Friday, 31 August 2018

The weak crumble, are slaughtered and are erased from history while the strong, for good or for ill, survive

Two belligerent tweets from Israel's prime minister at its nuclear weapons centre at Dimona on Wednesday this week chills middle east  politics. Read on....


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The weak crumble, are slaughtered and are erased from history while the strong, for good or for ill, survive. The strong are respected, and alliances are made with the strong, and in the end peace is made with the strong.

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https://pbs.twimg.com/profile_images/1772866269/portrait_bigger.jpgPM Netanyahu:

Shimon aspired toward peace but he knew that true peace can be achieved only if our hands strongly grasp defensive weaponry. In the Middle East, and in many parts of the world, there is a simple truth: There is no place for the weak.pic.twitter.com/Quh681u47E

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At nuclear facility, Netanyahu lobs stark warning at Iran

'Whoever threatens us with destruction puts himself in similar danger,' PM says at ceremony renaming Dimona reactor after Shimon Peres

By Alexander Fulbright 29 August 2018, 8:36 pm

In a pointed warning to Iran, Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu said Wednesday that any country that threatens to destroy Israel risks meeting a similar fate, while vowing to continue taking action against the Islamic Republic’s military presence in Syria.

Netanyahu spoke during a ceremony at the nuclear research facility in Dimona, which was renamed after the late Israeli statesman Shimon Peres, who died in September 2016.

“Shimon aspired toward peace but he knew that true peace can be achieved only if our hands strongly grasp defensive weaponry,” Netanyahu said at the top-secret site.

Israel has never acknowledged possessing nuclear weapons, instead maintaining a policy of “strategic ambiguity.” Foreign reports have put the size of Israel’s nuclear arsenal in the dozens to hundreds of weapons.

Peres, who later became known for his efforts to reach peace with the Palestinians and Arab countries, played a leading role in the early development of Israel’s military industry and the nuclear facility in Dimona, which was initially portrayed to the world as a textile factory.

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Shimon Peres and David Ben-Gurion visit Israel’s nuclear reactor in Dimona (Defense Ministry Archives)

In light of Peres’s longtime promotion of an accommodation with the Palestinians and the Arab world, Netanyahu said peace must be reached from a position of strength.

“In the Middle East, and in many parts of the world, there is a simple truth: There is no place for the weak. The weak crumble, are slaughtered and are erased from history while the strong, for good or for ill, survive,” he said.

“The strong are respected, and alliances are made with the strong, and in the end peace is made with the strong.”

Netanyahu credited this strength for the “normalization” of Israel’s relations with “leading countries in the Arab world,” apparently referring to growing unofficial ties with nations such as Saudi Arabia.

Though saying he held out hope Israel will be able to achieve peace with its neighbors, Netanyahu noted the Jewish state continues to face threats from near and far.

“But our enemies know very well what Israel is capable of doing. They are familiar with our policy. Whoever tries to hurt us – we hurt them,” he said.

“I am not spouting slogans. I am describing a persistent, clear and determined policy… backed by appropriate deployment, equipment, preparedness and – in the hour of need – appropriate orders,” Netanyahu added.

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This photo taken on September 8, 2002, shows a partial view of the Dimona nuclear power plant in the southern Israeli Negev desert. (AFP/Thomas Coex)

Turning to Iran, the prime minister reiterated Israel’s opposition to any Iranian military presence in Syria, likening Israeli efforts to do so to his campaign for the cancellation of the 2015 international agreement meant to limit Tehran’s nuclear program.

Noting the effect of renewed sanctions on Iran’s economy following US President Donald Trump’s decision to quit the accord in May, Netanyahu said Israel would continue to work through diplomatic channels “to apply pressure on the dangerous, extremist regime” in Iran.

He said the Israeli military will continue to take action against Iran’s military entrenchment in Syria and issued an emphatic warning against those who call for Israel’s annihilation, such as the Islamic Republic.

“Whoever threatens us with destruction puts himself in similar danger, and in any case will not achieve his goal,” Netanyahu said.

Hours later, Iranian Foreign Minister slammed Netanyahu as a “warmonger” for threatening Iran with “atomic annihilation.”

“Iran, a country without nuclear weapons, is threatened with atomic annihilation by a warmonger standing next to an actual nuclear weapons factory. Beyond shameless in the gall,” Zarif tweeted.

 

Iran's FM Fires Back at Netanyahu: You're 'A Warmonger Standing Next to a Nuke Plant'

'Iran, a country without nuclear weapons, is threatened with atomic annihilation by a warmonger standing next to an actual nuclear weapons factory'

 

Haaretz , Aug 29, 2018 11:10 PM


Backstory:

'You Have to Be Strong to Get Respect': What the U.S. Ambassador to Israel Really Thinks of the Middle East

David Friedman's remarks are strikingly similar to what Benjamin Netanyahu said Wednesday. 'In the Middle East there's a simple truth: There's no place for the weak,' the PM said

by Noa Landau

Haaretz, Top of Form

Aug 30, 2018 3:26 PM


 

U.S. Ambassador to Israel David Friedman revealed Tuesday his view on the Middle East, and in particular, the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, during a private conversation with members of the American Jewish Congress. 

"The Middle East is not the U.S. There’s a different way of thinking… It’s really different here, it’s a very different world, and you have to be strong here, there is no other way to gain respect in this part of the world… you can’t talk your way, you just have to be strong… Maybe it would be better if the world weren’t like that but that’s how it is," Friedman said.


Friedman's remarks bore a striking similarity to what Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu said Wednesday during a ceremony renaming the nuclear reactor in Dimona to the Shimon Peres Negev Nuclear Research Center. “Shimon aspired toward peace but he knew that true peace can be achieved only if our hands strongly grasp defensive weaponry," Netanyahu said at the beginning of the ceremony. He then turned to addressing the unrest across the Middle East region.

"In the Middle East, and in many parts of the world, there's a simple truth: There's no place for the weak. The weak collapse, get butchered, are erased from history. And the strong, for better or worse, are the ones who survive," he said.

"The strong," he said, "are the ones who are respected, the strong are the ones with whom alliances are struck, and eventually the strong are the ones with whom you make peace." Netanyahu added this strength was behind the “normalization” of Israel’s relations with “leading countries in the Arab world.”

In Tuesday's telephone briefing with American Jewish Congress members, Friedman said "there is no capacity to have peace with the Palestinians unless there's peace with all the Palestinians, including the million and a half in Gaza."

Friedman went on to clarify that this "means there should be ideally one government [for the Palestinians]… If you go around the PA and somehow try to restructure Gaza without them, you're giving a tremendous prize to Hamas… with all the failings of the PA if the choice is Hamas we pick the PA."

The U.S. ambassador reiterated, as he has publicly on several occasions in the past, that Trump's administration won't make Israel suffer negative consequences over the transfer of the U.S. Embassy in Israel from Tel Aviv to Jerusalem. Friedman also clarified that the only price U.S. President Donald Trump is asking the two sides to pay is to demonstrate willingness to advance in peace talks.

Friedman also confirmed a recent statement by U.S. National Security Adviser John Bolton that the administration did not have an exact deadline for the unveiling of its peace plan, and that it will not be presented at the upcoming UN General Assembly session.

Speaking about internal Israeli affairs, Friedman addressed the controversy that was sparked over Israel's passage of the contentious nation-state law. He was heard giving explanations on behalf of Israel to the American Jewish Congress regarding the decision to pass the legislation.

"Israel is a democracy and it has a right to pass laws and govern its people," Friedman said and objected to the idea that the U.S. would interfere with the Israeli government's decision-making.

"There's a basic law of human dignity and nothing in the nation-state law overwrites that," he added.

Friedman allowed that "many in the Israeli leadership regretted that it had that effect on the Druze who serve in the military and on a personal level are amazing people" and that "there are things that could have been done better."

Nonetheless, the ambassador stated that he had no doubt that "at some point down the road the court will have to consider the interplay between the nation-state law and the basic law of human dignity… I'm pretty confident that the basic law of human dignity is going to win out."

 

Knesset rejects international nuclear oversight

Asked by Zahalka if Israel had a nuclear plant in Dimona, Energy Minister Yuval Steinitz said Israel made sure there would be no nuclear weapons in Iraq and Syria.


July 4, 2018 13:49






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The Knesset voted 73 to 8 Wednesday afternoon to reject MK Jamal Zahalka’s proposal for international monitoring over Israel’s alleged nuclear facility in Dimona.

Only MKs from Zahalka’s Joint List faction voted for the bill, which would have compelled Israel to sign the  Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons within a month and then submit the Dimona facility to the oversight of the International Atomic Energy Agency.


Zahalka warned in the Knesset debate that the facility endangered the region, its people, and property, especially if there would be an earthquake. He noted that there was a small earthquake in Tiberias overnight and that a small earthquake near a nuclear facility in Japan six years ago caused significant damage.

The bill was co-sponsored by Joint List MKs Haneen Zoabi and  Juma Azbarga. Zahalka warned that the Dimoana facility encouraged neighboring countries to build similar facilities.

“As long as Israel has nuclear weapons, other countries in the region will try to acquire them as well, and they will get them sooner or later,” Zahalka said. “The only way to prevent that from happening is to denuclearize the entire Middle East from weapons of mass destruction, including Israel.”

Asked by Zahalka if Israel had a nuclear plant in Dimona, Energy Minister Yuval Steinitz said Israel made sure there would be no nuclear weapons in Iraq and Syria and would ensure Iran would not get a nuclear capability. Steinitz said that if Iran stops being militant, there will be Middle East peace but if Israel stops fighting for its existence, it will be destroyed.

The minister added that the IAEA had nothing to do with earthquakes. Zahalka rebutted him that if there would be an earthquake, there could be damage to the reactor, and then the IAEA would have to get involved to deal with the repercussions.


Turning to the MKs who voted against the bill, Zahalka said: “You are responsible for the disaster that could come because the reactor is unsupervised.”


Steinitz called the bill “a joke,” because Zahalka focuses on safety from earthquakes while the IAEA “didn’t prevent Fukushima,” referencing the 2011 disaster at a nuclear plant in Japan.

The minister stressed a difference between a “research reactor” and a reactor used as a power plant. He further explained the plant was upgraded several times over since the 90s and said Zahalka was wrong to call it old and outdated. He stressed it would also be safe even in the event of an earthquake.

Israel is widely believed to be the Middle East’s only nuclear power, though it has never confirmed or denied that it has a nuclear arsenal. The country has refused to sign on to international nonproliferation treaties and arrested Mordechai Vanunu in 1986 for leaking information about a facility in Dimona.

Vanunu was jailed as a traitor in 1986 after discussing his work as a technician at the Dimona nuclear reactor facility with Britain’s Sunday Times newspaper, an interview that led experts to conclude that the facility had produced fissile material for as many as 200 atomic warheads.

Lahav Harkov, Avraham Gold and Yonah Jeremy Bob contributed to this report.

 


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Netanyahu: The Dimona nuclear facility will be named after Peres

"Only when I became prime minister and entered the nuclear facility did I understand its importance for Israeli security, which Shimon Peres established."

By ARIEL WHITMAN

October 28, 2016 10:48

Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu at Former Presudent Shimon Peres's grave

Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu at Former Presudent Shimon Peres's grave. (photo credit: HAIM ZACH/GPO)

Israel marked 30 days since the death of former President Shimon Peres with a traditional Jewish 30 day memorial ceremony and tombstone unveiling on Friday.

Friends and family gathered at Mount Herzl in Jerusalem and speakers included Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and President Reuven Rivlin, as well as Peres' grandchildren.


Rivlin spoke of Peres' contributions to the world stating, "In the days following your passing, more and more stories have come out about your great contribution to Israel and even the world."

"Above all your spirit is what made you great," Rivlin added.

Among Peres' contributions was Israel's nuclear facility.

As director-general of the Defense Ministry in the mid 1950s, Peres was instrumental in building a close relationship with France, which agreed to sell a nuclear reactor to Israel. France also provided the technical knowledge and equipment needed to turn the young Jewish state into the world’s sixth nuclear power. Peres played another pivotal role in securing other key components needed for the program, all under the nose of the Americans.

Netanyahu announced his plan to name the Dimona nuclear facility after the late president stating,"In the years in which I was an officer in the IDF, we trained and did a navigation near Dimona and were told not to go there."


"Only when I became prime minister and entered the nuclear facility did I understand its importance for Israeli security, which Shimon Peres established."

"I have given a directive to change the name of the nuclear facility in Dimona to the 'Shimon Peres nuclear center,'" stated Netanyahu.

Netanyahu also read from a letter that his father had sent to Shimon Peres two days after the Entebbe mission in which Yoni Netanyahu was killed.

The letter spoke of his appreciation and admiration for Peres, who was Israel's defense minister at the time.

"We missed an opportunity, each of us was fortified in his political position and only in the last years did our connection really blossom and strengthen," Netanyahu stated.


Mika Almog, granddaughter of Peres, spoke of the hope that Peres brought to Israel.

Almog stated, "The fear that your passing is an end to hope, to Israel as a nation looking for peace, a nation looking for leaders who are compassionate, not just looking to win elections or arguments."

"Shimon Peres's passing is a commandment not to lose hope."

Peres was buried between former prime ministers Yitzhak Shamir and Yitzhak Rabin.

Herb Keinon contributed to this article.

 

 

Friday, 24 August 2018

Nuclear deal with Iran unveiled as UK detaches itself from EU nuclear body


 
 
On 23  August ,  the  specialist  publication Middle East  Monitor published an article with the intriguing headline ‘Tehran: Britain will help upgrade Arak nuclear reactor.’ It explained  that  Iran announced on Wednesday that Britain would contribute in upgrading the Arak nuclear reactor after the United States withdrew from the nuclear deal, adding “Experts from Britain will replace their US counterparts during reactor redesign process,” said Ali Akbar Salehi, head of Iran’s Atomic Energy Organization.

Under the nuclear deal, experts from both the United States and China were redesigning the Arak heavy water reactor to reduce the amount of plutonium produced by the reactor as a by-product, the article explained. (https://www.middleeastmonitor.com/20180823-tehran-britain-will-help-upgrade-arak-nuclear-reactor/)

The UK has a long, nearly 60 year, history of doing nuclear deals with Iran. On 4 February 1959 the UK Parliament was informed of the outcome of the 6th meeting of the  Baghdad Pact  Ministerial Council Meeting, held in Karachi the month before. It included this revelation:

“The Council welcomed the offer of the United Kingdom to provide equipment for a nuclear centre to be set up at Tehran. This centre will provide facilities for training technicians in the use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes.”


 

A few weeks later, on 18 February 1959, more details of the deal were provided to MPs, Under the heading Technical assistance and joint projects, the Government  stated:

“A Multilateral Technical Co-operation Fund was established with an initial capital of $150,000, designed to increase technical cooperation amongst members. It was announced that the United Kingdom would make provision each financial year for a rate of expenditure of £850,000 for technical assistance and joint projects. In addition Her Majesty's Government have offered to provide equipment for a nuclear training centre to be set up in Tehran.”


The Sixth Session of the Baghdad Pact Council was held in Karachi from January 26th to 28th, 1959. The delegations from countries participating in this meeting were led by: H.E. Dr. Manouchehr Eghbal, Prime Minister, Iran;  Manzur Qadir, Foreign Minister, Pakistan; H.E. Adnan Menderes, Prime Minister, Turkey; The Right Hon. Duncan Sandys, MP, Minister of Defence, United Kingdom; and The Hon. Loy W. Henderson, Deputy Under-Secretary of State, United States of America.

This was a very interesting quintet of countries to establish Iran’s nuclear programme.

Fast forward 59 years, and  on the  very day the revelation of prospective new UK involvement in the Iranian nuclear deal was published, the UK Government released a collection of  so-called ‘technical notices’ setting out prospective legislative and managerial exigencies  providing “ information to allow businesses and citizens to understand what they would need to do in a ‘no deal’ scenario, so they can make informed plans and preparations.”


One of the first 24 notices published covered Civil nuclear regulation if there’s no Brexit deal’ ( reproduce din full below) This included a section dealing with ‘Reporting and notification obligations under Article 37 of the Euratom Treaty’

It explains that before 29 March 2019, when the UK is projected to leave the European Union and its associated bodies, including the European Atomic Energy Agency (Euratom)  under Article 37 of the Euratom Treaty, the UK government (on behalf of operators) submits information to the European Commission on plans to dispose of radioactive waste. Operators must receive a positive opinion from the Commission before obtaining domestic environmental permits or proceeding with a project.”

And reveals that after 29 March 2019 - if there’s no deal -  “on exit from the EU, the requirement for the UK to notify the European Commission of plans for the disposal of radioactive waste will no longer apply.

The Implications, it explains are that “Operators will not need to secure the Commission’s opinion before obtaining domestic environmental permits or proceeding with their radioactive waste disposal plans” and goe son to add “The UK will consult with stakeholders on any future measures to keep neighbouring states informed of these types of activity in the UK that will apply after this date.”

This is an additional, unexamined  problem for future relations with Ireland, which has already  expressed concern over radiological dangers posed to its citizens from nuclear facilities on the UK  ‘s west coast at Sellafield in Cumbria and Hinkley Point  in Somerset (https://www.irishtimes.com/news/environment/uk-yet-to-properly-assess-nuclear-plan-s-impact-on-ireland-1.3470471; https://www.irishtimes.com/opinion/letters/brexit-and-nuclear-safety-treaty-1.3541656)

 

There is surely a responsibility here for the national nuclear safety regulators, the Office for Nuclear Regulation, and the Environment Agency, to step in a replace the Euratom  treaty article 37  reporting obligation on radiological releases ( as the ONR is doing with Euratom’s role in applying nuclear safeguards) with  national one, overseen by the nuclear regulatory apparatus they  oversee.

 

Guidance

Civil nuclear regulation if there’s no Brexit deal

Published 23 August 2018

Contents

  1. Purpose
  2. Nuclear safeguards
  3. Ownership of special fissile material
  4. Supply contracts for nuclear material
  5. Export licence arrangements
  6. Import licence arrangements
  7. Nuclear Cooperation Agreements
  8. Management of spent fuel and radioactive waste
  9. Reporting and notification obligations under Article 37 of the Euratom Treaty
  10. Reporting and notification obligations under Article 41 of the Euratom Treaty
  11. Notification of radioactive source shipments

This publication is licensed under the terms of the Open Government Licence v3.0 except where otherwise stated. To view this licence, visit nationalarchives.gov.uk/doc/open-government-licence/version/3 or write to the Information Policy Team, The National Archives, Kew, London TW9 4DU, or email: psi@nationalarchives.gsi.gov.uk.

Where we have identified any third party copyright information you will need to obtain permission from the copyright holders concerned.

This publication is available at https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/civil-nuclear-regulation-if-theres-no-brexit-deal/civil-nuclear-regulation-if-theres-no-brexit-deal

A scenario in which the UK leaves the EU without agreement (a ‘no deal’ scenario) remains unlikely given the mutual interests of the UK and the EU in securing a negotiated outcome.

Negotiations are progressing well and both we and the EU continue to work hard to seek a positive deal. However, it’s our duty as a responsible government to prepare for all eventualities, including ‘no deal’, until we can be certain of the outcome of those negotiations.

For two years, the government has been implementing a significant programme of work to ensure the UK will be ready from day 1 in all scenarios, including a potential ‘no deal’ outcome in March 2019.

It has always been the case that as we get nearer to March 2019, preparations for a no deal scenario would have to be accelerated. Such an acceleration does not reflect an increased likelihood of a ‘no deal’ outcome. Rather it is about ensuring our plans are in place in the unlikely scenario that they need to be relied upon.

This series of technical notices sets out information to allow businesses and citizens to understand what they would need to do in a ‘no deal’ scenario, so they can make informed plans and preparations.

This guidance is part of that series.

Also included is an overarching framing notice explaining the government’s overarching approach to preparing the UK for this outcome in order to minimise disruption and ensure a smooth and orderly exit in all scenarios.

We are working with the devolved administrations on technical notices and we will continue to do so as plans develop.

Purpose

This notice explains to the civil nuclear industry and stakeholders how the sector will be affected in the UK in the unlikely event that the UK leaves the EU and the European Atomic Energy Community (Euratom) in March 2019 with no agreement in place.

This notice covers:

  • nuclear safeguards
  • ownership and movement of nuclear material, equipment and technology
  • management of spent fuel and radioactive waste
  • reporting and notifications to the European Commission.

Nuclear safeguards

Before 29 March 2019

The European Commission currently implements nuclear safeguards in respect of nuclear material for all EU countries, including the UK.

The UK has already passed new legislation so that the Office for Nuclear Regulation (ONR) can oversee domestic safeguards instead of Euratom and signed new international agreements with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) to replace the existing trilateral agreements between the IAEA, Euratom and the UK.

After 29 March 2019 if there’s no deal

On exit from the EU, a new domestic nuclear safeguards regime will come into force.

Implications

The new regime will be run by the ONR, which already has regulatory oversight of nuclear safety and nuclear security. The new regime is not dependent on there being a deal with the EU and Euratom.

The ONR will publish guidance on the new inspection arrangements on its website.

Actions for businesses and other stakeholders

All operators in the UK civil nuclear sector will need to comply with the new domestic safeguards regime as it applies to them. This will be underpinned by regulations and administered by the ONR. The regime will include new domestic arrangements for nuclear material accountancy. Operators are encouraged to submit their views on the draft Nuclear Safeguards Regulations, which are open to public consultation until 14 September 2018.

Ownership of special fissile material

Before 29 March 2019

Under Euratom Treaty arrangements, all special fissile material in any EU country is legally “owned” by Euratom. Operators that hold the legal title to the material have the unlimited right to use and consume the material as long as they comply with obligations in the Euratom Treaty.

After 29 March 2019 if there’s no deal

On exit from the EU, Euratom ownership of special fissile material in the UK will end.

Implications

Operators that hold the legal title to special fissile material in the UK will have full ownership from this date, and their associated rights will remain unaffected.

For special fissile material on Euratom territory, Euratom rules will continue to apply until the material is exported from Euratom territory.

Actions for businesses and other stakeholders

Operators with special fissile material on UK or Euratom territory will not need to take any action in relation to the ownership of special fissile material. Operators’ legal title to this material and any associated rights will be unaffected by the UK’s withdrawal.

Supply contracts for nuclear material

Before 29 March 2019

Under current arrangements operators in the EU, including the UK, are required to obtain approval from the Euratom Supply Agency and, depending on the nature of the contract, the European Commission, before they conclude a supply contract for nuclear material.

After 29 March 2019 if there’s no deal

On exit from the EU, Euratom Supply Agency approval will no longer be required for contracts agreed by UK-established operators, except where these involve an EU27-established operator. For EU27-established operators, Euratom Supply Agency procedures will continue to apply as currently.

Implications

The EU has set out its view that some existing contracts will need to be re-approved. Further details of the actions to be taken are set out below.

Actions for businesses and other stakeholders

The steps that UK and EU27 operators may wish to consider taking will depend on when their contract was, or is due to be, concluded.

On exit from the EU, some existing supply contracts will need to be re-approved as a result of the UK’s withdrawal. This will apply only to supply contracts that:

  • involve both a UK-established operator and an EU27-established operator
  • have been co-signed by the Euratom Supply Agency prior to the UK’s withdrawal
  • have a supply period which extends beyond the date of the UK’s withdrawal.

For existing supply contracts of this type, UK and EU27 operators affected should engage with the Euratom Supply Agency on the process for re-approval and agree with their counterparts on any steps that will need to be taken to manage the period during which this process takes place. We will continue to work with the UK operators concerned to ensure that appropriate contingency supply arrangements are in place.

For UK-established operators, Euratom Supply Agency approval will only be required after the day of withdrawal if the contract involves an EU27-established operator. Operators will need to comply with standard Euratom Supply Agency processes.

For EU27-established operators, Euratom Supply Agency procedures will continue to apply as currently.

Further information

Further details on the Euratom Supply Agency’s standard procedures can be found on the Euratom Supply Agency’s website.

Export licence arrangements

Before 29 March 2019

The controls that apply to the export and transfer of dual-use goods and technology are implemented by the EU Dual-Use Regulation (428/2009). At present, an export licence is required to move certain sensitive nuclear materials, facilities and equipment between the UK and other EU countries.

After 29 March 2019 if there’s no deal

On exit from the EU, there will be a continued requirement for operators to obtain export licences for certain sensitive nuclear materials, facilities and equipment.

Implications

Further details of the export licence arrangements that will apply are set out in the Exporting Controlled Goods technical notice.

Actions for businesses and other stakeholders

Operators can find further detail on export licensing and information on the steps they will need to take in the Exporting Controlled Goods technical notice.

Further information

Further information on how to apply for export licences is available from the Export Control Joint Unit.

Import licence arrangements

Before 29 March 2019

The current import licensing regime set out in the Notice to Importers 2867 means that the import of relevant nuclear materials from EU countries does not require operators to obtain an import licence.

After 29 March 2019 if there’s no deal

The Notice to Importers 2867 will be updated in time for Exit Day to set out the arrangements that will apply following the UK’s withdrawal from the EU.

Implications

Under the updated arrangements, importers may need to obtain an import licence for imports of relevant nuclear materials from the EU. The UK will engage with importers on any new arrangements that will apply from this date and provide further guidance on these.

Actions for businesses and other stakeholders

Importers should check the updated Notice to Importers for details of the import licence arrangements that will apply after the date of the UK’s exit from the EU. Further guidance will also be published on the website below.

Further information

Further information can be found on the import control arrangements GOV.UK page.

Nuclear Cooperation Agreements

Before 29 March 2019

Euratom is currently party to a number of Nuclear Cooperation Agreements (NCAs) with third countries which provide the framework for the UK’s civil nuclear trade with these countries.

After 29 March 2019 if there’s ‘no deal’

Discussions to agree bilateral NCA arrangements with priority countries are on track to be completed before the UK leaves the EU, and the UK has already signed new bilateral NCAs with a number of third countries. This will ensure that civil nuclear trade can continue unimpeded.

Implications

Civil nuclear trade and cooperation will continue under the UK’s bilateral agreements.

Actions for businesses and other stakeholders

Operators do not need to take any action in relation to NCAs.

Further information

Further information is available from the Nuclear Cooperation Agreement Factsheet.

Management of spent fuel and radioactive waste

Before 29 March 2019

The current Euratom arrangements provide the framework for the movement of spent fuel and radioactive waste between countries. This includes authorisations for shipments under the Supervision and Control of Shipments of Radioactive Waste and Spent Fuel Directive 2006 (Directive 2006/117/Euratom – “the 2006 Directive”).

Under these arrangements, a number of EU countries have contracts in place for the reprocessing of spent fuel and the treatment and processing of radioactive waste in the UK. The UK government’s policy is not to accept overseas origin radioactive waste for disposal in the UK except in specific circumstances which are set out in the relevant UK government policy documents.

After 29 March 2019 if there’s no deal

The UK’s current arrangements for the reprocessing of spent fuel and treatment of radioactive waste will continue after the UK’s withdrawal from Euratom.

On exit from the EU, the process for authorising new shipments of spent fuel and radioactive waste from the UK to EU27 will change to reflect the fact that the UK will no longer be within the EU. The UK will engage with operators on any new arrangements that will apply for the authorisation of new shipments of spent fuel and radioactive waste from the EU27 to the UK, and will provide further guidance on these.

Beyond this, arrangements for new shipments of spent fuel and radioactive waste from EU27 countries to the UK for the purposes of management will not be affected. Under EU rules, there will be some small changes applicable to shipments of radioactive waste for the purposes of disposal, but the UK government’s policy on accepting such shipments will remain unaffected.

Implications

The management of EU27 spent fuel and radioactive waste in the UK will continue in line with existing contractual arrangements.

For new shipments of spent fuel and radioactive waste between the UK and EU27, all operators will need to comply with the arrangements that apply to third countries when shipping spent fuel and radioactive waste from the UK to EU27 countries. Further guidance will be provided on the arrangements that will apply for authorisations of spent fuel and radioactive waste from the EU27 to the UK.

The government will continue working with the Scottish government, Welsh government and Northern Ireland Civil Service to ensure that these arrangements work for the whole of the UK.

The current arrangements that determine which state has ultimate responsibility for the safe and responsible disposal of any spent fuel and radioactive waste generated will not be affected by the UK’s exit for either the UK or EU27 countries.

Actions for businesses and other stakeholders

The management of spent fuel and radioactive waste in the UK and EU27 will continue as now. UK and EU27 operators will not need to take any action.

Please note that if the existing contract is considered to be a supply contract under Euratom Supply Agency arrangements, operators should check the section of this technical notice on ‘Supply Contracts for Nuclear Material’.

For new shipments, all operators wishing to ship radioactive waste or spent fuel from the UK to an EU27 country will need to comply with the arrangements for third countries as set out in the 2006 directive. This means that shipments from the UK to EU27 countries will require authorisation from competent authorities in both the originating and destination states, and that EU27 competent authorities will no longer be subject to the current two-month deadline to grant authorisations.

Operators wishing to secure new authorisations to ship radioactive waste or spent fuel from EU27 countries to the UK should check the website below for further guidance of the arrangements that will apply after this date.

EU27 operators will be able to continue to enter into management contracts for spent fuel and radioactive waste in the UK.

Under the Community Framework for the Responsible and Safe Management of Spent Fuel and Radioactive Waste Directive (Directive 2011/70/EURATOM), EU27 operators will need to comply with the arrangements that apply to third countries prior to any shipment of radioactive waste for the purposes of disposal in the UK. This will not affect new shipments of spent fuel and radioactive waste in the UK for the purposes of processing, treatment or reprocessing.

Further information

Further guidance on authorisations for shipments of radioactive waste and spent fuel will be published on the radioactive waste and spent fuel GOV.UK page.

Reporting and notification obligations under Article 37 of the Euratom Treaty

Before 29 March 2019

Under Article 37 of the Euratom Treaty, the UK government (on behalf of operators) submits information to the European Commission on plans to dispose of radioactive waste. Operators must receive a positive opinion from the Commission before obtaining domestic environmental permits or proceeding with a project.

After 29 March 2019 if there’s no deal

On exit from the EU, the requirement for the UK to notify the European Commission of plans for the disposal of radioactive waste will no longer apply.

Implications

Operators will not need to secure the Commission’s opinion before obtaining domestic environmental permits or proceeding with their radioactive waste disposal plans.

The UK will consult with stakeholders on any future measures to keep neighbouring states informed of these types of activity in the UK that will apply after this date.

Actions for businesses and other stakeholders

UK operators should continue to follow the requirement to notify the Commission of plans to dispose of radioactive waste until the date of the UK’s exit from the EU. This includes continuing to work with the Department for Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy to complete and return submissions and secure Commission opinions.

Further information

Further details of the application of the current requirements are set out in Commission Recommendation 2010/635/Euratom.

Reporting and notification obligations under Article 41 of the Euratom Treaty

Before 29 March 2019

Under Article 41 of the Euratom Treaty operators with plans for certain nuclear investments must report the details of these to the Commission. The type of nuclear investments that require notification are defined in Council Regulation (Euratom) 2587/1999, and the required content of the reports is set out in Commission Regulation (EC) 1209/2000.

After 29 March 2019 if there’s no deal

On exit from the EU, the requirement for nuclear operators to inform the Commission of investment projects in the UK civil nuclear sector will no longer apply. The EU Regulations defining the content of Article 41 submissions (Council Regulation 2587/1999 and Commission Regulation 1209/2000) as they apply in the UK will be repealed.

Implications

UK and EU operators will no longer need to inform the Commission of planned investments in the UK civil nuclear sector after the date of the UK’s exit from the EU.

Actions for businesses and other stakeholders

UK and EU operators should continue to follow the requirement to inform the Commission of planned investments in the UK civil nuclear sector until the date of the UK’s exit from the EU. This includes continuing to complete and return submissions and discuss the submissions with the Commission. After the date of the UK’s exit from the EU, operators will no longer need to comply with this requirement.

Further information

Further details of the current requirements are set out in Council Regulation (Euratom) 2587/1999 and Commission Regulation (EC) 1209/2000.

Notification of radioactive source shipments

Before 29 March 2019

Before any shipment of radioactive sources between EU countries, radioactive source holders must obtain a prior written declaration from the receiver of the source, noting that they have complied with national requirements for the safe storage, use and disposal of the source being received. These requirements are set out in Council Regulation 1493/93/Euratom.

After 29 March 2019 if there’s no deal

UK radioactive source holders who plan to send material to other EU states will continue to comply with Regulation 1493/93 by obtaining prior written declarations until the date of withdrawal. The UK will engage with operators on any new arrangements that will apply after this date, and provide further guidance on these.

Implications

The UK will provide further guidance on the arrangements that will apply after the date of the UK’s exit from the EU. Any changes to these notification procedures will not prevent the shipment of radioactive sources into the UK after exit.

Actions for businesses and other stakeholders

Operators should continue to comply with the notification requirements for radioactive source shipments until the date of the UK’s exit from the EU. Operators should check the website below for further guidance of the arrangements that will apply after this date.

Further information

Further guidance will be published on the radioactive waste and spent fuel GOV.UK page.

This notice is meant for guidance only. You should consider whether you need separate professional advice before making specific preparations.

It is part of the government’s ongoing programme of planning for all possible outcomes. We expect to negotiate a successful deal with the EU.


COMMISSION RECOMMENDATION

of 11 October 2010

on the application of Article 37 of the Euratom Treaty

(2010/635/Euratom)

THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION,

Having regard to the Treaty establishing the European Atomic Energy Community, and in particular Article 37 thereof in conjunction with Article 106a referring to Article 292 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union,

Having consulted the group of persons appointed in accordance with Article 31 of the Euratom Treaty by the Scientific and Technical Committee,

Whereas:

(1)
Article 37 requires that each Member State is to provide the Commission with such general data relating to any plan for the disposal of radioactive waste in whatever form as will make it possible to determine whether the implementation of such plan is liable to result in the radioactive contamination of the water, soil or airspace of another Member State. The Commission is to deliver its opinion within six months, after consulting the group of experts referred to in Article 31.

 

(2)
Experience has been acquired in the application of the Commission Recommendations of 16 November 1960 (1), 82/181/Euratom (2) 91/4/Euratom (3) and 1999/829/Euratom (4) concerning the application of Article 37 of the Treaty.

 

(3)
The Court of Justice of the European Union, in its judgment of 22 September 1988 in Case 187/87 (5), ruled that Article 37 of the Euratom Treaty must be interpreted as meaning that the European Commission shall be provided with general data before the discharge authorisation of radioactive effluents is granted by the Member State concerned, in order to make it possible for the Commission to issue its opinion before such discharges are authorised so that the Commission’s opinion can be taken into account.

 

(4)
Article 37 has as its objective to forestall any possibility of radioactive contamination of another Member State. The Commission, having consulted the abovementioned group of experts has deemed the disposal of radioactive waste associated with certain operations not to be liable to result in the radioactive contamination of another Member State.

 

(5)
In exceptional cases due to information received, the Commission may call for general data to be submitted for a plan for the disposal of radioactive waste, otherwise deemed not to be liable to result in the radioactive contamination of another Member State on the basis of the present Recommendation; the Commission’s opinion may then pertain to an authorisation which has been granted at an earlier stage.

 

(6)
To appraise disposal plans in a consistent manner, it is necessary to specify which types of operation may result in the disposal of radioactive waste within the meaning of Article 37 of the Treaty, and to specify for the different types of operation which information is to be supplied as the general data.

 

(7)
Mixed-oxide fuel fabrication plants process large amounts of plutonium oxide, a submission of general data for the dismantling of such plants should be required as is already the case for the dismantling of nuclear reactors and reprocessing plants.

 

(8)
Trivial operations having no or negligible radiological impact in other Member States should not be submitted to the Commission.

 

(9)
Member States may communicate an integrated submission for a complex site where major changes are scheduled to be carried out over a long period of time, involving several steps and including the operation of new facilities, and the completeness of the information contained in the initial general data should allow the Commission to fulfil its obligations pursuant to Article 37 of the Euratom Treaty and deliver a sound opinion.

 

(10)
In view of the number of existing nuclear plants on which no opinion has already been issued within the meaning of Article 37 of the Treaty and which may be subject to modifications or dismantling operations, it is necessary to specify which information is to be supplied as the general data to allow the Commission to fulfil its obligation without prejudice to the principle of equity between installations subject to modifications and those which are not.

 

(11)
In cases where the exposure of the population in the vicinity of the site of interest is very low, this information may be sufficient for the assessment of the impact on other Member States.

 

(12)
To appraise in a consistent manner the radiological impact on other Member States of accidental situations, information requested in the general data on unplanned releases from nuclear reactors and reprocessing plants should be extended beyond the reference accidents to accidents taken into consideration for the establishment of the site related national emergency plan.

 

(13)
To clarify and limit the information required by the Commission pertaining to the predisposal management of radioactive waste and to modifications of a plan on which no opinion has already been issued by the Commission, two new annexes have been included.

 

(14)
All Member States have now declared that they will desist from sea dumping and no Member State intends to carry out sub-seabed burial of radioactive waste,

HAS ADOPTED THIS RECOMMENDATION:

1.
The ‘disposal of radioactive waste’ within the meaning of Article 37 of the Treaty should cover any planned or accidental release of radioactive substances associated with the operations listed below, in gaseous, liquid or solid form in or to the environment:
(1)
the operation of nuclear reactors (except research reactors whose maximum power does not exceed 1 MW continuous thermal load);
 
(2)
the reprocessing of irradiated nuclear fuel;
 
(3)
the mining, milling and conversion of uranium and thorium;
 
(4)
U-235 enrichment of uranium;
 
(5)
the fabrication of nuclear fuel;
 
(6)
the storage of irradiated nuclear fuel (6) in dedicated facilities (except storage of irradiated nuclear fuel in casks licensed for transport or storage, on existing nuclear sites);
 
(7)
the handling and processing of artificial radioactive substances on an industrial scale;
 
(8)
the predisposal management (7) of radioactive waste arising from operations (1) to (7) and (9);
 
(9)
the dismantling (8) of nuclear reactors, mixed-oxide (9) fuel fabrication plants and reprocessing plants (except research reactors whose maximum power does not exceed 50 MW continuous thermal load);
 
(10)
the emplacement of radioactive waste above or under the ground without the intention of retrieval;
 
(11)
the industrial processing of naturally occurring radioactive materials subject to a discharge authorisation;
 
(12)
all other relevant operations.

 

2.
‘General data’ within the meaning of Article 37 of the Treaty should be understood to mean:
for operations referred to in point 1(1) to (7), the information set out in Annex I,
 
for operations referred to in point 1(8), the information set out in Annex II,
 
for operations referred to in point 1(9), the information set out in Annex III,
 
for operations referred to in point 1(10), the information set out in Annex IV,
 
for operations referred to in point 1(11), the relevant parts of the information set out in Annex I (Sections 6 and 7 of Annex I are in most cases not applicable).

 

3.
Operations falling within the scope of point 1(12) should be deemed not to be liable to result in the radioactive contamination of another Member State, significant from the point of view of health, unless in any specific case the Commission calls for general data to be provided.

 

4.
For operations falling within the scope of point 1(9), the submission of general data should be governed by the following conditions:
(a)
submission of general data is necessary if
a new licence or authorisation for a plan for the disposal of radioactive waste in whatever form for the dismantling is envisaged by the Member State, or
 
dismantling of the contaminated or activated parts of the plant will be started;
 
(b)
if a Member State envisages dismantling an installation referred to in point 1(9) on which no opinion has already been given under the terms of Article 37, the general data should be submitted in the form of Annex III;
 
(c)
if a Member State envisages dismantling a plant referred to in point 1(9) on which an opinion has already been given under the terms of Article 37, the general data should be submitted in the form of Annex III. However, with regard to the description of the site and its surroundings, the emergency plans and the environmental monitoring, reference to the general data submitted for the earlier procedure is sufficient if all appropriate additional information is provided as regards possible changes.

 

5.
If a Member State envisages modifying (10) a plan for the disposal of radioactive waste, the submission of general data should be governed by the following conditions:
(a)
if a Member State envisages modifying a plan for the disposal of radioactive waste, on which an opinion has already been given under the terms of Article 37, a submission of general data containing at least the information set out in a standard form in Annex V is necessary if the authorised limits or the associated requirements for the disposal of radioactive waste are less restrictive than in the existing plan or if the potential consequences of the unplanned releases which may follow the accident(s) evaluated in the licensing procedure are increased;
 
(b)
unless the Commission calls for general data to be communicated, no submission of general data is necessary if no new authorisation or licence is required;
 
(c)
unless the Commission calls for general data to be communicated, no submission of general data is necessary if:
the modification of the plan for the disposal of radioactive waste envisages unchanged or more restrictive authorised limits and associated requirements than in the existing plan, and
 
the potential consequences of the unplanned releases which may follow the reference accident(s) evaluated in the licensing procedure are unchanged or decreased;
 
(d)
in the case of a plan for the disposal of radioactive waste on which no opinion has already been given under the terms of Article 37, a submission of the general data is necessary unless the Member State provides the Commission with a statement demonstrating that the conditions outlined in point (b) and (c) are met. If any of these conditions are not met, the general data should contain the relevant information set out in Annex VI.

 

6.
The general data should be submitted to the Commission:
(a)
after the plan for the disposal of radioactive waste is firmly established, and whenever possible one year but not less than six months:
before any authorisation for the discharge of radioactive waste is granted by competent authorities, and
 
before start-up of those operations for which no authorisation for the discharge of radioactive waste is foreseen;
 
(b)
in cases where the Commission has called for general data in accordance with point 3, no later than six months after the request, without prejudice to any authorisation duly granted by the competent authorities pending receipt of the Commission’s request. Any authorisation granted before the Commission called for general data should be reviewed in the light of the Commission’s subsequent opinion.

 

7.
Where Member States communicate an integrated submission of general data for a complex site where major changes are scheduled to be carried out over long periods of time, involving several steps and including, inter alia, the operation of new facilities, the initial submission should contain a complete and detailed overview of the planned operations, to be updated by subsequent submissions in case of any modifications to the existing plan. As regards the accident scenarios in the initial submission, the general data should include at least information on estimated amounts and physico-chemical forms of radionuclides present in each of the facilities on the site as well as quantities assumed to be released in the event of the accident considered for each of those facilities. The general data may provide background on past and current operations on the site, bearing in mind that the Commission’s opinions will relate only to future operations.

 

8.
Since submission of a plan for the disposal of radioactive waste is the responsibility of the relevant Member State, that State should accept responsibility for all information submitted to the Commission in respect of such a plan.

 

9.
Following receipt of an opinion, the Member State concerned should inform the Commission of the actions it envisages in response to any recommendation given in the Commission opinion on a disposal plan.

 

10.
Following receipt of an opinion, the Member State concerned should communicate to the Commission the discharge authorisation as well as any later amendments for comparison with the information in the general data on which the Commission opinion was based.

This Recommendation is addressed to the Member States.

It replaces Recommendation 1999/829/Euratom.

Done at Brussels, 11 October 2010.

For the Commission

Günther OETTINGER

Member of the Commission







(5)  [1988] ECR 5013.

(6)  Provided that the operation is not incorporated in a plan submitted under another heading.

(7)  The term ‘predisposal management’ includes storage of radioactive waste.

(8)  Decommissioning comprises all technical and administrative procedures, activities and measures taken after the final shut-down of a facility and up to the release of the site for unrestricted or other licensed use. Within these activities ‘dismantling’ comprises disassembling, cutting and demolition of contaminated or activated components, systems and structures including their packaging and transfer off-site.

(9)  Oxides of uranium and plutonium.

(10)  Modifications of a plan might also include preparatory work in view of the operations referred to in point 1(9).



ANNEX I

General data applicable to the operations referred to in point 1(1) to (7)

Introduction

general presentation of the plan,

 

present stage of licensing procedure, envisaged commissioning steps.

1.   THE SITE AND ITS SURROUNDINGS

1.1.   Geographical, topographical and geological features of the site and the region with

a map of the region showing the location and geographical coordinates (degrees, minutes) of the site,

 

the relevant features of the region, including geological features,

 

the location of the installation in relation to such other installations, the discharges from which need to be considered in conjunction with those from the installation in question,

 

the location of the site with regard to other Member States giving the distances from frontiers and relevant conurbations, together with their populations.

1.2.   Seismology

the degree of seismic activity in the region; probable maximum seismic activity and designed seismic resistance of the installation.

1.3.   Hydrology

For an installation situated near to a waterbody providing a potential contamination pathway to another Member State, a brief description of appropriate hydrological features, extending to the other Member State(s), for example:

brief description of the path(s), tributaries, estuary, water abstraction, floodplains, etc.,

 

average, maximum and minimum water flows and their frequency of occurrence,

 

underground water table, levels and flows,

 

brief description of the littoral areas,

 

direction and force of currents, tides, circulation patterns, both local and regional,

 

flood risk and protection of the installation.

1.4.   Meteorology

Local climatology with frequency distributions of:

wind directions and speeds,

 

precipitation intensity and duration,

 

for each wind sector, atmospheric dispersion conditions, duration of temperature inversions,

 

extreme weather phenomena (for example, tornadoes, severe storms, heavy rainfall, droughts).

1.5.   Natural resources and foodstuffs

Brief description of:

water utilisation in the region and as appropriate in neighbouring Member States,

 

principal food resources in the region and as appropriate in other Member States: crops, stock breeding, fishing and, for discharges into sea, data on fishing in territorial and extraterritorial waters,

 

foodstuff distribution system and particularly the export to other Member States from the regions concerned, in so far as they are related to the risk of exposure from discharges through the significant exposure pathways.

1.6.   Other activities in the vicinity of the site

where appropriate, other nuclear facilities and any hazardous industrial or military activities, surface and aerial traffic, pipelines, storages and any other factors which may have an influence on the safety of the installation,

 

protection measures.

2.   THE INSTALLATION

2.1.   Main features of the installation

brief description of the installation,

 

type, purpose and main features of the processes,

 

site layout plan,

 

safety provisions.

2.2.   Ventilation systems and the treatment of gaseous and airborne wastes

Description of ventilation, decay, filtration and discharge systems, in normal conditions and in the case of an accident, including flow diagrams

2.3.   Liquid waste treatment

Description of liquid waste treatment facilities, storage capacities and discharge systems, including flow diagrams

2.4.   Solid waste treatment

Description of solid waste treatment facilities and storage capacities

2.5.   Containment

Description of systems and provisions to confine radioactive substances

2.6.   Decommissioning and dismantling

envisaged period of operation of the installation,

 

consideration given to decommissioning and dismantling,

 

outline of regulatory and administrative provisions for decommissioning and dismantling.

3.   RELEASE FROM THE INSTALLATION OF AIRBORNE RADIOACTIVE EFFLUENTS IN NORMAL CONDITIONS

3.1.   Authorisation procedure in force

outline of the procedure in force,

 

discharge limits and associated requirements envisaged by the authorities, including the assumed radionuclide composition.

3.2.   Technical aspects

annual discharges foreseen,

 

origins of the radioactive effluents, their composition and physico-chemical forms,

 

management of these effluents, methods and paths of release.

3.3.   Monitoring of discharges

sampling, measurement and analysis of discharges, whether undertaken by the operator or by competent authorities,

 

principal features of the monitoring equipment,

 

for operations listed under (1) and (2), key radionuclides and associated detection limits should at least fulfil the specifications laid down in Commission Recommendation 2004/2/Euratom (1),

 

alarm levels, intervention actions (manual and automatic).

3.4.   Evaluation of transfer to man

Except for operations listed under (1) and (2), if the assessed maximum exposure levels from releases in normal conditions to adults, children and infants in the vicinity of the plant are below 10 μSv per annum and there are no exceptional pathways of exposure, e.g. involving the export of foodstuffs, no data on effective doses in other affected  (2) Member States are required if doses to the reference groups in the vicinity of the plant are provided.

3.4.1.   Models, including where appropriate generic models, and parameter values used to calculate the consequences of the releases in the vicinity of the plant and for other affected Member States:

atmospheric dispersion of the effluents,

 

ground deposition and re-suspension,

 

food chains, inhalation, external exposure etc.,

 

living habits (diet, exposure time etc.),

 

other parameter values used in the calculations.

3.4.2.   Evaluation of concentration and exposure levels associated with the envisaged discharge limits cited in 3.1 above:

annual average concentrations of activity in the atmosphere near the ground and surface contamination levels, for the most exposed areas in the vicinity of the plant and in other affected Member States,

 

for the reference group(s) in the vicinity of the plant and in other affected Member States, corresponding annual exposure levels: effective dose to adults, children and infants, taking account of all significant exposure pathways.

3.5.   Radioactive discharges to atmosphere from other installations

Procedures for coordination with radioactive discharges from other installations referred to in 1.1, third indent

4.   RELEASE FROM THE INSTALLATION OF LIQUID RADIOACTIVE EFFLUENTS IN NORMAL CONDITIONS

4.1.   Authorisation procedure in force

outline of the general procedure involved,

 

discharge limits and associated requirements envisaged by the authorities, including the assumed radionuclide composition.

4.2.   Technical aspects

annual discharges foreseen,

 

origins of the radioactive effluents, their composition and physico-chemical forms,

 

management of the effluents, methods and paths of release.

4.3.   Monitoring of discharges

sampling, measurement and analysis of discharges, whether undertaken by the operator or by competent authorities,

 

principal features of monitoring equipment,

 

for operations listed under (1) and (2), key radionuclides and associated detection limits should at least fulfil the specifications laid down in Recommendation 2004/2/Euratom,

 

alarm levels, intervention actions (manual and automatic).

4.4.   Evaluation of transfer to man

Except for operations listed under (1) and (2), if the assessed maximum exposure levels from releases in normal conditions to adults, children and infants in the vicinity of the plant are below 10 μSv per annum and there are no exceptional pathways of exposure, e.g. involving the export of foodstuffs, no data on effective doses in other affected Member States are required if doses to reference groups in the vicinity of the plant are provided.

4.4.1.   Models, including where appropriate generic models, and parameter values used to calculate the consequences of the releases in the vicinity of the plant and for other affected Member States:

aquatic dispersion of the effluents,

 

their transfer by sedimentation and ion exchange,

 

food chains, inhalation of sea spray, external exposure etc.,

 

living habits (diet, exposure time etc.),

 

other parameter values used in the calculations.

4.4.2.   Evaluation of concentration and exposure levels associated with the discharge limits cited in 4.1 above:

annual average concentrations of activity in surface waters, at the points where such concentrations are highest, in the vicinity of the plant and in other affected Member States,

 

for the reference group(s) in the vicinity of the plant and in other affected Member States: effective dose to adults, children and infants, taking account of all significant exposure pathways.

4.5.   Radioactive discharges into the same receiving waters from other installations

Procedures for coordination with discharges from other installations referred to in 1.1, third indent

5.   DISPOSAL OF SOLID RADIOACTIVE WASTE FROM THE INSTALLATION

5.1.   Solid radioactive waste

categories of solid radioactive waste and estimated amounts,

 

processing and packaging,

 

storage arrangements on site.

5.2.   Radiological risks to the environment

assessment of risks to the environment,

 

precautions taken.

5.3.   Off-site arrangements for the transfer of waste

5.4.   Release of materials from the requirements of the basic safety standards

national strategy, criteria and procedures for the release of contaminated and activated materials,

 

clearance levels established by competent authorities for disposal, recycling and reuse,

 

envisaged types and amounts of released materials.

6.   UNPLANNED RELEASES OF RADIOACTIVE EFFLUENTS

6.1.   Review of accidents of internal and external origin which could result in unplanned releases of radioactive substances

List of the accidents studied in the safety report

6.2.   Reference accident(s) taken into consideration by the competent national authorities for evaluating possible radiological consequences in the case of unplanned releases

In addition, for operations (1) and (2) accidents taken into consideration by the competent authorities for the establishment of the site related national emergency plan.

Outline of the accident(s) considered and reasons for its (their) choice

6.3.   Evaluation of the radiological consequences of the reference accident(s) and for operations (1) and (2), the accident(s) taken into consideration by the competent authorities for the establishment of the site related national emergency plan

6.3.1.   Accidents entailing releases to atmosphere

Except for operations listed under (1) and (2), if the assessed maximum exposure levels from the reference accident to adults, children and infants in the vicinity of the plant are below 1 mSv and there are no exceptional pathways of exposure, e.g. involving the export of foodstuffs, no data on exposure levels in other affected Member States are required if exposure levels in the vicinity of the plant are provided.

assumptions used to calculate the releases to atmosphere,

 

release paths; time patterns of the releases,

 

amounts and physico-chemical forms of those radionuclides released which are significant from the point of view of health,

 

models and parameter values used to calculate for the releases their atmospheric dispersion, ground deposition, re-suspension and transfer via food chains and to evaluate the maximum exposure levels via the significant exposure pathways in the vicinity of the plant and for other affected Member States,

 

maximum time-integrated concentrations of radioactivity in the atmosphere near the ground and maximum surface contamination levels (in dry and wet weather) for the most exposed areas in the vicinity of the plant and for relevant areas in other affected Member States,

 

expected levels of radioactive contamination of foodstuffs which might be exported to other affected Member States,

 

corresponding maximum exposure levels: effective dose to adults, children and infants living in the vicinity of the plant and in relevant areas of other affected Member States taking account of all significant exposure pathways.

6.3.2.   Accidents entailing releases into an aquatic environment

Except for operations listed under (1) and (2), if the assessed maximum exposure levels from the reference accident to adults, children and infants close to the plant are below 1 mSv and there are no exceptional pathways of exposure, e.g. involving the export of foodstuffs, no data on exposure levels in other affected Member States are required if exposure levels in the vicinity of the plant are provided.

assumptions used to calculate the liquid release,

 

release paths, time pattern of releases,

 

amounts and physico-chemical forms of those radionuclides released which are significant from the point of view of health,

 

models and parameters used to calculate for the releases their aquatic dispersion, their transfer by sedimentation and ion exchange, their transfer via food chains and to evaluate the maximum exposure levels via the significant exposure pathways,

 

expected levels of radioactive contamination of foodstuffs which might be exported to other affected Member States,

 

corresponding maximum exposure levels: effective dose to adults, children and infants living in the vicinity of the plant and in relevant areas of other affected Member States taking account of all significant exposure pathways.

7.   EMERGENCY PLANS, AGREEMENTS WITH OTHER MEMBER STATES

In relation to possible radiological emergencies which may affect other Member States in order to facilitate the organisation of radiological protection in these States:

Brief description of:

intervention levels established for different types of countermeasures,

 

emergency planning arrangements, including the emergency planning zones adopted for the installation,

 

arrangements in place for the early exchange of information with other Member States, bilateral or multilateral agreements on transfrontier information, coordination of emergency plans and their implementation and mutual assistance,

 

emergency plan testing arrangements with particular reference to the involvement of other Member States.

8.   ENVIRONMENTAL MONITORING

external radiation monitoring,

 

monitoring of radioactive substances in air, water, soil and the food chains, whether undertaken by the operator or by competent authorities.

With reference to 3.1 and 4.1 above, monitoring programs as approved by the competent national authorities, organisation, sample forms and frequency, type of monitoring instruments used in normal and accident circumstances; where appropriate, any collaboration arrangements in this respect with neighbouring Member States.



(1)  Commission Recommendation of 18 December 2003 on standardised information on radioactive airborne and liquid discharges into the environment from nuclear power reactors and reprocessing plants in normal operation (OJ L 2, 6.1.2004, p. 36).

(2)  Affected Member States are to be selected by taking into account distance from the installation, wind direction for gaseous effluent releases and the route of water courses for liquid effluent releases.



ANNEX II

General data applicable to the operation referred to in point 1(8)

The predisposal management of radioactive waste arising from the operations referred to in point 1(1) to (7) and (9)

Introduction

general presentation of the plan,

 

present stage of licensing procedure, and

 

envisaged commissioning steps.

1.   THE SITE AND ITS SURROUNDINGS

1.1.   Geographical, topographical and geological features of the site and the region with

a map of the region showing the location and geographical coordinates (degrees, minutes) of the site,

 

the relevant features of the region, including geological features,

 

the location of the installation in relation to such other installations, the discharges from which need to be considered in conjunction with those from the installation in question,

 

the location of the site with regard to other Member States giving the distances from frontiers and relevant conurbations, together with their populations.

1.2.   Seismology

the degree of seismic activity in the region; probable maximum seismic activity and designed seismic resistance of the installation.

1.3.   Hydrology

For an installation situated near to a waterbody providing a potential contamination pathway to another Member State, a brief description of appropriate hydrological features, extending to the other Member State(s), for example:

brief description of the path(s), tributaries, estuary, water abstraction, floodplains, etc.,

 

average, maximum and minimum water flows and their frequency of occurrence,

 

underground water table, levels and flows,

 

brief description of the littoral areas,

 

direction and force of currents, tides, circulation patterns, both local and regional,

 

flood risk and protection of the installation.

1.4.   Meteorology

Local climatology with frequency distributions of:

wind directions and speeds,

 

precipitation intensity and duration,

 

for each wind sector, atmospheric dispersion conditions, duration of temperature inversions,

 

extreme weather phenomena (for example, tornadoes, severe storms, heavy rainfall, droughts).

1.5.   Natural resources and foodstuffs

Brief description of:

water utilisation in the region and as appropriate in neighbouring Member States,

 

principal food resources in the region and as appropriate in other Member States: crops, stock breeding, fishing and, for discharges into sea, data on fishing in territorial and extraterritorial waters,

 

foodstuff distribution system and particularly the export to other Member States from the regions concerned, in so far as they are related to the risk of exposure from discharges through the significant exposure pathways.

1.6.   Other activities in the vicinity of the site

where appropriate, other nuclear facilities and any hazardous industrial or military activities, surface and aerial traffic, pipelines, storages and any other factors which may have an influence on the safety of the installation,

 

protection measures.

2.   THE INSTALLATION

2.1.   Main features of the installation

brief description of the installation,

 

type, purpose and main features of the processes,

 

description of radioactive waste to be received for storage and processing, facilities and storage capacities, categories and types of radioactive waste (for example, low or intermediate level, metal, combustible waste) to be stored and processed, including volumes and radionuclide content,

 

site layout plan,

 

safety provisions.

2.2.   Ventilation systems and the treatment of gaseous and airborne wastes

Description of ventilation, decay, filtration and discharge systems, in normal conditions and in the case of an accident, including flow diagrams

2.3.   Liquid waste treatment

Description of secondary liquid waste treatment facilities, storage capacities and discharge systems, including flow diagrams

2.4.   Solid waste treatment

Description of secondary solid waste treatment facilities and storage capacities

2.5.   Containment

Description of systems and provisions to confine radioactive substances

2.6.   Decommissioning and dismantling

envisaged period of operation of the installation,

 

consideration given to decommissioning and dismantling,

 

outline of regulatory and administrative provisions for decommissioning and dismantling.

3.   RELEASE FROM THE INSTALLATION OF AIRBORNE RADIOACTIVE EFFLUENTS IN NORMAL CONDITIONS

3.1.   Authorisation procedure in force

outline of the procedure in force,

 

discharge limits and associated requirements envisaged by the authorities, including the assumed radionuclide composition.

3.2.   Technical aspects

annual discharges expected,

 

origins of the radioactive effluents, their composition and physico-chemical forms,

 

management of these effluents, methods and paths of release.

3.3.   Monitoring of discharges

sampling, measurement and analysis of discharges, whether undertaken by the operator or by competent authorities,

 

principal features of the monitoring equipment,

 

alarm levels, intervention actions (manual and automatic).

3.4.   Evaluation of transfer to man

If the assessed maximum exposure levels from releases in normal conditions to adults, children and infants in the vicinity of the plant are below 10 μSv per annum and there are no exceptional pathways of exposure, e.g. involving the export of foodstuffs, no data on effective doses in other affected  (1) Member States are required if doses to the reference groups in the vicinity of the plant are provided.

3.4.1.   Models, including where appropriate generic models, and parameter values used to calculate the consequences of the releases in the vicinity of the plant and for other affected Member States:

atmospheric dispersion of the effluents,

 

ground deposition and re-suspension,

 

food chains, inhalation, external exposure etc.,

 

living habits (diet, exposure time etc.),

 

other parameter values used in the calculations.

3.4.2.   Evaluation of the concentration and exposure levels associated with the envisaged discharge limits cited in 3.1 above:

annual average concentrations of activity in the atmosphere near the ground and surface contamination levels, for the most exposed areas in the vicinity of the installation and in other affected Member States,

 

for the reference group(s) in the vicinity of the plant and in other affected Member States, corresponding annual exposure levels: effective dose to adults, children and infants, taking account of all significant exposure pathways.

3.5.   Radioactive discharges to atmosphere from other installations

Procedures for coordination with radioactive discharges from other installations referred to in 1.1, third indent

4.   RELEASE FROM THE INSTALLATION OF LIQUID RADIOACTIVE EFFLUENTS IN NORMAL CONDITIONS

4.1.   Authorisation procedure in force

outline of the general procedure involved,

 

discharge limits and associated requirements envisaged by the authorities, including the assumed radionuclide composition.

4.2.   Technical aspects

annual discharges expected,

 

origins of the radioactive effluents, their composition and physico-chemical forms,

 

management of the effluents, methods and paths of release.

4.3.   Monitoring of discharges

sampling, measurement and analysis of discharges, whether undertaken by the operator or by competent authorities,

 

principal features of monitoring equipment,

 

alarm levels, intervention actions (manual and automatic).

4.4.   Evaluation of transfer to man

If the assessed maximum exposure levels from releases in normal conditions to adults, children and infants in the vicinity of the plant are below 10 μSv per annum and there are no exceptional pathways of exposure, e.g. involving the export of foodstuffs, no data on effective doses in other affected Member States are required if doses to reference groups in the vicinity of the plant are provided.

4.4.1.   Models, including where appropriate generic models, and parameter values used to calculate the consequences of the releases in the vicinity of the plant and for other affected Member States:

aquatic dispersion of the effluents,

 

their transfer by sedimentation and ion exchange,

 

food chains, inhalation of sea spray, external exposure etc.,

 

living habits (diet, exposure time etc.),

 

other parameter values used in the calculations.

4.4.2.   Evaluation of concentration and exposure levels associated with the discharge limits cited in 4.1 above:

annual average concentrations of activity in surface waters, at the points where such concentrations are highest, in the vicinity of the plant and in other affected Member States,

 

for the reference group(s) in the vicinity of the plant and in other affected Member States: effective dose to adults, children and infants, taking account of all significant exposure pathways.

4.5.   Radioactive discharges into the same receiving waters from other installations

Procedures for coordination with discharges from other installations referred to in 1.1, third indent

5.   DISPOSAL OF SOLID RADIOACTIVE WASTE FROM THE INSTALLATION

5.1.   Solid radioactive waste

categories of solid radioactive waste and estimated amounts,

 

processing and packaging,

 

storage arrangements on site.

5.2.   Radiological risks to the environment

assessment of risks to the environment,

 

precautions taken.

5.3.   Off-site arrangements for the transfer of waste

5.4.   Release of materials from the requirements of the basic safety standards

national strategy, criteria and procedures for the release of contaminated and activated materials,

 

clearance levels established by competent authorities for disposal, recycling and reuse,

 

envisaged types and amounts of released materials.

6.   UNPLANNED RELEASES OF RADIOACTIVE EFFLUENTS

6.1.   Review of accidents of internal and external origin which could result in unplanned releases of radioactive substances

List of the accidents studied in the safety report

6.2.   Reference accident(s) taken into consideration by the competent national authorities for evaluating possible radiological consequences in the case of unplanned releases

Outline of the accident(s) considered and reasons for its (their) choice

6.3.   Evaluation of the radiological consequences of the reference accident(s)

6.3.1.   Accidents entailing releases to atmosphere

If the assessed maximum exposure levels from the reference accident to adults, children and infants in the vicinity of the plant are below 1 mSv and there are no exceptional pathways of exposure, e.g. involving the export of foodstuffs, no data on exposure levels in other affected Member States are required if exposure levels in the vicinity of the plant are provided.

assumptions used to calculate the releases to atmosphere,

 

release paths; time patterns of the releases,

 

amounts and physico-chemical forms of those radionuclides released which are significant from the point of view of health,

 

models and parameter values used to calculate for the releases their atmospheric dispersion, ground deposition, re-suspension and transfer via food chains and to evaluate the maximum exposure levels via the significant exposure pathways in the vicinity of the plant and for other affected Member States,

 

maximum time-integrated concentrations of radioactivity in the atmosphere near the ground and maximum surface contamination levels (in dry and wet weather) for the most exposed areas in the vicinity of the plant and for relevant areas in other affected Member States,

 

expected levels of radioactive contamination of foodstuffs which might be exported to other affected Member States,

 

corresponding maximum exposure levels: effective dose to adults, children and infants living in the vicinity of the plant and in relevant areas of other affected Member States taking account of all significant exposure pathways.

6.3.2.   Accidents entailing releases into an aquatic environment

If the assessed maximum exposure levels from the reference accident to adults, children and infants close to the plant are below 1 mSv and there are no exceptional pathways of exposure, e.g. involving the export of foodstuffs, no data on exposure levels in other affected Member States are required if exposure levels in the vicinity of the plant are provided.

assumptions used to calculate the liquid release,

 

release paths, time pattern of releases,

 

amounts and physico-chemical forms of those radionuclides released which are significant from the point of view of health,

 

models and parameters used to calculate for the releases their aquatic dispersion, their transfer by sedimentation and ion exchange, their transfer via food chains and to evaluate the maximum exposure levels via the significant exposure pathways,

 

expected levels of radioactive contamination of foodstuffs which might be exported to other affected Member States,

 

corresponding maximum exposure levels: effective dose to adults, children and infants living in the vicinity of the plant and in relevant areas of other affected Member States taking account of all significant exposure pathways.

7.   EMERGENCY PLANS, AGREEMENTS WITH OTHER MEMBER STATES

In relation to possible radiological emergencies which may affect other Member States in order to facilitate the organisation of radiological protection in these States:

Brief description of:

intervention levels established for different types of countermeasures,

 

emergency planning arrangements, including the emergency planning zones adopted for the installation,

 

arrangements in place for the early exchange of information with other Member States, bilateral or multilateral agreements on transfrontier information, coordination of emergency plans and their implementation and mutual assistance,

 

emergency plan testing arrangements with particular reference to the involvement of other Member States.

8.   ENVIRONMENTAL MONITORING

external radiation monitoring,

 

monitoring of radioactive substances in air, water, soil and the food chains, whether undertaken by the operator or by competent authorities.

With reference to 3.1 and 4.1 above, monitoring programs as approved by the competent national authorities, organisation, sample forms and frequency, type of monitoring instruments used in normal and accident circumstances; where appropriate, any collaboration arrangements in this respect with neighbouring Member States.



(1)  Affected Member States are to be selected by taking into account distance from the installation, wind direction for gaseous effluent releases and the route of water courses for liquid effluent releases.



ANNEX III

General data applicable to the operations referred to in point 1(9)

The dismantling of nuclear reactors, mixed-oxide fuel fabrication plants and reprocessing plants (except research reactors whose maximum power does not exceed 50 MW continuous thermal load)

Introduction

general presentation of the plan,

 

description of the different decommissioning and dismantling phases envisaged,

 

decommissioning and dismantling licensing procedures.

1.   THE SITE AND ITS SURROUNDINGS

1.1.   Geographical, topographical and geological features of the site and region with

a map of the region showing the location and geographical coordinates (degrees, minutes) of the site,

 

the relevant features of the region, including geological features,

 

the location of the installation in relation to such installations, the discharges from which need to be considered in conjunction with those from the installation in question,

 

the location of the site with regard to other Member States giving the distances from frontiers and relevant conurbations, together with their populations.

1.2.   Hydrology

For an installation situated near to a waterbody providing a potential contamination pathway to another Member State, a brief description of appropriate hydrological features, extending to the other Member State(s), for example:

brief description of the path(s), tributaries, estuary, water abstraction, floodplains, etc.,

 

average, maximum and minimum water flows and their frequency of occurrence,

 

underground water table, levels and flows,

 

brief description of the littoral areas,

 

direction and force of currents, tides, circulation patterns, both local and regional,

 

flood risk and protection of the installation.

1.3.   Meteorology

Local climatology with frequency distributions of:

wind directions and speeds,

 

precipitation intensity and duration,

 

for each wind sector, atmospheric dispersion conditions, duration of temperature inversions,

 

extreme weather phenomena (for example, tornadoes, severe storms, heavy rainfall, droughts).

1.4.   Natural resources and foodstuffs

Brief description of:

water utilisation in the region and as appropriate in neighbouring Member States,

 

principal food resources in the region and as appropriate in other Member States: crops, stock breeding, fishing and, for discharges into sea, data on fishing in territorial and extraterritorial waters,

 

foodstuff distribution system and particularly the export to other Member States from the regions concerned, in so far as they are related to the risk of exposure from discharges through the significant exposure pathways.

2.   THE INSTALLATION

2.1.   Brief description and history of the installation to be dismantled

2.2.   Ventilation systems and the treatment of gaseous and airborne wastes

Description of ventilation, decay, filtration and discharge systems during dismantling, in normal conditions and in the case of an accident, including flow diagrams

2.3.   Liquid waste treatment

Description of liquid waste treatment facilities during dismantling, storage capacities and discharge systems, including flow diagrams

2.4.   Solid waste treatment

Description of solid waste treatment facilities and storage capacities at the site during dismantling

2.5.   Containment

Description of systems and provisions to confine radioactive substances

3.   RELEASE FROM THE INSTALLATION OF AIRBORNE RADIOACTIVE EFFLUENTS IN NORMAL CONDITIONS

3.1.   Authorisation procedure in force

outline of the procedure in force,

 

discharge limits and associated requirements envisaged by the authorities for the dismantling operations, including the assumed radionuclide composition,

 

for comparison: discharge limits and associated requirements in force for the time before the envisaged dismantling operations, including the radionuclide composition.

3.2.   Technical aspects

annual discharges expected during dismantling,

 

origins of the radioactive effluents, their composition and physico-chemical forms,

 

management of these effluents, methods and paths of release.

3.3.   Monitoring of discharges

sampling, measurement and analysis of discharges, whether undertaken by the operator or by competent authorities,

 

principal features of the monitoring equipment,

 

alarm levels, intervention actions (manual and automatic).

3.4.   Evaluation of transfer to man

If the assessed maximum exposure levels from releases in normal conditions to adults, children and infants in the vicinity of the plant are below 10 μSv per annum and there are no exceptional pathways of exposure, e.g. involving the export of foodstuffs, no data on effective doses in other affected  (1) Member States are required if doses to the reference groups in the vicinity of the plant are provided.

3.4.1.   Models, including where appropriate generic models, and parameter values used to calculate the consequences of the releases in the vicinity of the plant and for other affected Member States:

atmospheric dispersion of the effluents,

 

ground deposition and re-suspension,

 

food chains, inhalation, external exposure etc.,

 

living habits (diet, exposure time etc.),

 

other parameter values used in the calculations.

3.4.2.   Evaluation of the concentration and exposure levels associated with the envisaged discharge limits for the dismantling operations cited in 3.1 above:

annual average concentrations of activity in the atmosphere near the ground and surface contamination levels, for the most exposed areas in the vicinity of the plant and in other affected Member States,

 

for the reference group(s) in the vicinity of the plant and in other affected Member States, corresponding annual exposure levels: effective dose to adults, children and infants, taking account of all significant exposure pathways.

4.   RELEASE FROM THE INSTALLATION OF LIQUID RADIOACTIVE EFFLUENTS IN NORMAL CONDITIONS

4.1.   Authorisation procedure in force

outline of the general procedure involved,

 

discharge limits and associated requirements envisaged by the authorities for the dismantling operations, including the assumed radionuclide composition,

 

for comparison: discharge limits and associated requirements in force before the envisaged dismantling operations, including the radionuclide composition.

4.2.   Technical aspects

annual discharges expected during dismantling,

 

origins of the radioactive effluents, their composition and physico-chemical forms,

 

management of the effluents, methods and paths of release.

4.3.   Monitoring of discharges

sampling, measurement and analysis of discharges, whether undertaken by the operator or by competent authorities,

 

principal features of monitoring equipment,

 

alarm levels, intervention actions (manual and automatic).

4.4.   Evaluation of transfer to man

If the assessed maximum exposure levels from releases in normal conditions to adults, children and infants in the vicinity of the plant are below 10 μSv per annum and there are no exceptional pathways of exposure, e.g. involving the export of foodstuffs, no data on effective doses in other affected Member States are required if doses to reference groups in the vicinity of the plant are provided.

4.4.1.   Models, including where appropriate generic models, and parameter values used to calculate the consequences of the releases in the vicinity of the plant and for other affected Member States:

aquatic dispersion of the effluents,

 

their transfer by sedimentation and ion exchange,

 

food chains, inhalation of sea spray, external exposure, etc.,

 

living habits (diet, exposure time etc.),

 

other parameter values used in the calculations.

4.4.2.   Evaluation of the concentration and exposure levels associated with the envisaged discharge limits for the dismantling operations cited in 4.1 above:

annual average concentrations of activity in surface waters, at the points where such concentrations are highest, in the vicinity of the plant and in other affected Member States,

 

for the reference group(s) in the vicinity of the plant and in other affected Member States, corresponding annual exposure levels: effective dose to adults, children and infants, taking account of all significant exposure pathways.

5.   DISPOSAL OF SOLID RADIOACTIVE WASTE FROM THE INSTALLATION

5.1.   Solid radioactive wastes

categories of solid radioactive wastes and estimated amounts,

 

processing and packaging,

 

storage arrangements on site.

5.2.   Radiological risks to the environment

assessment of risks to the environment,

 

precautions taken.

5.3.   Off-site arrangements for the transfer of waste

5.4.   Release of materials from the requirements of the basic safety standards

national strategy, criteria and procedures for the release of contaminated and activated materials,

 

clearance levels established by competent authorities for disposal, recycling or reuse,

 

envisaged types and amounts of released materials.

6.   UNPLANNED RELEASES OF RADIOACTIVE EFFLUENTS

6.1.   Review of accidents of internal and external origin which could result in unplanned releases of radioactive substances

List of the accidents studied in the safety report

6.2.   Reference accident(s) taken into consideration by the competent national authorities for evaluating possible radiological consequences in the case of unplanned releases

Outline of the accident(s) considered and reasons for its (their) choice

6.3.   Evaluation of the radiological consequences of the reference accident(s)

6.3.1.   Accidents entailing releases to atmosphere

If the assessed maximum exposure levels from the reference accident to adults, children and infants in the vicinity of the plant are below 1 mSv and there are no exceptional pathways of exposure, e.g. involving the export of foodstuffs, no data on exposure levels in other affected Member States are required if exposure levels in the vicinity of the plant are provided.

assumptions used to calculate the releases to atmosphere,

 

release paths; time patterns of the releases,

 

amounts and physico-chemical forms of those radionuclides released which are significant from the point of view of health,

 

models and parameter values used to calculate for the releases their atmospheric dispersion, ground deposition, re-suspension and transfer via food chains and to evaluate the maximum exposure levels via the significant exposure pathways in the vicinity of the plant and for other affected Member States,

 

maximum time-integrated concentrations of radioactivity in the atmosphere near the ground and maximum surface contamination levels (in dry and wet weather) for the most exposed areas in the vicinity of the plant and for relevant areas in other affected Member States,

 

expected levels of radioactive contamination of foodstuffs which might be exported to other affected Member States,

 

corresponding maximum exposure levels: effective dose to adults, children and infants in the vicinity of the plant and in relevant areas of other affected Member States taking account of all significant exposure pathways.

6.3.2.   Accidents entailing releases into an aquatic environment

If the assessed maximum exposure levels from the reference accident to adults, children and infants close to the plant are below 1 mSv and there are no exceptional pathways of exposure, e.g. involving the export of foodstuffs, no data on exposure levels in other affected Member States are required if exposure levels in the vicinity of the plant are provided.

assumptions used to calculate the liquid release,

 

release paths, time pattern of releases,

 

amounts and physico-chemical forms of those radionuclides released which are significant from the point of view of health,

 

models and parameters used to calculate for the releases their aquatic dispersion, their transfer by sedimentation and ion exchange, their transfer via food chains and to evaluate the maximum exposure levels via the significant exposure pathways,

 

expected levels of radioactive contamination of foodstuffs which might be exported to other affected Member States,

 

corresponding maximum exposure levels: effective dose to adults, children and infants living in the vicinity of the plant and in relevant areas of other affected Member States taking account of all significant exposure pathways.

7.   EMERGENCY PLANS, AGREEMENTS WITH OTHER MEMBER STATES

In relation to possible radiological emergencies which may affect other Member States in order to facilitate the organisation of radiological protection in these States:

Brief description of:

intervention levels established for different types of countermeasures,

 

emergency planning arrangements, including the emergency planning zones adopted for the installation,

 

arrangements in place for the early exchange of information with other Member States, bilateral or multilateral agreements on transfrontier information, coordination of emergency plans and their implementation and mutual assistance,

 

emergency plan testing arrangements with particular reference to the involvement of other Member States.

In the case of reactors no data are required if all nuclear fuel has been transferred off-site to a licensed facility or to an on-site storage facility, on which an opinion has already been given under the terms of Article 37.

8.   ENVIRONMENTAL MONITORING

external radiation monitoring,

 

monitoring of radioactive substances in air, water, soil and the food chains, whether undertaken by the operator or by competent authorities.

With reference to 3.1 and 4.1 above, monitoring programs as approved by the competent national authorities, organisation, sample forms and frequency, type of monitoring instruments used in normal and accident circumstances; where appropriate, any collaboration arrangements in this respect with neighbouring Member States.



(1)  Affected Member States are to be selected by taking into account distance from the installation, wind direction for gaseous effluent releases and the route of water courses for liquid effluent releases.



ANNEX IV

General data applicable to the operations referred to in point 1(10)

The emplacement of radioactive waste above or under the ground without intention of retrieval

Introduction

general presentation of the waste emplacement plan,

 

general presentation of the repository, type and class of waste,

 

present stage of project and licensing procedure, envisaged commissioning and licensing steps,

 

timescale, envisaged starting date, operational period and closure date.

1.   THE SITE AND ITS SURROUNDINGS

1.1.   Geographical, topographical and geological features of the site and the region with

a map of the region showing the location and geographical coordinates (degrees, minutes) of the site,

 

the relevant features of the region, including geological features,

 

the location of the repository in relation to such other installations, the discharges from which need to be considered in conjunction with those from the installation in question,

 

the location of the site with regard to other Member States giving the distances from frontiers and closest conurbations, together with their populations,

 

anticipated changes in geography and topography over the time period considered for the assessment of post-closure impact.

1.2.   Geology and seismology

geological setting,

 

active tectonic processes, historical earthquakes, the degree of seismic activity in the region; probable maximum seismic activity,

 

structural and geotechnical soil characteristics, soil liquefaction (as appropriate),

 

surface processes (landslides and erosion) (1),

 

anticipated changes in geology over the time period considered for the assessment of post-closure impact.

1.3.   Hydrology and hydrogeology

A brief description of hydrological features providing a potential contamination pathway to another Member State:

regional and local water tables and their seasonal variations,

 

ground water flow direction and velocity, water discharge and extraction points,

 

existing and projected major water users, location of the repository with respect to potential potable water aquifers,

 

brief description of the surface water bodies (rivers, lakes, estuary, water abstraction, floodplains, etc.) and littoral areas (as appropriate),

 

average, maximum and minimum water flows and their frequency of occurrence (as appropriate),

 

chemical composition of ground water,

 

flood risk and protection of the installation (as appropriate),

 

anticipated changes in hydrology, hydrogeology over the time period considered for the assessment of post-closure impact.

1.4.   Meteorology and climate

A brief description of climate and meteorological features:

wind directions and speeds,

 

precipitation intensity (rain and snow) and duration,

 

temperature (average, minimal and maximal),

 

atmospheric dispersion conditions,

 

extreme weather phenomena (for example, tornadoes, severe storms, heavy rainfalls, droughts) (1),

 

anticipated changes of climate (for example, glacial effects, potential impact of global warming), and, for coastal sites, sea level changes and coastal erosion over the time period considered for the assessment of post-closure impact.

1.5.   Natural resources and foodstuffs

A brief description of:

water utilisation in the region and as appropriate in neighbouring Member States,

 

principal food resources in the region and as appropriate in other Member States: crops, stock breeding, fishing and, for discharges into sea, data on fishing in territorial and extraterritorial waters,

 

foodstuff distribution system and particularly the export to other Member States from the regions concerned, in so far as they are related to the risk of exposure from discharges through the significant exposure pathways,

 

assumptions made on future population patterns, habits and food sources.

1.6.   Other activities in the vicinity of the site

where appropriate, other nuclear facilities and any hazardous industrial or military activities, surface and aerial traffic, pipelines, storages and any other factors which may have an influence on the safety of the installation,

 

protection measures (as appropriate),

 

anticipated evolution of activities over the time period considered for the assessment of long-term impact.

2.   THE REPOSITORY

2.1.   Conceptual approach and design

disposal concept,

 

depth and location in relation to geological strata (as appropriate)  (2),

 

design criteria for natural phenomena,

 

waste emplacement methods, backfill and sealing strategy and methods,

 

safety approach: role of the geological and engineered barriers,

 

closure of repository,

 

approach to retrievability of waste (if applicable),

 

auxiliary waste treatment, conditioning and buffer storage facilities to be constructed at the site of the repository.

2.2.   Wastes to be disposed of in the repository

types of waste,

 

waste form, applied conditioning methods and characteristics of waste packages (as appropriate),

 

waste inventory; amounts and radionuclide activities,

 

potential heat generation, potential gas generation, potential criticality (as appropriate),

 

waste acceptance requirements/criteria, waste package verification procedure and techniques to ensure compliance with established waste acceptance criteria.

2.3.   Ventilation systems and the treatment of gaseous and airborne wastes

Description of ventilation, filtration and discharge systems, in normal conditions and in the case of an accident (as appropriate)

2.4.   Drainage system and the treatment of liquid effluents

Description of potentially contaminated water collection, drainage and discharge systems, in normal conditions and in the case of an accident (as appropriate)

2.5.   Management of secondary solid and liquid waste in normal conditions and in the case of an accident

categories of secondary liquid and solid radioactive waste and estimated amounts,

 

storage and transportation of waste,

 

treatment of waste.

3.   RELEASE FROM THE INSTALLATION OF AIRBORNE RADIOACTIVE EFFLUENTS IN NORMAL CONDITIONS

During normal operation of waste disposal facilities only very minor releases of radioactive substances, if any, are expected and significant exposure of members of the public is not anticipated. Therefore this section is not applicable if there is no authorisation for radioactive discharges granted. However, if radionuclide discharge limits are prescribed and discharge monitoring is in place, the general data must be submitted according requirements specified in Section 3 of Annex II.

4.   RELEASE FROM THE INSTALLATION OF LIQUID RADIOACTIVE EFFLUENTS IN NORMAL CONDITIONS

During normal operation of waste disposal facilities only very minor releases of radioactive substances, if any, are expected and significant exposure of members of the public is not anticipated. Therefore this section is not applicable if there is no authorisation for radioactive discharges granted. However, if radionuclide discharge limits are prescribed and discharge monitoring is in place, the general data must be submitted according requirements specified in Section 4 of Annex II.

5.   DISPOSAL OF SOLID RADIOACTIVE WASTE FROM THE INSTALLATION

This section is normally not applicable.

6.   UNPLANNED RELEASES OF RADIOACTIVE EFFLUENTS

6.1.   Review of accidents of internal and external origin which could result in unplanned releases of radioactive substances. Accidents studied in the safety assessment report and evaluated radiological consequences in the case of unplanned releases.

6.2.   Evaluation of the radiological consequences of releases to atmosphere

If the assessed maximum exposure levels from the reference accident to adults, children and infants in the vicinity of the plant are below 1 mSv and there are no exceptional pathways of exposure, e.g. involving the export of foodstuffs, no data on exposure levels in other affected  (3) Member States are required if exposure levels in the vicinity of the plant are provided.

assumptions used to calculate the releases to atmosphere,

 

release paths; time patterns of the releases,

 

amounts and physico-chemical forms of those radionuclides released which are significant from the point of view of health,

 

models and parameter values used to calculate for the releases their atmospheric dispersion, ground deposition, re-suspension and transfer via food chains and to evaluate the maximum exposure levels via the significant exposure pathways in the vicinity of the plant and for other affected Member States,

 

maximum time-integrated concentrations of radioactivity in the atmosphere near the ground and maximum surface contamination levels (in dry and wet weather) for the most exposed areas in the vicinity of the plant and for relevant areas in other affected Member States,

 

expected levels of radioactive contamination of foodstuffs which might be exported to other affected Member States,

 

corresponding maximum exposure levels: effective dose to adults, children and infants living in the vicinity of the plant and in relevant areas of other affected Member States taking account of all significant exposure pathways.

6.3.   Evaluation of the radiological consequences of releases into an aquatic environment

If the assessed maximum exposure levels from the reference accident to adults, children and infants close to the plant are below 1 mSv and there are no exceptional pathways of exposure, e.g. involving the export of foodstuffs, no data on exposure levels in other affected Member States are required if exposure levels in the vicinity of the plant are provided.

assumptions used to calculate the liquid release,

 

release paths, time pattern of releases,

 

amounts and physico-chemical forms of those radionuclides released which are significant from the point of view of health,

 

models and parameters used to calculate for the releases their aquatic dispersion, their transfer by sedimentation and ion exchange, their transfer via food chains and to evaluate the maximum exposure levels via the significant exposure pathways,

 

expected levels of radioactive contamination of foodstuffs which might be exported to other affected Member States,

 

corresponding maximum exposure levels: effective dose to adults, children and infants living in the vicinity of the plant and in relevant areas of other affected Member States taking account of all significant exposure pathways.

7.   EMERGENCY PLANS; AGREEMENTS WITH OTHER MEMBER STATES

In relation to possible radiological emergencies which may affect other Member States in order to facilitate the organisation of radiological protection in these States:

Brief description of:

intervention levels established for different types of countermeasures,

 

emergency planning arrangements, including the emergency planning zones adopted for the installation,

 

arrangements in place for the early exchange of information with other Member States, bilateral or multilateral agreements on transfrontier information, coordination of emergency plans and their implementation and mutual assistance,

 

emergency plan testing arrangements with particular reference to the involvement of other Member States.

8.   POST-CLOSURE PERIOD

The different post-closure phases (e.g. active and passive institutional control phases) should be taken into account where appropriate.

8.1.   Regulatory and administrative provisions

plans for the repository closure,

 

time periods considered (periods of active and passive institutional control),

 

description of measures foreseen for active institutional control period,

 

description of measures foreseen for passive institutional control period,

 

record-keeping,

 

dismantling programme for auxiliary installations,

 

periodical safety reviews before closure.

8.2.   Radiological impact during post-closure period

If the assessed maximum exposure levels from releases resulting from normal evolution and from early degradation of barriers to adults, children and infants in the vicinity of the installation are below 1 mSv per annum and there are no exceptional pathways of exposure, e.g. involving the export of foodstuffs, no data on effective doses in other affected Member States are required if doses to reference groups in the vicinity of the plant are provided.

redundancy and performance of barriers (if relevant),

 

time periods considered,

 

analysed features, events and processes, description of scenarios assumed (brief descriptions of the normal evolution scenario, most relevant degraded evolution scenarios and human intrusion scenarios),

 

methods and techniques used for assessment of radiological impact,

 

parameters and assumptions,

 

main exposure pathways in vicinity of repository and other affected Member States resulting from normal evolution and for early degradation of barriers,

 

activity and timing of radionuclide release,

 

corresponding maximum exposure levels: effective doses and/or estimated risks to adults, children and infants living in the vicinity of the plant and in relevant areas of other affected Member States taking account of all significant exposure pathways,

 

evaluation of the uncertainties.

9.   ENVIRONMENTAL MONITORING

operational monitoring of external radiation and radioactive substances in air, water, soil and the food chains, whether undertaken by the operator or by competent authorities (sample forms and frequency, type of monitoring instruments used in normal and accident circumstances),

 

guidelines for post-closure monitoring of radioactive substances in air, water, soil and the food chains, whether undertaken by the operator or by competent authorities (1),

 

any collaboration arrangements with neighbouring Member States in respect of environmental monitoring.

Notes:



(1)  Relevant for new surface repositories only.

(2)  Relevant for geological repositories only.

(3)  Affected Member States are to be selected by taking into account distance from the installation, wind direction for gaseous effluent releases and the route of water courses for liquid effluent releases.



ANNEX V

General data applicable to modifications of a plan on which an opinion has already been given

STANDARD FORM

1.
Name and location of the facility concerned:

 

2.
Date of the Commission’s Opinion:

 

3.
Brief description of the planned modifications:

 

4.
Authorised discharge limits in the existing plan, and other relevant conditions:

 

4.1.
Gaseous effluents:

 

4.2.
Liquid effluents:

 

4.3.
Solid waste:

 

5.
New discharge limits envisaged by the authorities, including modifications in the assumed radionuclide composition, and other relevant conditions:

 

5.1.
Gaseous effluents:

 

5.2.
Liquid effluents:

 

5.3.
Solid waste:

 

6.
Consequences of the new discharge limits and associated requirements (gaseous and/or liquid effluents) in relation to the evaluation of the exposure of the population in other Member States:

 

7.
Consequences of the modifications in relation to the disposal of solid waste:

 

8.
Consequences of the modifications in relation to the reference accident(s) taken into account in the previous opinion:

 

9.
In the case of new reference accident(s): description and evaluation of the radiological consequences:

 

10.
Implications of the modifications in relation to the current emergency plans and the current environmental monitoring:



ANNEX VI

General data applicable to modifications of a plan on which no opinion has been given yet

Introduction

general presentation of the plan,

 

present stage of licensing procedure.

1.   THE SITE AND ITS SURROUNDINGS

1.1.   Geographical, topographical and geological features of the site and the region with

a map of the region showing the location and geographical coordinates (degrees, minutes) of the site,

 

the relevant features of the region, including geological features,

 

the location of the installation in relation to such other installations, the discharges from which need to be considered in conjunction with those from the installation in question,

 

the location of the site with regard to other Member States giving the distances from frontiers and closest conurbations, together with their populations.

1.2.   Hydrology

Data mentioned in this section 1.2 are required only if the modification of the discharges from the plant of liquid radioactive effluents in normal conditions envisages less restrictive authorised limits or associated requirements than in the existing plan or if the potential consequences of the reference accident(s) entailing releases into an aquatic environment are increased.

For an installation situated near to a waterbody providing a potential contamination pathway to another Member State, a brief description of appropriate hydrological features, extending to the other Member State(s), for example:

brief description of the path(s), tributaries, estuary, water abstraction, floodplains, etc.,

 

average, maximum and minimum water flows and their frequency of occurrence,

 

brief description of the littoral areas,

 

direction and force of currents, tides, circulation patterns, both local and regional.

1.3.   Meteorology

Data mentioned in this section 1.3 are required only if the modification of the discharges from the plant of gaseous radioactive effluents in normal conditions envisages less restrictive authorised limits or associated requirements than in the existing plan or if the potential consequences of the reference accident(s) entailing releases to atmosphere are increased.

Local climatology with frequency distributions of:

wind directions and speeds,

 

precipitation intensity and duration,

 

for each wind sector, atmospheric dispersion conditions, duration of temperature inversions,

 

extreme weather phenomena (for example, tornadoes, severe storms, heavy rainfall, droughts).

1.4.   Natural resources and foodstuffs

Brief description of:

water utilisation in the region and as appropriate in neighbouring Member States,

 

principal food resources in the region and as appropriate in other Member States: crops, stock breeding, fishing, hunting and, for discharges into sea, data on fishing in territorial and extraterritorial waters,

 

foodstuff distribution system and particularly the export to other Member States from the regions concerned, in so far as they are related to the risk of exposure from discharges through the significant exposure pathways.

2.   THE INSTALLATION

brief description of the installation,

 

type, purpose and main features of the processes,

 

site layout plan,

 

safety provisions,

 

waste treatment,

 

relevant details of the modification.

3.   RELEASE FROM THE INSTALLATION OF AIRBORNE RADIOACTIVE EFFLUENTS IN NORMAL CONDITIONS

Data mentioned in this section 3 are required only if the modification of the discharges from the plant of gaseous radioactive effluents in normal conditions envisages less restrictive authorised limits or associated requirements than in the existing plan.

3.1.   Authorisation procedure in force

outline of the procedure in force,

 

current authorisation limits,

 

discharge limits and associated requirements envisaged by the authorities, including the assumed radionuclide composition.

3.2.   Technical aspects

annual discharges expected,

 

composition and physico-chemical forms of the radioactive effluents,

 

management of these effluents, methods and paths of release.

3.3.   Monitoring of discharges

sampling, measurement and analysis of discharges, whether undertaken by the operator or by competent authorities,

 

principal features of the monitoring equipment,

 

alarm levels, intervention actions (manual and automatic).

3.4.   Evaluation of transfer to man

If the assessed maximum exposure levels from releases in normal conditions to adults, children and infants in the vicinity of the plant are below 10 μSv per annum and there are no exceptional pathways of exposure, e.g. involving the export of foodstuffs, no data on effective doses in other affected Member States are required if doses to the reference groups in the vicinity of the plant are provided.

3.4.1.   Models, including where appropriate generic models, and parameter values used to calculate the consequences of the releases in the vicinity of the installation and for other affected (1) Member States:

atmospheric dispersion of the effluents,

 

ground deposition and re-suspension,

 

food chains, inhalation, external exposure, etc.,

 

living habits (diet, exposure time, etc.),

 

other parameter values used in the calculations.

3.4.2.   Evaluation of the concentration and exposure levels associated with the envisaged discharge limits cited in 3.1 above:

annual average concentrations of activity in the atmosphere near the ground and surface contamination levels, for the most exposed areas in the vicinity of the plant and in other affected Member States,

 

for the reference group(s) in the vicinity of the plant and in other affected Member States, corresponding annual exposure levels: effective dose to adults, children and infants, taking account of all significant exposure pathways.

3.5.   Radioactive discharges to atmosphere from other installations

Procedures for coordination with radioactive discharges from other installations referred to in 1.1, third indent

4.   RELEASE FROM THE INSTALLATION OF LIQUID RADIOACTIVE EFFLUENTS IN NORMAL CONDITIONS

Data mentioned in this section 4 are required only if the modification of the discharges from the plant of liquid radioactive effluents in normal conditions envisages less restrictive authorised limits or associated requirements than in the existing plan.

4.1.   Authorisation procedure in force

outline of the general procedure involved,

 

current authorisation limits,

 

discharge limits and associated requirements envisaged by the authorities, including the assumed radionuclide composition.

4.2.   Technical aspects

annual discharges expected,

 

composition and physico-chemical forms of the radioactive effluents,

 

management of the effluents, methods and paths of release.

4.3.   Monitoring of discharges

sampling, measurement and analysis of discharges, whether undertaken by the operator or by competent authorities,

 

principal features of monitoring equipment,

 

alarm levels, intervention actions (manual and automatic).

4.4.   Evaluation of transfer to man

If the assessed maximum exposure levels from releases in normal conditions to adults, children and infants in the vicinity of the plant are below 10 μSv per annum and there are no exceptional pathways of exposure, e.g. involving the export of foodstuffs, no data on effective doses in other affected Member States are required if doses to reference groups in the vicinity of the plant are provided.

4.4.1.   Models, including where appropriate generic models, and parameter values used to calculate the consequences of the releases in the vicinity of the plant and for other affected Member States:

aquatic dispersion of the effluents,

 

their transfer by sedimentation and ion exchange,

 

food chains, inhalation of sea spray, external exposure, etc.,

 

living habits (diet, exposure time, etc.),

 

other parameter values used in the calculations.

4.4.2.   Evaluation of concentration and exposure levels associated with the discharge limits cited in 4.1 above:

annual average concentrations of activity in surface waters, at the points where such concentrations are highest, in the vicinity of the plant and in other affected Member States,

 

for the reference group(s) in the vicinity of the plant and in other affected Member States: effective dose to adults, children and infants, taking account of all significant exposure pathways.

4.5.   Radioactive discharges into the same receiving waters from other installations

Procedures for coordination with discharges from other installations referred to in 1.1, third indent

5.   DISPOSAL OF SOLID RADIOACTIVE WASTE FROM THE INSTALLATION

Data mentioned in this section 5 are required only if the modification of the disposal from the plant of solid radioactive waste in normal conditions envisages less restrictive authorised limits or associated requirements than in the existing plan.

5.1.   Solid radioactive waste

categories of solid radioactive waste and estimated amounts,

 

processing and packaging,

 

storage arrangements on site.

5.2.   Radiological risks to the environment

assessment of risks to the environment,

 

precautions taken.

5.3.   Off-site arrangements for the transfer of waste

5.4.   Release of materials from the requirements of the basic safety standards

national strategy, criteria and procedures for the release of contaminated or activated materials,

 

clearance levels established by competent authorities for disposal, recycling and reuse,

 

envisaged types and amounts of released materials.

6.   UNPLANNED RELEASES OF RADIOACTIVE EFFLUENTS

Data mentioned in this section 6 are required only if the potential consequences of the reference accident(s) are increased.

6.1.   Review of accidents of internal and external origin which could result in unplanned releases of radioactive substances

List of the accidents studied in the safety report

6.2.   Reference accident(s) taken into consideration by the competent national authorities for evaluating possible radiological consequences in the case of unplanned releases

Outline of the accident(s) considered and reasons for its (their) choice

Impact of the modification on the reference accident(s)

6.3.   Evaluation of the radiological consequences of the reference accident(s)

6.3.1.   Accidents entailing releases to atmosphere

Data mentioned in this section 6.3.1 are required only if the potential consequences of the reference accident(s) entailing releases to atmosphere are increased.

If the assessed maximum exposure levels from the reference accident to adults children and infants in the vicinity of the plant are below 1 mSv and there are no exceptional pathways of exposure, e.g. involving the export of foodstuffs, no data on exposure levels in other affected Member States are required if exposure levels in the vicinity of the plant are provided.

assumptions used to calculate the releases to atmosphere,

 

release paths; time patterns of the releases,

 

amounts and physico-chemical forms of those radionuclides released which are significant from the point of view of health,

 

models and parameter values used to calculate for the releases their atmospheric dispersion, ground deposition, re-suspension and transfer via food chains and to evaluate the maximum exposure levels via the significant exposure pathways in the vicinity of the plant and for other affected Member States,

 

maximum time-integrated concentrations of radioactivity in the atmosphere near the ground and maximum surface contamination levels (in dry and wet weather) for the most exposed areas in the vicinity of the plant and for relevant areas in other affected Member States,

 

expected levels of radioactive contamination of foodstuffs which might be exported to other affected Member States,

 

corresponding maximum exposure levels: effective dose to adults, children and infants living in the vicinity of the plant and in relevant areas of other affected Member States taking account of all significant exposure pathways.

If not already submitted under heading 3.3:

sampling, measurement and analysis of discharges, whether undertaken by the operator or by competent authorities,

 

principal features of the monitoring equipment,

 

alarm levels, intervention actions (manual and automatic).

6.3.2.   Accidents entailing releases into an aquatic environment

Data mentioned in this section 6.3.2 are required only if the potential consequences of the reference accident(s) entailing releases into an aquatic environment are increased.

If the assessed maximum exposure levels from the reference accident to adults children and infants close to the plant are below 1 mSv and there are no exceptional pathways of exposure, e.g. involving the export of foodstuffs, no data on exposure levels in other affected Member States are required if exposure levels in the vicinity of the plant are provided.

assumptions used to calculate the liquid release,

 

release paths, time pattern of releases,

 

amounts and physico-chemical forms of those radionuclides released which are significant from the point of view of health,

 

models and parameters used to calculate for the releases their aquatic dispersion, their transfer by sedimentation and ion exchange, their transfer via food chains and to evaluate the maximum exposure levels via the significant exposure pathways,

 

expected levels of radioactive contamination of foodstuffs which might be exported to other affected Member States,

 

corresponding maximum exposure levels: effective dose to adults, children and infants living in the vicinity of the plant and in relevant areas of other affected Member States taking account of all significant exposure pathways.

If not already submitted under heading 4.3:

sampling, measurement and analysis of discharges, whether undertaken by the operator or by competent authorities,

 

principal features of the monitoring equipment,

 

alarm levels, intervention actions (manual and automatic).

7.   EMERGENCY PLANS; AGREEMENTS WITH OTHER MEMBER STATES

In relation to possible radiological emergencies which may affect other Member States in order to facilitate the organisation of radiological protection in these States

Brief description of:

intervention levels established for different types of countermeasures,

 

emergency planning arrangements, including the emergency planning zones adopted for the installation,

 

arrangements in place for the early exchange of information with other Member States, bilateral or multilateral agreements on transfrontier information, coordination of emergency plans and their implementation and mutual assistance,

 

emergency plan testing arrangements with particular reference to the involvement of other Member States.

8.   ENVIRONMENTAL MONITORING

Relevant information in relation with the modification



(1)  Affected Member States are to be selected by taking into account distance from the installation, wind direction for gaseous effluent releases and the route of water courses for liquid effluent releases.