"A Christmas ‘bubble’ is a sensible and proportionate way to enable people to spend time with others over the festive period" Really?

Coronavirus: Disease Control https://questions-statements.parliament.uk/written-questions/detail/2020-12-07/125983 Question for Department of Health and Social Care UIN 125983, tabled on 7 December 2020 Question by Caroline Lucas , Green Party, Brighton, Pavilion Commons To ask the Secretary of State for Health and Social Care, pursuant to the Answer of 3 December 2020 to Question 121227 on Coronavirus: Disease Control and with reference to paragraph 7.41 of the Explanatory Memorandum to The Health Protection (Coronavirus, Restrictions) (All Tiers) (England) Regulations 2020, what the evidential basis was for the Government's assessment that there was likely to be widespread non-compliance with stringent covid-19 restrictions over Christmas 2020; whether he holds modelled data on the estimated number of additional deaths from covid-19 infection arising as a result of (a) potential non-compliance with stringent covid-19 restrictions over Christmas 2020 and (b) the loosening of covid-19 restrictions as set out under those regulations over Christmas 2020; and if he will make a statement. Answer from Ms Nadine Dorries  Conservative, Mid Bedfordshire 16 December 2020 Advice from the Scientific Advisory Group for Emergencies is clear that because major celebrations represent special or unique occasions for participants, COVID-19 related behavioural norms might be relaxed or suspended as a result. Their advice is available at the following link: https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/spi-b-key-evidence-and-advice-on-celebrations-and-observances-during-covid-19-5-november-2020(opens in a new tab) The absence of, or non-compliance with, restrictions over the Christmas period could allow COVID-19 to grow exponentially. A Christmas ‘bubble’ is a sensible and proportionate way to enable people to spend time with others over the festive period, while limiting the risk of spreading infection.  5 November 2020 https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/939166/S0866_Key_Evidence_and_Advice_on_Celebrations_and_Observances_during_COVID-19.pdf SAGE Task and Finish Group Key Evidence and Advice on Celebrations and Observances during COVID-19 Key Recommendations • Major celebrations represent a special or unique occasion for participants such that COVID-19 related behavioural norms might be relaxed or suspended. This is highly likely to precipitate nationwide increases in transmission particularly when celebrations are also public holidays (High Confidence). Increased transmission is likely to result from more social mixing during celebrations, often involving gatherings beyond habitual networks and across regions, and in larger groups (High Confidence). Multiple periods of relaxations in close succession will have amplified cumulative impacts (High Confidence). The impact of a celebration or observance will depend on the state of the epidemic at the time (High Confidence). Celebrations and observances will have less of an impact on the number of infections if prevalence is low before the event (High Confidence). National guidance for celebrations is the most viable option to minimise transmission and to prevent a large increase in R. • Continued adherence to current guidance, particularly individual and household/support bubble-isolation, is crucial and must be emphasised in the context of celebrations (High Confidence). • Celebrations are composed of collections of behaviours (e.g. visiting with family and friends, sharing food and drink, community gatherings). Focusing on enablers or alternatives to these behaviours, rather than considering each celebration separately, encourages consistency between different events (Medium Confidence). Additionally, observance-specific behaviours need to be seen in the context of the pandemic and the risks they present. • Approaches to celebrations vary with individuals, families and communities adopting different behaviours and emphasising different traditions. Any alternatives must be co-developed. This increases the potential of alternatives to reflect and reinforce shared norms and has positive implications for adherence (Medium to High Confidence) • The need for minimisation of risks must be balanced by recognition of the social and cultural importance of some aspects of celebrations. Differential treatments of specific celebrations/observances risks undermining legitimacy, diminishing perception of risk, and engendering resentment (High Confidence). Interventions will have differential impacts on vulnerable groups and other specific groups like children and those without digital connectivity that must be acknowledged and addressed. • Specific, evidence-based guidance on managing transmission risk in the home should be produced to inform those who have visitors in their home during celebrations and should be ready in time for the end of the stricter ‘stay at home’ restriction. • It should be communicated early that celebrations will need to take place in alternative ways. This does not necessarily mean cancelling events; some aspects of celebration can still take place, while other elements would change. Clear rationales for restrictions or adaptations must be given by Government to maintain legitimacy and increase the likelihood of adherence (High Confidence). • Communications should include the clear message that actions that pose only a low risk at individual level may nevertheless lead to major increases in risk at population level. 5 November 2020 2 1. Background and Scope 1. Celebrations and observances are a critical part of our national, multicultural, religious and secular ways of life. In their many forms, they help to support the well-being of individuals, families, communities, and faith groups. 2. The risks associated with different celebrations during COVID-19 will depend on the prevalence of infection at any given time. Some national celebratory events and public holidays in winter 2020 will fall just after the end of a set of lockdown restrictions in some parts of the UK, but before the period of maximum winter pressure on the health services. Objective of this paper 3. This paper focuses on the risks associated with the activities that make up widespread, national celebrations and the potential impact of these events on the epidemic. SAGE has previously considered some of the risks relevant to these activities, particularly those associated with household transmission1 and mass-national-travel2 . 4. The objective is to identify potential ways to help minimise the increased nationwide transmission that will occur because of widespread national celebrations. Also considered here are the potential approaches to national celebrations, and their impacts on adherence to guidelines, well-being, and cohesion during the event and in the longer-term after the event. This builds on the advice in the previous SAGE paper “SPI-B - Insights on Celebrations and Observances during COVID-19”3. This paper does not cover smaller personal celebrations which occur throughout the year (e.g birthdays, anniversaries) which pose similar, but less concentrated risks. Approach 5. Celebrations are associated with behaviours and activities that are highly likely to result in increased social contacts and risk of transmission. Some widespread celebrations may result in nationwide or regional transmission, particularly those coinciding with national public holidays. A national effort at the country, community and individual level is required to co-create a position that makes the best trade-offs between increased viral transmission and the cultural and social value of celebrations and observances. Benefits to the overall national position would be significantly increased from all three interventions working together. • At the Country level, the objective would be to minimise the likelihood that celebrations and observances significantly increase transmission and cause a corresponding increase to the reproduction number (R) and prevalence, and thence to hospital admissions and the need for further restrictive interventions. • At the Community level, the objective would be to enable valuable events whilst reducing opportunities for transmission by empowering communities and their local leaders (including faith groups, community champions and networks, neighbourhoods, charities) to co-create alternatives. • At the Individual level, the objective would be to provide individuals with the knowledge, support and culturally tailored tools to empower them to rethink valued behaviours critical to the celebration in manner that minimises risk. This is essential to protect those involved in their own celebrations, but also to reduce the major risks of increased transmission that would accrue from the aggregation of multiple low risk behaviours at an individual level4. 5 November 2020 3 2. Impacts on pandemic depend on timing, prevalence and aggregate impacts of individual-level behaviours 6. International evidence suggests some celebrations have led to widespread transmission. The impact of family returning to Israel for celebration from overseas was highlighted as moving the country from a controlled regime to exponential growth5. Studies concluded that even a short lapse in public adherence to restrictions around celebration events can have a dramatic effect. Similarly, the risk associated with particular activities around Eid-Ul-Adha in Pakistan and the need for these to be communicated to the public have been highlighted6,7. 7. Some countries have also used public holidays as opportunities for implementing restrictions. During the early stage of the COVID-19 outbreak in China, the holiday during the Chinese Lunar New Year, during which schools and workplaces are closed, was extended as a method of outbreak control and people were encouraged to stay at home8,9,10, limiting social contacts to family members and close friends. If treated carefully, encouraging specific behaviours during holidays can slow down the spread of epidemics that are transmitted via social contacts. Population-level impacts 8. As described in section 1, communication of risks and the impact of individual behaviours is critical. Activities perceived to have low individual risk can nevertheless result in large impacts at the population-level. 9. During celebrations, there tends to be a higher degree of social mixing than usual. People gather in larger groups, often having travelled long distances. Significantly, these will not necessarily be extensions of “normal” mixing patterns: individuals will be meeting with multiple households who are not part of their usual routine and with higher levels of intergenerational mixing. 10. Analysis from one SPI-M-O group considered the implications of increased social mixing on household transmission. If all households were to form a bubble with one other household, the number of out-of-bubble contacts would have to reduce to the levels seen in April 2020 (<1 external contact per person) in order to prevent exponential growtha. As context, this would be less than half of current non-household (and non-school) contacts, as estimated in September, and less than 10% of such contacts in “normal” circumstances in 2017/18. In the absence of restrictions, it is likely that social mixing during celebrations is higher than this. 11. This mixing of households, often in indoor environments which facilitate viral transmission more in winter, will have network implications. The rewiring of connection networks across the country is hard to predict, but will result in the potential for more extensive transmission chains and linked outbreaks. The increased mixing across generations and potentially also vulnerable groups over the festive period may also lead to disproportionate increases in severe illness and deaths. 12. Many celebrations involve families and households travelling across the country or internationally. If there is regional variation in prevalence, then this has the potential to seed infection from areas of high prevalence to low, and to change the geographical distribution of infection. a This assumes 35% secondary attack rate (SAR) within households, 5% SAR among non-household contacts and a 5 day duration of infectiousness. 5 November 2020 4 National context 13. Celebrations are associated with behaviours and activities that are highly likely to result in increased social contacts and risk of transmission. The precise impact is difficult to predict, and will depend on the relaxations implemented, but may result in a step change in incidence and prevalence. 14. As such, proposals to relax measures for specific celebrations cannot be viewed in isolation, and must be considered in context. 15. In particular, the consequences of such relaxations will depend critically on the trajectory of the epidemic (R and growth rate), background prevalence and incidence, and the extent of regional variation at the point of relaxation. Increasing transmission even for a short period can significantly alter the trajectory of the whole epidemic. An increase in transmission will have more concerning impacts on hospital admissions and deaths in a scenario of high and uncontrolled transmission nationally, with health services close to capacity, than it would in a scenario of low and controlled prevalence. Interaction with, and adherence to any other measures in place will also be important. 16. In order to enable a period of celebrations, there therefore needs to be the “scope” to accommodate an increase in transmission. The increased transmission from a short period of relaxations can potentially be “compensated” for by implementing sufficiently restrictive measures of sufficient duration before and/or after the event. 17. Preliminary work from one SPI-M-O group suggests that for each day that measures are relaxed, five days of stringent measures would be required to maintain prevalence. The less stringent these measures are or the lower adherence is, the longer the “compensatory” action required will be. 18. Changes in social distancing measures do not need to balance immediately. The compensatory restrictions could be implemented before or after the event. However, given the potential for increased inter-generational mixing and the exposure of more vulnerable people, compensating before the increased period is greatly preferable. A period of high transmission during late December will bring forward any rise in infection during January. Quantitative predictions of impact are not possible until nearer the event. 19. To enable more mixing during the festive period than that which is currently achievable, a substantial reduction in prevalence from current levels (4 November 2020) would be required. Quantitative results from modelling will be possible towards the end of November, and will include the impact of recently announced measures in England and devolved nations. Timing of celebrations 20. It is not evident to SPI-M-O whether spreading out festivities over time or condensing gatherings into, for example, a three-day period would be best to limit transmission, and further work is needed to explore this if required. 21. It is essential that the “package” of festivals and celebrations behaviours over the Winter period are considered collectively, and not as independent events, as multiple periods of relaxations in close succession will have amplified cumulative impacts. For example, allowing greater mixing for beyond a week will potentially enable multiple generations of infection. This is similarly the case for separate events close together, such as Christmas and New Year’s Eve: people infected during Christmas festivities will be near peak-infectiousness at New Year. 22. Reduction in prevalence of infection prior to events has disproportionate benefits, as the likelihood of meeting someone infected is much lower. If prevalence is 2%, meeting with 34 5 November 2020 5 others gives a ~50% chance of meeting someone infected; if prevalence is 0.5%, the chance reduces to 16%. Households can significantly reduce their risk of introducing infection into an event by quarantining for 2 weeks. However this raises equity issues as many families would struggle to do this, including front-line workers. 3. Individual and collective behaviours associated with celebrations 23. COVID-19 restrictions on celebrations and observances should not be based on an all or nothing approach. Celebrations comprise a series of individual behaviours before, during and after the event, each one of which carries a different level of risk. 24. Guidance should be provided for managing risk of celebrations, so that individuals and groups can plan for safer practices. Information should be provided early to help people plan and should include minimising risk associated with celebrations within the home. Paradoxically, and perhaps counter-intuitively, the largest transmission effects at population level may arise among people who only engage in small increases in risk, because they are likely to be more numerous than others engaging in more extreme risk behaviours. 25. It is important to recognise that some celebration behaviours can still take place during the Covid-19 pandemic and alternative behaviours can take place alongside traditional behaviours. Promoting and supporting positive alternative behaviours may help to reduce the negative emotions and undesirable replacement behaviours that some experience and develop when forced to stop or suppress a behaviour that they value. 26. Co-design of alternative behaviours and communication have the potential to move beyond COVID-19-restricted celebrations towards more inclusive, enabling, and rewarding events rooted in shared celebratory norms (e.g. goodwill to all) on a community, local, and national level. 27. Perception of risk is a major motivational factor in adherence to interventions, and care for others (including empathy and duty of protection) is a key enabler of behaviour change. Communicating – in a culturally sensitive way – the risk and impact of individual behaviours on community- and population-level transmission enables individuals and groups to assess the risk of their behaviour more accurately and has the potential to strengthen messages of standing together and protecting each other. These messages may also be stronger during times of increased group identity created around celebrations and observances. 28. If guidance indicates that traditions must be avoided to reduce the risk of spread, clear and compelling reasoning must be given. The absence of this may cause resentment and undermine mitigation measures. 29. Annex 1 describes some behaviours common to multiple celebrations and observances. Some observance-specific practices may require bespoke guidance that can be applied equitably to religious and cultural events across ethnic minority groups11. Minimisation of risks needs to be balanced by social and cultural importance of celebrations, and differential impacts on vulnerable groups and other specific groups like children. 4. Considerations for implementing and changing country-level restrictions 30. Adherence to existing guidance is crucial in the context of celebrations. The importance of adherence to existing guidance and processes (eg. Self-isolate if you have symptoms) needs to be reinforced in the context of celebrations which are often considered as special or exceptional occasions. Enablers and blockers to adherence for specific groups should be considered. 5 November 2020 6 31. Differential treatment of specific celebrations/observances risks undermining legitimacy, diminishing perception of risk, and engendering resentment12. For example, any messaging/decisions around Christmas needs to be sensitive to and acknowledge what happened earlier in the pandemic when celebrations such as Eid ul Adha were disrupted at short notice due to rising local infections13. This has been repeated with the latest national restrictions disrupting Diwali and other religious celebrations in November. In particular, celebration- or observance-amnesties have the potential to increase community tension and decrease social cohesion. Social cohesion could be protected or increased if messaging draws on similarities between faiths. 32. Amnesties for celebrations and observances also risk discrediting previous guidance and any future guidance. Guidance that changes overnight may diminish the perception of risk. If guidelines are relaxed for some festivals, some may reason that this can be applied to other celebrations such as birthdays and anniversaries, using the same logic that was applied to the amnesty when associating same level of importance and values on other celebrations. 33. The effectiveness of enforcement to encourage adherence to interventions is limited, is likely to be significant for only a minority of people groups, and risks being counter-productive14. Legitimacy and proportionality are vital and will depend on perception of risk, including transmission and prevalence rates at the time. 34. Care should be taken to ensure vulnerable and marginalised groups are not disproportionately impacted or excluded. This could include enabling access to technology to allow them to participate in events that would normally be in person, and community efforts to ensure that cards and food are provided and that no-one is alone. This is especially important for the very elderly or seriously ill – leeway could be considered for people such as this to experience what may be their last major celebration, without extending this consideration across all of society in ways that lead unnecessarily to increased viral transmission. 35. Specific consideration should be given to the differential impact on specific groups. This would include impact on children from (e.g.) reduced gift-giving and interaction with family members, and children’s fears that special events may spread the virus. Responses could include guidance for schools to provide safe celebrations for children and guidance specifically for families. Guidance on the ability of children to interact with others must be clear, and acknowledge and explain different approaches. Consideration should be given to the additional pressures and responsibilities that fall to women due to restrictions15, and when celebrations and observances must be reimagined. National, community, and household co-creation can create opportunities to mitigate these. 36. Communication should be consistent and conveyed early enough to enable planning. Individuals and groups are more likely to adhere to restrictions if they are able to plan ahead and are more likely to be able to adapt their plans if they know that changes will be needed in advance. Changes to restrictions and/or likely scenarios should therefore be communicated well in advance. 37. Given growing evidence on the high rates of transmission in some minority ethnic communities, national communications must take account of the principles of communicating to different socio-cultural groups and subgroups of gender and age within them16. 38. Evidence-based messaging can counter the spread of misleading or inaccurate information and rumours, which are corrosive to communities and can instil fear, make people confused about what actions they should be taking, and erode trust in official messages. 5 November 2020 7 39. Winter celebrations and public holidays bring large-scale transport risks17. Particular consideration must be taken regarding the mass movement of students during university vacations, as this may impact transmission during celebrations that take place during the vacations. Staggering student travel across the UK should be considered18. There is a significant risk that the current ‘stay at home’ restriction in England will shorten the window for people travelling for end of year celebrations, putting additional pressure on the transport network and risking reduced ability for social distancing in public transport. However, DfT survey data suggest that travel plans are changing, with 23% of GB adults expect to visit family and friends they do not live with for Christmas, compared to 51% who would do so in a normal yearb. References 1 SPI-B/EMG: MHCLG Housing Impacts Paper (Sep 2020) 2 SAGE Task & Finish group on Higher Education/Further Education: Principles for Managing SARS-CoV-2 Transmission Associated with Higher Education (Sep 2020) 3 SPI-B: Insights on Celebrations and Observances during Covid-19 (Oct 2020). Available from the SPI-B Secretariat. 4 Rose G, 1985. Sick individuals and sick populations. International Journal of Epidemiology, Volume 14, Issue 1, pp 32–38, doi: 10.1093/ije/14.1.32 5 Klausner, Z., Fattal, E., Hirsch, E. and Shapira, S.C., 2020. A single holiday was the turning point of the COVID-19 policy of Israel. Medrxiv. 6 Mallhi, T.H., Khan, Y.H., Butt, M.H., Liaqat, A., Abid, A., Ahmad, A. and Misbah, S., 2020. Risks of Zoonotic Transmission of COVID-19 During Eid-Ul-Adha in Pakistan. Disaster Medicine and Public Health Preparedness, pp.1-2. 7 Mallhi, T.H., Khan, Y.H., Alotaibi, N.H., Alzarea, A.I., Tanveer, N. and Khan, A., 2020. Celebrating Eid-ul-Adha in the era of COVID-19 pandemic in Pakistan: potential threats and precautionary measures. Clinical Microbiology and Infection. 8 Mallhi, T.H., Khan, Y.H., Alotaibi, N.H., Alzarea, A.I., Tanveer, N. and Khan, A., 2020. Celebrating Eid-ul-Adha in the era of COVID-19 pandemic in Pakistan: potential threats and precautionary measures. Clinical Microbiology and Infection. 9 Stern AM, Markel H, 2009. What Mexico taught the world about pandemic influenza preparedness and community mitigation strategies. JAMA 302 (11):1221–2. 10 Chen, S., Chen, Q., Yang, W., Xue, L., Liu, Y., Yang, J., Wang, C. and Bärnighausen, T., 2020. Buying time for an effective epidemic response: The impact of a public holiday for outbreak control on COVID-19 epidemic spread. Engineering. 11 South Asian Health Foundation: Recommendations on religious festivals during COVID-19 pandemic (Nov 2020). Available from SAGE Secretariat 12 SPI-B: Insights on Celebrations and Observances during COVID-19 (Oct 2020). Available from the SPI-B Secretariat. 13 Manchester Evening News. How will Eid celebrations be impacted by the pandemic after coronavirus spikes in Greater Manchester? 14 SPI-B Policing & Security: Assessing the value of an enforcement-based approach to Covid (Sep 2020). Available from the SPI-B Secretariat. 15 SPI-B: Insights on Celebrations and Observances during COVID-19 (Oct 2020). Available from the SPI-B Secretariat. 16 SPI-B: Public Health Messaging for Communities from Different Cultural Backgrounds (Jul 2020) 17 SAGE Task & Finish group on Higher Education/Further Education: Principles for Managing SARS-CoV-2 Transmission Associated with Higher Education (Sep 2020) 18 SAGE Task & Finish group on Higher Education/Further Education: Principles for Managing SARS-CoV-2 Transmission Associated with Higher Education (Sep 2020) b Ipsos Mori OFFSEN, 23-24 Sept 2020. n=1,098. 5 November 2020 8 Annex 1 Table 1: Some common behaviours associated with UK celebrations, risk factors, and examples of potential mitigation measures. Behaviours related to UK celebrations Risks Additional risks at community-/population-level (italics) Examples of mitigation measures Elimination and substitution/alternative behaviours Increased local mixing and pressure on retail, including days out, travel to events and shopping for gifts • Prolonged increased mixing in days and weeks prior to celebratory occasion. For Christmas celebrations this may be compounded by the inability for people to do normal seasonal shopping in November. • Gatherings at events, shopping centres, beauty spots, and other popular venues. • Additional pressure on retail outlets and personal services (e.g. hairdressing) will increase queuing for long periods. • Additional pressure on delivery services and availability of items in a timely manner if activity is moved online. • Sending and buying presents online. • Making/crafting gifts and decorations at home. • Families can consider still doing some activities at home. • Physical gatherings at events may be supplemented by remote access. Increased travel to destinations, including journeys over greater distances • Travel in private and public transport, potentially between or through areas with different levels of restrictions. • Mixing with other travellers outside of household, in some cases for a prolonged duration. • Mass travel of large numbers of people on the same day will create additional risks for travellers and transport workers. • Mixing between individuals in areas with different prevalence can lead to additional risks for those in lower prevalence areas • Visiting with friends and family through video calls or in a socially distanced manner. • Celebrate with local community instead of faraway family and friends. • Support community groups (including financial) to organise safe alternative celebrations particularly for vulnerable groups. • Stagger travel to reduce pressure on transport systems and travel risks. Overnight stays • Prolonged mixing with friends and family across a number of days. • Prolonged use of shared facilities, including bathrooms. • Extended duration and proximity to others (e.g. room sharing)i,ii. • Multiple small mixing events with different groups over the course of several days leads to larger risk of transmission • Avoid repeated and extended overnight stays. • If possible and circumstances allow, self-quarantine for 2 weeks before and after visit • Maintenance of existing ‘bubbles’ rather than creation of new ones i SPI-B/EMG: MHCLG Housing Impacts Paper (Sep 2020) ii SPI-B: Evidence Review for MHCLG Housing Impacts Paper (Sep 2020) 5 November 2020 9 Gathering in homes • Mixing with family and friends, beyond usual contacts and from widely distanced locations • Mixing between generations and at-risk groups • Overcrowding and lack of social distancing between individuals and households • Lack of adequate ventilation • Use of shared facilities • Multiple small mixing events with different groups over the course of several days leads to larger risk of transmission • Share experiences via video calls or other technology, including story-telling, singing, treasure hunts, and opening of giftsiii. • Reimagining and enabling activities outdoors but socially distanced, online, or at a later dateiv. • Where interactions do take place provide clear guidance on mitigation strategies Sharing food and drink • Increased transmission on surfaces • Increased face touching and likelihood of hand-mouth transmission • Share mealtimes remotely over the phone or video call. • Where food and drink is shared in person, provide clear guidance on how to reduce transmission. Group activities, e.g. exchanging gifts, praying, singing, dancing, hugging • Reduced social distancing and increased physical contact • ‘Loud’ activities increasing transmission by aerosols and droplets • Increased transmission on surfaces of gifts as items passed around • Move ‘loud’ activities online, outdoors or to large venues with good ventilation. • Design alternative behaviours to replace physical contact • Precautions such as face coverings, distancing and hand hygiene where interactions do take place Gathering at celebration-specific events, e.g. religious services, workplace celebrations or holiday performances and events • Mixing with family and friends, beyond usual contacts and from widely distanced locations • Mixing with strangers, with potentially limited space/overcrowding • Workplace celebrations • Multiple small mixing events with different groups over the course of several days leads to larger risk of transmission • Identify ways to move events outside or create new outside events which retain value, e.g. celebration trails and external decorations, lights etc. • Create alternative events at home and in households. • Live stream events and performances, including a wider range of celebrations to cater for different social groups and religious observances. • Consider replacing large workplace celebrations with smaller social distanced activities • Ensure guidance doesn’t enable “loopholes” for groups to mix (e.g. celebration is called a “work activity”) iii National Foresight and Intelligence Briefing, 2020, p. 23. (Official Sensitive Document) iv SPI-B: Positive strategies for sustaining adherence to infection control behaviours (Oct 2020). Available from the SPI-B Secretariat.

License to kill revealed as spymaster Le Carre dies naturally

On 15 December, the Annual Report of the Investigatory Powers Commissioner 2019 was released. Here are some extraordinary extracts. https://www.ipco.org.uk/docs/IPC%20Annual%20Report%202019_Web%20Accessible%20version_final.pdf 8. MI5 CHIS Participation in Criminality (PIC) 8.10 MI5 has an internal policy governing PIC by CHIS which relates to both recruited agents and MI5 officers operating under cover in both the real world and online. The Investigatory Powers Commissioner (IPC) is required by the Prime Minister to oversee MI5 compliance with this policy by virtue of a direction that was first made public in 2018. An earlier iteration of this requirement has become known as “The Third Direction” and was the subject of litigation in the Investigatory Powers Tribunal (IPT) in 2019. The IPT gave its judgment in late December 2019 and found MI5’s policy to be lawful, although permission to appeal this decision has been granted. Directed Surveillance 8.15 We raised a concern with MI5 in 2018 in relation to their review processes for directed surveillance authorisations (DSAs). We found that MI5 did not have an adequate review process in place for this commonly used power, which meant that authorising officers were not properly setting out their considerations of necessity, proportionality and collateral intrusion for continued operations during the period for which a DSA was authorised. We advised MI5 that their informal, often verbal, review processes fell short of the requirements of the Code of Practice (CoP). We also highlighted a lack of specificity on documentation for authorisations that covered a range of powers: MI5’s renewal casework commonly did not justify the continued use of the full range of techniques and cancellation records often lacked detail regarding the activity undertaken and value to the investigation and operation. 8.16 We have challenged MI5’s policy of noting authorising officer comments for surveillance only in exceptional cases. In the vast majority of cases, this means that there is no record of any consideration by the authorising officer. We recommended that it would be more appropriate for a routine notation of considerations to be made in each case. We believe that this would give authorising officers greater ownership of the process and would increase our level of confidence in this process. 8.39 We have observed the positive development of the BOP and note its impact in managing internal compliance. We continue to seek greater clarity regarding the process MI5 uses to carry out initial examinations of new data sets to better understand decisions to classify a dataset as BPD or, for example, as targeted data. We were concerned by one unresolved action on the BOP minutes around resolving discrepancies between allocations of BPD between MI5 and SIS. It is possible, because of the different uses of the data and the different cuts of data being held, that both agencies could hold the same dataset, or versions of it, and that it could lawfully be categorised as bulk by one and targeted data by the other. There is a risk that, if one of the agencies has incorrectly categorised the data holding as targeted then that data would be held without appropriate warrant and might not be subject to appropriate safeguards. We suggested that this question should be resolved as a priority. Confidential material 8.26 We selected and reviewed a number of warrants under which confidential material had been obtained. We were satisfied that MI5 handled any such confidential material carefully and in accordance with the legislation. During 2019, MI5 changed their legal professional privilege (LPP) policy to align it with the requirements of the IPA and to mirror the arrangements of the Secret Intelligence Service (SIS) and the Government Communications Headquarters (GCHQ), which we believe is an appropriate approach. MI5 had previously applied the test of an “exceptional and compelling” case to justify the retention of any LPP material obtained under a warrant. This is a more stringent test than that set out in the IPA, which requires a balance of public interest test to be applied. MI5’s policy was developed before the IPA came into force, hence the inclusion of a different and higher test than the one the IPA actually requires. MI5 has now amended the policy to refer to the balance of public interest test but we do not expect this to make a significant difference to how they are retaining LPP in practice. 9. MI6 9.2 In October 2019, the IPC wrote to the Prime Minister about oversight of SIS’s agent running activities overseas. This activity has a statutory basis under section 1 of the Intelligence Services Act 1994 (ISA). SIS agent running overseas is subject to oversight by the Investigatory Powers Commissioner’s Office (IPCO) only in so far as it involves approvals under section 7 of the ISA. All other overseas agent running is not, and has never been, subject to oversight by IPCO or its predecessors. Further, the obligations under Part 2 of Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000 (RIPA) do not apply to overseas agent running. 9.3 In his letter to the Prime Minister, the IPC acknowledged that the Government may have taken a policy decision that the running of agents overseas requires less detailed and intrusive oversight than those run in the UK. However, the IPC recommended that the Government ought carefully to consider whether this is still the right policy position. We expect to receive a response to the IPC’s letter in 2020 and will reflect this in our 2020 annual report. 9.37 During 2019, SIS were required by the FCO to restrict the length of submission documents. Although there is the option to provide additional and contextual information in an58 Investigatory annex, we have raised the concern that this may lead to a distortion of facts and could prevent SIS from giving a full and balanced case for appropriate ministerial oversight. We have identified one instance where we believe the paperwork submitted to the FCO was misleading in part because of the brevity imposed by the FCO, but in this case the risks were overstated and so there is no concern that any key facts were omitted or that the Secretary of State would not have authorised the case in its full reality. 9.39 We reviewed a section 7 submission relating to a high-risk SIS agent case overseas. SIS identified a risk that the agent may be involved in serious criminality overseas. SIS did not encourage, condone or approve any such criminality on the part of their agent. In their submission, SIS set out that they had secured the agent’s cooperation on terms of full transparency about the activities in which the agent was involved. It included some clear ‘red lines’, setting out conduct that was not authorised and would result in the termination of SIS’s relationship with the agent

UK Energy white paper whitewashes over nuclear futures

https://hansard.parliament.uk/commons/2020-12-14/debates/846BF98E-0C0C-40CF-90E7-BD6FF19B4BB6/EnergyWhitePaperalt At 5.09pm on 14 December 2020 the long awaited UK White Paper on energy was finally unveiled to MPs in the House of Commons in the UK Parliament by Alok Sharma, the Secretary of State for Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy, following months of briefing sections to the media since the summer Sharma introduced the White Paper, on which he said ministers had been working since last year, emphasizing that it “sets out immediate steps to achieve our climate ambitions, to deliver on the Prime Minister’s 10-point plan, to create jobs ..as we transition to net zero. It also allows us… to build back greener.” Rising to his theme, he stressed “We have set out a vision of the future for us all” adding “This White Paper comes at a vital time for rebuilding our businesses. It reinforces commitments made in the 10-point plan to deliver a green recovery…Now is the time to seize these opportunities.” Turning to the green theme, he pointed out that “Clean energy is at the heart of our transformation from a fossil fuel-based energy system to one that will deliver net zero. Low-carbon electricity will be a key enabler for net zero as we change the way we travel and heat our homes.” Then he came to how the nuclear fits into this future, saying: “Of course, nuclear power continues to be an important source of clean, reliable and safe energy that, as part of our net zero mix, will help to result in lower costs to consumers. But with the existing nuclear fleet largely retiring over the next decade, we need further new capacity, so I have confirmed today that we aim to bring at least one large-scale nuclear project to the point of final investment decision by the end of this Parliament, and the Government will enter negotiations with EDF in relation to the Sizewell C project in Suffolk.These commitments will be subject to full Government, regulatory and other approvals, including of course, very importantly, value for money. The Government will negotiate this in the best interests of the British people, ensuring low-cost, secure and clean energy over the lifetime of the project.” He next addressed the future financing of nuclear, revealing that ministers had published “responses to the consultation on the regulated asset base funding model used in many significant infrastructure projects.” Such a model, he added “could help to secure private investment and drive down costs for consumers in the long run. We will continue to explore a range of options, including the potential role of Government finance during construction, provided that there is clear value for money for consumers and taxpayers.” Responding for the Labour Party, its former leader - and a former Secretary of State for renergy and climate change - Ed Miliband stressed that “the Climate Change committee (CCC) is clear that, as part of its plan, we need to deliver zero-carbon electricity by that date—2035—but my understanding from the White Paper is that it appears simply to have an ambition of 2050 for zero-emissions electricity.” On new nuclear, he opined that “we too believe that it can play a part in the energy mix, but the Government appear not to have come to a view after years of consultation, frankly, about how to pay for it,” asking: can the Secretary of State expand on what is his preferred method of financing? Sharma’s surprizingly bullish reply was “let me just say to him: we are all revolutionaries now. We believe in the green industrial revolution.” He added on financing for nuclear: “we are at the start of that process of discussions with EDF, the developer at Sizewell C. There is a whole range of financing models that we need to work our way through.” Scottish National party MP Alan Brown, a strong nuclear critic, asserted that the White Paper was a year and a half late, observing “it still has the same outdated nuclear obsession. For existing nuclear waste, there is a £132 billion bill. For Hinkley Point, it is £20 billion. To add to that £150 billion, we have Sizewell C, which is £20 billion, and Bradwell to follow, which is £20 billion. Despite market failure, the Government have not given up on Wylfa, Oldbury and Moorside, so that is potentially another £50 billion. Small modular reactors, advanced reactors and nuclear fission mean further blank cheques. We cannot be serious about energy bills and value for money when it all comes to 35-year nuclear contracts.. He pointedly asked: What cost-benefit analysis has been done on the cost of nuclear jobs versus renewables? Sharma sardonically replied: “I will take it from his comments that he is not a fan of nuclear power. Perhaps I could explain to him that, of course, renewables are playing an increasingly large part in our energy mix, but the wind does not always blow as hard as we would like and the sun does not always shine. We know that nuclear power is reliable, safe and not intermittent; that is why it needs to be a part of the energy mix. He will know that a significant number of power plants will be coming offline and that is why we are proceeding with our discussions on Sizewell C.” But Liz Saville Roberts, the leader at Westminster of the Welsh Nationalists, Plaid Cymru, was much more supportive on nuclear options. Pointing out that “the White Paper mentions small modular reactors,” she asked: “When will the Secretary of State be in a position to update the House regarding the process for locating SMRs, bearing in mind that the Welsh Government are establishing a development company, Cwmni Egino, for the former nuclear site at Trawsfynydd?” Sharma said in reply: “Obviously, SMRs in the UK are currently at the design phase, and the consortium led by Rolls-Royce is making progress. We think there is the potential for SMR technology to be operational by the early 2030s, so we are still some way away from that.” A Labour MP in a constituency containing an old AGR nuclear plant, Mike Hill representing Hartlepool, said he thanked the Secretary of State for his commitment to the future of SMRs and his target of 2030, but pointed out “that might be too late for Hartlepool power station, which is due to be decommissioned in 2025, the first of the existing fleets.” stressing his area has “a skilled nuclear workforce and a safe nuclear transport infrastructure,” he asked “what hope can the Secretary of State give my constituents on the future of nuclear jobs in Hartlepool? Answering positively, Sharma said:“If there are parties out there who want to come forward with proposals for the hon. Gentleman’s constituency, we will of course look at them. The value of developing SMRs is that one will potentially be able to have factories in a number of places in time, and that will mean that we continue the agenda of levelling up across the country.” Asked by Greg Clark, a former Tory Business secretary, “to drive that revolution forward, will he make sure that he invests in energy research and technology?” Sharma said “I agree with him: of course we want to invest in energy research…We will power ahead in research and development and be a leading country when it comes to R&D.” Tory MP, Bim Afolami, (who represents Hitchin and Harpenden which so far has no nuclear facility) said he welcomed the Secretary of State’s support for nuclear and the discussions on Sizewell C, asking: “ Is the eventual financing model entirely contingent upon the 30% reduction in the build cost for nuclear that is set out in the White Paper? To what extent does he see Government investing in nuclear over the medium to long term as a first resort, or should the first resort be investment from the private sector, with Government investment a last resort? The Business Secretary replied that Alofami had made “an important point about funding models. Of course, Sizewell C will be second of a kind in terms of projects. I think there is likely to be an appetite from the private sector to invest in that, but we are at the start of the discussion with EDF to explore financing options. It could involve the regulated asset base model. As I said in my statement, we will look at the part that the Government or consumers could play in the financing, but at the heart of any decision will be ensuring that we are delivering value for money for British taxpayers and British consumers.” I wonder with Afolami’s nuclear enthusiasm, he might not welcome a nuclear waste disposal repository in his constituency? Jonathan Edwards, an independent MP, pointed out that to accompany the White Paper, the British Government have confirmed that they are willing to take a direct equity stake in the proposed £20 billion Sizewell C nuclear plant, and wondered why similar direct public funding is not being made available to other energy technologies, such as the Swansea Bay tidal lagoon, instead of the very costly contracts for difference model? Alok Sharma was miffed, retorting brusquely: “May I respectfully suggest to the hon. Gentleman that he looks at what we have actually said about nuclear? What we have said is that we are starting a discussion with the developer, EDF. We have not set out a financing model. As I have said, the point at which a decision is made on whether we move to a final investment decision in this Parliament will be on the basis that any financing model delivers value for money for the British taxpayer and, indeed, for consumers.” Former Wales Secretary, Alun Cairns said he “warmly welcomed the commitment shown towards nuclear energy and the open mind that he shows towards the financing model. He then asked :”Does he recognise the challenges that the regulated asset base will give to assessing the risk at the early stage of a traditional build of nuclear power stations? Will he also show the same enthusiasm for small modular reactors that provide an exciting opportunity to parts of the UK that are looking for significant investment and the job-creating opportunities that small modular and advanced modular reactors can bring? Taken aback at praise, Sharma effused: “I very much support the idea that we should be advancing on SMRs and AMRs, and [he] knows that there is a £385 million advanced nuclear fund to support the development of SMRs. He will also know that we will be supporting a consortium led by Rolls-Royce on that. He is right that that offers not only an opportunity for us to create jobs, but export opportunities for our country in the future.” Unsurprizingly, Green MP Caroline Lucas was unenthusiastic over new nuclear , describing it as “both eye-wateringly expensive and painfully slow in the face of the climate emergency,” asking Sharma if he would “confirm that, far from saving consumers money, the regulated asset base funding model essentially means that consumers pay twice: first to reduce the cost of borrowing by increasing bills before the plant is operating, forcing liability for construction delays on to customers, and secondly for extremely costly power once the plant starts operating?” And demanded that he immediately publish the modelling that allows him to mysteriously claim that this will drive down costs for consumers. In replying, Sharma a said: “On nuclear, of course we will look at a range of financing models. I explained earlier why nuclear is so important as part of the energy mix—it is a non-intermittent supply—but of course the whole point of the regulated asset base model is that, ultimately, it should result in cheaper prices for consumers.” Nuclear fanatic Tory MP Virginia Crosbie, representing the island of Anglesey (Ynys Môn in Welsh) – who has regularly demonstrated herself as one of the worst informed MPs on nuclear power in Parliament- said enthusiastically congratulated the Secretary of State “on the publication of an excellent energy White Paper,” and pointed out “the word ‘nuclear’ is mentioned about 80 times,” and the WP also “stated the ambition to make a financial investment decision on at least one large-scale nuclear project by the end of this Parliament’” by way of prefacing her question: “Apart from writing to Santa, what more does he suggest I do to ensure that my constituents on Ynys Môn have some good news regarding Wylfa Newydd this Christmas?” Alok Sharma told her: “We will of course consider any new projects that come forward with any viable companies and investors that wish to develop sites in Wales or elsewhere. She should direct them to my Department.” Another North Wales Tory, Dr James Davies representing the Vale of Clwyd, said: “The north Wales Mersey Dee region has the potential to be at the centre of a green industrial revolution, including from Wylfa Newydd and offshore wind to a gigafactory, hydrogen production and carbon capture.” Former Tory Scottish Secretary, David Mundell said his personal regret was that his own constituency “cannot have a new nuclear power station because of the Scottish National party’s obsessive and dogmatic opposition to nuclear. Alok Sharma observed, wryly [His] “is a voice of reason. I just wish the SNP would listen to him more.” Another Tory, Richard Graham representing Gloucester (near to the nuclear sites of closed reactors at Oldbury and Berkeley) asserted “This energy White Paper is bristling with good things. The Secretary of State alluded to the negotiations with Sizewell C. May I highlight for him the importance of this project not just to the nuclear energy sector or to that part of the country, but to my constituents in Gloucester, where the operational headquarters of EDF Energy at Barnwood are extremely important? Can he confirm that access to Government financing will be the key to reducing the risk and costs of this project? Suitably invited, Alok Sharma responded saying: “On Sizewell C, we are going to look at the financing model and that will be part of the discussion, but one of the other key points is that it will be creating jobs during the construction phase and indeed beyond. A number of colleagues have asked what is the connection between this and the lives of people in our constituencies, and the answer is that it is very much about jobs.” Another Tory MPS whose constituency hosts a nuclear plant, Ian Liddell-Grainger repesenting Bridgwater and West Somerset - home of the Hinkley Point nuclear complex – opined “the White Paper is a really good piece of work. It has taken a very long time and, as somebody who is rather keen on nuclear, for obvious reasons, I am delighted. However, having read through it, I will say that one of the great things we have down here is the National College for Nuclear, and apprentices in this remarkable industry do need time to be trained in nuclear skills. If we are talking about 10 years for the first SMRs and for Sizewell, we will need more people and we will need them quickly.” He then urged the Secretary of State to visit Hinkley, and to “ensure adequate funding within the White Paper so that we can train the future of the nuclear industry.” Sharma responded saying: “He raises an important point about skills, which a number of colleagues have talked about. We very much recognise the need to ensure that we train people up for the sunrise industries of the future, and we will look to address some of that in the refreshed industrial strategy.” Finally, the Conservative MP for Stroud, Siobhan Baillie, noted that “The Government have stated they will be ambitious in developing fusion power and, as the Secretary of State knows, I am ambitious about developing opportunities for Stroud. Business West and other groups are already making the case to use the decommissioned nuclear site in Berkeley as an opportunity for fusion, and rightly so.” And asked the minister if he would “tell us a little more about the potential benefits of fusion power for the climate, for energy and for jobs? Delighted at such a simple question to finish, Alok Sharma enthused that she had “raised an important point” adding “this is set out on page 51 of the Energy White Paper—the Government have already committed over £400 million towards new UK fusion programmes. She will also know that this month we launched the spherical tokamak for energy production—STEP—programme and published an open call for communities across the UK to apply to be the host site. I encourage her to look at that and, should her constituents or anyone in the area want to apply, they should put their details forward.” And that is what counts for scrutiny of a crucial public policy paper on energy in the UK Parliament as 2020 closes!

Brexit backers' total confusion

Letter sent to The Bournemouth Echo: Your correspondents Jeff Williams of Parkstone and Simon Harper of Fordingbridge (Have your day, B.E 12 December) make excellent points and point the finger at the political cheerleaders for Brexit to have to own this craziest of self-inflicted political and economic follies. To the politicians I would add most of the national daily newspapers who backed Brexit to the hilt, and are mostly owned by billionaire proprietors who themselves conveniently live abroad, outside the country on which their daily printed propaganda is to bring havoc! I would also point out to the confused Brexit backers, who demand we leave the EU to protect out so called “sovereignty”, that the U.K. will have to abide by trading rules of the World Trade Organization ( WTO) if we leave the EU without a trade agreement, and will still have to pool our military security in our membership of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). Indeed, the threats being made against French fishing fleets from the Royal Navy in the event of a no deal would pit the British Navy up against the fleet of our ally, France, to demonstrate the utter absurdity of the whole Brexit farrago.

Questioning Trident warhead replacement legality

Letter sent to the Guardian newspaper today: Your defence editor’s revelations that the incoming Biden administration is expected to take “critical look” at next-generation nuclear warhead for Trident submarines (“US nuclear warhead standoff 'has significant implications for UK',” 9 December2020; https://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2020/dec/08/us-nuclear-warhead-standoff-has-significant-implications-for-uk) raises several important security issues. In a written ministerial answer on 11 March this year, defence minister Jeremy Quin told Green MP Caroline Lucas that: “the Defence Nuclear Organisation and Atomic Weapons Establishment will deliver the UK's replacement warhead.” He added that “This is consistent with our approach to our current warhead and we will continue to be fully compliant with our obligations under the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT).” (https://questions-statements.parliament.uk/written-questions/detail/2020-03-03/24309) This assertions is open to debate, as Article 1 of the NPT prohibits the transfer of nuclear explosive devices ( eg a nuclear warhead) "directly or indirectly to any recipient whatsoever,” including between nuclear-armed allies such as the US and UK. The minister concluded saying: “the replacement warhead is not required until at least the late 2030s, and the programme to deliver it will be subject to the Government's major programme approvals and oversight. We are withholding specific information about cost and in-service dates for the purposes of safeguarding national security.” This is surely not good enough for elected parliamentarians in the UK, a newly independent democracy hailed by prime minister Johnson, to be kept in the dark. The UK Parliament should, as is the US Congress, be fully furnished with costs and other details of the joint Trident warhead production program at Los Alamos national nuclear laboratories. The Foreign and Development Office should also provide MPs (and indeed the MOD!) with its legal advice on the compatibility of Trident warhead replacement with the provisions of the NPT.

The fight ahead: nuclear power versus energy sustainability in the EU

The fight ahead: nuclear power versus energy sustainability in the EU https://energytransition.org/2020/12/the-fight-ahead-nuclear-power-versus-energy-sustainability-in-the-eu/ by Dr David Lowry 08 Dec 2020 As we approach the end of a tumultuous 2020, with the UK finally to leave the European Union on 31 December after its transition period expires, the EU – primarily the Commission – itself has continued to refine the parameters of its sustainable energy strategy, which has been constructed very much in the face of the pressures of the unprecedented global pandemic. David Lowry has the details. A pile of small paper flags from the EU, Germany, France and the UK (Public Domain) -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- One big issue has been whether nuclear power should have any role, and if so, what? This debate has had a long gestation period. For example, the green taxonomy, which some see as the most sensitive part of a European Commission plan on sustainable finance – which aims at shifting financial flows towards the decarbonisation of the economy – were presented in May 2018 by then Commission Vice-President Valdis Dombrovskis, who underlined that financing the energy transition could not be financed with public money alone. Then, on 28 March 2019, the European Parliament voted on the proposed classification for sustainable assets, which would have excluded nuclear power from receiving a green stamp of approval on financial markets. The text voted in Parliament also excludes fossil fuels and gas infrastructure from the EU’s proposed green finance taxonomy, which aims to divert investments away from polluting industries into clean technologies. In a bid to prevent “green-washing”, the Parliament text also requires investors to disclose whether their financial products have sustainability objectives, and if they do, whether the product is consistent with the EU’s green assets classification, or taxonomy. While activists applauded the move, they said the classification voted by the European Parliament was too narrow and applies only to a limited set of recognisable green assets, such as wind and solar power companies Kristina Jeromin, Head of Group Sustainability at Deutsche Börse and Managing Director of the Green and Sustainable Finance Cluster Germany, told EU specialist web site, EURACTIV, that she would have liked to see a more ambitious approach, and that the process was only at the beginning. According to Jeromin, the amount of capital needed to move financial markets could not “only be stimulated by adopting a common taxonomy alone”. Sébastien Godinot, an economist at the WWF’s European Policy Office, observed “To make more sustainable investments, investors, companies, and banks need to know how relatively good or bad for the environment all economic activities are. Instead, this result would only reveal the few which are definitely good for it,” adding “At least MEPs did take steps to tackle greenwashing by saying no to fossil fuels and nuclear power being labelled ‘sustainable.’ Nearly a year on from that EP vote, in January this year, the Commission unveiled new proposals, refining the EC position. At an expert briefing an EU sustainability taxonomy, a definition of priority investment areas, the clarification of investor duties and development of “official” European sustainability standards for green bonds were are some of the recommendations experts made to the European Commission on Wednesday. On 14th January 2020, the European Commission presented the European Green Deal’s Just Transition Mechanism and the Sustainable Europe Investment Plan. The former initiative has been crafted to provide “tailored financial and practical support to help workers and generate the necessary investments in regions most affected by the [energy] transition” primarily from fossil –fuel dependence. It will make investments more attractive, with an overall financial package worth at least €100 billion. The latter plan is aimed to mobilise public investment and help unlock private funds through EU financial instruments – most notably InvestEU – according to an EC briefing “leading to a total of at least €1 trillion of investments. This is needed if the EU is to become the first climate-neutral bloc in the world by 2050.” Speaking at the launch, the EC President Ursula von der Leyen, stressed that: “People are at the core of the European Green Deal, our vision to make Europe climate-neutral by 2050. The transformation ahead of us is unprecedented. And it will only work if it is just – and if it works for all. We will support our people and our regions that need to make bigger efforts in this transformation, to make sure that we leave no one behind. The Green Deal comes with important investment needs, which we will turn into investment opportunities.” EC Executive Vice-President Valdis Dombrovskis added: “For Europe to transition to a climate-neutral economy, we need both political commitment and massive investments. The Green Deal shows our determination to tackle climate change, which we are now backing up with a funding plan. […] The European Union was not built in a day. A Green Europe will not happen overnight. Putting sustainability at the heart of how we invest requires a change of mindset. We have taken an important step towards achieving this today.” THE EUROPAN GREEN DEAL INVESTMENT PLAN Mobilising at least €1 trillion of investments over the course of 10 years, thanks to the combined: € capital from EU and national budgets; 25% of all European Union funding for climate measures public and private investments; 30% of InvestEU to projects that fight climate change additional measures to facilitate and boost green public and private investment; attractive investment conditions; Stimulating green investments with support from the EIB Group technical assistance to help investors in selecting sustainable projects. Just Transition Mechanism support of least €100 billion is planned to be available to all Member States, focused on the most carbon-intensive regions and regions with many people working in fossil fuels. Member States will get access by preparing territorial just transition plans covering the period up to 2030, identifying the most impacted territories that should get support. Plans will set out ways to best address social, economic and environmental challenges. EU-funded projects to green the economy Hans-Werner Sinn, Professor of Economics at the University of Munich, a past President of the Ifo Institute for Economic Research – and who serves on the German economy ministry’s Advisory Council – is sceptic of the Just Transition, which was given further detailed contours by Ursula von der Leyen, in her first annual “state of the union” address on 16 September. In her address, titled ‘Building the world we want to live in: A Union of vitality in a world of fragility’, she stressed: “This is our opportunity to make change happen by design – not by disaster or by diktat from others in the world. To emerge stronger by creating opportunities for the world of tomorrow and not just building contingencies for the world of yesterday. We have everything we need to make this happen. We have shaken off the old excuses and home comforts that have always held us back. We have the vision, we have the plan, we have the investment. It is now time to get to work. Professor Sinn retorts: “with its so-called Green Deal, [the EC] has committed itself to a new and pervasive form of government intervention in the economy. Apparently, the bureaucrats in Brussels think that they — and only they — know which technological pathways are best for building a sustainable future…In adopting this approach, EU politicians are purporting to know things about the costs of avoiding carbon dioxide emissions that they in fact do not know. But because they will be spending other people’s money rather than their own, they have no incentive to seek out potentially less expensive methods of avoiding or reducing emissions. A naive faith in the wisdom and honesty of central planners — a fatal attraction we thought we had overcome in 1989 — is rearing its ugly head in Europe once again.” ..The carbon dioxide price emerging from a comprehensive emissions trading system would prompt all companies to look for the greenest options for investing in emission reductions. Green innovations would sprout up everywhere, and Brussels bureaucrats would marvel at the environmental benefits conferred by new technologies that they themselves had never considered feasible. For example, hydrogen fuel cells might prevail over battery-powered electric vehicles (EVs). Green electricity from Extremadura might triumph over green electricity from the North Sea. The possibility of nuclear fusion would remain on the table. “The EU Commission so far has shown no indication that it is willing to abandon central planning in favor of a comprehensive emissions trading system. By turning its back on the market, it exposes itself to the suspicion that its main concern is not with combating climate protection, but rather with crafting an industrial policy whose true motives and aims can only be a matter of speculation.” A national exemplar A Greener Slovakia, is the plan envisaged by one smaller WC member state, which has significant pressures to phase out former fossil-fuel dependence to alternative energy technology futures. It stresses that “Global climate change is a worldwide problem, but there are measures that can mitigate and even prevent its impact on Slovakia. In our environment, this is especially the case for reducing greenhouse gas emissions, protecting and revitalizing ecosystems, reducing and mitigating the risk of floods and soil erosion. The current challenge is also to prevent and reduce the consequences of drought and other unwanted impacts of climate change. The Strategy for the Environmental Policy of the Slovak Republic until 2030 was based on international, European and national legislation and applicable strategic documents, as well as from the study of the European Environment Agency that was focused on the analysis of global megatrends, and the follow-up assessment of global megatrends from the point of view of the Slovak Republic. “ It adds: “The 2030 Agenda contains the main 17 sustainable development goals (SDGs), worked into 169 related sub-targets. While the primary objective of the Millennium Development Goals was to eliminate extreme poverty and hunger in developing countries, the motto of the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development is no one will be left behind“, and the pledge to fulfil its goals is expected also from developed countries. The 2030 Agenda is not legally binding, but its honouring is a natural duty of developed countries.” The Slovak Ministry of the Environment will deal with the area of data and its publication in cooperation with all government departments, according to its material scope, and in cooperation with the Deputy Prime Minister‘s Office for Investments and Information and the Office of the Government Plenipotentiary for Civil Society. Curiously, despite the very strong public support for nuclear power by the Slovak prime minister, Igor Matovič and his predecessor, Peter Pellegrini, it is not mentioned in this Green Transition National Plan. Nuclear fight back The global nuclear industry has sought ways to resurrect its much promised but in reality failed “nuclear renaissance” as the market and Governments have stubbornly failed to be convinced by its seductive atomic allure. In the wake of von der Leyen’s “state of the union” speech, the United Nations Economic Commission for Europe (UNECE) provided a platform to welcome the nuclear industry into its debate on the policy responses required to address climate change and sustainable development. A week after her speech, UNECE’s Expert Group on Resource Management (EGRM) held a session titled The role of nuclear energy resources in sustainable development as part of UNECE Energy Week 2020 King Lee and Agneta Rising during a UNECE session in November The session was chaired by King Lee, who leads World Nuclear Association’s ‘Harmony Programme’, which is the nuclear industry’s vision for the future of electricity, with a goal for nuclear energy to supply 25% of global electricity with 1000 GWe of new nuclear capacity by 2050. During the EGRM session, Lee presented the development of a new UNECE report, The Role of Nuclear Energy in Sustainable Development: Entry Pathways, which he said aims to inform “sound policy formulation” for countries considering nuclear energy programmes and the utilisation of uranium resources, and to help them define “locally relevant pathways” to support sustainable development. The report gives attention both to newcomer countries and the deployment of small modular reactors, as well as to existing large-scale nuclear reactor technologies. The report was developed under the guidance of UNECE’s Nuclear Fuel Working Group with support from World Nuclear Association, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and the OECD’s Nuclear Energy Agency.: the nuclear club was out in force. Lee asserted “The report explores nuclear technology contributions to the Sustainable Development Goals where it plays a key role in decarbonising the energy sector, but it can also support the attainment of all other Sustainable Development Goals – including supporting the elimination of poverty, zero hunger, clean water, affordable energy, economic growth and industry innovation. It highlights SDG 7 energy as ‘central to nearly every major challenge and opportunity the world faces today’. Energy access supports all of the SDGs and is a key pillar of the UN’s sustainable development agenda.” The report draws on what its proponents assert is “the internationally recognised process for nuclear energy programme development – the IAEA’s Milestones Approach.” – and highlights five nuclear development considerations that are readily aligned with sustainable development: energy system evaluation and planning; socioeconomic development factors; environmental factors; regulatory and legal factors; and economics and project financing. It recognises that nuclear energy supports the realisation of a number of national policy goals, Lee said, including: affordable and clean energy provision; mitigating climate change; enhancing energy resilience; and development of industry and infrastructure. Scott Foster, director of UNECE’s Sustainable Energy Division, said the climate emergency was now at “10 past midnight” and that a technology neutral approach to reducing greenhouse gas emissions was vital. The planet has reached a tipping point, and the emergency lights are flashing.” He concluded: “We need to deploy every technology and to pursue every approach to reverse the trend. We must recognise that every country has its endowment of natural resources and its own cultural, legislative and regulatory heritage, and each country will pursue its pathway to the 2030 Agenda. What is clear, based on our work at UNECE, is that we will not achieve our objectives collectively if nuclear energy is excluded.” Within days, a giant atomic jamboree in followed in Vienna, when the IAEA hosted its “2020 Scientific Forum on Nuclear Power and the Clean Energy Transition” The UN’s lead nuclear promotional body’s Director General, Dr Rafael Mariano Grossi, asserted in opening the forum that to meet climate change goals “almost all electricity will need to be low carbon, and that will only be possible if the use of nuclear power is increased. It will require us to make use of all energy sources that do not emit greenhouse gases. Nuclear power is part of the solution.” Mr Grossi emphasized how innovation is necessary for nuclear power to achieve its full potential. “Advanced large reactors are helping to make nuclear power more accessible, sustainable and affordable. Innovations [are] being used, or considered, to optimise the operation and maintenance of nuclear power plants.” The IAEA claims that: “Nuclear power is a resilient source of energy, as demonstrated even during the pandemics, and already provides one third of all low carbon electricity. With technological and scientific progress in the use of atomic energy, this year’s Scientific Forum [will] examine how nuclear power can play a role in the clean energy transition helping countries achieve both climate and development goals. The Scientific Forum is took place on the margins of the IAEA’s 64th General Conference Alok Sharma, the UK Secretary of State for Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy- who is the President of COP 26, the UN Climate Change Conference, scheduled to take place in November 2021 in Glasgow in Scotland – observed in a video statement: “In the first four months of this year, more than 60 per cent of the UK’s electricity came from low carbon sources, and a quarter of this clean electricity was generated by nuclear power. We know that a clean future depends on decarbonizing the power sector……and as a source of constant, low-carbon power, nuclear can play an important role.” Fatih Birol, Executive Director of the International Energy Agency, said that nuclear is part of the solution to address climate change, asserting: “The scale of the challenge of addressing climate is so big that we cannot afford to exclude nuclear from the table.. We must work to use all technology we have.” Global ministers lobbied At the G20 Energy Ministers Virtual Meeting, held on 27-28 September -under the presidency of Saudi Arabia - the Group of Twenty (G20) Energy Ministers acknowledged the role of nuclear energy in providing clean energy and enhancing energy security. NEA Director-General William D. Magwood, IV, who participated in the meeting, presented the NEA’s analysis of the role of nuclear energy in a circular carbon economy. The NEA report Reduce: Nuclear prepared as part of the Guide to the Circular Carbon Economy (CCE) was published as part of a series coordinated by the King Abdullah Petroleum Studies and Research Centre (KAPSARC) within the context of Saudi Arabia’s 2020 G20 Presidency. At the end of the two-day meeting, the ministers issued a bland consensual communique. The role of nuclear power in the circular carbon economy TheNEA argued that “the circular carbon economy (CCE) approach applies the circular economy model and its ‘3Rs’ framework of Reduce, Reuse, and Recycle to mitigating carbon emissions. The concept of the CCE also incorporates a fourth element, Remove. The reports that form the CCE Guide series provide detailed insights into each of these elements. Nuclear energy is incorporated within the “Reduce” element of the CCE framework, which aims to reduce greenhouse gas emissions by adding strategies to a core circular economy such as energy efficiency and low-carbon energy generation.” The NEA report concluded : “ While the existing nuclear fleet remains the world’s second largest low-carbon source of electricity after hydro, nuclear energy is not on track with the International Energy Agency (IEA) Sustainable Development Scenario (SDS), which requires an annual average of 15 GW of new nuclear capacity between 2020 and 2040. Additional lifetime extensions and a doubling of the annual rate of capacity additions are therefore required to meet the SDS.” The report further highlights the essential role played by the existing nuclear reactor fleet in supporting the resilience of the electricity system through the COVID-19 crisis, and the significant role that the nuclear sector can play in post-COVID-19 recovery efforts. As G20 countries recover from the COVID-19 crisis, governments should take advantage of the economic recovery stimulus to accelerate the energy transition towards meeting their climate objectives. The nuclear debate is clearly far from over! by Dr David Lowry Dr David Lowry senior international research fellow at the Institute for Resource and Security Studies, Cambridge, Massachusetts USA

Why European issues are so darned confusing

Your two correspondents, John Smith and Paul Ruane ( Daily Mail, Thursday), both complain about the intention of Boris Johnson to retain British adherence to the European Convention on Human Rights, apparently believing the ECHR is part of the European Union. It isn’t! The EHCR was drafted in 1950, and came into force in 1953, four years before the European Union ( then called the European Economic Communities, EEC) was established. The EHCR is part of the Council of Europe apparatus, which predates the EU, and has a much wider membership, including Russia. The confusion arises because the ECHR has an arbitration body, the the European Court of Human Rights, which sits in the French city of Strasbourg, which is also the location of the EU’s arbitration body, the European Court of Justice. In my view all civilised Governments need to ensure continued membership if the ECHR. It gives us leverage over some less open societies, like Putin’s Russia