 August.

United Nations (2009). Framework on Durable Solutions for Internally Displaced Persons. A/HRC/13/21/Add.4, 29 December.

United Nations (2013). Report of the Special Rapporteur on the right of everyone to the enjoyment of the highest attainable standard of physical and mental health. Anand Grover, Mission to Japan (15-16 November 2012), A/HRC/23/41/Add.3, 2 May.A167

United Nations (2017) Compilation on Japan: Report of the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights. Human Rights Council. Working Group on the Universal Periodic Review. 4 September 2017.

Van der putte, J., Shaun, B. & Ulrich, K. (2014). The IAEA Fukushima Daiichi Accident Summary Report: A preliminary analysis. Greenpeace Report.

Vasquez-Maignan, Ximena (2012). The Japanese nuclear liability regime in the context of the international nuclear liability principles. In OECD (2012). Japan’s Compensation System for Nuclear Damage: As Related to the TEPCO Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Accident. Nuclear Energy Agency (NEA). Paris: pp 9-14

Vaulerin, A. (2016). La désolation. Les humains jetables de Fukushima. Paris: Grasset.

White, P. (2015). Japan’s 2012 National Debate on Energy and Environment Policy: Unprecedented but Short-Lived Public Influence. Electric Journal Contemporary Japanese Studies (ejcjs). Volume 15, Issue 2 (Article 7), 2015.

Yamamoto, K., Takaki. R., Sato, A. and Yamashita, Y. (2015). Listen to the voice of nuclear evacuees: what is the problem with reconstruction policy? (Original title: Genpatsuhinansha no koe wo kiku: fukkoseisaku no naniga mondaika). Iwanami Booklet 927.

Yamashita, Y. (2017). The Future of Communities Taken Away by the “Reconstruction”. (In Japanese: “Fukko” ga ubau chiiki no mirai), Iwanami Shoten. Rapport IRSN/2019/00178 Shinrai research Project: The 3/11 accident and its social consequences 165/165

Ce document est la propriété de l’IRSN et ne peut pas être communiqué, reproduit ou utilisé sans son autorisation écrite préalable. This document is the property of IRSN and shall not be disseminated, copied or used without its prior formal approval

 

Yamashita, Y. and Kainuma, H. (2012). Theory of Nuclear Evacuation: From the Reality of Evacuation to Second Town and Hometown Revival (Original title: Genpatsuhinanron: hinan no jitsusou kara second town, kokyo saisei made): Akashi Shoten

Yamashita, Y., Ichimura, T. and Sato, A. (2016). Reconstruction without Humans (Inhabitants): Nuclear Evacuation and People’s “Lack of Understanding” (In Japanese: Ningen naki Fukko: Genpatsu hinan to kokumin no “furikai” wo megutte), Chikuma Bunko.

Yamauchi, T. (Septembre 2011). Report on the level of radioactive contamination – limit of decontamination in the Watari district, commissioned by Friends of the Earth (NGO), Fukuro-no-kai (NGO) and residents of the Watari district, . Kobe University.

Yokemoto, M. (2013). Questioning the Nuclear Compensation – Vague Responsibility, Tossed Around Evacuees (Vol. 866): Iwanami Booklet

Yokemoto, M. (2015). What is imbalanced reconstruction? (In Japanese: Fukintou na fukko toha nanika). In: M. Yokemoto and T. Watanabe, (Eds). Why does nuclear disaster induce imbalanced reconstruction? : Toward “Reconstruction of Human Life” and Community Revival from Fukushima Accident: Minerva Shobo.

Yokemoto, M. (2015). What is imbalanced reconstruction? (In Japanese: Fukintou na fukko toha nanika). In: M. Yokemoto and T. Watanabe, (Eds). Why does nuclear disaster induce imbalanced reconstruction? : Toward “Reconstruction of Human Life” and Community Revival from Fukushima Accident. Minerva Shobo.

Yoko, T. (2012). Journal des jours tremblants . Paris: Verdier.

Yuasa, M. (2013). Whistle in the Graveyard : Safety Discourse and Hiroshima/Nagasaki Authority in post fukushima Japan. In Japan's 3/11 disaster as seen from Hiroshima: A multidisciplinary approach . Hiroshima Shiritsu Daigaku .

Zvizdal. Chernobyl so far, so close. Décembre 2016. (www.berlinberlin.be., Performer) Le 104, Paris.