Make
the Syria Plan Regional
Moscow
Times, 15 September 2013 | Issue 5213
On Sept.
9, international dialogue about Syrian chemical weapons took a dizzying
turn. Seizing upon a remark by U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry,
the Russian government proposed that these weapons be placed under
international control. The Syrian government immediately accepted this
proposal and has now begun the process of acceding to the
Chemical Weapons Convention, or CWC.
In response,
U.S. President Barack Obama suspended his call for airstrikes
on Syria. The governments of Russia, the U.S.
and other countries are trying to reach an agreement whereby
Syria's chemical weapons can be identified, secured and eventually
destroyed.
The framework
for destroying chemical weapons in Syria could pave the way
for better control of these weapons across the entire Middle
East.
The problems
to be addressed in a workable agreement are daunting. One contentious
subject is the establishment of mechanisms to ensure compliance
by the Syrian government. Related concerns include the coherence
of command authority within that government and the extent
of its control of chemical weapons. Other problems include
the mechanics of identifying and securing chemical weapons
in the midst of a civil war. Compounding the challenge is
the potential for false-flag operations.
Nestling
within this daunting challenge is one great opportunity: progress on the
control of weapons of mass destruction across the Middle East
and globally. Notably, establishing global control of Syria's
chemical weapons could improve the climate for confirmation
of Iran's non-nuclear status and for progress toward the goal
of a Middle East free of nuclear, chemical and biological
weapons.
The ingredients
required to pursue these opportunities would enhance the workability
of any Syria-focused chemical weapons agreement hammered out
by Russia, the U.S. and other countries now involved. There
would be two major ingredients. First, additional countries would be engaged
with the problem. Iran is an especially important case, but other
countries, including Israel and Egypt, could play important roles. Second,
the objectives of diplomacy would be broadened to encompass
global principles, exemplified in this instance by the CWC.
A first
step could be to convene a special session of states party
to the CWC. Any party could call for this step. The session's
purpose would be to seek rapid accession to the CWC by holdout
countries, with special attention to Syria. At present, Syria, South
Sudan, North Korea, Egypt and Angola have not signed the CWC. Israel
and Myanmar have signed but have not ratified it.
Accession
to the CWC by Syria, Egypt and Israel would be symbolically
and practically important. It would commit every Middle East country
to the elimination of chemical weapons and, with appropriate
concessions by Israel, could promote progress toward the goal
of a nuclear-free region. Pursuit of these goals could provide
a setting for productive engagement by Iran.
Iran
is a firm ally of the Syrian government. Yet Iran's people have
learned from bitter experience to abhor chemical weapons. Reflecting
that sentiment, Iran made a statement to the April 2013 CWC review
conference, on behalf of the Non-Aligned Movement countries
and China, that expressed concern that chemical weapons may have been used
in Syria in violation of international norms.
In a
suitable diplomatic environment, Iran could be closely engaged
in international control of Syria's chemical weapons. Iran
and Russia, allies of the Syrian government, could each exert
pressure that ensures its compliance. Iran could also provide intelligence that
helps the international community to identify and secure Syria's
chemical weapons.
Accession
to the CWC by Syria and Egypt would require these countries
to abandon their long-standing refusal to take this action until
Israel dismantles its nuclear arsenal. Similarly, in assisting Syrian
and Egyptian accession to the CWC, Iran would have to overcome
its long-standing resentment of Israel's regional nuclear monopoly.
Although a Middle East free of chemical weapons would be safer
for all parties, this outcome would be a bitter pill for Syria,
Egypt and Iran to swallow if Israel's nuclear status were unaltered.
Israel's
elimination of its nuclear weapons is unlikely at present, but it
could abandon its longstanding position of nuclear
"opacity." Another concession could be a moratorium
on Israel's production of fissile material.
David Lowry is former
director of the European Proliferation Information Centre in London.
Gordon Thompson directs the Institute for Resource and Security
Studies in Cambridge, Massachusetts.
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