Recently in the United Kingdom a major political debate
has broken out over whether the planned departure by the UK from the European
Union also must mean the UK’s departure from Euratom [European Atomic Energy
Community] (“What Euratom really stands for…”,The New European, 20-26 July 2017, http://www.theneweuropean.co.uk/top-stories/what-euratom-really-stands-for-1-5117645).
An
explanatory interpretation The UK Brexits Euratom: Legal Framework and
Future Developments, published on 30
January 2017( http://eulawanalysis.blogspot.co.uk/2017/01/the-uk-brexits-euratom-legal-framework.html) was provided by Professor Steve Peers,
a specialist in EU law at the University of Essex (UK) (https://www1.essex.ac.uk/law/staff/profile.aspx?ID=839)
He
wrote:
“The UK government’s draft bill (http://services.parliament.uk/bills/2016-17/europeanunionnotificationofwithdrawal.html) on triggering Article
50 TEU, the EU withdrawal clause (the ‘Article 50 Bill’) had a surprise for
some. Tucked away in the explanatory memorandum of the bill was a note
explaining that the UK intended not only to leave the EU but also the separate
(but linked) European Atomic Energy Community – Euratom for short.”
He explained the complex legal framework thus
“The Euratom treaty is a separate treaty
from the treaty which initially created what was the European Economic
Community (EEC) – now known as the European Union (EU). Equally, Euratom is a
separate international organisation from the EU. But there have always been close
links between the two. The founding treaties were negotiated together, and they
have always had the same membership. They shared some institutions from the
outset in 1958, and all institutions from 1967, when the ‘Merger Treaty’ brought together
the separate Councils and Commissions which the three Communities (the EEC,
Euratom and the European Coal and Steel Community) had until then.
Since that point, the provisions on the
institutions in the Euratom Treaty have been updated every time the
corresponding rules in the EEC Treaty were amended. Those institutional rules are
now split between the Treaty on the Functioning of the
European Union (TFEU)
– as the EEC Treaty is now called – and the Treaty on European Union (TEU). The link
between the latter two treaties, which are the legal basis for the EU, and the
Euratom Treaty, is now set out in Article 106a of the Euratom Treaty, which was
inserted by the Treaty of Lisbon.”
In a debate in the UK Parliament on the European Union (Notification of
Withdrawal) Bill held on 1 February this year, the then British minister for
Brexit, David Jones, stated clearly the UK Government position on Euratom;
“Euratom an d the
EU share a common institutional framework, including the European Court of
Justice, a role for the Commission and decision making in the Council, making
them uniquely legally joined. Triggering article 50 therefore also entails
giving notice to leave Euratom. The nuclear industry is of key strategic
importance to the UK, and we have been clear that this does not affect our
intention to maintain close and effective arrangements relating to civil
nuclear co-operation, safeguards and safety with Europe and the rest of the
world.” (http://hansard.parliament.uk/Commons/2017-02-01/debates/5B0251FC-94E6-4216-8830-4F85E0EC2250/EuropeanUnion(NotificationOfWithdrawal)Bill#contribution-FB7A07C3-AD27-4816-9997-0E5AEB2326DB)
The Annual report of the Department for Business, Energy
and Innovation Strategy (BEIS)- responsible for nuclear policy – published on
19 July, stated (page 19):“We are maintaining a strong nuclear “safeguards regime outside of the
European Atomic Energy Community (Euratom). When we
triggered Article 50 we committed to leaving Euratom as well as the EU – these
are separate treaties but they are legally entwined and share a common EU
budget and EU institutions. Our objective in the negotiations will be to
continue a constructive relationship of full co-operation with Euratom after we
have left. We are confident that the EU wants the same outcome. The UK will
continue to meet all its international obligations in respect of nuclear
safeguards and non-proliferation, and it was announced in the Queen’s Speech
that the Government will bring forward legislation to establish a UK nuclear
safeguards regime. This change should not have any adverse impact on our
existing nuclear.” (www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/632617/beis-annual-report-accounts-2016-17-update-web.pdf)
A British House of Commons Library briefing paper on
Euratom, published on 7 July, (http://researchbriefings.parliament.uk/ResearchBriefing/Summary/CBP-8036)
explained that “ Euratom, was established in 1957 as part of the creation of the
European Community. The UK became a member of both on 1 January 1973. Euratom
provides the basis for the regulation of civilian nuclear activity, implements
a system of safeguards to control the use of nuclear materials, controls the
supply of fissile materials within EU member states and funds leading
international research such as the Culham Centre of Fusion Energy.)
According
to this paper “Leaving Euratom has the potential to impact the UK’s current
nuclear operations, including fuel supply, waste management, cooperation with
other nuclear states, and research. Industry has warned of a “cliff edge” exit
that could cause “major disruption to business across the whole nuclear fuel
cycle.” The UK will need to take on a number of measures to leave Euratom
smoothly and some are concerned that the timetable for achieving these measures
is ambitious.”
The BEIS) select committee in the House of Commons has recommended
delaying the departure from Euratom to give the nuclear industry time to set up
alternative arrangements.
The annual UK Government legislative program (“The Queen’s Speech”)
contained a Nuclear Safeguards Bill to give the UK’s Office for Nuclear
Regulation (ONR) powers to take on the role and responsibilities of Euratom,
required to meet international safeguards, and nuclear non-proliferation
obligations.
|
A UK
Government position paper Nuclear
materials and safeguards
issues (https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/627909/FINAL_OFF_SEN_Position_Paper_HMG_Nuclear_materials_and_safeguards_issues_Position_Paper_FINAL_120717__3_.pdf) issued on
13 July expands the details of the new safeguards regime as follows:
|
“As
part of the UK’s orderly withdrawal, and to provide certainty to industry and
reassurance to all, it is important to work through the following issues in the
initial phases of discussion:
nuclear safeguards arrangements; and
provision of legal certainty on immediate issues related to nuclear material in
both the UK and Euratom.
7. These issues are set out in
further detail below. The UK looks forward to addressing further issues as a
priority in the negotiations once the European Commission has further developed
its approach in these areas. This will include nuclear research and
development, regulatory and wider cooperation, trade and the mobility of
nuclear workers and researchers. As with all issues related to the UK’s
withdrawal, it is clear these issues are closely linked to the future
relationship. The UK is keen to discuss this as quickly as possible, in order
to establish a close working relationship between the UK and the Euratom
Community.
Nuclear safeguards
arrangements
8.
The UK remains firmly committed to maintaining its role as a responsible
Nuclear Weapons State and non-proliferation leader, and to ensuring that a UK
nuclear safeguards regime is in place that is commensurate with its
international obligations through the IAEA.
9.
In order to ensure this, the UK will:
agree a Voluntary Offer Agreement with the IAEA that sets out the UK’s primary
safeguards arrangements in international law;
take responsibility for meeting the UK’s safeguards obligations, as agreed with
the IAEA;
in line with the specific
circumstances of the UK and respecting the UK’s current obligations, agree
Nuclear Cooperation Agreements between the UK and key non-EU/Euratom States,
including the United States, Canada, Australia and Japan - these agreements
will underline the UK’s commitment to upholding the safeguards obligations
agreed with the IAEA;
work
closely with the European Commission to ensure a smooth transition to its new
arrangements, including the setup of the new safeguards regime; and
seek to ensure that the UK’s new regime provides for
continued close cooperation with the Euratom Community.
Euratom safeguards
equipment
10.
As part of the transition to a new nuclear safeguards regime in the UK, it is
important to agree the future ownership and liabilities for safeguards
equipment that is currently owned by the Euratom Community and located in the
UK.
11. The UK will ensure that all
necessary safeguards equipment is in place to comply with its IAEA obligations.
As part of this, further consideration will be given to the possibility of the
UK taking ownership of existing Euratom-owned equipment. This will need to be
rooted in a common understanding of the fair value and liabilities of the
equipment concerned, and interactions with the EU budget.”
On fissile
material stocks and ownership it states:
“The
ownership of all special fissile material that is currently with the Euratom
Community by virtue of Article 86 of the Treaty, and which is present on UK
territory on the date of withdrawal, should transfer to the persons or
undertakings with the right of use and consumption of the material pursuant to
Article 87 of the Treaty. This should apply in relation to all persons or
undertakings with the right of use and consumption, whether these are
established in the UK, EU or non-EU states.
15. The ownership of all
special fissile material that is currently with the Euratom Community by virtue
of Article 86 of the Treaty, and which is present on the Euratom territory on
the date of withdrawal, and the right of use and consumption of which pursuant
to Article 87 of the Treaty is with a natural or legal person established in
the UK, should be transferred to the persons or undertakings with the right of
use and consumption on the date this material is exported from the Euratom
territory to the UK.”
This iissue was first raised intheUK shortly after the referendum
resulton Brexit, ion 23 June 2016, when Green Party MP Caroline Lucas ((Brighton,
Pavilion) asked BEIS on 11 July 2016
(Written Question number 42312): “
what steps would be needed to replace EU Atomic Energy
Community safeguards inspectors with International Atomic Energy Agency
Inspectors to implement safeguards provisions on (a) UK nuclear installations and (b) nuclear
material used and created at UK nuclear
sites under treaties to which the UK is a party.?”
The then energy minister at BEIS,
Jesse Norman, did not
provide much of a political steer in his answer, which stated blandly on 3 August 2016:
“Until
the UK leaves the EU, it is expected to remain a full member with all relevant
rights and obligations. The Department for Business, Energy, and Industrial Strategy
will continue to work closely with stakeholders and the rest of Government
during our negotiations to exit the EU to deliver energy which is secure,
affordable and clean.”
Radwaste
return-to-sender?
The
international business and finance newspaper, the Financial Times, reported on 19 July (https://www.ft.com/content/0c56a4f2-6bc5-11e7-bfeb-33fe0c5b7eaa)
that Britain has “put the EU on notice
that it has the right to return radioactive waste to the bloc after it leaves,
in an attempt to increase the UK’s negotiating clout on the vexed issue of
nuclear regulation. UK officials hope raising complex questions over what
should happen to Britain’s stockpile of radioactive materials — some of which
originate from EU countries including Germany, Italy and Sweden — will convince
Brussels to take a co-operative approach to the nuclear issue.
“It might just be a reminder that a boatload
of plutonium could end up at a harbour in Antwerp unless an arrangement is
made,” said one nuclear expert who has advised the government. Leaders of the
UK nuclear industry are lobbying the government to find a way of remaining part
of Euratom or, if that proves impossible, to negotiate an extended transition
deal to allow time to establish a new regulatory system.”
However, the FT stressed “either
of those options would require continued jurisdiction by the European Court of
Justice — something Theresa May, UK prime minister, has so far resisted. Those
arguing for Mrs May to compromise have highlighted the threat of disruption to
UK supplies of nuclear fuel, reactor parts and medical isotopes used in cancer
treatments if Britain fails to reach a deal with Brussels.”
This report is
based on a curious confusion and a worrying level of ignorance by anonymous
so-called nuclear experts cited to have advised the UK Government.
It
a is both an empty and a totally counter-productive threat to return fissile
materials ( and radioactive wastes) to countries of origin in the EU, as
part of a negotiating posture on Brexit by the UK.
On
19 January this year, BEIS announced it had agreed to the
Nuclear Decommissioning Authority (NDA) taking ownership of 600 kg of material
previously owned by a Spanish utility, and of 5 kg of material
previously owned by a German organisation.
BEIS asserted
that "These transactions, which have been agreed by the Euratom Supply
Agency, will not result in any new plutonium being brought into the UK, and
will not therefore increase the overall amount of plutonium in the UK."
adding it had "agreed to these transactions on the grounds that
they offer a cost-effective and beneficial arrangement, which allows the UK to
gain national control over more of the civil plutonium located in the UK, and
facilitates conclusion of outstanding contracts with the Spanish and
German" (http://www.parliament.uk/business/publications/written-questions-answers-statements/written-statement/Commons/2017-01-19/HCWS422/).
Preceding
this, three years ago, on 3 July 2014 the UK announced that it had struck an
agreement with German
and Swedish governments to take title to 140 kgs of plutonium in the
former case, and 800 kgs in the latter, arising from the reprocessing at
Sellafield and management at Dounreay respectively of spent nuclear fuel from
the two nations. (http://fissilematerials.org/blog/2014/07/uk_decision_to_take_over_.html; https://publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201415/cmhansrd/cm140702/text/140702w0003.htm#140702100000002)
And,
earlier, in April 2013, BEIS's predecessor department, DECC, announced in a
statement on management of oversees owned plutonium it was taking over
750 kg of plutonium belonging to German utilities, 1,850 kg previously loaned from
France, and 350 kg from Dutch firm GKN. At the same time, 650 kg of plutonium
stored at Sellafield was transferred from German to Japanese ownership.(https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/written-ministerial-statement-by-michael-fallon-management-of-overseas-owned-plutonium-in-the-uk)
A similar deal with Germany in in 2012 saw the UK take ownership
of 4,000 kgs of plutonium. (http://fissilematerials.org/blog/2012/07/united_kingdom_takes_owne.html)
Thus
the overseas ownership of plutonium in the UK has gradually been transferred to
the UK. Thus there is no prospect of any ship sailing towards Antwerp (or
any other EU port) as the nuclear expert cited fancifully imagined.
It
is possible that some of reprocessing waste arising from the chemical
separation of imported foreign spent nuclear fuel at Sellafield could be
returned-to-sender in a fit of pique by DexEU. However, BEIS has already-
through its predecessor department- indicated it wanted to adopt a policy
of substitution" based on "radiotoxic equivalence"
to the reprocessing nuclear waste stockpile to minimize the volumes
of waste shipped back to continental Europe.
A
BEIS official said at a nuclear policy forum meeting of interested
non-governmental parties on 18 July that the department has a team of
dedicated staff looking in detail at all the ramifications of withdrawal from
Euratom for UK nuclear policy. Perhaps DexEU officials should consult these
in-house experts over Euratom before issuing empty threats.
Medical radioisotopes
Another key issue raised by nuclear
proponents is whether Euratom is essential to facilitate the import of medical
radiochemicals/isotopes for use in the British health service. Brussels- based nuclear
consultant, Mark Johnston, in his blog Euratom fact-check, (https://markjohnston.org/2017/07/23/euratom-fact-check/) on 23 July asserts:
“Euratom does not place any export restrictions on medical isotopes so the
future trade in such goods will not be affected if Brexit goes ahead. This is a
red herring.“
But this viewpoint has been challenged both politically and
institutionally. In a Parliamentary debate (http://hansard.parliament.uk/lords/2017-07-20/debates/02A1B589-EBE5-4E7B-8991-81562A57AFFA/Euratom) held in
the House of Lords (UK upper House of Parliament) on 20 July, several peers
argued Euratom was needed for conitnued assurance of supply of medical radioisotopes.
“On a practical basis, [the] Euratom supply agency looks
after and ensures the supply of nuclear fuels and radioactive isotopes for the
medical area of the whole Euratom community—all 28 of its member states.
He stressed: “Radioactive isotopes identify and treat
cancers. In the United Kingdom, some 500,000 procedures use these materials
each year. Again, we have no domestic supply. They are very perishable. In
fact, the half-life of some is as little as hours, and for the most important
ones it is days—and that means that they are perishable. We import the vast
majority of them from France, Belgium and the Netherlands, all of which are
Euratom member states at the present time. That supply chain is fragile.
I was concerned that the Minister in the other place
(Hous e of Commons) , when it had a debate on Euratom, said that there was no
issue about medical isotopes because they were not fissile material. I do not
want to think that Ministers’ Statements can no longer be trusted, but this is
an easy soundbite around a much more complex situation.”
Radioactive medical isotopes are specifically listed in
annex IV of chapter 9 of the Euratom treaty, along with other items such as
nuclear reactors….. In 2008 the technical issues that created delays and
difficulties in the Eurotunnel at the time meant that the isotopes could not be
transported quickly and efficiently from other parts of western Europe. That
led to a number of cancer procedures being delayed and cancelled here in UK
hospitals.
That was followed in 2009 by a world shortage of these
isotopes and difficulties in the supply chain. As a result, the Euratom Supply
Agency set up the European Observatory on the Supply of Medical Radioisotopes
to help the whole of the community solve the long-term problem of ensuring the
supply of medical isotopes. That vital work is still continuing and covers all
28 member states.”
Lord Whitty, a Labour peer agreed,
arguing:
“[Euratom] is also vital to the provision of medical
supplies and treatments
“There have been protestsfrom the nuclear industry, the
pharmaceutical industry, scientists, oncologists, the Bioindustry Association
and the supply agency producing technetium-99m for cancer treatments and
diagnosis. We have heard from specialists concerned about future supplies of medical
isotopes, given that many of the reactors producing them are coming to the end
of their lives.”
“I had hoped that by now the Government would have seen
the error of their obduracy and reversed their position on Euratom… I want to
touch in particular on the implications for the National Health Service and,
most importantly, for all of us who in the future may become patients requiring
treatment with medical radioisotopes.
I know the importance of this matter because my partner
was recently treated by the fantastic staff at the Royal Marsden Hospital in
Fulham. The treatment that he received involved radioisotopes created in a
German reactor which supplies the NHS for this purpose..”
Jennifer Cole, a senior research fellow on Resilience and Emergency Management, at
the London-based Royal United Services
Institute (RUSI), and Sobhan
Vinjamuri, President of the British
Nuclear Medicine Society, have jointly written in a Commentary, ‘How will Britain’s
potential withdrawal from the Euratom Treaty affect the supply of
radiopharmaceuticals?’ (https://rusi.org/commentary/how-will-britain’s-potential-withdrawal-euratom-treaty-affect-supply-radiopharmaceuticals) published on 21 July 2017
They argue that the UK’s ability to ensure a reliable and
consistent supply of pharmaceuticals” is highly vulnerable to supply chain
disruption.” Lack of in-country manufacturing capability makes the UK reliant on overseas imports, which in turn are
vulnerable to market pressures and international trade arrangements, they
stress..
The British Nuclear Medicine Society (BNMS) and other
key stakeholders question the degree to which it is realistic to expect that
withdrawal will not have a negative impact on the UK nuclear medicine industry.
They point out:
“Medical isotopes are chemicals that undergo radioactive
decay. The excess radiation they emit enables diagnosis, as it can be picked up
by medical scanners to produce images, and as therapy, as it damages harmful
cells such as cancers.The UK does not produce any of the longer-lived
medical radioisotopes most often used, however, in
particular Technetium-99m (99mTc), which is used for more than 80% of
diagnostic nuclear medicine scans. The majority of imports are received from EU
countries, especially the Netherlands and France.99mTc is made from
Molybdenum-99 (99Mo), which in turn is made from enriched uranium. A second
challenge comes from the aging condition of many reactors, which were built in
the 1950s and 60s and are reaching the end of their lifespans. In 2009, two
major reactors in the Netherlands and Canada were closed temporarily
simultaneously.
The two were responsible for two-thirds of the world’s
99Mo supply, and this led to a major review of the way in which medical
isotopes are made and distributed. However, investment in new facilities has
not been a high priority and there are conflicting views, including from the OECD and the Association of Imaging Producers & Equipment Suppliers (AIPES), about whether 99mTc shortages will be a problem in future.
Building a new reactor in the UK would take ten years and
cost £240–£400million. In the short-term, it might be better for Britain to
invest in existing projects in Belgium and the Netherlands, in exchange for
guarantee of isotopes, but this raises separate jurisdictional issues for
Brexit negotiations.”
They conclude:
“Frank discussions between all relevant stakeholders,
including government, industry, professional medical societies and medical
royal colleges, is needed to ensure the implications of a withdrawal from
Euratom are fully understood and the possible alternatives fully scoped and
costed within realistic timeframes.”
The
minister, Lord Prior, replied:
“Euratom places no restrictions on the export of medical
isotopes to countries outside the EU. It is in everyone’s interests to ensure
that there are no restrictions on the export of medical isotopes to countries
outside the EU. These isotopes are not subject to Euratom supply agency
contracts or to Euratom safeguards. This means that no special arrangements
need to be put in place ahead of withdrawal. The UK’s ability to import medical
isotopes from Europe and the rest of the world will not be affected.”
Fusion boondoggle
The other special pleading that the
threatened withdrawal from Euratom has provoked is from the supporter sof
fusion power, and the UK’s pivotal role (at the Culham fusion research centre http://www.ccfe.ac.uk/) in the EU –
and wider international fusion research
and development such as ITER- fusion
research program
For
example, in the House of Lords debate, Labour peer and former minister, Lord
Hunt of Chesterton, stressed:
“I am chairman of the advisory committee of Tokamak
Energy, which is a private sector fusion project.
Euratom has several vital roles which affect us—from
timescales of a few hours, as we have been hearing in medical examples, to a
long-term programme of dealing with nuclear waste of up to 100,000 years.
Euratom has a very important role in co-ordinating the
European contribution to the global project on fusion. Euratom leads the global
experiment, which started with JET, which is still at Culham. That will
transfer into ITER, which is the international Tokamak in France. The UK plays
a major role in these programmes, and how that will happen has to be
negotiated.”
“I live on the nexus of three constituencies, and nearby
are Culham, Rutherford and the whole business at Harwell. Lots of people from
abroad work there. They have families here and they will be greatly affected by
any withdrawal.
The people at the top of the tree in all these things
have interchangeable skills and will go and work elsewhere if they cannot work
here on a collaborative basis. I underline this: everything in the university
and at the research establishments is collaborative work and is funded by the
EU on that basis. The free exchange of ideas and the free movement of these
people are axiomatic to this continuing.”
Safeguards outside Euratom : who will watch the watchers?
Lord Prior told peers in the Euratom debate:”
It is clear that we need continuity and must avoid any break in our
safeguards regime. The UK meets our
safeguards standards through our membership of Euratom. The Government’s aim is
clear: we want to maintain our mutually successful civil nuclear co-operation
with Euratom. We can do so while establishing our own nuclear safeguards
regime, using the body that already regulates nuclear security and safety: the
Office for Nuclear Regulation. To do that, we need primary legislation.
That is why the Queen’s Speech on 21 June included our
intention to take powers to set up a domestic nuclear safeguards regime, in
partnership with the Office for Nuclear Regulation, to enable us to continue to
meet international safeguards and nuclear non-proliferation obligations.
The Government’s primary aim throughout these
negotiations will be to maintain our mutually successful civil nuclear
co-operation with Euratom and the rest of the world. We are strong supporters
of Euratom and that is not going to change. “has the power it needs for a
domestic safeguards regime…. We are preparing a domestic nuclear safeguards
Bill; we are opening negotiations with the EU; we are talking to third
countries about bilateral agreements; finally, of course, we are talking to the
International Atomic Energy Agency. My officials have met with IAEA officials
in Vienna and had constructive conversations about a new voluntary offer
agreement, to replace the current one that we have by virtue of our Euratom
membership.”
“Secondly, we are keen to ensure that there is minimal
disruption to civil nuclear trade and co-operation with non-European partners.
To this end, the Government are negotiating with the United States, Canada,
Australia and Japan so that the UK has appropriate nuclear co-operation
agreements in place. Government officials have met with the Canadian Government
and the Canadian regulators; we have also written to them at ministerial level.
Canada is as keen as we are to reach a new agreement on bilateral terms. That is
equally true of the USA, Japan and Australia, with all of whom we have started
constructive discussions.”
On July 13 the UK Government position paper on “Nuclear
materials and safeguards issues,” (https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/627909/FINAL_OFF_SEN_Position_Paper_HMG_Nuclear_materials_and_safeguards_issues_Position_Paper_FINAL_120717__3_.pdf) which includes the
key suggestion the U.K. will: “take responsibility for meeting the UK’s
safeguards obligations, as agree with IAEA (International Atomic Energy
Agency).”
The UK government had earlier explained they intend UK nuclear security
regulator, the Office for Nuclear Regulation (ONR) to take over from the
independent safeguards inspectors from Euratom, to ‘self-police’ the
British nuclear industry against military misuse.
This is a highly contendable and certainly contentious proposal: just
imagine if Iran or North Korea proposed to do that!
It should also be noted that even under the Euratom safeguards regime
the UK has withdrawn fissile nuclear
materials, including plutonium, from safeguards on at least 600 occasions since
the U.K’s trilateral safeguards treaty with Euratom and IAEA came into force in
1978 (http://www.hse.gov.uk/nuclear/safeguards/withdrawals.htm)
The European Commission’s own Position paper transmitted to EU27 on nuclear materials and safeguard equipment (Euratom) released on 23 June (https://ec.europa.eu/commission/publications/position-paper-transmitted-eu27-nuclear-materials-and-safeguard-equipment-euratom_en) states the European commission position on post-Brexit safeguards application in the UK as follows:
“The United Kingdom is a
member of the International Atomic Energy Agency ("IAEA") and bound
by international conventions to which it is a party in its own right. From the
withdrawal date, the United Kingdom will have sole responsibility for ensuring
its compliance with international obligations arising therefrom.
Given that the Treaty
will cease to apply in the United Kingdom, it appears appropriate that the Withdrawal
Agreement set out arrangements for the transfer of the ownership of special
fissile materials and Community property located in the United Kingdom used for
the purposes of providing safeguards to the United Kingdom, respecting the
Community's obligations under international agreements.
The Withdrawal Agreement
should also provide that the United Kingdom assume all rights and obligations
associated with the ownership of materials or property transferred and should
regulate other questions related to material and property under the Treaty, in
particular safeguards obligation.”
What kind of future membership, if
any, could the UK have with Euratom?
David Phinnemore, Professor of European
Politics at Queen's University Belfast, and Visiting Professor at the College
of Europe in Bruges, writing on 18 July on the blog site of EUROPP
– European Politics and Policy,
administered by the European Institute of the London School of Economics at
London University (http://blogs.lse.ac.uk/europpblog/2017/07/18/no-such-thing-as-associate-membership-euratom/) argues there is currently no such thing as
‘associate membership’ of Euratom, but that other routes for an association
between the UK and Euratom could potentially be pursued.
In
so doing, Professor Phinnemore
reflects an argument made by Andrew Duff, Visiting Fellow, European Policy Centre; Liberal MEP 1999-2014, in his own blog
analysis, published on 11 July (“ Running Commentary XVI: Brexit and Euratom: No need to
panic,” http://andrewduff.blogactiv.eu/2017/07/11/running-commentary-xvi/), who explains:
“The
European Union is founded on three basic treaties. These are the Treaty on
European Union, signed at Maastricht in 1992, and the Treaty on the
Functioning of the EU (formerly the Treaty establishing the European
Community) that was signed in Rome in 1957 along with the Treaty on the
European Atomic Energy Community (Euratom). The UK has been a signatory to
all the basic statutes of the EU since its own accession treaty in January
1972. All three treaties were most recently revised by the Treaty of Lisbon
in 2007, to which they are linked by virtue of Article 1 of Protocol No. 36.
Euratom is therefore a fundamental building block of the European Union and not an accessory. It cannot be separated out from the rest of the Union. Joining the EU means joining Euratom; leaving the EU means leaving Euratom: Article 50 applies automatically to the secession of membership of Euratom.”
Euratom is therefore a fundamental building block of the European Union and not an accessory. It cannot be separated out from the rest of the Union. Joining the EU means joining Euratom; leaving the EU means leaving Euratom: Article 50 applies automatically to the secession of membership of Euratom.”
He adds:
“Euratom is not a mere agency
like the Food Safety Agency or Europol. The institutions of Euratom are the
institutions of the EU, and its budget is part of the general budget of the EU.
The European Commission has wide powers under the Euratom treaty to regulate
the European internal market in nuclear materials, impose safety standards,
issue and remove licences to operators such as Sellafield, promote R&D and
conduct international negotiations on atomic energy matters through membership
of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA).
There is no such thing as associate membership of Euratom — or, indeed, of the wider European Union. There is however the possibility for a third country, which the UK will be, to seek an association agreement with the Union, including the continued use of Euratom.”
There is no such thing as associate membership of Euratom — or, indeed, of the wider European Union. There is however the possibility for a third country, which the UK will be, to seek an association agreement with the Union, including the continued use of Euratom.”
Professor Phinnemore points out that initial responses to the prospect of UK departure from
Euratom have included calls for the UK to pursue ‘associate membership’ with references being made to Switzerland supposedly enjoying such a status.”
Moreover, he argued “ to
describe Switzerland’s status vis-à-vis Euratom as ‘associate membership’ is
misleading. The Swiss do participate with ‘associated country status’ in a
number of Euratom-focused research programmes under the Horizon 2020 programme.
Switzerland also has a formal ‘Cooperation Agreement’ with Euratom dating back to 1978. Its
focus is controlled thermonuclear fusion and plasma physics. These and other
cooperative arrangements between Switzerland and Euratom do not amount,
however, to ‘associate membership’. Nor do they mean that Switzerland is an
‘associate’ of either Euratom or the EU.
Established
interpretations of the potential scope of association agreements is that the
provisions allow for considerable flexibility, and a relationship falling only
narrowly short of membership is possible. Walter Hallstein, the first President
of the European Commission, declared on various occasions that association, as
far as the EC was concerned, could range anywhere between membership minus one
per cent and a
With regard to atomic
energy, Article 342 of the Ukraine Association Agreement provides for extensive
cooperation:
‘to
ensure high level of nuclear safety, the clean and peaceful use of nuclear
energy, covering all civil nuclear energy activities and stages of the fuel
cycle, including production of and trade in nuclear materials, safety and
security aspects of nuclear energy, and emergency preparedness, as well as
health-related and environmental issues and non-proliferation. In this context,
cooperation will also include the further development of policies and legal and
regulatory frameworks based on EU legislation and practices, as well as on
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) standards. The Parties shall promote
civil scientific research in the fields of nuclear safety and security,
including joint research and development activities, and training and mobility
of scientists’.
The UK’s chief Brexit negotiator, David Davis MP,
commented on the future relations with Euratom in an interview with BBC (“Brexit:
UK could be 'associate' of EU nuclear body,” BBC on line, 13 July; http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-politics-40593588)asserting an
"arbitration arrangement" would have to be agreed.
Mr Davis told the BBC's political editor Laura Kuenssberg:
"Whether we have an association agreement with the European Union or we
have something independent under the International Atomic Energy Authority
(sic) , we'll provide the sorts of safeguards that we have today at
least."
Mr Davis stressed such an agreement would not be governed by the
European Court of Justice but by an arrangement to be agreed between the UK and
the EU. It remains to be seen if such a
proposal is acceptable to EU v chief negotiator, Commissioner Michael Barnier.
As well as the nuclear question, it was also
"quite likely" that a new "arbitration arrangement" would
be needed to govern the UK's trading relationship with the EU after Brexit, he
said.
UK Atomic Energy Authority chairman Professor Roger Cashmore backed the idea of associate
membership of Euratom, asserting he had had "a lot of positive
support" from ministers including Business Secretary Greg Clark.
Other
comments include:
Tom Greatrex, Nuclear Industry
Association (NIA-UK) chief executive,
said: "While containing very little detail, the UK government's position
paper demonstrates the complexity of replicating Euratom arrangements in UK
regulation and co-operation agreements with third countries which the industry
has warned of. The government must therefore make the need for transitional
arrangements its starting point in negotiations. Failure to do so will risk
precisely the disruption the government state they want to avoid.
UK government charts legal route out of
Euratom, World Nuclear News, 13
July 2017;http://www.world-nuclear-news.org/NP-UK-government-charts-legal-route-out-of-Euratom-13071701.html
(“Post-Euratom
regime likely to rely on voluntary arrangements,”
Dr Paul Hatchwell, energy editor at ENDs , (“Post-Euratom
regime likely to rely on voluntary arrangements,” 17 July
2017 says the UK will be falling back on a series of peer review and voluntary
international arrangements on nuclear safety after its controversial withdrawal
from EU watchdog Euratom, according to lawyers.
The UK Environmental Law Association
(UKELA)’s Brexit Taskforce, states in a report released on 14 July, says
that withdrawal from
the Euratom Framework Directive on the
Safety of Nuclear Installations could risk weaker standards in
future.
On transport of radioactive materials, it
says there is uncertainty over how the Euratom Regulation on Shipments of
Radioactive Substances between Member States will be imported
into UK law.
Another unresolved issue is the future of
provisions under a 2006 Euratom recommendation on the management of financial resources
for the decommissioning of nuclear installations, spent fuel and radioactive
waste, it says.
Labour MP Rachel Reeves, newly elected chairperson of the BEIS Select Committee intheUK
Parliament, plans to hold hearing on Euratom in theAutumn, making the planned
UK withdrawal one of her top priorities
. She told BBC radio
“We need
to do an inquiry into Euratom because 65,000 jobs are in the civil nuclear
sector.When we are up and running, I want to do an inquiry into this because so
many jobs and research depends on it.”
(“BEIS
committee to scrutinise Euratom exit,” Utility Week, 17 July
The European
Parliament Brexit ‘pointman’ (negotiator) Guy Verhofstadt - a former Belgian prime
minister - has said Britain cannot stay
a member of the EU nuclear regulator Euratom after Brexit, whether it wants to
or not, stressing:
"In my opinion, since in the
Lisbon Treaty Euratom and the EU are fully interlinked, you cannot be fully
part of Euratom and not part of the European Union ..Because oversight of
Euratom is part of the European Union, part of budget and so on…What is not
possible is to go out of the union but stay a full member of Euratom." (“Britain must leave
EU nuclear body: Verhofstadt ‘” AFP, July 12, https://au.news.yahoo.com/world/a/36357536/britain-must-leave-eu-nuclear-body-verhofstadt/#page1)
Julian
Jessop, chief economist, London-based Institute for Economic Affairs (IEA)
Not many
people would have heard of the European Atomic Energy Community (Euratom) until
recently and even fewer will have had it in the front of their minds when
voting on the UK’s membership of the EU. And yet the current furore over
nuclear cooperation has the potential to cause a chain reaction that derails
Brexit, or at least fundamentally alters its shape……… almost everyone –
including other EU countries who benefit from nuclear trade with the UK and
sharing of expertise – agrees that the UK’s continued participation in the
activities of Euratom would be a good thing and in the interests of all
parties.
(“Fallout from Euratom scare stories shouldn’t be allowed to derail Brexit,” 13 July
(“Fallout from Euratom scare stories shouldn’t be allowed to derail Brexit,” 13 July
on 25 July
“[BEIS] has had several discussions with officials from
the United States on civil nuclear cooperation when the UK leaves Euratom,
including a future Nuclear Cooperation Agreement with the United States. Our
aim is clear: we want to maintain continuity of our mutually successful civil
nuclear co-operation with Euratom and international partners.”
Euratom background material on
Nuclear Energy
Safe
nuclear power
The
EU promotes the highest standards of nuclear safety across Europe and beyond.
The
EU establishes requirements for safe long-term management of radioactive
waste.
The
EU seeks to protect people from the dangers of ionising radiation.
The
EU plays an important role in the decommissioning of nuclear installations.
Nuclear
safeguards ensure that nuclear material is used only for
peaceful purposes.
Overview
Nuclear
power plants generate almost 30% of the electricity produced in the EU. There
are 130 nuclear reactors in operation in 14 EU countries. Each EU country
decides alone whether to include nuclear power in its energy mix or not.
Nuclear power currently being produced is released by a process called nuclear
fission. It involves the splitting of atoms using uranium to release energy.
The
peaceful use of nuclear energy within the EU is governed by the 1957 Euratom
Treaty, which established the European Atomic
Energy Community (Euratom). While Euratom is a separate legal entity from the
EU, it is governed by the EU's institutions.
The
European Commission deals with nuclear activities from three angles:
·
nuclear safety is about the safe operation
of nuclear installations. It is complemented by radiation protection and
radioactive waste management
·
nuclear safeguards are measures to
ensure that nuclear materials are used only for the purposes declared by the
users
·
nuclear security relates to the physical
protection of nuclear material and installations against intentional malicious
acts.
Nuclear
safety
The
EU promotes the highest safety
standards for all types of civilian nuclear activity,
including power generation, research, and medical use. In response to the 2011
Fukushima nuclear accident, a series of stress tests were
carried out in 2011 and 2012 to measure the ability of EU nuclear installations
to withstand natural disasters.
In
July 2014, the EU amended its Nuclear
Safety Directive from 2009, which establishes common safety rules for
nuclear installations.
Radioactive
waste and decommissioning
Radioactive waste results from nuclear activities such as electricity generation, medicine,
and research. The EU's Directive
for the Management of Radioactive Waste and Spent Fuel sets
out rules for safely disposing of used radioactive materials.
The shutting down and decommissioning of a nuclear power plant at the end of its lifecycle is a long and expensive
process. The 'Waste Directive' also requires the creation of EU country plans
for financing the safe disposal of radioactive waste during decommissioning.
The
EU has set up nuclear decommissioning assistance programmes to help Bulgaria,
Lithuania, and Slovakia finance the safe decommissioning of old Soviet-type
reactors.
Radiation
protection
The
EU has radiation protection legislation in place to protect human health against the dangers arising
from ionising radiation. This includes the Basic
Safety Standards 
, supplemented by a
number of acts ensuring a high level of protection for the public,
workers, and patients.
, supplemented by a
number of acts ensuring a high level of protection for the public,
workers, and patients.
In
addition, the EU requires EU countries to monitor radioactivity in the air, water, soil and foodstuffs. It also plays an important role in
the international exchange of radiological information, in particular in the
event of a nuclear emergency.
Nuclear
Fusion
Nuclear
fusion is currently in an experimental phase. It produces
energy by fusing light atoms such as hydrogen
at extremely elevated pressures and high temperatures. The
International Thermonuclear Experimental Reactor (ITER) is an experimental fusion reactor in the south of France aiming to
demonstrate the feasibility of fusion as a viable source of energy.
Proper
use of nuclear materials – safeguards
The
EU wants to ensure that nuclear materials are not diverted from their original
intended use. Under the Euratom Treaty, nuclear safeguards were established to guarantee this. They oblige users to keep accurate
records and make declarations to the European Commission. The Commission verifies
these declarations and performs inspections.
Nuclear
security
The
physical protection of nuclear installations and radioactive materials is
related to countries' security and defence policies and is mostly within their
competence.
Nuclear
fuel supply security
The Euratom Supply Agency (ESA) ensures a regular and diversified supply of nuclear fuels to EU users. In
particular, the ESA recommends that EU facilities operating nuclear power
plants maintain stocks of nuclear materials and cover their needs by entering
into long-term contracts with a diverse range of suppliers. It also monitors
the EU nuclear fuel market.
EURATOM Related documents
·
Nuclear
Illustrative Programme (PINC) – May 2017Search for available translations
of the preceding link•••
·
Commission
decision on the adoption of the work programme for 2017 in the field of nuclear
energySearch for available translations of
the preceding link••• | AnnexSearch for available translations of the preceding link•••
| AnnexSearch for available translations of the preceding link•••
·
Commission report on risk and
safety assessments ('stress tests') of nuclear power plants in Europe
·
Third
Commission report on financing decommissioningSearch for available translations of the preceding link•••
Related legislation
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