Foreign Secretary Boris Johnson opined in a very pro-Brexit speech to the
Raisina Dialogue - an annual conference, envisioned to be India's flagship
conference of geopolitics and geo-economics-
held in India’s capital city, New Delhi, on 19 January: “I think the time has come to stick up for
free trade to make the case once again for the immense benefits of a globalised
economy where we learn from each other and trade freely with each other and
that case needs setting out here now and I believe I am perhaps the man to do
it because I belong to a select group of people who are not always approved of
by the global elites.”
Johnson added: “by the way we were the first P5 country to call for India
to join the Security Council as well as the Nuclear Suppliers Group.”
The Foreign Secretary seems to regard these
proposals as an unquestionably
positive good, but not all nations agree. For example, the UK’s partner
on the UN Security Council Permanent 5 (P5), China, has opposed India being
allowed to join the Nuclear Suppliers Group, a stance criticised by the outgoing Obama administration, which negatively dubbed
Beijing as an "outlier" in America's efforts to bring New Delhi on
board the elite nuclear trading group..
But China is advocating a two-step so-called
"non-discriminatory" approach for admission of countries who have not
signed nuclear-Non Proliferation Treaty (NPT) for which the UK and US are
founding members and depositary states- in the NSG. The US and France back the UK
in wanting India to join the NSG.
Beijing announced last in November,
it first wants to find a solution that is applicable to the admission of all
non-NPT members followed by discussions to admit specific non-NPT member. China's
stand for a non-discriminatory criteria is regarded significant as Pakistan, a
close ally of Beijing too has applied for the NSG membership along with India.
('Outlier' China preventing India's entry into Nuclear Suppliers Group,
says US, Times of India, PTI, 15
January 2017; http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/outlier-china-preventing-indias-entry-into-nuclear-suppliers-group-says-us/articleshow/56559841.cms
But the UK has gone even further, negotiating preferential deal with India
on nuclear technology and science co-operation, begun under the last Labour government
(“The Atomic Bizarre: Nuclear
security and proliferation – key issues of concern
This notorious nuclear agreement was initially agree in London on 13 November 2015, and
subsequently entered into force on 16 December 2016. Bu tit was only presented to Parliament by the Foreign Secretary
in January 2017 (as Cm 9311)
Here are some edited
extracts to give the flavor of the planned co-operation, which, as China has
pointed out, goes against the spirit if not the absolute letter of the UK’s
obligation as a (depositary) state for the1968 Nuclear Non Proliferation Treaty
(NPT) which India persistently and consistently refuses to join, due to its
discrimination in favour of the P5 nuclear weapons states.
It worrying shows how the UK Government under the pressures
of Brexit to find new global trading partners, is prepared to ride hard and
fast over the previously preciously guarded international norms against nuclear
proliferation.
The Treaty:
Recalling the Joint
Declaration of the Parties on civil nuclear co-operation, done on
11
February 2010
Recognising that the
United Kingdom is a member of the European Atomic Energy
Community
("Euratom"), and is subject to obligations under the Treaty
Establishing
the European Atomic Energy Community ("Euratom Treaty") done at
Brussels
on 17 April 19571;
Noting Euratom's
role in relation to the supply of nuclear material in the European
Union;
Mindful that
India has concluded an “Agreement between the Government of India
and
the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards to
Civilian
Nuclear Facilities" (done at Vienna on 2 February 2009, and entered into
force
on 11 May 20092),
hereinafter referred to as INFCIRC/754, as supplemented
by
an Additional Protocol (done at Vienna on 25 February 2009, and entered into
force
on 25 July 20143);
Mindful also that
the United Kingdom is subject to Euratom Treaty Safeguards and
has
voluntarily entered into an “Agreement between the United Kingdom of Great
Britain
and Northern Ireland, the European Atomic Energy Community and the
International
Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in the United
Kingdom
of Great Britain and Northern Ireland in connection with the Treaty on
the
Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons” (done at Vienna on 6 September 19764, and entered into force on 14 August 1978), hereinafter
referred to as INFCIRC/263,
as
supplemented by an Additional Protocol (done at Vienna on 22 September
19985,
and entered into force on 30 April 2004);
Scope of the Cooperation Agreement
1. The Parties shall cooperate in the promotion and development of
peaceful
uses of nuclear energy in accordance with the provisions of this
Agreement.
2. Nothing in this Agreement will affect the rights and
obligations of the Parties
in terms of their respective applicable national laws and policies
as well as in terms
of their respective applicable international Agreements, Treaties
and Conventions.
3. For the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland,
the
international Treaties referred to in paragraph (2) include in
particular the rights
and obligations arising from its participation in the European
Union and Euratom.
4. The Parties may co-operate in any of the following areas:
a) use of nuclear energy for generation of electricity and water
desalination;
b) research and development, including the design and application
of
nuclear energy for use in such fields as agriculture, healthcare, industry
and medicine;
c) nuclear safety, radiation aspects, and environmental
protection;
d) the supply of nuclear material, non-nuclear material,
equipment,
components, technology or information;
e) nuclear fuel and nuclear fuel cycle management, including
through the
development of strategic reserve of nuclear fuel to guard against
any
disruption of supply over the life time of India’s nuclear
reactors which
have been notified by India to the IAEA as per the provisions of
INFCIRC/754;
f) industrial co-operation related to peaceful uses of nuclear
energy
between persons in the United Kingdom and in India;
g) technical training and education related to peaceful uses of
nuclear
energy including access to and use of equipment;
h) the provision of technical assistance and services, including
fuel
services;
i) decommissioning of nuclear facilities;
j) other areas for co-operation agreed by the Parties in writing.
ARTICLE IV
Nuclear Trade
1. The Parties shall facilitate nuclear trade between themselves
and those duly
authorised by them, and also where appropriate, trade between
either Party and
third countries of nuclear material, non-nuclear material,
equipment, components or
technology obligated to the other Party.
8
ARTICLE V
Transfers and Retransfers
1. Nuclear material, non-nuclear material, equipment, components
or
technology transferred between the Parties, whether transferred
directly or through
an authorised third party, as well as all successive generations
of nuclear material
recovered or obtained as by-products, shall be subject to this
Agreement unless
otherwise jointly decided in writing by the Parties.
2. Nuclear material, non-nuclear material, equipment, components
or
technology subject to this Agreement shall not be transferred
beyond the territory,
jurisdiction or control of the recipient Party without the prior
written consent of the
supplier Party, except in accordance with this Article.
3. A Party shall only allow the transfer of nuclear material,
non-nuclear
material, equipment, components or technology subject to this
Agreement to a third
State after having obtained written consent for this purpose from
the other Party,
and a commitment by the recipient that such transfers shall be:
a) used for peaceful purposes only;
b) subject to IAEA safeguards; and
c) protected by adequate physical protection measures.
4. The requirements of
paragraphs 1 and 2 above shall not apply to any transfers
to a Member State of the European Union of nuclear material, non-nuclear
material, equipment, components or technology, including all
successive
generations of nuclear material recovered or obtained as
by-products, that are
subject to the provisions of the Euratom Treaty and any relevant,
related EU legal
measures.
ARTICLE VI
Reprocessing and Enrichment
1. Reprocessing and any other alteration in form or content of
nuclear material
transferred to India pursuant to this Agreement and any nuclear
material, including
all successive generations of nuclear material recovered or
obtained as by-products,
used in or produced through the use of nuclear material,
non-nuclear material,
equipment, components or technology so transferred to India shall
only be carried
out in a facility which has been notified by India to the IAEA as
per the provisions
of INFCIRC/754. Any nuclear material that may be separated thereby
may be
stored and utilised in facilities which have been so notified by
India and which are
subject to IAEA safeguards.
9
2. Enrichment up to twenty percent in the isotope 235 of uranium
transferred to
India pursuant to this Agreement, as well as uranium and all
successive generations
of nuclear material recovered or obtained as by-products used in
or produced
through the use of equipment so transferred, may only be carried
out in a facility
which has been notified by India to the IAEA as per the provisions
of
INFCIRC/754.
ARTICLE VII
Peaceful uses and Safeguards
1. The Parties shall ensure that the nuclear material, non-nuclear
material,
equipment, components or technology transferred under this
Agreement, as well as
all successive generations of nuclear material recovered or
obtained as by-products,
are used only for peaceful purposes.
2. Nuclear material, non-nuclear material, equipment, components
or nuclear
facilities transferred to India under this Agreement and notified
by the supplier
Party to that end, and also all successive generations of nuclear
material recovered
or obtained as by-products, shall remain subject to IAEA
safeguards, in accordance
with the provisions of INFCIRC/754 as supplemented by an
Additional Protocol
(done at Vienna on 25 February 2009, and entered into force on 25
July 2014).
3. Nuclear material, non-nuclear material, equipment, components
or nuclear
facilities transferred to the United Kingdom under this Agreement
and notified by
the supplier Party to that end, and also all successive
generations of nuclear
material recovered or obtained as by-products, shall be subject to
the provisions of
Chapter 7 of the Euratom Treaty and of INFCIRC/263, as
supplemented by an
Additional Protocol (done at Vienna on 22 September 1998, and
entered into force
on 30 April 2004).
4. If the IAEA decides that the application of safeguards by the
IAEA is not
possible, the Parties shall consult and agree in writing on
appropriate verification measures.
ARTICLE VIII
Extent of Application of the Agreement
1. Nuclear material, non-nuclear material, equipment, components or
technology, as well as all successive generations of nuclear
material recovered or
obtained
as by-products, shall remain subject to this Agreement until:
Physical Protection
1. Each Party shall ensure that adequate physical protection
measures are
applied to nuclear material, non-nuclear material, equipment,
components or
technology transferred under this Agreement, as well as all
successive generations
of nuclear material recovered or obtained as by-products. The
responsibility of a
Party for ensuring the application of such physical protection
measures extends to
the international transport thereof, until that responsibility is
properly transferred to
another State.
2. In addition to its obligations under the Convention on the
Physical Protection
of Nuclear Material, done at Vienna on 3 March 1980 and as amended
and in force
for each Party from time to time, each Party shall apply the
recommendations of
Agency document INFCIRC/225/Rev.5 entitled, “Nuclear Security
Recommendations on Physical Protection of Nuclear Material and
Nuclear
Facilities”, as updated from time to time, or any subsequent
document replacing
INFCIRC/225/Rev.5. Any alteration to or replacement of document
INFCIRC/225/Rev.5 shall have effect under this Agreement only when
the Parties
have informed each other in writing that they accept such
alteration or replacement.
11
ARTICLE X
CONFIDENTIALITY AND INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY
1. Each Party shall take all necessary measures, consistent with
its respective
legislation as well as applicable international Treaties and
Conventions to which
both India and the United Kingdom are Party, to prevent the
unauthorised use or
disclosure of any information or technology transferred under this
Agreement.
Information and technology transferred under this Agreement shall
not be
communicated to third parties, whether public or private, without
prior written
approval from the Party providing that information and technology.
2. This Agreement is not intended to transfer any intellectual
property rights.
The intellectual property rights existing or arising in the
framework of the cooperation
provided by this Agreement shall be allocated or transferred, if
at all, on
a case-by-case basis in any specific agreements or contracts
associated with this
Agreement.
ARTICLE XI
Implementation of this Agreement
1. The Parties, through their respective appropriate governmental
authorities,
shall establish administrative arrangements as necessary to
facilitate the effective
implementation of this Agreement. Such arrangements shall include
the
procedures necessary for the appropriate governmental authorities
to implement
and administer the provisions of this Agreement.
2. None of the provisions of this Agreement shall be interpreted
as affecting the
rights and obligations which result from the participation by
either of the Parties in
their international Agreements, Treaties and Conventions.
ARTICLE XII
Consultations
1. The Parties shall consult regularly, or at any time at the
request of either
Party, in order to ensure the effective fulfilment of the
obligations of this
Agreement, or to review any matters relating to cooperation in the
peaceful uses of
nuclear energy. Such consultations may also take the form of an
exchange of
correspondence.
12
ARTICLE XIII
Settlement of Disputes
1. The Parties shall promptly seek to settle any dispute
concerning the
interpretation or implementation of the provisions of this
Agreement through
negotiations, or any other means mutually agreed between the
Parties.
2. Disputes regarding the interpretation, implementation or
performance of
subsequent commercial contracts or Memoranda of Understanding
shall be dealt
with in accordance with the provisions found in the contracts or
Memoranda of
Understanding.
ARTICLE XIV
Amendments
1. The terms of this Agreement may be amended at any time by
written
agreement between the Parties. Such amendment shall enter into
force on the last
date on which the Parties have notified each other in writing that
their respective
internal procedures necessary for its entry into force have been
completed.
ARTICLE XV
Entry into Force and Duration
1. This Agreement shall come into force on the last date upon
which the Parties
notify each other in writing of the completion of their internal
procedures necessary
for the entry into force of this Agreement.
2. Subject to Article XVI, this Agreement shall remain in force
for a minimum
period of forty years (40). If neither Party has notified the
other Party of its
intention to terminate the Agreement at least six (6) months prior
to the expiry of
that minimum forty-year period, this Agreement shall continue in
force for
additional periods of twenty (20) years each unless, at least six
(6) months before
the expiration of any such additional period, a Party notifies the
other Party of its
intention
to terminate this Agreement.
India’s continued use of nuclear-armed
missiles (following the bad example of the UK, US, China, Russia, and France)
has led to a fierce reaction by China to India’s recent missile tests.
As Brig. (retd) Dr Arun Sahgal, Senior Fellow at the Delhi Policy Group, a
policy think tank focusing on national security, diplomacy and Track II
Dialogues, recently stressed: “Two back-to-back Agni IV and V missile
tests have rattled China, particularly as they signal the growing prowess of
India’s inter-continental ballistic missile (ICBM) development program. Reacting
to the Indian missile tests, Global Times, an English-language Chinese
state-owned publication, gratuitously advised “India to cool its missile fever.
It went on to chastise India for attempting to develop an intercontinental
missile capability, adding that owning a few missiles does not mean India has
become a nuclear power. “It will be a long time before it [India] can show off
its strength to the world.”
The underlying reason for the
Chinese outburst is India’s attempt at seeking strategic equivalence with China
through its intercontinental missile development program, which can pose a
threat to China as well as upset the existing strategic balance in Asia,
Dr Sahgal concluded.
(“Why India’s ICBM Tests
Rile China”, The Diplomat,
(Tokyo) 14 January 2017; http://thediplomat.com/2017/01/why-indias-icbm-tests-rile-china/)
India could
face a diverse array of challenges over the next five years, ranging from
“internal tensions over inequality and religion” and extreme weather events to
the traditional threat from Pakistan-based terrorists, according to a new
report by top US intelligence analysts.
And all this
could happen as India and the US “grow closer than ever in their history”, says
the report titled Global Trends: Paradox of Progress from the National
Intelligence Council, part of the Office of the Director of National Intelligence.
It described
India’s ability to use its economic and human potential to drive regional trade
and development as South Asia’s “greatest hope”.
Pakistan, the
report said, will feel “compelled to address India’s economic and conventional
military capabilities through asymmetric means” and also seek to “enhance its
nuclear deterrent against India by expanding its nuclear arsenal and delivery
means, including pursuing ‘battlefield nuclear weapons’ and sea-based options”.
The possible
deployment of nuclear weapons by India, Pakistan, and perhaps China, would
“increasingly nuclearise the Indian Ocean during the next two decades”. The
presence of multiple nuclear powers with “uncertain doctrine for managing at
sea incidents between nuclear-armed vessels increases the risk of
miscalculation and inadvertent escalation”, the report said.
“Internal tension to terror threats, US report says India faces many
challenges, Hindustan Times, New Delhi, 11 January 2017; http://www.hindustantimes.com/world-news/internal-tension-to-terror-threats-us-reports-says-india-faces-many-challenges/story-JRMMHKv7PmZxRJIwB2KhxO.html
As my annex below outlines, there is
opposition from well educated professionals and academics in India to this
nuclear expansion. It is a pity Boris Johnson Is not listening to them, but only to the vested interests of the nuclear lobby.
Annex
Modi-initiative Nuclear
Free SAARC, circulated by Professor Dhirendra Sharma
The Campaign for South Asian
Democratic Union have urged Heads of South Asian states to
forgo the path of Nuclear confrontation. Endorsed by artists, scientists,
intellectuals, jurists and human rights activists of South Asian
community, “We accept the Challenge posed by
the grim elements of narrow sub-national and sectarian forces, within and
without the South Asian borders. The Life and Liberties of future
generations are at stake here in the heightened
communal trust-deficit when the main problems of Development and
Survival are common concern of all peoples in South Asia.
Since 1985, while the
Heads of SAARC were meeting annually, India and Pakistan have
secretly amassed some 200 Nuclear Warheads avowedly in ‘Self-defence’.
But the Nuclear weapons in “Self-defence”
is an irrational political paradigm. For, the Nuclear
weapons do not differentiate between friends and
foes. There is no “self-defense” in a nuclear conflict, when
movable and immovable - homes, schools, hospitals,
temples, mosques, and churches, factories and offices, stationary vehicles and
metros and air-ports–all and everything would be engulfed in the
nuclear holocaust.”
It is, therefore, imperative
that the SAARC states give up fighting for
exclusive regional, sub-national, sectarian or religious identities.
Though divided we are, we need to begin with assertion that the South Asian
peoples share not only geo-graphical space but also a common history and
culture. History teaches us not to repeat the past mistakes.
India is committed to No
First Use of Nuclear weapons doctrine. But it had planned the
Credible Nuclear Deterrent policy (CNDP). It constructed nuclear shelters
equipped with nuclear warheads on long range surface-to-surface ballistic
missile systems. In February 2014, Nuclear Powered Submarine, named
“Arihant”, in Sanskrit, meaning “the Killer of the Enemy”, was
launched.
Operating on enriched
uranium reactor fuel, the Arihant can stay deep inside the
Ocean, 300 mt. (980 feet), undetected for months. Built at the cost Rs.
15,000 crores ( US. $3.9 billion), the Arihant sub. is 110
mt. long, weighs 6000 tones, with the missile range 400 mts. and it can
house 100 personnel, with all essential facilities inside the
nuclear submarine. There are four more Arihant N- submarines under
planning.
Indian have also
developed BrahMos supersonic cruise missiles. The BrahMos and
Arihant retaliatory system and the underground N-missiles may deter a
constitutional state authority. But any non-state actor or Islamic terrorists
would not be deterred by our invincible supersonic BrahMos or Arihant
hidden under the deep ocean.
No First Use doctrine.
The Indian Credible
Nuclear Deterrent policy is really non-credible in response to the
Divine Warrior ( jihadi terrorist). Indian Defense Research and
Development Organization (DRDO) had constructed twelve prototypes underground
nuclear shelters, that are self-contained units with sleeping bunks for 30 top
personnel, equipped with captive power and water supply systems. Toilets and
decontamination module including waste disposal and fire-fighting systems
installed within the nuclear missile base. These radiation-proof shelters are
meant to protect a few specialized n-force personnel but for a short-term
survival, provided no enemy missile hit the N-shelter directly.
But In case there is a
surprise nuclear terrorist attack, the command ready to retaliate with
overwhelming nuclear strikes, leading to total devastation of towns and cities
of the enemy. But in a suicidal strike, the land based N-High Command’s
electronic system would be destroyed instantly. How would the N-sub operators
know when and against whom to fire the retaliatory Nuclear missiles.
Dr. Narayan Lakhsman,
(in The Hindu, March 29, 2016). rightly refers to three
N-security potential threats from the Islamic State actors
making, acquiring and exploding n-devices. Admittedly, the Credible
N-deterrence is meant to deter any hostile entity from using a nuclear weapon
against the Indian Republic. But in case of non-state suicidal jihadi delivered
a N-devise, say, on the Parliament. How the No First N-Use policy
would work against the terrorist whose identity would not be
verified.
Stockpiles of
Radioactivity
By 1985, both Moscow and
Washington had stockpiled 50,000 nuclear warheads and achieved Mutual Assured
Destruction (MAD) capability to destroy the planet Earth ten times over. In
building the Credible N-deterrence India had repeated the folly of
the Cold War pundits who believed the Atomic bombs were “ the
currency of power”.
No civil defense and
fire control mechanism can function in a nuclear war theatre. The concerned
scientists have, therefore, established the Nuclear Nights and Nuclear Winter
paradigm that “ the nuclear war cannot be fought, nor can it be
won.”
Dr. Lakshman has also
stated that those who make the most destructive arsenal in human
history are not allowed to speak about their scientific achievements.
Secrecy not only undermines our Democratic Constitution, but also make our
scientists suffer high stress often leading to undisclosed suicidal
killing.
Moreover, the nuclear shelters are but
non-active entities in the long drawn nuclear war games. The Arihant,
e.g, is operated on the enriched uranium fuel. In case of any leak or
mishaps, inside the submarine, when it is under the deep ocean, how would
the Nuclear High Command assure the “safe keeping” of the nuclear
subs-with N-warheads.
Disciple of Atal
Bihari Vajpayee, our dynamic Prime Minister Modi is committed to
World Peace. The PM of India has proclaimed repeatedly:
“The World is One
Family” (Vasudhaiv kutumbakam).
Campaign for South Asian
Democratic Union call upon Modi and Sharif to accept the
United Nations Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty.
Memorandum
Signatories include:
Mr.
Soli J. Sorabjee, Former Attorney General of India/U.N. Human Rights
Commission.
Justice
V.R. Krishna Iyer. Former Chief Justice of India.
Mr.
Fali S. Airman, MP., President-Emeritus, Bar Association of India;
Co-Chair of the IBA Human Rights Institute (2001 to 2004); Founder and Chairman
of Permanent Committee of Human Rights of LAWASIA (1979 to 1985).
Justice
Nasir Aslam Zahid, Former Chief Justice, Panjab& Sindh, Karachi,
Pakistan.
Dr.
Sima Samar, Former Minister and Women’s Human Rights Commission,
Afghanistan.
Mr.
I. A. Rehman, Human Rights and Peace Activist, Lahore.
Dr.
Pervez Hoodbhoy, Prof. Physics, Quaid-e-Azam University, Islamabad.
Dr.
N. Vittal, Former Vigilance Commissioner of India, Chennai.
(Lord)
Prof. Meghnad Desai, Author, of “Rediscovery of India”.
“Mandela
of Kashmir” Mr. Shabir Ahmed Shah, President, J&K Freedom Party,
Srinagar.
Dr.
S.K. Joshi, Former DG, Council Science & Industrial Research, New Delhi.
Air
Vice-Marshal Dr.N.Natarajan(retd.), Ex.Vice-Chancellor, Srinagar
University, (Garhwal).
Ms.
Saeeda Diep, Chair, Institute Peace and Secular Studies, Lahore.
Prof.
M. Shamsur Rahman, Ex.Vice-Chancellor, Jatiya Kabi Nazrul Islam
University,Decca.
Dr.
Farooq Tariq, General secretary, Awami Workers Party, Karachi,
(Pakistan).
Mr.
Haroon Habib, Writer, Journalists, and Bangladesh Liberation War Veteran,
Decca.
Dr.
Dileep Padgaonkar, Former Editor, Times of India, Member J&K Human Rights
Commission.
Prof.
B.D. Joshi, Former VC. Kumaon University, Director, Doon Library
& Research, Dehradun.
Dr
Asghar Ali Engineer, Director, Centre for Islamic Studies, Mumbai (Dr. Engineer
endorsed the Campaign a week before he passed away).
Prof.
Girijesh Pant, International Studies, JNU, & Ex. VC Doon University.
Dr.
K.S. Jayaraman, Former Science Editor PTI, and Resident Ed., NATURE, Bangalore.
“Padmabhushan”
Mr.Leeladhar Jagudi, Poet,& Member of the Sahitya Academy.
Mr.
Ram Puniyani, Writer and Social Activist, Mumbai.
Dr.
Rafat Jamal Azmi, Himalayan Geological Research Scientist, Dehradun.
Ms.
Nageen Tanvir, Director, Tanvir Theatre, Bhopal.
Ms
Teesta Sitalwad, Civil Rights Advocate, Mumbai.
Mr. Bader
Sayeed, Lawyer, & Former Chairperson, Minorities Commission, State Wakf
Board Tamil Nadu.
Mr.Mohammad
Shafi Pandit, IAS (Retd.) former Chairman, J&K Public Service
Commission. Srinagar (J&K).
Dr.
Zaheer Ahmad Sayeed, Professor Neurological Sciences, Chennai.
Dr.
Ishtiaq Ahmed, Prof.of Humanities & Social Sciences, Lahore,
Inst.
Of South Asian Studies, Nat. University of Singapore,
Author,
“The Punjab Bloodied,Partitioned & Cleansed”(Karachi, Oxford University
Press, 2012).
Prof.
A. H. Nayyar, Physicist, Ex. Quaid-i-Azam University, Islambad.
Dr.
Karamat Ali, Convenor, SAARC Peoples’ Conference, Member Labour Rights
Commission, Karachi.
Dr.
Irfan Engineer, Director, Inst. Of Study of Society& Secularism, Mumbai
Ms.
Shabana Azami, Peace activist, Member of Indian Parliament,Mumbai.
Mr.
Javed Akhtar, Peace activist, Writer& Poet, Mumbai.
Ms.
Asma Jahangir, Human Rights Activist Advocate, Lahore.
Dr.Nishchal N.Pandey, Director, Centre for South
Asian Studies,Kathmandu ( Nepal).
Dr. S.Kalyanaraman, Former. Sr. Executive.,
Asian Development Bank.
Prof. S.D. Muni, South Asian Diplomat and author
“Emerging Dimension of SAARC”, Defence Studies & Analysis, New Delhi.
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