While all eyes
at Parliament in Westminster last week for focused on the interminable political
debate over Brexit, some MPs were dealing with the micro-management of
secondary legislation being scrutinised in a series of so-called Delegated
Legislation Committee (DLC) meetings.
Fourteen
MPs of 16 on the committee attended (with former Labour foreign Secretary Margaret
Beckett, and Labour MPs Stephen Hepburn and Ellie Reeves absent) to hear BEIS energy
minister Richard Harrington present the arguments for the Government, under the
chairmanship of Virendra Sharma MP
Harrington argued by emphasizing that
the two sets of regulations are “essential to establishing our domestic regime,
whether we leave the EU with a deal or not—their effect will be exactly the
same in either outcome.“
He laid out how “The powers to make
this secondary legislation are found in the 2013 Act, which we amended with the
2018 Act. The territorial extent and application of the regulations is to
England and Wales, Scotland and Northern Ireland.”
“Nuclear safeguards are accounting,
reporting and verification processes designed to assure and demonstrate to the
international community that civil nuclear material is not diverted unlawfully
into military or weapons programmes,” he explained to MPs, stressing “ hat is
not to do with nuclear safety and nuclear security.”
He also, questionably, asserted the UK “have
a very good record as a responsible nuclear state” and accurately stated the UK
were a founding member of the International Atomic Energy Agency in 1957. He
then went on to inaccurately characterise
the role of the IAEA claiming it “ensures that states honour their
international legal nuclear safeguards obligations in connection with the
non-proliferation treaty, and basically stops civil nuclear being used for
military purposes.”
It does not! It deters by the threat of
detection through mandatory, intrusive verification. Bu tit does not stop
diversion to military misuse
The minister then falsely asserted “We have always voluntarily
accepted two safeguards agreements with the IAEA” These agreements were very
reluctantly agreed by the UK in 1977- twenty years after the UK joined the I AEA
– very much involuntary voluntary offer
agreements.
He then referred to plans to replace the trilateral safeguards agreements
between the UK, the IAEA and Euratom that have been in place since 1978 in
order to “enable the continuity of civil nuclear trade with our international
trading partners.”
Under the new so-called “voluntary safeguards agreement
(VOA) signed on 7 June 2018 between the
UK and the UN international watchdog, the IAEA, to replace the existing trilateral
agreements between UK-IAEA and the EU nuclear watchdog body,
Euratom, under Brexit arrangements, it includes in its very first article,
the following exclusion:
“The United Kingdom shall accept the application of
safeguards, in accordance with the terms of this Agreement, on all source or
special fissionable material in facilities or parts thereof within the United
Kingdom, subject to exclusions for national security reasons only, with
a view to enabling the Agency to verify that such material is not, except as
provided for in this Agreement, withdrawn from civil activities.” (emphasis
added)
Lest anyone thinks this is simply an enabling option,
very unlikely to be implemented, we know from Parliamentary answers and annual
publications by the UK nuclear regulator, the Office for Nuclear Regulation,
under the predecessor trilateral agreement (in force from September 1978),
which this new treaty replaces, there have been several hundred occasions when
nuclear materials, including plutonium, has been withdrawn from safeguards
cover.
A written answer to
Green Party MP Caroline Lucas on 17 December 2018 (200104) by foreign office
minister, Sir Alan Duncan, withdrawals year by year since
1999 were as follows: in 2000 there were 6; in 2001, 18; in 2002, 11; in 2003,
20; in 2004 19; in 2005, 17; in 2006, 16; in 2007, 31; in 2008, 19; in 2009,
15; in 2010, 14; in 2011, 17; in 2012, 19; in 2013, 34; in 2014, 18, in 2015,
29; in 2016, 44 and in 2017 35 withdrawals.
We also know, by combining these to
annual totals with those included in a
paper put into the House of Commons Library by ministers in July 2000, that in
total withdrawal of nuclear materials form “safeguards” in the UK have taken
place on more then 600 occasions.
Minister Harrington also asserted “the
Government have prioritised putting agreements in place with key
countries—Australia, Canada, Japan and the US—that require nuclear co-operation
agreements, unlike others,” explaining that “ NCAs are legally binding treaties
that allow states to formally recognise their willingness to co-operate with
each other on civil nuclear matters. We have now concluded—and Parliament has
now approved—the ratification of replacement bilateral NCAs with Australia,
Canada and the US. We already have a bilateral NCA with Japan.”
He then reiterated the Government’s
commitment to establishing, by December 2020, a regime that is “equivalent in
effectiveness and coverage to that currently provided by Euratom, and that will
exceed the commitments that the international community expects us to meet.”
He added “ I am confident that the
fissionable regulations and nuclear safeguards regulations do that. We want to
establish a regime that will operate in a similar way to the existing
arrangements, taking account of best practice in our regulation making and
considering the need to minimise disruption to industry, which were
undertakings I gave during the passage of the Nuclear Safeguards Bill”.
Turning to the nuclear regulator, the
ONR, Mr Harrington then revealed the
significant progress has made in the set-up of the domestic regime” since Parliament
was updated Parliament in October, and explaine dhow “From this month—in the past
couple of weeks—our domestic regime has commenced parallel running alongside
Euratom, processing and checking reports received from industry through our IT
system—the safeguards information management and reporting system—and producing
the declarations required to enable the UK to meet its international
obligations.”
We have been running the scheme in parallel so
that we have time in the next few weeks, if we need it before the end of March,
to see whether any adjustments need to be made, he added
He also reported to MPs that the “ONR’s
recruitment target for the first phase has been met: 16 safeguards officers are
in place, which is seven more than the minimum of nine required to deliver the
regime at the end of March; and four nuclear material accountants have been
appointed, so 20 are in post.”
Between July and September last year,
BEIS held a consultation on the content of these draft regulations and the
nuclear safeguards regulations. In total, 28 formal responses were received. At
the end of November we published our response. No major changes to these
regulations were suggested.
This statement is totally untrue. I proposed in my personal;
response that the clause that permits proliferation by
withdrawing nuclear explosive materials from safeguards scrutiny - as I explained above- be dropped. It was
retained, to permit futur eUK proliferation from its civil nuclear material
stockpile!
“We had some discussion during the
passage of the Bill about relevant international agreements and what had to be
done. As the Minister has outlined, a number of treaties were made with third
party countries and the IAEA through Euratom, of which we were a member, on our
behalf. Therefore, if we leave Euratom and we are still dealing with what was
treated in the Bill as a contingency, but which we are now close to, we will no
longer be covered by those international treaties and we will effectively have
to negotiate them anew.”
What is missing, however, is a possible
treaty with Japan, he stressed, which he found “puzzling” because during the passage of the Bill, the Harrington
had told him:
“The Government have the power to
conclude international treaties under their prerogative powers. Of course, that
cannot automatically change domestic law or rights and cannot make major
changes to the UK’s constitutional arrangements without parliamentary
authority. That remains the case for international agreements relating to
safeguards that are currently under negotiation—for example, the nuclear
co-operation agreements currently being negotiated with the US, Canada, Japan
and Australia, and the new safeguards agreements with the IAEA. Parliament will
therefore have the opportunity to consider those agreements before they come
into force.[Official Report, Nuclear Safeguards Public Bill Committee, 2
November 2017; column 56.]
“Good
progress has also been made in discussions with Canada and Japan…The UK has
had”— I emphasise the tense— “a bilateral NCA in place with Japan since 1998.
The UK and Japan have had detailed discussions on this, and have now commenced
negotiations formally to put in place arrangements to ensure that this NCA
remains operable following the UK’s withdrawal from Euratom. Given this
progress, we are confident that all priority NCA arrangements will be in place
to enable international cooperation in the civil nuclear sector.”
Although there appears to have been an
NCA in place with Japan, it is clear, both from what the Minister said at the
time of the Nuclear Safeguards Act 2018 and from what has been said in the
progress document, that there are negotiations and that those negotiations are
intended to end in arrangements being in place so that this NCA remains
operable. There may be a very good reason why the NCA that was originally in
place, but has been a subject of negotiations, is not before us now and has not
gone through the process that, as I just mentioned, has now been completed for
those other agreements, but it is certainly the case that there is no new
treaty with Japan in place at the time of this SI discussion.”
In response, Richard Harrington said about the Japan
agreement mystery: “A bilateral NCA between the UK and Japan is already in
place. It is not like the other one. I confirm that it will remain in place
following the UK’s departure from the EU. It is not necessary to conclude a new
NCA with Japan. We are having detailed discussions with the Japanese on this
issue and negotiations to make sure that if any adjustments are needed, they
will be made. Without doubt, that the agreements remain operable after our exit
from Euratom is very important, but I really am not concerned about that.
He concluded by saying “we have a series of meetings not just
with the devolved Assemblies and Governments but with all interested
stakeholders. That continues on a regular basis.”
Let us hope ministers and departmental officials
are more accurate – and more challenged - than Harington was before MPs last
week.
NGO Forum 24
January 2018
Euratom Exit
Written Update
The UK is well
prepared for our departure from Euratom and we are confident that we will have
all necessary measures in place to ensure that the civil nuclear sector can
continue to operate safely, securely and in line with our international
commitments on nuclear non-proliferation, with or without a deal with the EU.
The Government’s strategy is twofold: through negotiations with the European
Commission we will seek a close association with Euratom and to
include Euratom in any implementation period negotiated as part of our wider exit discussions;
and at the same time, to put in place all the necessary measures to ensure that
the UK could operate as an independent and responsible nuclear state from day
one.
As part of BEIS’
ongoing commitment to proactively engage with our stakeholders and to share key
government messages on the UK’s withdrawal from Euratom, we would like to
update you on recent developments.
International
Agreements
To ensure that the UK
continues to meet its commitments to the international community, new
international nuclear safeguards agreements with the International Atomic
Energy Agency (IAEA) are needed to
replace the current trilateral agreements that include Euratom. These
agreements, a Voluntary Offer Agreement and an Additional Protocol, set out the
UK’s voluntary international safeguards, and nuclear non-proliferation,
obligations. These new agreements were signed with the IAEA on 7 June 2018.
Additionally, to
ensure uninterrupted cooperation and trade in the civil nuclear sector
following our departure from Euratom, the United Kingdom needed to put in place
new nuclear cooperation agreements (NCAs) with Australia, Canada and the United
States. These new agreements were signed with the US on 4 May, Australia on 21
August and Canada on 2 November. The UK has had a bilateral NCA in place with
Japan since 1998, which will remain in force following UK’s withdrawal from
Euratom.
On 19 December 2018,
the UK Parliament approved the ratification of all the new international
agreements that are required:
It is the UK’s intention that these new agreements will come into force
at the end of the implementation period. If, however, there is no agreement
with the EU and no Implementation Period, these agreements would be brought
into force on 29 March 2019, the day on which the UK leaves the EU.
Nuclear Safeguards
Regime
In addition to these
new international agreements, the UK has been putting in place a number of
measures to ensure that the civil nuclear sector can continue to operate with
certainty in any scenario, including no deal. This includes the set up of a
domestic nuclear safeguards regime, to be run by the Office for Nuclear
Regulation (ONR), to enable us to meet the UK’s international safeguards and
nuclear non-proliferation commitments as set out in our new bilateral
safeguards agreements with the IAEA.
The Nuclear Safeguards Act 2018, which gives the
Government the power to establish a new nuclear safeguards regime, was passed
in June 2018 and the underpinning nuclear safeguards regulations were laid in
Parliament for approval in November 2018, after a public consultation running
from 9 July to 14 September 2018. Responses voiced broad acceptance of the
government proposals and provided valuable insights that have allowed us to
make some changes to the regulations. The draft Nuclear Safeguards Regulations
set out a new framework for the UK to deliver the Government’s objective to put
in place safeguards arrangements that will offer coverage and effectiveness
equivalent to the Euratom regime. A teleconference on this was held with NGO
Forum members on 17 April 2018. As part of the Government response to the consultation,
issued on 29 November 2018, Government has committed to fund the costs
associated with setting up the new nuclear safeguards regime through to 2020.
Work of the Office for
Nuclear Regulation
ONR is working to ensure it will have in place by 29 March 2019 the IT
systems and safeguards inspectors needed to operate this new regime, meet
international standards and to build, over time, to equivalent effectiveness
and coverage to Euratom.
ONR estimates that it will require a minimum of 9 safeguards inspectors
and 15 safeguards officers are currently in place and undergoing training to
become warranted inspectors.
From January 2019, the SSAC commenced parallel running alongside
Euratom, processing and checking reports received from industry through the
Safeguards Information Management and Reporting System (SIMRS) IT system and
producing the declarations required to enable the UK to meet its international
obligations. Based on current progress, ONR will be in a position to deliver
safeguards arrangements that meet international safeguards standards by 29
March 2019.
No Deal Planning
Government has also
published a technical notice to stakeholders on measures
that may need to be put in place in the event that the UK leaves the EU without
a deal. The Government is well advanced in its work to address the issues that
may affect the civil nuclear sector if there is no Brexit deal, and is
confident that all necessary measures will be in place to ensure that the civil
nuclear sector can continue to operate, with or without a deal. Government has
laid, or will lay shortly in Parliament, a number of statutory instruments that
address our departure from Euratom. These are:
Further ‘no deal’ guidance will be published shortly on aspects such as
import licensing arrangements and the shipment of nuclear waste, spent fuel and
radioactive substances.
The fourth quarterly update to Parliament of the government’s progress
on the UK’s exit from the Euratom Treaty will also be published shortly.
