Fire disaster for
Kensington could be so much worse, borough admitted 16 years ago
In
a meeting room at City Hall, the headquarters of London government, on 26 March
2001, a committee of London Assembly members heard explosive evidence on public
safety from Guy Denington, a senior council official responsible for
environmental safety at the Royal Borough of Kensington and Chelsea (RBKC)
He
told the committee members, chaired by the Green Party’s Darren Johnson that given
the amount of people who resided and worked in the centre of London,
alternative rail routes to the west London Line that passes through west
Kensington should be found through areas of much lower density population for
the transportation of radioactive waste and that rail freight should routed
around (rather than through) London wherever possible, which would allow
greater use from relevant rail lines for passenger services.
Some
200 transport of radioactive materials – mainly irradiated nuclear fuels rods
from the nuclear plants at Sizewell in Suffolk, Bradwell in Essex, and Dungeness in Kent- then took place through London each year.
It
was suggested by Mr Denington that a thorough examination of the issues of
risks and routes associated with the transport of nuclear waste needed to be
undertaken.
He
was backed by David Norton, who lead the London borough of Barnet’s pollution
control team, including emergency planning, who advised that there was “a
perceived need for the nuclear waste trains to pass through areas of lower
population density as reasoned argument suggested that if smaller numbers of
people were being potentially exposed to the risk of exposure to radioactive
material the risk was smaller than if a large number of people were potentially
being exposed.”
LB
Barnet had, he said, sought alternative routes (through dialogue with relevant
bodies arising from the Cricklewood Inquiry in the late 1990s) although
information about routes had not been particularly forthcoming and conclusive
answers about potential alternative routes had not been received. He strongly argued that routes used in the transportation of
radioactive waste should avoid bridges and tunnels wherever possible,
particularly as it was understood that one of the types of flasks used in the
transportation, if upside down and heated for approximately 2 hours, could allow
venting of radioactive material through its safety valve. Such a scenario was not inconceivable and
that, if this were to occur in a tunnel, the problems for the emergency
services associated with trying to reach a flask in this situation and rectifying
the situation would be very difficult
Mr
Denington said that while the
possibility of a major rail accident involving flasks containing radioactive
material was very small for that Borough – the Borough’s emergency planning
officer had advised that there was a higher probability of chemical spillages
(e.g. a gas spillage) which would potentially be much more difficult to contain
than a very low-level spillage from a nuclear waste transport flask – “In terms
of public perception, the RBKC emergency planning team had noted that, in the
event of an incident involving the transport of radioactive waste, it may be
that the public response would be the most serious aspect of the incident if
information was not handled and presented carefully.”
Fast forward to June
2017, and it has been apparent for all to see how inadequately prepared the
RBKC’s emergency incident plan has been to deal with the major catastrophic
fire at the Grenfell Tower social housing project. How much it would have been
had the fire been spewing out radioactive smoke across North Kensington,
requiring the urgent mass evacuation of tens
of thousands of residents.
David
Norton had stressed to the London Assembly committee looking into the hazards
of nuclear materials transports through
London, that it was possible that the transported flasks represented a target
for terrorist action. Under questioning,
Guy Denington said the RBKC emergency
planning officer had suggested that terrorists may well look for easier and
more controllable methods of creating major disruption and damage, although he acknowledged that this was essentially
speculation as there had been no formal
study of this issue by RBKC. He supported a test run of the Government’s
emergency plan called RADSAFE, for incidents involving radioactivity.
He
also advised the committee that RBKC was in favour of a detailed risk analysis
being undertaken before it could reasonably comment on the adequacy of the
liability arrangements. (https://www.london.gov.uk/moderngov/Data/Nuclear%20Waste%20Trains%20Investigative%20Committee/20010326/Minutes/Minutes%20RTF.rtf)
The final report of the committee’s investigations was published on 15
October 2001, (https://www.london.gov.uk/sites/default/files/gla_migrate_files_destination/archives/assembly-reports-environment-nuc_waste.pdf) barely a month after the world biggest ever terrorist
attack, that destroyed the Twin Towers of the World Trade Center in New York
City, killing 3000 civilians
The report made a number of considered recommendations, including that
until alternative routes around London had been established, nuclear trains running
through densely populated urban areas of
London should be limited to 45mph. This was not only ignored,
but the maximum permitted speed was subsequently raised to 60mph.
Even the recommendation of limiting the speeds of nuclear trains to
45mph was ignored and the maximum speed subsequently raised to 60mph.
The Committee warned an attack on a train carrying spent nuclear
fuel through London could leave emergency services struggling to cope, and
argued an urgent technical review was needed for the possibility of an attack -
terrorist or vandal - on, or derailment of, the train, particularly as no
exercise had been conducted involving all of the capital's emergency services. The
report also said Railtrack and operators must improve trackside security
"as a matter of urgency".
Other recommendations included improving trackside
security including relating to access to spent fuel flasks, monitoring
radiation levels of trains and trackside, a review by the Emergency Services
and Boroughs, "for example the setting up.... of radiation hotlines,
mechanisms for ensuring consistency of helpline advice and the training of
helpline staff" and the Emergency Services to review "whether
current arrangements can be extended to provide an effective response to any
incident more serious than those officially anticipated." It also
said, "Any decision on nuclear reactors in the South-East would have to be
made in conjunction with by-pass routes, the possibility of on-site storage
facilities and the capacity of the network to carry the required number of
shipments safely.
Committee chairman, Green group
leader in the Greater London authority, Darren Johnson, told the Guardian the train transportation of
spent fuel should be halted, and he urged an exercise to test the coordinated
response from all services, stressing "We don't believe that adequate
procedures are yet in place in terms of training exercises to deal with an
emergency on one of those trains. Security measures do need to be improved."
(“London vulnerable to
attack on nuclear waste train,” Guardian,
15 October 2001; https://www.theguardian.com/environment/2001/oct/15/energy.londonmayor)
But Mr Johnson also said:
"It has always been maintained by the regulatory authorities and the nuclear
industry in this country that nuclear flasks are not a promising target for
terrorists. Nevertheless, work carried out in the US before 11 September
indicated that it was a credible scenario to assume that a flask could be
sabotaged, and could be punctured with an explosive device.
"We didn't get
full details from either the nuclear industry or from other bodies about the
arrangements in place to deal with a terrorist threat in this country. But what
we were concerned to hear was that they didn't consider it a very plausible
threat which suggest that there aren't many precautions in place to deal with
it."
(“Nuclear
waste trains 'at risk from terrorists’,” Independent, 15 October 2001; http://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/home-news/nuclear-waste-trains-at-risk-from-terrorists-9175378.html)
Seven years earlier,
London-based writer Mary Flanagan had written a controversial article in the
same newspaper, highly critical of the hazards being imposed on Londoners from
nuclear transports through the city. (“Deadly
cargo: Nuclear waste travelling through London poses unacceptable risks,”
Independent, 30 August 1994;http://www.independent.co.uk/voices/deadly-cargo-nuclear-waste-travelling-through-london-poses-unacceptable-risks-5428912.html)
She
wrote: “Few shoppers in the throbbing Brixton street market realise that a
train carrying irradiated waste from Germany and Switzerland trundles past
regularly on the bridge overhead, en route to the Sellafield reprocessing plant
in Cumbria. No authority has seen fit to inform them. Several minutes later, the same train and its toxic cargo will hurtle
through Olympia, past the exhibition centre, tower blocks and elegant white
houses of Kensington.”
The
Political Ecology Research Group, led by Dr Peter Taylor, had already reported that
a 10% leak from a ruptured nuclear flask
would render a strip of land widening out from the site of the accident
uninhabitable for 125 years.
Virtually all these recommendations were ignored by the then Labour
Government, including by current London Mayor, Sadiq Khan, who became transport
minister rin June 1999. Carrying out a risk assessment on the lines
suggested was voted down by the GLA, but the independent Mayor, Ken
Livingstone, subsequently in September 2005 set up his own £17,500 evaluation, and Commissioned technical contractor SERCO to do the work.
The
risk assessment would include, the GLA Business Management and Appointments
committee decided, establishing the following key objectives:
•
The implications of current nuclear train routes for impacts in the event of an
incident, in particular allowing for population and employment densities around
key routes and sites; and
• The opportunity, benefits and costs of
reducing risk and/or exposure particularly through re-routing transport of
nuclear fuel away from London
The need for the study was outlined thus:
“Recent events highlight the terrorist
threat that exists within the UK, in particular within London. The rail lines
carrying nuclear waste through London could be an attractive target for
terrorism. Recognising that trains do also run through other points of Great
Britain, the size of London’s population further highlights the vulnerability
of London and the need for the study.
A London-specific study of risks of
the transport of spent nuclear fuel by rail through London was an explicit
recommendation of the London Assembly Nuclear Waste Trains Investigative
Committee ‘Scrutiny of the transportation of nuclear waste by train through
London’ report in October 2001”.
In June 2007 it was discovered that the GLA had decided not to publish
SERCO's final report.
The London-based Nuclear Trains Action Group however got sent a copy of
the unpublished report, which revealed that the study only considered
"accidents" not "deliberate acts". Dave Polden of
NTAG noted cynically “Since one of the main purposes of the risk assessment
recommended by the Investigative Committee had been ‘consideration of the risk
from sabotage or terrorist attack’ it is no wonder the GLA decided not to
publish the report.”
Subsequently there has been no known effort to carry such a critical study.
Subsequently there has been no known effort to carry such a critical study.
What travels on the trains?
Each transport flask contains about
2 tons of rods, and about 1 million Curies of radioactivity, or 37 thousand
million million Bequerels (one Bequerel is equivalent to one click on a geiger
counter; the Hiroshima bomb released about 3 million Curies). The outside
surface of these flasks emit radiation well above background levels: even the
14-inch thick walls are inadequate shielding against the highly radioactive
rods. If the water coolant was lost, the fuel rods would overheat then combust,
dispersing a massive dose of radioactivity into the atmosphere. They are a highly
dangerous cargo, which the nuclear industry and Government technically describe
as "spent nuclear fuel" (SNF)..
From the railheads near Sizewell and
Dungeness power stations the trains carry this nuclear waste through London to
Willesden Junction, where they are marshalled into one train which later
travels up to Sellafield in Cumbria. Here the rods (along with those from other
power stations) are 'reprocessed', initially by stripping the now radioactive
cladding and dissolving the contents in nitric acid. Uranium and plutonium are
eventually extracted and stored (and currently unused
Train
spotting
The trains are easily recognized by
the large grey or cream 'cabins' covering the flasks, the long flat-bed
waggons, and the short trains. Leaving nearby the power stations there are
typically no more than three waggons to a train, but marshalled further along
the route there might be up to ten. They are now usually pulled by engines
labelled DRS (Direct Rail Services) - the picture above shows a flask being
shunted. There used to be a guard's van at the rear of the train, but this was
stopped to save money. The trains also make the return journey with the empty
flasks, but sometimes take slightly different routes.
The trains typically travel once or
twice a week, but this depends on several factors: the number of fuel rods in
the ponds, the length of time they have been there, and the current state of
the relevant reprocessing plant at Sellafield.
The Mark Thomas Comedy Product
showed, on a TV programme broadcast on 10 February 1999 how easy it would be for terrorists to
intercept a nuclear waste train from Dungeness. There are quiet spots on the
line from Dungeness and Sizewell power stations, the trains are unguarded, and
they no longer carry a guards van (so the flasks can only be observed from one
view.
Regulated to death
The UK
regulations covering the safety and security of transport of nuclear materials
are based on the recommendations of the IAEA (Regulations for the Safe Transport of Radioactive
Material
2012 IAEA,http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/Pub1570_web.pdf)
The UK
nuclear regulator, the Office for Nuclear Regulation,(ONR) states of its
responsibilities and mission: “ONR Transport carries
out a range of regulatory activities to assure the safe transport of
radioactive materials. Approval is granted for the designs of packages used to
carry high-hazard radioactive materials to ensure they meet exacting
international safety standards, and the packages are built to robust quality
assurance plans, and are correctly used and maintained. Regulation is also
carried out through a programme of targeted, risk-informed inspections and
engagement with duty holders which may lead to interventions. Inspections
examine the management systems utilised by duty holders, as well as compliance
with safety and security legal requirements. ONR Transport inspects duty
holders across nuclear; non-nuclear; and industrial, medical and carrier
sectors.” (http://www.onr.org.uk/transport/)
The then energy minister Andrea Leadsom told
Parliament on 13 April 2016 that “Details of safety events involving the transport of nuclear material both
by rail and on the strategic road network can be found in the following report:
Events reported to Nuclear Safety Regulator 2001-2015: This details in no less than 3,866 events of varying
degree of significance, including those reported under the ‘Carriage
of Dangerous Goods and use of Transportable Pressure Equipment Regulations
2009’ for the transport of radioactive materials. The report notes “the
incorporation of radioactive material transport regulation into ONR (in October
2011) correlates with the increase in the
number of transport events reported to ONR since that time.” ( emphasis
added) (http://news.onr.org.uk/2016/02/events-reported-to-nuclear-safety-regulator-2001-15/
Malicious
threats to nuclear material transports
One of the key issues for
UK nuclear regulators and policy makers is around the transportation of radioactive
materials and their protection from a malicious attack.
Many transports of
radioactive materials involve mildly radioactive material such as
pharmaceuticals, ores,
low-level radioactive waste, and consumer products containing
radionuclides (e.g.,
watches, smoke detectors). However, increasing quantities of much more radioactive
- and thus hazardous - nuclear materials such as irradiated (―spent‖) nuclear
fuel and fresh, un-irradiated nuclear fuel, including some containing plutonium
(in so-called MOX or a mixed oxide plutonium-uranium mix), is due to be
transported around the UK as the existing nuclear programme is wound down and
decommissioned; and a new build programme of over a dozen new reactors
distributed around the country is planned.
High-level nuclear waste
materials, such as spent nuclear fuel, are transported in very heavy, robust
containers, which must meet extremely demanding standards to ensure their
integrity in the most severe conditions, including sabotage.
The September 11, 2001
terrorist attacks on the US caused the German government to reassess the
security of its nuclear power plants and spent fuel storage facilities. The
Reaktorsicherheitskommission
(RSK), the German Nuclear Safety Commission, issued a statement
recommending that an analysis be carried out on each plant to assess its
vulnerability to September 11-type attacks. Plant operators assert that
terrorist attacks are a general risk of society and should be
A series of tests
simulating terrorist attacks on transportation casks were done in Germany, France,
the United States (for the German government), and Switzerland (for the Swiss government).
Additional tests may have been done that are not publicly acknowledged.
As long ago as 1979–1980,
at the German Army facility in Meppen, a ―hollow charge‖ (i.e., shaped charge)
weapon was fired at a ductile cast iron plate and fuel assembly dummy to
simulate a CASTOR cask. The cask plate was perforated but release fractions
from the fuel assembly were not examined. From this experiment, the German
government concluded that the wall thickness of the cask should not be less
than 300 millimetres.
Other tests were carried
out at the Centre d‘Etude de Gramat
in France in 1992 on behalf of the BMU involving shaped charges directed at a
CASTOR cask filled with nine fuel element dummies A256 (NB142) with depleted uranium. The
shaped charge perforated the cask and penetrated fuel elements. This damaged
the fuel and resulted in the release of fuel particles from the cask.
(emphaisis added)
(NFLA Policy
Briefing 145: Nuclear security concerns – how secure is the UK civil nuclear
sector? May 2016; http://www.nuclearpolicy.info/category/briefings/policy/page/2/)
Britain’s equivalent was a spectacular staged
crash by the former Central Electricity Generating Board (CEGB) on 17 July 1984, with the aim of
publicly demonstrating the integrity of the
SNF transport flask. It gained n
massive immediate positive publicity at
the time. But the technical report on the
crash was published far away from those it affected, at a nuclear material packaging and
transport conference held in Las Vegas, where the damage done to the flask was
admitted
As Trevor Dutton of OveArup engineering
partners wrote in his article “Spent fuel transport: it’s probabilistically
safe “ in a special edition of Nuclear
Engineering International in 1993 “Some further problems remain, in
particular the paucity of data relating to serious saccidents as well as the
lack of generally accepted reference risk criteria.”
That worryingly remains the case
Nuclear flask train crash
simulation
The most spectacular trial at the Old Dalby Test Track was the Central Electricity Generating Board Nuclear Flask crash test, which took place on 17th July 1984. The collision was a public demonstration staged to dispel fears that a nuclear waste flask could not survive the impact of a rail crash. Needless to say the flask survived intact unlike the locomotive.
Two redundant Class 46 locomotives were selected (in case one broke down). These were 46009 and 46023, which was not used and eventually cut up. The unfortunate 46009 was coupled to four Mk1 coaches and set off from the northern end of the line with the controls set and no-one in the cab. This was achieved by means of an extra brake isolating cock situated on the sole bar of the loco next to the footsteps. Once everything was set in the cab, the power handle was opened and the driver baled out and closed the brake cock from the ground - and away she went!
The site chosen was just to the south of Old Dalby control centre, where the main test line was cut and slewed across into the old headshunt area of the former Army base exchange sidings. Extensive grandstands were erected for the invited guests and members of the press and the area was equipped with security fencing and patrolled by guards. This fencing survives to this day in some areas around Old Dalby.
