Friday 20 March 2020

Reasons to be (very) fearful: critical national nuclear infrastructure under rapid viral threat


The UK is globally renowned for the quality of our preparedness planning, and we have world-leading capabilities to address significant biological risks.

Across local and national Government and the Devolved Administrations, and through our work internationally, the UK invests hundreds of millions of pounds a year in protecting against and preparing for disease outbreaks and biological incidents.

However, these efforts have not always been as well co-ordinated as they could have been and we have sometimes failed to approach these issues with an international as well as a domestic perspective. 

Effective co-ordination and a global world-view are essential if we are to avoid the risks of inefficiencies and of gaps going undetected or opportunities going unexploited.
We may also fail to maximise the impact of our activities or to tackle issues as quickly as we need to. This approach is even more essential in the context of the evolving risk landscape.
(my emphasis added -DL)

“For natural diseases (whether human, animal or plant), significant work is undertaken to address the factors that can make the emergence of natural disease outbreaks more likely. This includes public awareness campaigns about the importance of effective hygiene in disease prevention, comprehensive public vaccination programmes…"

[UK Biological Security Strategy - 30 July 2018; 48 pages


 
 
The Mail on Line news outlet reported overnight (19-20 March 2020) - see Annex below for full text - that up to 20 nuclear navy  workers could have contracted Covid19 at the Faslane Trident nuclear submarine base in Holy Loch  off the Clyde River estuary in Western Scotland. 

This raises the question of how well protected are our critical national nuclear installations- including nuclear submarine bases, nuclear weapons manufacturing plant such as AWE Aldermaston and Burgfield near Reading in Berkshire and civil nuclear power plants and associate nuclear fuel chain facilities such as Sellafield* in Cumbria and Capenhurst in Cheshire- from being overwhelmed  by a rapid spread of a virus without any known antidote c vaccine?

 

*Sellafield has already reported two cases and is in active close down. (Carlisle News & Star 15th March 2020; https://www.newsandstar.co.uk/news/18306310.exclusive-sellafield-worker-coronavirus/)

As a member of the Chief Nuclear Inspector’s  Independent Advisory Panel (which should have met today in Liverpool, but had to be postponed due to the Coronavirus dislocation),  I asked the  UK national safety and security regulator - The Office for Nuclear Regulation (ONR) ten days ago what provisions they  had made the event of a viral threat to the plants and to the  regulator’s own ability to regulate. (ONR regulate all civil nuclear plants and is co-regulator of military nuclear plants with the Defence Nuclear Safety Regulator, of which more below)

 

Here is  a note in response to myself  from r David Lowry from Katie Day,  Director, Policy and Communications, Office for Nuclear Regulation,  (based at 4S.3, Redgrave Court, Merton Road, Bootle, L20 7HS) on 16 March 2020

+++++

/_ONR Internal Arrangements_/

/We have business continuity plans and incident management procedures in
place for a range of scenarios. We have recently tested these plans and
incident management arrangements and are confident that we would be able
to continue to operate essential services./

//

/_External Arrangements_/

/All civil nuclear sites have minimum staffing levels, and contingency
plans should they fall below these levels, to enable them to remain in
control of activities that could impact on nuclear safety under all
foreseeable circumstances throughout the life cycle of the facility.
This is enforced through nuclear site licence condition 36 (LC36)^made
under the Nuclear Installations Act. /

//

/An ONR Technical Assessment Guide (focused on staffing levels and task
organisation) sets out ONR’s expectations on appropriate numbers of
Suitably Qualified and Experienced Persons (SQEPs). You can find it on
our website./

//

/In addition, licensees need minimum staffing levels to comply with
their on-site and off-site emergency plans. The on-site arrangements are
covered under nuclear site licence condition 11 (LC11) and are tested on
an annual basis, with the exception of some low hazard sites where
modular testing arrangements are in place. Again, an ONR Technical
Inspection Guide on LC11 gives their expectations, also on our website./

//

/Under the Nuclear Industries Security Regulations 2003, nuclear site
security plans must describe the manner in which the premises are to be
policed and guarded, including the number of such personnel who will
normally be present and the contingency measures to be implemented
should this level of staffing not be achieved./

//

/Staff rotas at nuclear sites are resilient to keep generation running
in scenarios including pandemic or industrial action. If a generating
site needed to be shut down for any reason, it would be shut down
safely. In the case of a complex, non-generating site like Sellafield,
operations would be scaled back to a level necessary to sustain
essential safety operations. /

/In line with the arrangements set out above, our inspectors are in
contact with licensees, as appropriate, given the developing national
and international situation./

 

 

Annex

This collects together much important primary information from the ONR, DNSR, and the Government’s extraordinary 48 page manual ‘The UK Biological Security Strategy, issued as recently as  30 July 2018, and apparently unread by the current  Chief Medical Officer and Chief Scientific Officer,  who jointly are frighteningly the two key  prime ministerial advisors trying to keep  us all safe!

 

Coronavirus (COVID-19) – ONR Position

17 March, 2020


In response to Government advice issued on 16 March, 2020, ONR staff have been directed to work at home while ensuring we maintain effective regulatory oversight.

A number of inspectors will continue to travel to sites where required but we will endeavour to carry out as much of our business as possible via phone, email and Skype. These measures will not have a severe impact on our regulation of the nuclear industry.

We are actively engaged with all our nuclear sites to ensure that appropriate contingency plans are in place, given the developing national and international situation.

The UK’s nuclear industry is mature and responsible, with an excellent nuclear safety record, and we expect it to continue to make responsible and risk-based decisions as it responds to the challenges of the pandemic.

All sites have minimum staffing levels, and contingency plans should they fall below these levels, to enable them to remain in control of activities that could impact on nuclear safety under all foreseeable circumstances, including pandemic disease.

We remain actively engaged with site licensees to ensure the protection of the public and will continue to take decisions aimed at protecting the health and wellbeing of our staff.

ONR is leading by example, following the latest advice from the Government and Chief Medical Officer to help delay the

 Defence Nuclear Safety Regulator (DNSR)


 

The Defence Nuclear Safety Regulator is responsible for the regulation of nuclear safety across the Defence Nuclear Enterprise.

 

Policy paper

Secretary of State for Defence policy statement on health, safety and environmental protection

This policy statement sets out the MOD’s legal obligations and the requirements of the Secretary of State for Defence from individuals, managers and commanders.

Published 12 July 2013
Last updated 20 July 2018 — see all updates

From:


Documents

https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/727413/thumbnail_2018_Policy_statement_by_SofS_HSandEP_with_MOD_Logo.pdf.png

HEALTH, SAFETY AND ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION IN DEFENCE

Policy Statement by the Secretary of State for Defence

1. I make the following Policy Statement for all health, safety and environmental protection

(HS&EP) matters in Defence because, as Secretary of State, I am answerable to Parliament for such

matters and to comply with a requirement of the Health and Safety at Work etc. Act. In doing so,

I emphasise the importance which I attach to the health and safety of those who deliver Defence

activities (including the Armed Forces, MOD civilians and contractors where Defence owes a legal Duty

of Care) and those who may be affected by Defence activities and to the protection of the environment.

This Policy Statement is a commitment of my personal leadership in this area and I rely on all

those also in leadership roles to ensure my policy is applied throughout Defence.

GENERAL DUTIES

2. I require that:

a. We minimise work-related fatalities, injuries, ill-health and adverse effects on the

environment, and we reduce health and safety risks so that they are as low as reasonably

practicable (ALARP).

b. Within the United Kingdom (UK) we comply with all applicable HS&EP legislation.

c. Overseas we apply our UK standards and arrangements where reasonably practicable

and, in addition, respond to host nations’ relevant HS&EP expectations.

d. Where Defence has exemptions, derogations or dis-applications from HS&EP

legislation, we maintain Departmental arrangements that produce outcomes that are, so far as

reasonably practicable, at least as good as those required by UK legislation.

e. Those of us in positions of management or command, from the Defence Board

downwards, lead by example on HS&EP by giving it the priority it deserves and maintain a

climate that promotes a safety culture where everyone is empowered to contribute to HS&EP

objectives.

f. We take reasonable care of the health and safety of ourselves and others who may be

affected by our acts or omissions at work, we protect the environment and we co-operate with

arrangements that are in place to enable us to discharge the duties placed on us.

GOVERNANCE

3. As the Department’s most senior official for HS&EP matters, the Permanent Secretary (Perm

Sec) is to ensure that effective management arrangements are in place to achieve compliance with this

Policy Statement, which may be amplified as appropriate, drawing on advice as necessary from across

the Department. The Perm Sec is to include HS&EP performance in the Department’s holding-toaccount

process.

1

4. I appoint Director General Defence Safety Authority (DG DSA) by Charter to provide me with

independent assurance that my policy is being promoted and implemented in the conduct of Defence

activities. This is achieved through 3 distinct functions; as Regulator of compliance with my policy

where Defence has authority; Investigator of safety-related accidents, incidents and near misses; and,

as Defence Authority in setting policy and assuring standards. In this respect, I require DG DSA to

produce an Annual Assurance Report (AAR) for my consideration and by the Defence Board.

5. I require each the Top Level Budget Holder (TLBH) or Chief Executive of a Defence Executive

Agency (CDEA) to set down and implement HS&EP management arrangements through a Safety and

Environment Management System (SEMS) for activities in his/her Area of responsibility (AoR) and

ensure that commanding officers and managers to whom he/she may delegate HS&EP authority are

competent and have adequate resources at their disposal.

6. Where a Defence activity leads to a Risk to Life that requires management through enhanced

safety management arrangements, I require the TLBH or CDEA to be appointed as the Senior Duty

Holder (SDH), in addition to his/her legal HS&EP responsibilities. If an SDH considers that a risk from

a Defence activity cannot be mitigated so that it is ALARP, he/she is to refer it to me.

7. Any TLBH or CDEA proposing organisational change, where there is potential for significant

impact on HS&EP standards and performance, is to ensure that, before being implemented, the

impacts of the proposed change are properly assessed through an Organisational Safety Assessment

(OSA) in order to demonstrate that any detriment to these standards and performance are mitigated to

ALARP.

8. The detailed organisation and arrangements that amplify this Policy Statement are to be set out

in policy requirements, Defence Regulations and guidance produced by DG DSA.

REVIEW AND AMENDMENT

9. This policy remains in effect through any changes of the Secretary of State, PS or DG DSA.

I require DG DSA to maintain my policy’s alignment to any relevant changes in legislation or Defence

governance arrangements. He/she may propose amendments at any time, consulting with the Perm

Sec and Defence Safety Committee (DSC). I will review this policy at least every fifth year.


PDF, 53.7KB, 2 pages

Details

Health and safety and the protection of the environment have always been at the centre of the Ministry of Defence’s (MOD) policy making and its activities. The MOD needs to manage these responsibilities in a consistent manner and the Secretary of State’s policy statement provides the high level framework under which this is done.

This policy statement dated July 2018 replaces the version published in August 2014.

Published 12 July 2013
Last updated 20 July 2018 + show all updates

 

Policy paper

Secretary of State for Defence policy statement on health, safety and environmental protection

This policy statement sets out the MOD’s legal obligations and the requirements of the Secretary of State for Defence from individuals, managers and commanders.

Published 12 July 2013
Last updated 20 July 2018 — see all updates


HEALTH, SAFETY AND ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION IN DEFENCE

Policy Statement by the Secretary of State for Defence

1. I make the following Policy Statement for all health, safety and environmental protection

(HS&EP) matters in Defence because, as Secretary of State, I am answerable to Parliament for such

matters and to comply with a requirement of the Health and Safety at Work etc. Act. In doing so,

I emphasise the importance which I attach to the health and safety of those who deliver Defence

activities (including the Armed Forces, MOD civilians and contractors where Defence owes a legal Duty

of Care) and those who may be affected by Defence activities and to the protection of the environment.

This Policy Statement is a commitment of my personal leadership in this area and I rely on all

those also in leadership roles to ensure my policy is applied throughout Defence.

GENERAL DUTIES

2. I require that:

a. We minimise work-related fatalities, injuries, ill-health and adverse effects on the

environment, and we reduce health and safety risks so that they are as low as reasonably

practicable (ALARP).

b. Within the United Kingdom (UK) we comply with all applicable HS&EP legislation.

c. Overseas we apply our UK standards and arrangements where reasonably practicable

and, in addition, respond to host nations’ relevant HS&EP expectations.

d. Where Defence has exemptions, derogations or dis-applications from HS&EP

legislation, we maintain Departmental arrangements that produce outcomes that are, so far as

reasonably practicable, at least as good as those required by UK legislation.

e. Those of us in positions of management or command, from the Defence Board

downwards, lead by example on HS&EP by giving it the priority it deserves and maintain a

climate that promotes a safety culture where everyone is empowered to contribute to HS&EP

objectives.

f. We take reasonable care of the health and safety of ourselves and others who may be

affected by our acts or omissions at work, we protect the environment and we co-operate with

arrangements that are in place to enable us to discharge the duties placed on us.

GOVERNANCE

3. As the Department’s most senior official for HS&EP matters, the Permanent Secretary (Perm

Sec) is to ensure that effective management arrangements are in place to achieve compliance with this

Policy Statement, which may be amplified as appropriate, drawing on advice as necessary from across

the Department. The Perm Sec is to include HS&EP performance in the Department’s holding-toaccount

process.

1

4. I appoint Director General Defence Safety Authority (DG DSA) by Charter to provide me with

independent assurance that my policy is being promoted and implemented in the conduct of Defence

activities. This is achieved through 3 distinct functions; as Regulator of compliance with my policy

where Defence has authority; Investigator of safety-related accidents, incidents and near misses; and,

as Defence Authority in setting policy and assuring standards. In this respect, I require DG DSA to

produce an Annual Assurance Report (AAR) for my consideration and by the Defence Board.

5. I require each the Top Level Budget Holder (TLBH) or Chief Executive of a Defence Executive

Agency (CDEA) to set down and implement HS&EP management arrangements through a Safety and

Environment Management System (SEMS) for activities in his/her Area of responsibility (AoR) and

ensure that commanding officers and managers to whom he/she may delegate HS&EP authority are

competent and have adequate resources at their disposal.

6. Where a Defence activity leads to a Risk to Life that requires management through enhanced

safety management arrangements, I require the TLBH or CDEA to be appointed as the Senior Duty

Holder (SDH), in addition to his/her legal HS&EP responsibilities. If an SDH considers that a risk from

a Defence activity cannot be mitigated so that it is ALARP, he/she is to refer it to me.

7. Any TLBH or CDEA proposing organisational change, where there is potential for significant

impact on HS&EP standards and performance, is to ensure that, before being implemented, the

impacts of the proposed change are properly assessed through an Organisational Safety Assessment

(OSA) in order to demonstrate that any detriment to these standards and performance are mitigated to

ALARP.

8. The detailed organisation and arrangements that amplify this Policy Statement are to be set out

in policy requirements, Defence Regulations and guidance produced by DG DSA.

REVIEW AND AMENDMENT

9. This policy remains in effect through any changes of the Secretary of State, PS or DG DSA.

I require DG DSA to maintain my policy’s alignment to any relevant changes in legislation or Defence

governance arrangements. He/she may propose amendments at any time, consulting with the Perm

Sec and Defence Safety Committee (DSC). I will review this policy at least every fifth year.

SECRETARY OF STATE FOR DEFENCE

20 June 2018

2

 

 

Contents

1.   Who we are

2.   What we do

3.   Vision

4.   Mission

5.   Contact us

Who we are

Part of the Defence Safety Authority, the Defence Nuclear Safety Regulator (DNSR) is responsible for regulating the nuclear hazards of the Defence Nuclear Enterprise (DNE) consisting of the Naval Nuclear Propulsion Programme and the Nuclear Weapon Programme, where the Ministry of Defence has specific exemptions from statute: these concern the through-life safety of the Nuclear Reactor Plant and Nuclear Weapon activities.

The arrangements for, and management of, nuclear safety across the Defence Nuclear Enterprise, must meet the exceptionally high standards required by applicable legislation, defence policy and relevant good practice within the nuclear industry.

DNSR consists of a team of Civilian and Naval staff who are predominately nuclear specialist engineers and scientists, supported by a small administrative team. Additionally, DNSR draws on contracted subject matter expertise from The Regulatory Support Directorate of Wood Group and the Defence Scientific and Technical Laboratory to provide capabilities it is not possible or sensible to permanently retain in-house.

What we do

The DNSR’s primary function is the regulation of nuclear safety across the DNE, holding individuals to account and providing independent assurance of compliance against the Secretary of State for Defence Policy Statement on Health Safety and Environmental Protection which requires that; “Where defence has exemptions, derogations or dis-applications from HS&EP legislation, we maintain Departmental arrangements that produce outcomes that are, so far as reasonably practicable, at least as good as those required by UK legislation. To achieve this, the DNSR aligns our regulation as closely as possible to that of the Office for Nuclear Regulation, deviating only where necessary.

Regulation

DNSR provides non-prescriptive goal setting regulation, utilising authorisation conditions akin to the civil sectors Licence Conditions augmented by Further Authorisation Conditions (FAC) and Approval and Design Authority Accreditation Conditions.

Our Regulations


It should be noted that our regulations and Operating Model are being reviewed throughout 2018 to 2019.

Most of Defence Nuclear Safety Regulator staff are Nuclear Inspectors whose working life is spent being the eyes and ears on the ground, examining the arrangements of our regulated community against the regulations which we set and also wider good practice from the Nuclear industry looking for compliance, emergent good practice and continuous improvement.

In addition to examining arrangements we also examine nuclear designs, activities, and permission the transportation of defence nuclear materials and approve the containers utilised.

By working closely with colleagues from the statutory and other defence regulators, we generate benefits for our mutual regulated communities through consistent and joined-up regulation, their interpretation and enforcement.

The DNSR acknowledges key interfaces with the statutory nuclear safety regulator, the Office for Nuclear Regulation and with the environmental regulators, the Environment Agency and Scottish Environmental Protection Agency.

Within defence the DNSR works closely with the Defence Maritime Regulator, the Defence Ordnance and Munitions and Explosives Regulator and the Defence Nuclear Security regulator, recognising the interfaces and dependences between us.

Vision

Nuclear capability which is demonstrably safe and available to meet the needs of defence.

Mission

To regulate the nuclear hazards of the Defence Nuclear Programme, as a trusted independent regulator in defence.

Contact us

By post:

Enquiries
Defence safety Authority - Defence Nuclear Safety Regulator
Mail point #2003
Mod Abbey Wood South
Bristol
BS34 8JH

Email: dsa-dnsr-enquiries@mod.gov.uk

Related Information












UK Biological Security Strategy

30 July 2018

It opens with the following prophetic and chilling words in the foreword from the then Security minister, Ben Wallace, now Defence Secretary: “Significant outbreaks of disease are among the highest impact risks faced by any society – threatening lives and causing disruption to public services and the economy. This is true whether such outbreaks occur naturally, such as pandemic influenza or emerging infectious diseases, or in the less likely event of a disease being caused by an accidental release from scientific or industrial facilities, or as the result of a deliberate biological attack.” Empty words followed if recent experience is anything to go by, when Wallace asserted:….“we are exposed to these risks, both at home and overseas, but it also gives us the opportunity to work with international partners to tackle such threats at source.”   If only! Wallace concluded : We cannot predict all the ways in which this risk landscape will evolve in the future, but it is by breaking down barriers, working in a co-ordinated way across and beyond Government, and thinking globally that we will be best prepared to meet the threat of significant disease outbreaks (however they occur).”

 

The 2015 National Security Risk Assessment

(NSRA1), based on a judgement of both

likelihood and impact, identifies a major human

health crisis (such as pandemic influenza) as

one of the most significant civil emergency

risks facing the UK (a Tier One risk). Such an

outbreak could have the potential to cause

hundreds of thousands of fatalities and to cost

the UK tens of billions of pounds.

www.gov.uk/government/

uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/555607/2015

 

The pace of global technological change and

the democratisation of scientific knowledge

have the potential to shape the biological

risk picture in the future – both positively and

negatively. While a deliberate biological attack

against the UK by a state or terrorist group

is unlikely, technology and the spread of

scientific knowledge online have the potential

to bring the necessary tools within the reach

of an increasing number of actors. However,

these developments have potential to bring

great benefit, creating opportunities for new

preventive, diagnostic and treatment options

for diseases of epidemic and pandemic

potential, new means of detecting and

addressing potential risks, and significant

possibilities for our world-leading biological

sciences sector – which generates more than

220,000 jobs and over £60 billion each year

 

The pace of global technological change and

the democratisation of scientific knowledge

have the potential to shape the biological

risk picture in the future – both positively and

negatively. While a deliberate biological attack

against the UK by a state or terrorist group

is unlikely, technology and the spread of

scientific knowledge online have the potential

to bring the necessary tools within the reach

of an increasing number of actors. However,

these developments have potential to bring

great benefit, creating opportunities for new

preventive, diagnostic and treatment options

for diseases of epidemic and pandemic

potential, new means of detecting and

addressing potential risks, and significant

possibilities for our world-leading biological

sciences sector – which generates more than

220,000 jobs and over £60 billion each year

for our economy – to add to UK prosperity.

 

 

A UK Biological Security Strategy

This document sets out our strategy for

meeting these challenges and exploiting

the opportunities – some of this will be

achievable within this Parliament, while some

will only be achievable in the longer term.

Alongside this strategy we must be

conscious of a range of other relevant

national and international programmes,

strategies and future work programmes.

These include the vision set out in the 2015

Strategic Defence and Security Review, our

Global Health Security and UK Antimicrobial

Resistance Strategy, and our counter

terrorism strategy CONTEST, the National

Counter-Proliferation Strategy to 2020, the

UK Influenza Preparedness Strategy, the

Strategy for UK Life Sciences, the Vision

and high level Strategy for UK Animal

and Plant Health Research to 2020 and

Beyond, and the Strategy for Agricultural

Technologies and the Department for

International Development’s (DFID’s) 2016

Research Review.

This strategy does not seek to duplicate

or replace the work set out in those other

documents (many of which focus on specific

areas within this landscape in more detail),

but rather to set out an overarching narrative

for how the cross-Government effort fits

together, and to highlight those areas where

we will seek to do more collectively.

 

E. All elements of our response must be

underpinned by the right scientific

capabilities and capacity – now and in

the future.

F. We must be able to take advantage of

the opportunities that the biological

sector offers the UK, as well as thinking

about the risks.

 

We will ensure even more effective

information sharing through a cross-

Government biological assessment

working group. This will include:

– better use of data sharing, including

through exploring options for a cross-

Government data platform to allow

sharing between sectors; and

– long term trend mapping of emerging

biological risks.

We will improve our communication

of risk information to the public, and

our communication with the private,

academic and third sectors, to enhance

biological risk awareness and to drive

innovation in addressing that risk,

including by learning from areas of good

practice. In doing this we will build on

work already undertaken such as the UK

Plant Health Risk Register, which enables

any interested party to see at what level

Defra has rated the risk to the UK from

more than 900 plant pests and diseases.

• We will continue to work with international

partners to:

– share understanding of the risks; and

– understand where the UK and other

countries have gaps in their capabilities.

Preventing biological risks - Internationally

The UK is a leading supporter of the

international rules-based system and is

actively engaged in the international forums

and organisations that work to strengthen

biological security around the world. These

include the:

• World Health Organization (WHO);

• Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO);

• World Organisation for Animal Health (OIE);

• Global Health Security Agenda (GHSA);

 

 

Our commitment to spend £120 million to

develop vaccines for diseases with epidemic

potential in low and middle income countries

and investing over £500 million in tackling

AMR internationally are just two examples

of our direct preventative action for natural

risks globally.

 

 

 

 

 

EXCLUSIVE: Coronavirus crisis at UK's nuclear submarine base as twenty staff show COVID-19 symptoms and are forced into isolation

  • A makeshift quarantine unit has been created on a floor of the nuclear base
  • Staff have complained at being 'left in the dark' about the virus risk at the facility
  • An MoD source insisted that Britain's nuclear deterrent remains fully operational
  • Coronavirus symptoms: what are they and should you see a doctor?


 

Published: 20:08, 19 March 2020 | Updated: 22:01, 19 March 2020

 


 

 

Britain's Trident nuclear submarine base is in the grip of a Coronavirus scare, MailOnline can reveal.

Her Majesty's Naval Base Clyde, the home of the UK nuclear deterrent in Scotland, has nearly 20 possible cases of infection so far.

Servicemen and women reporting Covid-19 symptoms have been isolated in sealed rooms with 'no entry' signs taped to the doors.

The number of possible victims is currently in the 'low teens', a source said, and preparations are underway for a major outbreak.

The top floor of the Linton Block, one of 17 accommodation buildings at the facility, has been converted into a makeshift quarantine unit and sealed off. 

A medical team equipped with masks and yellow biohazard bags was seen at work on the base last week. 

+5

A Trident nuclear submarine is pictured at the Faslane naval base, Scotland, in 2007 

A Ministry of Defence source insisted that Britain's nuclear deterrent remains fully operational and that there is no possibility of a national security emergency.

So far nobody has tested positive on the base, he added, though he acknowledged that testing has not been carried out in every case, in line with Government guidelines.

Staff have complained at being 'left in the dark', saying they have not been informed about the virus risk at the facility.

'Nobody knows what is going on and it's making people frightened,' one told MailOnline on condition of anonymity.

'We have not had a single communication to tell us what is happening, and every day more rooms are sealed off.

'Everyone here is expected to put our lives on the line for the Navy. We just want the Navy to level with us and tell us what the risk is.'

A Ministry of Defence source said that the jigsaw of different private firms and Navy units that operate the base has made it difficult to communicate news about the virus effectively to all staff.

The source said: 'The base is endeavouring to ensure all personnel are aware of the situation and the measures being taken to safeguard personnel.'

HMNB Clyde, commonly known throughout the Navy as 'Faslane', is home to 3,000 service personnel, 800 of their families and 4,000 civilian workers, mainly from the engineering firm Babcock International.

The Linton Block, where the quarantine facility is being set up, is opposite the 'Supermess', one of the base's major leisure hubs.

In addition to separate bars for officers and sailors, there are restaurants, cafes and shops, with a bowling alley, ski slope, swimming pool and gym nearby.

All of these are now seen as a 'petri dish for the virus', according to personnel serving at the site, and most are being closed down as the top brass prepares for the worst.

The sports schedules, which include circuit training and team events such as football, rugby and boxing, have been cancelled, and the swimming pool has been shut in an effort to combat the spread of the disease.

The quarantine area consists of about 24 single rooms – known as 'cabins' in Navy jargon – each containing a double bed, wardrobe, desk and chair, chest of drawers, bedside cabinet and television table.

Each also has a walk-in shower, en-suite lavatory and sink.

Cleaning staff normally service the cabins once a week and there are communal kitchens with washing machines and tumble dryers.

A Royal Navy spokesman said: 'The Ministry of Defence has put in place robust plans to ensure the delivery of key operations in the UK and overseas and we are confident that essential defence tasks will be maintained during this time.

'Any serving personnel who are showing symptoms will follow the advice and guidance issued by Public Health England. Whilst sensible precautions are being taken, all required outputs are being maintained at HM Naval Base Clyde.'

The base in Faslane, about 40miles northwest of Glasgow, is the home of the Submarine Service, and is the Royal Navy's main presence in Scotland.

In addition to Trident, Britain's nuclear deterrent, it houses the new generation of hunter-killer submarines.

The site is run in partnership with Babcock International, a civilian firm that provides specialist engineering services and manages the base's critical infrastructure and nuclear facilities.

The Royal Naval Armaments Depot at Coulport, eight miles from Faslane, is responsible for the storage and maintenance of Trident and all submarine weaponry.

Today it was announced that three more people in Scotland have died after testing positive for Coronavirus, taking the country's total number of deaths to six.

The total number of people in Scotland who have contracted Covid-19 stands at 266, an increase of 39 in 24 hours.

The First Minister, Nicola Sturgeon, said that the figure was 'likely to be an underestimate of the true prevalence of the infection.'

The number of cases in Wales now stands at 170, an overnight increase of 24, and Northern Ireland recorded its first death today – one of 68 people who have tested positive there.

Britain as a whole has recorded 108 deaths and 2,689 confirmed cases of Coronavirus.

Coronavirus: Workers at UK's nuclear submarine base 'show symptoms of killer bug'

There is believed to be nearly 20 possible cases of coronavirus at Her Majesty's Naval Base Clyde in Scotland. A makeshift quarantine unit has been set up on the site


By Lorraine King

 Daily Mirror,  20 MAR 2020

 

www.mirror.co.uk/news/uk-news/coronavirus-workers-uks-nuclear-submarine-21723183

Several workers at Britain's Trident nuclear submarine base have reportedly been quarantine after showing symptoms of coronavirus.

It is feared there could be up to 20 possible cases of Covid-19 at Her Majesty's Naval Base Clyde, the UK nuclear deterrent in Scotland, although the Ministry of Defence say there have been no cases confirmed yet.

Servicemen and women experiencing symptoms of the killer bug have been isolated in sealed rooms with 'no entry' signs on the doors, Mail Online reports.

A makeshift sealed quarantine unit is claimed to have been set up on the top floor of the Linton Block, one of 17 accommodation buildings at the facility.

A medical team equipped with masks and yellow biohazard bags spotted at work on the base last week.

A source reportedly said the base, also known as Faslane, is being prepared for a major outbreak of the killer bug that has claimed the lives of 144 in the UK.

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