“Candour is vital,
it is the only way we can work.. we need unvarnished analysis”
- Sir Simon
McDonald, Head of the Diplomatic Service, 10 July 2019
On 7 July, the Mail on Sunday
published an explosive set of articles based on private cables sent by the British
ambassador in Washington DC, Sir Kim Darroch, a very experienced senior
diplomat, to ministers at the Foreign Office, the UK Government’s National
Security Advisor (Sir Mark Sedwell, also now the Cabinet Secretary) - a post
Sir Kim himself held from January 2012 to September 2015
before going to Washington - and to the Prime Minister May over the past two years.
Amongst other things, in his limited circulation letters and diplomatic
telegrams, called DipTels in the jargon, Sir Kim described Trump’s White House
operations as “uniquely dysfunctional” plagued by “vicious infighting and
chaos”, suggested in his embassy team’s
judgment “we don’t believe this
Administration is going to become
substantially more normal; less dysfunctional; less unpredictable; less faction
riven; less diplomatically clumsy and inept,” and opined of President Trump
himself “for a man who has risen to the highest office on the planet, President Trump radiates
insecurity.”
Another note questioned whether the
White House “will ever look competent”. And following President Trump's state
visit to the UK in June, Sir Kim noted Trump had been “dazzled by the pomp.”
A tetchy Trump, proving Sir Kim’s analysis to be
spot-on, tweeted intemperately tweeted that the ambassador 'has not served
Britain well' as being “wacky” and “pompous” and “a very stupid guy.”
Sir Kim was subsequently spitefully un-invited to a
diplomatic dinner on Monday evening at the White House with the Emir of Qatar.
This began to make untenable his ability to conduct his crucial diplomatic role
in the capital city of the UK’s closest diplomatic ally
Justice Secretary David Gauke called
the leak “disgraceful' and said it was important for ambassadors to 'tell the
truth'. A leak inquiry was immediately established. In a treacherous move, Brexit
Party leader Nigel Farage - an ally and confident of President Trump - sided with the foreign leader, and called for the
British ambassador Darroch to be sacked. [Darroch is known to have opposed
Brexit.]
In a live televised debate between the two
candidates for leadership of the Conservative Party on 9 July in Salford, the
current Foreign Secretary Jeremy Hunt backed Sir Kim fully, but his challenger,
former Foreign Secretary Boris Johnson very evidently declined to do so. (“Kim Darroch quits as UK
ambassador to US 'after Johnson remarks': Envoy understood to have seen his position as
untenable after Boris Johnson did not back him,” Guardian on line, 10 July 2019; https://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2019/jul/10/kim-darroch-resigns-as-uk-ambassador-to-us-after-leaked-trump-comment)
Sir Kim resigned his post in the early
morning in Washington on 10 July, just before midday British time, barely half
an hour before Prime Minister’s questions.
In a letter to Sir Simon McDonald, Permanent Under Secretary at the Foreign and Commonwealth Office, Sir Kim wrote:
Since the leak of official documents from this Embassy there has been a great deal of speculation surrounding my position and the duration of my remaining term as ambassador. I want to put an end to that speculation. The current situation is making it impossible for me to carry out my role as I would like.
Although my posting is not due to end until the end of this year, I believe in the current circumstances the responsible course is to allow the appointment of a new ambassador.
I am grateful to all those in the UK and the US, who have offered their support during this difficult few days. This has brought home to me the depth of friendship and close ties between our two countries. I have been deeply touched.
I am also grateful to all those with whom I have worked
over the last four decades, particularly my team here in the US. The
professionalism and integrity of the British civil service is the envy of the
world. I will leave it full of confidence that its values remain in safe hands.
The last time a British Ambassador to Washington DC had trouble with the United
States was in 1856, when the US Government under President Franklin Pierce (
the 14th US President) objected to the British army recruiting American
citizens to fight for Great Britain in the Crimean war, according to Sir Simon
McDonald, Head of the Diplomatic Service in evidence lunchtime on 10 July
before the House of Commons foreign Affairs Committee.
But the UK has had earlier
diplomatic difficulties with the United States, including obviously before and during the great Revolutionary war
in the 1770s, and during the Suez crisis in autumn of 1956.Below are some
intriguing accounts.
Washington’s break with King George
III (1738-1820)
George III
was the King of Great Britain and Ireland during the American Revolution. The
death of his father, Frederick Lewis, the Prince of Wales, in 1751 meant that
the 22-year-old prince succeeded his grandfather, George II, to the throne in
1760. The first royal heir born in Britain in 130 years, George III's reign as
a patriot king was intended to mark a new chapter for a British monarchy that
had been criticized as more interested in matters in Europe than at home. He
emphasized the break from his predecessors in his first meeting of the Privy
Council, when he called Britain "this my native country." Hoping to
mend a fractured political nation, George III ended the decades-long ban of
Tories from national and local office and broke the hold of latitudinarian
moderates on the Church of England, both of which had long-term impacts on
political and religious life in the British Atlantic.
Although many
Americans, such as Thomas Jefferson, placed the blame for the Revolution
squarely on George III's shoulders, no British monarch in more than a century
was in a constitutional position to exercise any real responsibility. The
policies that created disaffection and fomented rebellion in the colonies-such
as the Stamp Act (which George III thought "abundant in absurdities")
and the Townshend duties-were generated by successive British ministries.
Horace Walpole, a severe critic of George III, explained that the King
"seemed to resign himself entirely to their conduct" before 1774. The
King understood that Parliament was the true sovereign in Great Britain.
That is not
to say that George III did not contribute to the causes of the American
Revolution. His inexperience and overreliance on his childhood tutor-John
Stuart, Earl of Bute-for advice on political matters helped trigger the
instability of British ministries in the 1760s. The Duke of Devonshire, a
senior member of the Privy Council, was shocked to learn that the two knew
"so little" about the affairs of the world and it was widely feared
on both sides of the Atlantic that Bute, whom one senior British official called
"the greatest political coward" he ever met, was the real power
behind the throne. He appointed Bute first minister at his earliest opportunity
in 1762, but Bute's government failed to command a majority in the House of
Commons and lasted less than a year. George III then went through a string of
ministries before settling on Frederick, Lord North, in 1770 and then refusing
for the next 12 years North's annual requests to resign.
George III
also personally influenced the character of the transatlantic conflict after
news of the Boston Tea Party reached London in early 1774. Convinced that the
troubles with America derived from the lenience of British policies (and not
shifting British ministries), the King argued for strong, coercive measures
against the recalcitrant colonials. He declared it his duty to stand fast
against the Americans in "the battle of the legislature" and
"withstand every attempt to weaken or impair" its sovereign authority
throughout the empire. Consequently, he was thrilled that the Coercive Acts
passed almost unanimously and celebrated the returns of the parliamentary
election of late 1774 that elected an even wider majority of members who
opposed conciliation. The Coercive Acts finally drove the colonies into unified
opposition, and the King proclaimed to Lord North in November 1774 that
"We must either master them or totally leave them to themselves."
Lord North,
however, quickly developed doubts that any victory would be worth the cost. He
and Lord Dartmouth, his step-brother and Secretary of State for the Colonies,
hoped for something like a negotiated settlement that would return calm to the
British Atlantic. North's Conciliatory Proposals, which failed to move the
Americans, were considered by Parliament in February 1775 and clearly showed
the growing divide between supporters of the King's position and outright
opponents of military action such as Edmund Burke, Charles James Fox, the Earl
of Chatham, and the Earl of Camden. The King
was convinced that "the Deluded Americans" must be brought to
"feel the necessity of returning to their Duty" and quickly
grew tired of continued debates on the matter. By early 1775 he refused to
receive petitions-including John Dickinson's "Olive Branch Petition,"
adopted by the First Continental Congress-asking for his help in resolving the
dispute between Parliament and the colonies, despite North's earnest requests
that he at least hear them. The outbreak of war in April 1775 at Lexington and
Concord gave the King precisely what he wanted: the opportunity to expressly
proclaim the colonies in "open and avowed rebellion," which he did on
August 19, 1775. The proclamation also did
something that had not previously been a dimension of America's polemical
attacks on Britain — it brought George III into the debate as a legitimate
target of blame and abuse. As New Jersey's John Witherspoon would later recall,
prior to 1775 "greater insults were offered to the sovereign, within the
city of London then ever were thought of . . . in any part of America." The
publication of Thomas Paine's Common Sense in 1776 lambasted the King as
"the royal brute," and Jefferson's Declaration of Independence was
the last straw in the collapse of George III's American legacy when it
fictively ascribed to the King a long list of acts as evidence of a personal
campaign of tyranny against the colonies and the constitution.
And then
there was Suez in October 1956...
Much more
telling than Soviet condemnation was the disapproval of the Eisenhower
administration in the USA. Washington was appalled
by the Anglo-French-Israeli invasion of the canal zone and the Sinai. The
action threatened to destabilise the strategically vital region, and strengthen
Soviet links with liberation movements around the world. It raised global
tensions in an age dominated by the nuclear arms race and recurring superpower crises.
More viscerally, it was viewed with distaste as a nakedly imperial exercise in
a post-imperial age.
Eden, a
master of self-delusion, thought he had received a nod and wink of approval for
the invasion from John Foster Dulles, the US secretary of state. He should have
checked with Dwight D Eisenhower, who
was enraged by the action.
He forced through the UN resolution imposing a ceasefire, and made it clear
that in this matter at any rate, Britain would have no 'special relationship'
with the USA.
The final
straw for Eden came when the Treasury told the government that sterling, under
sustained attack over the crisis, needed urgent US support to the tune of a
billion dollars. 'Ike' had a crisp reply: no ceasefire, no loan. The
invaders were ordered to halt, and await the arrival of a UN intervention
force.
Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957,
Suez Crisis, July 26–December 31, 1956, Volume XVI
455. Memorandum of Discussion at the 302d Meeting of
the National Security Council, Washington, November 1, 1956, 9 a.m.1
Washington,
November 1, 1956, 9 a.m.
[Here follows
a paragraph listing the participants at the meeting.]
Upon entering
the Cabinet Room from his office, the President informed the members of the
Council that, except in so far as it was the subject of the DQ’s intelligence
briefing, he did not wish the Council to take up the situation in the Soviet
satellites. Instead, he wished to concentrate on the Middle East.
1.
Significant World Developments Affecting U.S. Security
[Here follows
a briefing by Allen Dulles on the situation in Hungary.]
With respect
to the hostilities in the Middle East, Mr. [Allen] Dulles stated that approval
for the attacks on Egypt by the British and the French had so far come only
from Australia and New Zealand. It was probable, moreover, that there was a
wide split of opinion in Australia between Mr. Menzies and Mr. Casey.
Mr. Dulles
indicated that he would not, as planned, cover military developments in the
Near East, inasmuch as these would be covered by Admiral Radford. The President
interrupted to say that he did not wish to go into the military situation at
the present time. Instead, he wished to concentrate on the policy problem.
Accordingly, Mr. Dulles concluded his briefing by stating that from reports
received to date, the Israelis appeared to have gained a substantial victory
over the Egyptians.
The National
Security Council:2
Noted an oral
briefing by the Director of Central Intelligence on the subject, with specific
reference to the recent developments regarding Hungary and Poland, and the
situation in the Near East.
2. U.S.
Policy With Respect to the Hostilities in the Near East (NSC 5428,3 as amended by
NSC Action No. 14624)
The President
announced that he would start the discussion of this subject by asking the
Secretary of State to bring the National Security Council up to date on
diplomatic developments as the Secretary saw them.
Secretary
Dulles observed that, following the meeting of the UN Security Council in New York
some two weeks ago, it had been expected that negotiations among the British,
French and Egyptians would be renewed in Geneva beginning October 29. This
expectation had been based on an unofficial understanding reached at that
meeting. Indeed, Selwyn Lloyd and Pineau had come very close to agreement with
Egyptian Foreign Minister Fawzi on an acceptable settlement of the Suez
problem. In fact, according to Selwyn Lloyd, an actual agreement on such a
settlement would have been reached at that time had it not been for the
stubbornness of Pineau, who dragged his feet in the early meetings of these
three men.
In any event,
after Selwyn Lloyd and Pineau returned home, they found sentiments in favor of
resorting to force very strong in their governments. We had known all along
that the French had been pushing strongly for a forceful solution of the Suez
crisis. There had been no doubt of their attitude from the beginning. There
were likewise elements in the British Government who wished to invoke force.
These elements thought it best not to have Secretary Dulles around as they
moved toward their objective. Accordingly, there was a blackout of
communications between Washington on the one hand and London and Paris on the
other, after Secretary Dulles’ return to Washington. Secretary Dulles said he
gradually became very concerned about this news blackout, and sent a cable to
our Ambassadors in London and Paris last week expressing his concern.
Subsequently, our Ambassadors had conversations in London and in Paris which
were superficially reassuring. On the other hand, our fears became aggravated
when it became clear that the French were working very close with the Israelis,
as was shown, for example, in [Page 904]the heavy
diplomatic traffic between Paris and Israel. This was followed by the Israeli
mobilization and then by the Israeli strike.
Secretary
Dulles indicated that we had thought that the Israeli attack might go against
Jordan, since the Israelis are anxious to secure the territory up to the west
bank of the Jordan River. Apparently, however, the British persuaded the
Israelis not to strike at Jordan because to do so would involve the British in
the invocation of the Anglo-Jordanian treaty. The result of British persuasion
was, accordingly, an agreement that the Israelis would strike south at Egypt.
This was a move which the British and French could use as a pretext to
intervene to protect the Suez Canal.
When the Israelis
commenced their attack, we promptly called in the British and French
Ambassadors to see what their governments were going to do under the terms of
the Tripartite Declaration of 1950. The British and French were evasive in
their response. We said that we would honor our commitments under the
Tripartite Declaration.
Coincidentally
with the Israeli strike came the so-called ultimatum by Britain and France to
Israel and Egypt. Evidently, said Secretary Dulles, this was not much of an
ultimatum as far as Israel was concerned. They were only asked to keep ten
miles back from the Canal itself. According to the terms of the ultimatum, even
if the Canal were freed from the risk involved in the fighting, the British and
French proposed to occupy the Canal Zone. All this Secretary Dulles described
as a series of concerted moves among the British, French and Israelis, the
French actually conducting the concerted planning and the British acquiescing.
Moreover, the French had for some time been supplying the Israelis with far
more military equipment than we knew anything about. They were thus violating
an agreement among the three powers that each was to let the others know the
extent of the assistance they were giving to Israel.
The whole
matter is now before the United Nations in terms of a resolution introduced by
the United States prior to the Anglo-French ultimatum. Among other things, this
resolution called for the withdrawal of Israeli forces behind the armistice
line, with no support to be given to Israel by the other nations, etc., etc. We
have thought that the terms of this resolution continued to be appropriate even
after the Anglo-French ultimatum had been served. The resolution, of course,
was defeated by the British and French vetoes. The vote was seven to four, with
two abstentions—Australia and Belgium.5 These
abstentions were significant.
Under the
Uniting for Peace Resolution, continued Secretary Dulles, a meeting of the
General Assembly can be called in 24 hours if the UN Security Council is
inhibited from action because of a veto. Such a meeting of the General Assembly
has been called for five o’clock this afternoon in New York. We must be
concerned with the U.S. position. Broadly speaking, this position, for at least
the last three months, has been the position of avoiding resort to a solution
by force. This has been a policy which has evoked greater international support
for the United States than we have secured at any time in our history. Indeed,
the whole world is looking to the United States for firm leadership in this
critical situation.
Yesterday, at
the meeting of the NATO Council, the United States duly made its report on the
implication of these recent events so far as we were concerned.6 On this occasion
the British and the French said nothing. As far as can be ascertained from
developments at this NATO Council meeting, the British have probably secured
the support of the Netherlands for their action against Egypt. Apparently all
the other members of the NATO Council are opposed to the Anglo-French action,
though Portugal may yet line up on the British and French side thanks to its
colonial preoccupations in India. They have not yet done so, and all of the
other members expressed themselves as opposed to the use of force to reach a
settlement. Moreover, the verdict of the rest of the world is altogether
unanimous in the same sense. At this point, Mr. Allen Dulles interrupted to
note the exception in the case of Australia and of New Zealand. Secretary
Dulles replied that these were in a sense exceptions, but there was much
unhappiness in Australia; and as for New Zealand, it was virtually a colony and
almost invariably followed the lead of the United Kingdom.
Here
Secretary Dulles paused to state that we were now squarely facing the problem
of what the United States should do. He said that he had prepared yesterday and
had with him at present a statement of what we proposed to do (presumably in
carrying out our obligations under the Tripartite Declaration).7 This statement
proposed certain mild sanctions against Israel—namely, suspending some of our
military and economic assistance programs. The sanctions would not touch such
vital matters as the freezing of Israeli [Page 906]balances in the
United States or suspending remittances from the United States to Israel.
Pointing out that we still have a freeze on Egyptian balances in the United
States, Secretary Dulles added that we must presently decide whether to keep
these Egyptian balances frozen in the circumstances now existing.
Besides our
action in implementation of the Tripartite Declaration, we also faced the
question of what our position is to be in the United Nations. The great
question is, do we reassert our leadership in the struggle against the use of
force in this situation, admitting grave provocations on both sides? Certainly
we must try to find ways and means to shorten the duration and limit the scope
of the hostilities.
Secretary
Dulles warned with emphasis that if we were not now prepared to assert our
leadership in this cause, leadership would certainly be seized by the Soviet
Union. But asserting our leadership would involve us in some very basic
problems. For many years now the United States has been walking a tightrope
between the effort to maintain our old and valued relations with our British
and French allies on the one hand, and on the other trying to assure ourselves
of the friendship and understanding of the newly independent countries who have
escaped from colonialism. It seemed to Secretary Dulles that in view of the
overwhelming Asian and African pressure upon us, we could not walk this
tightrope much longer. Unless we now assert and maintain this leadership, all
of these newly independent countries will turn from us to the USSR. We will be
looked upon as forever tied to British and French colonialist policies. In
short, the United States would survive or go down on the basis of the fate of
colonialism if the United States supports the French and the British on the
colonial issue. Win or lose, we will share the fate of Britain and France.
On this
point, Secretary Dulles expressed his view that the British and French would
not win. Indeed, recent events are close to marking the death knell for Great
Britain and France. These countries have acted deliberately contrary to the
clearest advice we could possibly give them. They have acted contrary both to
principle and to what was expedient from the point of view of their own
interests. Of course, we should not let ourselves be swayed by resentment at
the treatment the British and French have given us, or do anything except what
we decide is the right thing to do.
Summing up,
Secretary Dulles stated that basically we had almost reached the point of
deciding today whether we think the future lies with a policy of reasserting by
force colonial control over the less developed nations, or whether we will
oppose such a course of action by every appropriate means. Great Britain and
France are, of course, our oldest and most trusted allies. If we became engaged
[Page 907]in a war, these
are the allies we would most surely depend upon for assistance. It is nothing
less than tragic that at this very time, when we are on the point of winning an
immense and long-hoped-for victory over Soviet colonialism in Eastern Europe,
we should be forced to choose between following in the footsteps of
Anglo-French colonialism in Asia and Africa, or splitting our course away from
their course. Yet this decision must be made in a mere matter of hours—before
five o’clock this afternoon.
The President
broke the tension which followed Secretary Dulles’ statement by saying that if
anybody wanted to know how “political” this issue had become, this was shown by
the telegram which the President had received last night from Governor
Stevenson. It was sent from La Guardia Field at 7:25 p.m. Stevenson was writing
the message even while the President was talking,8 and he released
the text of the message before he sent it to the President.
The President
then said he wished to ask one question. Is the United States under the
necessity of introducing the resolution in the UN General Assembly today, or
could the Secretary-General, for example, introduce a resolution? Secretary
Dulles replied that resolutions would either be introduced by the United States
or by the Soviet Union. Indeed, any nation could introduce a resolution, and
perhaps India would do so. Secretary Dulles added that he had had a long
message from Prime Minister Nehru. He hadn’t had a chance to read it as yet, but
it was said to be cast in very general terms.
The President
said that at any rate he thought it would be a complete mistake for this
country to continue with any kind of aid to Israel, which was an aggressor. The
President then interrupted himself and said that, on the other hand, Israel had
not yet been branded as an aggressor, had it? Secretary Dulles answered that
Israel had not yet been branded an aggressor by the UN. Nevertheless, at the
very minimum we must do to the Israelis what the UN resolution called for. In
illustration of this, Secretary Dulles read from the written statement to which
he had referred earlier in the course of the meeting. This statement, as read,
gave details as to what governmental aid by the United States to Israel would
be suspended, including even such matters as shipments already in the pipeline,
and the like. In concluding his reading of the statement, Secretary Dulles
described these sanctions as very mild.
The President
inquired whether it would not be wise to state plainly that the United States
was party to a tripartite agreement made in good faith with two other nations.
These other two nations have reneged on their commitment and deserted us.
Accordingly this [Page 908]statement must
contain a review of exactly what we are going to do. The President then
commented that since we had already made it clear that we would not involve
ourselves in this war, what the Secretary of State proposed to say was
generally correct, though the sanctions outlined in the statement seemed a
little mild. The President inquired about the timing of the issuance of this
statement. Secretary Dulles replied that if the President approved, he would issue
this statement of mild sanctions today. He would then summon the Israeli
Ambassador and inform him that these sanctions represented the minimum. This
would threaten further steps by way of sanctions if the Israelis did not
retreat to the armistice lines from which their military operations had
commenced. He would, for example, threaten to suspend Israeli remittances from
the United States to Israel.
Secretary
Wilson inquired whether we could not wait for the United Nations to take action
in this General Assembly before we undertook to do anything else. Secretary
Dulles replied that it had been his intention to issue the statement he was
discussing this morning.
At this
point, Secretary Humphrey inquired whether our resolution could not simply
demand that the United Nations determine who was the aggressor. Meanwhile we
would withhold any further action of any kind until they made such a
determination of the aggressor. The President replied that it seemed to him
foolish for people who know as much as we do about what is going on, to
continue to give, as a government, assistance to Israel. Secretary Humphrey
then suggested that our best course of action might be to suspend all our
government assistance to everyone concerned—Israel, Egypt, Britain and France.
The President
replied that what we must now do is to agree among ourselves what the United
States should do in the light of our statement. Secretary Humphrey countered
with the view that until the United Nations actually identifies the aggressor,
we should take no further action. After the identification is made, we could
proceed to take appropriate action. Dr. Flemming pointed out that this still
leaves us the question of the position we should take before the United Nations
General Assembly. To this, Secretary Humphrey replied that we should take
whatever position we think is right. Personally, he believed that the United
Kingdom was the real aggressor, and Israel only a pawn.
The President
led the discussion on a slightly different angle by stating that he had never
realized that the Arab states had consistently afforded the UN inspectors
access to their boundaries so that inspections could be consistently made. It
was the Israelis who had refused similar inspection rights on their side of the
boundaries.
Governor
Stassen raised the question as to the merits of focusing the U.S. position in
the United Nations on a simple cease-fire agreement. After all, our great
objective is to prevent this war from spreading. A number of mistakes had
already been made. The Soviets had made a grave error in putting arms in the
hands of the Egyptians. Egyptian seizure of the Suez Canal was a grave error,
in turn, and after all, the Suez Canal is an absolutely vital lifeline for the
British.
The President
answered Governor Stassen by pointing out that, in fact, transit through the
Canal has increased rather than decreased since the Egyptians took over.
Governor Stassen admitted that this was true, but emphasized that the British
feel that they cannot possibly have an individual like Nasser holding their
lifeline in his hands. In response to this argument, the President cited the
six principles agreed on among the British, French and Egyptians, emphasizing
in particular the principle that the Canal must be insulated from the politics
of any nation. He accordingly could not agree, he said, with Governor Stassen.
If the British would agree to negotiate a settlement, then the opinion of the
whole world would be against Egypt.
Governor
Stassen replied by expressing his agreement that the British had committed a
terrible error. On the other hand, it was a vital friend who had committed this
error, and our real enemy was the Soviet Union. One of the reasons for such
strong sentiment in Britain was the British fear of the effect on the pound
sterling of having the Canal in Nasser’s hands. They were facing a genuine
crisis. They had made a judgment that the future of Great Britain depended on
getting the Canal into friendly hands again. The Soviet Union is still the
great threat to the United States. We must accordingly approach the whole
problem with a calm perspective. About all that we need to do now is to move
toward the future; that is, in the direction first of a cease-fire, and then of
a negotiated peace. Governor Stassen emphasized that he could not see how it
would serve the interests of the United States to strike now at Britain and
Israel.
With great
warmth, Secretary Dulles said he was compelled to point out to Governor Stassen
that it was the British and French who had just vetoed the proposal for a
cease-fire. Of course, once they were thoroughly lodged in Egypt, they would be
agreeable to accepting a cease-fire. Governor Stassen asked that even so,
wasn’t this kind of an acceptance of a cease-fire to our immediate advantage?
Secretary Dulles replied with an emphatic negative, and added that what the
British and French had done was nothing but the straight old-fashioned variety
of colonialism of the most obvious sort. Even so, replied Governor Stassen, it
seemed to him that the [Page 910]future of Great
Britain and of France was still the most important consideration for the United
States, and that all our efforts should now be directed toward a cease-fire.
At this
juncture in the discussion, Secretary Humphrey called attention to the
developing fissures in British public opinion. He said he referred not only to
the split between the Conservative and the Labour Parties, but to differences
of opinion among the Conservatives themselves. He was convinced, he said, that
recent British action was primarily Eden’s own creation.
Governor Stassen
replied that if British public opinion was divided, so would American public
opinion be divided if we go on with our plan against Britain, France and
Israel. On the other hand, U.S. public opinion could readily be united under a
course of action in which we avoided anything except the cease-fire. Governor
Stassen turned to the President and went on to say that he might not succeed in
gaining Congressional support for his long-term policies if U.S. action in the
current crisis divided our people. We must keep the U.S. people united, and we
would certainly not succeed in doing this if we split away from Britain and
France and acted on the assumption, which Governor Stassen did not believe
correct, that these two powers were going downhill.
The President
responded to Governor Stassen by stating his emphatic belief that these powers
were going downhill with the kind of policy that they were engaged at the
moment in carrying out. How could we possibly support Britain and France if in
doing so we lose the whole Arab world?
Secretary
Wilson counseled that we must take a longer time to analyze this problem, and
Secretary Humphrey repeated his suggestion that we defer action until the UN
defines the aggressor. To these suggestions, Secretary Dulles responded that we
would very soon find in the UN who is the aggressor if we permitted the Soviet
Union to introduce its resolution. This resolution would certainly declare that
Britain and France were the aggressors, and the Soviet resolution would win by
acclamation. As a result, we lose our leadership to the Soviet Union.
Secretary
Humphrey then asked Secretary Dulles what kind of U.S. resolution he really
wanted. Secretary Dulles answered that he wanted a resolution which would call
on the parties in the conflict to state the terms on which they would end
hostilities and meantime pledge themselves to call off the hostilities.
Secretary Humphrey said that if this was the case, what the Secretary wanted
was in effect what we had all been talking about—a cease-fire. The President
said that he likewise favored in general the idea of including the call for a
cease-fire in the resolution. Secretary Dulles pointed out that unless the
United States were to propose a resolution which was [Page 911]“moderate” in
character, the Soviets would propose a resolution couched in very extreme
terms. If we could not support such a Soviet resolution, we would be left in
the backwash. Worse than that, Secretary Dulles predicted that the United
Nations Organization would be unable to survive a failure to act on the great
issues in the Near East.
Governor
Stassen again put forward his suggestion that the resolution confine itself to
calling for a cease-fire. With warmth, Secretary Dulles inquired of Governor
Stassen how we could possibly do only this when the Israelis, the British, and
the French were overrunning Egyptian territory.
The President
inquired what the argument was really all about. Turning to Secretary Dulles,
he said that the Secretary was asking for a mild U.S. resolution in the United
Nations. The President said he couldn’t agree more. Do we need to do anything
beyond this? Secretary Dulles replied that he thought the best thing was for
him to go back to the State Department and work in quiet on a draft.
Secretary
Humphrey pointed out that we were all seeking some kind of delaying action in
the United Nations before we proceeded to impose sanctions on anyone. Secretary
Dulles insisted that his own list of sanctions constituted nothing more than a
slap on the wrist to Israel. Nevertheless, this mild slap on the wrist might
well avoid the necessity for more severe measures.
Governor
Stassen again called for a resolution which sought only a cease-fire. The
President, however, explained that we could scarcely call for a cease-fire and
continue to send supplies and assistance to Israel. Secretary Wilson believed
that we shouldn’t make a goat out of Israel alone. Were we proposing to
continue to send military supplies to Great Britain? The President replied that
we would so continue to assist Britain in order that she might meet her NATO
requirements. If the British actually diverted these supplies to other
purposes, we would have to consider such an action to represent another case of
“perfidious Albion”.
(At this
point, Secretary Dulles asked and was given the President’s permission to leave
the Cabinet Room to take a telephone call from Ambassador Lodge at the United
Nations.)9
The President
stated his firm belief that we should state clearly that we are going to
suspend arms shipments to the whole Near Eastern region while the UN is
considering this crisis. He then added that he could scarcely even imagine that
the United States could abandon Britain and France. On the other hand, he
believed that Secretary Dulles was correct in trying to devise some list of
moderate sanctions. Secretary Wilson counseled that we stop everything [Page 912]while the
President “took a look”, but the President went on to say that he just knew that
Secretary Dulles was right in trying to get from the United Nations something
that was soft and reasonable. If he succeeded, we would avoid getting into a
“runaway” situation. The President repeated this view when Secretary Dulles
returned to the Cabinet Room. He counseled that we stop all arms shipments to
the hostile areas at once, and that we decide later what we should do about
“Hollister’s stuff” (assistance programs under the aegis of the International
Cooperation Administration). If the UN ended by branding Israel an aggressor,
then assistance programs under the ICA would be stopped too. What the President
said he really feared was the prospect of imposing a blockade against Israel.
Secretary
Dulles turned to the President and warned that if he did not provide leadership
at this point, the UN would be calling for a blockade likewise of Britain and
France. It would not do for the United States to confine itself merely to
calling for a cease-fire, with the Israeli forces running all over Egyptian territory.
Mr. Allen
Dulles offered the suggestion that in the present circumstances of approaching
military defeat, Nasser might well welcome a cease-fire in order to save his
skin. Admiral Radford thought that this was unlikely, and added his further
belief that the General Assembly would end by branding Britain, Israel and
France as aggressors all.
Secretary
Dulles pointed out that we have said to Prime Minister Eden that the kind of
action which he had undertaken to carry out was nothing short of disastrous.
Having nevertheless continued with his policy and action, do we, the United
States, propose to go along with it? Governor Stassen argued that we must still
try to save a friend from disaster, even though that friend had brought the
disaster on himself.
Turning to
the Secretary of State, the President suggested that the thing for him to do
was to go now and see what he could draft up in the way of the mildest things
we could do in an effort to block the introduction of a really mean and
arbitrary resolution in the UN General Assembly. Secretary Dulles agreed,
pointing out, however, that Ambassador Lodge had just informed him that if we
did not come back to the UN with a resolution much along the lines of our
earlier resolution, the Soviets would certainly introduce a very much more
extreme resolution. Such an action on the part of the Soviets would plainly
force the United States into one camp or the other. We would not be able to
walk the tightrope after five o’clock this afternoon.
Secretary
Humphrey asked whether we were not all clear in our minds that we cannot be on
the side of the British and the French on this issue. The President said that
at any rate we certainly [Page 913]couldn’t be on
their side unless he turned around completely from what he said in his
statement last night (the 15-minute telecast from the White House).10 On the other
hand, the President stated with emphasis, we do not want the British and the
French to be branded aggressors. Secretary Humphrey commented that we would
want to do our best to extricate the British and the French from their error,
but we didn’t need to get into the error with them.
Coming back
to the General Assembly meeting, said Dr. Flemming, are we in a position to get
our resolution before the General Assembly earlier than the Soviets can get
theirs? Secretary Dulles replied that we can do so if we move fast enough. He
said he wanted to be quite clear: It is important that we suspend our economic
assistance program to Israel at this time, though the fact of this suspension
need not be made public. Both Secretary Humphrey and the Attorney General
disagreed with the latter proposal, and expressed a preference for stopping
arms shipments to the whole Near Eastern area. They believed that our action
should cover the whole area and not be confined to a single country such as
Israel.
Secretary
Dulles, in response, pointed out that we had only yesterday been arguing in the
UN Security Council in favor of suspending economic and financial assistance to
the Israelis. Could we now abruptly change? Mr. Allen Dulles pointed out that
if the British and the French were branded aggressors, would we not then have
to apply sanctions against them as well as against Israel? This seemed to Mr.
Dulles a very dangerous course of action.
The President
added the further point that we would find plenty of Americans who think the
Arabs are every bit as much aggressors as anyone else. In response to the
President’s point, Secretary Dulles stated that General Burns had been trying
desperately to induce the Israelis to agree to inspection and patrol by members
of the Armistice Commission. The Israelis had frustrated all his efforts.
Governor Stassen admitted the truth of this statement, but pointed out that we
could not fail to consider the state of mind of the Israelis in the face of so
many provocations and fears. Secretary Dulles answered that one thing at least
was clear: We do not approve of murder. We have simply got to refrain from
resort to force in settling international disputes. Turning to Governor
Stassen, he cited one of the Governor’s own speeches, in which Governor Stassen
had made this very point; and he again warned that if we [Page 914]stand idly by in
this great crisis the whole United Nations would go down the drain.
The President
expressed agreement with Secretary Dulles’ position, while Governor Stassen
once again called for a cease-fire only. In some irritation, Secretary Dulles
inquired whether Governor Stassen meant a cease-fire that would leave the
aggressor in possession of his gains. Governor Stassen replied that, under the
circumstances, the answer was yes, for which there seemed to be some support
among other members of the National Security Council. Secretary Humphrey, in
turn, called again for stopping all arms shipments to the whole Near Eastern
area, without singling out the Israelis for special treatment.
Mr. Hollister
raised the question of what supplies should be sent and what supplies should be
held up for Arab states other than Egypt, while Governor Stassen outlined again
his view of how we could best proceed in the UN General Assembly. He argued
first for a resolution insisting on a cease-fire. This might be followed by a
second resolution calling on Israel to bring back its forces within the
armistice lines. This might be followed by a resolution looking to a
settlement.
The President
inquired whether we should not, as a precautionary measure, state that we are
stopping all military, strategic, and governmental shipments from the United
States to all nations involved in this mess at this time. In any event, he
added, the Secretary of State must now be allowed to go off and put something
down on paper. He could then come back and get together with the President and
with other key members of the National Security Council.
After the
Secretary of State had left the Cabinet Room, the President turned to the other
members of the Council and said that of course no one in the whole world really
expected us to break off our long alliance with Great Britain and France. We
must not permit ourselves to be blinded by the thought that anything we are
going to do will result in our fighting with Great Britain and France. Such a
course of action is simply unthinkable, and no one can possibly believe that we
will do it.
Mr. Allen
Dulles served notice of an announcement that the British had sunk a ship in the
Suez Canal,11 which would
probably block traffic in the Canal. Mr. Dulles said he believed that the ship
in question had been filled with cement by the Egyptians for the express
purpose of blocking the Canal.
The President
then ended this phase of the discussion by calling on Admiral Radford to give
the Council his report on the military situation in the area of hostilities.
Admiral
Radford read his report, which gave a detailed appreciation of the military
situation. (A copy of the substance of Admiral Radford’s report is filed in the
minutes of the meeting.)12 When he had
finished, Admiral Radford stated that the U.S. forces in the area had largely
completed their first responsibility of effecting the evacuation of U.S.
citizens from the area of hostilities. He pointed out that the Joint Chiefs of
Staff were currently much concerned over the possibility of uprisings against
Europeans in the several Arab states.
Dr. Flemming
asked about the reports as to the likelihood of sabotage of the oil pipelines.
Deputy Secretary of Defense Robertson inquired whether evacuation had been
completed in Cairo. Admiral Radford replied that the evacuation of Americans
from that city was not yet complete.
The President
then asked Admiral Radford whether it was at all possible that the Russians
could have “slipped” the Egyptians a half dozen atomic bombs. Admiral Radford
replied that he doubted this, particularly in view of the manifest failure of
the Egyptians to make effective use of the other weapons which the Russians had
already provided them.
Secretary
Wilson expressed a doubt as to the wisdom of keeping the Sixth Fleet in the
area of hostilities once it had completed its task of assisting in the
evacuation of Americans from the danger area. He said that the Defense Department
needed guidance on this matter.
The President
brought the meeting to a close by stating that we must go now and see what we
can do about this business. His idea was to do what was decent and right, but
still not condemn more furiously than we had to. Secretary Dulles was dead
right in his view that if we did not do something to indicate some vigor in the
way of asserting our leadership, the Soviets would take over the leadership
from us. He had told Anthony Eden a week ago that if the British did what they
are now doing and the Russians got into the Middle East, the fat would really
be in the fire.
The National
Security Council:13
a.
Noted and discussed an oral report by the
Secretary of State on the subject, particularly as regards appropriate U.S.
action under [Page 916]the Tripartite
Declaration of May 1950; and the U.S. position in the meeting of the United
Nations General Assembly scheduled later this date.
b.
Noted the President’s directive that the
Secretary of State draft appropriate action papers in the light of the discussion
at this meeting, for subsequent consideration by the President.
c.
Noted and discussed an oral briefing by
the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, on the military situation in the Near
East.
Note: The
action in b above, as approved by the President, subsequently transmitted to
the Secretary of State for implementation.
[Here follows
agenda item 3, “U.S. Policy Toward Developments in Poland and Hungary”, which
was deferred until a subsequent meeting.]
S. Everett
Gleason
- Source: Eisenhower
Library, Whitman File, NSC Records. Top Secret. Prepared by Gleason. The
time of the meeting is from the record of the President’s Daily
Appointments. (Ibid.)↩
- The paragraph that
follows constitutes NSC Action No. 1626, approved by the President on
November 6. (Department of State, S/S–NSC (Miscellaneous) Files: Lot 66 D
95, Records of Action by the National Security Council, 1956)↩
- For text, see .↩
- Taken at the 263d
meeting of the National Security Council on October 27, 1955.↩
- The U.S. draft
resolution was brought to a vote at the 749th meeting of the Security
Council on October 30. The result was seven in favor, two (Great Britain
and France) opposed, and two abstentions. (U.N. doc. S/PV.749)↩
- The text of the U.S.
statement to be made at the October 31 meeting of the North Atlantic
Council was transmitted to Paris in Topol 704, October 30. (Department of
State, Central Files, 684A.86/10–3056) A report on the October 31 meeting
is in Polto 960 from Paris, October 31, not printed. (Ibid.,
750.5/10–3156)↩
- No copy of the draft
statement described here has been found in Department of State files or
the Eisenhower Library. Dulles directed on October 31 that a public
statement be prepared which would reflect the decisions made at the
Department of State meeting held at 4 p.m. on October 31; see .↩
- The text of
Stevenson’s telegram to Eisenhower was printed in The New York Times,
November 1, 1956.↩
- No account of this
conversation has been found in the Eisenhower Library.↩
- At 7 p.m. in
Washington, October 31, President Eisenhower reported to the nation over
radio and television on developments in Eastern Europe and the Middle
East. For text of the President’s statement, see Department of State
Bulletin, November 12, 1956, pp. 743–745; extracts pertaining to the
Middle East are printed in United States Policy in the Middle East,
September 1956–June 1957, pp. 148–151.↩
- Reference is to the
Akka; see .↩
- Not found in
Department of State files or the Eisenhower Library.↩
- Paragraphs a–c and
the Note that follow constitute NSC Action No. 1627, approved by the
President on November 6. (Department of State, S/S–NSC (Miscellaneous)
Files: Lot 66 D 95, Records of Action by the National Security Council,
1956)↩
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