“The UK is globally renowned for the quality of our
preparedness planning, and we have
world-leading capabilities to address significant biological risks.
Across local and
national Government and the Devolved Administrations, and through our work internationally, the UK
invests hundreds of millions of
pounds a
year in protecting against and preparing for disease outbreaks and biological incidents.
However, these efforts have not always been as
well co-ordinated as they could have been and we have sometimes failed
to approach these issues with an international as well as a domestic
perspective.
“Effective co-ordination and a global
world-view are essential if we are to avoid the risks of
inefficiencies and of gaps going undetected or opportunities going unexploited.
We may also fail to maximise the impact
of our activities or to tackle issues as quickly as we need to. This
approach is even more essential in the context of the evolving risk landscape.”
(my emphasis added -DL)
“For natural diseases
(whether human, animal or plant), significant work is undertaken to address the
factors that can make the emergence of natural disease outbreaks more likely. This
includes public awareness campaigns about the importance of effective hygiene in
disease prevention, comprehensive
public vaccination programmes…"
[UK Biological Security Strategy - 30 July 2018; 48 pages
The Mail
on Line news outlet reported overnight (19-20 March 2020) - see Annex below for full text - that up to 20
nuclear navy workers could have contracted
Covid19 at the Faslane Trident nuclear submarine base in Holy Loch off the Clyde River estuary in Western Scotland.
This raises the question of how well
protected are our critical national nuclear installations- including nuclear
submarine bases, nuclear weapons manufacturing plant such as AWE Aldermaston
and Burgfield near Reading in Berkshire and civil nuclear power plants and
associate nuclear fuel chain facilities such as Sellafield* in Cumbria and
Capenhurst in Cheshire- from being overwhelmed
by a rapid spread of a virus without any known antidote c vaccine?
*Sellafield has already reported two cases and is in active close down. (Carlisle News & Star 15th March 2020; https://www.newsandstar.co.uk/news/18306310.exclusive-sellafield-worker-coronavirus/)
As a member of the Chief Nuclear Inspector’s Independent Advisory Panel (which should have
met today in Liverpool, but had to be postponed due to the Coronavirus dislocation),
I asked the UK national safety and security regulator -
The Office for Nuclear Regulation (ONR) ten days ago what provisions they had made the event of a viral threat to the plants
and to the regulator’s own ability to
regulate. (ONR regulate all civil nuclear plants and is co-regulator of
military nuclear plants with the Defence Nuclear Safety Regulator, of which more
below)
Here is a note in response to myself from r David Lowry from Katie Day,
Director, Policy and Communications, Office for Nuclear Regulation, (based at 4S.3, Redgrave Court, Merton Road, Bootle, L20 7HS) on 16 March 2020
+++++
/_ONR Internal Arrangements_/
/We have business continuity plans and incident management procedures in
place for a range of scenarios. We have recently tested these plans and
incident management arrangements and are confident that we would be able
to continue to operate essential services./
//
/_External Arrangements_/
/All civil nuclear sites have minimum staffing levels, and contingency
plans should they fall below these levels, to enable them to remain in
control of activities that could impact on nuclear safety under all
foreseeable circumstances throughout the life cycle of the facility.
This is enforced through nuclear site licence condition 36 (LC36)^made
under the Nuclear Installations Act. /
//
/An ONR Technical Assessment Guide (focused on staffing levels and task
organisation) sets out ONR’s expectations on appropriate numbers of
Suitably Qualified and Experienced Persons (SQEPs). You can find it on
our website./
//
/In addition, licensees need minimum staffing levels to comply with
their on-site and off-site emergency plans. The on-site arrangements are
covered under nuclear site licence condition 11 (LC11) and are tested on
an annual basis, with the exception of some low hazard sites where
modular testing arrangements are in place. Again, an ONR Technical
Inspection Guide on LC11 gives their expectations, also on our website./
//
/Under the Nuclear Industries Security Regulations 2003, nuclear site
security plans must describe the manner in which the premises are to be
policed and guarded, including the number of such personnel who will
normally be present and the contingency measures to be implemented
should this level of staffing not be achieved./
//
/Staff rotas at nuclear sites are resilient to keep generation running
in scenarios including pandemic or industrial action. If a generating
site needed to be shut down for any reason, it would be shut down
safely. In the case of a complex, non-generating site like Sellafield,
operations would be scaled back to a level necessary to sustain
essential safety operations. /
/In line with the arrangements set out above, our inspectors are in
contact with licensees, as appropriate, given the developing national
and international situation./
+++++
/_ONR Internal Arrangements_/
/We have business continuity plans and incident management procedures in
place for a range of scenarios. We have recently tested these plans and
incident management arrangements and are confident that we would be able
to continue to operate essential services./
//
/_External Arrangements_/
/All civil nuclear sites have minimum staffing levels, and contingency
plans should they fall below these levels, to enable them to remain in
control of activities that could impact on nuclear safety under all
foreseeable circumstances throughout the life cycle of the facility.
This is enforced through nuclear site licence condition 36 (LC36)^made
under the Nuclear Installations Act. /
//
/An ONR Technical Assessment Guide (focused on staffing levels and task
organisation) sets out ONR’s expectations on appropriate numbers of
Suitably Qualified and Experienced Persons (SQEPs). You can find it on
our website./
//
/In addition, licensees need minimum staffing levels to comply with
their on-site and off-site emergency plans. The on-site arrangements are
covered under nuclear site licence condition 11 (LC11) and are tested on
an annual basis, with the exception of some low hazard sites where
modular testing arrangements are in place. Again, an ONR Technical
Inspection Guide on LC11 gives their expectations, also on our website./
//
/Under the Nuclear Industries Security Regulations 2003, nuclear site
security plans must describe the manner in which the premises are to be
policed and guarded, including the number of such personnel who will
normally be present and the contingency measures to be implemented
should this level of staffing not be achieved./
//
/Staff rotas at nuclear sites are resilient to keep generation running
in scenarios including pandemic or industrial action. If a generating
site needed to be shut down for any reason, it would be shut down
safely. In the case of a complex, non-generating site like Sellafield,
operations would be scaled back to a level necessary to sustain
essential safety operations. /
/In line with the arrangements set out above, our inspectors are in
contact with licensees, as appropriate, given the developing national
and international situation./
Annex
This
collects together much important primary information from the ONR, DNSR, and the
Government’s extraordinary 48 page manual ‘The UK Biological Security
Strategy, issued as recently as 30 July
2018, and apparently unread by the current Chief Medical Officer and Chief Scientific
Officer, who jointly are frighteningly the
two key prime ministerial advisors trying
to keep us all safe!
Coronavirus (COVID-19) – ONR Position
17 March, 2020
In response to Government advice issued on 16 March,
2020, ONR staff have been directed to work at home while ensuring we maintain
effective regulatory oversight.
A number of inspectors will continue to travel to
sites where required but we will endeavour to carry out as much of our business
as possible via phone, email and Skype. These measures will not have a severe
impact on our regulation of the nuclear industry.
We are actively engaged with all our nuclear sites to
ensure that appropriate contingency plans are in place, given the developing
national and international situation.
The UK’s nuclear industry is mature and responsible,
with an excellent nuclear safety record, and we expect it to continue to make
responsible and risk-based decisions as it responds to the challenges of the
pandemic.
All sites have minimum staffing levels, and
contingency plans should they fall below these levels, to enable them to remain
in control of activities that could impact on nuclear safety under all
foreseeable circumstances, including pandemic disease.
We remain actively engaged with site licensees to
ensure the protection of the public and will continue to take decisions aimed
at protecting the health and wellbeing of our staff.
ONR is leading by example, following the latest advice
from the Government and Chief Medical Officer to help delay the
Defence Nuclear Safety
Regulator (DNSR)
The Defence Nuclear Safety
Regulator is responsible for the regulation of nuclear safety across the
Defence Nuclear Enterprise.
Policy paper
Secretary of State for Defence policy statement on
health, safety and environmental protection
This policy statement sets out the MOD’s legal
obligations and the requirements of the Secretary of State for Defence from
individuals, managers and commanders.
Published 12 July
2013
Last updated 20 July 2018 — see all updates
Last updated 20 July 2018 — see all updates
From:
Documents
HEALTH,
SAFETY AND ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION IN DEFENCE
Policy
Statement by the Secretary of State for Defence
1. I make the
following Policy Statement for all health, safety and environmental protection
(HS&EP) matters
in Defence because, as Secretary of State, I am answerable to Parliament for
such
matters and to
comply with a requirement of the Health and Safety at Work etc. Act. In doing so,
I emphasise the
importance which I attach to the health and safety of those who deliver Defence
activities
(including the Armed Forces, MOD civilians and contractors where Defence owes a
legal Duty
of Care) and those
who may be affected by Defence activities and to the protection of the
environment.
This Policy
Statement is a commitment of my personal leadership in this area and I rely on
all
those also in
leadership roles to ensure my policy is applied throughout Defence.
GENERAL DUTIES
2. I require that:
a. We minimise
work-related fatalities, injuries, ill-health and adverse effects on the
environment, and we
reduce health and safety risks so that they are as low as reasonably
practicable
(ALARP).
b. Within the
United Kingdom (UK) we comply with all applicable HS&EP legislation.
c. Overseas we
apply our UK standards and arrangements where reasonably practicable
and, in addition,
respond to host nations’ relevant HS&EP expectations.
d. Where Defence
has exemptions, derogations or dis-applications from HS&EP
legislation, we
maintain Departmental arrangements that produce outcomes that are, so far as
reasonably
practicable, at least as good as those required by UK legislation.
e. Those of us in
positions of management or command, from the Defence Board
downwards, lead by
example on HS&EP by giving it the priority it deserves and maintain a
climate that
promotes a safety culture where everyone is empowered to contribute to
HS&EP
objectives.
f. We take
reasonable care of the health and safety of ourselves and others who may be
affected by our
acts or omissions at work, we protect the environment and we co-operate with
arrangements that
are in place to enable us to discharge the duties placed on us.
GOVERNANCE
3. As the
Department’s most senior official for HS&EP matters, the Permanent
Secretary (Perm
Sec) is to ensure
that effective management arrangements are in place to achieve compliance with
this
Policy Statement,
which may be amplified as appropriate, drawing on advice as necessary from
across
the Department. The
Perm Sec is to include HS&EP performance in the Department’s
holding-toaccount
process.
1
4. I appoint
Director General Defence Safety Authority (DG DSA) by Charter to provide me
with
independent
assurance that my policy is being promoted and implemented in the conduct of
Defence
activities. This is
achieved through 3 distinct functions; as Regulator of compliance with my
policy
where Defence has
authority; Investigator of safety-related accidents, incidents and near misses;
and,
as Defence Authority
in setting policy and assuring standards. In this respect, I require DG DSA to
produce an Annual
Assurance Report (AAR) for my consideration and by the Defence Board.
5. I require each
the Top Level Budget Holder (TLBH) or Chief Executive of a Defence Executive
Agency (CDEA) to
set down and implement HS&EP management arrangements through a Safety and
Environment
Management System (SEMS) for activities in his/her Area of responsibility (AoR)
and
ensure that
commanding officers and managers to whom he/she may delegate HS&EP
authority are
competent and have
adequate resources at their disposal.
6. Where a Defence
activity leads to a Risk to Life that requires management through enhanced
safety management
arrangements, I require the TLBH or CDEA to be appointed as the Senior Duty
Holder (SDH), in
addition to his/her legal HS&EP responsibilities. If an SDH considers that
a risk from
a Defence activity
cannot be mitigated so that it is ALARP, he/she is to refer it to me.
7. Any TLBH or CDEA
proposing organisational change, where there is potential for significant
impact on HS&EP
standards and performance, is to ensure that, before being implemented, the
impacts of the
proposed change are properly assessed through an Organisational Safety
Assessment
(OSA) in order to
demonstrate that any detriment to these standards and performance are mitigated
to
ALARP.
8. The detailed
organisation and arrangements that amplify this Policy Statement are to be set
out
in policy
requirements, Defence Regulations and guidance produced by DG DSA.
REVIEW AND
AMENDMENT
9. This policy
remains in effect through any changes of the Secretary of State, PS or DG DSA.
I require DG DSA to
maintain my policy’s alignment to any relevant changes in legislation or
Defence
governance
arrangements. He/she may propose amendments at any time, consulting with the
Perm
Sec and Defence
Safety Committee (DSC). I will review this policy at least every fifth year.
PDF, 53.7KB, 2 pages
Details
Health and safety and the protection of the environment
have always been at the centre of the Ministry of Defence’s (MOD) policy making
and its activities. The MOD needs to manage these responsibilities in a
consistent manner and the Secretary of State’s policy statement provides the
high level framework under which this is done.
This policy statement dated July 2018 replaces the
version published in August 2014.
Published 12 July
2013
Last updated 20 July 2018 + show all updates
Last updated 20 July 2018 + show all updates
Policy paper
Secretary of State for Defence policy statement on health, safety and
environmental protection
This policy statement sets out the MOD’s legal
obligations and the requirements of the Secretary of State for Defence from
individuals, managers and commanders.
Published 12 July
2013
Last updated 20 July 2018 — see all updates
Last updated 20 July 2018 — see all updates
HEALTH, SAFETY AND ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION IN DEFENCE
Policy Statement by the Secretary of State for Defence
1. I make the following Policy Statement for all health, safety and
environmental protection
(HS&EP) matters in Defence because, as Secretary of State, I am
answerable to Parliament for such
matters and to comply with a requirement of the Health and Safety at
Work etc. Act. In doing so,
I emphasise the importance which I attach to the health and safety of
those who deliver Defence
activities (including the Armed Forces, MOD civilians and contractors
where Defence owes a legal Duty
of Care) and those who may be affected by Defence activities and to the
protection of the environment.
This Policy Statement is a commitment of my personal leadership in this
area and I rely on all
those also in leadership roles to ensure my policy is applied throughout
Defence.
GENERAL DUTIES
2. I require that:
a. We minimise work-related fatalities, injuries, ill-health and adverse
effects on the
environment, and we reduce health and safety risks so that they are as
low as reasonably
practicable (ALARP).
b. Within the United Kingdom (UK) we comply with all applicable
HS&EP legislation.
c. Overseas we apply our UK standards and arrangements where reasonably
practicable
and, in addition, respond to host nations’ relevant HS&EP
expectations.
d. Where Defence has exemptions, derogations or dis-applications from
HS&EP
legislation, we maintain Departmental arrangements that produce outcomes
that are, so far as
reasonably practicable, at least as good as those required by UK legislation.
e. Those of us in positions of management or command, from the Defence
Board
downwards, lead by example on HS&EP by giving it the priority it
deserves and maintain a
climate that promotes a safety culture where everyone is empowered to
contribute to HS&EP
objectives.
f. We take reasonable care of the health and safety of ourselves and
others who may be
affected by our acts or omissions at work, we protect the environment
and we co-operate with
arrangements that are in place to enable us to discharge the duties
placed on us.
GOVERNANCE
3. As the Department’s most senior official for HS&EP matters, the
Permanent Secretary (Perm
Sec) is to ensure that effective management arrangements are in place to
achieve compliance with this
Policy Statement, which may be amplified as appropriate, drawing on
advice as necessary from across
the Department. The Perm Sec is to include HS&EP performance in the
Department’s holding-toaccount
process.
1
4. I appoint Director General Defence Safety Authority (DG DSA) by Charter
to provide me with
independent assurance that my policy is being promoted and implemented
in the conduct of Defence
activities. This is achieved through 3 distinct functions; as Regulator
of compliance with my policy
where Defence has authority; Investigator of safety-related accidents,
incidents and near misses; and,
as Defence Authority in setting policy and assuring standards. In this
respect, I require DG DSA to
produce an Annual Assurance Report (AAR) for my consideration and by the
Defence Board.
5. I require each the Top Level Budget Holder (TLBH) or Chief Executive
of a Defence Executive
Agency (CDEA) to set down and implement HS&EP management
arrangements through a Safety and
Environment Management System (SEMS) for activities in his/her Area of
responsibility (AoR) and
ensure that commanding officers and managers to whom he/she may delegate
HS&EP authority are
competent and have adequate resources at their disposal.
6. Where a Defence activity leads to a Risk to Life that requires
management through enhanced
safety management arrangements, I require the TLBH or CDEA to be
appointed as the Senior Duty
Holder (SDH), in addition to his/her legal HS&EP responsibilities.
If an SDH considers that a risk from
a Defence activity cannot be mitigated so that it is ALARP, he/she is to
refer it to me.
7. Any TLBH or CDEA proposing organisational change, where there is
potential for significant
impact on HS&EP standards and performance, is to ensure that, before
being implemented, the
impacts of the proposed change are properly assessed through an
Organisational Safety Assessment
(OSA) in order to demonstrate that any detriment to these standards and
performance are mitigated to
ALARP.
8. The detailed organisation and arrangements that amplify this Policy
Statement are to be set out
in policy requirements, Defence Regulations and guidance produced by DG
DSA.
REVIEW AND AMENDMENT
9. This policy remains in effect through any changes of the Secretary of
State, PS or DG DSA.
I require DG DSA to maintain my policy’s alignment to any relevant
changes in legislation or Defence
governance arrangements. He/she may propose amendments at any time,
consulting with the Perm
Sec and Defence Safety Committee (DSC). I will review this policy at
least every fifth year.
SECRETARY OF STATE FOR DEFENCE
20 June 2018
2
Contents
1.
Who we are
2.
What we do
3.
Vision
4.
Mission
5.
Contact us
Who we
are
Part of the Defence Safety Authority, the Defence Nuclear
Safety Regulator (DNSR) is responsible for regulating the nuclear hazards of
the Defence Nuclear Enterprise (DNE) consisting of the Naval Nuclear Propulsion
Programme and the Nuclear Weapon Programme, where the Ministry of Defence has specific
exemptions from statute: these concern the through-life safety of the Nuclear
Reactor Plant and Nuclear Weapon activities.
The arrangements for, and management of, nuclear
safety across the Defence Nuclear Enterprise, must meet the exceptionally high
standards required by applicable legislation, defence policy and relevant good
practice within the nuclear industry.
DNSR consists of a team of Civilian and Naval staff
who are predominately nuclear specialist engineers and scientists, supported by
a small administrative team. Additionally, DNSR draws on contracted subject
matter expertise from The Regulatory Support Directorate of Wood Group and the
Defence Scientific and Technical Laboratory to provide capabilities it is not
possible or sensible to permanently retain in-house.
What we
do
The DNSR’s primary function is the regulation of
nuclear safety across the DNE, holding individuals to account and providing
independent assurance of compliance against the Secretary of State for Defence Policy Statement on Health Safety and Environmental
Protection which requires that; “Where defence has exemptions,
derogations or dis-applications from HS&EP legislation, we maintain
Departmental arrangements that produce outcomes that are, so far as reasonably
practicable, at least as good as those required by UK legislation. To achieve
this, the DNSR aligns our regulation as closely as possible to that of the
Office for Nuclear Regulation, deviating only where necessary.
Regulation
DNSR provides non-prescriptive goal setting
regulation, utilising authorisation conditions akin to the civil sectors
Licence Conditions augmented by Further Authorisation Conditions (FAC) and
Approval and Design Authority Accreditation Conditions.
Our
Regulations
Joint Service Publication 518 Regulation of the Naval
Nuclear Propulsion Programme and, Joint Service Publication 538 Regulation of the Nuclear
Weapons Programme.
It should be noted that our regulations and Operating
Model are being reviewed throughout 2018 to 2019.
Most of Defence Nuclear Safety Regulator staff are
Nuclear Inspectors whose working life is spent being the eyes and ears on the ground,
examining the arrangements of our regulated community against the regulations
which we set and also wider good practice from the Nuclear industry looking for
compliance, emergent good practice and continuous improvement.
In addition to examining arrangements we also examine
nuclear designs, activities, and permission the transportation of defence
nuclear materials and approve the containers utilised.
By working closely with colleagues from the statutory
and other defence regulators, we generate benefits for our mutual regulated
communities through consistent and joined-up regulation, their interpretation
and enforcement.
The DNSR acknowledges key interfaces with the
statutory nuclear safety regulator, the Office for Nuclear Regulation and with
the environmental regulators, the Environment Agency and Scottish Environmental
Protection Agency.
Within defence the DNSR works closely with the Defence
Maritime Regulator, the Defence Ordnance and Munitions and Explosives Regulator
and the Defence Nuclear Security regulator, recognising the interfaces and
dependences between us.
Vision
Nuclear capability which is demonstrably safe and
available to meet the needs of defence.
Mission
To regulate the nuclear hazards of the Defence Nuclear
Programme, as a trusted independent regulator in defence.
Contact
us
By post:
Enquiries
Defence safety Authority - Defence Nuclear Safety Regulator
Mail point #2003
Mod Abbey Wood South
Bristol
BS34 8JH
Defence safety Authority - Defence Nuclear Safety Regulator
Mail point #2003
Mod Abbey Wood South
Bristol
BS34 8JH
Email: dsa-dnsr-enquiries@mod.gov.uk
Related
Information
UK Biological Security Strategy
30 July 2018
It
opens with the following prophetic and chilling words in the foreword from the
then Security minister, Ben Wallace, now Defence Secretary: “Significant outbreaks of disease are among the
highest impact risks faced by any society – threatening lives and causing
disruption to public services and the economy. This is true whether such
outbreaks occur naturally, such as pandemic influenza or emerging infectious
diseases, or in the less likely event of a disease being caused by an
accidental release from scientific or industrial facilities, or as the result
of a deliberate biological attack.” Empty
words followed if recent experience is anything to go by, when Wallace
asserted:….“we are exposed to
these risks, both at home and overseas, but it also gives us the opportunity to
work with international partners to tackle such threats at source.”
If only!
Wallace concluded : We cannot
predict all the ways in which this risk landscape will evolve in the future,
but it is by breaking down barriers, working in a co-ordinated way across and
beyond Government, and thinking globally that we will be best prepared to meet
the threat of significant disease outbreaks (however they occur).”
The 2015 National Security Risk
Assessment
(NSRA1), based on a judgement of both
likelihood and impact, identifies
a major human
health crisis (such as pandemic
influenza) as
one of the most significant civil
emergency
risks facing the UK (a Tier One
risk). Such an
outbreak could have the potential
to cause
hundreds of thousands of
fatalities and to cost
the UK tens of billions of pounds.
www.gov.uk/government/
uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/555607/2015
The pace of global technological change
and
the democratisation of scientific
knowledge
have the potential to shape the biological
risk picture in the future – both
positively and
negatively. While a deliberate biological
attack
against the UK by a state or terrorist
group
is unlikely, technology and the spread of
scientific knowledge online have the
potential
to bring the necessary tools within the
reach
of an increasing number of actors.
However,
these developments have potential to bring
great benefit, creating opportunities for
new
preventive, diagnostic and treatment
options
for diseases of epidemic and pandemic
potential, new means of detecting and
addressing potential risks, and
significant
possibilities for our world-leading
biological
sciences sector – which generates more
than
220,000 jobs and over £60 billion each
year
The pace of global technological change
and
the democratisation of scientific
knowledge
have the potential to shape the biological
risk picture in the future – both
positively and
negatively. While a deliberate biological
attack
against the UK by a state or terrorist
group
is unlikely, technology and the spread of
scientific knowledge online have the
potential
to bring the necessary tools within the
reach
of an increasing number of actors.
However,
these developments have potential to bring
great benefit, creating opportunities for
new
preventive, diagnostic and treatment
options
for diseases of epidemic and pandemic
potential, new means of detecting and
addressing potential risks, and significant
possibilities for our world-leading
biological
sciences sector – which generates more
than
220,000 jobs and over £60 billion each
year
for our economy – to add to UK prosperity.
A UK Biological Security Strategy
This document sets out our strategy for
meeting these challenges and exploiting
the opportunities – some of this will be
achievable within this Parliament, while
some
will only be achievable in the longer
term.
Alongside this strategy we must be
conscious of a range of other relevant
national and international programmes,
strategies and future work programmes.
These include the vision set out in the
2015
Strategic Defence and Security Review, our
Global Health Security and UK
Antimicrobial
Resistance Strategy, and our counter
terrorism strategy CONTEST, the National
Counter-Proliferation Strategy to 2020,
the
UK Influenza Preparedness Strategy, the
Strategy for UK Life Sciences, the Vision
and high level Strategy for UK Animal
and Plant Health Research to 2020 and
Beyond, and the Strategy for Agricultural
Technologies and the Department for
International Development’s (DFID’s) 2016
Research Review.
This strategy does not seek to duplicate
or replace the work set out in those other
documents (many of which focus on specific
areas within this landscape in more
detail),
but rather to set out an overarching
narrative
for how the cross-Government effort fits
together, and to highlight those areas
where
we will seek to do more collectively.
E. All elements of our response must be
underpinned by the right scientific
capabilities and capacity – now and in
the future.
F. We must be able to take advantage of
the opportunities that the biological
sector offers the UK, as well as thinking
about the risks.
We will ensure even more effective
information sharing through a cross-
Government biological assessment
working group. This will include:
– better use of data sharing, including
through exploring options for a cross-
Government data platform to allow
sharing between sectors; and
– long term trend mapping of emerging
biological risks.
• We will improve our communication
of risk information to the public, and
our communication with the private,
academic and third sectors, to enhance
biological risk awareness and to drive
innovation in addressing that risk,
including by learning from areas of good
practice. In doing this we will build on
work already undertaken such as the UK
Plant Health Risk Register, which enables
any interested party to see at what level
Defra has rated the risk to the UK from
more than 900 plant pests and diseases.
• We
will continue to work with international
partners
to:
–
share understanding of the risks; and
–
understand where the UK and other
countries
have gaps in their capabilities.
Preventing
biological risks - Internationally
The
UK is a leading supporter of the
international
rules-based system and is
actively
engaged in the international forums
and
organisations that work to strengthen
biological
security around the world. These
include
the:
•
World Health Organization (WHO);
• Food
and Agriculture Organization (FAO);
•
World Organisation for Animal Health (OIE);
•
Global Health Security Agenda (GHSA);
Our
commitment to spend £120 million to
develop
vaccines for diseases with epidemic
potential
in low and middle income countries
and
investing over £500 million in tackling
AMR
internationally are just two examples
of
our direct preventative action for natural
risks
globally.
EXCLUSIVE: Coronavirus crisis at UK's nuclear
submarine base as twenty staff show COVID-19 symptoms and are forced into
isolation
- A makeshift quarantine unit has been created on a
floor of the nuclear base
- Staff have complained at being 'left in the dark'
about the virus risk at the facility
- An MoD source insisted that Britain's nuclear
deterrent remains fully operational
- Coronavirus symptoms: what are they and
should you see a doctor?
Published: 20:08, 19 March 2020 |
Updated: 22:01, 19 March 2020
Britain's Trident nuclear submarine
base is in the grip of a Coronavirus scare, MailOnline can
reveal.
Her Majesty's Naval Base Clyde, the
home of the UK nuclear deterrent in Scotland, has nearly 20 possible cases of
infection so far.
Servicemen and women reporting
Covid-19 symptoms have been isolated in sealed rooms with 'no entry' signs
taped to the doors.
The number of possible victims is
currently in the 'low teens', a source said, and preparations are underway for
a major outbreak.
The top floor of the Linton Block,
one of 17 accommodation buildings at the facility, has been converted into a
makeshift quarantine unit and sealed off.
A medical team equipped with masks
and yellow biohazard bags was seen at work on the base last week.
+5
A Trident nuclear submarine is
pictured at the Faslane naval base, Scotland, in 2007
A Ministry of Defence source
insisted that Britain's nuclear deterrent remains fully operational and that
there is no possibility of a national security emergency.
So far nobody has tested positive
on the base, he added, though he acknowledged that testing has not been carried
out in every case, in line with Government guidelines.
Staff have complained at being 'left
in the dark', saying they have not been informed about the virus risk at the
facility.
'Nobody knows what is going on and
it's making people frightened,' one told MailOnline on condition of anonymity.
'We have not had a single
communication to tell us what is happening, and every day more rooms are sealed
off.
'Everyone here is expected to put
our lives on the line for the Navy. We just want the Navy to level with us and
tell us what the risk is.'
A Ministry of Defence source said
that the jigsaw of different private firms and Navy units that operate the base
has made it difficult to communicate news about the virus effectively to all
staff.
The source said: 'The base is
endeavouring to ensure all personnel are aware of the situation and the
measures being taken to safeguard personnel.'
HMNB Clyde, commonly known
throughout the Navy as 'Faslane', is home to 3,000 service personnel, 800 of
their families and 4,000 civilian workers, mainly from the engineering firm
Babcock International.
The Linton Block, where the
quarantine facility is being set up, is opposite the 'Supermess', one of the
base's major leisure hubs.
In addition to separate bars for
officers and sailors, there are restaurants, cafes and shops, with a bowling
alley, ski slope, swimming pool and gym nearby.
All of these are now seen as a
'petri dish for the virus', according to personnel serving at the site, and
most are being closed down as the top brass prepares for the worst.
The sports schedules, which include
circuit training and team events such as football, rugby and boxing, have been
cancelled, and the swimming pool has been shut in an effort to combat the
spread of the disease.
The quarantine area consists of
about 24 single rooms – known as 'cabins' in Navy jargon – each containing a
double bed, wardrobe, desk and chair, chest of drawers, bedside cabinet and
television table.
Each also has a walk-in shower,
en-suite lavatory and sink.
Cleaning staff normally service the
cabins once a week and there are communal kitchens with washing machines and
tumble dryers.
A Royal Navy spokesman said: 'The
Ministry of Defence has put in place robust plans to ensure the delivery of key
operations in the UK and overseas and we are confident that essential defence
tasks will be maintained during this time.
'Any serving personnel who are
showing symptoms will follow the advice and guidance issued by Public Health
England. Whilst sensible precautions are being taken, all required outputs are
being maintained at HM Naval Base Clyde.'
The base in Faslane, about 40miles
northwest of Glasgow, is the home of the Submarine Service, and is the Royal
Navy's main presence in Scotland.
In addition to Trident, Britain's
nuclear deterrent, it houses the new generation of hunter-killer submarines.
The site is run in partnership with
Babcock International, a civilian firm that provides specialist engineering
services and manages the base's critical infrastructure and nuclear facilities.
The Royal Naval Armaments Depot at
Coulport, eight miles from Faslane, is responsible for the storage and
maintenance of Trident and all submarine weaponry.
Today it was announced that three
more people in Scotland have died after testing positive for Coronavirus,
taking the country's total number of deaths to six.
The total number of people in
Scotland who have contracted Covid-19 stands at 266, an increase of 39 in 24
hours.
The First Minister, Nicola
Sturgeon, said that the figure was 'likely to be an underestimate of the true
prevalence of the infection.'
The number of cases in Wales now stands
at 170, an overnight increase of 24, and Northern Ireland recorded its first
death today – one of 68 people who have tested positive there.
Britain as a whole has recorded 108
deaths and 2,689 confirmed cases of Coronavirus.
Coronavirus: Workers at UK's nuclear
submarine base 'show symptoms of killer bug'
There is believed to be nearly 20 possible cases of
coronavirus at Her Majesty's Naval Base Clyde in Scotland. A makeshift
quarantine unit has been set up on the site
By Lorraine King
Daily
Mirror, 20 MAR 2020
www.mirror.co.uk/news/uk-news/coronavirus-workers-uks-nuclear-submarine-21723183
Several workers at Britain's Trident
nuclear submarine base have reportedly been quarantine after showing symptoms
of coronavirus.
It is feared there could be up to 20
possible cases of Covid-19 at Her Majesty's Naval Base Clyde, the UK nuclear
deterrent in Scotland, although the Ministry of Defence say there have been no
cases confirmed yet.
Servicemen and women experiencing symptoms of the
killer bug have been isolated in sealed rooms with 'no entry' signs on the
doors, Mail Online reports.
A makeshift sealed quarantine unit is
claimed to have been set up on the top floor of the Linton Block, one of 17
accommodation buildings at the facility.
A medical team equipped with masks and
yellow biohazard bags spotted at work on the base last week.
A source reportedly said the base, also
known as Faslane, is being prepared for a major outbreak of the killer bug that
has claimed the lives of 144 in the UK.
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