A very important, path-breaking report on
radioactive waste was released in Berlin yesterday, at an all-day press
conference* held at the headquarters of the Heinrich-Böll-Foundation,
major sponsors of the research that informs the content of the study, titled World Nuclear Waste Report
(WNWR). https://worldnuclearwastereport.org/wp-content/themes/wnwr_theme/content/World_Nuclear_Waste_Report_2019_Focus_Europe.pdf)
It is the brain-child of former German Green Party/ Alliance 90 MEP, Rebecca Harms – a forty year campaigner against nuclear power- and independent Paris-based international energy consultant,
Mycle Schneider, the team behind the now internationally respected and encyclopedically comprehensive annual World Nuclear Industry Status Report.(
https://www.worldnuclearreport.org/The-World-Nuclear-Industry-Status-Report-2019-HTML.html|),
the most recent edition of which was released (in Budapest) on 27 September.
The WNWR concludes “The final disposal of high-level
radioactive waste presents governments worldwide with major challenges that
have not yet been addressed, and entails incalculable technical, logistical,
and financial risks.”
It spells out in nearly 150-pages of
detailed analysis that over 60,000 tons of spent nuclear fuel ( one type of
highly dangerous and long-lived ) alone are stored in interim storage
facilities across Europe (excluding Russia and Slovakia as the data published by these two
countries is inadequate, according to the authors ). It adds that within the
EU, France accounts for 25% of the current spent nuclear fuel generated,
followed by Germany (15%) and the United Kingdom (14%).
In addition, more than 2.5 million m³ of low- and intermediate-level waste has been generated in Europe (excluding Slovakia and Russia). Over its lifetime, the European nuclear reactor fleet will produce an estimated 6.6 million m³ of nuclear waste. Four countries are responsible for most of this waste: France (30%), the UK (20%), the Ukraine (18%) and Germany (8%).
WNWR stresses that “many governments underestimate the costs of interim and final storage. No country has a consistent financing model to date in places. This poses further financial risk for taxpayers.”
"Worldwide, the amount of nuclear waste is growing. But even 70 years after the start of the nuclear age, no country in the world has found a real solution for the legacies of nuclear power," said Harms. Marcos Buser, a Swiss geology expert and co-author of the report, added: "Increasing amounts of high-level waste have to be interim stored for ever longer periods of time, as no country in the world has yet commissioned a deep geological repository for such waste. The problem is that interim storage facilities have not been designed for such long-term use…The shutdown and decommissioning of many nuclear power plants will again drastically increase the quantities of nuclear waste."
In addition to the safety aspects, the report identifies the enormous costs of interim storage and final disposal as another risk. "National governments and operators often significantly underestimate the costs of decommissioning, storage, and disposal of nuclear waste," said Ben Wealer, another co-author of the study and industrial engineer at the Technical University of Berlin. In many countries there is a large gap between the expected costs and the financial resources earmarked for them. The problem would be exacerbated by the fact that final disposal also involves incalculable risks, which could lead to enormous cost increases, as the German government experiences with the Asse repository illustrate.
Nearly every government claims to apply the polluter-pays-principle, which makes operators liable for the costs of managing, storing, and disposing of nuclear waste. In reality, however, governments fail to apply the polluter-pays-principle consistently. "No country in Europe has taken sufficient precautions to finance the costs of the final disposal of nuclear waste. There is a threat that the real, massive costs will ultimately be borne by the taxpayers," Wealer warned.
Ellen Ueberschär, President of the Heinrich-Böll-Stiftung, asserted: "The numerous unsolved problems in dealing with nuclear waste show that nuclear power has no future. At the same time, the report makes clear that phasing out nuclear power is not enough. Insufficient financial provisions for disposing of nuclear waste must not undermine the care and safety of decisions for interim storage and final disposal. The search for a suitable final repository needs greater public attention. The report is intended to facilitate a qualified international debate."
[This first edition of the WNWR will be translated into French and Czech. The initiators intend to publish a follow-up edition in the coming years in order to identify trends and developments.]
In addition, more than 2.5 million m³ of low- and intermediate-level waste has been generated in Europe (excluding Slovakia and Russia). Over its lifetime, the European nuclear reactor fleet will produce an estimated 6.6 million m³ of nuclear waste. Four countries are responsible for most of this waste: France (30%), the UK (20%), the Ukraine (18%) and Germany (8%).
WNWR stresses that “many governments underestimate the costs of interim and final storage. No country has a consistent financing model to date in places. This poses further financial risk for taxpayers.”
"Worldwide, the amount of nuclear waste is growing. But even 70 years after the start of the nuclear age, no country in the world has found a real solution for the legacies of nuclear power," said Harms. Marcos Buser, a Swiss geology expert and co-author of the report, added: "Increasing amounts of high-level waste have to be interim stored for ever longer periods of time, as no country in the world has yet commissioned a deep geological repository for such waste. The problem is that interim storage facilities have not been designed for such long-term use…The shutdown and decommissioning of many nuclear power plants will again drastically increase the quantities of nuclear waste."
In addition to the safety aspects, the report identifies the enormous costs of interim storage and final disposal as another risk. "National governments and operators often significantly underestimate the costs of decommissioning, storage, and disposal of nuclear waste," said Ben Wealer, another co-author of the study and industrial engineer at the Technical University of Berlin. In many countries there is a large gap between the expected costs and the financial resources earmarked for them. The problem would be exacerbated by the fact that final disposal also involves incalculable risks, which could lead to enormous cost increases, as the German government experiences with the Asse repository illustrate.
Nearly every government claims to apply the polluter-pays-principle, which makes operators liable for the costs of managing, storing, and disposing of nuclear waste. In reality, however, governments fail to apply the polluter-pays-principle consistently. "No country in Europe has taken sufficient precautions to finance the costs of the final disposal of nuclear waste. There is a threat that the real, massive costs will ultimately be borne by the taxpayers," Wealer warned.
Ellen Ueberschär, President of the Heinrich-Böll-Stiftung, asserted: "The numerous unsolved problems in dealing with nuclear waste show that nuclear power has no future. At the same time, the report makes clear that phasing out nuclear power is not enough. Insufficient financial provisions for disposing of nuclear waste must not undermine the care and safety of decisions for interim storage and final disposal. The search for a suitable final repository needs greater public attention. The report is intended to facilitate a qualified international debate."
[This first edition of the WNWR will be translated into French and Czech. The initiators intend to publish a follow-up edition in the coming years in order to identify trends and developments.]
(see
also: ”No country in the world has found solution for nuclear waste challenge –
report,” Clean Energy Wire, 11 November, 2019; www.cleanenergywire.org/news/no-country-world-has-found-solution-nuclear-waste-challenge-report).
Two authors of the report are British: the UK chapter was written by Professor Gordon
MacKerron, director
of Science and Technology Policy Research at University of Sussex, who has served as director of Sussex Energy Group,
SPRU (Science and Technology Policy Research Unit), since April 2005. He was also
the first chairperson of the UK Government’s independent panel, the Committee on
Radioactive Waste Management (CORWM); and the risk chapter was written by
independent radiation consultant, Dr Ian
Fairlie, who has worked variously at the TUC, Greenpeace Canada, the Scottish environmental regulator (Scottish Environmental Protection Agency,
SEPA) as well as having a role as a radiation expert at the HQ of the former Ministry of Agriculture,
Fisheries and Food (MAFF, now DEFRA). He
is a former scientific secretary of the independent UK Government-appointed
advisory panel, the Committee Examining
Radiation Risks of Internal Emitters (www.cerrie.org). He has studied at the both Imperial College, London and Princeton
University in the United States.
Both authors are thus eminently qualified
(and highly experienced) , to write
their chapters, which I have reproduced below.
The WNWR should become the annual
go-to report on radioactive waste for
all practioners in the field
7.7 THE UNITED KINGDOM
OVERVIEW
The UK was one of the
earliest developers of nuclear technology. This was initially for the purpose
of producing nuclear weapons starting in the 1940s, and the site at Sellafield
(formerly Windscale) in North West England was used to develop the ‘Windscale
piles’ for the production of plutonium for weapons. This was followed by the
development of dual-use reactors, which were used both for plutonium production
for weapons as well as electricity generation.391
391 Pocock,
R.F. 1977. Nuclear power. Its development in the United Kingdom. Gresham Books
The UK has been through
three distinct phases in development of power reactors. The first was the development
of the Magnox design, based on the dual-use reactors. They used natural uranium
and were graphite-moderated and cooled by carbon dioxide. All are now closed. A
second phase was also based on gas-graphite reactors, the Advanced Gas Cooled
Reactors (AGRs) now using enriched uranium.392
392 MacKerron,
G. and Sadnicki, M. 1995, UK nuclear privatisation and public sector
liabilities (No. 4). University of Sussex, Science Policy Research Unit. A
third, truncated phase involved importing pressurized water reactors (PWR) and
one was completed in 1997. Nuclear power plants contributed at peak levels 28
percent of electricity generation in the UK in 1998, but this has gradually
declined to 21 percent in 2017 as old plants have been shut down and age-related
problems affect plant availability.393
393 Department
of Energy and Climate Change 2009, 60th Anniversary Digest of UK Energy
Statistics, pp. 40. , 394
394 Department of Energy, Industry and
Industrial Strategy 2018, Digest of Energy Statistics 2018, pp. 117.
After a long gap, Hinkley Point C,
a European Pressurized Water Reactor (EPR) of similar design to the earlier
PWR, is now under construction. While five further large new nuclear stations
might be built, this is now open to question as developers have stopped work,
citing financial problems.395
395 Vaughan, A. 2019 ‘UK’s nuclear plans in
doubt after report Welsh plant may be axed,’ The Guardian, viewed 22 April
2019, https://www.theguardian.com/environment/2018/dec/10/uk-nuclear-plant-hitachi-wylfa-anglesey
The dismantling of old nuclear
structures is a slow process. “Care and maintenance” 396
396 Nuclear Decommissioning Authority (NDA)
2018, Business Plan 1 April 2018 to 31 March 2021, viewed 28 June 2019, https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/695245/
NDA_Business_Plan_2018_to_2021.pdf, pp. 9 (a UK term) is the status
where all buildings have been removed from the reactor site except for the
reactor building, pond structures and intermediate- and
low-level waste (ILW) stores. These remaining facilities are then
weather-proofed. It is expected that they will be dismantled after around 80
years. Only one Magnox station has yet reached care and maintenance status, and
the UK’s Nuclear Decommissioning Authority (NDA) predicts that the others will
do so by 2029.397
397 Nuclear
Decommissioning Authority (NDA) 2018
The UK has a wide range
of other nuclear structures. Besides facilities for producing nuclear weapons,
these include two fast breeder reactors, several prototype reactors, and many
other research facilities. The UK has never mined or milled any uranium, but it
has plants for all other stages of the nuclear fuel chain. This includes
conversion, enrichment and fabricating nuclear fuel, as well as reprocessing
spent fuel to separate out plutonium and uranium. The UK has operated two large
reprocessing plants at Sellafield. One, B205, is designed to reprocess
metallic fuel from Magnox reactors; it opened in 1962 and is due to close in
2020. The other is a Thermal Oxide Reprocessing Plant (THORP), opened in 1994
and closed in 2018.398
398 Government
of the UK 2018, End of reprocessing at THORP signals new era for Sellafield,
viewed 5 April 2019, https://www.gov.uk/government/news/end-of-reprocessing-at-thorp-signals-new-era-for-sellafield
THORP has reprocessed significant quantities of foreign fuel,
notably from Japan and 130
Germany,
but its main activity was always reprocessing of UK-owned fuel from the AGRs.
It operated well below capacity and was closed as a result of commercial and
technical problems. The UK also has an operating dry fuel store at Sizewell and
disposal sites for low-level waste (LLW) at Drigg, near Sellafield and at
Dounreay in Scotland.
The Sellafield site is
especially complex and hosts hundreds of disused buildings and stores. Much
work remains to be done before all the waste there can even be characterized,
let alone managed safely.399
399 National
Audit Office (NAO) 2018, The Nuclear Decommissioning Authority: progress with
reducing risk. HC 1126, viewed 22 April 2019, https://www.nao.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2018/06/The-Nuclear-Decommissioning-
Authority-progress-with-reducing-risk-at-Sellafield.pdf Like
most other countries, the UK plans to use Deep Geological Disposal (DGD) to
dispose of intermediate-level waste (ILW) and high-level waste (HLW) but has
made little progress to date. Scotland’s policy is different from that of the
rest of the UK, and envisages near-surface disposal of all nuclear waste within
its borders.400
400 Government
of Scotland 2011, Scotland’s higher activity radioactive waste policy, viewed
22 April 2019, https://www.gov.scot/publications/scotlands-higher-activity-radioactive-waste-policy-2011/
WASTE CLASSIFICATION SYSTEM
The UK waste
classification system is close to the IAEA system. The categories are primarily
based on activity levels with no explicit consideration of whether wastes are
short-lived. They are as follows:401
401 Department
of Business Energy and Industrial Strategy (BEIS) and NDA 2017, Radioactive
wastes in the UK: UK radioactive waste inventory report, viewed 22 April 2019, https://ukinventory.nda.gov.uk
Very low-level waste (VLLW): waste with low enough
levels of radioactivity to be predominantly disposed of at licensed landfill
sites
Low-level waste (LLW): waste with low levels of
radioactivity which still needs to be managed in engineered shallow
repositories
Intermediate-level waste (ILW): contains activity
above the upper limit for LLW but is not heat-generating
High-level waste (HLW): produced from reprocessing
spent fuel, heat-generating as well as highly radioactive.
Definitions of what is
and is not waste vary by country and over time. Like France, UK policy does not
define separated plutonium, spent fuel, and depleted or reprocessed uranium as
waste, and so these are not included in the official waste inventory. This
decision is officially rationalized on the grounds that all these materials
might be used in fabricating nuclear fuel in the future. However, such uses are
far from certain, and even if all are used in fuel fabrication, they would lead
to further waste streams and these do not appear in the official UK waste
inventory. 131
QUANTITIES OF WASTE
The UK government
publishes a waste inventory every three years. The data below comes from the
most recent inventory, which records waste volumes and activity as of April
1st, 2016 as well as expected future volumes. Among the features of the
inventory are:
There are many different waste streams identified
(1,337 in total). These streams are divided into 24 waste groups.
A high proportion of all nuclear waste is in ‘raw’
(in UK terms ‘reported’) form. This is waste that is not yet conditioned or
packaged. Of the 24 waste ‘groups’ only one is described as ‘conditioned
waste’. While the proportion of waste in this raw form has not been disclosed
it seems probable that it is well over half of total volumes.
Liquid and gaseous discharges are not included in
the inventory, which therefore consists of different forms of solids.
Most of the waste by activity levels (58 percent) is
concentrated at Sellafield (only 0.03 percent was at military sites).
Foreign-owned wastes are not included in the UK
inventory. Some substitution agreements between the UK government and the
governments of owners of foreign-owned wastes held in the UK have specified
that the countries with ownership will receive back the same amount of
radioactivity as that contained in the original spent fuel. However, these
returned wastes will be in the form of HLW, much smaller in volume than the
various waste streams produced by the reprocessing of that fuel.
Because the UK will not
have an operational DGD facility for decades to come, successive UK inventories
show that the volumes and activity of higher activity wastes continue to
accumulate and require ever-growing interim storage facilities.
The Table
19 shows the volumes and mass of nuclear waste in storage as at 1 April
2016. The HLW arises entirely as a by-product of reprocessing and is currently
stored at Sellafield. This waste is initially in the form of highly active
nitric acid (Highly Active Liquor or HAL), which undergoes an evaporation
process before it is vitrified into glass blocks inside stainless steel
canisters.
ILW is much more
diverse and also lacks a current disposal route, and so must be stored. About
74 percent by volume of ILW is at Sellafield. Nearly all the rest is at power
stations. When packaging occurs, it can be in cement (inside steel or concrete
containers) or immobilized in polymer inside mild steel containers. LLW and
VLLW are routinely disposed of and so the volumes currently awaiting disposal
are small.132
TABLE
19: Nuclear waste in the
United Kingdom as of December 31, 2016
|
Type of waste
|
Type of storage
|
Storage site
|
Quantity
|
||||||
|
SNF (HLW)
|
Interim storage (wet)
|
Storage pools at nuclear power
plants
|
3,549 tHM
|
||||||
|
Interim storage (wet)
|
Sellafield
|
4,151 tHM
|
|||||||
|
HLW
|
Interim storage
|
Sellafield
|
1,960 m³
|
||||||
|
ILW
|
Interim storage
|
Sellafield, Aldermaston, Dounreay,
Harwell, NPPs
|
99,000 m³
|
||||||
|
LLW
|
Interim storage
|
Sellafield, Capenhurst, Dounreay
|
30,100 m³
|
||||||
|
Disposed waste
|
Closed (in 2005) near-surface
repository at Dounreay
|
33,600 m³
|
|||||||
|
Disposed waste
|
New near-surface repository at
Dounreay
|
3,130 m³
|
|||||||
|
Disposed waste
|
Near-surface repository LLW
repository at Drigg
|
905,000 m³
|
|||||||
|
VLLW
|
Interim storage
|
935 m³
|
|||||||
|
Dump sites
|
n.a.
|
||||||||
The significance of ILW and especially HLW derive from their
high levels of radioactivity relative to LLW and VLLW. HLW contains by far the
bulk of activity levels in the UK inventory, much of which will reduce over the
next century as a result of radioactive decay though there will remain very
long-lived radionuclides which must be isolated for thousands of years.
QUANTITIES OF OTHER RADIOACTIVE MATERIALS NOT
CLASSIFIED AS WASTE
At this point, the UK does not classify uranium, separated
plutonium and spent fuel as waste because plutonium and uranium might be used
as ingredients of future nuclear fuel. However, it is in practice very unlikely
that there will be such use and these materials will probably be managed as
wastes at some future point. SNF is included in Table 19. The UK
holding of stocks of separated plutonium will amount to 140 tons at the end of
reprocessing in 2020, of which 23 tons will be foreign-owned. This is the
world’s largest stockpile of civil separated plutonium.402
402 NDA 2019, Progress on plutonium conditioning, storage and
disposal, viewed 22 April 2019, https://assets.publishing.
service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/791046/Progress_on_Plutonium.pdf
The UK also held, as at April 2016 113,000tHM of natural,
depleted and reprocessed uranium, nearly all of it at Sellafield. Most of this
very large stock consisted of depleted uranium following uranium enrichment.403
403 Department for Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy, and
NDA, 2017, Radioactive Wastes in the UK: Radioactive Wastes and Materials not
Reported in the 2016 Waste Inventory, March, pp. 16.
Overall, plutonium, spent fuel and uranium will, once finally
classified as waste, add very significantly both to the activity (spent fuel
and plutonium) and volume (uranium) of UK nuclear wastes, a high probability
that current policy ignores. The UK inventory also anticipates that there will
be very large future waste arisings between 2016 and 2125. Given a set of
future scenarios that assumes no further new build 133
of nuclear power the
expectation of future waste volumes is as follows:404
404 Department
for Business Energy and Industrial Strategy 2017, Radioactive Wastes in the UK:
UK Radioactive Waste Inventory Report, pp. 23.
HLW 366 m³
ILW 299,000 m³
LLW 1,570,000 m³
VLLW 2,720,00 m³
The future volume of HLW is relatively small because
reprocessing has limited future lifetime. However, ILW volumes are expected to
rise roughly threefold and LLW by about 1.5 times. Most of this future waste
will derive from decommissioning of power plants, and facilities at Sellafield
(where the latter are expected to account for 62 percent of all future ILW, 84
percent of future LLW and 95 percent of future VLLW).
WASTE MANAGEMENT POLICIES AND FACILITIES
The UK produced military wastes from the 1940s and civilian
wastes from the 1950s. LLW was always disposed via shallow burial. Serious
policy for other potential wastes was for many years solely a commitment to
reprocessing all spent fuel. Reprocessing was based on the conviction that the
plutonium would initially be needed for weapons and then later that it would be
needed to fuel fast breeder reactors. This latter rationale evaporated and in
1994 fast reactor development was abandoned, though reprocessing continued.405
405 International Panel on Fissile Materials 2015, Plutonium
separation in nuclear power programs: Status, problems, and prospects of
civilian reprocessing around the world. All ILW was subject to interim storage.
Policy for higher activity wastes (ILW and HLW) was neglected
until the 1970s when the Royal Commission on Environmental Pollution
recommended that new nuclear power should not be developed until credible waste
management routes were demonstrated.406
406 Royal Commission on Environmental Pollution 1976, Nuclear
power and the environment: 6th report of the Royal Commission on Environmental
Pollution, Cm 6618 This led to explicit plans for deep geological disposal of
ILW and, implicitly if later in time, HLW. Attempts to achieve this all failed
due to local resistance at proposed sites.
An independent Committee on Radioactive Waste Management
(CoRWM) reported in 2006 in favor of Deep Geological Disposal (DGD) for all
higher activity waste.407
407 Committee on Radioactive Waste Management 2006, Managing our
radioactive waste safely: CoRWM’s recommendations to Government Doc 700 It
also suggested robust interim storage and a new voluntary process in which local
communities would be invited to negotiate terms under which they would accept
development of DGD. The government chose to endorse this general approach in
2008 and pursued one serious (but failed) attempt to get buy-in from
communities around Sellafield to agree to host a DGD.408
408 Defra, BERR and the devolved administrations of Wales and
Northern Ireland 2008, Managing our radioactive waste safely: a framework for
implementing geological disposal, viewed 24 April 2019, https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/
managing-radioactive-waste-safely-a-framework-for-implementing-geological-disposal
The government is engaged, as of early 2019, in a renewed process
designed to find a willing host community for DGD.409
409 World Nuclear News 2018, “UK relaunches repository site
selection process,” 20 December, viewed 22 April 2019, http://www.world-nuclear-news.org/Articles/UK-relaunches-repository-site-selection-process134
The UK’s Department of
Business Energy and Industrial Strategy (BEIS) is in charge of nuclear waste
policy. Closure of the Magnox stations and the poor and deteriorating state of
Sellafield made it clear by the early 2000s that a more coherent policy and
higher expenditures were needed to manage waste in the short- and medium-term.
The 2004 Energy Act provided the foundation for setting up the Nuclear
Decommissioning Authority (NDA) in 2005.410
410 Government
of the UK 2004, Energy Act, viewed 28 June 2019, http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2004/20/contents
Its purpose is to deliver the decommissioning and clean-up of all
publicly-owned nuclear sites and also to undertake the long-term management of
nuclear waste. It is the first time that an institution has been developed in
the UK with the primary purpose of nuclear waste management.
The NDA recognized that Sellafield was the most problematic
site, containing a huge range of ex-military and ex-civilian buildings and
wastes. Sellafield contains four so-called Legacy Ponds and Silos, all
representing major hazards, as well as being home to virtually all UK spent
fuel, much of which has been reprocessed there. This means that cleaning up
Sellafield is the highest priority for the NDA.411
411 National Audit Office (NAO) 2018, part 2.
The NDA attempted to innovate in managing the nuclear sites,
which it now owns. In particular, it has held competitions to appoint ‘Parent
Body Organisations’ (PBOs) to oversee the work of the site license companies at
each site for specified periods. These competitive processes were designed to
encourage cost reductions and bring in wider international expertise. However,
the model has not worked well and the NDA is taking direct management
responsibility for the two largest segments of the UK decommissioning and
waste management task: Sellafield and the Magnox sites.412
412 James, S. 2018, ’Magnox becomes NDA subsidiary,’ Nuclear
Matters, 4 July, viewed 22 April 2019, www.nuclearmatters.co.uk/2018/07/magnox-becomes-nda-subsidiary
Apart from final disposal sites for LLW near Sellafield and
Dounreay the UK has no other long-term sites. Interim storage, as indicated in Table
19, is practiced for all other wastes at many sites, though Sellafield
holds the majority of all wastes by volume and activity.
COSTS AND FINANCING
The total costs of managing all of the UK’s nuclear waste is
very high. The NDA provides estimates for the future costs of public sector
‘legacy’ waste. This legacy covers waste which has either arisen in the past or
is unavoidable in the future (mainly because of the need to decommission many
nuclear structures). As of 2006, the NDA estimated the undiscounted future
costs of its task to amount to £53 billion (around US$98 billion in 2006). By
2018 this had escalated to an estimate of £121 billion (US$162 billion) of
which costs at Sellafield, where escalation has been concentrated, were an
expected £91 billion (US$121 billion). The NDA now puts an uncertainty range on
its central estimate of £99–225 billion (US$129-292 billion).413
413 NDA 2018, Annual Report and Accounts 2017, viewed 22 April
2019, https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/
nuclear-decommissioning-authority-annual-report-and-accounts-2017-to-2018Expenditures
are expected until around 2125. 135
The UK has a poor historic
record in financing waste. Only for very brief periods has it set up small segregated
funds for public sector wastes and these were all abandoned. Currently, there
are three different systems of finance:
For public sector wastes, the main system is an annual
government grant-in-aid, in the absence of any fund to pay for public
sector-owned wastes. This grant finances the NDA and is supplemented by income
that the NDA receives from services it provides, such as managing spent fuel
via reprocessing, and long-term spent fuel storage. In 2017-18 this commercial
income totaled £1.2 billion (US$1.5 billion) most of which was for spent fuel
services. The UK government grant amounted to £2.1 billion (US$2.7 billion)
making the total spent in 2017/18 around £3.3 billion (US$4.3 billion). Sixty
percent of this was spent at Sellafield. Total annual NDA expenditure has been
around £3 billion (US$3.9 billion) for several years. In future, commercial
income from spent fuel services will fall steeply, because of the closure of
all reprocessing by 2020.
The second finance system is the Nuclear Liabilities Fund
(NLF), an independent trust, which has a genuine fund currently amounting to
£9.26 billion (around US$12 billion).414
414 Nuclear Liabilities Fund
2018, Protecting the future: Annual Report and Accounts 2018, viewed 22 April
2019, http://www.nlf.uk.net/media/1076/nlf_annual_report_2018.pdf It is
used for the decommissioning and waste liabilities in private ownership i.e.
the AGR reactors (excluding ongoing payments to the NDA for spent AGR fuel).
These reactors are all owned by EDF Energy. The fund is expected to cover the
discounted value of EDF Energy liabilities. Qualifying expenditure has to be
approved by the fund. Because the reactors are still operating, expenditure
from the fund has so far been limited, primarily for a dry spent fuel store at
Sizewell.
The third system is a planned Funded Decommissioning Plan,
which will apply to new reactors. Reactor owners are to develop a plan which is
subject to government approval. It covers all future liabilities and is
designed to ensure that owners of reactors bear the full costs of
decommissioning and waste management.415
415 Government of the UK 2011,
Energy Act 2008 “Funded decommissioning programme guidance for new nuclear
power stations“, December, Part 2bThese arrangements will include a system
in which a waste transfer price will be set in future, at which point, after
reactor shutdowns, owners will pay the British government to take ownership of
the wastes. The intention is to ensure that this price will be high enough to
more than cover all subsequent waste management costs.
SUMMARY
The UK has a legacy of over 1,300 waste streams, and a policy
history of largely neglecting the active management of decommissioning and
waste until the setting up of the Nuclear Decommissioning Authority in 2005.
Future wastes to 2125 are expected to be significantly larger in volume than
the inventory as at 2016 and more future wastes will derive from
decommissioning.
The required expenditure to manage this
waste is extremely high and the task very challenging. The great bulk of future
expenditure on waste management will come from annual public expenditure and is
expected to exceed £120 billion (US$156 billion). Spent fuel, separated
plutonium and uranium are not considered as waste in the UK and this means that
actual waste volumes are higher than official estimates. In keeping with other
countries, policy for higher activity waste is to use deep geological disposal.
However progress has been slow, and no repository is likely to be available
before 2040 at the earliest.
RISKS FOR THE ENVIRONMENT AND HUMAN HEALTH46
chapter from
World Nuclear Waste Report (WNWR) - Focus Europe, 11-11-19
Radioactive waste poses risks to the
environment and human health. “Risk” is defined here as a function of both
hazard and exposure: the most likely consequence of a hazard, combined with the
probability of exposure to it. This chapter will focus on higher activity
nuclear wastes (see chapter on classifications) and highlight potential
unresolved dangers and problems. Although nuclear waste poses both radiological
and chemical risks, it will concentrate on the former, as these are generally
more serious.
Although risks arise from every step in
the lengthy nuclear fuel chain, this chapter will focus on the hazards and
risks of nuclear waste arising from the following:
- uranium mining,
milling, enrichment, and fuel fabrication
- operation of nuclear power plants
- spent nuclear fuel
- reprocessing of spent nuclear fuel, and
- reactor decommissioning.
4.1
RADIATION RISKS OF NUCLEAR WASTE
Nuclear waste can give off several types of radiation: alpha particles,
beta particles, and gamma rays. While alpha particles are most easily stopped,
even by thin barriers such as paper, their effects are particularly damaging.
They are very detrimental when inhaled or ingested and have a radiation weighting
factor 20 times greater than gamma rays per unit of exposure. Beta particles
are more penetrating than alpha particles, but can still be attenuated by
denser materials such as plastic and aluminum. Gamma rays are highly
penetrating; dense materials such as lead and thick concrete are required to
attenuate them.
Radiation from radioactive waste is carcinogenic, mutagenic, and
teratogenic (a teratogenic substance is one that can damage a fetus or embryo).
Radiogenic65
65 Radiogenic means produced by or determined
from radioactivity. cancer risks depend on the type of
cancer, the tissues exposed, the dose, dose rate, and type of radiation. The
final risk to individuals will also depend on their gender, age, and the time
that has passed since exposure. Radiation is also increasingly implicated in a
wide range of other diseases including cardiovascular diseases, strokes, eye
cataracts, and mental effects.
According to the International Commission on Radiological Protection
(ICRP), an external whole-body radiation dose of one sievert (Sv) results in an
approximately ten percent risk of fatal cancer in adults. However, the ICRP
later reduced its estimate by half to five percent through its use of a dose
and dose-rate effectiveness factor (DDREF) of two for solid cancers.66
66 International Commission on Radiological
Protection 2007, “The 2007 Recommendations of the International Commission on
Radiological Protection”, ICRP publication 103.37 DDREFs were formerly used to reduce risks
derived from the Japanese bomb survivors’ exposures to low dose and low
dose-rate radiation. Older cell and animal studies had indicated these
exposures were less harmful than those to higher doses at higher dose rates.
More recent human studies have now shown the use of DDREFs is incorrect.67,68 Since
2013, most international agencies have ceased using DDREFs, so the real risk of
fatal cancer has increased to at least 10 percent per Sv. Unfortunately, the
ICRP has not stopped using DDREFs.69 Thus, governments and the ICRP have not
recognized the perceived increased risks of radiation, nor tightened radiation
limits. There is still no international consensus on the risks of radiation.
What is clear, however, is that the ICRP’s recommendations are conservative.
Radioactive waste can contain a wide range
of radionuclides, whose atoms are unstable. When their nuclei disintegrate,
they give off various forms of radiation. Many of these atoms have a high
radiotoxicity, which is the degree to which a radionuclide can damage an organism.
Their half-lives, the amount of time it takes for half the original amount
present to decay, are often extremely long, they can be thousands or even
millions of years.
In order to estimate the risk of a
radionuclide to an organism, the following factors are important:
- radioactive
decay modes: the emission of alpha particles, beta particles and gamma
rays
- chemical compounds which contain the
radioisotope
- solubility in water
- transport modes through the environment
- relative biological effectiveness: the ratio
of damage from one type of radiation relative to another, given the same
amount of absorbed energy
- radiotoxicity: usually based on specific
activity, stated as radioactivity in bequerel (Bq) per gram
- dose conversion factor, which converts becquerel
to sieverts.
- In most instances, exposures will be internal rather than external,
so doses and risks will also depend on their uptake rates, metabolisms and
excretion rates in humans.
No proper hazard classification scheme has yet taken the above factors
into account for radionuclides. Such schemes already exist for chemicals and
biocides, and calls have been made for such a scheme to be established for
radioactive waste.70
70 Kirchner, G. 1990, A New
Hazard Index for the Determination of Risk Potentials of Radioactive Waste
Journal of Environmental Radioactivity, 11, pp. 71-95.
4.2 RISKS
FROM URANIUM MINING, MINE TAILINGS,
ENRICHMENT,
AND FUEL FABRICATION
Uranium mining, mine tailings, enrichment, and fuel fabrication are
collectively termed the ‘front end’ of the nuclear fuel chain. Health risks
arise at each of these stages. Uranium is a radioactive substance naturally
existing in the earth’s crust. Its deposits are more concentrated in areas of
the world where 47
the ore is mined and processed. The
resulting mining waste and slurries are the first nuclear waste in the nuclear
fuel chain. It is widely recognized that exposures to uranium and its decay
products are responsible for a major fraction of the total health and
environmental impact from the nuclear fuel chain.71
71 IAEA 2004, “Environmental Contamination from Uranium Production
Facilities and Their Remediation.” Proceedings Of An International Workshop On
Environmental Contamination From Uranium Production Facilities And Their Remediation
Organized By The International Atomic Energy Agency And Held In Lisbon, 11–13
February 2004. The industry states that global
uranium mining has decreased by four percent from 2013-16, but the decline in
global uranium mining has accelerated since.72
72 NEA and IAEA 2016, Uranium 2016: Resources, Production and Demand. NEA
Report No. 7301.A, viewed 24 May 2019, https://www.oecd-nea.org/ndd/pubs/2016/7301-uranium-2016.pdf
Practically no uranium mining occurs in the European Union at present,
but clean-up and remediation continue at former mines in France, Germany,
Portugal, the Czech Republic, and Romania. During mine rehabilitation efforts
in the Czech Republic, Germany and Hungary, small quantities of uranium are recovered;
it is unclear whether there is still a small quantity being mined (a few dozen
tons per year) in Romania at present.
HEALTH RISKS FROM EXPOSURES TO URANIUM
The health risks associated with exposures to uranium (including
depleted uranium73
73 Depleted uranium (DU) is a by-product of
uranium enrichment. It is controversial: in some countries it is used for
radiation shielding and ammunition by military forces, while in others it is
banned. Information about DU and its risks from a 2008 UN Institute for
Disarmament Research report is available here: http://www.unidir.org/files/publications/pdfs/uranium-weapons-en-328.pdf
) include kidney disease, respiratory
disorders, DNA damage, endocrine disruption, cancers, and neurological defects.74
74 Keith, S., Faroon, O., Roney, N., Scinicariello,
F., Wilbur, S., Ingerman, L., Llados, F., Plewak, D., Wohlers, D. and Diamond,
G. 2013, “Toxicological profile for uranium,” public statement by the US Agency
for Toxic Substances and Disease Registry. , 75
75 Wilson, J. and Thorne, M.
2015, “An assessment and comparison of the chemotoxic and radiotoxic properties
of uranium compounds,” ASSIST report to RWM Populations exposed to environmental uranium should be
monitored for increased risk of fertility problems and reproductive cancers.76
76 Raymond-Whish, S., Mayer,
L.P., O’Neal, T., Martinez, A., Sellers, M.A., Christian, P.J., Marion, S.L.,
Begay, C., Propper, C.R., Hoyer, P.B. and Dyer, C.A., 2007. Drinking water with
uranium below the US EPA water standard causes estrogen receptor–dependent responses
in female mice, Environmental health perspectives, 115(12), pp. 1711-1716.
Animal and cell studies have indicated that uranium’s
health detriments are due to its affinity for DNA77
77 Miller, A.C., Stewart,
M., Brooks, K., Shi, L. and Page, N. 2002, Depleted uranium-catalyzed oxidative
DNA damage: absence of significant alpha particle decay, Journal of inorganic
biochemistry, 91(1), pp. 246-252. and
to the potential combination of its chemical and radioactive properties, as
uranium as a heavy metal has both chemical and radiological effects. It is
theorized that these might play tumor-initiating and tumor-promoting roles
respectively.78
78 Miller, A.C., Brooks, K.,
Smith, J. and Page, N. 2004, Effect of the militarily-relevant heavy metals,
depleted uranium and heavy metal tungsten-alloy on gene expression in human
liver carcinoma cells (HepG2), Molecular and cellular biochemistry, 255(1-2),
pp. 247-256. The report focuses on U-238, which makes
up 99.27 percent of natural uranium.
The rest is comprised of U-235 (0.72 percent) and U-234, a decay product
of U-238 (0.0055 percent). Uranium in ore is invariably accompanied by U-238’s
decay progeny.79
79 Includes thorium-234, protactinium-234m,
protactinium-234, thorium-230, radium-226, radon-222, polonium-218,
actinium-218, radon-218, lead-214, bismuth-214, polonium-214, thallium-210,
lead-210, bismuth-210, polonium-210, thallium-206, and finally lead-206, which
is stable.Each of the above nuclides individually
is estimated to be more dangerous than the parent U-238. Together, these decay
products in uranium ore contain about 14 times more radioactivity than the parent
U-238. 48
The most problematic decay product is
radium-226 for three reasons: its salts are mainly soluble; it has a long
half-life (1,760 years); and it emits gamma rays. Another dangerous nuclide is
radon-222 (half-life 3.8 days). Because it is an odourless, colourless gas, it
and its progeny, although invisible, are readily distributed in the
environment. Exposures to radon gas are considered to be the second leading
cause of lung cancer worldwide after smoking tobacco.80
80 Darby, S., Hill, D., Auvinen, A., Barros-Dios, J.M., Baysson, H.,
Bochicchio, F., Deo, H., Falk, R., Forastiere, F., Hakama, M. and Heid, I.
2005, Radon in homes and risk of lung cancer: collaborative analysis of
individual data from 13 European case-control studies, Bmj, 330(7485), pp. 223.
The US Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) has
estimated that indoor radon exposure causes or contributes to about 21,000 lung-cancer
deaths in the United States annually.81
81 Pawel, D.J. and Puskin, J.S. 2004, The US Environmental Protection
Agency’s assessment of risks from indoor radon, Health physics, 87(1), pp.
68-74.
Partly for these reasons, the ICRP estimated that a lifetime excess
absolute risk of 5 × 10-⁴ per Working Level Month (WLM)82
82 One working level (WL) refers to the
concentration of short-lived decay products of radon in equilibrium of 3,700
Bq/m³ (100 pCi/L) in air. A working level month (WLM) is the exposure to one
working level for 170 hours per month. It is conventionally assumed that 1 WLM
= ~10 mSv. should be used as the risk coefficient for
radon-induced lung cancer, doubling its previous estimate.83
83 Tirmarche, M., Harrison, J.D., Laurier,
D., Paquet, F., Blanchardon, E. and Marsh, J. 2010, Lung cancer risk from radon
and progeny and statement on radon, Annals of the ICRP, 40(1), pp.1-64. These cancer risks are expressed using either the Excess Relative Risk
(ERR) model or the Excess Absolute Risk (EAR) model. ERR is the proportional
increase in risk over the background rate (i.e. where people are not exposed).
EAR is the additional risk above the background rate. However, several ICRP
authors later added that the risk would have actually increased to 7 × 10-4 per
WLM if lung cancer rates among Euro-American males had been used instead of
inappropriate ICRP reference rates (namely males and females and Euro-American
and Asian populations).84
84 Tirmarche, M., Harrison, J., Laurier, D.,
Blanchardon, E., Paquet, F. and Marsh, J. 2012, Risk of lung cancer from radon
exposure: contribution of recently published studies of uranium miners, Annals
of the ICRP, 41(3-4), pp.368-377. In other words,
the estimated risk rates for most uranium mine workers have approximately
tripled rather than doubled since 1993. This increased awareness of uranium
mining’s risks has not been reflected in tighter safety standards for uranium
workers.
URANIUM MINING
Although many uranium mines are now closed, the past history of uranium
mining throughout the world remains bleak, with many accidents and reports of
ill health among uranium miners. Older epidemiology studies indicated
significant excesses of lung cancer among uranium mining workers.85
85 Grosche, B., Kreuzer, M., Kreisheimer, M.,
Schnelzer, M. and Tschense, A. 2006, Lung cancer risk among German male uranium
miners: a cohort study, 1946–1998, British journal of cancer, 95(9), pp. 1280.
Perhaps the best-documented example in Europe is the Wismut mine complex
in former East Germany. The Soviet-run uranium mine complex was in operation
until 1996. 59,000 of these miners employed between 1946 and 1989 were
examined. Researchers found a significant increase in lung cancer risk with
increasing radon exposure (ERR/WLM = 0.0019).86
86 Kreuzer, M., Grosche, B., Schnelzer, M.,
Tschense, A., Dufey, F. and Walsh, L. 2010, Radon and risk of death from cancer
and cardiovascular diseases in the German uranium miners cohort study:
follow-up 1946–2003, Radiation and environmental biophysics, 49(2), pp.177-185.
An update of this study found that the lung-cancer
risk actually increased threefold (to ERR/WLM = 0.006) with the extended
observation period to 2013.87
87 Kreuzer, M., Sobotzki, C., Schnelzer, M.
and Fenske, N. 2017, Factors modifying the radon-related lung cancer risk at
low exposures and exposure rates among German uranium miners, Radiation
research, 189(2), pp.165-176.Also, the authors found
3,942 miners from the cohort had died from lung cancer during their increased
observation period from 1946 to 2013. Unfortunately, the new study omits the
number of deaths from extra-pulmonary cancers, heart diseases and
cerebro-vascular diseases which had been observed in the earlier cohort study. 49
URANIUM MINE TAILINGS
After mining, milling and the removal of uranium from its ore, the
residues are pumped to tailing piles or pools. Since the average uranium
content in ore is typically about 0.1 percent to 0.15 percent, almost all of
the ore winds up in the tailings. The result is very large amounts of tailings
at uranium mines. For example, by 2016, Canadian mining companies had
accumulated about 200 million tons of uranium mine tailings at closed mines and
another 17 million tons at operating mines (excluding waste rock and contaminated
water).88
88 Government of Canada 2016, Inventory of
Radioactive Waste in Canada 2016, viewed 24 May 2019, https://www.nrcan.gc.ca/sites/www.nrcan.gc.ca/files/energy/pdf/uranium-nuclear/17-0467%20Canada%
20Radioactive%20Waste%20Report_access_e.pdf
Because of the large volumes of sulphuric acid used, high levels of
heavy metals such as copper, zinc, nickel, and lead are mobilized, which are
toxic to wildlife. Severe contamination of ground water constitutes a
permanent risk. Health Canada, a department of the Canadian government, has
warned that “the food chain can be contaminated unless appropriate mitigation
is instituted. Fish, wildlife, vegetation, country foods, and drinking water
are all at risk should spills or leakages occur. The need to manage the water
from waste management areas is important, particularly if there are drinking
water sources in the vicinity.” 89
89 Government of Canada 2008, Canadian
Handbook on Health Impact Assessment — Volume 4: Health Impacts B y Industry
Sector, viewed 24 May 2019, http://publications.gc.ca/collections/Collection/H46-2-04-363E.pdf
Undisturbed ore contains all the radioactive daughter isotopes of
uranium listed above in this section in secular equilibrium; its Becquerel
amount thus remains constant. Uranium mill tailings contain all the products of
the U-238 decay chain. The total radioactivity of these nuclides is
approximately 80 percent of the radioactivity in the original ore, although the
exact percentage depends on how long the ore has been exposed to air. Tailings
can also contain significant quantities of hazardous chemicals such as copper,
zinc, nickel, lead, arsenic, molybdenum, and selenium, depending upon the ore
source and the reagents in the milling process.
Uranium tailings remain problematic because their radionuclides have
multiple routes to living beings. Radon gas and the radioactive decay products
of radon can be inhaled. Radioactive and toxic chemicals can be ingested with
food and water, and external gamma radiation is emitted by the tailings.
Contrary to popular belief, inhalation is the most important route as its
collective doses are considerably larger than those from other exposure paths.
The existence of tailings piles and pools remains problematic because
one of the decay products (thorium-230, which has a half-life 80,000 years)
continues to generate the many nuclides in its decay chain for millennia. These
accumulate under waste containers or they may penetrate or permeate them
depend-ing on the soil depths and the permeability of the types of containers
currently in use. Such permeation means that radioactive lead-210 or
polonium-210 can reach surface soils on top of tailings in high concentrations
via plant uptakes (these materials have half-lives of 22.3 years and 138 days
respectively).90
90 Pérez-Sánchez, D. and Thorne, M.C. 2014,
An investigation into the upward transport of uranium-series radionuclides in
soils and uptake by plants, Journal of Radiological Protection, 34(3), pp. 545.
Few studies have quantified the risks from uranium mill tailings. In a
1983 report, the US Environmental Protection Agency estimated the lifetime
excess lung cancer risk of residents living near a bare tailings pile of 80
hectares (0.8 km²) at
two cases per hundred residents.91
91 US Environmental Protection Agency (EPA)
1983, “40 CFR Part 192 Environmental Standards for Uranium and Thorium Mill
Tailings at Licensed Commercial Processing Sites,” in: Federal Register Vol.48,
No.196, Washington D.C. October 7 1983, pp. 45940. https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/FR-1983-10-07/content-detail.htmlRadon gas from mill tailings can 50
spread with wind and rain, so that
there is also a danger that people further away will also be exposed. While the
risks to these individuals are expected to be small, they cannot be neglected
as radiation risks extend down to zero dose. As potentially large numbers of
people may be exposed, their collective doses and risks must be estimated.92
92 Fairlie, I. and Sumner, D. 2000, In Defence of Collective Dose, Journal
of Radiological Protection, 20(1), pp. 9.
The health risks associated with uranium conversion and enrichment are
mostly due to the inhalation and/or ingestion of uranium in its different
chemical forms. In the U-235 enrichment process, uranium concentrate from
milling (U3O8), which is also called yellowcake, is converted into uranium
hexafluoride (UF6), a highly volatile gas that is extremely chemically
reactive and radiologically toxic. In addition, UF6 gas immediately reacts with
water vapor in air to form hydrofluoric acid (HF), which is even more reactive
and highly toxic, causing pulmonary irritation, oedema, and corrosion of the
lining of lungs at low concentrations. It also causes seizures and death in
people exposed to high concentrations.93
93 US National Library of Medicine (NLM),
undated, Uranium Hexafluoride. CASRN: 7783-81-5, viewed 29 May 2019, https://toxnet.nlm.nih.gov/cgi-bin/sis/search/a?dbs+hsdb:@term+@DOCNO+4501
4.3 RISKS
FROM OPERATION
RISKS FROM GASES, LIQUIDS AND SOLID WASTE
During normal operation, nuclear power plants routinely produce a
significant amount of solid waste as well as liquid and gaseous discharges.
Risks from routinely storing solid waste arise from limited storage
space and insufficient safety on-site; they drastically increase if the nuclear
waste is involved in malfunctions of, or accidents within, nuclear facilities.
Given the planned lifetime extensions of nuclear power plants in many countries
around the world,94
94 Schneider et al. 2018 the accumulation of hazardous operational waste in older nuclear power
plants could induce additional exposure to radiation.
Given the planned lifetime extensions of nuclear power plants in many
countries, the accumulation of hazardous operational waste in older nuclear power
plants could induce additional exposure to radiation.
In addition to solid waste, nuclear power plants also emit radioactive
gases and liquids to the surroundings. The main radioactive releases are
tritium (hydrogen-3, half-life of 12.3 years), carbon-14 (5,730 years),
krypton-85 (10.8 years), argon-41 (1.8 hours), and a number of iodine isotopes
including iodine-129 (16 million years). The majority of annual air emissions
(about 70 to 80 percent) are released during annual refueling. These increase the
estimated doses to residents nearby by a factor of at least 20 compared to
releases averaged over a year.95
95 UK Health Protection Agency 2011,
“Short-Term Releases to the Atmosphere” National Dose Assessment Working Group,
viewed 29 May 2019, https://srp-uk.org/resources/national-dose-assessmentThe main risk drivers are the emissions of tritium and carbon-14.
Although the emissions of radioactive noble gases are slightly greater than
those of tritium, these inert gases are not thought to contribute significantly
to overall doses from reactor emissions.
Gaseous emissions result in greater individual and collective doses than
liquid discharges do. They may contribute to a higher risk to develop leukemia
near nuclear power plants. The first recorded leukemia 51
cluster near nuclear facilities in
Europe was in 1984 in the UK near the Sellafield nuclear facility. In subsequent
years, increased incidences of childhood leukemia occurred near other nuclear
facilities in the UK,96
96 Forman, D., Cook-Mozaffari, P., Darby, S., Davey, G., Stratton, I.,
Doll, R., and Pike, M. 1987, Cancer near nuclear installations, Nature,
329(6139), pp. 499-505. ,97
97 Gardner, M.J. 1991, Father’s occupational exposure to radiation and the
raised level of childhood leukemia near the Sellafield nuclear plant,
Environmental health perspectives, 94, pp.5-7. in
France,98
98 Pobel, D. and Viel, J.F. 1997, Case-control study of leukemia among
young people near La Hague nuclear reprocessing plant: the environmental
hypothesis revisited, Bmj, 314(7074), pp. 101. and
in Germany.99
99 Baker, P.J. and Hoel, D.G. 2007, Meta‐analysis
of standardized incidence and mortality rates of childhood leukaemia in
proximity to nuclear facilities, European Journal of cancer care, 16(4), pp.
355-363.
In 2008, the German government published a major epidemiology study
called Childhood Cancer in the Vicinity of Nuclear Power Plants. This report
found a 120 percent increase in leukemia and a 60 percent increase in all
cancers among infants and children under five years old living within five
kilometers of all German reactors.100
100 Kaatsch, P., Spix, C., Schulze‐Rath, R., Schmiedel, S. and Blettner, M. 2008, Leukemia in young
children living in the vicinity of German nuclear power plants. International
Journal of Cancer, 122(4), pp. 721-726 , 101
101 Spix, C., Schmiedel, S.,
Kaatsch, P., Schulze-Rath, R. and Blettner, M. 2008, Case–control study on
childhood cancer in the vicinity of nuclear power plants in Germany 1980–2003,
European Journal of Cancer, 44(2), pp. 275-284. The increase of risk with proximity to the reactor
site was statistically significant for all cancers.
The study reignited the international debate on childhood leukemia near nuclear
power plants. Researchers undertook similar studies in the UK,102
102 UK Committee on Medical Aspects of
Radiation in the Environment 2011, “Further Consideration of the Incidence of
Childhood Leukemia Around Nuclear Power Plants in Great Britain, 14th Report,”
COMARE France,103
103 Sermage‐Faure,
C., Laurier, D., Goujon‐Bellec, S.,
Chartier, M., Guyot‐Goubin, A., Rudant, J., Hémon, D. and Clavel, J.
2012, Childhood leukemia around French nuclear power plants—the Geocap study, 2002–2007, International
journal of cancer, 131(5), pp. E769-E780. and
Switzerland.104
104 Spycher, B.D., Feller, M., Zwahlen, M.,
Röösli, M., von der Weid, N.X., Hengartner, H., Egger, M., Kuehni, C.E., Swiss
Paediatric Oncology Group and Swiss National Cohort Study Group 2011, Childhood
cancer and nuclear power plants in Switzerland: a census-based cohort study,
International journal of epidemiology, 40(5), pp.1247-1260. Taken together, the research provides strong statistical evidence that
leukemia increases near nuclear reactors.
Various studies have identified several possible causes for the
phenomenon, including pre-paternal exposures to occupational doses received by
fathers,105
105 Gardner, M.J., Snee, M.P., Hall, A.J.,
Powell, C.A., Downes, S. and Terrell, J.D. 1990, Results of case-control study
of leu kemia and lymphoma among young people near Sellafield nuclear plant in
West Cumbria. Bmj, 300(6722), pp. 423-429. a
postulated virus from population-mixing,106
106 Kinlen, L.J. 2004, Childhood leukemia and
population mixing, Pediatrics, 114(1), pp. 330-331. an
unusual response to infectious diseases in children,107
107 Greaves, M. 2006, Infection, immune
responses and the aetiology of childhood leukemia, Nature Reviews Cancer, 6(3),
pp.193. a genetic pre-disposition to cancer, high
labelling of the embryos/fetuses of pregnant women near nuclear power plants,108
108 Fairlie, I. 2014, A hypothesis to explain
childhood cancers near nuclear power plants, Journal of environmental
radioactivity, 133, pp. 10-17. or a combination of these
factors. Whatever the final explanation, the evidence worldwide shows that
living near nuclear reactors entails serious health risks for babies and young children.109
109 Laurier, D., Jacob, S., Bernier, M.O.,
Leuraud, K., Metz, C., Samson, E. and Laloi, P. 2008, Epidemiological studies
of leukemia in children and young adults around nuclear facilities: a critical
review, Radiation Protection Dosimetry, 132(2), pp. 182-190.While the evidence of association strongly suggests living near nuclear
power presents serious health risks the causes cannot be definitively determined
and so the issue remains controversial.
RISKS TO NUCLEAR WORKERS
Over the past two decades, the average exposures of nuclear workers in
European countries have generally declined. Much of the collective dose
continues to be received by temporary workers, nuclear 52
sub-contractor workers, and the
operators of fuel chain facilities. Although exposures may be declining, the
perceived risks from them are increasing. In 2015, a large epidemiology study110
110 Leuraud, K., Richardson, D.B., Cardis, E., Daniels, R.D., Gillies, M.,
O’hagan, J.A., Hamra, G.B., Haylock, R., Laurier, D., Moissonnier, M. and
Schubauer-Berigan, M.K. 2015, Ionising radiation and risk of death from
leukaemia and lymphoma in radiation-monitored workers (INWORKS): an
international cohort study, The Lancet Haematology, 2(7), pp. e276-e281 by scientists from national health institutes in the US, UK, and France
of over 300,000 nuclear workers found that their leukemia risks were more than
double those found in an earlier study.111
111 Cardis, E., Vrijheid, M., Blettner, M., Gilbert, E., Hakama, M., Hill,
C., Howe, G., Kaldor, J., Muirhead, C.R., Schubauer-Berigan, M. and Yoshimura,
T. 2005, Risk of cancer after low doses of ionising radiation: retrospective
cohort study in 15 countries, Bmj, 331(7508), pp. 77 A
few months later a second study– this time for all solid cancers112
112 Richardson, D.B., Cardis, E., Daniels, R.D., Gillies, M., O’Hagan, J.A.,
Hamra, G.B., Haylock, R., Laurier, D., Leuraud, K., Moissonnier, M. and
Schubauer-Berigan, M.K. 2015, Risk of cancer from occupational exposure to
ionising radiation: retrospective cohort study of workers in France, the United
Kingdom, and the United States (INWORKS), bmj, 351, pp. h5359 — done by largely the same team of scientists found large absolute
risks of solid cancers, with 47 percent per Gray (Gy)113
113 The gray is a derived unit of ionizing radiation dose. It is defined as
the absorption of one joule of radiation energy per kilogram of matter much higher than researchers had expected. These risks are considerably
larger than the ICRP’s estimate of 5 percent per Gy.
4.4 RISKS
FROM SPENT NUCLEAR FUEL
After nuclear fuel has undergone fission for three to four years, it is
termed ‘spent’ and is placed in cooling pools. However, the adjective ‘spent’
is misleading as the fuel continues to emit large amounts of radiation for tens
of thousands of years. For example, even after ten years’ cooling, radiation
dose rates from unshielded used fuel assemblies range from 1 to 100 Gy per
hour depending on the type of fuel, its burnup, and how long it has been out of
the reactor. A dose of 4 to 5 Gy is usually considered lethal.114
114 US Nuclear Regulatory Commission 2019,
“Legal Dose”, Online glossary entry, viewed 29 May 2019, https://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/basic-ref/glossary/lethal-dose-ld.html
An unshielded, freshly unloaded spent fuel
element delivers a lethal dose at one-meter distance in less than one minute.
For this reason, spent fuel is either transferred under water,
transported in heavily shielded casks to fuel ponds at reactor sites, or
transferred into equally shielded dry store casks. Exposure rates near these
casks vary considerably according to the type of fuel (uranium oxide or
uranium-plutonium mixed oxide) fuel utilization or ‘burnups’ and the age of
the spent fuel. Dose rates are estimated at 1 meter from German Castor dry
store casks to be about 0.1 mSv/hour, for French TN28 flasks 0.04 mSv/hour.115
115 Wilkinson, W. 2006, Radiation Dose
Assessment for the Transport of Nuclear Fuel Cycle Materials, World Nuclear
Transport Institute, viewed 24 May 2019, https://www.wnti.co.uk/media/31656/IP8_EN_MAR13_V2.pdf
Countries have different regulations for how high dose-rates workers can
be exposed to. In Canada, maximum allowable exposures to workers near dry store
flasks are 2 mSv/hour at contact with the flask surface and 0.1 mSv/hour at one
meter away. In the US, NRC regulations limit exposures to 10 mSv/hour at
contact and 0.1 mSv/hour two meters away. Spent nuclear fuel contains most of
the radioactivity in the world’s nuclear waste, and consists of fission and
activation products.116
116 The major activation products are
plutonium-239, plutonium-240, plutonium-241, plutonium-242 and tritium. A
series of ‘minor’ actinides are also formed: neptunium-237, curium-242,
curium-244, americium-241, and americium-243. In addition, approximately 700
fission products are formed in spent fuel, most of them short-lived. The main
risk drivers include caesium-134, caesium-137, strontium-90, technecium-99 and
cobalt-60 as these have longer half-lives and emit powerful gamma rays. Tritium
(H-3), the radioactive isotope of hydrogen, is also formed as a tertiary
fission product.
RISKS OF SPENT FUEL IN POOLS
The continued practise of storing spent nuclear fuel for long periods in
pools at most nuclear power plants worldwide constitutes a major risk to the
public and to the environment.117
117 Alvarez, R. 2011, Spent Nuclear Fuel Pools
in the US, Institute for Policy Studies.Spent
fuel pools must 53
be constantly monitored, continually
cooled to remove decay heat, and chemically adjusted to ensure correct
alkalinity levels. If cooling were to fail for any reason, the pools would
fully evaporate within a few days and the fuel assemblies could ignite as their
zirconium cladding would react strongly with oxygen in air.118
118 von Hippel, F.N. and Schoeppner, M. 2016, Reducing the danger from fires
in spent fuel pools, Science & Global Security, 24(3), pp. 141-173. The same would occur if the pond waters were emptied for any reason,
such as a breach of the walls of the pools caused by a terrorist attack. These
problems grow worse over time by the fact that the lengths of time spent fuel
stays in pools has been increasing and now routinely extend for several
decades.
The continued practise of storing spent nuclear fuel for long periods in
pools at most nuclear power plants worldwide constitutes a major risk to the
public and to the environment. Spent nuclear fuel contains most of the
radioactivity in the world’s nuclear waste, and consists of fission and
activation products.
In 2014, the US Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) examined whether to
require most spent fuel currently held in pools at nuclear power plants to be
moved into dry casks and storage vaults. Such a move would reduce the
likelihood and consequences of a spent fuel pool fire. It concluded that the
projected benefits did not justify the estimated US$4 billion cost of a
wholesale transfer.119
119 Barto, A. 2014, Consequence study of a
beyond-design-basis earthquake affecting the spent fuel pool for a US Mark I
boiling water reactor, United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Office of
Nuclear Regulatory Research.
However, the NRC report was criticized for seriously underestimating the
risk and consequences of a spent fuel fire: models of a potential accident at
US nuclear fuel storage sites estimated very serious effects of hypothetical
radionuclide releases.120
120 von Hippel, F.N. and Schoeppner, M. 2017,
Economic Losses from a Fire in a Dense-Packed US Spent Fuel Pool, Science &
Global Security, 25(2), pp.80-92. They contained
maps illustrating the radioactive plumes across large areas of northeastern
United States. The lead author, Professor Frank von Hippel, Princeton
University, warned of drastic economic consequences: “We’re talking about
trillion-dollar consequences.” 121
121 Stone, R. 2016, “Spent fuel fire on US
soil could dwarf impact of Fukushima”, Science, May 24, viewed 25 May 2019, https://www.sciencemag.org/news/2016/05/spent-fuel-fire-us-soil-could-dwarf-impact-fukushimaThis risk not just affects the US but most countries that operate
nuclear power plants, where increasing amounts of spent fuel are being left in
cooling pools for increasingly long periods of time.
The absence of robust proven technical solutions and the existence of
political opposition to plans for nuclear waste facilities make this difficult
situation even more problematic. The present situation poses considerable
challenges for current governments and future generations.
In the meantime, it is widely accepted that spent nuclear fuel requires
well-designed storage for long periods to minimize the risks of releases of the
contained radioactivity to the environment. Safeguards are also required to
ensure that neither plutonium nor highly enriched uranium is diverted to
weapons use.
4.5 RISKS
FROM THE REPROCESSING OF SPENT NUCLEAR FUEL
Two main means exist for managing spent nuclear fuel: long-term storage
with the ultimate aim of direct disposal and reprocessing. This section
discusses the latter method. In the 1950s and 1960s, during the Cold War,
countries constructed reprocessing plants in order to create weapons with
plutonium separated from spent fuel. 54
Reprocessing involves the dissolution
of spent fuel in boiling concentrated nitric acid followed by the
physico-chemical separation of plutonium and uranium from the dissolved fuel.
This difficult, complex, expensive and dangerous process results in numerous
nuclear waste streams, very large releases of nuclide waste to air and sea,
and large radiation exposures to workers and to the public.
Only about 15 percent of the world’s spent nuclear fuel is reprocessed.
Most countries have abandoned the reprocessing option and currently only France
and Russia practice plutonium separation on a commercial scale. These
countries that have historically carried out the work for a range of other
countries now mainly process their own fuel. Reprocessing creates large
quantities of highly active liquid (HAL) waste, which are heat-producing and
extremely radioactive. As described below, liquid waste presents severe
problems for current waste management. Originally, liquid waste was to be
glassified and stored in a more manageable solid form called vitrified waste.
However, such processes, though implemented rather successfully in France, have
proved difficult in the UK and the US, and much of this waste may remain in
liquid form for the immediate future. In addition to HAL waste, reprocessing
also results in the following waste streams:
- Emissions of
radionuclides in the air
- Discharge of radionuclides into the sea
- Large stockpiles of separated plutonium
- Tens of thousands of drums with separated
reprocessed uranium
- Thousands of steel canisters containing
vitrified waste
- Radioactive graphite from AGR fuel sleeves
and decommissioned reactors
- Concrete silos filled with fuel claddings
stripped from spent fuel, and
- Many other radioactive waste, including sludges, resins, and
filters.
The collective doses to the world’s population from the long-lived
gaseous nuclides C-14, and I-129, and from medium-lived Kr-85 and H-3 (tritium)
emitted at Sellafield and La Hague are very large, much higher than for
nuclear power plants. While any discharge of alpha emitters is prohibited at
reactor sites, it is authorized at La Hague within the limits of 0.01 GBq in
gaseous and 140 GBq in liquid effluents.122
122 Schneider, M., and Marignac, Y. 2008,
“Reprocessing of Spent Nuclear Fuel in France”, International Panel on Fissile
Materials, Research Report #4, viewed 24 May 2018, http://fissilematerials.org/publications/2008/05/spent_nuclear_fuel_reprocessin.html
The global collective dose, truncated at 100,000 years, resulting from
the discharges of the La Hague reprocessing facility alone has been calculated
to be 3,600 person sieverts per year.123
123 Smith, R., Bexon, A., Sihra, K., Simmonds,
J.2007, “The calculation, presentation and use of collective doses for routine
discharges,” In Proceedings of IRPA12: 12. Congress of the International
Radiation Protection Association: Strengthening Radiation Protection
Worldwide-Highlights, Global Perspective and Future Trends.Continuing discharges at similar levels for the years of La Hague’s
operational life until 2025 would cause over 3,000 additional cancer deaths
globally, if the linear no-threshold theory of radiation is applied. 55
FISSILE MATERIALS
The original purpose of reprocessing was to obtain fissile plutonium for
nuclear weapons. This rationale has changed over the years, at least since the
mid-1990s, when the major nuclear weapon states ceased the separation of
plutonium for military purposes. Moreover, in 2017, the UN General Assembly
agreed the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons, a legally binding
international agreement to comprehensively prohibit nuclear weapons. Countries
that persist with reprocessing face particular challenges of proliferation and
security risks, such as the vulnerability to terrorist attacks.
In 2007, the UK’s prestigious Royal Society warned that the potential
consequences of a major security breach or accident involving the UK’s
stockpile of separated plutonium “are so severe that the Government should
urgently develop and implement a strategy for its long term use or disposal.”124
124 The Royal Society 2007, Strategy options
for the UK’s separated Plutonium, Policy document 24/07, viewed 29 May 2019, https://royalsociety.org/~/media/Royal_Society_Content/policy/publications/2007/8018.pdf
These stocks amounted to 100 tons in 2007.
By 2017, they had increased to 140 tons.125
125 Department for Business, Energy and
Industrial Strategy (DBEIS) 2017, The United Kingdom’s Sixth National Report on
Compliance with the Obligations of the Joint Convention on the Safety of Spent
Fuel and Radioactive Waste Management, viewed 25 May 2019, https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/the-uks-sixth-national-report-on-com-pliance-with-the-obligations-of-the-joint-convention-on-the-safety-of-spent-fuel-and-radioactive-waste-management
In the past 10 years, successive UK
Governments have failed to develop a policy for this fissile waste. Japan faces
a similar dilemma with a large stock of separated plutonium, a commercial
reprocessing plant under construction, and only a small plutonium absorption
capacity. France, however, remains the only country legally committed to
large-scale reprocessing.
MIXED OXIDE FUEL (MOX)
A later justification for reprocessing was the goal to use the separated
plutonium oxide in plutonium-uranium mixed oxide (MOX) nuclear fuel, first for
Fast Breeder Reactors (FBRs), then as substitute for uranium fuel for Light
Water Reactors (LWRs). FBR programs have been terminated in most countries and
MOX fuel has proved to be several times more expensive than uranium fuel
because of indispensable additional safety and security measures. Spent MOX
fuel is not reprocessed anywhere, as the plutonium quality is degraded, and it
is significantly more radioactive and hotter when it exits reactors. Compared
to uranium fuel, MOX requires either over a century longer cooling periods in
intermediate storage, or at least three times more space in a final repository.
This has serious economic consequences as the inventory of a waste repository
is generally limited by the thermal load.
4.6
DECOMMISSIONING RISKS
Once a nuclear power plant is closed, the spent fuel has to be removed,
cooling systems and moderators drained. The process of defueling,
deconstruction, and dismantling of a nuclear power plant is called
decommissioning. In 2018, 154 nuclear reactors worldwide were awaiting, or are
in various stages of decommissioning. Another 19 had been fully decommissioned,
mostly in the US (13) and Germany (5). The average duration of reactor
decommissioning is around 19 years, in most cases longer than the construction
and operational period of the reactor combined.126
126 Schneider et al. 2018
A reactor is considered “fully decommissioned”, when the reactor
building has been entirely emptied and can be put to other use or when every
building has been removed but the spent fuel is still on-site. The decommission
state is considered “greenfield” if all buildings and waste have been removed
and the site can be freely used for other purposes. Only 10 of the 19 reactors
fully decommissioned so far have reached the greenfield status. In some cases
graphite reactor cores remain in situ in shielded buildings for later
dismantlement. 56
These two basic strategies for
decommissioning are Immediate Dismantling (ID) and Long-Term Enclosure (LTE,
termed “SAFSTOR” in the US). In general, ID is preferable as the skills and
experiences of operating staff can be used, a clear line of responsibilities
still exists, public interest is continuing, and the finance set aside is more
likely to match the necessary work. Some large nuclear countries like France
and Germany have made ID their principle policy. LTE usually runs the risk of
losing human competences, clear lines of responsibility, corporate continuity
and public interest, thus dragging out decommissioning for decades.
CONTINUED RADIONUCLIDE EMISSIONS FROM DECOMMISSIONED
REACTORS
A variety of radionuclides are released not only from operating reactors
but also from closed ones, especially gaseous emissions of tritium and
carbon-14. Nuclide emissions data in the UK Government’s annual Radioactivity
in Food and the Environment (RIFE) publication reveal that the Winfrith
reactors which closed in 1995 still emitted two trillion (2 x 1012) becquerels
per year of tritium in 2016, more than 20 years later.127
127 Scottish Environment Protection Agency
(SEPA) 2017, Radioactivity in Food and the Environment. RIFE Report 22, viewed
24 May 2019, https://www.sepa.org.uk/media/328601/rife-22.pdf Similar patterns are observed at the long-closed reactors at
Trawsfynydd, Dounreay, Chapelcross and all closed Magnox stations. In Canada,
the small experimental reactors at Whiteshell and Rolphton, which were closed
over 30 years ago, are still reported as emitting large quantities of tritium
each year. The available data so far only concern Magnox and heavy water
reactors. During their operations, high concentrations of tritium and C-14 are
absorbed into the concrete and steel structures of Magnox and HWR reactors and
their containment structures. After the cessation of fission, these nuclides
continue to seep out over decades-long time scales.
DECOMMISSIONING VS OPERATIONAL EXPOSURES
It has been claimed that worker exposures from reactor decommissioning
will be significant and that decommissioning should be postponed for as long as
possible. However, the European Commission (EC) has calculated that the dose
reduction from the closure of a nuclear plant is considerably greater than the
impact of its decommissioning. The EC estimated that the collective dose from
atmospheric emissions during decommissioning of a nuclear facility in the EU in
2004 was about 2 person-sieverts per year, compared to about 150
person-sieverts per year from the operation of each nuclear facility in the EU.128
128 European Commission 2007, Guidance on the
calculation, presentation and use of collective doses for routine discharges,
Radiation Protection Report 144. Directorate-General for Energy Directorate D—
Nuclear Energy Unit D.4 — Radiation Protection. 57
4.7 SUMMARY
Nuclear waste constitutes a health hazard for several reasons. First are
the reported health impacts from routine gaseous and liquid waste emissions
from nuclear facilities. Second are the very large global collective doses from
nuclear reprocessing. And third is the unsatisfactory and unstable condition of
much of the nuclear waste already created. High-level waste (HLW) in the form
of spent nuclear fuel and vitrified waste from reprocessing contains more than
90 percent of the radioactivity in nuclear waste. However, there is no fully
operational HLW final disposal site in the world. The continued practise of
storing spent nuclear fuel for long periods in pools at most nuclear power
plants worldwide constitutes a major risk to the public and to the environment.
Spent nuclear fuel contains most of the radioactivity in the world’s nuclear
waste, and consists of fission and activation products.
Estimates of the impacts of an operational HLW disposal remain
speculative, but HLW still poses key questions of intergenerational liability
and justice. The very long time-frames involved—the half life of Pu-239 is over
24,000 years—remains the single most important factor distinguishing nuclear
waste from other kinds of waste.
Reprocessing of nuclear fuel creates more accessible forms of highly
dangerous radioactive wastes, proliferation problems, high exposures to workers
and the public, and radioactive contamination of the air and seas.
Only few countries do publish information, for example, on nuclide
inventories in wastes. Such data collection and dissemination are primarily the
responsibility of national governments. The data is needed to properly assess
risks from nuclear waste and develop hazard rankings which tie observed health
effects to exposures. So far, no comprehensive hazard scheme exists for the
radionuclides in nuclear waste.
Risks may be derived from epidemiological studies, but the few that
exist are of limited quality. Some studies suggest increased cancer rates, for
example, but are individually too small to give statistically significant
results. Meta-analyses could combine smaller studies to generate larger datasets
which do produce statistically significant findings. However, meta-analyses on
nuclear waste are notable for their virtual absence. The result is that many
small studies continue to be criticized for their lack of statistical
significance.
Finally,
in order to assess risks, it is also necessary to have accurate doses, but
these are often not measured in epidemiology studies. Even if they do exist
they can often be unreliable due to the large uncertainties which surround
them.
THE WORLD
NUCLEAR WASTE
REPORT 2019
EXECUTIVE
SUMMARY
Focus Europe
This report would have not been
possible without the generous support of a diverse group of friends and
partners, in particular – listed in alphabetical order – the Altner-Combecher
Stiftung, Bäuerliche Notgemeinschaft Trebel, Bund für Umwelt und Naturschutz
(BUND), Bürgerinitiative Umweltschutz Lüchow-Dannenberg e.V., Climate Core and
Green/EFA MEPs Group in the European Parliament,Heinrich-Böll-Stiftung (HBS)
and its offices in Berlin, Brussels, Paris, Prague, and Washington DC, KLAR!
Schweiz, Annette und Wolf Römmig, and the Swiss Energy Foundation. Thank you
all formaking this possible!
CONTENTS
Title
page...............................................................................................................................................................................
1
Partners &
Sponsors.........................................................................................................................................................
2
Foreword..............................................................................................................................................................................
3
Acknowledgments..............................................................................................................................................................
5
Key
Insights.........................................................................................................................................................................
9
Executive
summary...........................................................................................................................................................11
1. INTRODUCTION..................................................................................................................................................
17
2. ORIGINS AND
CLASSIFICATION..................................................................................................................
20
2.1 Types of waste: the nuclear fuel
chain............................................................................................................21
Uranium mining, milling, processing and
fuel fabrication........................................................................
22
Nuclear fission (fuel
irradiation).......................................................................................................................
23
Management of spent fuel.................................................................................................................................
23
Reactor (and fuel chain facility)
decommissioning.....................................................................................
23
2.2 Waste quantities and
activity...........................................................................................................................
24
2.3 Classification systems and
categories............................................................................................................
24
2.3.1 The IAEA
classification..............................................................................................................................
25
2.3.2 The EU classification..................................................................................................................................27
2.3.3 Examples of national
classifications......................................................................................................27
2.4
Summary................................................................................................................................................................30
3. QUANTITIES OF
WASTE..................................................................................................................................
31
3.1 Reporting
obligations............................................................................................................................................31
3.2 Waste quantities along the supply
chain........................................................................................................31
Uranium mining and fuel
fabrication...............................................................................................................31
Operational
waste................................................................................................................................................
32
Spent nuclear fuel................................................................................................................................................
33
Decommissioning
waste.....................................................................................................................................34
Estimated waste quantities along the
supply
chain....................................................................................
35
3.3 Reported waste quantities under the
Joint Convention.............................................................................37
Uranium mining and fuel
fabrication...............................................................................................................37
Low- and intermediate-level
waste..................................................................................................................37
Spent nuclear fuel and high-level
waste........................................................................................................40
3.4 Summary................................................................................................................................................................
43
4. RISKS FOR THE ENVIRONMENT AND HUMAN
HEALTH.................................................................... 45
4.1 Radiation risks of nuclear
waste.......................................................................................................................
45
4.2 Risks from uranium mining, mine
tailings, enrichment, and fuel fabrication.....................................46
Health risks from exposures to
uranium........................................................................................................47
Uranium
mining....................................................................................................................................................
48
Uranium mine
tailings........................................................................................................................................
49
4.3 Risks from
operation...........................................................................................................................................50
Risks from gases, liquids and solid
waste......................................................................................................50
Risks to nuclear
workers.....................................................................................................................................
51
4.4 Risks from spent nuclear
fuel...........................................................................................................................
52
Risks of spent fuel in
pools................................................................................................................................
527
4.5 Risks from the reprocessing of spent
nuclear
fuel......................................................................................
53
Fissile
materials....................................................................................................................................................
55
Mixed oxide fuel
(MOX)......................................................................................................................................
55
4.6 Decommissioning
risks.......................................................................................................................................
55
Continued radionuclide emissions from
decommissioned reactors......................................................56
Decommissioning vs operational
exposures................................................................................................56
4.7
Summary..................................................................................................................................................................57
5. WASTE MANAGEMENT
CONCEPTS...........................................................................................................
58
5.1 Historical background........................................................................................................................................
58
5.2 The context of nuclear waste
management..................................................................................................63
5.3 Management concepts for nuclear
waste......................................................................................................65
Disposal
concepts................................................................................................................................................65
Host
rocks..............................................................................................................................................................66
LILW-repositories................................................................................................................................................
67
HLW-repositories.................................................................................................................................................
68
Deep borehole
disposal......................................................................................................................................
70
5.4 Interim strategies:
storage.................................................................................................................................
71
Interim
storage......................................................................................................................................................
71
Extended
storage..................................................................................................................................................73
5.5 Summary.................................................................................................................................................................75
6. COSTS AND
FINANCING.................................................................................................................................76
6.1 The nature of the funding systems for
decommissioning, storage, and disposal............................... 76
Basic liability for decommissioning and
waste management...................................................................
76
Overview and nature of the
funds....................................................................................................................77
Accumulation of the
funds..................................................................................................................................78
6.2 Cost estimations and
experiences...................................................................................................................
79
Cost estimation
methodologies........................................................................................................................
79
Decommissioning
costs......................................................................................................................................80
Disposal
costs........................................................................................................................................................
82
6.3 Financing schemes...............................................................................................................................................
82
Financing schemes for
decommissioning......................................................................................................
82
Financing schemes for interim
storage..........................................................................................................
84
Financing schemes for
disposal........................................................................................................................
85
Integrated financing
schemes...........................................................................................................................87
6.4 Summary................................................................................................................................................................
88
7. COUNTRY
STUDIES..........................................................................................................................................90
7.1 Czech
Republic......................................................................................................................................................90
Overview.................................................................................................................................................................90
Waste classification
system................................................................................................................................90
Quantities of
waste...............................................................................................................................................91
Waste management policies and
facilities.....................................................................................................
92
Costs and
financing.............................................................................................................................................93
Summary................................................................................................................................................................94
7.2
France......................................................................................................................................................................95
Overview.................................................................................................................................................................95
Waste classification
system................................................................................................................................96
Quantities of
waste..............................................................................................................................................
978
Waste management policies and
facilities.....................................................................................................99
Costs and financing............................................................................................................................................
101
Summary..............................................................................................................................................................
103
7.3.Germany...............................................................................................................................................................
104
Overview...............................................................................................................................................................
104
Waste classification
system.............................................................................................................................
105
Quantities of
waste............................................................................................................................................
105
Waste management policies and facilities....................................................................................................107
Costs and
financing...........................................................................................................................................
108
Summary..............................................................................................................................................................
109
7.4
Hungary..................................................................................................................................................................111
Overview.................................................................................................................................................................111
Waste classification
system................................................................................................................................111
Quantities of
waste.............................................................................................................................................
112
Waste management policies and
facilities....................................................................................................
113
Costs and financing.............................................................................................................................................114
Summary................................................................................................................................................................115
7.5
Sweden...................................................................................................................................................................
116
Overview................................................................................................................................................................
116
Waste classification
system................................................................................................................................117
Quantities of
waste..............................................................................................................................................117
Waste management policies and
facilities....................................................................................................
119
Costs and
financing............................................................................................................................................
121
Summary...............................................................................................................................................................122
7.6
Switzerland...........................................................................................................................................................123
Overview................................................................................................................................................................123
Waste classification
system..............................................................................................................................124
Quantities of
waste.............................................................................................................................................124
Waste management policies and
facilities....................................................................................................125
Costs and
financing............................................................................................................................................
127
Summary...............................................................................................................................................................128
7.7 The United
Kingdom...........................................................................................................................................129
Overview................................................................................................................................................................129
Waste classification
system.............................................................................................................................
130
Quantities of
waste.............................................................................................................................................
131
Waste management policies and
facilities....................................................................................................133
Costs and
financing............................................................................................................................................134
Summary...............................................................................................................................................................135
7.8 The United States of
America..........................................................................................................................136
Overview................................................................................................................................................................136
Waste classification
system..............................................................................................................................
137
Quantities of
waste.............................................................................................................................................138
Waste management policies and
facilities....................................................................................................139
Costs and financing.............................................................................................................................................141
Summary................................................................................................................................................................141
8. TABLE OF
ABBREVIATIONS........................................................................................................................142
9. CONTRIBUTORS...............................................................................................................................................145
Imprint...................................................................................................................................................................1479
KEY INSIGHTS
WASTE MANAGEMENT CONCEPTS
- No
country in the world has a deep geological repository for spent nuclear
fuel in operation. Finland
is the only country currently constructing a permanent repository.
- Despite multiple failed
selection procedures and abandoned repositories, a preference for
geological disposal remains. There is a strong
consensus that the current state of research and exchange with civil
society is inadequate for the challenges faced.
- With deep geological repositories not available for decades to
come, the risks are increasingly shifting to interim storage facilities
which are running out of capacity: for example, storage capacity for
spent fuel in Finland has reached 93 percent saturation.
QUANTITIES OF NUCLEAR WASTE
- Over
60,000 tons of spent nuclear fuel are in storage across Europe (excluding Russia and Slovakia), most of
which in France. Spent nuclear fuel is considered high-level waste and
makes up the vast bulk of radioactivity. As of 2016, 81 percent of
Europe’s spent fuel has been moved into wet storage, which comes with its
own safety risks.
- Around 2.5 million m³ of low-
and intermediate-level waste has been generated in Europe. Around 20 percent of this waste (0.5 million m³) has been stored;
80 percent (close to 2 million m³) has been disposed of.
- Decomissioning Europe’s reactors may
generate at least another 1.4 million m³ of low- and intermedaite level
waste.
- Over its lifetime, European
nuclear reactors may produce around 6.6 million m³ of nuclear waste. If stacked in one place, this would fill up a football field 919
meters high, 90 meters higher than the tallest building in the world, the
Burj Khalifa in Dubai. Four countries account for over 75 percent of this
waste: France (30 percent), the UK (20 percent), Ukraine (18 percent), and
Germany (8 percent).
- Apart from Russia, which is still produces
uranium, Germany and France have the largest inventory of nuclear waste
from uranium mining in Europe.
10
COSTS AND FINANCES
- Governments
do not apply the polluter-pays-principle consistently. While operators are liable for the costs
of managing, storing, and disposing of nuclear waste, costs may end up
being borne by taxpayers.
- Governments fail to properly
estimate the costs for decommissioning, storage, and disposal of nuclear
waste due to underlying uncertainties. Many
governments base their cost estimates on overly optimistic discount rates
and outdated data, leading to serious funding gaps for waste management
costs.
- Overall, no country has both estimated costs precisely and closed
the gap between secured funds and cost estimates.
ORIGINS AND CLASSIFICATIONS
- Countries
differ significantly in how they define and categorize nuclear waste and
in how they report about generated amounts of nuclear waste. All countries publish regularly
information, yet not all report in a thorough way.
- Despite international efforts to establish common
safety principles and practices, such inconsistencies remain and make
comparison very complex. The different national approaches reflect a
lack of coherency in how countries manage nuclear waste.
RISKS FOR THE ENVIRONMENT AND HUMAN HEALTH
- Nuclear
waste constitutes a health hazard due to routine gaseous and liquid waste emissions
from nuclear facilities and the global collective doses from reprocessing.
- Reprocessing of spent nuclear
fuel poses increased challenges, including
proliferation risks, high exposures to humans, and contamination of the
environment.
- Overall, there is a lack of comprehensive, quantitative and
qualitative information on risks associated with nuclear waste.
3 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
The WORLD NUCLEAR WASTE REPORT (WNWR) shows that governments around the world have been struggling for decades
to develop and implement comprehensive nuclear waste management strategies.
Much of the task will fall onto future generations.
WASTE MANAGEMENT CONCEPTS
More than 70 years after the start of the nuclear age, no country in the
world has a deep geological repository for spent nuclear fuel in operation. Finland is the only country that is currently constructing a permanent
repository for this most dangerous type of nuclear waste. Besides Finland, only
Sweden and France have de facto determined the location for a high-level waste
repository in an early confinement process. The US is operating the Waste
Isolation Pilot Project (WIPP). However, this repository is only used for
long-lived transuranic waste from nuclear weapons, not for spent nuclear fuel
from commercial reactors.
Despite multiple examples of failed selection procedures and abandoned
repositories, current national and international governance show a preference
for geological disposal. This requires clear and
ambitious conditions for the site selection, exploration, and approval processes.
Still, there is no guarantee for the feasibility of deep geological disposal.
This is why the process of searching for such repositories must be implemented
with extraordinary care on the basis of industrial feasibility and accompanied
by appropriate monitoring. Some scientists consider that monitored, long-term
storage in a protected environment is more responsible, much faster to achieve
and should therefore be implemented. Overall there is a strong consensus that
the current state of research and scientific debate and exchange with
politicians and involved citizens is not adequate for the magnitude of the
challenge.
The conditioning, transport, storage and disposal of nuclear waste
constitute significant and growing challenges for all nuclear countries. These
developments show that governments and authorities are under pressure to
improve the management of interim storage and disposal programs. Accordingly,
standards must be implemented for the governance of the programs, including
planning quality and safety, quality assurance, citizen participation and
safety culture.
Interim storage of spent nuclear fuel and high-level waste will continue
for a century or more. With deep geological
repositories not available for decades to come, the risks are increasingly
shifting to interim storage. The current storage practices for spent
nuclear fuel and other easily dispersible intermediate- and high-level waste
forms were not planned for the long-term. These practices thus represent a
growing and particularly high risk, especially when other options are available
(solidification, dry storage) in hardened facilities. Extended storage of
nuclear waste increases risks today, adds billions in costs, and shifts these
burdens to future generations.
QUANTITIES OF NUCLEAR WASTE
European countries have produced several million cubic meters of nuclear
waste (not even including uranium mining and processing wastes). By the end of
2016, France, the United Kingdom and Germany were Europe’s biggest producers
of nuclear waste along the nuclear fuel chain. 4
Over 60,000 tons of spent
nuclear fuel are stored across Europe (excluding
Russia and Slovakia), most of which in France (Table 1). Within
the EU, France accounts for 25 percent of the current spent nuclear fuel,
followed by Germany (15 percent) and the United Kingdom (14 percent). Spent
nuclear fuel is considered high-level waste. Though present in comparably small
volumes, it makes up the vast bulk of radioactivity. TABLE 1: Reported
spent nuclear fuel inventories in Europe and amount in wet storage as of
December 31, 2016
|
Country
|
SNF
inventory [tons]
|
Fuel
Assemblies*
|
Wet
Storage [tons]
|
SNF in
wet storage [%]
|
|||
|
BELGIUM
|
501**
|
4,173
|
237
|
47%
|
|||
|
BULGARIA
|
876
|
4,383
|
788
|
90%
|
|||
|
CZECH
REPUBLIC
|
1,828
|
11,619
|
654
|
36%
|
|||
|
FINLAND
|
2,095
|
13,887
|
2,095
|
100%
|
|||
|
FRANCE
|
13,990
|
n.a.
|
13,990
|
100%
|
|||
|
GERMANY
|
8,485
|
n.a.
|
3,609
|
43%
|
|||
|
HUNGARY
|
1,261
|
10,507
|
216
|
17%
|
|||
|
LITHUANIA
|
2,210
|
19,731
|
1,417
|
64%
|
|||
|
THE
NETHERLANDS
|
80***
|
266
|
80
|
100%
|
|||
|
ROMANIA
|
2,867
|
151,686
|
1,297
|
45%
|
|||
|
SLOVENIA
|
350
|
884
|
350
|
100%
|
|||
|
SPAIN
|
4,975
|
15,082
|
4,400
|
91%
|
|||
|
SWEDEN
|
6,758
|
34,204
|
6,758
|
100%
|
|||
|
SWITZERLAND
|
1,377
|
6,474
|
831
|
60%
|
|||
|
UKRAINE
*
|
4,651****
|
27,325
|
4,081
|
94%
|
|||
|
UNITED
KINGDOM
|
7,700
|
n.a.
|
7,700
|
100%
|
|||
|
TOTAL
|
ca.
60,500
|
ca.
49,000
|
81%
|
||||
Conference Monday, 11.
November 2019 /
Berlin
Launch of the
World Nuclear Waste Report (WNWR) - Focus Europe
Date, Time
Address
Heinrich-Böll-Stiftung -
Headquarter Berlin
Schumannstr. 8
10117 Berlin
Schumannstr. 8
10117 Berlin
Language
German
English
Organizer
Heinrich-Böll-Stiftung Brüssel
- Europäische Union
Legal
The first edition of the
World Nuclear Waste Report (WNWR) – Focus Europe assesses how much waste
countries have generated, how much is stored and disposed of. It provides an
overview about the estimated costs for management, storage and disposal of
nuclear waste and how governments try to secure funding for these costs.
Finally, the report presents a short history of how countries worldwide have
been struggling up until today to advance in the search for repositories. The
report offers a selection of country studies, including the Czech Republic,
France, Germany, Hungary, Sweden, Switzerland, the United Kingdom, and the
United States.
A dozen of renowned
international scientists has compiled the report. Authors will present key
findings at the event in English. The final panel will discuss in German
lessons of decade-long attempts of countries to find a final repository.
Programme
10:00 Welcome
- Ellen Ueberschär, President,
Heinrich-Böll-Stiftung
10:10 Nuclear waste - a challenge for more than one generation
- Rebecca
Harms, former Member of European Parliament (Alliance 90/The Greens)
10:30 The World Nuclear Waste Report – an introduction
- Arne
Jungjohann, Editor and Coordinator of the World Nuclear Waste Report
10.45 Categories and conventions
- Florian Emrich, Head of President’s
Office, Federal Office for the Safety of Nuclear Waste Management (BfE)
- Gordon
MacKerron*, Director of Science and Technology Policy Research, University
of Sussex
- Moderation:
Arne Jungjohann
11:40 Europe’s piles of nuclear waste
- Mycle
Schneider, International Consultant, Convening Lead Author of the World
Nuclear Industry Status Report
- Ben Wealer,
Research Associate at Berlin Institute of Technology, guest researcher the
German Institute for Economic Research (DIW)
- Moderation:
Sylvia Kotting-Uhl, Member of Parliament (Alliance 90/The Greens), Chair of Committee for Environment,
Nature Protection, and Nuclear Safety
12:30 Lunch Break
13:30 Closing the gap? Rising costs and the challenge of financing
- Yves
Marignac, Director, World Information Service on Energy Paris
- Jürgen
Trittin, Member of Parliament (Alliance 90/The Greens), former Chair of
the Nuclear Financing Commission Germany
- Moderation:
Craig Morris, Renewable Energy Agency
14:20 Die Suche nach einem Endlager für hochradioaktive Abfälle: Kein Ende in Sicht?
- Miranda
Schreurs, Chair of National Civil Society Board (Nationales
Begleitgremium), Technical University of Munich, School of Governance
- Marcos
Buser, former member of the Federal Commission for Nuclear Safety in Switzerland
- Jorina
Suckow, member of the National Civil Society Board (Nationales
Begleitgremium)
- Moderation:
Rebecca Harms, former Member of European Parliament (Alliance 90/The
Greens)
15:30 End of event
* to be confirmed
Information:
Martin Keim, Head of European Energy
Transition Programme, Heinrich-Böll-Stiftung European Union | E-Mail Martin.Keim@eu.boell.org
Julia Bartmann, Project Officer European Union / North America Division, Heinrich-Böll-Stiftung | E-Mail bartmann@boell.de
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