Westinghouse meltdown and the dodgy security clearance of its new reactor design

Your energy editor’s report on the UK nuclear regulator’ (Office for Nuclear Regulation, ONR)’s sign- off for the application by the bankrupt American reactor vendor, Westinghouse,  for its AP1000 design (“Westinghouse reactor passes UK test,” March 31; http://www.thetimes.co.uk/edition/business/westinghouse-reactor-passes-uk-test-t59x8k36z) overlooks one important aspect of the Generic Design Assessment process for this  reactor

Just over five years ago, ONR published a report the Westinghouse reactor design stating : “Overall, based on the review undertaken, we are satisfied that the claims, arguments and evidence laid down within the documentation [...] presents an adequate security case for the generic AP1000 reactor design.

[‘ Step 4 Security Assessment of the Westinghouse AP1000® Reactor}

 (http://www.onr.org.uk/new-reactors/reports/step-four/technical-assessment/ap1000-sec-onr-gda-ar-11-015-r-rev-0.pdf)

“The AP1000 reactor is therefore considered suitable from a security perspective for construction in the UK, subject to satisfactory progression and resolution of GDA Findings.”

But it also points out that “a number of plant items have been agreed with Westinghouse as being outside the scope of the GDA process and hence have not been included in the assessment.”

Readers may be surprised to learn these exclusions include (but are not limited to): “The physical security measures for the High Security Area boundary within which the nuclear island will be contained and the long-term storage facilities for spent nuclear fuel and intermediate level waste.”

Later the report reveals: “Aircraft Impact is not considered as a part of the security assessment.” But clarifies: “However, this subject is addressed under the Civil Engineering and External Hazards topic areas.”

The report also admits that “the Nuclear Industries Malicious Capabilities Planning Assumptions document is protectively marked with a UK eyes only caveat and could not be shared with Westinghouse. “However, the methodologies used to identify potential Vital Areas were shared.”

This means Westinghouse had to make educated guesses against which malicious threats to plan, an approach that does not fill external analysts with confidence in the robustness of the security measures being in-built into the reactor and associated facilities design.

I am not sanguine about this reactor design being given security clearance

Nuclear is war of unevenly distributed human consequences: females get hurt most

 

 

At the multilateral conference negotiating a  Global Nuclear Weapons Ban treaty, which started at the United Nations in New York on Monday this week, the diplomatically progressive EU-State, Sweden,  called for a reference to the “gendered impact” of nuclear weapons to be incorporated  in the preamble of  the treaty.  

(http://www.reachingcriticalwill.org/images/documents/Disarmament-fora/nuclear-weapon-ban/statements/28March_Sweden-T1.pdf}

In the words of Sweden’s Disarmament Ambassador, Eva Walder,”

“Furthermore, we would like to see that the treaty recognizes the gender aspects of nuclear issues. We would also like to see references to the ever present danger of use of nuclear weapons by mistake. And finally, there should be references to the enormous waste of resources resulting from the production and modernization of nuclear weapons.”

 

This concern was raised by the American campaigner and researcher, Mary Olsen*, in an invited presentation she made to a big planning conference  , hosted by the fellow diplomatically progressive EU state, Austria, in Vienna, in December 2014.

(https://www.bmeia.gv.at/fileadmin/user_upload/Zentrale/Aussenpolitik/Abruestung/HINW14/Presentations/HINW14_S1_Presentation_Mary_Olson.pdf).

 

The United Kingdom, a professed global champion of multilateral nuclear disarmament, has refused to send any diplomatic representation to either conference.. Over 120 other countries, including diplomatically progressive Ireland, have managed to do so.

 

 

Below is an edited version of this very important paper.

 

“The Cold War promised “mutual destruction” of civilian populations; most cities of 100,000

or more people in both the USA and Russia became targets. Vaporizing large numbers of

people is the strategy.

Even a “limited use” with today’s weapons, would result in unavoidable, enduring,

catastrophic damage to our ecologic, economic and public health.

It is my job to give a summary of the medical consequences of using these weapons

A nuclear explosion is composed of three types of energy:

Blast, Heat, and Radiation.

85% of the total energy is the blast and the heat.

Instantaneous radiation is about 5%, and long term persistent radioactivity is about 10%.

 

My government chose to use the first nuclear weapons on cities full of people.

Five years later, the US initiated a long‐term study of the atomic bomb survivors.

Those researchers assumed that humanitarian and medical aide might “skew the results” of

their study and so medical treatment was not offered to the victims.

The data on radiation that I, and many others, use came from these historical actions.

Most published studies do not acknowledge this. Speaking only as one women, I am deeply

sorry that any of this ever happened.

 

A nuclear shockwave is somewhat slower than conventional explosives.

Pressure waves form in living tissue;

The body’s lungs and other membranes rupture.

Internal bleeding and embolisms cause immediate death.

 

At Ground Zero the temperatures are as hot as the surface of the sun (3,800 degrees C)

Resulting in:

• Immolation

• Asphyxiation

• Burns

The updraft from the heat creates winds up to 88 kilometer per hour, leveling everything in

the way.

The immediate updraft of the mushroom cloud carries particulate high in the atmosphere.

 

International Physicians for the Prevention of Nuclear War have published a number of

papers on the climate impacts of even an limited nuclear war. The most recent of which

projects a staggering 2 billion deaths likely from what is now called Nuclear Famine.

 

Radiation is invisible. However we can see the impact that radiation has on our cells and

the damage it can do. These chromosomes were broken by ionizing radiation. Some have

rejoined in a way that is not normal. These dicentric chromosomal aberrations can be used

to assess radiation exposure, but they also cause cells to malfunction.

 

Radiation impacts our cells.

When reproductive cells are harmed, deformations are one outcome.

We also suffer:

·        Loss of fertility due to abnormal egg or sperm, spontaneous abortion and

miscarriage;

·        Possible heritable mutations;

·        Avoidance of reproduction due to uncertainty.

 

When energy in the form of a gamma or X‐ray, or a moving particle hits the genetic

material inside a living cell, the damage may lead to an abnormal cell. Typically there is a

period of time (latency period) of years or even decades before the damaged cell divides. A

cancer results from out‐of‐control division of abnormal cells.

One of the challenges of the longer term impacts of exposure to ionizing radiation is

uncertainty. There is no way to predict which exposure will result in an abnormal cell. Our

bodies have repair mechanisms that fix a lot of damage, but these are not perfect. In

general, the more radiation the higher the risk of a malignancy, but there is no way to know

for sure. Even an exposure too small to measure could, sometimes result in death.

This makes radiation exposure a source of uncertainty in people’s lives as well.

 

It has been long understood that radiation is more harmful to children and most harmful to

the developing embryo and fetus.

 

Children’s bodies are small; so the same amount of radiation delivers a larger dose.

Since children are growing, the cells in their bodies are dividing more rapidly. The DNA in

cells is most likely to be damaged when in cell division.

 

The children who between the ages of birth and 5 years old in August 1945 and survived in

Hiroshima or in Nagasaki, were put together as a group called a “cohort.”

This, and other age cohorts were tracked in the long‐term survivor study.

The 0‐5 year cohort had the highest risk of getting cancer at some point in their lives.

Girls in this group were twice as likely to get cancer at some point than were boys.

For every two males in this group who suffered cancer at some point in their lives, four

females got cancer.

This disproportionate impact is derived from the data BEIR VII report. Dr. Arjun Makhijani

independently published a paper and began a campaign in 2006 to change radiation

standards to protect the most vulnerable called “Healthy from the Start.” The BEIR VII

report is silent on gender as a factor in cancer risk. People have a right to know about this.

 

Makhijani, 2005 started the Healthy from the Start Campaign to address disproportionate

impact of ionizing radiation on young females.

 

It is extremely important to understand that little girls are not a “sub‐population.”

She is not a subpopulation, she is part of the human lifecycle.

 

Among survivors who were adults at the time of the atomic bombing there is still a gender

difference. When exposed to acute radiation as adults, over their remaining lifetime

women suffer 50% more fatal cancer than will men in the same group.

For every 2 men in these cohorts who die of cancer, three women will die of cancer.

 

When we breathe, eat and drink radioactive contamination, the radioactivity is released as particles and energy inside our body:

The Local Dose to the immediate surrounding cells may be very high

Alpha particle emissions inside the body may damage cells and cell structures

1000 times more than an external gamma or X‐ray

Damage from internal exposures may be qualitatively different than a purely

external exposure

An internal dose of radioactivity may be so local in impact that there is “no”

dose to the whole body; nonetheless, cancer may result.

 

For our Earth, time moves slow. For Earth, the time since the first nuclear weapon is very

very short – not even a blink.

The future is in our hands.

I want to thank this community for moving this discussion forward.

 

Mary Olson, senior radioactive waste specialist and former south east US co-ordinator  for the Washington DC-based  Nuclear Information and Resource Service (NIRS ) in the United States on the Medical Consequences of Using Nuclear Weapons and Radiation Risks for Women and Girls (https://www.nirs.org/mary-olson-nirs-medical-consequences-using-nuclear-weapons-radiation-risks-women-girls/)

Background resources:

Resources:

 

Olson, 2011. NIRS Briefing Paper: “Atomic Radiation is more harmful to women.” posted:

http://www.nirs.org/radiation/radhealth/radhealthhome.htm

 

International Physicians for the Prevention of Nuclear War:

http://www.ippnw.org/pdf/1998ForrowJAMA.pdf

“From Hiroshima to Mutual Assured Destruction to Abolition 2000.” Lachlan Forrow, MD;Victor W. Sidel, MD; reprinted from the Journal of the American Medical Association,

August 5, 1998; Vol 280, No 5, pages 456—461.

 

European Leadership Network: 2014. Ambassador A. Kmentt.

http://www.europeanleadershipnetwork.org/avoiding‐the‐worst‐re‐framing‐the‐debateon‐

nuclear‐disarmament_1558.html

 

NUCLEAR WEAPONS, GENDER AND GLOBAL GOALS

United Nations Disarmament Institute (UNIDIR)

http://www.unidir.org/files/publications/pdfs/gender-development-and-nuclear-weapons-en-659.pdf

‘Civil society statement on gender and disarmament”

UN General Assembly First Committee, New York, 16 October 2015’: http://www.reachingcriticalwill.org/resources/statements/10407-statement-on-gender-and-disarmament-to-the-un-general-assembly-first-committee

The Atomic Bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki :

Chapter 18 ‐ Characteristics of the Injuries to Persons

(“This report has been compiled by the Manhattan Engineer District of the United States

Army under the direction of Major General Leslie R. Groves.”) circa 1945

http://avalon.law.yale.edu/20th_century/mp18.asp

Ira Helfand, IPPNW, “Nuclear Famine: 2 Billion People at Risk: Global Impacts of Limited

Nuclear War on agriculture, food supplies and Human Nutrition,” second edition, 2013.

 http://www.ippnw.org/pdf/nuclear‐famine‐two‐billion‐at‐risk‐2013.pdf

 

Steven Starr, Senior Research Scientist for Physicians for Social Responsibility has compiled

many references on “Nuclear Darkness”

http://www.wagingpeace.org/references‐on‐high‐alert‐and‐nuclear‐famine‐dangers/

 

Nuclear clean-up contract chaos: a tale of collusion and calumny

Letter to The Guardian:

 

Your energy editor’s report of the very expensive consequences of what you characterize as the “flawed tendering process for dismantling old reactors at 12 sites”  (“UK nuclear decommissioning debacle costs taxpayer nearly £100m,”  27 March, https://www.theguardian.com/business/2017/mar/27/uk-nuclear-decommissioning-debacle-costs-government-100m) quotes my research colleague, Stephen Thomas, emeritus professor of energy policy at the University of Greenwich, as branding  the (Nuclear Decommissioning  Authority) NDA’s handling of the contract as “an immense screw-up.”

I fear it is much worse than that.

From my detailed experience of a previous failed management contract agreed by the NDA , also placed with an American company-led consortium, Nuclear Management Partners (NMP) , which also led to the early cancelling of the contract, there could well be dubious collusion between the NDA and  the then responsible Government Department ( energy and climate change, DECC) under a Labour Government, at the expense of the long fleeced taxpayers.

The investigator appointed by business secretary Greg Clark to look into this scandal, Steve Holliday, needs to revisit this earlier Sellafield scandal  to assess why the public procurement lessons – especially the need for candour and transparency- that should have been learned, were not

The NMP contracts were awarded in a way that ministers and departmental officials demonstrably tried to circumvent Parliamentary oversight. A Parliamentary debate (www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200708/cmhansrd/cm081119/halltext/81119h0009.htm#08111970000004)  led by Labour MP Paul Flynn  held on 19 November 2008 exposed  how the Public Accounts Committee ( then under a Conservative chairman) effectively colluded in the deal.

Mr Flynn was denounced by the then energy minister, Mike O’Brien, for traducing ministers with allegations of “some sort of cover-up.”

Actually, Mr Flynn’s allegations turned out to be under-estimations of calumny.

The PAC  only later  properly probed the procurement scandal  October 2013, (by then under a Labour chairwoman) using documents I  secured from the NDA  - via long running freedom of information application -  comprising hitherto secret internal KPMG audit of Sellafield’s operations.

I would be happy to provide these to Mr Holliday to assist this investigation.

 

 

 

 

 

 

Lessons from the London Terror Attack

The Prime Minister Theresa May told MPs in a Parliamentary statement in the morning of 23 March:

“Yesterday, an act of terrorism tried to silence our democracy, but today we meet as normal, as generations have done before us and as future generations will continue to do, to deliver a simple message: we are not afraid, and our resolve will never waver in the face of terrorism.”

She added: “at this time it is so important that we show that it is our values that will prevail, that the terrorists will not win and that we will go about our lives showing that unity of purpose and the values that we share as one nation as we go forward, ensuring that the terrorists will be defeated.”

She outlined the actions of the lone wolf terrorist thus:

“At approximately 2.40 pm yesterday, a single attacker drove his vehicle at speed into innocent pedestrians who were crossing Westminster bridge, killing two people and injuring around 40 more. In addition to 12 Britons admitted to hospital, we know that the victims include three French children, two Romanians, four South Koreans, one German, one Pole, one Irish, one Chinese, one Italian, one American and two Greeks, and we are in close contact with the Governments of the countries of all those affected. The injured also included three police officers who were returning from an event to recognise their bravery; two of those three remain in a serious condition.

The attacker then left the vehicle and approached a police officer at Carriage Gates, attacking that officer with a large knife, before he was shot dead by an armed police officer. Tragically, as the House will know, 48-year-old PC Keith Palmer was killed.

He was a peripheral figure. The case is historic: he was not part of the current intelligence picture. There was no prior intelligence of his intent or of the plot.

At 7.30 pm last night (22 March) , I chaired a meeting of the Government’s emergency committee, Cobra, and will have further briefings and meetings with security officials today. The threat level to the UK has been set at “severe”—meaning an attack is highly likely—for some time. This is the second highest threat level. The highest level—“critical”—means that there is specific intelligence that an attack is imminent. As there is no such intelligence, the independent joint terrorism analysis centre has decided that the threat level will not change in the light of yesterday’s attack.”

She stressed in her view “This act of terror was not done in the name of a religion; it was done, as I said earlier, as a result of a warped ideology. All acts of terror are evil acts underpinned by warped ideologies of different sorts…”

She also claimed: “Since June 2013, our police, security and intelligence agencies have successfully disrupted 13 separate terrorist plots in Britain.”

Adding,

“Following the 2015 strategic defence and security review, we protected the police budgets for counter-terrorism and committed to increase cross-Government spending on counter-terrorism by 30% in real terms over the course of this Parliament. Over the next five years, we will invest an extra £2.5 billion in building our global security and intelligence network, employing over 1,900 additional staff at MI5, MI6 and GCHQ, and more than doubling our global network of counter-terrorism experts working with priority countries across Europe, the middle east, Africa and Asia.”

Labour leader Jeremy Corbyn  responded saying, inter alia:

“Many people will have been totally traumatised by yesterday’s awful events—not just all of us here, but those who were watching on television, worried for the safety of their friends and loved ones—so I ask in this House and in the country, please, that we look after each other, help one another and think of one another. It is by demonstrating our values—solidarity, community, humanity and love—that we will defeat the poison and division of hatred.”

    The Prime Minister responded,

“at this time it is so important that we show that it is our values that will prevail, that the terrorists will not win and that we will go about our lives showing that unity of purpose and the values that we share as one nation as we go forward, ensuring that the terrorists will be defeated.”

Outside Parliament, the streets were virtually empty, as many roads were closed (Whitehall, Victoria Street, Parliament Square and Westminster Bridge).  Westminster  underground station was closed. Life was certainly not going on around  Parliament as usual

(People came to the aid of the wounded after the driver of a large vehicle mowed down pedestrians on Westminster Bridge.) 

Brussels Terrorist Attacks, a year earlier

Perhaps not by chance the Westminster attack took place exactly one year to the day that a horrific multiple terrorist attack took place at Brussels Airport and an on an underground train in the capital city of the Europen Union.

Theresa May, then the  home Secretary, made the following remarks to Parliament in response:

“The cold-blooded attacks in Brussels yesterday morning have shocked and sickened people around the world. Fourteen people were murdered and 106 wounded when two bombs exploded at Brussels airport. A further attack at Maelbeek metro station an hour later killed 20 people and wounded more than 100 others.”

“These were ordinary people simply going about their daily lives—families going on holiday, tourists visiting the city, workers making their way to their offices. They have been attacked in the most brutal and cowardly way,

“This is the 14th attack in Europe since the start of 2015. In January last year, gunmen killed 17 people at the office of Charlie Hebdo and a Jewish supermarket in Paris; in February, two people were shot dead at a synagogue and a cafe in Copenhagen; in August, an attack was prevented on a Thalys train en route to Paris; and in November, 130 people were killed, and many more were injured, in a series of concerted attacks in Paris. There have been further attacks in other parts of the world, including in Bangladesh, Saudi Arabia, Lebanon, Kuwait, Egypt and Tunisia, More recently, a suicide bomber killed at least five people and injured more than 30 in an attack in the heart of Istanbul.

“In the UK, the threat from international terrorism, which is determined by the independent joint terrorism analysis centre, remains at severe, meaning that an attack is highly likely. In the last 18 months, the police and the security services have disrupted seven terrorist plots to attack the UK.

“In London, the Metropolitan police have deployed additional officers on the transport network.

“….the UK enjoys the longest lasting security relationship in the world, through the “Five Eyes”, with our allies the United States, Australia, Canada and New Zealand. That relationship allows us to share information, best practice and vital intelligence to disrupt terrorist activity, prevent the movement of foreign fighters and stop messages of hate spreading.

“Following the attacks in Paris last November, our security and intelligence agencies have strengthened co-operation with their counterparts across Europe, including through the counter-terrorism group, which brings together the heads of all domestic intelligence agencies of EU member states, Norway and Switzerland. Through that forum, the UK has been working to improve co-operation and co-ordination in response to the terrorist threat and to exchange operational intelligence

This is the third statement to the House that I have given following a terrorist attack in just over a year. Each horrendous attack brings pain and suffering to the victims and their loved ones. Each time the terrorists attack they mean to divide us. But each time they fail.”

The then shadow Home Secretary, Andy Burnham, asked Mrs May:

“There was a report in The Observer late last year that Scotland Yard had briefed the Home Secretary on its fears about the lack of capacity in regional forces to respond to terror attacks. Is that true, and can she say more about it? Has she reviewed the ability of all major cities to respond, and can she provide assurance today that if there were to be a Paris or Brussels-style attack outside London, our police and fire services would have the necessary capability to respond?

She replied: “Everybody in this House condemns the terrorist attacks, and we will stand against anybody who seeks to divide our communities.” But pointedly did not answer his question.

She added: “We must fight this ideology and these terrorists, and ensure that the values that underpin our society, which the terrorists are attacking and trying to destroy, are maintained. That is one reason why the Government have looked not just at counter-terrorism, but also at our counter-extremism strategy. We want to work with communities across the United Kingdom to promote the values that underpin what makes this country such a great place to live in—values that are shared across the United Kingdom and across all communities.”

Mrs May also pointed out: “I think there is absolute unanimity around this House in our condemnation of these terrible attacks. There are two elements to the upgrade of the Metropolitan police’s armed response. I think that the 600 figure …is not the recruitment of new firearms officers but the training of existing officers in certain parts of the Metropolitan police. As I understand it, that training is under way. The uplift in armed response vehicles across the country..is also under way.”

And stressed : “The intelligence services in this country obviously look at any attack that takes place elsewhere in the world and at the information available to see what lessons we need to learn. The key has been the increase in co-operation and intelligence sharing off the back of these attacks. It is important we learn lessons when things happen. Of course, because of the attacks we have sadly suffered in the past, the UK has developed, particularly post 7/7, ways of dealing with these issues, and we are working and sharing our experience with others.” (https://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201516/cmhansrd/cm160323/debtext/160323-0001.htm#16032339000003)

Promenade des Anglais atrocity

Barely months later, another major  lone wolf low- tech murderous terrorist attack took place on Bastille evening on the Promenade des Anglais in Nice, on the French Riviera. On 18 July, Amber Rudd, the new Home Secretary ( Mrs May’s replacement) ,  addressed Parliament , observing inter alia:

“At least 84 people were killed when a heavy goods lorry was driven deliberately into crowds enjoying Bastille day celebrations…. More than 200 people were injured and a number are in a critical condition.”

“In the UK, the threat from international terrorism, which is determined by the independent joint terrorism analysis centre, remains at “severe”, meaning that an attack is “highly likely”. The public should be vigilant but not alarmed. On Friday, following the attack in Nice, the police and security and intelligence agencies took steps to review our security measures and ensure we had robust procedures in place, and I receive regular updates. All police forces have reviewed upcoming events taking place in their regions to ensure that security measures are appropriate and proportionate.

“The UK has considerable experience in managing and policing major events. Extra security measures are used …when the police assess there to be a risk of vehicle attacks—the deployment of the national barrier asset. This is made up of a range of temporary equipment, including security fences and gates, that enables the physical protection of ​sites.

“We continue to test our response to terrorist attacks, including by learning the lessons from attacks such as those in France and through national exercises involving the Government, the military, the police, the ambulance and fire and rescue services and other agencies.

She stressed however: “The threat from terrorism is serious and growing.”

Labour’s shadow Home Secretary, Andy Burnham, then commented :  

“Unlike other attacks, this was not planned by a cell with sophisticated tactics and weapons. A similar attack could be launched anywhere at any time, and that is what makes it so frightening and so difficult to predict and prevent.

Amber Rudd responded saying: “We have 170 counter-terrorism security advisers who are in touch with …when necessary, those in large cities—so that they can be given the right advice. That advice is being taken, so that we can ensure that people are as safe as possible.”

https://hansard.parliament.uk/Commons/2016-07-18/debates/16071818000002/TerroristAttackNice

 

After the horrific Paris terrorist attacks in November the previous year,  Mr May made a statement to Parliament as Home Secretary (on 16 November 2015)

“The full details of last Friday’s horrific attack in Paris are still emerging, but at least 129 innocent people, including at least one British national, have been killed, with more than 352 injured and 99 of those declared critical.”

“In the UK, the threat level, set by the independent Joint Terrorism Analysis Centre, remains at “severe”, meaning that an attack is highly likely and could occur without warning. In the past months, a number of serious plots have been disrupted here in the UK.”

 “Our law enforcement and security and intelligence agencies are working constantly day and night to keep the people of this country safe and secure, and the Government are taking all necessary steps to make sure they have the powers, the capabilities and resources they need. As soon as the attacks took place, we took steps to maintain the security of the UK. …The police have increased their presence on some streets and at some locations, and they will be intensifying their approach at events in big cities. Officers are working closely with London’s communities and businesses to provide advice and reassurance.”

“.. we have long had detailed plans for dealing with these kind of attacks in the UK. …Nevertheless, in the light of events in France, it is right that we should review our response to firearms attacks, and we are doing so urgently to ensure that any lessons are learned.

“Since 2010, the Government have undertaken significant work to strengthen our response to the threat that we face from terrorism. In 2014, we passed legislation to ensure that law enforcement and the security and intelligence agencies could continue to access the information that they needed. …Following any terrorist attack, we always consider the legal powers that we have to keep our country secure, but it is important that this landmark legislation undergoes proper parliamentary scrutiny.

“The police and the security and intelligence agencies do an incredible job to keep the people of this country safe. Their work often goes unseen and unrecognised, but we owe them an enormous debt of gratitude.

“The terrorists seek to divide us and destroy our way of life, but theirs is an empty, perverted and murderous ideology. They represent ​no one, and they will fail. France grieves, but she does not grieve alone. People of all faiths, all nationalities, and all backgrounds around the world are with her, and together we will defeat them.”

(https://hansard.parliament.uk/commons/2015-11-16/debates/1511162000002/ParisTerroristAttacks)

Charlie Hebdo terrorist attacks in Paris

Eleven months earlier, Theresa May as Home Secretary made another statement to MPs, after yet another terrorist attack in Paris, telling Parliament:

“It will take some time for us to learn the full details of the attacks last week, but the basic facts are now clear. Seventeen innocent people were murdered in cold blood, and a number of others were injured. ..As the appalling events in Paris were unfolding, this House was debating the Government's Counter-Terrorism and Security Bill, and the threat level in the United Kingdom—which is set by the independent Joint Terrorism Analysis Centre—remains at severe. This means that a terrorist attack in our country is highly likely and could occur without warning.”

“As soon as the attacks in France took place, the Government increased security at the UK border. Officers from Border Force, the police and other organisations intensified checks on passengers, vehicles and goods entering the UK, and we offered the French Government all assistance necessary, including the full co-operation of our police and security and intelligence agencies.

“On Monday, the Prime Minister, the Defence Secretary and I held a security meeting with senior officials to review the Paris attacks and the risks to the UK of a similar attack. Of course, we have long had detailed plans for dealing with these kinds of attacks. ..Since 2010, and learning the lessons of that attack, we have improved our police firearms capability and the speed of our military response, and we have enhanced protective security where possible.”

“The police and other agencies regularly carry out exercises to test the response to a terrorist attack, and these exercises include scenarios that are similar to the events in Paris. We will ensure that future exercises reflect specific elements of the Paris attacks, so we can learn from them and be ready for them should they ever occur in the United Kingdom.

The measures we have taken following events in Paris are in addition to the substantial work that the Government have undertaken, and continue to undertake, to counter the threat from terrorism.

We have always been clear that the police and the security agencies must have the capabilities and powers they need to do their job, and following the attacks in Paris the Prime Minister has reiterated that commitment. Unfortunately, when it comes to communications data and the intercept of communications, there is no cross-party consensus and therefore no Parliamentary majority to pass the legislation to give the police and security services the capabilities they need. Let me be absolutely clear: every day that passes without the proposals in the draft Communications Data Bill, the capabilities of the people who keep us safe diminish; and as those capabilities diminish, more people find themselves in danger and—yes—crimes will go unpunished and innocent lives will be put at risk.

(Hansard, 14 January 2015: Column 869: https://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201415/cmhansrd/cm150114/debtext/150114-0001.htm#15011442000003)

 

Five years earlier -  in the dying days of Gordon Brown’s  Labour Governement -  the House of Commons  Home Affairs Committee, then chaired by Labour MP Keith Vaz,  issued a report  on  “The Home Office’s Response to Terrorist Attacks, with the somewhat alarming headline 

 “INSTITUTONAL INERTIA” THREATENING EFFECTIVENESS OF UK COUNTER-TERROR OPERATIONS

Existing counter-terrorism committees should be merged to form a “National Security Committee, the Committee concluded

A press release on the report said”

“In a report on the Government’s response to terror attacks published today, Tuesday 2 February 2010, the Home Affairs Committee calls for the merger of many different counter-terrorism committees into a single, formalised “National Security Committee” chaired by the Home Secretary or Prime Minister and assisted by a “Condoleezza Rice-style” National Security Advisor. 

The Committee also says that while the structures now in place may be suitable for combating the terrorist threat as currently constituted it is not confident that government institutions have the desire to constantly adapt to meet ever-changing threats; a lack of political will has hindered the institution of valuable reforms such as regional policing counter-terrorism units; and a “degree of institutional inertia has set in” to counter-terror operations in the UK and those involved in counter-terrorism “may be willing to settle for existing sub-optimal solutions”, rather than proactively reforming to meet ever-changing threats.

It cautions against the creation of a separate National Terrorism Agency modelled on the American Department of Homeland Security, saying that this has the potential to cause major problems and will not represent a major simplification of policing structures. Instead, the primacy of the Metropolitan Police in counter-terrorism operations should be enshrined in statute to increase accountability and simplify the command structures.

The Committee also says there must be changes in the counter terror measures put in place by Government, saying the control order regime, which has been plagued by questions about its legality since its inception, “no longer provides an effective response” and should be scrapped.  Instead the Government should immediately introduce legislation to allow the admission of intercept evidence in court, which would make the identification, charging and conviction of terror suspects easier; the Committee considers denying prosecutors the use of this power to be “ridiculous”.

The Committee chair, said:

“Too often in this inquiry we saw suggestions for reforms to the counter-terrorism structure rebuffed because “it works well at the moment”, or “the benefits are not yet proven”. We are very concerned that a degree of inertia has set in to the Government’s counter-terrorism planning and operations. The threat is ever present and ever changing and Government must above all be ever ready to adapt and innovate to meet this challenge. We believe it is time to appoint a more open, accountable National Security Committee assisted by Condoleezza Rice-style National Security Advisors to drive forward strategy and operations. This should not however detract from the primacy and centrality of the Metropolitan Police, and the regional forces they assist, as the core of our counter-terror operations. The Government’s response to terrorism must be as constant and adaptable as the threats we face are themselves, and should be clearly visible and accountable to both the public and Parliament.”

(Home Affairs Committee, 1 February 2010; (http://www.parliament.uk/business/committees/committees-archive/home-affairs-committee/hacpn100202no30/ )

At the time, the Government’s strategy for countering international terrorism—Project CONTEST—set out a detailed account of the history of threat, the impact that this has had on the UK, our understanding of the causes and our view of its likely direction”.

 CONTEST is split into four ‘work streams:

 

i. ‘Pursue’—to stop terrorist attacks;

ii. ‘Prevent’—to stop people becoming terrorists or supporting violent extremism;

iii. ‘Protect’—to strengthen our protection against terrorist attacks; and

iv. ‘Prepare’—where an attack cannot be stopped, to mitigate its impact.

This still remains the basic counter-terrorism strategy

Here is the contents list of the report on The Home Office’s Response to Terrorist Attacks (HC 117-I [Incorporating HC 1007-i & ii, Session 2008–09] published on 2 February

Report Page

Previous Work 4

2 Coordinating an immediate response 5

The policing structure 9

3 Legal Tools 14

The admission of intercept evidence 14

Control Orders 18

4 Funding and Counter-Terrorism Focus 21

5 Parliamentary Scrutiny 24

6 Conclusion 25

Conclusions and recommendations 26

Formal Minutes 30

Witnesses 31

List of written evidence 31

List of Reports from the Committee during the current Parliament 32

(https://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200910/cmselect/cmhaff/117/117i.pdf)

Academic insights

There are a multitude  of academic appraisals of terrorist threats and consequences. Here is one  fromth United States compiled shortly after the 9/11 attacks on theUS

 

A note on “Benefit-Cost Analysis for Malevolent Human Actions”  by D. Gordon Woo of  Risk Management Solutions prepared for the Columbia/Penn Roundtable in Palisades, New York, April 12-13, 2002, observed:

 

 

“In UK, anti-terrorism expenditure has been substantial over the past few decades in

meeting the IRA threat to potential military, government, and civilian targets. The cost

of terrorist action on the mainland, and the burden of providing protection, has been

borne by both the public and private sector. In their terror campaign, the IRA have aimed strikes at many different types of British target: from the Prime Minister’s residence to the Palace of Westminster, to bridges, highways, subway stations, commercial offices, department stores, hotels and pubs. Extra security for government buildings, (such as an entrance gate into Downing Street), and additional police guards, have served to mitigate the risk to this class of target. However, transport infrastructure is notoriously hard to protect, and bomb scares alone caused weekly disruption of the London subway system.

Given the priority of providing security for government property, it is inevitable that

police and military resources should be concentrated around this task. This leaves most

industrial, commercial and residential property exposed to some residual terrorism risk

that can be partially mitigated through adopting, and paying for, additional security

measures. But as the burglar alarm paradigm demonstrates, risk mitigation strategiesmay involve game-theoretic insights in even the most basic adversarial situations.”

 

It also says “Risk assessments at some UK nuclear installations are made to maximize the benefit of anti-sabotage expenditure.”

 

Adding: “The most glaring vulnerability of nuclear plants is to impact from large aircraft. In nuclear safety cases, this scenario is usually ruled out on the grounds of improbability as an accident: aircraft crashes are rare, and pilots are expected to make every effort to

avoid hitting built-up areas. The most serious near-miss arose when the ill-fated Pan-

Am jet disintegrated over Lockerbie, under the force of a terrorist bomb, only a few

kilometers from the Chapelcross nuclear plant near the England-Scotland border. With

the future prospect of kamikaze attacks on nuclear plants, the best defence is a shield of fighter jets, or anti-aircraft missile launchers, prepared to shoot down planes straying too close to a nuclear plant. These military assets could be collectively deployed in such a way as to prevent any one plant from being significantly more vulnerable to kamikaze

attack than another.

Where civil decisions are made to prevent commercial jets from being hijacked or stolen, there will be vulnerability differences between airlines and airports. The installation of bullet-proof cockpit doors is a safety precaution which some airlines have invested in so as to win back the confidence of anxious passengers as well as deter would-be hijackers.

Those airlines which are slow to introduce improved security measures may become

more likely targets. As with airlines after September 11, commercial airports are under

economic pressure to save expenditure where possible.  [….]Manchester airport in

northwest England announced that it was cutting the jobs of a number of security staff in

response to the downturn in air travel. Enticed by this publicity, a journalist succeeded

in smuggling weapons passed security barriers at this airport.”

(https://www.ldeo.columbia.edu/chrr/documents/meetings/roundtable/pdf/notes/woo_note.pdf)

 

Conclusion

 

The shocking events in Westminster on 22 March were both predicted and extremely limited compared to what a determined terrorist group could achieve in the UK.

 

The most vulnerable targets are the nation’s crucial national infrastructure, including the civil nuclear power installations

 

Ministers planning to expand this with  more than ten new  nuclear plants should wise up very soon.

 

Assessing the risk of terrorist attacks on nuclear facilities, report, July 2004 - POST Note - UK Parliament

• Assessing the risk of terrorist attacks on nuclear facilities, report, July 2004 Published Thursday, July 1, 2004 In recent years there has been increased awareness of the risk of terrorist attacks ...

http://researchbriefings.parliament.uk/ResearchBriefing/Summary/POST-PN-222

NFLA Policy Briefing 145: Nuclear security concerns – how secure is the UK civil nuclear sector? (published on May 29, 2016

 

·         View PDF

 

Annex 1

British MPs  published Parliamentary motion in solidarity with their Indian Parliamentary colleagues in December 2001, perhaps little expecting their own Parliament would be the focus of an albeit much smaller attack 16 yeas later

Early day motion 572

http://www.parliament.uk/edm/2001-02/572

   ATTACK ON INDIAN PARLIAMENT

·         Session: 2001-02

·         Date tabled: 13.12.2001

·         Primary sponsor: Gardiner, Barry

That this House unreservedly condemns the terrorist attacks on the Indian Parliament on 13th December; expresses its sympathy to the families of the murdered security personnel and other staff; and considers this attack on the parliament of the largest democracy in the world to be an attack on the sovereign rights and freedoms of democratic peoples everywhere.

 

Showing 138 out of 138

Name	Party	Constituency	Date Signed
Abbott, Diane	Labour Party	Hackney North and Stoke Newington	31.01.2002
Adams, Irene	Labour Party	Paisley North	18.12.2001
Anderson, Donald	Labour Party	Swansea East	17.12.2001
Atherton, Candy	Labour Party	Falmouth and Camborne	13.12.2001
Austin, John	Labour Party	Erith and Thamesmead	13.12.2001
Bacon, Richard	Conservative Party	South Norfolk	13.12.2001
Barnes, Harry	Labour Party	North East Derbyshire	13.12.2001
Barrett, John	Liberal Democrats	Edinburgh West	19.12.2001
Barron, Kevin	Labour Party	Rother Valley	18.12.2001
Beard, Nigel	Labour Party	Bexleyheath and Crayford	18.12.2001
Begg, Anne	Labour Party	Aberdeen South	19.12.2001
Beggs, Roy	Ulster Unionist Party	East Antrim	18.12.2001
Breed, Colin	Liberal Democrats	South East Cornwall	13.12.2001
Brown, Russell	Labour Party	Dumfries	18.12.2001
Burden, Richard	Labour Party	Birmingham Northfield	13.12.2001
Cable, Vincent	Liberal Democrats	Twickenham	08.01.2002
Cairns, David	Labour Party	Greenock and Inverclyde	13.12.2001
Calton, Patsy	Liberal Democrats	Cheadle	13.12.2001
Carmichael, Alistair	Liberal Democrats	Orkney and Shetland	13.12.2001
Caton, Martin	Labour Party	Gower	18.12.2001
Clapham, Michael	Labour Party	Barnsley West and Penistone	13.12.2001
Clarke, Tony	Labour Party	Northampton South	13.02.2002
Clelland, David	Labour Party	Tyne Bridge	13.12.2001
Clwyd, Ann	Labour Party	Cynon Valley	13.12.2001
Coleman, Iain	Labour Party	Hammersmith and Fulham	13.12.2001
Colman, Tony	Labour Party	Putney	18.12.2001
Cousins, Jim	Labour Party	Newcastle upon Tyne Central	18.12.2001
Cox, Tom	Labour Party	Tooting	08.01.2002
Crausby, David	Labour Party	Bolton North East	13.12.2001
Cryer, Ann	Labour Party	Keighley	13.12.2001
Cryer, John	Labour Party	Hornchurch	13.12.2001
Cunningham, Jim	Labour Party	Coventry South	13.12.2001
Cunningham, Tony	Labour Party	Workington	18.12.2001
Curtis-Thomas, Claire	Labour Party	Crosby	13.12.2001
Daisley, Paul	Labour Party	Brent East	16.01.2002
Davey, Valerie	Labour Party	Bristol West	19.12.2001
Davis, Terry	Labour Party	Birmingham Hodge Hill	17.12.2001
Dean, Janet	Labour Party	Burton	19.12.2001
Dhanda, Parmjit	Labour Party	Gloucester	13.12.2001
Dismore, Andrew	Labour Party	Hendon	17.12.2001
Dobbin, Jim	Labour Party	Heywood and Middleton	24.01.2002
Doran, Frank	Labour Party	Aberdeen Central	19.12.2001
Doughty, Sue	Liberal Democrats	Guildford	13.12.2001
Drew, David	Labour Party	Stroud	18.12.2001
Edwards, Huw	Labour Party	Monmouth	17.12.2001
Ellman, Louise	Labour Party	Liverpool Riverside	19.12.2001
Ewing, Annabelle	Scottish National Party	Perth	18.12.2001
Fisher, Mark	Labour Party	Stoke-on-Trent Central	13.12.2001
Flynn, Paul	Labour Party	Newport West	18.12.2001
Gardiner, Barry	Labour Party	Brent North	13.12.2001
George, Bruce	Labour Party	Walsall South	18.12.2001
Gerrard, Neil	Labour Party	Walthamstow	09.01.2002
Gilroy, Linda	Labour Party	Plymouth Sutton	13.12.2001
Godsiff, Roger	Labour Party	Birmingham Sparkbrook and Small Heath	08.01.2002
Green, Matthew	Liberal Democrats	Ludlow	01.02.2002
Hamilton, David	Labour Party	Midlothian	18.12.2001
Hancock, Mike	Liberal Democrats	Portsmouth South	18.12.2001
Henderson, Ivan	Labour Party	Harwich	13.12.2001
Holmes, Paul	Liberal Democrats	Chesterfield	19.12.2001
Howarth, Alan	Labour Party	Newport East	13.12.2001
Hoyle, Lindsay	Labour Party	Chorley	13.12.2001
Hughes, Simon	Liberal Democrats	North Southwark and Bermondsey	18.12.2001
Humble, Joan	Labour Party	Blackpool North and Fleetwood	19.12.2001
Iddon, Brian	Labour Party	Bolton South East	13.12.2001
Illsley, Eric	Labour Party	Barnsley Central	19.12.2001
Jenkins, Brian	Labour Party	Tamworth	18.12.2001
Jones, Helen	Labour Party	Warrington North	13.12.2001
Kaufman, Gerald	Labour Party	Manchester Gorton	13.12.2001
Khabra, Piara S	Labour Party	Ealing Southall	13.12.2001
Kidney, David	Labour Party	Stafford	13.12.2001
Kilfoyle, Peter	Labour Party	Liverpool Walton	18.12.2001
Knight, Jim	Labour Party	South Dorset	13.12.2001
Kumar, Ashok	Labour Party	Middlesbrough South and East Cleveland	13.12.2001
Ladyman, Stephen	Labour Party	South Thanet	13.12.2001
Lawrence, Jackie	Labour Party	Preseli Pembrokeshire	18.12.2001
Lazarowicz, Mark	Labour Party	Edinburgh North and Leith	13.12.2001
Lepper, David	Labour Party	Brighton Pavilion	18.12.2001
Lewis, Julian	Conservative Party	New Forest East	07.02.2002
Linton, Martin	Labour Party	Battersea	08.01.2002
Llwyd, Elfyn	Plaid Cymru	Meirionnydd Nant Conwy	19.12.2001
Love, Andrew	Labour Party	Edmonton	13.12.2001
Lucas, Ian	Labour Party	Wrexham	09.01.2002
Luke, Iain	Labour Party	Dundee East	13.12.2001
Lyons, John	Labour Party	Strathkelvin and Bearsden	18.12.2001
Mackinlay, Andrew	Labour Party	Thurrock	13.12.2001
Mahon, Alice	Labour Party	Halifax	13.12.2001
Mann, John	Labour Party	Bassetlaw	08.01.2002
Marshall, Jim	Labour Party	Leicester South	13.12.2001
Martlew, Eric	Labour Party	Carlisle	18.12.2001
McDonagh, Siobhain	Labour Party	Mitcham and Morden	13.12.2001
McNamara, Kevin	Labour Party	Kingston upon Hull North	18.12.2001
McWalter, Tony	Labour Party	Hemel Hempstead	13.12.2001
McWilliam, John	Labour Party	Blaydon	10.01.2002
Meale, Alan	Labour Party	Mansfield	19.12.2001
Moffatt, Laura	Labour Party	Crawley	19.12.2001
Morgan, Julie	Labour Party	Cardiff North	13.12.2001
Mountford, Kali	Labour Party	Colne Valley	13.12.2001
Mullin, Chris	Labour Party	Sunderland South	13.12.2001
Olner, Bill	Labour Party	Nuneaton	18.12.2001
Organ, Diana	Labour Party	Forest of Dean	13.12.2001
Owen, Albert	Labour Party	Ynys Môn	13.12.2001
Pike, Peter L	Labour Party	Burnley	13.12.2001
Pond, Chris	Labour Party	Gravesham	18.12.2001
Pound, Stephen	Labour Party	Ealing North	13.12.2001
Pugh, John	Liberal Democrats	Southport	18.12.2001
Purnell, James [R]	Labour Party	Stalybridge and Hyde	18.12.2001
Quin, Joyce	Labour Party	Gateshead East and Washington West	13.12.2001
Rapson, Syd	Labour Party	Portsmouth North	19.12.2001
Robertson, John	Labour Party	Glasgow Anniesland	18.12.2001
Rooney, Terry	Labour Party	Bradford North	13.12.2001
Ross, Ernie	Labour Party	Dundee West	13.12.2001
Ruddock, Joan	Labour Party	Lewisham Deptford	19.12.2001
Russell, Bob	Liberal Democrats	Colchester	17.12.2001
Sanders, Adrian	Liberal Democrats	Torbay	18.12.2001
Sedgemore, Brian	Labour Party	Hackney South and Shoreditch	13.12.2001
Shipley, Debra	Labour Party	Stourbridge	18.12.2001
Simpson, Alan	Labour Party	Nottingham South	13.12.2001
Skinner, Dennis	Labour Party	Bolsover	13.12.2001
Smyth, Martin	Ulster Unionist Party	Belfast South	19.12.2001
Spink, Bob	Conservative Party	Castle Point	14.01.2002
Stunell, Andrew	Liberal Democrats	Hazel Grove	18.12.2001
Taylor, Dari	Labour Party	Stockton South	13.12.2001
Thomas, Gareth (Clwyd West)	Labour Party	Clwyd West	13.12.2001
Thomas, Simon	Plaid Cymru	Ceredigion	17.12.2001
Tipping, Paddy	Labour Party	Sherwood	13.12.2001
Turner, Dennis	Labour Party	Wolverhampton South East	18.12.2001
Tyler, Paul	Liberal Democrats	North Cornwall	18.12.2001
Vis, Rudi	Labour Party	Finchley and Golders Green	18.12.2001
Wareing, Robert N	Labour Party	Liverpool West Derby	17.12.2001
Watson, Tom	Labour Party	West Bromwich East	19.12.2001
Watts, Dave	Labour Party	St Helens North	13.12.2001
Webb, Steve	Liberal Democrats	Northavon	18.12.2001
White, Brian	Labour Party	North East Milton Keynes	13.12.2001
Williams, Alan	Labour Party	Swansea West	18.12.2001
Winnick, David	Labour Party	Walsall North	13.12.2001
Wray, Jimmy	Labour Party	Glasgow Baillieston	13.12.2001
Wright, Anthony D	Labour Party	Great Yarmouth	13.12.2001
Wyatt, Derek	Labour Party	Sittingbourne and Sheppey	13.12.2001

 

Annex 2

Security information

To ensure that Parliament remains a safe and accessible place for those who work within and visit Parliament, we have implemented a range of security measures. Please take note of them before and during your visit.

Visitors are admitted on condition that they will allow themselves and their belongings to be searched.

You may be asked to show proof of identity. Where applicable, please bring your ticket, confirmation letter or invitation with you as these will form part of the security procedures.

Search and screening

Airport style searches are in place at the Houses of Parliament. Please leave plenty of time to pass through security. You should expect this to take at least 15 minutes. At busy times, which are unpredictable, the delay will be longer. On Tuesday and Wednesday afternoons the queue can exceed 45 minutes. Please dress appropriately for the weather.  

Personal defence equipment is not permitted and UK law prohibits the carrying of certain self-defence items which are lawful in other countries. Any visitor found in possession of such items – e.g. flick knives, butterfly knives and personal defence sprays – is liable to be arrested. 

In addition, the following items are not permitted on the parliamentary estate and will have to be voluntarily surrendered at the entrance:

• Sharp items e.g. knives (including Swiss army knives) scissors, cutlery and screwdrivers
• Paint spray
• Padlocks, chains and climbing gear
• Items that make a noise (e.g. whistles)
• Banners, placards and flags
• Liquids that are not in sealable containers

Visual guide to items prohibited in Parliament ( PDF 472 KB)

If you require sharp items for medical reasons, please seek advice from a member of the security team as soon as you arrive.

You may also be subject to secondary searches once inside the parliamentary estate.

When you are ready to leave the parliamentary estate you will be able to retrieve any surrendered items from the entrance at which you were screened.

Items that have not been retrieved the same day will be taken to Hallkeepers Lodge hkl@parliament.uk where they will be kept for up to three months and then disposed of.

Bags and bicycles

Please restrict the size of bags brought to Parliament as there are no facilities for storing or leaving bags or other personal items. Commercial left luggage facilities are available nearby at Charing Cross, Victoria and Waterloo stations.

Folding bicycles, luggage and other items that are larger than 550 mm x 360 mm (approximately the size of airline cabin baggage) will be refused entry unless authorised in advance. Non-folding bicycles may not be brought on to the parliamentary estate. The nearest bicycle rack is on Millbank.

Animals

Animals other than assistance dogs are not permitted entry.

Inside the building 

You are required to wear the visitor pass issued to you and must return this when you leave. You should not leave bags or personal items unattended.

Security cameras

CCTV cameras, alarms and other security technologies are in operation across the parliamentary estate. Please read the Parliamentary Security Camera Policy for further information.

Further security information

Members of our security and visitor services teams will be available on your arrival, and throughout your visit, to assist you and answer any questions.

For further information about access, please contact saaenquiries@parliament.uk.