A week ago the
Government published a near 100-page report titled ‘The future relationship between the
United Kingdom and the European Union’, which has provoked much public and
political discussion.
But one important issue not examined in
the media was the section on the future of the UK commercial nuclear sector and
any future relationship with the EU nuclear agency, Euratom. (The section on
Euratom is reproduced below)
1.7.6 Civil nuclear
143. The UK will seek a close association with Euratom:
a new relationship that is more comprehensive and broad than any existing
agreement between Euratom and a third country and would help ensure the UK’s
standing as a leading and responsible civil nuclear state is maintained. This
would be mutually beneficial for the UK and the Euratom Community, who will
continue to share a common interest in ensuring energy resilience and security
within Europe. Close cooperation on civil nuclear matters would also benefit
citizens and businesses in the UK and across the EU, whether related to secure
energy supplies, or the safeguarding of nuclear materials, equipment and
technology.
144. The UK proposes that this new relationship should
be based on a comprehensive NCA between Euratom and the UK. This should: a.
establish a cooperation mechanism between the UK safeguards regulator (the
Office for Nuclear Regulation) and Euratom, enabling activity such as technical
information exchanges, joint studies and consultation on regulatory or
legislative changes;
b. provide for UK association with the Euratom Research
and Training Programme, as part of an ambitious science and innovation accord;
c. ensure continuity of contractual arrangements for
the supply of nuclear material, either by allowing for existing nuclear supply
contracts with the UK to remain valid after the UK’s exit, or by providing for
their seamless re-approval prior to the UK’s exit;
d. minimise barriers and simplify export control
arrangements in the trade and transfer of sensitive nuclear materials,
equipment and technology between the UK and the Euratom Community;
e. provide for technical cooperation on nuclear safety
including continued notification and information sharing arrangements on
radiological events and monitoring, with the UK participating in EU systems
such as the European Community Urgent Radiological Information Exchange
(ECURIE) and the European Radiological Data Exchange Platform (EURDEP); and continue
UK cooperation and information-sharing.
This was,
however discussed at a House of Lords committee this month (‘Select Committee
on the European Union- Energy and Environment Sub-Committee; oral evidence: The
Office for Nuclear Regulation’s Brexit preparedness, Wednesday 11 July
2018; http://data.parliament.uk/writtenevidence/committeeevidence.svc/evidencedocument/eu-energy-and-environment-subcommittee/the-office-of-nuclear-regulations-brexit-preparedness/oral/86771.html)
One key issue raised
was over how the new ‘mark-your-own-homework’ national domestic nuclear “safeguards”
regime will be paid for.
Here is the exchange
in the committee, with Dr Golshan, the UK nuclear regulator ( Office for
Nuclear Regulation):
Q6
Baroness Sheehan: By when do you need clarity
regarding the funding for your new safeguarding activities?
Dr Mina Golshan: If I may give a little
background, the regulation that is out for consultation clarifies what is
required to deliver the framework. The question of funding has not been
addressed in the Regulation, but, as part of that consultation, the Government
seek to get views from industry and other stakeholders on what the funding
regime should look like. By the time we take the responsibility for regulating
the safeguards, or having a safeguards regime in place in the UK, we need to
know how those costs are recovered. If that date is March 2019, clearly by then
we need to have clarity about how the costs are recovered. If it is a later
date, then we can live with that gap.
Baroness Sheehan: So you do not have clarity at
the moment.
Dr Mina Golshan: It is fair to say that we are
awaiting the result of the consultation.
Baroness Sheehan: That is interesting. Thank
you.
Viscount Hanworth: Do you expect the industry to
bear much of the cost—people such as Euratom and others?
Dr Mina Golshan: I would expect that thorough
consultation is undertaken and that the Government, as is intended, take
feedback from that consultation and make the right decision.
Can I add for clarity that the cost of establishing the safeguards
regime is already covered by BEIS, so there is no doubt about the recovery of
our costs in relation to establishing this framework? That is already covered.
It is the future costs—the running costs from the day that we take on the
responsibility of safeguards—that is out for debate.
Baroness Sheehan: In a no‑deal situation, by
when do you need to know that?
Dr Mina Golshan: We need to know by the end of
March 2019.
Baroness Sheehan: You can wait until the eve
before crashing out.
Dr Mina Golshan: In theory, but perhaps clarity
before that would be helpful in the way that we arrange our finances.
Baroness Sheehan: You are content, then, to move
the funding item on your risk register from a red alert to not a red alert.
Dr Mina Golshan: As to the funding in the risk
register, there are two different fundings. The funding in the risk register
was in relation to clarity of arrangements for ongoing funds to fund
establishment costs—the work that we are doing, right up until the time we
leave, to develop this framework and to develop the regime. We wanted to have
security of funding, which is now being provided because the BEIS business case
has received approval from the Treasury. Within that, there is a clear
allocation for ONR’s costs.
Baroness Sheehan: Is the funding item on the
risk register an amber or a green?
Dr Mina Golshan: Paul?
Paul Dicks: I would have to confirm that
in writing afterwards. It is not red, but I do not know if it is amber or
green.
Baroness Sheehan: It was updated yesterday.
Paul Dicks: I know it was updated
yesterday.
Dr Mina Golshan: It is the words that help us
here. I do not believe it is red, but whether it is amber or amber‑green is up
for debate.
The Chairman: You can follow that up in writing.
This was subsequently followed up, with
the Committee writing to BEIS Minister
for Business and Industry, Richard Harrington, to ask for further clarity on
the ONR's future funding arrangements, and to request regular updates between
now (July 2018) and the point of withdrawal to ensure the ONR’s preparation
remains on track. The Committee also asked for an update on negotiations
regarding the intended Nuclear Cooperation Agreements with the USA, Canada,
Japan and Australia.
The letter is reproduced
below.(https://www.parliament.uk/documents/lords-committees/eu-energy-environment-subcommittee/Correspondence/Letter-from-Lord-Teverson-to-Richard-Harrington-190718.pdf)
Green MP Caroline Lucas was told in a written Parliamentary answer by Richard
Harrington on 14 May 2018 that:“ The total estimated cost to establish a domestic nuclear
safeguards regime is up to £10 million” and added this included “ any
expenditure made from cash advances received from the Contingencies Fund. The
Department’s applications to the Contingencies Fund were notified to Parliament
on 2 February 2018 and 16 April 2018.” Nuclear Power: Inspections,
BEIS
published its Nuclear Safeguards
Regulations for consultation on 9 July 2018.
Chapter
VIII on ‘Civil Activities’ contains the following section on exemptions to
safeguards coverage:
Withdrawal from civil
activities
173.
Regulation 33 prohibits an operator from withdrawing qualifying nuclear
material from civil activities except
with the prior written consent of the Office for Nuclear Regulation. This
is a key obligation that the UK has undertaken though its current Voluntary
Offer Agreement and will undertake in its future Voluntary Offer Agreement. (emphasis
added-DL)
174.
Regulation 33 requires an operator to provide the Office for Nuclear Regulation
with advance notification of any proposed withdrawal from civil activities at
least 14 days before the withdrawal occurs.
175.
The form for advance notification of intended withdrawal of qualifying nuclear
material from civil activities is set out in Part 12 of Schedule 1 to the
Regulations.
176. There are only limited
circumstances in which operators may be allowed to withdraw qualified nuclear
material from civil activities, in accordance with UK policy on this matter.
The Office for Nuclear Regulation publishes information on these withdrawals on
its website, demonstrating the UK’s policy commitment to make only very limited
use of our right to such withdrawals is being met.
Chapter XIV
on ‘Notification to the Secretary of State’ also includes the proposals that
the responsible minister may authorize the
withdrawal from the provisions of the domestic “safeguards” under
the following paragraphs:
232.
Regulation 50 provides that regulations 47 to 49 continue to apply to a
particular item in the United Kingdom until
the particular item is – (emphasis added-DL)
a.
no longer usable for any nuclear activity relevant for nuclear safeguards;
b.
irrecoverable for processing into a form in which it is usable for nuclear
activity; or
c.
the subject of a written confirmation from the Secretary of State to the person
holding the particular item that regulation 47 no longer applies to the
particular item, with effect from a specified date, following an agreement
between the UK and the Party to the relevant international agreement.
233. This reflects the
provisions and requirements within the relevant international agreements.
When BEIS
writes “demonstrating the UK’s policy commitment to make only very limited use
of our right to such withdrawals is being met” it adopts a novel definition of
limited, as there have been an admitted over 600 withdrawals of nuclear
materials from safeguards since the trilateral UK-Euratom-IAEA “safeguards”
agreement that is being superceded by the new proposed ‘mark-your-own-homework’
domestic arrangements.
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