Truth and untruth about the origins of COVID-19

On Friday 8th January a near 100–page report – with links to 100 written submissions- was released by the Science & Technology Committee of the House of Commons on the science advice given to ministers on the Coronacrisis. Inexplicably, it went virtually unreported by the media. It did not open promisingly, by misreporting when the viral outbreak actually happened. In its second paragraph, the committee said the following: 2.The emergence of a novel coronavirus, previously unseen in humans, was first reported in the city of Wuhan in China on 31 December 2019.4 The first case of the novel disease outside of China was reported on 13 January in Thailand.5 On 22 January 2020, the World Health Organisation (WHO) issued a statement saying there was some evidence of human-to-human transmission.6 On 30 January 2020, the WHO declared the outbreak a ‘Public Health Emergency of International Concern’.7 On 31 January 2020, the first two cases of covid-19 were confirmed in the UK (in England).8 The first death from covid-19in the UK (in England) was announced on 5 March.9 On 11 March, the WHO “made the assessment that covid-19 can be characterized as a pandemic”.10 4 World Health Organisation, Listings of WHO’s response to COVID-19, accessed 4 December 2020 5 World Health Organisation, WHO statement on novel coronavirus in Thailand, 13 January 2020 6 World Health Organisation, Mission summary: WHO Field Visit to Wuhan, China, 22 January 2020 7 World Health Organisation, Listings of WHO’s response to COVID-19, accessed 4 December 2020 8 GOV.UK, CMO confirms cases of coronavirus in England, 31 January 2020 9 GOV.UK, CMO for England announces first death of patient with COVID-19, 5 March 2020 10 World Health Organisation, Listings of WHO’s response to COVID-19, accessed 4 December 2020 The reliability of these dates is questionable, as the article below suggests: a hint at why they are inaccurate is to look at the sources used by the committee report drafter (s), which are either WHO or the UK Government, neither of which may be deemed to be reliable on coronavirus facts. I regard the newspaper as more reliable than these two official sources, as the reported incidences maybe cross referenced with contemporaneous accounts, all of which pre-date the 31 December 2019 date WHO cite as the earliest report of a COVID-19 case. [On page of the report, it states: “Further, Professor Chris Whitty, Chief Medical Officer (CMO) for England, informed us that he first discussed the news of the emerging outbreak with one of the deputy Chief Medical Officers on 2 January (2020)57(https://committees.parliament.uk//oralevidence/309/html)] Coronavirus could have been rampant in Wuhan THREE MONTHS before Beijing claims, reveals leaked hospital files • Patients with new, mysterious form of pneumonia were treated in eight hospitals • Records show that 40 patients were treated with this previously unseen illness • Hospital records show outbreak could have begun early as September 25 2019 By Abul Taher Security Correspondent The Mail on Sunday 22:09, 9 January 2021 | https://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-9129695/Coronavirus-rampant-Wuhan-THREE-MONTHS-Beijing-claims.html Coronavirus could have been rampant in Wuhan at least three months before the Chinese government has acknowledged, according to leaked hospital files. Medical records from the city reveal patients with a new, mysterious form of pneumonia were being treated at eight hospitals between late September and the beginning of December 2019. The records show that 40 patients were treated with this previously unseen illness, which bore symptoms resembling those of Covid-19. Of those, at least eight died in hospital, the files reveal. If, as some experts believe, these were early coronavirus cases, it would contradict the official Chinese government account of when the disease started. Beijing maintains that a ‘cluster of pneumonia cases of unknown cause’ first appeared on December 31, 2019, in Wuhan. The Chinese government officially declared the disease as a new coronavirus outbreak to the World Health Organisation on January 9 last year. But the hospital records show the outbreak could have begun as early as September 25, 2019. Had the Chinese authorities responded quickly, say critics, the global pandemic that has killed 1.9 million people so far may have been prevented. The records were obtained by the Epoch Times, an American-based Chinese newspaper linked to the persecuted Falun Gong religious sect in China. They show that the first patient to be treated for the new unexplained pneumonia at the Wuhan Puren Riverside Hospital was called Xiao Xgui, one of ten people cared for there until the start of December 2019. Another general hospital, Wuhan Yaxin, treated ten patients with a similar pneumonia, mostly in October 2019. The Wuhan Sixth Hospital, one of the main medical facilities in the city, recorded five deaths from the new pneumonia, with three dying in November and early December that year. One patient, Xu Xgan, became ill on October 1 (2019) and died on November 3, according to records. He was first treated at the Wuhan Central Hospital, where he was given an anti-infection treatment, before being brought to the Sixth. The Wuhan Hospital of Traditional Chinese Medicine, in Hankou District, also reported three deaths of patients from a similar unexplained pneumonia in October and November 2019. The city’s Eighth Hospital also recorded cases in the same period. Last night, The Epoch Times, which is a controversial paper fiercely critical of the Chinese regime, could not be contacted. But experts who have studied the files said they appear to be authentic. Gilles Demaneuf, a French data scientist who works with a group investigating the origins of Covid-19, said that ‘the Epoch Times findings are credible’. But he added: ‘Suspected cases [of Covid-19] do not mean confirmed cases, and should not be construed as such.’ The respected South China Morning Post, based in Hong Kong, also published a similar investigation last year, saying it had obtained medical records that showed patients were falling ill with the virus in November 2019. It said nine cases – four men and five women aged between 39 and 79 – fell ill with a disease similar to Covid-19 in and around Wuhan. This Report is structured as follows: In Chapter two, we consider how scientific advisory and key decision-making structures evolved in the early stages of the pandemic, through evidence we gathered from Chief Medical and Scientific Advisers, as well as the Secretary of State for Health and Social Care. Chapter three explores the initial awareness of the novel coronavirus in the UK Government as well as the activation and operation of SAGE itself. While it is apparent to us that science advisory mechanisms responded quickly, there is an open question regarding the longer-term operation of SAGE and the impacts on the independent experts who participate—and their research staff and technicians—as well as the Government officials who support SAGE. The transparency and communication of science advice is discussed in Chapter four. While it is regrettable that there were initial delays in the publication of SAGE evidence, minutes and the disclosure of expert advisers, we are pleased that a regular drumbeat of public information was eventually established. Nevertheless, we have concerns that the lessons from this experience have not been consistently applied, and call for the Government to publish the advice it has received on indirect effects of covid-19 (including impacts on mental health and social wellbeing, education and the economy) and work to improve transparency around the operation of the Joint Biosecurity Centre. In Chapter five, we discuss the breadth of expertise drawn upon by the Government through SAGE. We conclude that there was a particular reliance on epidemiological modelling expertise at the beginning of SAGE’s operation—reflecting the paucity of real world data early in the pandemic—and identify an apparent gap in the provision of independent advice on non-medical impacts. We also consider the issue of poor data flows, which have hampered the work of SAGE and other experts in understanding the pandemic. Our final Chapter presents a number of instances that exemplify how effectively science advice was used, in different policy areas, over the course of the pandemic. In Chapter six we consider the following examples in which science advice has been a key component: testing capacity; social distancing measures, such as face coverings; and the development of potential vaccines and therapeutics. * Transcripts of our oral evidence sessions can be viewed here: https://committees.parliament.uk/work/91/uk-science-research-and-technology-capability-and-influence-in-global-disease-outbreaks/publications/oral-evidence/ ** Written evidence received as part of our inquiry can be viewed here: https://committees.parliament.uk/work/91/uk-science-research-and-technology-capability-and-influence-in-global-disease-outbreaks/publications/written-evidence/ *** Health and Social Care Committee and Science and Technology Committee, Parliamentary Committees join forces: Inquiry launched to scrutinise Government response to the COVID-19 pandemic, 8 October 2020 **** Correspondence from Chair to the Prime Minister regarding lessons learned so far from the covid-19 pandemic, 18 May 2020 Key findings Our overall conclusions are that: 1. During the first part of the pandemic, the Government was serious about taking and following advice from scientists of international repute, through a structure that was designed and used during previous emergencies. 2. The length of the pandemic to date has placed extraordinary demands on the scientific advisers to Government. The Government Chief Scientific Adviser, the Chief Medical Officers, their teams, ministers and officials in Departments, the devolved administrations, the NHS, public health teams in Public Health England and local authorities, and each of the participants in SAGE and its sub-groups have worked 5 The UK response to covid-19: use of scientific advice intensively and continuously since the beginning of the pandemic. The structures for science advice in emergencies have been based around shorter term emergencies and the Government should consider the resilience of the arrangements for when they are needed to ensure in the longer term. 3. Initially, there was a lack of transparency about who were the scientists who served on the Government’s advisory body, SAGE, and what evidence and scientific papers their advice drew on. This has been improved following our earlier letter to the Government Chief Scientific Adviser, but there is still insufficient visibility as to what advice was given to the Government and over the transparency of the operation and advice of the new Joint Biosecurity Centre. 4. Although the Government was advised by many experts of distinction, and generally followed the advice that was given, the outcome during the first wave of the pandemic is not regarded as having been one of the best in the world.2 2 Sir Patrick Vallance told us in July it was “clear that the outcome in the UK has not been good” and that there was a “band of countries that have done less well” (Q1043). Further, Professor Neil Ferguson suggested to us in June that the UK’s position, in terms of per-capita deaths from covid-19, would not “necessarily change in a European setting” (Q942). While the experience of no country is perfectly comparable with others, it will be important to understand the reasons for this in order to learn lessons for the future. In this Report, there are questions of how quickly scientific analysis could be translated into Government decisions; whether full advantage had been taken of learning from the experience of other countries; and the extent to which scientific advice took as a given operational constraints, such as testing capacity, or sought to change them. 5. Measures taken to contain the pandemic had wider and indirect effects, such as on people’s livelihoods, educational progress and mental and emotional wellbeing. The assessment of these wider impacts was—and remains—much less transparent than the epidemiological analysis; the people conducting the analysis and giving advice are less visible than epidemiological modelling advisers; and its role in decision making opaque. 6. The public has benefitted from seeing and hearing directly from scientists advising the Government, and overall trust in science has remained high despite the inevitability that scientific advice has often been associated with restrictions on people’s activities and sometimes the focus of contention. As the Office for Statistics Regulation advised, in order to maintain high levels of confidence, data and statistics should be presented in ways that align with high standards of clarity and rigour—especially when they are used to support measures of great public impact. 7. A fully effective response to the pandemic has been hampered by a lack of data. For a fast-spreading, invisible, but deadly infection, data is the means of understanding and acting upon the course of the virus in the population. The early shortage of testing capacity—restricting testing only to those so ill that they were admitted to hospital—had the consequence of limiting knowledge of the whereabouts of covid-19. The ONS Infection Survey did not begin until May, and the fragmentation of data across public organisations has impeded the agility and precision of the response.The UK response to covid-19: use of scientific advice6 8. The increase in testing capacity that took place from April was driven principally by a target set by the Secretary of State for Health and Social Care rather than following a scientifically-based plan of what capacity was needed. While testing capacity has increased dramatically, it is still unclear what exact assessment has been made of the testing targets required in the management of the pandemic. In each instance, the approach we have taken is to draw on the evidence that has been presented to the Committee, orally and in writing, and to draw out lessons by way of recommendations to the Government—which is required to respond formally to the Report. Where recommendations reflect findings that things could have been done better we make them, in keeping with the scientific approach, not to apportion blame but— recalling the acute uncertainty and urgency with which decisions have had to be made—but to provide a means continually to improve our collective response to this, and future emergencies. Summary The coronavirus pandemic has marked the most significant test of the way that the UK Government takes and acts on scientific advice in living memory. The scientific community—in academia, in the public sector and in industry—has risen to that challenge in extraordinary and, in many cases, unprecedented ways. This Committee, on behalf of the House of Commons, is deeply grateful for the tireless, expert and unstinting work of everyone who has sought to understand the threat of covid-19 from its earliest appearance, and who have brought their experience, ingenuity and judgement to bear on mitigating its impacts and seeking treatments and vaccines against it. The high reputation of UK science is founded on openness and relentless self-challenge—looking always to test current theories and practices against new evidence and explanations, without sentiment and with a relish for discovery. The Science and Technology Committee in its continuing inquiry has sought to apply that same spirit. Through asking questions of expert witnesses and scrutinising written evidence our aim has been to do two things: •Distil from a necessarily complex and evolving response to a previouslyunknown virus lessons that can usefully be learned—positive and negative—that can be put into practice to help decisions yet to be taken, both in theremaining course of the pandemic and beyond; and •Capture contemporary evidence from what the people taking decisions, thoseadvising them and those working on the response to the pandemic thoughtat the time, so that future inquiries need not be only through the lens ofhindsight. In May, the Committee wrote to the Prime Minister and the Secretary of State for Health and Social Care with some recommendations drawn from the experience of the first few months of the pandemic.1 This Report considers, specifically, the ways in which the Government has obtained and made use of scientific advice during the pandemic to date. During the weeks ahead, both as the Science and Technology Committee and in our joint “lessons learned” inquiry with the Health and Social Care Committee, we will set out further evidence and findings on areas including the test and trace system, the development of vaccines and the preparedness for this emergency. In particular, the remarkable achievement of developing and being in a position to deploy multiple vaccines against a deadly and virulent virus that was completely unknown a little over a year ago ranks as one of the most outstanding scientific accomplishments of recent years—we will consider the lessons to be learned from the scientific, public policy and administrative contributions to this success in a subsequent Report. 1 Correspondence from Chair to the Prime Minister regarding lessons learned so far from the covid-19 pandemic, 18 May 2020 https://committees.parliament.uk/download/file/?url=/publications/1136/documents/9764 From Rt Hon Greg Clark MP, Chair Page 1 of 19 Rt Hon Boris Johnson MP Prime Minister (By e-mail) 18 May 2020 Dear Prime Minister, COVID-19 pandemic: some lessons learned so far I am writing to you on behalf of the House of Commons Science and Technology Committee. We are delighted to see you back after your recovery from Coronavirus and send our warm congratulations to you and Carrie on the birth of your son. My Committee has been taking evidence relating to the COVID-19 pandemic as part of our inquiry, UK Science, Research and Technology Capability and Influence in Global Disease Outbreaks.1 It is important for us to ask questions during the pandemic both: 1 https://committees.parliament.uk/work/91/uk-science-research-and-technology-capability-and-influence-in-global-disease-outbreaks/ i (i) to ensure that contemporary evidence is captured on decisions and assessments so that not all evidence relies on recollections and hindsight; and ii (ii) so that any lessons learned which are relevant to the ongoing management of the pandemic can be uncovered and applied. With the second purpose in mind, we wanted to share with you, your Ministers and advisers some findings that we have identified through our first six public evidence sessions that have implications for the ongoing response to the pandemic. It is important to say from the outset that any live response to this new and deadly virus—which was unknown to most of the world at the beginning of this year, and which has spread explosively to almost every country on Earth, and whose medical and scientific characteristics are being revealed and analysed day-by-day—to entail decisions, made in good faith and with the best information then available—which turn out to be wrong as well as right. Judgements, necessarily made within a fog of uncertainty, will be revealed by subsequent experience some to have been correct, and some incorrect. Scientific hypotheses that were advanced on good grounds when tested by the Page 2 of 19 emerging evidence will be found in some cases to gain in force, and in others to need to be revised or retired. We seek to be purposeful: in the true spirit of science to confront theory and early practice with the evidence that experience makes available, and so to be able to learn and apply the lessons at the earliest possible opportunity. A policy and practice that is open to learning from experience and making necessary adjustments is more deserving of public confidence than one which is impervious to criticism or resistant to alteration. On this basis, we offer ten findings and recommendations so far. i (i) SCIENTIFIC ADVICE TO GOVERNMENT Finding 1: The Government has sought to obtain and act on good scientific advice The United Kingdom benefits from one of the strongest bases of scientific expertise in the world—in terms of both individuals and institutions. The conception and structure of the Scientific Advisory Group for Emergencies (SAGE) and its sub-groups is designed to capitalise on this strength—drawing on a range of specialists whose expertise is most relevant to the nature of the emergency in question. It is clear from all of our evidence sessions that SAGE and its subsidiary groups have been extensively consulted and highly influential in Government decisions throughout the pandemic. The leading scientists in SAGE, the Government Chief Scientific Adviser (GCSA), Sir Patrick Vallance, and the Chief Medical Officer for England (CMO), Professor Chris Whitty, are substantial figures with independent reputations. SAGE has met frequently throughout the crisis and, according to its website, met 26 times from late January to mid-April.2 2https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/883086/sage-meeting-papers.csv Several witnesses who have participated in SAGE meetings described how the Group has made a serious attempt to distil the range of scientific views into advice to Government. Page 3 of 19 Professor Neil Ferguson, for example, told us: The Government have, I believe, been informed by the scientific evidence and have balanced that against other considerations—economic, health and all the things one might expect them to do.3 3 Q9 (all question numbers in footnotes refer to oral evidence taken before the Committee―transcripts are published on the Committee website: https://committees.parliament.uk/committee/135/science-and-technology-committee-commons/publications/oral-evidence) 4 Q247 5 Q80 6 Q841 Professor Chris Whitty explained the different groups feeding into SAGE: You have to remember that underneath the SAGE structure sit multiple other professional scientific advisory groups, and underneath that is a whole body of fantastic academic work.4 Witnesses told the Committee that the distinction between distilling up-to-date scientific knowledge—including areas of differing opinion—relevant to policy decisions and directing those decisions was well understood by those who have participated in SAGE meetings. Sir Patrick Vallance, for example, told us that he thought: the Government have listened to the advice of SAGE very carefully and followed it. Clearly, there are decisions that need to be made by politicians on how they want to implement that advice, and those areas are, rightly, political decisions and not scientific ones.5 Further when we asked Sir Patrick in March if there had been any “significant disagreement between the Government and their scientific advisers on anything material”, he was unambiguous in his response, simply replying “no”.6 Professor Chris Whitty told us how SAGE sought to distil the scientific evidence and its associated uncertainties—which may lead to a difference of opinion among those who have participated in SAGE meetings—in a helpful way for the Government to aid decision making: It is not very useful to Ministers or other decision makers to say, “There are 16 opinions. Here are all 16. Make up your mind.” Part of the process is to say in a unified way, “Here is the central view”, and then, if there are either dissenting views or a range of uncertainty quantitatively around that, to convey it in a way that is comprehensible to the people who are listening so that they understand the certainty with which the advice is Page 4 of 19 being proffered. If they do not, it is clearly going to lead to bad decision making.7 7 Q249 8 Q78 The Government Chief Scientific Adviser (GCSA) similarly explained: I think what SAGE has to do is to try to take complex science and bring it to a position where we say, “This is the consensus view of where we are now, but we are clear about the function and purposes of argument.” What I think is not helpful is to say, “Here are several different views,” and ask somebody who is less knowledgeable to bring these together and come to a single view. In SAGE, we try to come up with a consensus view, but we are always clear and open about how we arrive at that.8 While there is, and must continue to be, a clear distinction between the role of scientists as advisers, and Ministers as decision-takers, it is clear that the Government has been serious in taking scientific advice, and that British scientists on SAGE have sought to give that advice in a way designed to help decision making. Recommendation 1: The Government should continue to draw on extensive scientific advice through the further stages of the pandemic. Finding 2: The transparency around scientific advice has not always been as clear as it should have been. The strength of British science and the prominent role that scientific advice has played during the pandemic can be an important source of public confidence. The regular appearances of the GCSA and CMO at Downing Street press conferences have been a public demonstration that scientific advice has been influential in Government decisions. Yet there have been a number of concerns over the transparency of the scientific advice given and its relationship to Government decisions. First, transparency over the membership of SAGE and the groups feeding into it was not initially addressed. There are a number of reasons why transparency over who attends SAGE is beneficial. It is likely to a be a source of strength to demonstrate the breadth and depth of scientific advice that is being drawn on by Ministers and officials; and it also allows scrutiny of whether SAGE contains the appropriate range of disciplines necessary to give rounded advice. Page 5 of 19 Following evidence sessions held by the Committee, Sir Patrick Vallance made a commitment to publish the membership of SAGE. The Committee is grateful for that response to its concerns and strongly welcomes the decision. All but two of the names of people who have attended SAGE were published on 4 May. However, the published list conflates those who are part of a core membership that has guided policy throughout the pandemic while others—as Professor Sir David Spiegelhalter told us—had been present for a single meeting. A second concern is over the timely publication of the scientific papers on which SAGE has drawn for its advice. A website was established within gov.uk (“Scientific advice supporting the government response to COVID-19”) containing relevant papers.9 A commitment was given to the Committee in a letter of 4 April from Sir Patrick Vallance “to regularly publish evidence documents and studies on gov.uk which have formed the basis of SAGE’s discussions and advice”.10 9 https://www.gov.uk/government/groups/scientific-advisory-group-for-emergencies-sage-coronavirus-covid-19-response#contents 10 https://publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm5801/cmselect/cmsctech/correspondence/Patrick-Vallance-to-Greg-Clark-re-SAGE-composition.pdf 11 https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/883086/sage-meeting-papers.csv 12 Q259 However, after March no further papers were uploaded to the website until—after the Committee raised the matter with the CMO at our hearing on 24 April—a further set of papers was eventually published on 5 May. While it is welcome that some papers used to inform SAGE meetings have been published on this website, to date the majority of papers (92 out of 120) have not been published according to the full list of meeting papers published on gov.uk, meaning much of the evidence informing SAGE is still not in the public domain.11 The CMO explained in evidence on 24 April that in certain emergencies, questions of protecting intelligence and national security arise: The last time there was a SAGE thing was the Novichok poisonings in Salisbury; at that point I was interim chief Government scientific adviser and I chaired it. There was absolutely no way we were going to put those documents into the public domain, nor will we. I have also been involved previously in SAGE meetings where some of the information was at a classified level and some was not. There will be a mixture.12 Page 6 of 19 That is completely understood and accepted by the Committee. However the CMO acknowledged that the current circumstances are different: SAGE on this occasion is dealing with something that is a straight science-to-policy question […] wherever possible, we absolutely should be putting out the data and trying to give the underlying workings.13 13 Q259 14 Q9 Our third observation concerns the transparency of SAGE’s advice itself. The Government has drawn attention to basing its decisions on scientific advice, while accepting that policy decisions are made by Ministers rather than scientific advisers. Individuals who have participated in SAGE meetings during the current pandemic have confirmed that. For example, Professor Neil Ferguson said: “To be clear, SAGE does not recommend policy”.14 It is clearly important that this distinction is respected. However, there is no transparency over what the advice of SAGE is—whether in the form of its actual advice to Ministers, minutes of its meetings, or even a summary, suitable for publication, of its advice. Without visibility of the scientific advice it will be difficult to corroborate the Government’s assertion that it always follows the scientific advice. In particular, there will be a margin of ambiguity about what was the scientific advice and what was a matter of policy. To avoid the risk of elision between the scientific advice and policy decisions, it would be good practice to ensure these are always distinguishable. Recommendation 2: To increase transparency in the provision of scientific advice the Government should: i (i) update regularly the now public list of members of SAGE and state how many meetings the named people attended; ii (ii) disclose the disciplines of SAGE participants who are not publicly named; iii (iii) publish promptly the papers on which SAGE draws for its advice after each relevant meeting; and iv (iv) publish now and regularly a summary of the scientific advice which has informed Government decisions. i (ii) CO-ORDINATION IN SCIENTIFIC ADVICE BETWEEN THE UK NATIONS Finding 3: The provision of scientific advice has been well co-ordinated between all four nations of the United Kingdom. Page 7 of 19 The Chief Medical Officers for the four nations of the United Kingdom all told us of the strong co-operation and regular liaison between the public health organisations of the UK. Dr Gregor Smith, interim Chief Medical Officer for Scotland, for example, told us that there has “been regular discussions between the four UK CMOs”, with them speaking to: one another at a minimum three times a week, but we take various opportunities to ensure that we link with one another through senior clinician groups or through more ad hoc meetings because things have arisen that we need to speak about with more urgency.15 15 Q231 16 Q236 17 Q232 18 Q252 19 See for example Qq252–253. Further, Dr Smith explained the joint approach that the four nations had been taking: “In any of the discussions across the four nations between the CMOs, there has been a remarkable sense of agreement on the approaches we need to take from the scientific base”.16 The CMO for England made similar points to the Committee: The interaction among the CMOs has been excellent throughout, and we often communicate several times a day if things are urgent. We also all interact with our own chief scientific advisers to Government. I operate incredibly closely with Sir Patrick Vallance and talk to him or communicate with him at least once a day, often more frequently, as things go along.17 Dr Smith told the Committee that although there could be circumstances in which the appropriate measures for managing COVID-19 could be different in some parts of the UK, there was value to consistent messaging for ensuring public understanding and compliance.18 Two potential future reasons for divergent measures advanced were that: i i. there could be in future different local stages of development in the epidemic; and ii ii. different operational capabilities of the NHS and public health authorities in different parts of the United Kingdom.19 Professor Whitty explained that the recent peak in infections was an “artificial” peak brought about through social distancing measures, and that because Page 8 of 19 those measures were introduced across the UK at “almost exactly the same time” the peak was “occurring at broadly the same time around the country”. Consequently, Professor Whitty advised that “the argument for strong regional variation in what we do is not terribly convincing”.20 All four Chief Medical Officers of the UK indicated their support for this position.21 20 Q280 21 Q281 22 As of 9am 11 March 2020, a total of 27,476 people had been tested, up from 26,261 (as of 9am on 10 March). See https://twitter.com/DHSCgovuk/status/1237740175582801921 and https://twitter.com/DHSCgovuk/status/1237382759812861952. 23 Q85 24 Q257 25 Report of the WHO-China Joint Mission on Coronavirus Disease 2019 (COVID-19) Recommendation 3: All four UK Chief Medical Officers should continue to work closely together on their responses to COVID-19. i (iii) TESTING, TRACING AND ISOLATION Finding 4: Testing capacity has been inadequate for most of the pandemic so far. Capacity was not increased early enough or boldly enough. Capacity drove strategy, rather than strategy driving capacity. One of the most significant problems of the handling of the pandemic to date in the United Kingdom has been the lack of capacity to test people to determine whether they have COVID-19. Very low numbers of people were being tested well into March, with the number of tests actually falling at a critical time to 1,215 on 10 March.22 The Committee has found a consensus embracing a broad range of experts from within the UK and overseas—including among the Government’s scientific advisers—that testing capacity has been too low. Sir Patrick Vallance told the Committee on 25 March that he wished the UK had “more tests available today”, and that “it would be great to have got ahead of this more than we have been able to”.23 Professor Chris Whitty stated on 24 April that SAGE had consistently said that “one of the things we need is a greater capacity to test [for COVID-19] across the whole of the UK.24 As far back as February, the WHO-China Joint Report said that countries should “immediately expand surveillance to detect COVID-19 transmission chains by […] adding testing for the COVID-19 virus to existing surveillance systems”.25 Page 9 of 19 The Committee heard from witnesses from the Republic of Korea, Hong Kong and Germany who all emphasised the foundational nature of establishing mass testing capacity from an early stage. It was therefore identifiable from the beginning of the pandemic that testing capacity would be crucial. The evidence from Professor Sharon Peacock of Public Health England (PHE) to the Committee on 25 March was that PHE had chosen to follow a different approach to countries like the Republic of Korea which had engaged in mass testing from an early stage. Professor Peacock undertook to share “in the next few days” with the Committee the evidence and analysis on which the decision to reject the South Korean approach was taken.26 26 Qq121–124 27 Letter from PHE on 7 May 28 Letter from PHE on 1 May 29 https://hansard.parliament.uk/Commons/2020-02-26/debates/B0FE8C31-77D5-40AA-97AF-BBA8FB620A95/Coronavirus#contribution-20659EA2-7415-4DC9-BB45-3D59E18D1D01 30 https://hansard.parliament.uk/Commons/2020-03-11/debates/E9C77FF3-6EB8-4A29-8877-33359AB8C414/Coronavirus#contribution-964EA313-B93C-409E-9D6B-B15BB7223C9E 31 Correspondence between Rt Hon Greg Clark to Professor Sharon Peacock, Kathy Hall and Professor John Newton 32 Q119 Despite several requests by letter, email and telephone since the 25 March, PHE has not produced to the Committee the basis for the pivotal decision to choose an initially centralised, smaller scale approach to testing over other leading international approaches. In a letter of 1 May (for which the Chief Executive of PHE has subsequently apologised27) PHE sought to discharge their obligation to share the evidence on which their decision was based at the time by pointing to a completely different study only now being carried out by the Royal Society on how testing is carried out by other countries.28 The Committee, through the Chair, questioned the Secretary of State in the Chamber of the House of Commons on 26 February29 and 11 March30 on what steps were being taken to expand capacity, and in correspondence of 30 March and 14 April.31 Answers reiterated that a gradually expanding, centralised approach was being taken, within PHE laboratories. In evidence to the Committee, Sir Paul Nurse, Director of the Crick Institute, said that he had offered his laboratories and staff to the testing effort but he did “not think that [he] got a reply” until weeks later, once the Crick Institute had publicly announced its provision of testing for healthcare workers.32 The decision to pursue an approach of initially concentrating testing in a limited number of laboratories and to expand them gradually, rather than an approach Page 10 of 19 of surging capacity through a large number of available public sector, research institute, university and private sector labs is one of the most consequential made during this crisis. From it followed the decision on 12 March to cease testing in the community and retreat to testing principally within hospitals. Amongst other consequences, it meant that residents in care homes—even those displaying COVID-19 symptoms—and care home workers could not be tested at a time when the spread of the virus was at its most rampant. The failure of PHE to publish the evidence on which its testing policy was based is unacceptable for a decision that may have had such significant consequences. The absence of disclosure may indicate that—notwithstanding the oral evidence given to the Committee—no rigorous assessment was in fact made by PHE of other countries’ approach to testing. That would be of profound concern since the necessity to consider the approaches taken by others with experience of pandemics is obvious. It is vital that the formal assessment made at the time is published without further delay, or, if it does not exist, PHE is open about this and explains why. Several witnesses who have participated in SAGE meetings told us that the capacity to test was an operational matter under the control of PHE, rather than one that they could determine. For example, Professor Neil Ferguson told us that testing had “always been discussed significantly” at SAGE, but that “the reason it was not included in initial modelling was about the projections by PHE of how quickly this country could ramp up testing capacity”.33 33 Q20 34 Q257 35 Qq138–139 On 2 April the Secretary of State for Health and Social Care, Matt Hancock MP, announced a target of 100,000 tests a day to be carried out by the end of that month. However, Professor Whitty made clear to the Committee that “SAGE did not give that specific target”.34 Even public officials emphasised that the 100,000 target was the Secretary of State’s choice, with Professor John Newton explaining: I think specifically, no, it is not a SAGE target; it is the Secretary of State’s target. I think he has taken advice from the programme and from colleagues […] I am afraid you would have to ask the Secretary of State himself exactly where he got his advice from.35 While there was some public debate at the time about whether the target was met by 30 April, it is clear that it drove a major expansion of testing to a level, in Page 11 of 19 capacity at least, comparable with what Germany had enjoyed for several weeks. For such an important determinant of a wide range of policy responses, it is surprising that a target designed to galvanise a tenfold increase in testing capacity appears not to be on the advice of PHE, NHS England or SAGE but was more of a personal initiative by the Secretary of State. Had the public bodies responsible in this space themselves taken the initiative at the beginning of February, or even the beginning of March, rather than waiting until the Secretary of State imposed a target on 2 April, knowledge of the spread of the pandemic and decisions about the response to it may have made more options available to decision makers at earlier stages. Recommendation 4: The Government should publish the assessment of other countries’ testing models on which the decision to follow a centralised, sequential approach was based. Finding 5: It is not clear that the lessons of the delays to testing have been learned. Although multiple witnesses told the Committee that it would have been desirable had much greater testing capacity been available from an earlier stage in the pandemic, no one gave an account that the lessons had been understood and would be applied to other decisions during the future course of the pandemic which were relevant. Apart from the clinical purpose of identifying for isolation and medical attention of those infected with COVID-19, the retreat to testing only hospital patients for the virus drastically curtailed the ability to gather data that could have identified the spread of the virus among different groups and with different symptomatic severity. The Office for National Statistics is now conducting a very important sampling exercise in which data on the prevalence of COVID-19 in the UK population will be gathered and reported twice-weekly. It is of great importance in providing data on the spread of diseases, its impact on the different demographic groups and geographies, the incidence of asymptomatic transmission and even the Reproduction or ‘R’ number which the Government has made key to easing some social distancing restrictions. In evidence to the Committee, the National Statistician, Sir Ian Diamond, gave an impressive account of the speed in which his team had been able to organise and implement a significant testing programme. Page 12 of 19 Sir Ian said: The fact that we came into it on a Thursday and, with the University of Oxford, put together the design and protocol […] and put it to medical ethics the following Monday and data ethics on Tuesday, with letters out to potential participants on the Wednesday, seems to me to be one of the most rapid surveys I have ever in my life seen go into the field.36 36 Q389 37 Centre for Economics and Business Research, ‘Estimates of daily economic impact of the UK’s lockdown by sector’, published 6 April 2020 However, Sir Ian also told the Committee that the request to put together such a testing programme was made only on 17 April. It is not clear why such a study could not have been instigated by the Government at a much earlier stage. Indeed, had this study been in operation even a month earlier, many of the decisions that will be made on social distancing during the days and weeks ahead may have been made earlier, based on much more detailed data. With early estimates of the impact on the economy of the lockdown running at over £17 billion a week,37 there seems to be insufficient recognition that an avoidable delay in being able to take decisions because of the lack of data has an impact that is vastly greater the cost of the data collection exercise. In particular, the intended use by the Government of current estimates of the Reproduction number (‘R’) depends, as well as on modelling assumptions that should be open to be examined, on the depth and breadth of the data available to estimate it. Being able to operate at scale at, or in advance of, the point of need is a key lesson from the testing experience and will have a particular relevance to vaccination, which we discuss in finding 9 below. Recommendation 5: The Government should learn and apply the lessons from the slowness of the provision of testing capacity and take every opportunity to build capacity in advance of need to surge capacity explosively rather than follow a more gradual “ramping up” approach. Finding 6: Strategies to deal with carriers of COVID-19 who were asymptomatic have not been clear. One of the consequences of the small capacity for testing has been that the test has until recently been largely reserved for people suffering from suspected symptoms of COVID-19. Yet evidence presented to the Committee has raised the prospect that a high proportion of people with COVID-19—and therefore capable of transmitting it to others—are free of all symptoms. Page 13 of 19 Professor Xihong Lin of Harvard University said In our paper, we analysed that about 60% to 80% of daily new cases were asymptomatic. This was very interesting. A New England Journal of Medicine article was published earlier this week. In that study, they tested pregnant women in New York City. Among 215 pregnant women who tested positive, 85% were asymptomatic. Yesterday in the news there was a report on Boston homeless shelters: among a couple of hundred people who were tested, all those who tested positive were asymptomatic.38 38 Q229 39 Q283 40 Q173 The possibility of significant levels of asymptomatic transmission have a profound consequence for the management of the pandemic. If people have no means of knowing they are infected, then they risk transmitting the infection to large numbers of people if they are not rigorously socially distanced. This is a particular concern for NHS workers and care workers who may be asymptomatically infected and transmitting the disease to vulnerable people with whom they are in close contact. A significant degree of asymptomatic infection may require regular testing in particular settings—like hospitals and care homes—of all workers who come into contact with vulnerable groups, whether or not they display symptoms themselves. Recommendation 6: The Government should explicitly set out its approach to managing the risk of asymptomatic transmission of the disease. Finding 7: In combination with other measures, contact tracing can help to reduce the spread of disease. The UK’s limited capacity for contact tracing was an important factor in the decision to stop full contact tracing on 12 March. Rigorous contact tracing has been used in several countries that have reported low death rates from COVID-19, such as the Republic of Korea, Singapore and Hong Kong. Professor Chris Whitty told the Committee that contact tracing was a “very powerful tool of public health”, but that it was “unbelievably labour intensive” if done manually.39 Although Professor John Newton gave the Committee his opinion that contact tracing would have been stopped once there was widespread transmission in the UK regardless of capacity,40 many of our expert witnesses acknowledged that limited testing and tracing capacity was a Page 14 of 19 factor in the decision to stop contact tracing. For example, Professor Neil Ferguson said on 25 March: If we have to transit from the suppression strategy and the lockdown strategy to something this country can maintain long term, undoubtedly much more widespread testing, contact tracing and other methods will have to be deployed. If we are talking about back in January/February/ early March, it was very clear from messages from Public Health England that we would have nowhere near enough testing capacity to adopt that strategy.41 41 Q20 42 Q417 43 Qq416 and 418 44 Q335 45 Q336 46 Q339 With respect to easing lockdown restrictions, Professor Jonathan Edmunds, of the London School of Hygiene and Tropical Medicine, explained that contact tracing would “play a role” in managing the epidemic, but would require some social distancing measures to remain in place.42 He made clear that the point at which effective contact tracing would become feasible was an “operational decision” and would depend on the capacity for tracing and isolation in relation to the numbers of cases.43 We also heard that multiple approaches may be required towards managing the manual burden of contact tracing, including the use of new technologies. Professor Christophe Fraser told us that the use of digital contact tracing applications would be necessary to manage the spread of COVID-19 as manual efforts would be “unlikely to be quick enough” to inform those who might be infected.44 Nevertheless it is clear from the experiences of other countries, such as Singapore,45 that we cannot rely on the use of a contact tracing application to fulfil our needs. Indeed, Matthew Gould, the Chief Executive Officer of NHSX—which is developing the app—indicated to us that achieving the levels of uptake required for this approach to be optimal would be “tough”.46 Therefore it is critical that the capacity for contact tracing is advanced for future stages of managing the epidemic. Recommendation 7: The Government must urgently build up contact tracing capacity in order to facilitate further easing of social distancing measures as soon as possible, while minimising the risk of a second peak in infections. Finding 8: The role of isolation in combination with testing and tracing has been important in countries which have, so far, tackled the pandemic effectively. Page 15 of 19 The Committee has taken substantial evidence on how other countries have managed the pandemic, including leading experts from around the world. The consistent message from all of these witnesses was that not only is testing and contact tracing foundational to effective management but so is an extensive programme of isolating and managing infected persons. Professor Gabriel Leung of Hong Kong University emphasised the importance of quarantine and isolation in testing, tracking and tracing the virus in Hong Kong: every single infected individual who is confirmed by testing goes into a hospital bed. In fact, up until very recently, almost all of them would go into a negative pressure single room. All their close contacts who are identified by contact tracing are then quarantined in an isolated facility that is separately and specially prepared for such a purpose. There is no home quarantining for close contacts of confirmed cases.47 47 Q112 48 Q110 49 Q114 50 Q210 Dr Erica Lee of the Korea Centers for Disease Control and Prevention confirmed that the Republic of Korea had been using “isolation and quarantine measures”.48 Dr Lee also explained how Korea changed its approach to respond to rising cases so that there were categories of quarantine: If they have severe symptoms and they need the treatment, we transport them to either the negative pressure rooms or the tertiary hospitals designated by the Government. If the symptoms are mild, we have designated living and treatment facilities, so they can stay there in isolation and if they become severe, we transport them to the hospitals right away. If they have light symptoms or they are asymptomatic cases, we sometimes recommended that they stay home in isolation.49 Professor Xihong Lin of the Harvard T.H. Chan School of Public Health emphasised the important role of quarantine and isolation: social distancing, testing and contact tracing greatly help in reducing the transmission but they are not enough, based on analysis of the Wuhan data and other countries. Smart isolation and quarantine, such as the centralised quarantine and isolation used in Wuhan, is needed to bend the curve in a timely fashion.50 Without developed, extensive and operational testing and tracing capacities targeted isolation of infected individuals is difficult to achieve. However, when Page 16 of 19 testing and tracing has reached a dependable level and cases have fallen to a low enough level, other countries have found that dedicated facilities to isolate and treat infected people has been important in keeping cases very low. These include designated hospitals and non-clinical facilities such as requisitioned hotel accommodation. While intrusive, and incurring cost, providing dedicated facilities may be worthwhile when set against the more hidden but vastly greater cost of maintaining tighter restrictions on the rest of the population for longer if infected individuals are less rigorously isolated from society. Recommendation 8: The Government should set out the role of isolation and quarantine as part of its test, track and trace strategy, ensuring that it draws on the experiences of other countries. (iv) DEVELOPMENT OF VACCINES Finding 9: The development and deployment of vaccines could be critical to halting the COVID-19 pandemic. It is encouraging news that the first human trials of potential vaccines are now underway in the UK. The Secretary of State for Health and Social Care announced on 21 April that human trials of a potential vaccine for COVID-19 would start on 23 April.51 This is testament to the UK’s expertise in this area and the hard work of the researchers involved and those supporting them. Professor Sarah Gilbert, who is part of the Oxford team developing a vaccine, has said that she is “very optimistic” of a successful vaccine, which is a particularly encouraging assessment.52 51 https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/health-and-social-care-secretarys-statement-on-coronavirus-covid-19-21-april-2020 52 See for example: https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/health-52394485 We took evidence from Professor Andrew Pollard, of the University of Oxford, and Dr Melanie Saville, Director of Vaccine Research and Development at the Coalition for Epidemic Preparedness Innovations (CEPI), both of whom made clear the need to start the manufacture of potential vaccines before their effectiveness is proven in order for any successful vaccine to be available at scale as soon as possible. Dr Saville stressed the importance of investing in manufacturing capacity at an early stage and explained the work that CEPI was undertaking in this regard: to reach a 12 to 18-month timeframe many activities need to be done in parallel and at risk. With manufacturing, you do not usually scale up your process until you have clinical data. One of the approaches that CEPI is Page 17 of 19 taking in terms of funding is to accelerate the scale-up of manufacturing so that it is done even at pre-clinical phases.53 53 Q50 54 Q53 55 ‘COVID-19 Daily Deaths’, NHS England 56 Q284 Professor Pollard explained that if investment at risk in manufacture of a COVID-19 vaccine did not take place until all trials were completed then the UK would be “years and years away” from having a vaccine that could be ready for mass use.54 Clearly no vaccine may be used (other than in trials) before its effectiveness and safety is assured. However, to wait until all trials are completed in order to build up the capacity to manufacture and distribute vaccines could lose valuable time. Therefore, even at the risk of redundancy, it is imperative to ensure that the UK has built up sufficient manufacturing and distribution capacity to roll-out a vaccine as soon as its effectiveness is proven. Recommendation 9: The Government should build capacity for vaccine manufacture and deployment now in advance of need and so that their mass use can start as soon as their safety is proven. I (V) RECORDING ETHNICITY Finding 10: There are significant unexplained differences in the death rates in the UK of Black, Asian and minority ethnic groups compared to the population as a whole. NHS England publishes a breakdown of COVID-19 deaths by ethnicity,55 which is dependent upon such information being recorded in emergency department, in-patient or out-patient datasets, and is unavailable for almost 10% of such cases. Further, it does not cover those who die outside of an NHS setting, for example in care homes. Professor Chris Whitty, told us that there was “pretty clear evidence that there is over-representation, at least in certain areas, of people from BAME backgrounds in the number of people who get into severe difficulties” with COVID-19, but that the reason for this was not clear.56 Further, an analysis from the Institute for Fiscal Studies identified that “data published by NHS England on registered hospital deaths by ethnic group have confirmed stark inequalities between ethnic groups”. It explained that: among the black Caribbean and ‘other’ (which includes the Arab population) groups, per-capita hospital deaths are close to three times Page 18 of 19 those of the white British majority, and the ‘other black’ group has also recorded a disproportionate number of hospital deaths.57 57 https://www.ifs.org.uk/inequality/chapter/are-some-ethnic-groups-more-vulnerable-to-covid-19-than-others/ 58https://www.ons.gov.uk/peoplepopulationandcommunity/birthsdeathsandmarriages/deaths/articles/coronavirusrelateddeathsbyethnicgroupenglandandwales/2march2020to10april2020 59 Q284 60https://www.ons.gov.uk/peoplepopulationandcommunity/birthsdeathsandmarriages/deaths/articles/coronavirusrelateddeathsbyethnicgroupenglandandwales/2march2020to10april2020 61 Q284 62 Q286 63 Q288 Analysis published by the Office for National Statistics (ONS) on 7 May made similar findings: “After adjusting for age […], men and women from all ethnic minority groups (except females with Chinese ethnicity) are at greater risk of dying from COVID-19 compared with those of White ethnicity”.58 Professor Whitty made clear to us on 24 April that the cause for BAME over-representation in those people “who get into severe difficulties with this disease” was not known.59 The ONS analysis identified some of the reasons for the difference in outcomes, and found “that the difference between ethnic groups in COVID-19 mortality is partly a result of socio-economic disadvantage and other circumstances, but a remaining part of the difference has not yet been explained”.60 Professor Whitty explained that he had requested Public Health England and academic input to try and establish why there was this over-representation: I have asked Public Health England to look seriously at any datasets, because it is a major concern. In the National Institute for Health Research, we have put out a call for our academic colleagues also to look at it.61 It was also highlighted to us that data on the ethnicity of those dying from COVID-19 was not systematically collected. Professor Whitty argued that ethnicity and gender should be recorded “much more systematically”62 in a wide variety of data sources to facilitate monitoring and research into health impacts related to such characteristics. Dr Frank Atherton, Chief Medical Officer for Wales, similarly agreed that “more data is needed”.63 Recommendation 10: The Government should consider how ethnicity data on those dying as a result of COVID-19 could be systematically recorded. The Science and Technology Committee hopes that these initial findings and recommendations will be useful as a constructive contribution to the important Page 19 of 19 and difficult decisions you and your colleagues in Government have to make during the weeks ahead. As we continue to take evidence during the remaining course of this pandemic the Committee will, in the same spirit, write to you with further observations based on what we learn. I am copying this letter to the Secretary of State for Health and Social Care, the Chief Medical Officer for England and the Government Chief Scientific Adviser. I will be placing this letter in the public domain. With best wishes, Rt Hon Greg Clark MP Chair The UK response to covid-19: use of scientific advice https://committees.parliament.uk/publications/4165/documents/41300/default/ House of Commons Science and Technology Committee First Report of Session 2019–21 Report, together with formal minutes relating to the report Ordered by the House of Commons to be printed 16 December 2020 HC 136 Published on 8 January 2021by authority of the House of Commons Contents Summary3 Key findings 4 1 Introduction 7 Covid-197 Our inquiry 7 Aims of this Report 8 2 Expert advice and Government decision-making structures 10 Scientific advisory structures in the pandemic 10 UK Government 10 Science advice in the devolved nations 13 Key decision-making structures in the UK Government during the pandemic 14 Cabinet Office and COBR 14 Other decision-making structures 17 3 Activation and operation of SAGE 19 Timeliness of coordinating SAGE and science advice 19 Scientific advice 21 Sustainability of SAGE participation 22 4 Transparency and communication 24 Disclosure of science advisers and SAGE participants 24 Communicating science advice to Government decision-makers 27 Transparency of evidence and advice to Government 29 Communicating science advice to the public 31 5 Nature of the scientific advice to Government 37 Initial breadth of scientific expertise 37 Multi-disciplinary advice 38 Our analysis of SAGE meetings 40 Access to data in the development of expert advice 41 6 Application of science expertise 45 Testing and contact tracing 45 SAGE discussions 45 Capacity targets 47 Testing capacity growth 49The UK response to covid-19: use of scientific advice2 Social distancing and face coverings 53 The two-metre rule 53 Face coverings 54 Vaccine and therapeutic development 55 Annex One: Letter from the Chair of the Committee to the Prime Minister, dated 18 May 2020 59 Conclusions and recommendations 74 Formal minutes 82 Witnesses 83 Published written evidence 86 List of Reports from the Committee during the current Parliament 90 >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Published written evidence: 100 written submissions, all downloadable and searchable The following written evidence was received and can be viewed on the inquiry publications page of the Committee’s website. C numbers are generated by the evidence processing system and so may not be complete. 1 ABPI (The Association of the British Pharmaceutical Industry) (C190098) 2 Academy of Medical Sciences (C190102) 3 Apple (C190017) 4 BIVDA (C190082) 5 Barr, Dr G D (C190056) 6 Battye, Rose (C190040) 7 Biochemical Society (C190088) 8 Blott, Richard (C190039) and (C190049) 9 British Pharmacological Society (C190075) 10 British Society for Immunology (C190093) 11 Care England (C190021) 12 Clark, Dr Andre (C190008) 13 Centre for Genomic Pathogen Surveillance (C190090) 14 Cheng, CEO Andersen (CEO, Nomidio & Post-Quantum) (C190028) 15 Cole, Dr Jennifer (C190002) 16 Daniels, Professor James (Former DfiD Quarantine Manager, Ebola, VQF Hastings, SIERRA LEONE, WHH Dfid Funded) (C190051) 17 Davies, Nick (Research Fellow in Mathematical Modelling, London School of Hygiene and Tropical Medicine) (C190037) 18 Department of Health and Social Care (C190057) and (C190112) 19 Earlham Institute (C190024) 20 Emergent BioSolutions Inc. (C190058) 21 Evans, Ken (C190100) 22 Everbridge (C190019) 23 Faculty of Pharmaceutical Medicine (RCP UK) (C190091) 24 Fenton-O, Mark (C190009) 25 Fight for Freedom: Stand with Hong Kong (C190052) 26 Finlayson, Ashley (C190060) 27 Ferguson OBE, Professor Neil (Professor of Mathematical Biology, Imperial College London) (C190041) 28 Global Disability Innovation Hub (C190104) 29 Gonzalez-Rodriguez, Dr Jose (Associate Professor in Analytical Chemistry, University of Lincoln) (C190078) 30 Google (C190015) 31 Gough, Professor David (Director, EPPI-Centre, University College London) (C190097)87 The UK response to covid-19: use of scienti fic advice 32 Guinchard, Dr Audrey; and Dr Subhajit Basu (C190029) 33 Head, Mr Michael (Senior Research Fellow in Global Health Clinical Informatics Research Unit, Faculty of Medicine, University of Southampton) (C190067) 34 Health Research Authority (C190096) 35 Health and Safety Executive (C190033) 36 Hebard, Peter (Covid Task Force Coordinator, IMechE Covid Task Force) (C190042) and (C190054) 37 Hilton, Mr Samuel (Research Affiliate, Centre for the Study of Existential Risk); Toby Ord (Senior Research Fellow, Future of Humanity Institute); and Haydn Belfield (Academic Project Manager, Centre for the Study of Existential Risk) (C190076) 38 Home Office (C190036) 39 Imperial College London (C190038) 40 Institute for Life Sciences, University of Southampton (C190071) 41 Institute of Development Studies (C190089) 42 Institute of Physics and Engineering in Medicine (C190087) 43 Institution of Chemical Engineers; and International Society for Pharmaceutical Engineering UK Affiliate (ISPE UK) (C190068) 44 Keeling, Professor Matt (Professor, University of Warwick) (C190032) 45 Kime, Mr David Allan (C190001) 46 Kolstoe, Dr Simon (Senior Lecturer in Evidence Based Healthcare, and independent chair PHE Regulation & Governance Group, University of Portsmouth/PHE) (C190086) 47 Lawson, Dr Aaron (Lecturer in Environmental Health, Ulster University; and Contracted Research Associate, Safefood Ireland (The Food Safety Promotion Board)) (C190006) 48 Lewis, Dr Gregory (C190107) 49 Lin, Professor Xihong (Professor of Biostatistics, Harvard T.H. Chan School of Public Health) (C190013) 50 Lord Dowding Fund for Humane Research (C190095) 51 Loughhead, Professor John (Chief Scientific Adviser & Director General, Department for Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy) (C190046) 52 MacKay, Prof Robert (C190027) 53 Maroso, Mr Gabriele (Co-Founder Associate, Onfido) (C190014) 54 McAllister, Hayden (C190069) 55 National Institute for Health Research (NIHR) Health Protection Research Unit in Emerging and Zoonotic Infections; University of Oxford, Nuffield Department of Primary Care Health Sciences; and University of Liverpool, Institute of Infection and Global Health (C190084) 56 National Institute for Health and Care Excellence (C190092) 57 National Physical Laboratory (C190094) 58 Newton, Professor John (Director of Health Improvement, Public Health England; and Government’s Government adviser on increasing Covid-19 testing capacity, Public Health England) (C190034)The UK response to covid-19: use of scientific advice88 59 Northumbria Law School, University of Northumbria at Newcastle and the Centre for a Spacefaring Civilization; Northumbria Law School, University of Northumbria at Newcastle and the Centre for a Spacefaring Civilization; Northumbria Law School, University of Northumbria at Newcastle and the Centre for a Spacefaring Civilization; and Northumbria Law School, University of Northumbria at Newcastle and the Centre for a Spacefaring Civilization (C190059) 60 Nuffield Council on Bioethics (C190045) and (C190062) 61 Powis, Professor Stephen (National Medical Director, NHS England and NHS Improvement) (C190043) 62 Public Health England (C190035) 63 RJALogix (C190108) 64 Richardson, Professor Sylvia (Director, MRC Biostatistics Unit, Cambridge Institute of Public Health, University of Cambridge) (C190113) 65 Riley, Keith (C190099) 66 Roche Products Ltd (C190085) 67 Royal Academy of Engineering (C190101) 68 Royal Society of Chemistry (C190064) 69 Royal Society of Edinburgh (C190103) 70 SC Johnson Professional (C190070) 71 Safer Medicines Trust (C190079) 72 Schofield, Dr Stan (C190012) 73 Science Policy Research Unit, University of Sussex Business School; Science Policy Research Unit, University of Sussex Business School; Science Policy Research Unit, University of Sussex Business School; Science Policy Research Unit, University of Sussex Business School; Science Policy Research Unit, University of Sussex Business School; and Science Policy Research Unit, University of Sussex Business School (C190081) 74 Shanks, Professor Thomas (C190010) 75 Simpson, Mr Karl (Director, JKS Bioscience Limited) (C190047) 76 Smith, Sam (coordinator, medConfidential) (C190016) 77 Snell, Mr Geoff (C190074) 78 Society for Applied Microbiology (C190083) 79 Taylor, Mr Christopher Marc (Chair, ISRCTN registry) (C190077) 80 techUK (C190022) 81 The Francis Crick Institute (C190072) 82 The Future Vaccine Manufacturing Research Hub (C190106) 83 The Physiological Society (C190061) 84 The Royal Society (C190110) 85 Thimbleby, Prof Harold (C190005) 86 Tissue Solutions (C190053) 87 Tyrzyk, Mr Roger (Country Manager, IDnow) (C190018) 88 UCL Institute for Healthcare Engineering (C190105)89 The UK response to covid-19: use of scienti fic advice 89 UK Collaborative on Development Research (UKCDR) (C190080) 90 UK Reproducibility Network Steering Group; UK Reproducibility Network Steering Group; UK Reproducibility Network Steering Group; UK Reproducibility Network Steering Group; UK Reproducibility Network Steering Group; and UK Reproducibility Network Steering Group (C190063) 91 UK Research and Innovation (C190073) 92 Universities Policy Engagement Network (UPEN) (C190065) 93 University College London (C190055) 94 Vaghjiani, Nikita (Public Affairs Adviser, Royal College of Physicians) (C190007) and (C190025) 95 Vallance, Sir Patrick (C190111) 96 Veneklasen, Mr. Ethan (Head of Advocacy and Communications, ID2020) (C190031) 97 Watt, Dr Andrew (C190109) 98 Wellcome Sanger Institute (C190066) 99 Wilby, Professor Alvin (C190050) 100 Yoti (C190044) >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Transparency data https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/scientific-advisory-group-for-emergencies-sage-coronavirus-covid-19-response-membership/list-of-participants-of-sage-and-related-sub-groups List of participants of SAGE and related sub-groups Updated 8 January 2021 Contents 1. Scientific Advisory Group for Emergencies (SAGE) 2. Scientific Pandemic Insights Group on Behaviours (SPI-B) 3. Scientific Pandemic Influenza Group on Modelling (SPI-M) 4. PHE Serology Working Group 5. COVID-19 Clinical Information Network (CO-CIN) 6. Environmental Modelling Group 7. Children’s Task and Finish Working Group 8. Hospital Onset COVID-19 Working Group (HOCI) 9. Ethnicity Subgroup Since SAGE first met in response to COVID-19 on 22 January 2020, it has been grateful for insights from a huge range of sources. At high pace, experts from academic, public sector, industrial and commercial communities have provided the high quality research and information used to formulate advice given to government. Listed here are the names of participants who provided input as experts at one or more meetings, including public servants who acted in an expert capacity. SAGE participants are required to declare any interests relevant to the SAGE meetings they attend. Find out more about participants interests. These meetings are also regularly attended by officials from Her Majesty’s Government. These attendees have not been named. Permission to publish names was requested from all participants. Those who did not give permission have not been named. SAGE also uses advice generated by the New and Emerging Respiratory Virus Threats Advisory Group (NERVTAG), which is an existing group that advises the government on the threat posed by new and emerging respiratory viruses. Find out more about NERVTAG. Scientific Advisory Group for Emergencies (SAGE) SAGE provides scientific and technical advice to support government decision makers during emergencies. Find out more about SAGE. Sir Patrick Vallance FMedSci FRS Government Chief Scientific Adviser Professor Chris Whitty CB FMedSci Chief Medical Officer and Chief Scientific Adviser, Department of Health and Social Care Professor Rebecca Allen University of Oxford Professor John Aston Chief Scientific Adviser, Home Office Professor Charles Bangham Imperial College London Professor Wendy Barclay FMedSci Imperial College London Professor Jonathan Benger UWE Bristol Fliss Bennee Welsh Government Mr Allan Bennett Public Health England Professor Phil Blythe Chief Scientific Adviser, Department for Transport Professor Chris Bonnell London School of Hygiene and Tropical Medicine Professor Sir Ian Boyd FRSE University of St Andrews Professor Peter Bruce University of Oxford Caroline Cake HDR-UK Professor Andrew Curran Chief Scientific Adviser, Health and Safety Executive Professor Paul Cosford Public Health England Dr Gavin Dabrera Public Health England Professor Sir Ian Diamond FRSE FBA National Statistician, Office for National Statistics Professor Yvonne Doyle CB Medical Director, Public Health England Professor Deborah Dunn-Walters University of Surrey Professor John Edmunds OBE FMedSci London School of Hygiene and Tropical Medicine Professor Sir Jeremy Farrar FMedSci FRS Director, Wellcome Trust Professor Michael Ferguson University of Dundee Professor Neil Ferguson OBE FMedSci Imperial College London Professor Kevin Fenton Public Health England Dr Aidan Fowler FRCS National Health Service England Professor Julia Gog University of Cambridge Professor Robin Grimes Chief Scientific Adviser, Ministry of Defence Dr Ian Hall University of Manchester Dr David Halpern Behavioural Insights Team, Cabinet Office Dido Harding NHSI Dr Jenny Harries OBE Deputy Chief Medical Officer Dr Demis Hassabis FRS Personal capacity as a data scientist Professor Andrew Hayward UCL Professor Gideon Henderson Chief Scientific Adviser, Defra Professor Peter Horby University of Oxford Professor Anne Johnson UCL Dr Indra Joshi NHSx Professor Kamlesh Khunti University of Leicester Dr Ben Killingley UCLH Professor David Lalloo Liverpool School of Tropical Medicine Professor Janet Lord University of Birmingham Professor Dame Theresa Marteau FMedSci University of Cambridge Professor Dame Angela McLean FRS Chief Scientific Adviser, Ministry of Defence Dr Jim McMenamin Health Protection Scotland Professor Graham Medley London School of Hygiene & Tropical Medicine Dr Laura Merson University of Oxford Professor Susan Michie FAcSS FMedSci University College London Professor Christine Middlemiss Chief Veterinary Officer Professor Andrew Morris FMedSci FRSE University of Edinburgh Professor Paul Moss University of Birmingham Professor Carole Mundell Chief Scientific Adviser, Foreign and Commonwealth Office Professor Cath Noakes University of Leeds Dr Rob Orford Welsh Government Professor Michael Parker University of Oxford Professor Sharon Peacock FMedSci Public Health England Professor Alan Penn Chief Scientific Adviser, Ministry of Housing, Communities and Local Government Dr Pasi Penttinen European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control Professor Guy Poppy Chief Scientific Adviser, Food Standards Agency Professor Steve Powis FRCP National Health Service England Dr Mike Prentice National Health Service England Mr Osama Rahman Chief Scientific Adviser, Department for Education Professor Venki Ramakrishnan PRS Ex Officio as Chair of DELVE, convened by the Royal Society Professor Andrew Rambaut FRSE University of Edinburgh Professor Tom Rodden Chief Scientific Adviser, Department for Digital, Culture, Media and Sport Professor Brooke Rogers OBE Kings College London Dr Cathy Roth Department for International Development David Seymour HDR-UK Professor Sheila Rowan MBE FRS FRSE Chief Scientific Adviser, Scotland Alaster Smith Department for Education Professor Iyiola Solanke University of Leeds Dr Nicola Steedman Scottish Government Dr James Rubin Kings College London Professor Calum Semple University of Liverpool Dr Mike Short CBE Chief Scientific Adviser, Department for International Trade Dr Gregor Smith Scottish Government Chief Medical Officer Professor Sir David Spiegelhalter FRS University of Cambridge Professor Jonathan Van Tam MBE Deputy Chief Medical Officer Professor Russell Viner PRCPCH University College London Professor Charlotte Watts CMG FMedSci Chief Scientific Adviser, Department for International Development Dr Rhoswyn Walker HDR-UK Professor Sir Mark Walport FRCP FMedSci FRS UK Research and Innovation Professor Mark Wilcox University of Leeds Professor Lucy Yardley FAcSS University of Bristol and University of Southampton Professor Ian Young Northern Ireland Executive Professor Maria Zambon FMedSci Public Health England Scientific Pandemic Insights Group on Behaviours (SPI-B) SPI-B provides advice aimed at anticipating and helping people adhere to interventions that are recommended by medical or epidemiological experts. Find out more about SPI-B Professor Richard Amlôt Public Health England Professor Imran Awan Birmingham City University Professor Laura Bear London School of Economics Professor Chris Bonnell London School of Hygiene and Tropical Medicine Dr Ellen Brooks-Pollock University of Bristol Professor Val Curtis London School of Hygiene and Tropical Medicine Professor Stephen David Reicher University of St Andrews Dr Laura de Moliere Her Majesty’s Government Professor John Drury University of Sussex Dr Mark Egan Behavioural Insights Team Professor Nicola Fear Kings College London Dr David Halpern Behavioural Insights Team Mr Hugo Harper Behavioural Insights Team Professor Gerard Hastings University of Stirling Professor Ann John Swansea University Dr Atiya Kamal Birmingham City University Dr Daniel Leightley Kings College London Professor Dame Theresa Marteau University of Cambridge Mr Shaun McNally Her Majesty’s Government Professor G.J. Melendez-Torres University of Exeter Professor Susan Michie University College London Dr Gavin Morgan University College London DCC Paul Netherton Devon and Cornwall Police Professor Melissa Parker LSHTM Professor Michael Parker University of Oxford Mr Richard Pemberton British Psychological Society Dr Henry Potts University College London Professor Subhash Pokhrel Brunel University Dr Lorna Riddle Her Majesty’s Government Professor Brooke Rogers Kings College London Dr James Rubin Kings College London Ms Kathryn Scott British Psychological Society Dr Louise Smith Kings College London Professor Iyiola Solanke University of Leeds Mr Hugh Stickland Office for National Statistics Professor Clifford Stott Keele University Dr Tushna Vandrevala Kingston University Professor Russell Viner University College London Dr Jo Waller Kings College London Professor Charlotte Watts Chief Scientific Adviser, Department for International Development Professor Robert West University College London Professor Lucy Yardley University of Bristol and University of Southampton 4 participants have not given permission to be named. Scientific Pandemic Influenza Group on Modelling (SPI-M) SPI-M gives expert advice to the Department of Health and Social Care and wider UK government on scientific matters relating to the UK’s response to an influenza pandemic (or other emerging human infectious disease threats). The advice is based on infectious disease modelling and epidemiology. Find out more about SPI-M. Dr Marc Baguelin Imperial College London Fliss Bennee Welsh Government Dr Paul Birrell Public Health England Dr Joshua Blake University of Cambridge Professor Veronica Bowman Her Majesty’s Government Professor Stephen Brett Imperial College London Dr Ellen Brooks-Pollock University of Bristol Dr Andre Charlett Public Health England Dr Leon Danon University of Exeter Dr Nick Davies London School of Hygiene & Tropical Medicine Professor Daniela DeAngelis University of Cambridge Dr Louise Dyson University of Warwick Professor John Edmunds London School of Hygiene & Tropical Medicine Dr Rosalind Eggo London School of Hygiene & Tropical Medicine Professor Neil Ferguson Imperial College London Dr Thomas Finnie Public Health England Dr Sebastian Funk London School of Hygiene & Tropical Medicine Dr Nick Gent Public Health England Professor Julia Gog University of Cambridge Professor Nicholas Grassly Imperial College London Dr Ian Hall University of Manchester Dr Edward Hill University of Warwick Dr Thomas House University of Manchester Dr Christopher Jewell Lancaster University Professor Mark Jit London School of Hygiene & Tropical Medicine Dr Thibaut Jombart London School of Hygiene & Tropical Medicine Professor Matt Keeling University of Warwick Dr Petra Klepac London School of Hygiene and Tropical Medicine Dr Adam Kucharski London School of Hygiene and Tropical Medicine Dr Jamie Lopez Bernal Public Health England Professor Dame Angela McLean Chief Scientific Adviser, Ministry of Defence Professor Graham Medley London School of Hygiene and Tropical Medicine Dr Lorenzo Pellis University of Manchester Dr Jonathan Read Lancaster University Professor Steven Riley Imperial College London Professor Chris Robertson University of Strathclyde Dr Julie Robotham Public Health England Dr James Rubin Kings College London Dr Michael Tildesley University of Warwick Dr Edwin Van Leeuwen Public Health England Professor Jonathan Van Tam MBE Deputy Chief Medical Officer Dr Marc Warner Faculty, on behalf of NHSx Professor Mark Woolhouse University of Edinburgh Professor Lucy Yardley University of Bristol and University of Southampton Dr Rohini Mathur London School of Hygiene & Tropical Medicine Dr Joe Hilton University of Warwick Professor Wendy Barclay Imperial College London Mr Bill Quilty London School of Hygiene & Tropical Medicine Dr Sam Clifford London School of Hygiene & Tropical Medicine Professor Axel Gandy Imperial College London Dr Samir Bhatt Imperial College London Dr Thomas Crellen University of Oxford Mr Hugo Lewkowicz University of Manchester Dr Carl Whitfield University of Manchester Dr Joshua Firth University of Oxford Dr Gayatri Amirthalingam Public Health England Dr Heather Whitaker Public Health England Dr Kimberley Moore Faculty, on behalf on NHSx Mr Martyn Fyles University of Manchester Dr Elizabeth Fearon London School of Hygiene & Tropical Medicine Professor Deirdre Hollingsworth University of Oxford Dr Robert Challen University of Exeter Dr Gwen Knight London School of Hygiene & Tropical Medicine Dr Helena Stage University of Manchester Dr Tim Lucas Imperial College London Dr Emma Davis University of Oxford Dr Lewis Spurgin University of East Anglia Dr Daren Austin GSK, contributing in personal capacity PHE Serology Working Group The Serology Working Group provides oversight of sero-epidemiology work for COVID-19 in England and partners with international colleagues, including the WHO, on these serological studies. The group monitors and reviews work on the establishment and running of population-based seroprevalence surveys in England. Sero-epidemiology is crucial in informing our understanding of the extent of transmission of SARS-CoV-2, and to monitor how this changes over time. Dr Gayatri Amirthalingam Public Health England Dr Marc Baguelin London School of Hygiene and Tropical Medicine Professor Wendy Barclay Imperial College London Dr Rupert Beale Francis Crick Institute Dr Tim Brooks Public Health England Dr Mary De Silva Wellcome Trust Professor Sir Jeremy Farrar Wellcome Trust Professor Paul Kellam Imperial College London and Kymab Ltd Professor Sharon Peacock Public Health England Dr Mary Ramsay Public Health England Professor Gavin Screaton University of Oxford Dr Edwin Van Leeuwen Public Health England 5 participants have not given permission to be named. COVID-19 Clinical Information Network (CO-CIN) CO-CIN collates clinical information from the usual health care records of people of all ages admitted to hospital in the UK to characterise the clinical features of patients with severe COVID-19 in the UK. Dr Kenneth Baillie University of Edinburgh Dr Annemarie Docherty University of Edinburgh Dr Chris Green University of Birmingham Professor Ewen Harrison University of Edinburgh Professor Peter Horby University of Oxford Professor Peter Openshaw Imperial College London Professor Calum Semple University of Liverpool Professor Wei Shen Lim University of Nottingham Professor Jonathan Van Tam Deputy Chief Medical Officer Environmental Modelling Group The purpose of this group is to identify and steer the role that environmental modelling, data analysis and environmental sampling can play in understanding COVID-19 transmission, with a view to understanding transmission routes, factors that influence this and the impact of environmental and behavioural interventions and mitigations at a mechanistic level. Dr Alexander Allen National Health Service Professor Phil Blythe Chief Scientific Adviser, Department for Transport Dr Andrew Curran Chief Scientific Adviser, Health and Safety Executive Mr Adrian Eggleton National Health Service Dr Shaun Fitzgerald University of Cambridge Dr Ian Hall University of Manchester Dr Ben Killingley UCLH Professor Dame Theresa Marteau University of Cambridge Professor Cath Noakes University of Leeds Professor Alan Penn Chief Scientific Adviser, Ministry of Housing Communities and Local Government Professor Harry Rutter University of Bath Professor Tim Sharpe University of Strathclyde Dr Danielle Solomon National Health Service Professor Mark Wilcox University of Leeds Also attended by representatives of the Royal Academy of Engineering. Children’s Task and Finish Working Group The group provides consolidated scientific health advice to government. Subject advice focuses on the transmission of COVID-19 in children and within schools, ensuring research questions are fed into relevant studies and UKRI/ funders for new funding. Professor Laura Bear London School of Economics Professor Chris Bonnell London School of Hygiene and Tropical Medicine Dr Ellen Brooks-Pollock University of Bristol Professor John Edmunds London School of Hygiene and Tropical Medicine Dr Rosalind Eggo London School of Hygiene and Tropical Medicine Dr Thomas Finnie Public Health England Ms Clementine Fu Her Majesty’s Government Professor Julia Gog University of Cambridge Professor Peter Horby University of Oxford Dr Thomas House University of Manchester Dr Lorna Howarth Her Majesty’s Government Dr Michael J Tildesley University of Warwick Professor G. J. Melendez University of Exeter Professor Matt Keeling University of Warwick Dr Petra Klepac London School of Hygiene and Tropical Medicine Professor Graham Medley London School of Hygiene and Tropical Medicine Dr Gavin Morgan University College London Professor Cath Noakes University of Leeds Professor Michael Parker University of Oxford Dr Lorenzo Pellis University of Manchester Mr Osama Rahman Chief Scientific Adviser, Department for Education Dr Jonathan Read Lancaster University Professor Steven Riley Imperial College London Professor Brooke Rogers Kings College London Dr Edwin Van Leeuwen Public Health England Professor Russell Viner University College London Professor John Watkins Cardiff University and Public Health Wales Professor Charlotte Watts Chief Scientific Adviser, Department for International Development Professor Lucy Yardley University of Bristol and University of Southampton 7 participants have not given permission to be named. Hospital Onset COVID-19 Working Group (HOCI) This working group focuses on hospital-onset COVID-19 infection (HOCI) and its purpose is to provide thought leadership, direction to analysis and precipitate policy change and interventions that lead to a rapid and sustained reduction in the rate of HOCI. Mr Alexander Allen Public Health Registrar Dr Meera Chand Public Health England Dr Aidan Fowler National Health Service England Professor Alison Holmes Imperial College London Dr Russell Hope Public Health England Dr Susan Hopkins Public Health England Professor Nick Lemoine National Institute for Health Research Dr Kiran Loi National Health Service England Ms Ruth May National Health Service England Professor Graham Medley London School of Hygiene and Tropical Medicine Professor Cath Noakes University of Leeds Professor Sharon Peacock Public Health England Dr James Price Imperial College London Dr Lisa Ritchie National Health Service England Dr Julie Robotham Public Health England Professor Calum Semple University of Liverpool Ms Sue Tranka National Health Service England Ms Karen Turner National Health Service England Dr Ben Warne Cambridge University Hospitals Professor Mark Wilcox University of Leeds Ethnicity Subgroup This subgroup advises on COVID-19 risks and impacts for minority ethnic groups. Professor Benjamin Barr University of Liverpool Professor Laura Bear London School of Economics Mr Iain Bell Office for National Statistics Professor Ewan Birney Deputy Director General EMBL Professor Enitan Carrol University of Liverpool Dr Rosalind Eggo London School of Hygiene & Tropical Medicine Professor Kevin Fenton Public Health England Dr Ben Goldacre University of Oxford Dr Jenny Harries Deputy Chief Medical Officer Dr Ewan Harrison Wellcome Sanger Institute & University of Cambridge Professor Julia Hippisley-Cox University of Oxford. Dr Atiya Kamal Birmingham City University Professor S Vittal Katikireddi University of Glasgow Professor Kamlesh Khunti University of Leicester Dr Rohini Mathur London School of Hygiene and Tropical Medicine Professor Melinda Mills University of Oxford Dr Tolullah Oni University of Cambridge Professor Michael Parker Ethox Centre, University of Oxford Dr Julia Pearce King’s College London. Professor Alan Penn Chief Scientific Adviser, Ministry for Housing and Local Government Professor Lucinda Platt London School of Economics and Political Science Professor Henry Potts University College London Mr Osama Rahman Chief Scientific Adviser Department for Education Dr Allison Streetly Public Health England Ms Ruth Studley Office for National Statistics Mr Nizam Uddin The Prince’s Trust Professor Ewen Harrison University of Edinburgh

A paranoid president and 7,000 plutonium warheads

Of all the issues raised by the Trump boycott of the inauguration of Joe Biden as President on 20 January, the issue of how the codes that control the launch of US nuclear weapons is the most pressing and terrifying. Here are several articles addressing this problem: Here's what happens to the 'nuclear football' if Trump skips Biden's inauguration https://www.businessinsider.com/what-happens-to-nuclear-football-if-trump-skips-biden-inauguration-2020-12?r=US&IR=T by Ryan Pickrell Jan 8, 2021, 4:01 PM American presidents are accompanied by a military aide carrying a briefcase with the tools necessary for nuclear war. During presidential inaugurations, nuclear command authority and the "nuclear football," as the briefcase is called, are transferred to the new president. But President Donald Trump says he will not participate in President-elect Joe Biden's inauguration, which could complicate the transfer. The Pentagon told Insider there was a plan for the transfer in that scenario but declined to provide details. Nuclear-weapons experts and a former military aide who carried the briefcase were able to offer some insight though. An important yet discreet part of the inauguration of a new president is the transfer of command and control authority over the US nuclear arsenal, but President Donald Trump does not plan to attend President-elect Joe Biden's inauguration, which could complicate matters. Trump said Friday that he "will not be going to the Inauguration on January 20th." He did not say where he will be instead. So what happens to the "nuclear football" that accompanies the president if Trump doesn't show? How does it get to Biden? "That's a good question," Hans Kristensen, a nuclear weapons expert at the Federation of American Scientists, told Insider. "It is an unprecedented situation." In the nuclear age, no president has skipped their successor's inauguration. The president has the sole authority to conduct a nuclear strike, and wherever he goes, he is accompanied by a military aide carrying a briefcase called the "president's emergency satchel," more commonly known as the nuclear football. Every president since John F. Kennedy has been accompanied by the aide carrying the hefty briefcase, which gives the commander in chief the ability to command US nuclear forces while away from physical command and control centers. The briefcase does not contain a button that can instantly unleash hundreds of nuclear warheads deployed on intercontinental ballistic missiles, submarine-launched ballistic missiles, and strategic bombers. Instead, the briefcase contains communication tools, codes, and options for nuclear war. Separate from the football, presidents carry a card, sometimes called the "biscuit," on their person containing authentication codes. In a nuclear conflict, the president would use the codes in coordination with the tools in the briefcase to identify himself to the military and order a nuclear strike. Incoming presidents are typically briefed on their nuclear responsibilities before taking the oath of office. Then, during the inauguration, the codes they received that morning or the day before become active, and control of the football is quietly and seamlessly passed to the new president. Trump described that moment as "sobering" and "very scary," telling ABC News in 2017 that "when they explain what it represents and the kind of destruction that you're talking about, it is a very sobering moment." The transfer of the nuclear football is supposed to occur at noon as the new president is sworn in. The military aide who has been carrying the briefcase hands it off to the newly designated military aide, former Vice President Dick Cheney said in a past Discovery documentary. This traditionally happens off to the side and is not a part of the show. If Trump is not at the inauguration, then the transfer process will be different. Still, the transfer will need to be instantaneous, said retired Air Force Lt. Col. Buzz Patterson, who carried the football for former President Bill Clinton. "That's the way it has to be," he told Insider. "For the process to work, you have to have this clear handing off of responsibilities." He said that how that happens would be up to the Pentagon, which serves the office of the commander in chief, not the man. A Pentagon spokesperson told Insider the Department of Defense had a plan for the transfer on Inauguration Day but declined to provide any further details. "We war game this stuff, and we practice it ad nauseam for years and years," Patterson said. "There are systems in place to make sure that happens instantaneously. There won't be any kind of question about who has it, who is in charge at that point in time." "We don't take this stuff lightly," he added. "There won't be any kind of hiccup. It'll just go down without anybody even noticing, which is what is supposed to happen." Kristensen, the nuclear weapons expert at FAS, speculated that the plan could resemble plans in place for situations in which a president is suddenly killed or incapacitated, situations in which nuclear command and control authority and all accompanying equipment have to be immediately transferred to the vice president or another designated survivor. Stephen Schwartz, a nonresident senior fellow with the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, discussed what would happen to the nuclear football if Trump did not attend the inauguration with the Center for Arms Control and Non-Proliferation in December. Schwartz, known for his research on the nuclear football, said there was more than one football. In fact, he explained, there are at least three of them — for the president, vice president, and a designated survivor. He said that if another nuclear football had not already been prepared, one likely would be before the inauguration. There would be a military aide ready then to begin following Biden as soon as he is sworn in. And, at that time, Trump's nuclear command and control authority would expire. "Hopefully President Trump will be there and it will be just a handoff, which is what it's been for decades," Patterson said, adding that if he didn't, "it's not that big of a deal" because the military will make sure that the transfer occurs as needed. Note: This post, which was first published on December 15, has been re-posted following Trump's announcement on Friday, Jan. 8, that he will not attend Biden's inauguration. https://www.washingtonpost.com/there-is-no-legal-way-stop-trump-ordering-nuclear-strike-if-he-wants-expert-says President Trump at a campaign rally for Republican U.S Senate candidates in Dalton, Ga., on Jan. 5, 2021. (Erik S. Lesser/EPA-EFE/Shutterstock) (Erik S Lesser/EPA-EFE/REX/Shutterstock) By Elizabeth N. Saunders Washington Post, Jan. 8, 2021 at 7:27 p.m. UTC On Friday, House Speaker Nancy Pelosi (D-Calif.) sent a letter to her Democratic colleagues that included the following remarkable statement: “This morning, I spoke to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Mark Milley to discuss available precautions for preventing an unstable president from initiating military hostilities or accessing the launch codes and ordering a nuclear strike. The situation of this unhinged President could not be more dangerous, and we must do everything that we can to protect the American people from his unbalanced assault on our country and our democracy.” Subsequently, Milley issued a statement saying that “Speaker Pelosi initiated a call with the Chairman” and that he “answered her questions regarding the process of nuclear command authority.” I asked Vipin Narang, an associate professor of political science at MIT and a nuclear proliferation and strategy scholar, what this does — and doesn’t — mean. (The content has been lightly edited.) AD 1. Is there anything Milley can do to prevent the president from “accessing the launch codes and ordering a nuclear strike”? The answer is emphatically no. The president, and the president alone, possesses the sole authority to order a nuclear launch, and no one can legally stop him or her. Despite reports that Pelosi received assurances that there are safeguards in place in the event the president of the United States (POTUS) wants to launch a nuclear weapon, any such meaningful or effective safeguards would be illegal. Although it may be customary for the president to consult with his White House advisers, STRATCOM (U.S. Strategic Command, the military command in charge of nuclear weapons), or the (civilian) secretary of defense, there is no legal requirement to do so on nuclear launch. Contrary to popular belief, neither the chair of the Joint Chiefs of Staff nor the White House chief of staff nor the (civilian) secretary of defense nor the STRATCOM chief nor the vice president are in the nuclear launch chain of command. AD 2. What would happen if someone tries to enter the chain of command, for example by countermanding or refusing to obey a presidential order? Anyone who attempts to contravene a valid, authentic and legal (in the sense of whether the strike package was legal, and all off-the-shelf nuclear strike packages are pre-vetted for legality to some degree) order would be doing so illegally and risk the charge of mutiny. Now, if POTUS ordered a nuclear first strike out of the blue against China or Russia, there would be questions about legality. But if, for example, he ordered a limited nuclear strike against targets in Iran, such as the hardened and buried Fordow enrichment facility, or a complex in North Korea, it would be very difficult to argue that the president did not have the legal right to do that out of the blue if he or she deemed it in America’s national interest. So how does the president order the launch of nuclear weapons? The procedure, as far as we publicly know, is as follows: If POTUS decided to launch some or all of America’s nuclear weapons, s/he would simply take out the “biscuit” or authenticator which s/he carries on his/her person at all times, summon the military aide that accompanies POTUS at all times, who connects POTUS directly to the duty officer at the National Military Command Center. Based on an alphanumeric code on the “biscuit,” POTUS authenticates himself or herself to the duty officer and orders the desired nuclear launch package. AD At this point, if the order is deemed to be authentic (did POTUS respond with the correct authenticator) and valid (is the strike package valid?), it is considered a legal order from the commander in chief. The duty officer then transmits the order and strike package directly to America’s nuclear missiles and submarines and bombers to carry out the order and the desired strike package. At no point is anyone else legally, or even practically, in the chain of command for nuclear launch. Anyone — the duty officer or a missileer — who contravenes or fails to carry out this order would be doing so illegally. 3. Why does this system rely so much on one single actor: the president? The system originated in the Cold War, when the concern was the president would have extremely limited time, measured in minutes, to launch nuclear weapons, and therefore should not face hurdles that would slow him down. Some have suggested this system should change, but it remains the basic fact that if the president gives a launch order, only a military refusal to follow the order could stop it. AD For much of the Cold War, and since, sole authority was believed to be a feature not a bug — allowing the president to quickly preempt adversaries or retaliate in the event other principals were unavailable. In the hands of Donald Trump until Jan. 20, absent his removal from office, it is a risk, one that Pelosi herself raised. The United States is one of the only countries to have sole launch authority — even Russia does not. It is striking that the Russian system requires an additional vote to Russian President Vladimir Putin’s, but America’s does not. 4. What does Pelosi making this public mean? Pelosi likely knows all of this. But making this statement public may be a way to send another signal about the gravity of Trump remaining in office. It is the most extreme example of the powers he retains until the moment he is removed from office. AD The only way to guarantee that Trump cannot order a nuclear strike is to remove him from office through civilian means (i.e., impeachment or the 25th Amendment). Pelosi may want to remind civilians of that fact, even if they know it already. 5. Has this happened before? There is some debate about whether Defense Secretary James Schlesinger asked those around President Richard M. Nixon to double check with him before carrying out any military orders, including nuclear ones in the final days of the Nixon presidency. For using nonnuclear military force, that is legal as orders flow through the secretary of defense to the combatant commands. And the Pentagon can drag its heels in implementing any order to deploy nonnuclear forces. But if Schlesinger intended to try to block or circumvent a valid and authentic nuclear launch order from Nixon — and we are not sure he actually did — it would have been illegal, even if it was the responsible thing to do. There has been discussion about revising sole authority in the Trump years, given his history of nuclear threats and desire to play the ‘madman.' But right now, launching nuclear weapons is solely the president’s decision. Pelosi’s statement just gives everyone a reminder. https://www.nytimes.com/2020/06/22/opinion/nuclear-weapons-trump.html Opinion | Who Can We Trust With the Nuclear Button? No One - The New York Times

An Insurrection Trumped

How should we respond to the insurrection in Washington DC on 6 January? Millions of words have been expended in print, in broadcasts, and on digital media, to accompany some of the most jaw- dropping photography and television footage ever to come out of the United States, that beacon of democracy shining on the Hill. And that is the less than 24 hours since the insurrection- incited by the siting President of the nation!!- began its menacing march down the Washington Mall from the Ellipse park south of the White House to the Capitol, the cradle of US democracy, and until yesterday, the hope of millions living under an oppressive yoke in China, or Russia, Israel or Saudi Arabia. The tyrants are laughing now, or are they? I think the best way to illustrate the malign narcissistic personality of the US President that led to yesterday’s danger to democracy is to turn to existing studies made of what has formed his personality, drives his manic thoughts, and led to the nadir of nihilism that peaked yesterday. “Fire and Fury” by investigative reporter, Michael Wolff, who embedded himself inside the Trump White House for its first year, is replete with insights. But I turn to a second volume, “Rage” by the doyenne of Washington insider reportage, Bob Woodward, who was part of the Washington Post duo that broke the Watergate story that led to Richard Nixon’s resignation from the presidency in August 1973. Here are a few insights into Trump from “Rage”: In April 2018, defending his relationship with Russia to conservative Republican senator Lindsey Graham, an inveterate Trump supporter, he said of allegations emerging from the Mueller investigation into possible Russian collusion in the 2016 US Presidential election campaign, “I’ve done a lot of bad things, but I didn’t do this.” On 19 July 21018, Trump told his Director of National Intelligence “I don’t need a National Security Council, I just need myself.” When General “Mad Dog” Mattis, Trump’s dense secretary proposed Air Force chief of staff “Fingers David L. Goldfein to be the new US Chief of the Defense Staff, Trump turned him down, Woodward observed wryly it was because he would have brought a “level of intellectualism” to the job that the President had resisted. Later, Mattis recalled briefings with the President on intelligence gathered by one of the US’ 17 intelligence agencies. Trump, he said, would just shoot off onto another subject… something that had been said on Fox News was more salient to him.” The facts would just be dismissed.” Woodward commented: Trump lived in his own head, and if he wanted, out came an idea or a decision. It did not matter what anyone else thought.” Dr Mary L. Trump, the President’s dissident niece, also wrote a highly personal book in 2020 about her uncle, “To Much is Never Enough,” subtitled “How my family created the world’s most dangerous man”- which gives a very clear flavor of her perspective as a trained psychotherapist. She writes in her Prologue that “I have no problem in calling Donald a narcissist – he meets all nine criteria as outlined in the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental disorders (DSM5).” Meanwhile, this unstable person has total control over whether 9,000 nuclear weapons can be launched in the two weeks running up to the transition, when Joe Biden is sworn in as the 46th President . It may be an opportune time for the members of the Trump Cabinet- the U.S. Government’s executive- to invoke US constitutional Amendment 25, which enables the removal of the President if he is "unable to discharge the powers and duties of his office.” Section 4 reads: “Whenever the Vice President and a majority of either the principal officers of the executive departments or of such other body as Congress may by law provide, transmit to the President pro tempore of the Senate and the Speaker of the House of Representatives their written declaration that the President is unable to discharge the powers and duties of his office, the Vice President shall immediately assume the powers and duties of the office as Acting President.” (https://simple.wikipedia.org/wiki/Twenty-fifth_Amendment_to_the_United_States_Constitution#Approved_text)

Nuclear confusion in Daily Telegraph

Letter submitted to The Daily Telegraph on 4 January: Professor RG Faulkner ‘s letter (“ Britain needs nuclear energy to meet demand,” Daily Telegraph, 4 January 2021) makes a series of assumptions on likely future energy demand in order to reach his conclusions in the potential for significant increase in electricity supply. The professor’s specialism seems to be metallurgy, in his university ( Loughborough) department of Aeronautical and Automotive Engineering. His pronouncements on the need for new nuclear shows the danger out jumping out of your area of expertise into one where your knowledge is deficient. I have spent forty years studying and writing professionally on nuclear power, and several of his assertions are demonstrably wrong. Let me just take two. Firstly, he assumes that the U.K. needs to be able to generate all the electrify it needs. This is not so. The U.K. has an interconnector with continental Europe( and is working on one with Iceland that has virtually limitless geothermal potential to generate power). The Brexit agreement protects the continued use of the inter connector, which is helpful because the one hour time difference between the U.K. and most of the EU, means the peak demand is at different times across the Channel. Secondly, the Professor asserts that Rolls Royce has a design of small modular reactor( SMR)- 660 megawatt units- virtually available “off the shelf.” This is untrue. To be sure, RR does have a smaller submarine reactor design, but it’s SMR plant is more part of a successful public relations push by the company than an industrial reality. Even if it were technically ready, it still has a robust regulatory hurdle by the Office. for Nuclear Regulation (ONR) to pass, which is no foregone conclusion

Hinkley Point C new nuclear plant still has 415 key safety issues unresolved

On Christmas Eve last year I received a detailed response to a Freedom of Information request I had made to the UK Office for Nuclear Regulation [ONR] ( I am a member of the chief nuclear inspector's independent advisory panel) on the 415 unresolved nucleaer safety issues outstanding for the nuclear licence for the Hinkley Point C nuclear power plant the north Somerset coast, 18 miles from the Welsh capial city, Cardiff, across the Britol channel. It contains an alarming number of extremely important unresolved matters. Should this £25 billion plant really have been given the regulatory green light with so many safety issues unfinished? It is nonetheless reassuring that the ONR has been so thorough in flagging up key matters that need safety resolution Here is the covering letter, and my selection of the long list of most important unresolved safety issues: Unique ref: 2020/299949 Freedom of Information Request Reference No: FOI202011054 Thank you for your request for information received by us on 26 November 2020. Your enquiry is being dealt with under the terms of the Freedom of Information Act 2000 (FOIA). You requested: On page 22 of the Chief Nuclear Inspector’s Annual Report 2020, under the heading Resolution of GDA assessment findings, it states at paragraph 1.5 “We consider that NNB GenCo (HPC) continues to make good progress towards resolution of GDA assessment findings. At the end of GDA approximately 700 GDA assessment findings were raised (nuclear safety and security). As of March 2020, NNB GenCo (HPC) has closed 284 GDA assessment findings. The licensee continues to focus on closing out the remaining findings, which will be achieved as the site specific design continues develop.” Could you send me under Freedom of Information Act 2000 the headlines for each of the as yet circa 415 unresolved GDA assessment findings for Hinkley Point C, with an indication of the current best estimate respectively when each is expected to be closed out?? Our response: I confirm that under Section 1 of the FOIA,1 we hold the information related to your request. We have also provided some explanatory background to your requests below which we hope you may find helpful. 1) Headlines for each of the as yet circa 415 unresolved GDA assessment findings for Hinkley Point C The timely resolution of GDA Assessment Findings (AFs) remains an important strategic priority for ONR. The current status of outstanding GDA AFs for Hinkley Point C (HPC) is that as of 15 December 2020, 383 of the circa 700 nuclear safety and security findings remain open. The remaining open GDA AFs are listed in the table in Annex A along with the milestone by which they are required to have been addressed; a small number of these milestones have changed since they were published at the end of GDA following requests from the licensee and agreement by ONR. This was because the original milestones were initial estimates defined by ONR before the project started. As the project has since developed and evolved, we have responded and refined these milestones accordingly. The information on GDA AFs for HPC in Annex A, including definitions, have been compiled from many reports available on our website. These can be found on our page: Assessment of Reactors - UK European Pressurised Reactor™ (UK EPR). If you have any problems locating the definitions or specific acronyms, as we recognise there are many, please do come back to us. 2) Indication of the current best estimate respectively when each is expected to be closed out As set out in the table in Annex A, each assessment finding is measured against a milestone descriptor or event rather than a calendar date. Our focus is ensuring that the work described in the AF is complete in advance of the descriptive milestone. For example, the “fuel load” milestone means we expect those relevant AFs for that milestone to be closed at the latest before fuel can start to be loaded into the core. Regarding the open GDA AFs, care must be taken regarding how the absolute number of open findings is interpreted and the number of open findings should not be taken as a reliable indicator of design maturity. Furthermore, comparison of numbers of GDA AFs between different reactor designs should be avoided as assessment findings are not equal in terms of their significance. The significance of the assessment findings vary, with a number being normal business activities that must be completed during the construction or commissioning of any nuclear power plant; that is whether a GDA AF had been raised or not. We regularly discuss progress towards closure of GDA AFs with the licensee. We have also carried out detailed reviews of GDA AFs to inform our decisions whether to agree to certain activities starting, for example the start of construction of the nuclear island (see this report)2. Even where assessment findings remain open, significant progress has been made by the licensee towards their closure. However, in a significant number of cases the final evidence to support closure cannot be produced until later in the project, for example after certain commissioning activities are completed, making the resolution of GDA AFs a continuous process throughout the progress of HPC to commercial operations. On this basis, we consider that the licensee has prioritised resolution of the more significant GDA AFs, adequately addressed those findings where resolution was needed by early project milestones and it continues to make good progress towards resolution of outstanding GDA AFs in line with the agreed milestones. 2 http://www.onr.org.uk/pars/2018/hinkley-point-c-18-006.pdf Katie Day Director of Policy and Communications >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> AF-UKEPR-CC-14 A future licensee shall provide evidence to substantiate the grace times claimed in the EDF and AREVA report PEPS-F DC 133 dated November 2012 for a UK EPR™ following prolonged loss of power and / or cooling events for all operating states. AF-UKEPR-CC-18 A future UK EPR™ Licensee shall demonstrate how the long-term control of reactivity will be ensured following the total loss of AC power. AF-UKEPR-CE-038 The Licensee shall develop the test criteria and related monitoring and alert arrangements for the initial and decennial pressure tests on the containment. AF-UKEPR-CE-054 The Licensee shall provide justification of the seismic class of all items of structures systems and components in the MCR. AF-UKEPR-CE-068 The Licensee shall undertake analysis of the containment structure to reflect the actual concrete properties used in the construction. AF-UKEPR-CE-70 The Licensee shall confirm through appropriate simulation that the reliability of the containment structure against overpressure satisfies the safety case requirements. This shall take into account the design process undertaken, and the variation in strengths achieved in the construction of the containment. In addition, a full range of failure scenarios shall be considered. AF-UKEPR-CI-011 The Licensee shall produce a safety demonstration for the selection and use of Programmable Complex Electronic Components in the Teleperm XS platform, which form part of the Class 1 UKEPR Protection System, using appropriate standards and guidance. AF-UKEPR-CI-012 The Licensee shall produce a comprehensive safety demonstration addressing the adequacy of the SPPA-T2000 platform for Class 2 use covering hardware design, qualification and software design processes. AF-UKEPR-CI-014 The Licensee shall ensure that the software re-use argument presented addresses all Class 2 components of the SPPA-T2000 that contain dedicated devices with embedded software, or if no such software exists a positive statement saying so should be made. AF-UKEPR-CI-015 The Licensee shall produce adequate justification that the issue raised by ASN concerning the adequacy of the quality system test records for the original development of the SPPA-T2000 platform does not compromise the claims made for this platform in the UKEPR design. AF-UKEPR-CI-018 The Licensee shall ensure there is an adequate safety case for in-core instrumentation sensors and other sensors used in SIS. AF-UKEPR-CI-021 The Licensee shall demonstrate that the use of a different complier with the SIVAT tool compared to that used to generate the object code which will run on the PS does not compromise the integrity of the PS application software development lifecycle. AF-UKEPR-CI-024 The Licensee shall produce evidence to demonstrate the adequacy of the design and implementation of the PS calculated trip functions. AF-UKEPR-CI-025 The Licensee shall demonstrate that the differences of functional coverage across the PS trains do not give rise to any safety concerns (such as an inability to meet the reliability requirements or the single failure functional criterion requirements) when failures occur within a train, or any train is taken out of service for maintenance. AF-UKEPR-CI-031 Definition and assignment of functions to C&I SIS - The Licensee shall ensure that for the UKEPR there is a rigorous definition of the overall system architecture, the assignment of functions to SIS, interfaces and independence requirements AF-UKEPR-CI-035 The Licensee shall address the open points on the PCSR summarised below by updating the PCSR to: · include the justification of the adequacy of programmable complex electronic components; · include the UNICORN platform and NCSS justifications; and · address the inconsistencies in the status of the PICS and the interfaces between the Class 1 PS and other systems. AF-UKEPR-CI-038 The Licensee shall complete the demonstrations of reliability and independence for inclusion in the safety case, in particular to: · Undertake the modifications to the PS and / or its periodic test arrangements to allow the reliability targets (e.g. for trip on low DNBR by increasing the frequency of periodic tests) to be met. AF-UKEPR-CI-041 The Licensee shall: · Confirm that the SAS functional and safety interlocks referred to in TQ-EPR-1532 response inhibit spurious commands from the PICS, and produce a justification of the adequacy of the interlocks. · Produce a comprehensive justification that Class 2 systems cannot be adversely affected by lower class systems. This justification to include the RCSL and systems based on SPPA-T2000 platform version S7 technology. · Produce an analysis for the final UK EPR™ SAS design that demonstrates that a “spurious but valid command sent to the SAS from the PICS” will affect at the very worst only one division and the consequences can be managed AF-UKEPR-CI-043 The Licensee shall complete the demonstration of the adequacy of the UK EPR™ end-to-end response times for those functions important to safety which use the Class 3 Terminal Bus and / or Plant Bus using SPPA-T2000 platform version S7 information. The Licensee to: · Perform a design analysis of the end-to-end response times using SPPA-T2000 platform S7 version information (i.e. updating the SPPA-T2000 platform S5 version analyses provided during GDA). · Undertake a programme of performance / response time tests on fully representative UK EPR™ equipment (including SPPA-T2000 platform version S7 components) that include consideration of avalanche conditions both generated by the plant and internal to the SPPA-T2000 platform S7 version equipment). AF-UKEPR-CI-045 The Licensee shall confirm the adequacy of the allocation of conditioning modules and sensors (i.e. one group to the PS and other to the SAS / NCSS) by completing sufficient detailed calculations AF-UKEPR-CI-048 The Licensee shall: · Update document PEPS-F DC 90 so that it clearly defines the requirements for design in respect of common cause failure during maintenance. · When C&I categorisation and classification is complete, update the documentation (e.g. ECEF091489) to record the final categorisations of functions and classifications of systems, identifying any categorisation shortfalls and providing full justification, as necessary. AF-UKEPR-CI-050 The Licensee shall: · Document and justify the adequacy of the final NCSS design in the safety case (e.g. the approach to testing, fail safe capability and selection of single or dual chain architecture for manual functions, etc.). · Confirm the adequacy of the final NCSS design, in relation to reduction of plant risk, by including NCSS design details into the PSA. · Define how, once triggered, the action of an NCSS automatic function will be reset and confirm this meets the requirements of SAP ESS.14. · Assess the effect of power loss within the NCSS system on plant safety (e.g. power loss leading to a failure to actuate when required or send alarms to operators). AF-UKEPR-CI-051 The Licensee shall: · Complete the trial qualification of the Class 1 smart device, assess the effectiveness of the qualification, and update the smart device qualification documentation and processes where improvements are identified. · Address the omissions in the Class 2 smart device trial qualification, assess the effectiveness of the qualification, and update the qualification documentation and processes where improvements are identified. · Confirm that a change in the Emphasis version will not adversely affect the qualification of smart devices. · Ensure that all smart device features (e.g. such as clock synchronisation and removable data logging memory), that have the potential to adversely affect the operation of safety functions are identified and, as appropriate, included within the qualification. AF-UKEPR-CSA-001 The licensee shall provide the ventilation strategy supporting the concept of inaccessible/accessible areas during normal operations and accident conditions for situations where one or more of the foils and dampers have failed. AF-UKEPR-CSA-006 The licensee shall justify that the isolation systems and containment penetrations meet the site specific loading requirements (pressure, temperature, moisture and leakage) in accident conditions. AF-UKEPR-CSA-007 The licensee shall demonstrate that the design of insulation and the strainer structures associated with the safety injection system is such that the risk of sump blockage has been reduced to the lowest level reasonably practicable. In particular, the licensee should produce an analysis of the options and justify the choice of insulating technology. AF-UKEPR-CSA-008 The licensee shall justify the measurement systems indicating core conditions used to initiate the accident management procedures, such as, core outlet temperature measurements and the reliability of instrumentation routed via the RPV head; the justification should give consideration to common cause failure. AF-UKEPR-CSA-010 The licensee shall provide a robust justification of the operational requirements of the PDS during fault conditions. The justification is expected to fully consider the PDS implementation and Operating Strategies for Severe Accident (OSSA) for the UK EPR AF-UKEPR-CSA-014 The licensee shall provide additional justification to: · demonstrate that the weld beads and outer frame meet the loading requirement, and · support a testing programme to capture unacceptable defects in the weld beads. AF-UKEPR-CSA-015 The licensee shall justify that potential presence of chunks of concrete above the melt plug at the time of bottom head failure has no significant consequences on the melt plug opening. AF-UKEPR-CSA-021 The licensee shall provide the measure(s) and arrangement(s) for inspection in order to ensure that the reactor pit is kept sufficiently dry. AF-UKEPR-CSA-025 The licensee shall provide the available measures to limit the containment pressure, in the event of a severe accident leading to the failure of the CHRS, to prevent uncontrolled radiological releases from the primary containment. AF-UKEPR-FD-003 The licensee shall demonstrate that the procedures proposed for loading the reactor core with fuel will ensure that an uncontrolled criticality is incredible or that all reasonably practical measures have been taken to prevent this. AF-UKEPR-FD-008 The licensee shall review the derived criteria for cladding failure in RIA faults in the context of the results of the relevant experiments in the current CABRI programme if they become available. AF-UKEPR-FS-005 The future licensee shall assess the radiological consequences (and demonstrate compliance with Target 4 of the SAPs) of multiple consequential steam generator tube ruptures occurring following a steamline break assuming the single failure of the Main Steamline Isolation Valve failing to close on the steamline associated with the fault. AF-UKEPR-FS-013 The future licensee shall perform a sensitivity study to the loss of off-site power ATWT case with failure of the RCCAs to insert in which Interim insertion of RCCAs is assumed. This is to demonstrate that the power distribution is not distorted such that fuel enters DNB. AF-UKEPR-FS-017 The future licensee shall provide transient analysis to demonstrate that adequate protection is provided for a CVCS malfunction resulting in boron dilution while at power with failure of the reactor protection system to trip the reactor. AF-UKEPR-FS-018 The future licensee shall demonstrate that a fuel loading error involving the two most onerous fuel assemblies will not result in fuel entering DNB upon return to power. AF-UKEPR-FS-020 The future licensee shall perform SBLOCA with ATWT sensitivity studies to investigate the margins provided by the adopted Interim cooldown rate to avoid recriticality while ensuring adequate cooling of fuel. AF-UKEPR-FS-022 The future licensee shall ensure spurious C&I signals as initiating events are covered in the UK EPR safety case. AF-UKEPR-FS-104 The future licensee shall determine the consequences of failure for the control rod drive mechanisms and the ex-core flux instrumentation of the containment cooling ventilation system. AF-UKEPR-FS-112 The future licensee shall perform UK EPR™ specific transient analysis studies for the SBO sequence with failure of the SSSS. The analysis will need to confirm that adequate grace time is available for operator action to start the UDGs and restore adequate cooling and whether the CHRS is sized sufficiently such that one CHRS train is functionally capable of providing adequate cooling to the IRWST or demonstrate that the current design of the CHRS is ALARP. AF-UKEPR-FS-115 The future licensee shall perform thermal analysis to determine the timescales for which consequential loss of C&I and electrical equipment would occur as a result of the total loss of all the HVAC systems during the station blackout sequence prior to restoration of the UDGs. Adequate validation evidence will need to be presented to support the thermal analysis possibly including representative destructive testing. AF-UKEPR-FS-116 The future licensee shall perform thermal analysis to confirm that the C&I and electrical equipment needed to operate the severe accident mitigation measures will remain available despite the complete loss of all HVAC systems following the severe accident sequence associated with station blackout occurring together with subsequent failure of the UDGs to start. Adequate validation evidence will need to be presented to support the thermal analysis possibly including representative testing. AF-UKEPR-FS-30 The future licensee shall provide a revised PSA for external heterogeneous boron dilution faults. AF-UKEPR-FS-32 The future licensee shall demonstrate the functional capability of the CVCS letdown line to purge an unborated slug from a loop on the primary circuit. Ideally, the demonstration should take the form of a test performed upon either a full scaled test rig or an EPRTM reactor plant during commissioning. AF-UKEPR-FS-36 The future licensee shall perform PIRT and scaling analyses for the Juliette test rig to confirm its applicability for providing validation evidence of the important thermal hydraulic phenomena associated with heterogeneous boron dilution faults and to confirm safety margins. AF-UKEPR-FS-42 The future licensee shall demonstrate that the in-core Self-Powered Neutron Detectors (SPND) are functionally capable of protecting against Rod Cluster Control Assembly (RCCA) misalignment faults including one or more dropped RCCAs and against uncontrolled single RCCA withdrawal faults assuming the loss of the most onerous SPND finger due to a single failure such that DNB is avoided using conservative PCC analysis rules and conservative methods and assumptions. AF-UKEPR-FS-43 The future licensee shall explore the feasibility of using the axial offset signal on the ex-core detectors as a diverse means of ensuring the reactor is sufficiently well trimmed so as to avoid entering DNB following RCCA misplacement faults including the dropping of more than one RCCA together with common mode failure of the SPNDs. AF-UKEPR-FS-44 The future licensee shall determine which of the options identified within Change Management Form (CMF) #59 is to be developed into fully worked up proposal to provide diverse protection against homogeneous boron dilution faults occurring during shutdown conditions. AF-UKEPR-FS-46 The future licenses shall provide a fully integrated safety case for the station blackout sequence. AF-UKEPR-FS-48 The future licensee shall perform an ALARP assessment on the feasibility of providing a diverse means of isolating one pair of steam lines from the other pair following a break on the secondary side. AF-UKEPR-FS-53 The future licensee shall update the PCSR to reflect the definition of controlled state for fuel pool faults, the functioning of the RCSL anti-dilution safety function, the change in protection claimed for excessive increase in secondary steam flow faults with failure of PS and the inclusion of support system functions in the fault and protection schedule. AF-UKEPR-FS-63 The future licensee shall provide transient analysis studies to demonstrate that there is adequate diverse protection against the loss of one RCP. AF-UKEPR-FS-64 The future licensee shall provide transient analysis studies to demonstrate that there is adequate diverse protection against the uncontrolled single RCCA withdrawal fault. AF-UKEPR-FS-65 The future licensee shall review the allocation of conditioning modules for the in-core and ex-core detectors to reduce the risk to ALARP of both systems being unavailable following common failure of a single design of conditioning module. AF-UKEPR-FS-69 The future licensee shall review all valve and motor actuations to ensure that the design logic is such that common mode failure of a PACS module cannot result in the failure of two diverse systems both contributing to the same safety function. Consideration also needs to be given to common mode failure of the PS resulting in a spurious signal that overrides a correct signal from the SAS/NCSS. AF-UKEPR-FS-86 Complete the development work on the optimisation of operator actions claimed to prevent SG dry-out post SGTR faults. The revised proposal is required to fully consider the expectations of Emergency Operating Procedures (EOP) for the UK EPR™. AF-UKEPR-FS-88 Provide a robust justification that the position of the steam line activity sensors is optimised to maximise their sensitivity for detecting the activity released from SGTR faults or to minimise potential radiological discharge to atmosphere. AF-UKEPR-FS-89 Review and update the definition of the “controlled state” for SGTR faults. AF-UKEPR-HF-002 The licensee shall explicitly highlight the human error probabilities associated with Type A HFEs as part of the Level 1 HRA revision. AF-UKEPR-HF-005 The licensee shall undertake a systematic analysis to demonstrate that all credible HFEs are included in the revised Level 2 HRA. AF-UKEPR-HF-010 The licensee shall justify the quantitative modelling of error recovery as part of the HRA revision. AF-UKEPR-HF-011 The licensee shall justify the approach for the HRA modelling of diagnostic errors when revising the HRA. AF-UKEPR-HF-015 The licensee shall calculate the HEPs for initiating human errors based on an analytical process that includes consideration of dependency within the initiator and with other initiating HFEs. AF-UKEPR-HF-016 The licensee shall provide evidence to support the claims that maintenance and test procedures will minimise the potential for human error dependence. AF-UKEPR-HF-031 The licensee shall provide justification and evidence of the suitability of the workspaces and working positions in the UKEPR (not limited to the MCR) for the UK working population. AF-UKEPR-HF-032 The licensee shall provide further information on and justification relating to the emergency lighting design and relevant plant wide minimum lighting levels. AF-UKEPR-HF-039 The licensee shall provide a justification and evidence of the visibility of the detailed POP displays proposed for the UKEPR. AF-UKEPR-HF-044 The licensee shall demonstrate that a consistent approach to alarm prioritisation and configuration is taken throughout the UKEPR. AF-UKEPR-HF-049 The licensee shall substantiate that the SOA procedures ensure that claimed safety actions are reliably completed within the timescales required by the safety case. AF-UKEPR-HF-58 The Licensee shall determine if internal floods generate additional alarms that are likely to mask or delay response to key alarms or indications prompting operators to undertake claimed leak response actions. The licensee shall provide an appropriate justification that any claimed operator actions required to support the Internal Hazards flooding case are reliably achievable within the required timescales. AF-UKEPR-IH-003 The Licensee shall provide evidence to demonstrate that the design of the doors required to open in the event of increased pressure (due to a steam release) will do so at the requisite pressure and thus allow the steam release path to be realised in accordance with the requirements of the safety case. AF-UKEPR-IH-005 The Licensee shall provide evidence to demonstrate that the design of the doors required to remain intact in the event of increased pressure (due to a steam release) will withstand requisite pressure and ensure that the engineered discharge routes for the steam release to be realised in accordance with the requirements of the safety case. AF-UKEPR-IH-006 The Licensee shall provide evidence to demonstrate that the potential for a hydrogen explosion within the Battery Rooms during the most onerous operating conditions has been considered within the UKEPR design. AF-UKEPR-IH-15 The Licensee shall review the potential flooding scenarios that require automatic isolation following detection of a leak or break and provide substantiation of the classification and categorisation of those systems. AF-UKEPR-ME-008 The licensee shall generate evidence to demonstrate that the CRDMs meet their seismic design intent. AF-UKEPR-ME-014 The licensee shall ensure the design of all rigging equipment associated with lifts of nuclear safety significance is completed, and in doing so shall systematically review these rigging arrangements to identify faults, and review and implement reasonably practicable improvements to either eliminate such faults by design, or limit their frequency by the provision of engineered protection systems. AF-UKEPR-ME-022 The licensee shall ensure that fume cupboards within the UKEPR are not used for the containment of radioactive substances. AF-UKEPR-ME-031 The licensee shall make and implements adequate EMIT instructions to control the hazard of inadvertent use of an incorrect filter cartridge in a mechanical process filter. AF-UKEPR-PSA-002 The licensee shall ensure that the scope of the PSA is expanded to include hazards, such as fire and flooding during non power operating states. AF-UKEPR-PSA-017 The licensee shall ensure that substantiation for the HRA in the form of task analysis, procedures and training is provided to underpin the numerical HFE values used in the PSA. The substantiation should include further consideration of pre-initiating HFEs and the potential for HFE dependencies (pre & post fault). AF-UKEPR-PSA-018 The licensee shall ensure that Level 2 PSA sensitivities to individual and collective HEPs are used to provide insights into the development of the EPR severe accident guidance (OSSA). AF-UKEPR-PSA-028 The licensee shall ensure that the dependency between a LOOP and extreme weather events is taken into account and if necessary the PSA amended. AF-UKEPR-PSA-031 The licensee shall ensure that hazards such as internal explosion, turbine missiles and animal infestation are considered and if necessary included in the PSA model. AF-UKEPR-PSA-033 The licensee shall consolidate the assumptions made in the existing PCSR internal fire analysis in one location, and provide appropriate justification, reference, discussion of the effect of each assumption on the analysis and consider them as potential input to the full scope fire PSA to be carried out post GDA. AF-UKEPR-PSA-035 The licensee shall consolidate the assumptions made in the existing PCSR internal flooding analysis in one location, and provide appropriate justification, reference, discussion of the effect of each assumption on the analysis and consider them as potential input to the full scope flooding PSA to be carried out post GDA. AF-UKEPR-PSA-036 The licensee shall develop a full scope internal flooding PSA as the detailed design evolves. AF-UKEPR-PSA-037 The licensee shall provide a seismic PSA for the site. The seismic analysis should take account of consequential hazards that might be caused by a seismic event, such as fire or flooding, and if appropriate include them in the PSA. AF-UKEPR-PSA-038 The licensee shall ensure that the impact of seismic faults during shutdown is addressed in a consistent manner with other contributions to the risk during shutdown. AF-UKEPR-PSA-040 The licensee shall ensure that full consideration of parametric uncertainty is included the PSA. AF-UKEPR-PSA-041 The licensee shall ensure that long term faults should be properly incorporated into the overall PSA as the detailed design evolves so that the importance of long term recovery measures, (such as repair of Diesel Generators and supporting the emergency feed water system with fire fighting water) are captured and taken into account in future procedures and decision making. AF-UKEPR-PSA-042 The licensee should ensure that a UK-EPR specific containment structural analysis is performed which addresses all potential modes of containment failure, including penetration and leakage failures AF-UKEPR-PSA-043 The licensee shall update the Level 2 PSA model to ensure consistency with the current Safety Injection Severe Accident Management Strategy. AF-UKEPR-PSA-044 The licensee should ensure that the Level 3 PSA is developed to modern standards, in particular by placing less reliance on design basis dose assessments and by fully incorporating probabilistic factors such as weather. For each new plant the Site-specific Level 3 PSA will need to incorporate site specific source term and release frequency analyses together with site specific dispersion and consequence modelling parameters (such as weather data and distribution of population and agriculture) for all releases. AF-UKEPR-RC-001 The Licensee shall specify the normal operating chemistry regimes for the primary, secondary and auxiliary circuits of UKEPR. The specifications should be comprehensive and incorporate evidence for all modes of operation. The regimes should be consistent with the plant safety case, particularly the limits and conditions required by AF-UKEPR-RC-02 AF-UKEPR-RC-004 The Licensee shall generate a detailed risk analysis, fully justifying the boron strategy to be applied. This should include commissioning, the fuel management and chemistry requirements, necessary control actions and effects from evaporation on radioactivity and impurity accumulation. AF-UKEPR-RC-011 The licensee shall define a surveillance programme for control rods and secondary neutron sources. The programme shall prevent the release of materials such as tritium or silver before there is significant contamination of vessels or pipework. AF-UKEPR-RC-013 The Licensee shall conduct sensitivity analysis for fuel crud formation in UKEPR. This should be used to demonstrate that levels of crud can be controlled and reduced So Far As Is Reasonably Practicable (SFAIRP) in UKEPR and should be based upon the detailed operating chemistry and core design for the UKEPR reactor. These calculations should provide balanced predictions of activity levels that allow the assessment of control measures including boiling patterns and StelliteTM replacements, as well as the management of significant chemicals and radionuclides. The licensee shall conduct analyses of sensitivity to factors such as pH, zinc, boiling and dissolved corrosion products on crud build-up. The analysis should be used to justify related limits, conditions and criteria. AF-UKEPR-RC-015 The Licensee shall generate evidence for the optimum band for hydrogen concentration in a reactor with Inconel 690 steam generators. Such reactors normally operate within a narrower band of about 30 to 40 cc kg-1 and there appears to be little data to justify concentrations below around 25 cc kg-1. The analysis should include a fuller analysis of the effects of hydrogen levels on Inconel 690 and stainless steels in UKEPR specifically. AF-UKEPR-RC-021 The Licensee shall specify suitable procedures for Hot Functional Testing (HFT), building upon the evidence presented for GDA and including further knowledge and experience particularly from other EPR units commissioned prior to any UK new build. The documentation should justify the controls during HFT of UKEPR, particularly related to hold points, chemistry measurements and target levels, together with their justification. AF-UKEPR-RC-027 The Licensee shall conduct a design review, justification and analysis for the secondary circuit considering the operating regime, material choices, corrosion threats and plant design amongst others. This will input into the secondary chemistry optimisation. This should consider all of the major secondary circuit systems, including many of those not included within the GDA scope. AF-UKEPR-RC-033 The Licensee shall generate evidence that the monitoring and surveillance programme for flow accelerated corrosion around the secondary circuit will be adequate. AF-UKEPR-RC-037 The Licensee shall generate a justification for limits and conditions associated with activity in the Gaseous Waste Processing System (GWPS). This should consider all forms of activity and associated maintenance and testing of the GWPS. AF-UKEPR-RC-038 The Licensee shall generate further details and evidence to support the operation of the Liquid Waste Processing System (LWPS) evaporator, including consideration of chemical effects in operation, such as boron crystallisation, activity accumulation or precipitate generation, as noted in this assessment report. AF-UKEPR-RC-040 The Licensee shall update the safety analysis for Steam Generator Tube Rupture (SGTR) events presented in the safety case to be a clear and consistent safety justification for such events, based upon a single set of underlying assumptions. The chemistry aspects of the safety analysis should be consistent with current experimental data and knowledge on iodine chemistry. The assumptions used should be clearly linked to the supporting transient analysis and the behaviour of the plant systems and where bounding assumptions are used these should be demonstrably so. AF-UKEPR-RC-042 The Licensee shall undertake UKEPR specific analysis to support the Combustible Gas Control System design for UKEPR. This analysis should adequately cover all phenomena that may occur during such accident sequences. This analysis should cover the effects of B4C control rods in the UKEPR design and include demonstration of the long-term plant behaviour post accident. AF-UKEPR-RC-044 The Licensee shall demonstrate that the experimental testing of the PARs matches the boundary conditions used in the safety analysis, including under representative severe accident conditions. AF-UKEPR-RC-046 The Licensee shall demonstrate that the release fractions for plutonium and strontium in a severe accident, and their longer-term consequences are appropriate for the UKEPR. AF-UKEPR-RC-047 The Licensee shall quantify the proportions of gaseous elements contributing to the public consequences in the acute and longer timescales of an accident, so that evidence for the proportion of organic iodine can be generated if significant. An alternative analysis may be agreed with the regulator. AF-UKEPR-RC-049 The Licensee shall ensure that equilibrium levels of airborne fission-products within the containment are calculated and verified both for prolonged transients and events over longer timescales. AF-UKEPR-RC-050 The Licensee shall estimate the quantities of all possible chemical species that could degrade the performance of the IRWST and analyse their downstream effects on cooling and radioactive release. Possible sources from different events include; acidic fumes from radiolysis or pyrolysis, working materials introduced during shutdowns and leaching from solid materials trapped in the strainers. Each of these could reduce the quality of the water in the IRWST and impair heat transfer or iodine retention. AF-UKEPR-RC-055 The Licensee shall compare the results from equivalent analyses generated by the MAAP and COSACO computer codes to confirm the bounding results have been used to examine the consequences of severe accident, over the period where their scope overlaps. AF-UKEPR-RC-56 The licensee shall complete and document, as part of the site specific analysis, a: Ÿ Verification and validation of the codes used to support the safety case for combustible gas control, including a comparison of the analysis to relevant good practice guidelines for CFD use. Ÿ Review of inter-code comparisons where the analysis procedure calculates the same data in different codes AF-UKEPR-RC-58 The licensee shall include a demonstration of the impacts of allowing unreacted combustible gases to exit the PARs as part of the site specific analysis. AF-UKEPR-RC-62 The licensee shall provide additional evidence to support the claims made on the avoidance of detrimental flame acceleration as part of the site specific analysis. AF-UKEPR-RC-63 The licensee shall justify the scenario selection for the ex-vessel phases of a severe accident, including consideration of combustion risks at the local scale, as part of the site specific analysis AF-UKEPR-RC-65 The licensee shall quantify the temperatures loads from ex-vessel hydrogen combustion as part of the site specific analysis. This should demonstrate the effects of combustion in standing flames on thermal loads. AF-UKEPR-RC-66 The licensee shall demonstrate the impact of operation of the containment spray system on the combustible gas risks as part of the site specific analysis. AF-UKEPR-RC-68 The licensee shall provide site specific analysis for the radiological consequence of accidents involving core melting, including IRWST evaporation and uncertainties in the reactions of iodine. AF-UKEPR-RC-69 The licensee shall continue to refine the estimated performance of UK EPR™, in terms of the production, transport and accumulation of radioactivity in the primary circuit and connected systems, during the site specific phase. This should include taking account of operating experience feedback from other EPR™ plants, the aim being to move towards quantitative estimates so far as is reasonably practicable. AF-UKEPR-RP-006 PRMS: The licensee shall provide a report to demonstrate that the planned location of the installed radiation monitoring equipment of the KRC and KRT systems of the PRMS are appropriate and take account of the final radiological zoning classification scheme with regard to ensuring that radiation exposures received by workers whilst taking measurements or maintaining or testing such equipment are ALARP. AF-UKEPR-RP-007 Decontamination: The licensee shall provide a report to demonstrate its site-specific strategies, systems and techniques for decontamination during operations and maintenance, and during POCO and decommissioning, whilst taking account of the contamination zoning of the NPP. AF-UKEPR-RP-010 Optimisation for work activities: The licensee shall provide an ALARP justification (regarding radiological protection) to demonstrate worker dose optimisation for SG ultrasonic testing of secondary system compartment welds if more than one SG is inspected during an outage, and for SG eddy current tube inspections if they are carried out during ROOs. AF-UKEPR-RP-011 Optimisation for work activities: The licensee shall provide an ALARP justification for the use (or not) of robotics in SG maintenance and testing based on optimisation studies that identify specific tasks that should be carried out by specific robots. These tasks and robots shall be identified following a review of robots’ capabilities for undertaking tasks that yield quantifiable benefits in terms of dose reductions for workers. AF-UKEPR-RP-012 Optimisation for work activities: The licensee shall provide an ALARP justification for fitting and removing insulation in cramped areas, and in particular, for fitting insulation in the safety injection system rooms (known as banana rooms) and at the bottom of the pressuriser. Any additional cramped areas where fitting insulation is challenging shall be identified following a review of cramped areas and their insulation requirements, and in cases where fitting insulation is challenging, those areas shall also be included in the safety case. AF-UKEPR-RP-013 Optimisation for work activities: The licensee shall provide an ALARP justification for fitting and removing insulation where Interim insulation removal is required for inspection and maintenance. The locations where Interim insulation removal is required shall be identified following a review of work activities where complete removal of insulation would not be necessary for those work activities to take place, and of pieces of equipment where the insulation would be most often removed and replaced. AF-UKEPR-RP-015 Persons on site during accident conditions: The licensee shall provide a safety case that demonstrates that the on site specific radiological consequences analyses for accidents (including hazards) are ALARP and have taken due cognisance of usual UK methodology assumptions and have explicitly compared the results of those analyses against NT.1 Target 5 in ND’s SAPs regarding the risk impact to individuals from all the facilities on the site, and against NT.1 Target 6 in ND’s SAPs regarding the predicted single accident frequency versus dose to individuals on the site. AF-UKEPR-RP-016 Persons on site during accident conditions: The licensee shall provide an ALARP justification for occupancy of the main control room immediately post accident if the ventilation system has failed. AF-UKEPR-RP-017 Persons on site during accident conditions: The licensee shall provide a safety case to identify access requirements to specific components / pieces of equipment that will require maintenance / repair during the post-accident phase, and to identify potential doses to workers carrying out those maintenance / repair activities and to demonstrate that they are ALARP. AF-UKEPR-RP-019 Criticality control: The licensee shall establish systems to monitor the borated stainless steel in the fuel pond storage racks over the lifetime of the plant so as to identify and quantify any degradation. AF-UKEPR-RW-004 The licensee shall optimise the operation of the chemical volume control system and the liquid, gaseous and solid waste management processes to ensure that the risks associated with their operation and the management of the resulting wastes are as low as reasonably practicable. AF-UKEPR-RW-010 The licensee shall produce a safety report for the long-term storage of spent fuel. The report will contain information at least equivalent to that of a Preliminary Safety Case as defined in Guidance on the Purpose, Scope and Content of Nuclear Safety Cases, AF-UKEPR-SEC-006 The long term back up power supplies for the security infrastructure are not detailed in the CSA AF-UKEPR-SEC-009 Doors will need to meet the appropriate protection levels, and if necessary the locking system will need to meet the appropriate class, as detailed in the TRD. AF-UKEPR-SEC-011 Security screening at the specific areas of the plant is required. AF-UKEPR-SEC-012 Security arrangements for access to the containment under all plant conditions will need to be developed by the Licensee. AF-UKEPR-SI-001 The Licensee shall undertake fracture assessments on a wider range of weld locations on the High Integrity Components (HIC) in order to demonstrate that the limiting locations have been assessed. The Licensee shall also undertake fracture assessments on the vulnerable areas of the parent forgings in order to demonstrate that the limiting locations have been assessed. AF-UKEPR-SI-002 The Licensee shall undertake fatigue crack growth assessments at the limiting locations on the highest reliability components post GDA as part of the demonstration of avoidance of fracture. AF-UKEPR-SI-003 The Licensee shall undertake scoping fatigue crack growth assessments in advance of the manufacturing inspections in order to show that fatigue crack growth will not affect existing assumptions with regard to qualified defect sizes. AF-UKEPR-SI-005 The Licensee shall provide a robust justification for the use of a 0 MPa residual stress for the inner surface of the carbon manganese steam lines if this value is to be adopted in the post GDA fracture assessments for the main steam line welds AF-UKEPR-SI-007 The Licensee shall provide evidence that the capability of the NDT procedures applied during manufacture of safety-related components (but not subject to inspection qualification) is adequate for the purpose. AF-UKEPR-SI-008 The Licensee shall ensure that procedures exist to take appropriate action if any planar defects are detected in forgings for the HICs since this may indicative of manufacturing problems. AF-UKEPR-SI-012 The Licensee shall ensure that an adequate level of repeat inspection is proposed to assure the quality of all qualified manual ultrasonic inspections on the HICs. AF-UKEPR-SI-015 The Licensee shall ensure that details of the qualification procedure such as the number and types of defects in test pieces is defined on the basis of a good understanding of the likely weaknesses in the techniques derived from a draft Technical Justification. AF-UKEPR-SI-016 The Licensee shall produce a comprehensive material data set for use during the design and assessment process, and also to support through life operation. This will need to cover all relevant data including the basic design data and the confirmatory batch and weld specific test data from the complementary fracture toughness testing programme (Section 4.2.5.3). It will need to be clearly presented such that the pedigree of the data can be traced following the literature trail with comparison to other international data sets where possible and will need to be updated through life following developments in the field and in the light of through life testing of materials subject degradation mechanisms. AF-UKEPR-SI-017 The Licensee shall ensure that the fracture testing undertaken to support tearing resistance values assumed for the main steam line welds is representative of both the main steam line thicknesses and the direction of crack propagation. AF-UKEPR-SI-019 The Licensee shall extend the testing which is proposed at 330oC to a lower temperature of say 50oC to confirm the upper shelf toughness at the lower end of the temperature range on those RPV forgings which will be subject to irradiation damage. This shall also apply to the welds in these regions AF-UKEPR-SI-020 The Licensee shall provide evidence that results from a previous test of a thermally aged specimen of pipework weld is representative of the narrow gap TIG welds used on the pipe to pipe welds and the narrow gap GTAW welds used between the pipework and reactor coolant pump bowl. If this is not the case, tests will need to be carried out on representative welds. In addition evidence shall be provided that thermal ageing is not a concern for the dissimilar metal weld on the main coolant loop otherwise it may be necessary to test thermally aged specimens of the weld. AF-UKEPR-SI-021 The Licensee’s detailed proposals on the fracture toughness testing needed to underpin the toughness values assumed in the fracture assessments shall address the potential for batch to batch variability in the weld consumables affecting the toughness properties. Either a justification will be needed based on an understanding of the batch to batch variability of the properties supported by the testing of representative weld mock ups or testing on each batch of weld consumables. AF-UKEPR-SI-022 Where the safety case relies on stable tearing, the Licensee shall perform testing to support both the initiation value and tearing resistance values AF-UKEPR-SI-023 The Licensee shall check the competence of steelmaker(s) to comply with the RCC-M M140 qualification requirements for specific components before placing contracts for forgings. AF-UKEPR-SI-024 The Licensee shall ensure that, since the RCC-M Part Procurement Specifications for the main vessel forgings do not provide an adequate control on the composition for all elements, additional limits on composition are specified and justified AF-UKEPR-SI-025 The licensee shall ensure that the maximum value of nickel content in beltline welds is restricted, either by setting an upper limit not exceeding 0.85% Ni or by setting a target value with a rigorous process for reviewing the acceptability of the Ni value should the actual value be above 0.85%. This shall be completed before the generic milestone of RPV installation, although in practice it will need to be completed earlier to suit the programme for manufacture of the vessels. AF-UKEPR-SI-026 The Licensee shall ensure that sample ultrasonic inspections for underclad cracking are performed during manufacture of the RPV, SGs and PZR. This shall be completed before the generic milestone of RPV installation, although in practice it will need to be completed earlier to suit the programme for manufacture of the vessels. AF-UKEPR-SI-028 The Licensee shall ensure that sample ultrasonic inspections for underclad cracking are performed during manufacture on all 20MND5 components which are clad. The sample should take account of the relative lack of evidence on avoidance of underclad cracking with this material. This shall be completed before the generic milestone of RPV installation, although in practice it will need to be completed earlier to suit the programme for manufacture of the vessels. AF-UKEPR-SI-032 The Licensee shall ensure that more detailed guidance on the use of the RCC-M procedure is provided to support earthquake design of pipework AF-UKEPR-SI-033 The Licensee shall ensure that if a welding procedure qualification is performed against the requirements of earlier versions of the code a competent welding engineer reviews whether this is adequate and documents the review. AF-UKEPR-SI-034 The Licensee shall carry out additional tests during weld procedure qualification of the dissimilar metal welds to evaluate the degree of sensitisation and embrittlement occurring in the safe end material during the final PWHT. AF-UKEPR-SI-035 The Licensee shall undertake a fatigue design evaluation for locations in austenitic stainless steel and ferritic components that are in contact with the wetted environment to ensure that the effects of environment have been properly accounted for in the fatigue design analysis. AF-UKEPR-SI-037 The Licensee shall ensure that the site specific “Stress reports” confirm the adequacy of the design. AF-UKEPR-SI-038 The Licensee shall ensure that the safety cases for component internals include an analysis of the consequences of all the potential modes of failure. Alternatively the components should be added to the list of Highest Integrity Components and a case be developed accordingly. AF-UKEPR-SI-039 The Licensee shall provide more explicit evidence to demonstrate that failure of the core barrel during normal or upset conditions would not lead to unacceptable fuel damage as a result of flow diversion which was not recognised and caused the reactor control system to increase power as a response. AF-UKEPR-SI-041 The Licensee shall demonstrate that the manufacturing arrangements for the penetration welds in the RPV head are such that the welds will be of consistently high quality and will not require repair. AF-UKEPR-SI-43 The Licensee shall undertake validation studies to confirm that the methodology used to calculate the limiting defect size for the RPV outlet nozzle dissimilar metal weld is appropriate. AF-UKEPR-SI-44 The Licensee shall establish the limiting defect size for all High Integrity Components, including situations where cracked body finite element analyses are used to determine the limiting defect size. AF-UKEPR-SI-46 The Licensee shall explicitly identify the full thermal ageing shift in the HAZ material of the low alloy steel welds and any enhanced start of life properties required of the HAZ material in the materials data handbook used to support the UK EPR™. Any enhanced start of life properties for the HAZ should be demonstrated in the complementary fracture toughness testing. AF-UKEPR-SI-49 Should the Licensee adopt the RSE-M Appendix 5.4 fracture assessment procedure, the Licensee shall ensure that there is a capability to undertake assessment to RSE-M Appendix 5.4independently of the company supplying the reactor design in order to support the ongoing operation of the reactor. The availability of technical support organisations to allow the UK Nuclear Regulator (ONR) to commission such assessment work independently should also be considered. AF-UKEPR-SI-50 Should the Licensee adopt the RSE-M Appendix 5.4 fracture assessment procedure, the Licensee shall ensure that the UK methodology for undertaking the fracture assessments based on RSE-M Appendix 5.4is suitable and sufficient to define the methodology in relation to RSE-M, and to explain and justify departures from RSE-M. AF-UKEPR-SI-51 The Licensee shall review the upper shelf fracture toughness values used for areas affected by irradiation damage to ensure that they are consistent with the worldwide experience on the effect of irradiation damage on upper-shelf toughness and ensure that the surveillance scheme is adequate to confirm the assumptions made at the design stage. AF-UKEPR-SI-52 The Licensee shall confirm through appropriate analyses and assessment that the detailed redesign of the MCL pipework to increase counterbore lengths and to lower the cross-over leg does not have any unacceptable safety detriments. AF-UKEPR-SI-53 The Licensee shall demonstrate that the materials properties of the MCL forgings are adequately specified and controlled. This demonstration should include evidence that the M140 and shop qualifications for the MCL pipework remain valid for the modified design, and that the grain size is such that a reliable ultrasonic inspection of the parent material and associated welds can be achieved both during manufacture and in-service. AF-UKEPR-SI-54 The Licensee shall ensure that the surface profile of the MCL pipework is adequately specified and controlled for all those surfaces on which ultrasonic transducers are scanned or from which ultrasonic beams may be reflected. This should include the effects of any local features such as overlay welding to compensate for welding distortions or profile variations caused by the counterbore cutting machine. AF-UKEPR-SI-55 The Licensee shall ensure that during the design, manufacture and installation of all MSL components there are explicit checks on the detailed geometry near welds and other regions which require qualified NDT. These checks should ensure that the local component geometry (e.g. any component thickness changes or tapers) and the resultant surface profiles (both inside and outside the component) are such that an adequate inspection capability is achievable. AF-UKEPR-SI-56 The Licensee shall ensure that the qualified volumetric inspections of welded repairs on the RCP bowl have the capability to reliably detect defects of the target size (i.e. defects smaller than the calculated limiting defect size by a margin of typically 2). The scope of these qualified inspections should include all repairs down to a size comparable with the target defect size and significantly smaller (typically by a margin of 2) than the limiting defect size. AF-UKEPR-SI-57 The Licensee shall ensure that the inspection qualification of the radiographic and ultrasonic procedures for the RCP bowl and potential repairs takes account of the wide variation in the characteristics of potential defects and the need to demonstrate reliable detection and characterisation AF-UKEPR-SI-59 The Licensee shall demonstrate that the assessments of capability of the manufacturing NDT procedures for the flywheel (PT and UT) take account of the HIC nature of the component and the full range of defect types which might occur and that the inspections will provide adequate capability to detect these defects AF-UKEPR-SI-61 The Licensee shall demonstrate that the parameters of the austenitic cladding applied to each HIC component, especially near welds, are adequately controlled and understood so that any potential adverse effects on the inspection capability are tolerable. AF-UKEPR-SI-63 The Licensee shall review the fracture toughness values assumed for the fracture analysis of the MSIV pressure boundary to ensure that they are conservative and are likely to be achieved in practice. AF-UKEPR-SI-64 The Licensee shall ensure that the castings used in the fracture toughness test programme for the MSIV body/bonnet and weld repairs will be suitable for establishing data that is fully applicable to the valve bodies and bonnets installed on a UK EPR™. AF-UKEPR-SI-65 The Licensee shall undertake an MSIV specific fracture mechanics analysis to determine the limiting defect size for the MSIV. The analysis should cover the valve body, bonnet, weld repairs and the connection between the valve body and bonnet. It should postulate defects in all limiting locations taking into account all significant loadings applied to the MSIV including thermal shock and mechanical loads including those from the adjoining pipework. AF-UKEPR-SI-66 The Licensee shall ensure that the volumetric NDT techniques selected for the MSIV body, bonnet and any potential repairs have the capability to reliably detect flaws of the target defect size (i.e. defects smaller than the calculated limiting defect size by a margin of typically 2). The scope of the inspections should cover the full volume of the component and include all repairs down to a size comparable with the target defect size. The Licensee shall also justify the level of qualification to be applied to the technique(s) selected for this high integrity component. AF-UKEPR-SI-67 The Licensee shall ensure that the requirements for all non-destructive inspections of the MSIV body and bonnet (and any potential repairs) are fully specified and taken into account at the design stage. For example, it might be necessary for some inspections to be performed before final machining and weld repairs should be designed so that inspection requirements are satisfied.