Yesterday’s Observer Sunday
newspaper breaks probably the most important news story of the week. For
reasons hard to fathom, the editor placed it on page 20!
Broken
by Jamie Doward, one of the few investigative reporters still engaged by national newspaper- and who has a track
record of breaking path-breaking nuclear stories Government’s don’t want the
media to report - it concerns the long expected development of the UK collaborating with the US to
replace the ageing Trident nuclear warheads – jointly designed by Aldermaston
and Los Alamos weapons labs scientists -
in its stockpile.
Doward reported: “Earlier this month, Pentagon officials
confirmed that its proposed W93 sea-launched warhead, the nuclear tip of the
next generation of submarine-launched ballistic missiles, would share
technology with the UK’s next nuclear weapon, implying that a decision had been
taken between the two countries to work on the programme.
(“Pentagon
reveals deal with Britain to replace Trident: MPs dismayed after US defence officials
leak news of nuclear weapons deal before parliament is told, 23 February 2020; “https://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2020/feb/22/pentagon-gaffe-reveals-uk-deal-replace-trident-nuclear-weapon)
The Observer explained
that last week Admiral Charles Richard, commander of the US strategic command,
told the Senate defence committee that there was a requirement for a new
warhead, which would be called the W93 or Mk7. Richard said: “This effort will
also support a parallel replacement warhead programme in the United Kingdom,
whose nuclear deterrent plays an absolutely vital role in Nato’s overall
defence posture.”
Alan Shaffer,
Pentagon deputy under-secretary of defense for acquisition and sustainment,
also made reference to the new UK programme in a briefing session at the annual
nuclear deterrence summit, in Alexandria, Virginia. “I think it’s wonderful
that the UK is working on a new warhead at the same time, and I think we will
have discussions and be able to share technologies,” Shaffer said.
Hans
Kristensen, director of the nuclear information project at the Federation of
American Scientists, said the development of the new warhead posed significant
geopolitical problems. “Britain and the US have come a long away from being
leaders in reducing the role of nuclear weapons and contemplating the possible
road toward potential disarmament to re-embracing nuclear weapons for the long
haul. They are obviously not alone in this, with Russia, China and France doing
their own work. So, overall, this is a serious challenge for the international
non-proliferation regime,” he said.
SNP defence
spokesperson Stewart McDonald rightly raised the question about how the
decision could impact the UK's commitment to the 1968 Nuclear Non-Proliferation
Treaty.(NPT) saying "This is a quite astonishing story. Not only are we
learning about a new UK nuclear missiles programme from the US Senate, but the
programme itself clearly sets the UK on course to breach the Non-Proliferation
Treaty, to which it is a signatory. "The treaty makes it clear that
nuclear armed states are required to 'pursue negotiations in good faith on
effective measures relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early
date and to nuclear disarmament.' This programme clearly rips up that
commitment and that is of utmost concern. (“Leaked
plan to renew Trident sets UK on course to break nuclear treaty,: The National
, 3 February 2020; https://www.thenational.scot/news/18255695.leaked-plan-renew-trident-sets-uk-course-break-nuclear-treaty/
David Cullen,
director of technical research group the Nuclear Information Service, told the
Observer “The UK’s reliance on US knowledge and assistance for their nuclear
weapons programme means they will find it almost impossible to diverge from any
development path the US decides to take. “We are legally bound to take steps
towards disarmament under the nuclear non-proliferation treaty, but this would
take us in the opposite direction.”
Backstory
The
concern over nuclear warhead development for the UK’s nuclear WMDs - including contemporaneously the rented rockets from the
US Trident missile stocks at King’s Bay, in Georgia - has a long legacy.. This has
been raised in Parliament over the past sixty or so years by a very small
number of MPs who have scrutinised this least transparent of defence procurement
exercises.
One
such MP with a consistently strong record of serious scrutiny is outgoing
Labour Party leader, Jeremy Corbyn.
For example, he asked the MOD in
June 1990 what information in support of the United Kingdom nuclear weapons and
warhead design and development had been made available by the United States
under the 1958–59 as amended mutual defence agreement on atomic energy matters?
Defence minister Alan Clark said
helpfully in response: “It has been the policy of successive British Governments
not to disclose information exchanged under the terms of the 1958 United
Kingdom/United States defence agreement.
Corbyn also
asked what would be the financial savings made if the planned number of
warheads for the Trident D5 programme were reduced by (i) 50 per cent. and (ii)
75 per cent?
Clark added
again helpfully: ” It has been the policy of successive Governments not to
reveal details of this nature, for security reasons.
(Nuclear Weapons, HC Deb 13 June 1990 cc243-4W; https://api.parliament.uk/historic-hansard/written-answers/1990/jun/13/nuclear-weapons)
A decade
later, Corbyn brought up the issue on Trident nuclear warheads, this time with
Labour Defence Secretary Geoff Hoon, whom he asked what information senior
officers on Trident submarines are given on the specific yields and likely
targets of the missiles they are responsible for. [104077]
Hoon replied: “The Trident missiles
on which our nuclear deterrent is based have been de-targeted since 1994. In
the circumstances of our having to use our nuclear weapons, 95W members of
the patrolling submarine crew would be provided with the information they need
to discharge their duties.” adding ever helpfully “ I am withholding the
details of this information under Exemption 1 of the Code of Practice on Access
to Government Information relating to defence, security and international
relations.”
Hoon also stressed: “The United
Kingdom's minimum nuclear deterrent is consistent with international law. It
follows that UK military personnel engaged in the operation or support of
Trident are acting legally under the Nuremberg Principals. This has been made
clear down the chain of command, and members of the Armed Services who seek
further guidance on these issues can in the first instance do so through their
chain of command.
Guidance on
the Law of Armed Conflict for the Armed Services is set out in the draft Joint
Service Manual on the Law of Armed Conflict (Joint Service Publication 383)….
The relevant section on Nuclear Weapons was reconfirmed following the 1996
Advisory Opinion of the International Court of Justice on the use or threat of
use of nuclear weapons. It reads: ‘There is no specific rule of international
law, express or implied, which prohibits the use of nuclear weapons. The legality
of their use depends upon the application of the general rules of international
law, including those regulating the inherent right of self defence and the
conduct of hostilities. Those rules cannot be applied in isolation from any
factual context to imply a prohibition of a general nature. Whether the use, or
threatened use, of nuclear weapons in a particular case is lawful depends on
all the circumstances. Nuclear weapons fall to be dealt with by reference to
the same general principles as apply to conventional weapons. However, the new
rules introduced in Additional Protocol I [to the Geneva Conventions] are not
intended to have any effect on and do not regulate or prohibit the use of
nuclear weapons.’”
(Nuclear Weapons; HC Deb 10 January 2000 cc94-6W; https://api.parliament.uk/historic-hansard/written-answers/2000/jan/10/nuclear-weapons)
A further decade later, in late March 2009, and
Corbyn was still probing the MOD on Trident warheads, asking the MOD what was
its most recent estimate is of the cost
of the replacement of the Trident nuclear warhead system. [267184]
Labour’s Defence Secretary, John
Hutton, responded, stating: :We
published our initial estimate of the costs for the possible refurbishment or
replacement of the warhead for our future nuclear deterrent capability in the
December 2006 nuclear White Paper. This is in the range of £2 billion to £3
billion at 2006-07 prices. We have not yet made a decision to develop a new UK
nuclear warhead. However, work is being
undertaken to inform decisions, likely to be taken in the next Parliament, on
whether and how we might need to refurbish or replace our current warhead.(emphasis
added)
Corbyn followed up with a
perspicacious question - in light of
today’s Observer revelations that the
WMD warhead replacement was being undertaken behind the back of Parliamentary
scrutiny, requesting the Defence Secretary
to assure the House of Commons that there would be “no expenditure on
developing a new warhead without the specific approval of the House of
Commons,” and added the supplementary seeking assurance the MOD was “satisfied
that the development of a whole new warhead system is legal within the terms of
the nuclear non-proliferation treaty”?
Unsurprisingly,
but disingenuously, Hutton retorted: “Yes,
I believe that it certainly would be within the framework of the
non-proliferation treaty. The NPT did not require unilateral disarmament on the
part of the United Kingdom, and we are able to maintain very properly within
the terms of the NPT our minimum nuclear deterrent; and, yes, I believe that
there should be a vote in this House before such a decision was taken.”
It may be noted Corbyn asked nothing
about unilateral nuclear disarmament, but this was gratuitously included in the
answer,
(Trident, 30 March 2009, cols 650-52; https://publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200809/cmhansrd/cm090330/debtext/90330-0003.htm)
Other MPs
have explored WMD warhead replacement and deployment in earlier exchanges in
Parliament.
For
example, the inveterate peace and nuclear disarmament campaigner, Labour MP
Frank Allaun asked in March 1962 if the Government would request the United States
Government to circulate to their North Atlantic Treaty Organisation allies
details of the steps taken to ensure security of nuclear warheads where custody
pending use remains with the United States Government.
The minister Joseph Godber declined,
asserting “No, Sir. The North Atlantic Alliance is aware that the security of
such nuclear warheads is rigidly enforced and that they remain in the constant
physical custody of United States military detachments. Detailed security
arrangements are concluded bilaterally between the United States and each North
Atlantic Treaty Organisation country concerned. I see no reason to recommend
any change.
Allaun followed up asking: “But has
not the Mace already been supplied to Germany? Did not the Minister of Defence
on 20th December [1961] admit that nuclear warheads are allocated to Germans in
N.A.T.O. as they are to the British? Since the warheads in time of emergency
must be stored near the missiles, would
this not mean that they could be seized and used by German officers?”
Godber replies: “I am advised that
this is definitely not so. There is no question of this happening. The security
arrangements are strict and are stringently enforced, and I am sure that they
would cover all eventualities.
(N.A.T.O. NUCLEAR WARHEADS; HC Deb 26 March 1962 cc834-5; https://api.parliament.uk/historic-hansard/commons/1962/mar/26/nato-nuclear-warheads)
A few years
later, Labour’s Stan Orme, who later himself became a defence minister asked
the Prime Minister (Harold Wilson ) if he was aware that “for more than six
years nuclear warheads have been mounted secretly on aircraft and missiles of
West Germany and other North Atlantic Treaty Organisation allies;
Wilson
responded: “No non-nuclear members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation
have nuclear warheads under national control. The forces of a number of
non-nuclear members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation are equipped with
nuclear delivery vehicles. My information is that the warheads for these
weapons are kept under strict United States custody and control at all times.
Orme
followed up citing the New York Times;
asking the prime Minister if he was aware that this statement, first published
in the New York Times and subsequently in the British Press, has caused great
concern, and will he give an assurance that in no circumstances will there be a
German finger on the nuclear trigger? “
Harold Wilson retorted: “I am not
responsible for what appears in the Press, whether it be the New York Times or
any other newspaper. So far as the Question is concerned, the arrangements have
always been known, …and certainly as far as these particular weapons are
concerned there is no German finger on the trigger for the reason set out in my
original Answer.
(NUCLEAR
WARHEADS; HC Deb 30 November 1965 cc1234-5; https://api.parliament.uk/historic-hansard/commons/1965/nov/30/nuclear-warheads)
Labour
MP John McFall, who later chaired the Treasury select Committee and is now a
Labour peer, asked in March 1991 what review the MOD had “made of the safety of the
existing designs and designs currently under development of nuclear warheads;
what application of three-dimensional modelling has been used; and what
reconsideration has resulted of the safety case for an actual nuclear explosion
which might be accidentally or unintentionally initiated leading to the dispersal
of radioactivity and/or a nuclear yield?”.
Defence minister Archie Hamilton
said :” All of the United Kingdom's nuclear warheads are designed to meet
stringent safety requirements. Before entering operational service, the designs
are subject to a comprehensive series of trials and assessments, encompassing
normal and credible abnormal environments of in-service life, and to formal
safety approvals procedures, which are assessed independently. In addition, the
United Kingdom conducts a continuous safety review of all operationally
deployed designs by way of routine examination and sophisticated modelling.”(Nuclear Warheads; HC
Deb 25 March 1991 c300W https://api.parliament.uk/historic-hansard/written-answers/1991/mar/25/nuclear-warheads)
Left Labour
MP Llew Smith, now retired, for whom I did research for twenty odd years on
security issues, asked in April 1995 whether the figures the MOD cited (oral
answer, 28 March,Official Report, columns 817–18) on future deployment of United Kingdom nuclear
warheads include all existing categories of British land, sea and air-launched
nuclear weapons presently deployed by the Untied Kingdom or allocated to NATO.
[19335]
Churchill’s grandson, Defence
minister Nicholas Soames answered: “The figures cited are for the total number
of Untied Kingdom nuclear weapons, excluding only any awaiting final
dismantlement.”
(Nuclear Warheads; HC Deb 21 April 1995, c302W; https://api.parliament.uk/historic-hansard/written-answers/1995/apr/21/nuclear-warheads
Annex A
Select Committee on Defence Written Evidence 7 March 2006
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