Nobody knows
for certain what might result from bombing Syria. There are certain to be diplomatic penalties to pay with Russia,
China and maybe the ‘Arab street, seeing western bombs once more falling on muslims.
But we can be
sure if chemical weapons stockpiles are bombed, the contents will be dispersed,
with potentially catastrophic effects on those nearby?
Parliament’s
independent Office of Science and
Technology (POST) has produced a helpful note on a past incident in the
first Gulf War in March 1991, which says in part:
“ that some
releases may occur can however be illustrated by experience of the destruction of
sarin at Khamisiyah by US troops after the Gulf War [in 1991] Here, at least
8.5 tonnes of sarin (and the closely related cyclosarin) nerve agents were
blown up (it was not realised that the bunker contained chemical warheads).
Subsequent investigations have been the most detailed to date into nerve agent
behaviour on demolition (in the public domain)….”
The issue of contamination from bombing of Khamisiyah
has been raised several times by peers in the Lords over the past 10 years. For
instance, Conservative minister Lord Bach told Lord Morris in March 2004 “From July 1997, following more detailed analysis by
the US authorities, it became clear that British forces could have been exposed
to low levels of chemical agents [from Khamisiyah]…. As a result, the Ministry of
Defence reviewed the US modelling work and published a paper in December 1999
titled, Review of Events Concerning 32
Field Hospital and the Release of Nerve Agent Arising From US Demolition of Iraqi
Munitions at the Khamisiyah Depot in
March 1991 (which can be found at: www.mod.uk/issues/gulfwar/info/medical/khamisiyah.htm).
The paper
concluded that up to 9,000 British troops could have been within the modelled
plume but that the possible level of nerve agent exposure would have “no
detectable effect on human health, in either the short or long term.” (Hansard,
25 March 2004 : Column WA112)
A Pentagon
Report into the incident revealed in July 1997 that : “Ten months after
estimating 20,000 U.S. soldiers may have been exposed to Iraqi nerve gas during
the Persian Gulf War, DoD revised the figure to 98,910…. Soldiers destroyed
about 500 of 1,200 unmarked chemical rockets in an open pit at Khamisiyah. Only
18 percent of the nerve agent was released into the atmosphere. …”
The Pentagon
also continued to deny health impact on veterans.
(DoD Says
98,910 Exposed to Low Levels of Nerve Agent
American
Forces Press Service, WASHINGTON, July 28, 1997
But a
subsequent technical paper, published in the authoritative American Journal of Public Health, August 2005, concluded :
“exposed
veterans had an increased risk of brain cancer deaths ….The risk of brain
cancer death was larger among those exposed 2 or more days than those exposed 1
day when both were compared separately to all unexposed veterans.
Conclusions.
Exposure to chemical munitions at Khamisiyah may be associated with an
increased risk of brain cancer death.”
(Mortality in US Army Gulf War Veterans Exposed to
1991 Khamisiyah Chemical Munitions Destruction, http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC1449370/; Am J Public Health v.95(8);
Aug 2005 PMC1449370; Tim A. Bullman, MA, Clare M. Mahan, PhD, Han K. Kang,
DrPH, and William F. Page, PhD)
It is entirely innocent and beleaguered Syrian civilians who will be the
immediate victims if chemicals weapons
stores are bombed. Victims twice over.
Red Line: but
who crossed them first?
President
Obama proclaimed use of chemical weapons
as “crossing red line.” Everyone is appalled by such use of illegal weapons.
Except our own
export licencing department, apparently, who have facilitated the sale of
precursor chemicals capable of being
turned into chemical weapons to Syria!
Parliament’s
own Committees on Arms Exports Control
last month accused ministers in its
report of permitting export of industrial materials over
the past few years to Syria that could have been used to make chemical weapons.
The Business Secretary wrote to Sir John
Stanley, chairman of the joint committees
a year ago stating:
"Chemicals used for industrial/commercial processes"—two Standard Individual Export Licences (SIEL)
These licences were issued on 17 and 18 January 2012 and authorised the export of dual-use chemicals to a private company for use in industrial processes. The chemicals were sodium fluoride and potassium fluoride.
These chemicals have
legitimate commercial uses — for example, sodium fluoride is used in the
fluoridation of drinking water and the manufacture of toothpaste; and potassium
fluoride has applications in the metallurgical industry and the manufacture of
pesticides.
But the the Business
Secretary tellingly added:
“However, they could also be used as precursor chemicals in the
manufacture of chemical weapons which is why they are included on the Australia
Group chemical weapons precursors list.”
These
licences were only revoked on 30 July 2012, well into the Syrian civil war.
A statement published to accompany publication of the Report last month on
17 July said:
“The Committees welcome the Foreign Secretary’s statement that ‘we will not
issue licences where we judge there is a clear risk the proposed export might
provoke or prolong regional or internal conflicts, or which might be used to
facilitate internal repression’
However, the Committees adhere to their previous recommendation that the
Government should apply significantly more cautious judgements when considering
arms export licence applications for goods to authoritarian regimes “which
might be used to facilitate internal repression” in contravention of the
Government’s stated policy."
It is manifest that
ministers have utterly failed to deliver this recommendation as it assisted
Syria’s chemicals weapons programme.
It has abrogated any moral right it may b have had to object to Syria breaching international norms
against chemical weapons while assisting President Assad in making them.
It is not as if Parliament
has not been warned. The Labour MP Louse Ellman, told the Campaign Against the Arms Trade (CAAT) News in August/September
in 2012 that she was
“gravely concerned about hazardous exports to the Syria/Iran regimes”, as the
government publicly admit that they cannot check final destinations of exports
once they have left the UK. “I’ll be calling ministers urgently to see how
UK officials can realistically monitor the end-use of military exports to Iran
and Syria, especially chemical warfare agents.”
When will
we learn the lesson?
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