Nuclear no confidence: Fukushima 8 years on

 

 

Sometimes in my research work I come across outstanding research scholarship. This week, to mark the eighth anniversary of the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power plant accident in Japan, on 11 March 2011, two Paris –based researchers released a remarkable piece of extended research analysis.

 

Dr Christine Fassert of the advisory body (IRSN) for France’s official nuclear safety organization (ASN) and Japanese academic Reiko Hasegawa (of the Sciences Po médialab) in association with the Tokyo Institute of Technology- were the responsible authors. [Full disclosure: Christine is a friend and colleague of mine]

 

Their admirable report is titled: Shinrai (”Confidence”) Research Project: The 3/11 accident and its social consequences - Case studies from Fukushima prefecture (Rapport IRSN/2019/00178)

(https://www.irsn.fr/FR/connaissances/Installations_nucleaires/Les-accidents-nucleaires/accident-fukushima-2011/fukushima-2019/Documents/IRSN-Fukushima-2019-rapport-Shinrai-evacues_201903.pdf)

 

Below I have extracted some important and illustrative pieces of text from the 176 –page report,  and reproduced in full their conclusions and references.

 

I recommend everyone to read - and learn from - this unique study, that should inform all nuclear policy makers and emergency planners worldwide.

 

Abstract

This report summarizes the research result of the Shinrai project, which deals with social consequences of the Fukushima accident. Based on three case studies led in the Fukushima Prefecture, it analyses the loss of trust of citizens towards governmental authorities, and essential questions linked to return or non-return to the evacuated territories, offering a categorization of inhabitants according to their decisions. It also deals with the dilemma to which governmental officials, medical doctors and radioprotection experts have been confronted, and focus on the role of Mayors. The report concludes by making some reflections on the normative foundations of post accidental policies, as currently defined by the institutions in charge of managing nuclear accidents, and on their confrontation to the Fukushima experience and to the international criticism made by some of the UN institutions.

 

1. INTRODUCTION

1.1 SCOPE

The Shinrai project was launched in the aftermath of the triple disaster faced by Japan in March 2011: earthquake, tsunami, and a Nuclear Power Plant (NPP) accident in Fukushima Daiichi. The authorities had to face a dramatic situation, most notably the radiological consequences of the nuclear accident for the population. This research proposes to focus on the nuclear post-accidental situation in Japan, and to examine the various social and political consequences of the nuclear accident.

The theoretical framework of this research is inscribed in the field of disaster studies, which are intrinsically multidisciplinary. The examination of public policies led after an accident, their inscription in international regulations and institutions, their consequences for residents, the reactions of and the decisions made by inhabitants as regards evacuation and return policies, the consideration of contaminated territories and their future, the management of waste produced, and so on, all mobilize political sciences as well as sociology and anthropology. Within such a framework, which evokes countless questions, the choice was made to focus specifically on issues of trust. In fact, in the aftermath of the accident, this issue appeared quite rapidly within public space, where the media soon denounced the “loss of trust” on the part of Japanese citizens towards the government in charge of dealing with the crisis. Under this main theme, this project will address various questions linked to expertise provided in crisis situations: What makes a public expert trustworthy? What is his/her role in situations of uncertainty and controversy? What is the accountability of experts in these situations? What specific role did “counter-expertise” play in post-Fukushima? And how do citizens make vital decisions after a nuclear accident (e.g. to stay or to leave their place of residence, heeding or ignoring governmental advice; to allow their children play outside or not; etc.) when confronted with divergent sources of expertise and scientific controversies (such as the risk related to ionizing radiations for children, low-dose effects, etc.)?

The issues of remediation and of compensation, and the disputes these inevitably trigger, also call for an examination of the juridical aspects. Moreover, in the case of a nuclear accident, long-lasting divides concerning evaluation of the health effects of ionizing radiations are instrumental in the difficulty of building widely accepted solutions. This is why the present analysis proposes a focus on Science, Technology and Society (STS) studies, examining the major issues related to knowledge production as concerns radiological risks, and its translation into recommendations, policies, and government decisions.

The research is based on an intensive field work led by a Franco-Japanese team, and comprises more than 120 interviews with government representatives at national and local levels, with scientists, residents of Fukushima prefecture, Non-Profit Organisation (NPOs), and others. Details on the field research are provided in the annexes.

The deliverables of the Shinrai project comprise:

- Report 1: « Revue de littérature sur les concepts de confiance et d’expertise », (October 2017, in French). The main theoretical elements of this report are briefly summarized in Chapter 5 when discussing the issue of trust.

- Report 2: Controversies and decision-making after the Fukushima Accident (to be published in 2020)

- Report 3: “Case studies analysis and synthesis” (the present report).

Rapport IRSN/2019/00178 Shinrai research Project: The 3/11 accident and its social consequences 10/165

Ce document est la propriété de l’IRSN et ne peut pas être communiqué, reproduit ou utilisé sans son autorisation écrite préalable. This document is the property of IRSN and shall not be disseminated, copied or used without its prior formal approval

 

1.2 OUTLINE OF THE REPORT

This report is divided into 7 chapters, including the present introduction (Chapter 1).

- Chapter 2 gives an overview of the government policies established in the aftermath of the nuclear accident in Fukushima Daiichi in order to deal with the consequences of the accident.

- Chapter 3 presents their actual implementation in three towns: Kawauchi and Naraha, two evacuated villages, and Watari, a district of Fukushima city which was outside the evacuation zones. Most of the interviews with inhabitants were conducted with residents of these places.

The chapter examines how government policy was actually implemented at this local level, the difficulties encountered, focussing more specifically on the role played by the mayors (Kawauchi and Naraha) and how they struggled to implement policy while taking into account the residents’ (divergent) interests and desires.

- Chapter 4 examines in detail the consequences of these policies for inhabitants and their decision whether or not to return to their evacuated village, after the evacuation orders were lifted. Six types of “decisions” have been identified; this categorisation allows for an account of the variety of inhabitant reactions and judgements regarding their situation after the nuclear accident.

- Chapter 5 provides a more general analysis of the social consequences of the nuclear accident. Beyond the question of “whether to return or not”, this chapter examines the main issues with which inhabitants were confronted. These issues are presented on a temporal basis: from evacuation in the immediate aftermath of the accident, to the situation six years later, when field work ended for the present research project. They combine data from this field work (interviews and observations) together with a number of analyses from scholars in the field, focusing on research projects with a strong empirical basis.

This chapter also elaborates on the notion of trust. Based on the results of Shinrai report 1, it examines who (or which institutions) people trust or do not trust, after the accident, while they were being confronted with overwhelming amounts of divergent information concerning radiological risks, and decisions to be made.

- Chapter 6 also provides a “synthesis analysis”, this time more focused on political and juridical aspects. It examines - at a general level - the consequences of post-accidental Japanese policy and its debatable points. It also addresses the juridical aspects and the rising number of lawsuits where affected populations collectively brought civil actions against TEPCO1 and the government.

1 Tokyo Electric Power Company Holdings, Inc. owner/operator of Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power plant Rapport IRSN/2019/00178 Shinrai research Project: The 3/11 accident and its social consequences 11/165

Ce document est la propriété de l’IRSN et ne peut pas être communiqué, reproduit ou utilisé sans son autorisation écrite préalable. This document is the property of IRSN and shall not be disseminated, copied or used without its prior formal approval

 

- Chapter 7 presents the conclusion of this report, drawing on lessons learned from the nuclear accident, and offers some perspectives on research questions that are still open.

- Annexes provide details concerning methodology and a list of interviews conducted.

Extracts:

Before the F1NPP accident, nuclear emergency planning was defined in the Prevention Measures related to Nuclear Facility Emergencies (1980)2 published by the Nuclear Safety Commission, one of the two major nuclear regulatory bodies at the time which were merged to create a Nuclear Regulation Authority (NRA) post-Fukushima. In the guidelines, the zone within the 8–10 km radius of the nuclear power stations was considered to be an Emergency Planning Zone (EPZ), targeted for nuclear disaster drills and preparations. The guidelines specified that an EPZ was defined “based on a hypothetical scenario which is almost technically impossible” and thus nuclear disaster preparation would be suffice to be implemented in limited areas within the EPZ and no further, by insisting that “(nuclear installations) are safe in normal circumstances and do not trouble any daily activities of residents” (p.15). According to Imai (2012), “this, indeed, constitutes the basis of the notion in public policy that nuclear power stations were accident-free”3 (p. 24).

On the day of the accident, the first evacuation order concerning the 2 km radius from the F1NPP was issued by the Fukushima prefectural government. Even though the prefectural governor does not usually have the authority to issue evacuation orders, according to the Act on Nuclear Emergency, the order was largely considered to be valid and official under such exceptional circumstances and in the absence of State instructions. Following the prefectural order, the Nuclear Emergency Response Headquarter (Nuclear Emergency HQ)5 headed by Japanese Prime Minister, Naoto Kan, began issuing evacuation orders. As Imai (2014) comments, these evacuation orders were in fact the instruction for affected municipalities to issue evacuation orders for the residents, since such legal authority lay with the Mayors of municipalities.

Initially decided according to physical, radial distance from the F1NPP, Evacuation Zones (EZs) rapidly expanded beyond the envisaged EPZ: on the day after the accident, the Nuclear Emergency HQ instructed a compulsory evacuation of the area within a 20 km radius, which was then extended to the 20-30 km radius, four days later. These initial orders were thus issued without consideration of the actual radiological situation on the ground.

During the three months following the disaster, four different types of evacuation zone were created, as shown in the map below (Map 1). In all, a total of 13 municipalities were placed under various evacuation orders and recommendations.

 

 

NUMBERS AND CHARACTERISTICS OF NUCLEAR EVACUATION

The number of evacuees from Fukushima prefecture peaked at 163,000 in June 201213. Seven years after the accident (February 2018), 50,000 people were still displaced.

One of the distinctive aspects of the evacuation following the nuclear accident is that it triggered two patterns of displacement: mandatory evacuation under order from the government, and the spontaneous evacuation of residents living outside designated EZs who decided to flee of their own accord for fear of the effects of radiation, despite the government’s reassurances (Hasegawa, 2015). The proportion of spontaneous evacuation within the total number of evacuees remains unclear as so-called self-evacuees are rarely counted in official statistics and are accorded little recognition and assistance by the authorities.

…the government issued [another] policy paper concerning evacuation zones, in December 2013, entitled Accelerating the Fukushima Reconstruction from the Nuclear Disaster. The document detailed the government’s strategy to promote swift return of evacuees by creating additional compensation, increasing financial aid for local business and reconstruction projects, accelerating decontamination, and reinforcing risk communication. For the first time, it mentioned that the government would also help evacuees to start life over elsewhere (i.e. resettlement), especially for those from Red Zone, to which any prospect of return was considered slim. To support this, the [Jaspanese] government proposed a new compensation plan for house construction to those who wished to resettle elsewhere.

 

The second policy document also fixed the duration of compensation payment for psychological damage due to evacuation, paid to evacuees by TEPCO (about 800 euros/person every month), as up to one year following the lifting of the EO. This decision triggered criticism from evacuees, who saw it as a form of pressure, to make them return against their will and by default - because this compensation for psychological suffering would constitute de facto the financial assistance enabling them to sustain their life in refuge. In addition to the compensation, evacuees received temporary housing assistance offered by host prefectures of their refuge, thanks to which they could live for free in prefabricated shelters or public subsidized housing, or in private apartments where rent was subsidized. The temporary housing assistance was placed under the mandate of Prefectural Governors, to be managed by respective Prefectural Offices.

 

[The Government ]published a revised policy document in June 2015. The novelty of the policy was to extend the compensation payment to up to seven years after the accident, until March 2018, for residents from ‘Green and Yellow Zones.’

 

Decontaminating the area affected by the fallout of the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power plant (F1NPP ) accident was the policy which had been officially decided by the Nuclear Emergency HQ on 26 August 2011, five months after the disaster. From the official minutes of initial Nuclear Emergency HQ meetings, it is evident that the idea had been put on the table as early as May 2011, two months after the accident, to be consolidated in the following August.

On 30 August 2011, the National Diet of Japan then adopted ‘The Act on Special Measures Concerning the Handling of Environmental Pollution by Radioactive Materials Discharged by the Nuclear Power Station Accident Associated with the Tohoku District-Off the Pacific Ocean Earthquake that Occurred on March 11, 2011.

… The Japanese Ministry of the Environment [MoE] came up with the initial concept of decontamination activities on 11 November 2011, proposing a plan to divide the target area into two categories: Special Decontamination Areas (Special Areas) and Intensive Contamination Survey Areas (Survey Areas)…. The designation of target municipalities for each Special/Survey Area was made public in January 2012; a total of 102 municipalities over eight prefectures were included in the Survey Areas.

 

Liability avoided

Japan officially launched its civilian nuclear program in 1960 and enacted two liability laws to cover eventual nuclear damages in 1961: the Act on Compensation for Nuclear Damage (Compensation Act) and the Act on Indemnity Agreements for Compensation for Nuclear Damage (Indemnity Agreements Act). At the same period, nuclear liability regimes were adopted at the international level: the Paris Convention in 1960 and the Vienna Convention in 1963. Japan is not a party to any of these international conventions, but developed its own national liability regime. The country is also one of those States which have adopted unlimited liability, together with Germany and Switzerland (Vasquez-Maignan, 2012). In the case of the Fukushima accident, therefore, TEPCO is exclusively liable for the damage and its liability is unlimited.

The Compensation Act (Section 6) also stipulates that in any case where the operator cannot cover compensation payments, the government should intervene to provide financial assistance. Following this provision, the government set up the Nuclear Damage Compensation Facilitation Corporation in September 2001 to provide financial assistance to nuclear operators facing compensation payments of more than 120 billion Yen (880 million euros), which is the maximum amount covered by private insurance.

 

Following the accident, TEPCO was placed under State control on 31 July 2012. Currently TEPCO’s largest, controlling shareholder (50.1%), is the Nuclear Damage Compensation Facilitation Corporation, of which half is owned by the Japanese government. Since August 2014, the Corporation had also been also tasked with providing financial support to decommissioning operations, and was thus renamed the Nuclear Damage Compensation and Decommissioning Facilitation Corporation.

By December 2016, TEPCO had received a total of 8 trillion yen (62 billion euros) in financial aid from the State via the Compensation Corporation in order to pay compensation27. Thus, the compensation was in fact paid by the State, but administratively managed by TEPCO. In order to receive compensation, residents had to complete an application form, which initially contained 60 pages, and submit it to TEPCO with a significant number of supporting documents28. By 2 February 2018, TEPCO had paid a total of 62 billion euros in compensation for 2 million individual cases and 400,000 cases from corporations and business owners.

 

GENERAL CONCLUSION

This report aims at presenting the main results of the Shinrai project regarding the case studies analysed throughout an extensive fieldwork, led during eight missions in Japan, and comprising more than 120 interviews with different actors. Our main objective was –to quote the words of Michaël Ferrier speaking on the situation in the aftermath of Fukushima- “to enunciate, and not to denunciate365”. A comprehensive and detailed account of the consequences of the nuclear accident and of its “management” by the authorities allows to account for the many different and sometimes very opposite views on what happened –and is still happening- for affected residents. One of its specificities is to have listened to a number of persons who have been or are still in charge of dealing with the consequences of the accident (medical doctors, responsible of the ministries, Mayors, …) in order to understand how they have made sense of the situation, including the ethical stakes they had to face.

365 Interview on France Culture.

Some of the main findings from this field research can be summarized as follows:

 Six categories of inhabitants were identified in relation to their decision to return - or not - to their home village after the Lift of Evacuation Orders, namely: 1. “Return and resist to a Culture of Radioprotection”; 2. “Return and control/comply”; 3. “Return and doubt”; 4. “Between return and resettlement”; 5. “Not returning now”; 6. “Not returning ever”. While recognizing the limit and potentially reductive nature of any form of categorization, this classification helps us grasp a panoramic view of the choices, feelings and judgements underlying decisions made by the population after a nuclear accident..

 Mayors play a crucial role in implementing the policy defined by the government at the local level. They have limited margins for maneuver in organizing the Lifting of Evacuation Orders and the return of inhabitants. As long as particular groups of inhabitants (e.g.: seniors versus families with young children) had specific and opposed interests, it became difficult to act in the name of “general interest”. Each of the mayors justified his decisions by expressing what he considered most important: the right to return to, and eventually to die in one’s own home, or the right to “buy time” and not to come back, for those not satisfied with the life that coming back would offer.

 Examining the question of “who trusts whom?” not surprisingly shows a deep divide between people who trust the “official/governmental” scientists and experts, and those who trust scientists not linked to governmental or nuclear institutions. Such a divide effectively renders “taboo” the question of ionizing radiations consequences on health, because of the potential divisive effects the question can have on communities.

 Risk communication was considered by the authorities to be a solution (to dissipate fear toward radiation among the population) while citizen considered it as a strategy employed by the authorities. The reflexivity of actors who were in charge of communication activities illustrates how the intention to “reassure” could be critically analyzed by citizens and by the experts themselves, when

Rapport IRSN/2019/00178 Shinrai research Project: The 3/11 accident and its social consequences 158/165

Ce document est la propriété de l’IRSN et ne peut pas être communiqué, reproduit ou utilisé sans son autorisation écrite préalable. This document is the property of IRSN and shall not be disseminated, copied or used without its prior formal approval

 

 

they were offered the opportunity to look back on their actions at the time of the accident.

 Appraisal of the Japanese government actions offers accounts of the relatively low return rate and gives a number of reasons for this. This opens the way for addressing the issue of “reconstruction” and the question of “for whom” this reconstruction was promoted, as exposed in “Reconstruction Without Inhabitants” by Yamashita et al.

 Examining the implicit normative framework used by the Japanese government when dealing with 3/11 event contributes to a process of “learning from an accident”. In fact, the Japanese government’s implicit framework was challenged in many ways by what happened afterwards. Therefore, in order to learn from what happened in Fukushima, the deep-seated, “invisible” aspects effectively revealed after the accident must be taken into consideration. The choice was made to focus on the following three narratives: “attachment to territories”, “commensurability of risks”, and “contained contamination”. In the current discussions on post-accident management, these implicit aspects still appear to be insufficiently identified, and have not been called into question.

 Finally, frustrations and angers toward post-accident policies turned into legal proceedings led by a number of citizens against the authorities. At the time of writing, 31 group lawsuits, involving 12,000 plaintiffs from among evacuees and affected residents, have been filed against TEPCO and the government all over Japan. But these legal actions only play a partial role in repairing one’s life from the damage incurred by a nuclear accident. As in other cases of environmental damages compensation, symbolic aspects of these actions such as demand for apology and social recognition shall also be taken into account in the process of reparation.

 

A long-term opposition between experts and scientists of the nuclear sphere and non-institutional experts who have been opposing to them was abruptly “deconfined” after the nuclear accident. Its combination with a conflict of legitimacies –between nuclear-related institutions like ICRP and IAEA, and United Nations institutions - opens questions and challenges for the political and scientific spheres, as well as for SHS researchers.

https://www.sciencesetavenir.fr/nature-environnement/crise-nucleaire-au-japon/les-riverains-de-fukushima-ne-veulent-pas-revenir-chez-eux_132050?xtor=RSS-5

Les riverains de Fukushima ne veulent pas revenir chez eux - Sciences et Avenir Depuis la catastrophe du 11 mars 2011, l’IRSN suit les évolutions de l’opinion des citoyens directement impactés. Revenir dans son ancienne ville après la décontamination n’est pas une ... www.sciencesetavenir.fr

 

Les riverains de Fukushima n'osent pas revenir dans les zones officiellement décontaminées

Par Loïc Chauveau le 11.03.2019 à 15h57 Abonnés

Depuis la catastrophe du 11 mars 2011, l’IRSN suit les évolutions de l’opinion des citoyens directement impactés. Revenir dans son ancienne ville après la décontamination n’est pas une décision simple à prendre.

réagir

La centrale de Fukushima photographiée le 11 mars 2016, 5 ans après la catastrophe.

© NEWSCOM/SIPA

Commenter

CONFIANCE. Ce programme qui alliel'Institut de radioprotection et de sûreté nucléaire (IRSN) et l'université japonaise Tokyo Tech s'appelle "Shinrai" soit "confiance" en japonais. Depuis 2014, il s'attache à comprendre les rapports qui se nouent entre les autorités en charge des conséquences de l'explosion des réacteurs nucléaires de la centrale de Fukushima et les habitants. Officiellement, tout se déroule au mieux. Selon la Préfecture de Fukushima, la zone d'évacuation totale n'est plus que de 371km² soit 2,7% de la surface de la Préfecture. De 165.000 évacués en 2012, on est tombé en décembre 2018 à près de 43.000 personnes qui ne peuvent toujours pas retrouver leur maison.

Au huitième anniversaire de la catastrophe, Shinrai publie un nouveau rapport qui montre combien le retour des populations dans leur ancien lien de vie est dans la réalité difficile. Les chercheurs suivent pas à pas 120 personnes via des entretiens personnalisés et recueillent leurs réactions aux décisions des autorités. Ils constatent ainsi que les retours vers la ville d'origine sont peu nombreux. En moyenne, 15% seulement des habitants sont revenus après la décontamination de leur quartier et l'autorisation des pouvoirs publics. À l'exception de la ville de Tamura qui a vu 80% de retour, d'autres agglomérations comme Kawauchi (28,5%) ou Naraha (31,8%) ont des taux bien plus faibles et dans des villes partiellement évacuées comme Tomokia et Namie, 4% seulement des habitants se sont réinstallés bien que les autorités assurent qu'il n'y a désormais plus de danger pour la santé.

Les anciens reviennent, pas les jeunes

MEDECINS. Le rapport Shinrai confirme ce que le gouvernement japonais redoutait. Le taux de retour des enfants des 9 municipalités concernées est de 8,6% seulement. La tendance est clairement identifiée par l'Agence publique de reconstruction : plus la personne concernée est jeune, moins elle a envie de revenir. Dans les entretiens, les maires semblent ne plus se faire d'illusions : les familles avec des enfants en bas âge ne se réinstalleront probablement pas. Le portrait du "revenant" est donc celui d'un homme d'environ 50 à 60 ans, en bonne santé, autonome, ayant une voiture, capable d'entretenir des relations de voisinage et dont les enfants sont adultes et vivent ailleurs.

Ceux de la même génération mais ayant des problèmes de santé choisissent d'ores et déjà de se réinstaller dans les villes où vivent leurs enfants et où ils trouveront un bon encadrement médical. Les médecins et les infirmières font en effet majoritairement partie de la génération plus jeune qui ne se réinstallera pas. Certains élus comme ceux de Naraha cités par le rapport, estiment qu'au mieux 50% des anciens habitants reviendront y vivre. Dès lors, les autorités essaient d'imaginer ce que deviendront ces agglomérations dans 10 ou 20 ans. La notion de "ville marginale" refait ainsi surface. Définie en 1991 par le sociologue Akira Ono, elle décrit le devenir de ces zones urbaines où la moitié de la population a plus de 65 ans, dans le contexte du vieillissement de la pyramide des âges du Japon.

La reconstruction économique de la région pourrait profiter à des populations extérieures

RISQUES. Le rapport bat ainsi en brèche l'idée très ancrée que les habitants sont attachés à leur région et rechignent à la quitter même en cas d'accident nucléaire. L'exemple de Fukushima montre le contraire. La majorité des riverains ne veulent pas revenir et ce, malgré les efforts des autorités pour les rassurer sur l'absence de risque sanitaire. Shinrai identifie les principales craintes à l'origine de cette décision : risque d'exposition aux radiations notamment pour les enfants, peur associée au voisinage de la centrale accidentée, manque de structures médicales et d'écoles, manque d'infrastructures commerciales et sociales, la forte présence des ouvriers de décontamination de la radioactivité contrastant avec l'absence des amis et des voisins qui ne sont pas revenus…

Les discours rassurants des autorités nationales comme régionales ne peuvent rivaliser face au constat que l’accident a profondément changé les structures de vie. La perte des relations sociales et familiales est ainsi mise en exergue pour expliquer cette volonté de ne plus revenir. Les auteurs du rapport soulignent par ailleurs que cela ne devrait pas s’arranger. Depuis mars 2018 en effet, l’électricien TEPCO ne finance plus les aides au relogement en dehors de la zone contaminée. Des familles qui pouvaient ainsi occuper deux habitations, devront désormais choisir car incapables de payer deux loyers. Et le nombre des départs devrait augmenter.

Quelle politique de reconstruction doit dans ce contexte mener les autorités japonaises? Les actions engagées visent en effet à revitaliser le tissu économique de cette région en favorisant l’installation d’entreprises et la création d’emplois. Le rapport souligne que pour les habitants le mot "reconstruction" signifie plutôt le retour à un environnement sain apte à préserver leur santé et ne sont pas demandeurs de ces activités économiques. Les auteurs redoutent ainsi que les emplois créés attirent des populations économiquement plus fragiles d’autres régions de l'archipel, accentuant ainsi la dépendance des villes locales aux aides des autorités nationales.

CONFIANCE. Ce programme qui allie l’Institut de radioprotection et de sûreté nucléaire (IRSN) et l’université japonaise Tokyo Tech s’appelle "Shinrai" soit "confiance" en japonais. Depuis 2014, il s’attache à comprendre les rapports qui se nouent entre les autorités en charge des conséquences de l’explosion des réacteurs nucléaires de la centrale de Fukushima et les habitants. Officiellement, tout se déroule au mieux. Selon la Préfecture de Fukushima, la zone d’évacuation totale n’est plus que de 371km² soit 2,7% de la surface de la Préfecture. De 165.000 évacués en 2012, on est tombé en décembre 2018 à près de 43.000 personnes qui ne peuvent toujours pas retrouver leur maison.

Au huitième anniversaire de la catastrophe, Shinrai  publie un nouveau rapport qui montre combien le retour des populations dans leur ancien lien de vie est dans la réalité difficile. Les chercheurs suivent pas à pas 120 personnes via des entretiens personnalisés et recueillent leurs réactions aux décisions des autorités. Ils constatent ainsi que les retours vers la ville d’origine sont peu nombreux. En moyenne, 15% seulement des habitants sont revenus après la décontamination de leur quartier et l’autorisation des pouvoirs publics. À l’exception de la ville de Tamura qui a vu 80% de retour, d’autres agglomérations comme Kawauchi (28,5%) ou Naraha (31,8%) ont des taux bien plus faibles et dans des villes partiellement évacuées comme Tomokia et Namie, 4% seulement des habitants se sont réinstallés bien que les autorités assurent qu’il n’y a désormais plus de danger pour la santé.

Les anciens reviennent, pas les jeunes

MEDECINS. Le rapport Shinrai confirme ce que le gouvernement japonais redoutait. Le taux de retour des enfants des 9 municipalités concernées est de 8,6% seulement. La tendance est clairement identifiée par l’Agence publique de reconstruction : plus la personne concernée est jeune, moins elle a envie de revenir. Dans les entretiens, les maires semblent ne plus se faire d’illusions : les familles avec des enfants en bas âge ne se réinstalleront probablement pas. Le portrait du "revenant" est donc celui d’un homme d’environ 50 à 60 ans, en bonne santé, autonome, ayant une voiture, capable d’entretenir des relations de voisinage et dont les enfants sont adultes et vivent ailleurs.

Commenter

 

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