US National Security Adviser John Bolton, widely thought to be behind
the recent mobilisation of the USS
Abraham Lincoln aircraft carrier to the Arabian Sea, under the control of
CentCom (US Central Command in the Middle East) and the sending of B-52 strategic bombers to the US air base al-Udeid in the south-west of
Doha, Qatar, was reported to have asserted that these deployments were in response to “Iran’s worrying behaviours,”
[with the aim of sending] “a clear
message to the Iranian regime that any attack on the interests of the United
States or its allies will be met with unrelenting power.”
Even US President Trump quipped to the White
House press corps on Thursday: “I actually temper John, which is pretty amazing.”
Then on Sunday Trump himself tweeted
a very bellicose warning to Iran. “If Iran wants to fight, that will be the official end of Iran.
Never threaten the United States again!” He was repeating a warning he issued
in July last year,in a Tweet in capita letters that shouted: “NEVER, EVER
THREATEN THE UNITED STATES AGAIN OR YOU WILL SUFFER CONSEQUENCES THE LIKES OF
WHICH FEW THROUGHOUT HISTORY HAVE EVER SUFFERED BEFORE.”
“Trump: ‘If Iran
wants to fight, that will be the official end of Iran’ Politico, 19 May 2019;
Frightening
times.
But Iran
is not taking criticisms its international security policies quietly, and has diplomatically fought back. Ironically
the place where it has done so most forcibly
has been a diplomatic review committee
at the United Nations in New York, held over end of April and start of
May.
At the
Preparatory Committee for next year’s Review Conference for the 1968 Nuclear
Non Proliferation Treaty (NPT) [for which Iran was the first state to ratify in
1970], Iranian
delegate Bahram Shahaboddin said in his closing statement that nonnuclear
weapon states were “completely frustrated by the 50-year lack of progress on
nuclear disarmament,” and continuing delaying tactics by the nuclear powers”
adding robustly “We must not allow this to happen
again. In 2020, we must say loud and clear enough is enough. He singled out the
United States for spending $1.2 trillion on its nuclear arsenal and “brazenly”
threatening nonnuclear weapon states with nuclear weapons.” (“US says agreement
will be tough at 2020 Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty review,” AP, 11 May
2019; https://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2019/05/11/world/u-s-says-agreement-will-tough-2020-nuclear-nonproliferation-treaty-review/#.XOG5OKZYaM8)
When the PrepCom meeting
finished on 10 May, US Ambassador Robert
Wood said reaching agreement at the 2020 conference “will be an incredibly
difficult task.” but was “one we cannot abandon.”
The
entire two week diplomatic negotiation at the UN in New York on the most
pressing security issue of the century -
extinction threat from the multiple use of nuclear WMDs- inexplicably received
zero media coverage in the UK.
Malaysia’s
U.N. Ambassador Syed Mohd Hasrin Tengku Hussin, chair of the PrepCom told a news conference at the finish of the
meeting that delegates “do not agree on everything but remain committed to full
implementation” of the NPT, and talked about “how to accelerate measures to a
nuclear-free world.”
Citing
“significant challenges,” he noted that the meeting took place “at a time of
increasing international tension and deteriorating relationships between those
countries that possess nuclear weapons” — the U.S., Russia, China, Britain and
France.
Hussin
also singled out differences between nuclear weapon and nonnuclear weapon
states on disarmament.
Rebecca
Johnson, a security analyst - and founding president of the International
Campaign to Abolish Nuclear Weapons which won the 2017 Nobel Peace Prize - observed:
“The real questions for 2020 are going to be about the nuclear risks and
treaties under threat from a few narcissistic leaders who are pulling out of
them in order to keep proliferating and deploying nuclear weapons. Their
dangerous actions undermine not only the NPT … which we need to protect
humanity from nuclear war, but climate catastrophes that threaten security for
all of us.”
The UK
presented the PrepCom with an extraordinary self-serving draft so-called
compliance document, replete with errors of omission, commission and downright
hypocritical distortion (“National Report Pursuant to Actions 5, 20, and 21 of
the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) 2010 Review Conference Final
Document; Report submitted by the
United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland https://undocs.org/NPT/CONF.2020/PC.III/7)
It opened with
this assertion and invitation. “This is a draft document which we share with a
wide audience to gather feedback on what we are doing well and what we could do
differently. We will then produce a final version of the report for the Review
Conference next year.”
I have thus
picked out some of its more egregious errors.
The document
states boldly in its first paragraph:” The report outlines our commitment to
achieving our long-term goal of a world without nuclear weapons by highlighting
our efforts on disarmament, verification and safeguards. We firmly believe the
best way to achieve this is through gradual nuclear disarmament, negotiated
using a step-by-step approach within existing international frameworks, taking
into account current and future security risks.”
Since the UK
negotiated the NPT text in the mid-1960s, along with the then two other
permanent UN Security council members prepared to sign the treaty, the US and
former Soviet Union – France and China joined later - not one UK nuclear
warhead or missile has been withdrawn form service as a result of bilateral or
multilateral negotiations. All removals have been unilateral. Yet Article 6 of
the NPT sets out:
“Each of the Parties to the Treaty undertakes to pursue negotiations in
good faith on effective
measures relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date
and to nuclear
disarmament …under strict and effective international control.”
It is obvious the UK
has had no intention of fulfilling this obligation (despite early commitments
prior to signing th etreaty to do so),
nor does the current Conservative Government have any plans do so either. For
example, the recently sacked Defence Secretary Gavin Williamson told
MPs in Defence Questions on 14 January this year that “We constantly have discussions right
across Government to make sure that our continuous at-sea nuclear deterrence
can be sustained… and will continue to do so in the long term.. our nuclear
deterrent has kept Britain, and also our NATO partners, safe over 50 years… We
have to recognise the need to invest in a whole spectrum of different
capabilities, [including] nuclear deterrence..” (https://hansard.parliament.uk/commons/2019-01-14/debates/B155F4FA-6BB4-40FF-B8A5-F3E3F96E7BC1/Vanguard-ClassLifeExtensionProgramme)
Post 1968 when the UK signed the NPT, the UK possession and
deployment of nuclear WMDs was no longer solely a UK national security issue,
but an international legal nuclear disarmament obligation.
Let
me demonstrate, using materials extracted from British Official diplomatic
papers I discovered in the British National Archives the differences
between British official disarmament promises recorded for posterity and
contrast those with the subsequent belligerent nuclear practice of
development and deployment of Polaris and its replacement Trident nuclear
WMD systems, in violation of clear NPT commitments and on-the-record
pledges.
A
memorandum prepared by the Foreign Office in advance of the visit to London of
the then Soviet premier, Alexei Kosygin, in February 1967, included the
following final paragraph:
“We assume that
the Soviet Union regard, as we do, the proposed review conference (for the NPT)
as being an adequate assurance to the non-nuclears that the military
nuclear powers are serious about the need for action on nuclear disarmament.”
Nearly a year later, on 18
January 1968, Fred Mulley MP, the then Labour Minister of State for Disarmament
at the Foreign Office, told the 358th Plenary meeting of the
Eighteen Nation Disarmament Committee (ENDC) - the forerunner to the
present day UN Committee on Disarmament (CD) - in respect of the then
proposed Article 6 of the nascent NPT:
“My own Government have
consistently held that the [Nuclear Nonproliferation] Treaty should
and must lead to such [nuclear ] disarmament.” (emphasis added).
He added:” If it is fair
to describe the danger of proliferation as an obstacle to disarmament, it is
equally fair to say that without some progress in disarmament, the NPT will not
last….As I have made clear in previous speeches my Government accepts the
obligation to participate fully in the negotiations required by Article 6 and
it is our desire that these negotiations should begin as soon as possible
(emphasis added) and should produce speedy and successful results. There is no
excuse now for allowing a long delay to follow the signing of this Treaty, as
happened after the Partial Test Ban Treaty, before further measures can be
agreed and implemented.”
Mr Mulley subsequently
wrote a confidential memorandum to the British Cabinet Defence and Overseas
Policy Committee (OPD(68)6), on 26 January 1968, in which he set out the then
policy position on NPT article 6 (which at this stage in negotiations did not
yet include the clause “at an early date”):
“A number of countries may
withhold their ratification of the Treaty until the nuclear weapon states show
they are taking seriously the obligations which this Article imposes upon them.
It will therefore be essential to follow the Treaty up quickly with
further nuclear disarmament measures (emphasis added) if it is to
be brought into force and remain in force thereafter.”
The UK government’s contemporary
NPT ‘compliance paper makes this self-serving assertion in favour of nuclear
weapons as instruments of national defence:
“The UK independent
nuclear deterrent will remain essential to our security today, and for as long
as the global security situation demands. Other states continue to maintain
significant nuclear arsenals and there is a continuing risk of further
proliferation of nuclear weapons. Recent changes in the international security
environment remind us that there remains a risk that states might use their
nuclear capability to threaten the UK, or our vital interests. The existence of
states who engage in provocative nuclear rhetoric; rely on doctrine that promotes
the use of nuclear weapons; and develop new delivery capabilities designed to
undermine strategic stability are a constant reminder that our independent
nuclear deterrent remains essential to deter the most extreme threats to our
national security and that of our Allies.”
In so doing it unintentionally
demonstrates the illogic of decades of extreme “bad faith” – which in itself is
extraordinary as the UK is a depositary state charged with protecting and
promoting the furtherance of the aims of the NPT.
The paper also states this
demonstrable falsehood in a section purporting to be on Reporting on national measures relating to the peaceful uses of nuclear
energy:
“The UK was the first
country to establish a civil nuclear industry with the opening of the Calder
Hall reactor in 1956.”
This is fake news of the
very worst sort, as Calder Hall was designed, developed and used as a plutonium
manufacturing plant for material for the nuclear warhead stockpile. This is
documented fact, of which the authors of the UK ‘compliance paper’ are, to be
charitable, incompetently ignorant, or more probably, mendaciously misleading.
In
fact it was clearly stated at the time of the plant’s opening, in a remarkable
little book entitled Calder Hall: The Story of Britain’s First Atomic Power
Station, written by Kenneth Jay, and published by the Government’s Atomic
Energy Research Establishment at Harwell to mark Calder’s commissioning in
October 1956. Mr Jay wrote:
Major
plants built for military purposes such as Calder Hall are being used as
prototypes for civil plants . . . the plant has been designed as a dual-purpose
plant to produce plutonium for military purposes as well as electric power . .
. it would be wrong to pretend that the civil programme has not benefitted
from, and is not to some extent dependent upon, the military programme."
When Washington and Whitehall
charge Iran with telling untruths about the real facts of its nuclear programme,
they should first look at their own extremely challengeable and distorted record.
Queen Elizabeth II opened Calder Hall on October 17 1956 and delegates
from 48 countries gathered at the nuclear
site for the ceremony.
BACKSTORY
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International peace and disarmament is arguably in
crisis. Much of this can be ascribed to the United States’ reckless
trashing of past arms control agreements. Earlier this month, the world
learned that next to its withdrawal from the Joint Comprehensive Plan
of Action (JCPOA) with Iran and Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces
(INF) Treaty, the US administration announced that
it will revoke its signature from the Arms Trade Treaty. This affront
to multilateralism also creates space for other countries to consider
their own participation in these agreements. Against this backdrop, “it
becomes extremely challenging to understand how to advance peace
and security,” as Ray Acheson observes in one of her editorials of
the NPT News in Review during
this month’s nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) Preparatory
Committee. However, the challenge to multilateralism can also generate
activism and diplomacy to preserve and enhance our collective security
in new, creative ways. Those believing in diplomacy and cooperation
seem to draw even more energy, resilience, and courage from the
destructive behaviour of a few. During the NPT PrepCom, for example,
many non-nuclear armed states, energised by their common achievement of
the adoption of the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons
(TPNW), rallied behind each other with a fierceness rarely seen before
to ensure that the draft outcome of the meeting reflected the position
of the majority rather than the minority. While by no means easy to
sustain, this attitude should give us hope that peace and security can
be achieved, and that the tide is slowly but surely changing against
the few nuclear-armed states and their nuclear-supportive allies.
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NPT PrepCom: Non-nuclear armed states took a strong
stance for nuclear disarmament and gender considerations have increased
considerably
The Third Preparatory Committee
of the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) took
place from 29 April to 11 May in New York. This was the last
preparatory meeting before the Review Conference in 2020. The
Reaching Critical Will team provided extensive coverage of the meeting,
including live Tweeting and
regular editions of the NPT News in Review.
As usual, we made all relevant conference documents and statements available
on our website.
 As in past
years, RCW coordinated the NGO presentation segment, delivered on 1
May. You can find all statements, including WILPF’s statement on gender and the NPT,
on the website. Reaching Critical Will also organised morning briefings
with government representatives for civil society. Prior to the
conference, Reaching Critical Will published its 2019 NPT briefing book,
and its 2019 edition of Assuring destruction
forever.
(Picture: The Reaching Critical Will team and Alicia Sanders-Zakre
from Arms Control Association who supported the team during the two
weeks.)
The third PrepCom is among other things tasked with trying to adopt
recommendations for the upcoming Review Conference. The Chair produced
two draft texts. According to the majority of participants, the second
draft better reflected the majority view in the room, particularly on issues
related to nuclear disarmament. The nuclear-armed states were irate
that their view, that the “security environment” is not ripe for any
further action on disarmament, was not reflected in the document. Since
they could not be adopted by consensus, the draft recommendations were
put into a Chair’s working paper to be submitted to the RevCon. While
not perfect, the second draft of the recommendations includes good
language on the deep concerns over the humanitarian consequences of
nuclear weapons, on the complementarity of the Treaty on the
Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW) with the NPT, on the active
encouragement of states parties to support gender diversity in their
delegations, and on the central importance of implementing obligations
and commitments to accomplish nuclear abolition.
Gender considerations received heightened attention this year
throughout the PrepCom. Various states raised the disproportionate
impact of nuclear weapons on women and girls, the need for increased
diversity of participation in NPT discussions, and Ireland called
on states parties to promote “discourse that overcomes gendered
stereotypes about power and security.” Many working papers and side
events addressed different aspects of gender in the NPT. RCW’s Ray
Acheson participated as panellist in the side event Gender
and the NPT: building momentum to 2020 and beyond, organised
by Ireland, that attracted a broad and diverse audience and that
sparked rich and honest discussions.
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Outside of UN conference rooms, broad public support for
the abolition of nuclear weapons continues to rise
While the majority of diplomats and civil society
trapped in windowless UN conference rooms stood their ground against
the few nuclear-armed bullies and their allies, much has also happened
meanwhile outside of UN walls!
Prior to the start of this year’s PrepCom, more than 100  International
Campaign to Abolish Nuclear Weapons (ICAN) activists met in New
York and strategised together on the way forward to ensure that the
Treaty on the Prohibition on Nuclear Weapons (TPNW) enters into force
as quickly as possible. Campaigners left the meeting energised and
committed as ever to advance the nuclear ban. On Earth Day, 22 April,
ICAN and others mobilised for
the elimination of nuclear weapons in light of its immense destructive
power it would have on life on earth. And on 10 May, great news came
from Germany’s capital: Berlin has joined the ICAN cities
appeal. This is especially powerful as Berlin is also a
federal state.
 Great
resources rallying for the nuclear ban continue to pop up
everywhere. The International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC)
just published its Treaty Ratification Kit,
and PAX and ICAN released their report Producing mass destruction:
Private companies and the nuclear weapons industry. It
finds, amongst others, that governments have more than $116 billion in
contracts with private companies to make key components of nuclear
weapons, and it calls out 28 companies that are heavily involved in the
nuclear weapon industry. As we near the entry into force of the TPNW,
these companies will move further into the spotlight, and should
therefore immediately cease their involvement in the development,
testing and production of nuclear weapons.
Lastly, stay tuned for the world premiere of the documentary Nuclear Weapons: the
beginning of the end featuring RCW’s Ray Acheson
along with many other ICAN activists and ban treaty diplomats. The film
will be shown on 6 June at 7PM in Village East Cinema, New York, and registration is
still open! Pressenza, that produced the documentary, encourages anybody that’s
interested to organise a showing in your own city.
(Picture credits: ICAN & PAX)
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Protecting civilians from the use of explosive weapons
in populated areas
On 23 May, the UN Security Council will mark the twentieth anniversary
of the adoption of resolution 1265 (1999) with
an open debate on the protection of civilians. Twenty years after the
Security Council included the protection of civilians as an item in its
agenda, immense work remains to be done. The original mandate was motivated,
among other things, by the Council’s “deep concern” at the erosion of
respect for international humanitarian law during armed conflict. This
erosion has since continued. Many items will be up for discussion
during the open debate. One that WILPF’s disarmament programme is
focusing on is the use of explosive weapons in populated areas, which
has devastating impacts on human beings and the physical and social
infrastructure of cities, towns, and communities. The UN
Secretary-General once again raises this issue in his protection of civilians
report released on 7 May 2019. He highlights attacks on
civilians and civilian objects using explosive weapons, including in
Central African Republic, Syria, and Yemen. In the report, he
reiterates his call on all parties to conflict to avoid the use of
explosive weapons in populated areas and expresses his support for the
development of a political declaration that would commit states to
this. He also welcomes the decision of Austria to host an international
conference in October 2019 to raise awareness of the problem of
explosive weapons in populated areas and encourages UN member states to
participate constructively to initiate a process to draft a
declaration.
Ahead of the debate, the International Network on
Explosive Weapons (INEW), of which WILPF is a member,
released an updated briefing paper on
this issue. In it, we call on states to acknowledge the humanitarian
suffering caused by the use of explosive weapons in populated areas,
endorse the UN Secretary-General and International Committee of the Red
Cross’ recommendation that states should “avoid the use of explosive
weapons with wide area effects in populated areas,” and indicate
support for the development of a political instrument to stop the use
of explosive weapons in populated areas and provide a framework for
victim assistance.
WILPF has consistently highlighted the gendered harms and other human rights
violations that can be caused by the use of explosive
weapons in populated areas. We continue to call on states to end this
practice and to also end arms transfers where
there is a risk of the use of explosive weapons in populated areas.
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Featured news
Tensions rise amidst US withdrawal from Iran nuclear deal
A year after US withdrawal from the Joint Nuclear Plan of Action
(JCPOA), Iran’s deputy foreign minister informed that
Iran’s “patience is running out.” He called out the United States’
“bullying behavior” and its violation of UN Security Council resolution
2231, which endorsed the JCPOA. Iran’s president announced that
the country would begin scaling back curbs to its nuclear programme in
60 days if countries did not shield it from US unilateral and unlawful
sanctions. An Israeli cabinet minister warned of possible
direct or proxy Iranian attacks on Israel should the lack of agreement
between Tehran and Washington escalate. United Kingdom’s Jeremy
Hunt expressed concern at
an unintended escalation, and called for a “a period of calm so that
everyone understands what the other side is thinking”. European
signatories to the agreement reaffirmed their support for
the JCPOA but rejected Iran’s two-month deadline, and urged Iran to
continue implementing the agreement. In the meantime, the US has approved the
deployment of Patriot missiles to the Middle East, just months after the
Pentagon removed several Patriot batteries from the Middle
East. The US also recently re-imposed economic sanctions on Iran
targeting the country’s energy and banking sectors.
US administration proposes new arms control agreement with Russia
and China but China isn’t interested
After US withdrawal from the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty
(INF), the US administration proposed a trilateral
nuclear arms-control agreement that would bring
Russia’s nuclear weapons unregulated by treaties under new limits, and
to limit or verify China’s nuclear capabilities for the first time.
However, China indicated that
it has no interest in negotiating a nuclear control treaty with the
United States and Russia.
New report: the UK House of Lords International Relations Committee
on the rising threat of nuclear weapons use
The International Relations Committee published its report “Rising nuclear risk,
disarmament and the Nuclear Non Proliferation Treaty.” It
called on the UK government to endorse the principle that “a nuclear
war cannot be won and must never be fought,” urging the UK government
to address the grave concerns about the deteriorating state of nuclear
diplomacy.
US administration announces its withdrawal from the Arms Trade
Treaty
The US president announced at
the National Rifle Association’s annual meeting that it will “revoke
the effect of America’s signature from this badly misguided Treaty.”
The US signed the Arms Trade Treaty (ATT) in 2013 under President
Barack Obama but has never been ratified by US lawmakers. The Treaty
regulates international trade in conventional arms and seeks to prevent
and eradicate illicit trade and diversion of conventional arms. The US
administration has not yet decided whether it will continue to attend
international conferences or contribute funds related to the
Treaty.
China considers joining Arms Trade Treaty
The Chinese Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Geng Shuang announced that
China considers joining the ATT as it supports the Treaty’s goals.
After the US’ withdrawal from the ATT, China said that it hoped that
relevant countries can do more to strengthen the mechanism of
international arms control and safeguard international and regional
peace and stability.
Lebanon becomes 102nd state party to the Arms Trade Treaty
On 9 May, Lebanon deposited its instrument of ratification with the
United Nations. It is the second ATT state party in the Middle East
after Palestine’s accession in 2017. Following the deposit ceremony,
Ambassador Amal Mudallali of Lebanon stated that,
“Lebanon, who knows too well the pain and suffering that conflict and
arms bring to humanity, is proud to become the 102nd State Party to the
Arms Trade Treaty today. There are millions of people suffering from
the consequences of unregulated trade in conventional arms around the
world, and the Arms Trade Treaty gives hope to address this.”
France confirms contested arms exports to Saudi Arabia
The French government confirmed a new shipment of
weapons to Saudi Arabia, despite claims that Saudi
Arabia is using French arms in the Yemen war. France’s Defence Minister
Parly refused to identify the types of arms but reaffirmed France’s
stance that they have been used only for defensive purposes by Saudi
Arabia.
Brazil’s President signs decree easing gun imports
President Jair Bolsonaro signed a decree to
ease restrictions on gun imports and increase the amount of ammunition
a person can buy. The decree had initially been designed to ease
restrictions for collectors, marksmen and hunters but was expanded to
include other provisions. The decree raised a limit on ammunition
purchases to 5,000 cartridges per year for normal guns. The previous
cap was 50 cartridges per year for average citizens, with discretionary
limits for soldiers, police, hunters and some other categories left to
the Brazilian military.
Teachers in Florida can now arm themselves under new gun bill
Legislature in Florida passed a bill allowing
teachers to carry guns in the classroom, expanding a program launched
after the deadly high school shooting in Parkland with the aim of
preventing another massacre. Florida’s House of Representatives voted
65 to 47 to pass the bill after hours of debate in which the Republican
majority thwarted Democratic efforts to amend or stop the measure.
Republican Governor Ron DeSantis is expected to sign the bill into law,
enabling school districts wishing to take part in the voluntary
Guardian program to arm teachers who pass a 144-hour training
course.
Report finds that US-led coalition airstrikes in Raqqa killed at
least 1,6000 civilians
Amnesty International, along with the monitoring group Airwars,
released a report on
the US-led coalition’s air and artillery campaign during the four-month
offensive to retake the Raqqa, Syria, in 2017. The report found that
the coalition strikes killed at least 1,6000 civilians. The coalition
had admitted responsibility for having killed 159 civilians in Raqqa.
World military expenditure grows to $1.8 trillion in 2018
The Stockholm International Research Institute (SIPR) released
its 2018 report on
world military expenditures which has risen to $1822 billion in 2018,
representing an increase of 2.6 per cent from 2017.The five biggest
spenders in 2018 were the United States, China, Saudi Arabia, India,
and France, accounting together for 60 per cent of global military
spending.
Global Campaign on Military Spending concluded successfully
The Global Day(s) of Action on
Military Spending (GDAMS) took place from 13 April to 9
May under the slogan Demilitarise: invest in People’s Needs!Almost
20 countries participated in this year’s campaign, with at least 60
actions. Civil society, activists, and academics from all over the
world organised a wide range of different activities, from vigils,
protests, conferences, online campaigns, and exhibitions, raising
awareness about the counter-productive results of military expenditure.
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Recommended reading
Gilbert Holleufer, “The masculine condition in
contemporary warfare,” Humanitarian Law and Policy,
International Committee of the Red Cross, 14 May 2019
Christine Ahn, “More US Pressure on North
Korea is not the Path to Denuclearisation,” Truthout,
9 May 2019
Jon Schwarz, “How to dismantle the
absurd profitability of nuclear weapons,” The
Intercept, 4 May 2019
Producing mass destruction:
Private companies and the nuclear weapons industry,
PAX/International Campaign to Abolish Nuclear Weapons (ICAN), 2 May
2019
Mary Wareham, “Mary Wareham: Why NZ
should ban killer robots”, Radio New Zealand, 1
May 2019
Frank Slijper, Alice Beck, and Daan Kayser,“State of AI—Artificial
intelligence, the military and increasingly autonomous weapons,” PAX,
April 2019
Madeleine Rees, “On UN Security Council
Resolution 2467,” Women’s International League for
Peace and Freedom, 30 April 2019
Bonnie Docherty, “Clinic Reports Show
Benefits of Joining the Nuclear Weapon Ban Treaty Outweigh Concerns,”
30 April 2019
International Peace Institute, “Policy, Promise, and
Pitfalls: Women, Peace, and Security in 2020,” 18 April
2019
International Human Rights Clinic of Harvard, “Victim Assistance and
Environmental Remediation in the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear
Weapons—Myths and Realities,” April 2019
United Nations Office of Disarmament Affairs, “Civil Society and
Disarmament 2018—Advocacy by Non-Governmental Organisations to
Strengthen the United Nations Programme of Action on Small Arms and
Light Weapons,” 2018
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Reflections from the Non-Proliferation Treaty Preparatory Committee Meeting
Our Research Fellow in proliferation and
nuclear policy has just returned from the latest meeting of the Preparatory
Committee for the review of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty in an
optimistic mood.
Between the 29 April and 10 May, states parties to
the Treaty on Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons
(NPT) met for the final Preparatory Committee (PrepCom) before the
treaty Review Conference (RevCon) in 2020. The atmosphere at the meeting seemed
surprisingly positive, despite enduring hurdles to the adoption of a consensus
document in 2020. As representatives of many states pointed out, there is
increased pressure on the 2020 RevCon to produce a ‘successful’ outcome. This,
in part, is a result of the slow progress on disarmament efforts by the nuclear
weapons states (NWS), but also because 2020 marks the 50th anniversary of the
entry into force of the NPT, and 25 years since states parties agreed to its
indefinite extension. There have been many debates over what a ‘successful’
RevCon might look like, often predicated on achieving a consensus document. But
during the most recent PrepCom, a statement by Japan was much more poignant:
‘the world is expecting a meaningful outcome of 2020’. The common themes at the
first week of the PrepCom meeting indicate four areas that can contribute to a
‘meaningful’ outcome for 2020 and that can be sustained beyond the RevCon:
transparency; verification; progressing disarmament; and risk reduction.
Transparency
Transparency was regularly cited by states parties
as a priority action point. The UK has taken initiative in this space,
publishing a draft implementation
report for the PrepCom, and holding a side event during the
first week to solicit feedback. The group of states that make up the Non-Proliferation and Disarmament Initiative (NPDI)
have also championed transparency, drafting a reporting format to help guide
states to produce common and comparable national implementation reports, which
was submitted as a working
paper to this year’s PrepCom. The format proposed by the NPDI
differs slightly from that used by the UK, which follows the format agreed to
by the P5 Process (the permanent, veto-power members of the UN Security
Council). However, the differences in report formatting should not be a
barrier; while a check-list is helpful, a written report should be viewed as
the start of transparency, not the end product. Efforts to be transparent need
to go beyond paper to include dialogue between the NWS and between the NWS and
non-nuclear weapons states (NNWS).
At present, some states do not view transparency as
a process. For example, although France referred to transparency, it was done
so by highlighting the information that could be found in open sources and
supported by the circulation of a document that outlines French nuclear policy
and capabilities written by a non-governmental expert. This approach dismisses
the purpose of transparency – not an information sharing exercises as an end in
itself, but one which builds trust and confidence between all states parties.
Verification
Disarmament verification work was also a prominent
feature of the NPT PrepCom. The recently concluded Group of Governmental Experts (GGE) on
disarmament verification seems to have made a valuable contribution, raising
political awareness of this technical work. Up until 2014 when the US launched
the International Partnership for Nuclear Disarmament
Verification, technical work on verification had been limited
to a small number of states. Although the IPNDV includes around 25
participants, it still struggles to consistently included a wider range of
countries: this outcome is partly due to limited resources; partly due to weak
political buy-in from all states.
Although at present the verification tools required
are not attached to implementing a specific treaty, technical work can make
progress to ensure that when a disarmament treaty is negotiated , the technical
tools to implement it are available.
However, because of the relatively exclusive nature
of this work and its technical focus, verification has not earned the attention
it deserves. The GGE, tasked with advancing political discussions not technical
progress, has helped to improve this. During the PrepCom a Norwegian statement,
informed by the GGE, proposed setting up a trust fund under
the UN Office for Disarmament Affairs: a pot of money that lower-resourced
states could use to support their regular engagement with technical
verification work to strengthen inclusivity and improve the relationships
between NWS and NNWS within the NPT. The ongoing challenge here will be China's
and Russia’s lacking participation. During the PrepCom Russia stated that without a negotiated treaty
to underpin this work, technical work on verification is premature.
Progressing Disarmament
In debating how to progress disarmament, the
PrepCom meeting re-highlighted the question of prioritising the implementation
of previously agreed actions over new initiatives. Many states called on the
NWS to fully implement the 13 Steps and the 2010 Action Plan which call for the
entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, as well as a
reduction in stockpiles and in the prominence of nuclear weapons in security
doctrines. Alternatively, some states have proposed new initiatives for
progress in disarmament, such as the US’s Creating the Environment for Nuclear Disarmament,
and the announcement of the Swedish initiative
to support implementation of Article 6 of the NPT, both of which will formally
kick off this summer.
Reducing Nuclear Risks
The debate on progressing disarmament was also
coupled with a discussion on the efforts to reduce nuclear weapons stockpiles
relative to the value of policy changes to support disarmament. However, this
conversation was made increasingly difficult by the US statement declaring that numerical
reductions have ‘gone as far as [they] can’ in the current environment. Still,
the US did also note that space for dialogue remains, complementing a growing conversation on nuclear risk
reduction. This discussion also reflects the multi-faceted nature of
disarmament, recognising that it is not just about numerical reductions but
changes to nuclear weapons policies which are likely to reduce the NWS’
reliance on these capabilities.
Towards 2020 and Beyond
Efforts to promote transparency are not a one-time offering
and must be thought of as part of an ongoing dialogue. A key part of this will
be ensuring that the NWS are able to engage with each other and with the NNWS
actively. The opportunity created by the UK provides a great example of how to
action this, which will hopefully be carried beyond this review cycle. Given
that transparency did feature frequently in PrepCom discussions, the NWS should
be encouraged to follow the UK’s lead here.
Of course, technical work on disarmament
verification will not be sufficient to fulfil disarmament commitments, but it
should be an enduring key component. At a minimum, the current level of
technical work should be maintained, and the efforts of the GGE to broaden
political engagement should be bolstered. Ways to take this forward will
hopefully be clearer once the GGE report is published.
Engaging in dialogue on risk reduction should be
prioritised. It provides an opportunity to reconsider the conversation on the
humanitarian impacts of nuclear weapons and reaffirm negative security
assurances – two issues raised by many in the PrepCom. At a minimum all states
parties, but especially the NWS, should restate in 2020 that ‘nuclear war can
never be won and must never be fought’. Although China did re-state this at the PrepCom,
widespread reaffirmation was lacking.
The PrepCom demonstrated that states parties are
willing to work hard to maintain the NPT process. Although a consensus outcome
for the 2020 RevCon remains far from assured, the 2019 PrepCom has laid the
foundations to a more positive outlook. And it has spurred creative thinking.
Cristina Varriale is a
Research Fellow in the Proliferation and Nuclear Policy group at RUSI.
BANNER IMAGE: Opening remarks
by the US delegation at the 2018 PrepCom. Courtesy of US Mission to Geneva/Eric
Bridie
The views expressed in this
Commentary are the author’s, and do not necessarily reflect those of RUSI or
any other institution.
NPT/CONF.2020/PC.III/CRP.4/Rev.1 Preparatory Committee for the 2020 Review Conference
of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons 9 May 2019 English only
Third session
New York, 29
April–10 May 2019
Recommendations
to the 2020 Review Conference
The
Preparatory Committee reaffirms the need to continue to move with determination
towards the
full
implementation of the provisions of the Treaty and realisation of its
objectives, and accordingly conveys to the 2020 Review Conference the following
recommendations for consideration, without prejudice to the work of the Review
Conference:
1. Reaffirm
commitment to the Treaty, and its full and urgent implementation, and the
continued validity of the commitments and undertakings of past review
conferences, bearing in mind, inter alia, the 50th Anniversary of its entry into force, and the 25th Anniversary of its indefinite extension.
2. Reaffirm
the conviction that the Treaty is the cornerstone of the global nuclear
disarmament and non-proliferation regime, is integral to international peace
and security and facilitates international cooperation on peaceful uses of
nuclear energy.
3. Reaffirm
that the full, non-discriminatory and balanced implementation of the three
pillars of the Treaty remains essential for promoting its credibility and
effectiveness and in realizing its objectives.
4. Reaffirm
commitment to the full implementation of the provisions of the Treaty and
realisation of its objectives, as well as the reaffirmation of the previous
commitments made within the NPT framework, including the 1995 Review and
Extension Conference, the Final Document of the 2000 Review Conference and the
conclusions and recommendations for follow-on action of the 2010 Review
Conference.
5. Reaffirm
the responsibility of all States parties to the full implementation of the
Treaty and the importance of open, inclusive and transparent dialogue to
achieve this end.
6. Express
concern at the erosion of the treaty-based disarmament architecture and
underscore the mutually reinforcing relationship of its relevant treaties. NPT/CONF.2020/PC.III/ CRP.4/Rev.1
2/8
I. Nuclear Disarmament
7. Reaffirm
the commitment by all States parties to the full and effective implementation
of Article VI of the Treaty, and the unequivocal undertaking by the
nuclear-weapon States to accomplish the total elimination of their nuclear
arsenals leading to nuclear disarmament, to which all States parties are
committed under article VI of the Treaty and call for immediate action by the
nuclear-weapon States to comply with their relevant obligations.
8. Reaffirm
the commitment by all States parties, especially the nuclear-weapon States, to
pursue policies that are fully compatible with the Treaty and the objective of
achieving a world without nuclear weapons.
9. Call for
accelerated actions by the nuclear-weapon States in accomplishing the total
elimination of their nuclear arsenals, in an irreversible, transparent and
verifiable manner.
10. Reaffirm
the importance of the preservation and continued implementation of bilateral
arms control agreements between the Russian Federation and the United States,
and the need for urgent progress in this regard, including the extension of the
Treaty on Measures for the Further Reduction and Limitation of Strategic
Offensive Arms (the New START Treaty) and the negotiation of a successor
agreement leading to further reductions.
11. Reaffirm
the essential contribution of nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation to
international peace and security.
12. Call for
concrete and measureable steps to reduce the alert status of nuclear weapon
systems in a way that promotes international stability and security, with a
view to the total elimination of nuclear weapons.
13. Call for
the elaboration of measures that can contribute to building confidence and to
reduce the risk of the use of nuclear weapons, either intentionally, by
miscalculation, or by accident, in the context of achieving nuclear
disarmament.
14. Encourage
States parties to report to the 2020 Review Conference and the next review
cycle on their implementation of the Treaty, including commitments undertaken
during previous review cycles, and to agree to make future regular national
reports at specified frequencies to enhance transparency; call on nuclear-weapon
States to agree on a standard reporting form, and also call on all States
parties to use a reporting form that ensures national reports provide accurate,
up-to-date, complete and comparable information; and encourage sufficient time
to be allocated at the 2020 Review Conference and during the next review cycle
for interactive discussions on the substance of national reports.
15. Call on
nuclear-weapon States to cease the development of new types of nuclear weapons,
and refrain from qualitative improvements to existing nuclear weapons, and
further minimize the role and significance of nuclear weapons in all military
and security concepts, doctrines and policies, with a view to their total
elimination.
16. Reiterate
the deep concern at the catastrophic humanitarian consequences of nuclear
weapons, including any intentional or accidental nuclear explosion and call for
further consideration to prevent the devastation that would be visited upon all
humanity by a nuclear war and the consequent need to make every effort to avert
the danger of such a war and to take measures to safeguard the security of
peoples; and reaffirm the need for all States at all times to comply with
applicable international law, including international humanitarian law.
17. Call for
the entry into force as soon as possible of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban
Treaty (CTBT), recalling the responsibility of all States to promote that
Treaty; call for NPT/CONF.2020/PC.III/
CRP.4/Rev.1
3/8
the urgent signature and/or ratification of the CTBT by the
remaining eight Annex 2 States necessary for the entry into force of the CTBT,
highlighting the special responsibility of the nuclear-weapon States in this
regard; reaffirm, pending the entry into force of the CTBT, the need to
maintain moratoria on nuclear test explosions and to refrain from any action
that could defeat the objective and purpose of the CTBT; and calls for
increased support for the Provisional Technical Secretariat and the
International Monitoring System.
18. Call for
the immediate commencement of negotiations at the Conference on Disarmament, on
a verifiable, non-discriminatory comprehensive convention banning nuclear
weapons and other nuclear explosive devices.
19. Call for
the immediate commencement of negotiations at the Conference on Disarmament, on
a verifiable, non-discriminatory and universal treaty banning the production of
fissile material for use in nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices.
20. Call for
the immediate commencement of negotiations at the Conference on Disarmament, of
effective international legally binding arrangements to assure non-nuclear
weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons.
21.
Acknowledge the need for a legally-binding norm to prohibit nuclear weapons in
order to achieve and maintain a world without nuclear weapons.
22.
Acknowledge the support by many States parties for the Treaty on the
Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons and its complementarity to the NPT.
23. Reaffirm
that effective and credible nuclear disarmament verification is essential to
achieving and maintaining a world without nuclear weapons and welcome ongoing
work in this regard aimed at promoting trust and confidence among
nuclear-weapon States and non-nuclear weapon States, as well as the development
of appropriate multilateral technical capabilities.
24. Support
the establishment of further nuclear-weapon-free zones and the entry into force
of all Protocols to nuclear-weapon-free zone treaties; as well as the review of
reservations and interpretive statements made by nuclear-weapon States in
connection to the aforementioned Protocols; and taking into account the Fourth
Conference of Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zones and Mongolia in April 2020.
II. Nuclear
Non-Proliferation
25. Reaffirm
that IAEA safeguards are a fundamental component of the nuclear
non-proliferation regime, play an indispensable role in the implementation of
the Treaty and help to create an environment conducive to nuclear cooperation.
26. Reaffirm
that the IAEA is the competent authority responsible for verifying and
assuring, in accordance with the Statute of IAEA and the IAEA safeguards
system, compliance by States parties with the safeguards agreements undertaken
in fulfilment of their obligations under Article III, paragraph 1, of the
Treaty and underscore that nothing should be done to undermine the authority of
the IAEA in this regard.
27. Urge
States party to the Treaty that have yet to bring into force comprehensive
safeguards agreements with the IAEA to do so as soon as possible and without
further delay. Encourage all States parties with small quantities protocols
that have not yet done so to amend or rescind them as soon as possible.
Encourage also all States parties that have not yet done so to conclude and to
bring into force additional protocols as soon as possible. NPT/CONF.2020/PC.III/ CRP.4/Rev.1
4/8
28. Encourage the IAEA to further facilitate and assist the
States parties upon request in the conclusion, entry into force and
implementation of comprehensive safeguards agreements and additional protocols.
Encourage also the IAEA and States parties to consider specific measures that
would promote the universalization of the comprehensive safeguards agreements,
and adherence to additional protocols.
29. Recognize
that comprehensive safeguards agreements have been successful in their main
focus of providing assurance regarding non-diversion of declared nuclear
material and have also provided a limited level of assurance regarding the
absence of undeclared nuclear material and activities. Note that the
implementation of measures specified in the model additional protocol provides,
in an effective and efficient manner, increased confidence about the absence of
undeclared nuclear material and activities in a State as a whole. Note also
that numerous States are of the view that those measures have been introduced
as an integral part of the IAEA safeguards system. Also note that it is the
sovereign decision of any State to conclude an additional protocol, but once in
force, the additional protocol is a legal obligation.
30. Note that
in the case of a State party with a comprehensive safeguards agreement
concluded pursuant to article III, paragraph 1, of the Treaty and supplemented
by an additional protocol in force, measures contained in both instruments
represent the enhanced verification standard for that State. Note that the
additional protocol represents a significant confidence-building measure.
31. Call upon
all States parties to ensure that the IAEA continues to have all political,
technical and financial support so that it is able to effectively meet its
responsibility to apply safeguards as required by Article III of the Treaty and
to support and implement decisions adopted by the IAEA’s Board of Governors
aimed at further strengthening the effectiveness and improving the efficiency
of IAEA safeguards.
32. Emphasize
the importance of maintaining the credibility, effectiveness, and integrity of
IAEA safeguards, and stress that safeguards implementation should remain
technically based, effective, transparent, non-discriminatory, and objective.
33. Encourage
States parties that have not yet done so to establish and implement effective
national rules and regulations and to make use of multilaterally negotiated and
agreed guidelines and understandings in developing their own national export
controls.
34. Call upon
all States parties, within their responsibility, to achieve and maintain highly
effective nuclear security, including physical protection, of nuclear and other
radioactive material at all stages in their life cycle and protect sensitive
information. Encourage all States parties, in their efforts to strengthen
nuclear security, to take into account and apply the IAEA’s Nuclear Security
Series publications.
35. Reaffirm the
central role of the IAEA in strengthening the nuclear security framework
globally and in coordinating international activities in the field of nuclear
security. Emphasize the need for States parties to continue providing
appropriate technical, human and financial resources, including through the
Nuclear Security Fund, for the IAEA to implement its nuclear security
activities and to enable the IAEA to provide the support needed by States.
36. Welcome
that the IAEA organized international conferences on nuclear security and look
forward to the International Conference on Nuclear Security to be held in
February 2020. NPT/CONF.2020/PC.III/
CRP.4/Rev.1
5/8
37. Encourage States parties that have not yet done so to
become party to Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material
(CPPNM) and its Amendment as soon as possible. Welcome efforts to promote
further adherence to the Amendment with the aim of its universalization. Note
the preparations for convening a conference to review the implementation of the
Amended CPPNM and encourage all parties to assist with preparations for such
conference, which is due to take place in 2021.
38. Encourage
States parties that have not yet done so to become parties to the International
Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism as soon as
possible. Call upon all States parties to implement fully the Convention and
relevant Security Council resolutions.
39. Call upon
all States parties to improve their national capabilities to prevent, detect,
deter and respond to illicit trafficking in nuclear and other radioactive
material throughout their territories, in accordance with their national
legislation and relevant international obligations. Call upon the States
parties in a position to do so to work to enhance international partnerships
and capacity-building in this regard.
III.
Peaceful uses of nuclear energy
40. Reaffirm
that nothing in the Treaty should be interpreted as affecting the inalienable
right of all the Parties to the Treaty to develop, research, production and use
of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes without discrimination and in
conformity with the Treaty and that States parties undertake to facilitate, and
have the right to participate in, the fullest possible exchange of equipment, materials
and scientific and technological information for the peaceful uses of nuclear
energy.
41. Urge that
in all activities designed to promote the peaceful uses of nuclear energy,
preferential treatment should be given to the non-nuclear weapon States parties
to the Treaty, taking into account in particular the needs of developing
countries. Emphasize that transfers of nuclear technology and international
cooperation among States parties in conformity with the Treaty should be
encouraged, and that they would be facilitated by eliminating undue constraints
that might impede such cooperation.
42. Note that,
when developing nuclear energy, including nuclear power, the use of nuclear
energy must be accompanied at all stages by commitments to, and ongoing implementation
of, safeguards as well as appropriate and effective levels of safety and
security, consistent with States parties’ national legislation and respective
international obligations.
43. Recognize
the indispensable role of science and technology, including nuclear science and
technology, in achieving social and economic development for all States
parties, as reaffirmed in the Ministerial Declaration adopted at the 2018 IAEA
Ministerial Conference on Nuclear Science and Technology. Underline the need
for enhanced international cooperation, including through the efforts of the
IAEA, to expand the extent that nuclear sciences and applications are utilized
to improve the quality of life and the well-being of the peoples of the world
including the achievement of the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development
(A/RES/70/1), as well as the objectives of the Paris Agreement on Climate
Change under the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change. Call on
the United Nations development system to work closely with the IAEA to maximize
the potential role of nuclear science and technology for development. NPT/CONF.2020/PC.III/ CRP.4/Rev.1
6/8
44. Commend the IAEA’s contribution to peace and development
under the motto “Atoms for Peace and Development”. Underline the role of IAEA
in assisting developing States parties in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy
through the development and delivery of effective and efficient programmes in
areas such as health and nutrition, food and agriculture, water and environment,
industrial applications and cultural heritage. Note with appreciation the
IAEA’s preparedness to respond to emergencies such as zoonotic disease
outbreaks as well as natural disasters.
45.
Acknowledge the development of competent human resources as a key component for
the sustainable use of nuclear energy and underline the importance of
collaboration with the IAEA, as well as among States parties, in that regard.
46.
Acknowledge the central role of the IAEA Technical Cooperation Programme (TCP)
in enhancing the application of nuclear science and technology in many States
parties, in particular, in developing countries, and recognizes the Technical
Cooperation Fund (TCF) as the most important mechanism for the implementation
of the IAEA TCP. Stress the need to make every effort and to take practical
steps to ensure that IAEA resources for technical cooperation activities are
sufficient, assured and predictable to meet the objectives set out in the
IAEA’s Statute.
47. Stress
that the IAEA TCP, as the main vehicles for the transfer of nuclear technology
for peaceful purposes, should continue to be formulated and implemented in
accordance with the IAEA’s Statute and the guiding principles, as contained in
INFCIRC/267, and in accordance with relevant directives of IAEA Policy-making
Organs.
48. Welcome
the completion of major construction under both Renovation of the Nuclear
Applications Laboratories (ReNuAL) and ReNuAL+ projects. Welcome the
contributions made by countries to this project and call upon States parties in
a position to do so to make appropriate contributions to support the completion
of the renovation of these Laboratories in Seibersdorf.
49.
Acknowledge that the IAEA Peaceful Uses Initiative (PUI) has become
instrumental in mobilizing extrabudgetary contributions to support technical
cooperation and other unfunded projects of the IAEA aimed at promoting broad
development goals in Member States. Welcome the contributions made by countries
to the PUI and encourage States parties in a position to do so to make
additional contributions
50.
Acknowledge that each State party has the right to define its national energy
policy and that nuclear power is expected to continue playing an important role
in the energy mix of many countries. Welcome IAEA support to interested Member
States building their national capacities in the operation of nuclear power
plants and those embarking on new nuclear power programmes.
51. Note
developments on further minimization of highly enriched uranium in civilian stocks
and the use of low enriched uranium. Encourage States parties concerned, on a
voluntary basis, to continue these efforts, where technically and economically
feasible.
52. Note the
significant progress made on the establishment of the IAEA Low Enriched Uranium
Bank in Kazakhstan. Note also that the creation of mechanisms for assurance of
nuclear fuel supply should not affect State parties’ rights under the Treaty
and should be without prejudice to their national fuel cycle policies, while
tackling the technical, legal and economic complexities surrounding these
issues, including, in this regard, the requirement of IAEA full scope
safeguards. NPT/CONF.2020/PC.III/
CRP.4/Rev.1
7/8
53. Reaffirm the central role of the IAEA in promoting
international cooperation on nuclear safety-related matters, including through
the establishment of nuclear safety standards. Welcome the work of the IAEA to
support regulatory bodies and other relevant areas of the nuclear
infrastructure of Member States, including through peer review services,
training and education programmes.
54. Call upon
States parties that had not yet done so to become party to the Convention on
Nuclear Safety, the Convention on Early Notification of a Nuclear Accident, the
Convention on Assistance in the Case of a Nuclear Accident or Radiological
Emergency, and the Joint Convention on the Safety of Spent Fuel Management and
on the Safety of Radioactive Waste Management.
55. Encourage
States parties to put in place a civil nuclear liability regime becoming party
to relevant international instruments or adopting suitable national
legislation, based on the principles established by the main pertinent
international instruments.
56. Underline
the importance to transport radioactive materials consistent with relevant
international standards of safety, security and the environment protection, and
encourage continued efforts to improve communication between shipping and
coastal States for the purpose of confidence-building and addressing concerns
regarding transport safety, security and emergency preparedness.
57. Recall
that all States should abide by the decision adopted by consensus at the IAEA
General Conference on 18 September 2009 on prohibition of armed attack or
threat of attack against nuclear installations, during operation or under
construction.
IV.
Regional Issues
58. Continue
efforts towards the full implementation and the realisation of the objectives
of the 1995 resolution on the Middle East and take into account the conference
for the negotiation of a binding treaty on the creation of a zone free of
nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction in the Middle East to be
held in 2019.
59. Note the
strong support for the continued implementation of Joint Comprehensive Plan of
Action as endorsed by United Nations Security Council resolution 2231. Stress
the need for all parties concerned to maintain their constructive engagement so
as to ensure that progress was made towards the full implementation of the
Plan.
60. Stress the
importance of maintaining peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula, as well
as of the peaceful and diplomatic resolution of the Democratic People’s
Republic of Korea nuclear issue, and encourage efforts towards continuing
dialogue and engagement for the full denuclearisation of the Korean Peninsula.
Stress that all States must fully implement the relevant United Nations
Security Council resolutions. Urge the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea to
abandon all nuclear weapons and existing nuclear programmes in a complete,
verifiable and irreversible manner, as required by relevant United Nations
Security Council resolutions. Reaffirm that the Democratic People’s Republic of
Korea cannot have the status of a nuclear-weapon State in accordance with the
Treaty. Urge the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea to return, at an early
date, to the Treaty and IAEA safeguards. Also urge the Democratic People’s
Republic of Korea to sign and ratify the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty.
NPT/CONF.2020/PC.III/
CRP.4/Rev.1
8/8
V. Universality and other provisions of the Treaty
61. Call upon
India, Israel and Pakistan to accede to the Treaty as non-nuclear weapon States
promptly and without conditions, and to bring into force comprehensive
safeguards agreements as required by the Treaty.
62. Call upon
South Sudan to accede, as soon as possible, to the Treaty.
63. Encourage
States parties to be represented at a high level at the 2020 NPT Review
Conference.
64. Without
supplanting substantive discussion, allocate time for discussion at the 2020
NPT Review Conference with a view to adopting recommendations designed to
strengthen the review process, note the various proposals made throughout the
sessions of the Preparatory Committee in this regard, and continue to improve
the effectiveness of the review process of the Treaty, inter alia through
the establishment of a working group that would explore these issues throughout
the next review cycle, and through implementing measures aimed at reducing
costs and increasing the efficiency of the review process; reaffirm the
continued implementation of Decision 1 adopted at the 1995 NPT Review and
Extension Conference and “Improving the effectiveness of the strengthened
review process for the Treaty” agreed at the 2000 NPT Review Conference.
65. Support
initiatives in the field of disarmament and non-proliferation education and
reaffirm that the overall objective of disarmament and non-proliferation
education is to impart knowledge and skills to individuals to empower them to
make their contribution to the achievement of concrete disarmament and
non-proliferation measures, with a view to achieving a world without nuclear
weapon.
66. Endorse
the fundamental importance of promoting the equal, full and effective
participation and leadership of both women and men in nuclear disarmament,
non-proliferation, and the peaceful use of nuclear energy. Encourage States
Parties, in accordance with United Nations Security Council Resolution 1325, to
actively support gender diversity in their NPT delegations and through support
for sponsorship programmes. Recognise the disproportionate impact of ionizing
radiation on women and girls.
67. Promote 26 September as
the International Day for the Total Elimination of Nuclear Weapons in order to
mobilize international efforts towards achieving the common goal of a
nuclear-weapons-free world.
