At
LSE last night (5 February) Professor Sir David Omand, former director of the UK
electronic intelligence gathering service,
GCHQ, told the audience of a seminar
titled ‘What have you got to hide?’ that
GCHQ can only read e-mails gathered from the huge meta data collection of
electronic communications with a ministerial warrant.
By
chance, yesterday the following Parliamentary question was also answered.
Electronic Surveillance
Hansard,
4 February 2014 : Column 192W
Paul Flynn: To ask
the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs on how many
occasions the Director of Government Communications Headquarters (GCHQ), or
other GCHQ staff acting on his behalf, has requested ministerial authorisation
to approve GCHQ reading the content of e-mails gathered as part of general
metadata collection since May 2010; and on how many occasions such requests
were turned down. [185759]
Hugh
Robertson: It is the long-standing policy of successive Governments not to
comment on matters of intelligence.
Brought
to the attention of the panelist, Labour MP Hazel Blears, a member of the Parliamentary
Intelligence and Security committee - appointed by the Prime Minister-said she
thought ministers should be more expansive in answering such questions.
Meantime
a month ago, US President Obama spent a
an hour telling Congress what changes he was making to open up US security and
intelligence policy following a recent independent review. This is what the said:
The White House
Office of the Press
Secretary
For
Immediate Release
January
17, 2014
Remarks by the
President on Review of Signals Intelligence
Department of Justice
Washington, D.C.
11:15 A.M. EST
THE PRESIDENT: At the dawn of our
Republic, a small, secret surveillance committee borne out of the “The Sons of
Liberty” was established in Boston. And the group’s members included Paul
Revere. At night, they would patrol the streets, reporting back any signs
that the British were preparing raids against America’s early Patriots.
Throughout American history,
intelligence has helped secure our country and our freedoms. In the Civil
War, Union balloon reconnaissance tracked the size of Confederate armies by
counting the number of campfires. In World War II, code-breakers gave us
insights into Japanese war plans, and when Patton marched across Europe,
intercepted communications helped save the lives of his troops. After the
war, the rise of the Iron Curtain and nuclear weapons only increased the need
for sustained intelligence gathering. And so, in the early days of the
Cold War, President Truman created the National Security Agency, or NSA, to
give us insights into the Soviet bloc, and provide our leaders with information
they needed to confront aggression and avert catastrophe.
Throughout this evolution, we benefited
from both our Constitution and our traditions of limited government. U.S.
intelligence agencies were anchored in a system of checks and balances -- with
oversight from elected leaders, and protections for ordinary citizens.
Meanwhile, totalitarian states like East Germany offered a cautionary tale of
what could happen when vast, unchecked surveillance turned citizens into
informers, and persecuted people for what they said in the privacy of their own
homes.
In fact, even the United States proved
not to be immune to the abuse of surveillance. And in the 1960s,
government spied on civil rights leaders and critics of the Vietnam War.
And partly in response to these revelations, additional laws were established
in the 1970s to ensure that our intelligence capabilities could not be misused
against our citizens. In the long, twilight struggle against Communism,
we had been reminded that the very liberties that we sought to preserve could
not be sacrificed at the altar of national security.
If the fall of the Soviet Union left
America without a competing superpower, emerging threats from terrorist groups,
and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction placed new and in some
ways more complicated demands on our intelligence agencies. Globalization
and the Internet made these threats more acute, as technology erased borders
and empowered individuals to project great violence, as well as great
good. Moreover, these new threats raised new legal and new policy
questions. For while few doubted the legitimacy of spying on hostile
states, our framework of laws was not fully adapted to prevent terrorist
attacks by individuals acting on their own, or acting in small, ideologically
driven groups on behalf of a foreign power.
The horror of September 11th brought
all these issues to the fore. Across the political spectrum, Americans
recognized that we had to adapt to a world in which a bomb could be built in a
basement, and our electric grid could be shut down by operators an ocean
away. We were shaken by the signs we had missed leading up to the attacks
-- how the hijackers had made phone calls to known extremists and traveled to
suspicious places. So we demanded that our intelligence community improve
its capabilities, and that law enforcement change practices to focus more on
preventing attacks before they happen than prosecuting terrorists after an
attack.
It is hard to overstate the
transformation America’s intelligence community had to go through after
9/11. Our agencies suddenly needed to do far more than the traditional
mission of monitoring hostile powers and gathering information for
policymakers. Instead, they were now asked to identify and target
plotters in some of the most remote parts of the world, and to anticipate the
actions of networks that, by their very nature, cannot be easily penetrated
with spies or informants.
And it is a testimony to the hard work
and dedication of the men and women of our intelligence community that over the
past decade we’ve made enormous strides in fulfilling this mission.
Today, new capabilities allow intelligence agencies to track who a terrorist is
in contact with, and follow the trail of his travel or his funding. New
laws allow information to be collected and shared more quickly and effectively
between federal agencies, and state and local law enforcement.
Relationships with foreign intelligence services have expanded, and our
capacity to repel cyber-attacks have been strengthened. And taken
together, these efforts have prevented multiple attacks and saved innocent
lives -- not just here in the United States, but around the globe.
And yet, in our rush to respond to a
very real and novel set of threats, the risk of government overreach -- the
possibility that we lose some of our core liberties in pursuit of security --
also became more pronounced. We saw, in the immediate aftermath of 9/11,
our government engaged in enhanced interrogation techniques that contradicted
our values. As a Senator, I was critical of several practices, such as
warrantless wiretaps. And all too often new authorities were instituted
without adequate public debate.
Through a combination of action by the
courts, increased congressional oversight, and adjustments by the previous
administration, some of the worst excesses that emerged after 9/11 were curbed
by the time I took office. But a variety of factors have continued to
complicate America’s efforts to both defend our nation and uphold our civil
liberties.
First, the same technological advances
that allow U.S. intelligence agencies to pinpoint an al Qaeda cell in Yemen or
an email between two terrorists in the Sahel also mean that many routine
communications around the world are within our reach. And at a time when
more and more of our lives are digital, that prospect is disquieting for all of
us.
Second, the combination of increased
digital information and powerful supercomputers offers intelligence agencies
the possibility of sifting through massive amounts of bulk data to identify
patterns or pursue leads that may thwart impending threats. It’s a
powerful tool. But the government collection and storage of such bulk
data also creates a potential for abuse.
Third, the legal safeguards that
restrict surveillance against U.S. persons without a warrant do not apply to
foreign persons overseas. This is not unique to America; few, if any, spy
agencies around the world constrain their activities beyond their own
borders. And the whole point of intelligence is to obtain information
that is not publicly available. But America’s capabilities are unique,
and the power of new technologies means that there are fewer and fewer
technical constraints on what we can do. That places a special obligation
on us to ask tough questions about what we should do.
And finally, intelligence agencies
cannot function without secrecy, which makes their work less subject to public
debate. Yet there is an inevitable bias not only within the intelligence
community, but among all of us who are responsible for national security, to
collect more information about the world, not less. So in the absence of
institutional requirements for regular debate -- and oversight that is public,
as well as private or classified -- the danger of government overreach becomes
more acute. And this is particularly true when surveillance technology
and our reliance on digital information is evolving much faster than our laws.
For all these reasons, I maintained a
healthy skepticism toward our surveillance programs after I became
President. I ordered that our programs be reviewed by my national
security team and our lawyers, and in some cases I ordered changes in how we
did business. We increased oversight and auditing, including new
structures aimed at compliance. Improved rules were proposed by the
government and approved by the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court.
And we sought to keep Congress continually updated on these activities.
What I did not do is stop these
programs wholesale -- not only because I felt that they made us more secure,
but also because nothing in that initial review, and nothing that I have
learned since, indicated that our intelligence community has sought to violate
the law or is cavalier about the civil liberties of their fellow citizens.
To the contrary, in an extraordinarily
difficult job -- one in which actions are second-guessed, success is
unreported, and failure can be catastrophic -- the men and women of the
intelligence community, including the NSA, consistently follow protocols
designed to protect the privacy of ordinary people. They’re not abusing
authorities in order to listen to your private phone calls or read your
emails. When mistakes are made -- which is inevitable in any large and
complicated human enterprise -- they correct those mistakes. Laboring in
obscurity, often unable to discuss their work even with family and friends, the
men and women at the NSA know that if another 9/11 or massive cyber-attack
occurs, they will be asked, by Congress and the media, why they failed to
connect the dots. What sustains those who work at NSA and our other
intelligence agencies through all these pressures is the knowledge that their
professionalism and dedication play a central role in the defense of our
nation.
Now, to say that our intelligence
community follows the law, and is staffed by patriots, is not to suggest that I
or others in my administration felt complacent about the potential impact of
these programs. Those of us who hold office in America have a
responsibility to our Constitution, and while I was confident in the integrity
of those who lead our intelligence community, it was clear to me in observing
our intelligence operations on a regular basis that changes in our
technological capabilities were raising new questions about the privacy
safeguards currently in place.
Moreover, after an extended review of
our use of drones in the fight against terrorist networks, I believed a fresh
examination of our surveillance programs was a necessary next step in our
effort to get off the open-ended war footing that we’ve maintained since
9/11. And for these reasons, I indicated in a speech at the National
Defense University last May that we needed a more robust public discussion
about the balance between security and liberty. Of course, what I did not
know at the time is that within weeks of my speech, an avalanche of
unauthorized disclosures would spark controversies at home and abroad that have
continued to this day.
And given the fact of an open
investigation, I’m not going to dwell on Mr. Snowden’s actions or his
motivations; I will say that our nation’s defense depends in part on the
fidelity of those entrusted with our nation’s secrets. If any individual
who objects to government policy can take it into their own hands to publicly
disclose classified information, then we will not be able to keep our people
safe, or conduct foreign policy. Moreover, the sensational way in which
these disclosures have come out has often shed more heat than light, while
revealing methods to our adversaries that could impact our operations in ways
that we may not fully understand for years to come.
Regardless of how we got here, though,
the task before us now is greater than simply repairing the damage done to our
operations or preventing more disclosures from taking place in the
future. Instead, we have to make some important decisions about how to
protect ourselves and sustain our leadership in the world, while upholding the
civil liberties and privacy protections that our ideals and our Constitution
require. We need to do so not only because it is right, but because the
challenges posed by threats like terrorism and proliferation and cyber-attacks
are not going away any time soon. They are going to continue to be a
major problem. And for our intelligence community to be effective over
the long haul, we must maintain the trust of the American people, and people
around the world.
This effort will not be completed
overnight, and given the pace of technological change, we shouldn’t expect this
to be the last time America has this debate. But I want the American
people to know that the work has begun. Over the last six months, I
created an outside Review Group on Intelligence and Communications Technologies
to make recommendations for reform. I consulted with the Privacy and
Civil Liberties Oversight Board, created by Congress. I’ve listened to
foreign partners, privacy advocates, and industry leaders. My
administration has spent countless hours considering how to approach
intelligence in this era of diffuse threats and technological revolution.
So before outlining specific changes that I’ve ordered, let me make a few broad
observations that have emerged from this process.
First, everyone who has looked at these
problems, including skeptics of existing programs, recognizes that we have real
enemies and threats, and that intelligence serves a vital role in confronting
them. We cannot prevent terrorist attacks or cyber threats without some
capability to penetrate digital communications -- whether it’s to unravel a
terrorist plot; to intercept malware that targets a stock exchange; to make
sure air traffic control systems are not compromised; or to ensure that hackers
do not empty your bank accounts. We are expected to protect the American
people; that requires us to have capabilities in this field.
Moreover, we cannot unilaterally disarm
our intelligence agencies. There is a reason why BlackBerrys and iPhones
are not allowed in the White House Situation Room. We know that the
intelligence services of other countries -- including some who feign surprise
over the Snowden disclosures -- are constantly probing our government and
private sector networks, and accelerating programs to listen to our
conversations, and intercept our emails, and compromise our systems. We
know that.
Meanwhile, a number of countries,
including some who have loudly criticized the NSA, privately acknowledge that
America has special responsibilities as the world’s only superpower; that our
intelligence capabilities are critical to meeting these responsibilities, and
that they themselves have relied on the information we obtain to protect their
own people.
Second, just as ardent civil
libertarians recognize the need for robust intelligence capabilities, those
with responsibilities for our national security readily acknowledge the
potential for abuse as intelligence capabilities advance and more and more
private information is digitized. After all, the folks at NSA and other
intelligence agencies are our neighbors. They're our friends and
family. They’ve got electronic bank and medical records like everybody
else. They have kids on Facebook and Instagram, and they know, more than
most of us, the vulnerabilities to privacy that exist in a world where
transactions are recorded, and emails and text and messages are stored, and
even our movements can increasingly be tracked through the GPS on our phones.
Third, there was a recognition by all
who participated in these reviews that the challenges to our privacy do not
come from government alone. Corporations of all shapes and sizes track
what you buy, store and analyze our data, and use it for commercial purposes;
that’s how those targeted ads pop up on your computer and your smartphone
periodically. But all of us understand that the standards for government
surveillance must be higher. Given the unique power of the state, it is
not enough for leaders to say: Trust us, we won’t abuse the data we
collect. For history has too many examples when that trust has been
breached. Our system of government is built on the premise that our
liberty cannot depend on the good intentions of those in power; it depends on
the law to constrain those in power.
I make these observations to underscore
that the basic values of most Americans when it comes to questions of
surveillance and privacy converge a lot more than the crude characterizations
that have emerged over the last several months. Those who are troubled by
our existing programs are not interested in repeating the tragedy of 9/11, and
those who defend these programs are not dismissive of civil liberties.
The challenge is getting the details
right, and that is not simple. In fact, during the course of our review,
I have often reminded myself I would not be where I am today were it not for
the courage of dissidents like Dr. King, who were spied upon by their own government.
And as President, a President who looks at intelligence every morning, I also
can’t help but be reminded that America must be vigilant in the face of
threats.
Fortunately, by focusing on facts and
specifics rather than speculation and hypotheticals, this review process has
given me -- and hopefully the American people -- some clear direction for
change. And today, I can announce a series of concrete and substantial
reforms that my administration intends to adopt administratively or will seek to
codify with Congress.
First, I have approved a new
presidential directive for our signals intelligence activities both at home and
abroad. This guidance will strengthen executive branch oversight of our
intelligence activities. It will ensure that we take into account our
security requirements, but also our alliances; our trade and investment
relationships, including the concerns of American companies; and our commitment
to privacy and basic liberties. And we will review decisions about intelligence
priorities and sensitive targets on an annual basis so that our actions are
regularly scrutinized by my senior national security team.
Second, we will reform programs and
procedures in place to provide greater transparency to our surveillance
activities, and fortify the safeguards that protect the privacy of U.S.
persons. Since we began this review, including information being released
today, we have declassified over 40 opinions and orders of the Foreign
Intelligence Surveillance Court, which provides judicial review of some of our
most sensitive intelligence activities -- including the Section 702 program
targeting foreign individuals overseas, and the Section 215 telephone metadata
program.
And going forward, I’m directing the
Director of National Intelligence, in consultation with the Attorney General,
to annually review for the purposes of declassification any future opinions of
the court with broad privacy implications, and to report to me and to Congress
on these efforts. To ensure that the court hears a broader range of
privacy perspectives, I am also calling on Congress to authorize the
establishment of a panel of advocates from outside government to provide an
independent voice in significant cases before the Foreign Intelligence
Surveillance Court.
Third, we will provide additional
protections for activities conducted under Section 702, which allows the
government to intercept the communications of foreign targets overseas who have
information that’s important for our national security. Specifically, I
am asking the Attorney General and DNI to institute reforms that place
additional restrictions on government’s ability to retain, search, and use in
criminal cases communications between Americans and foreign citizens
incidentally collected under Section 702.
Fourth, in investigating threats, the
FBI also relies on what's called national security letters, which can require
companies to provide specific and limited information to the government without
disclosing the orders to the subject of the investigation. These are
cases in which it's important that the subject of the investigation, such as a
possible terrorist or spy, isn’t tipped off. But we can and should be
more transparent in how government uses this authority.
I have therefore directed the Attorney
General to amend how we use national security letters so that this secrecy will
not be indefinite, so that it will terminate within a fixed time unless the
government demonstrates a real need for further secrecy. We will also
enable communications providers to make public more information than ever
before about the orders that they have received to provide data to the
government.
This brings me to the program that has
generated the most controversy these past few months -- the bulk collection of telephone
records under Section 215. Let me repeat what I said when this story
first broke: This program does not involve the content of phone calls, or
the names of people making calls. Instead, it provides a record of phone
numbers and the times and lengths of calls -- metadata that can be queried if
and when we have a reasonable suspicion that a particular number is linked to a
terrorist organization.
Why is this necessary? The
program grew out of a desire to address a gap identified after 9/11. One
of the 9/11 hijackers -- Khalid al-Mihdhar -- made a phone call from San Diego
to a known al Qaeda safe-house in Yemen. NSA saw that call, but it could
not see that the call was coming from an individual already in the United
States. The telephone metadata program under Section 215 was designed to
map the communications of terrorists so we can see who they may be in contact
with as quickly as possible. And this capability could also prove
valuable in a crisis. For example, if a bomb goes off in one of our
cities and law enforcement is racing to determine whether a network is poised
to conduct additional attacks, time is of the essence. Being able to
quickly review phone connections to assess whether a network exists is critical
to that effort.
In sum, the program does not involve
the NSA examining the phone records of ordinary Americans. Rather, it
consolidates these records into a database that the government can query if it
has a specific lead -- a consolidation of phone records that the companies already
retained for business purposes. The review group turned up no indication
that this database has been intentionally abused. And I believe it is
important that the capability that this program is designed to meet is
preserved.
Having said that, I believe critics are
right to point out that without proper safeguards, this type of program could
be used to yield more information about our private lives, and open the door to
more intrusive bulk collection programs in the future. They’re also right
to point out that although the telephone bulk collection program was subject to
oversight by the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court and has been
reauthorized repeatedly by Congress, it has never been subject to vigorous
public debate.
For all these reasons, I believe we
need a new approach. I am therefore ordering a transition that will end
the Section 215 bulk metadata program as it currently exists, and establish a
mechanism that preserves the capabilities we need without the government
holding this bulk metadata.
This will not be simple. The
review group recommended that our current approach be replaced by one in which
the providers or a third party retain the bulk records, with government
accessing information as needed. Both of these options pose difficult
problems. Relying solely on the records of multiple providers, for
example, could require companies to alter their procedures in ways that raise
new privacy concerns. On the other hand, any third party maintaining a
single, consolidated database would be carrying out what is essentially a
government function but with more expense, more legal ambiguity, potentially
less accountability -- all of which would have a doubtful impact on increasing
public confidence that their privacy is being protected.
During the review process, some
suggested that we may also be able to preserve the capabilities we need through
a combination of existing authorities, better information sharing, and recent
technological advances. But more work needs to be done to determine
exactly how this system might work.
Because of the challenges involved,
I’ve ordered that the transition away from the existing program will proceed in
two steps. Effective immediately, we will only pursue phone calls that
are two steps removed from a number associated with a terrorist organization
instead of the current three. And I have directed the Attorney General to
work with the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court so that during this
transition period, the database can be queried only after a judicial finding or
in the case of a true emergency.
Next, step two, I have instructed the
intelligence community and the Attorney General to use this transition period
to develop options for a new approach that can match the capabilities and fill
the gaps that the Section 215 program was designed to address without the
government holding this metadata itself. They will report back to me with
options for alternative approaches before the program comes up for
reauthorization on March 28th. And during this period, I will consult
with the relevant committees in Congress to seek their views, and then seek
congressional authorization for the new program as needed.
Now, the reforms I’m proposing today
should give the American people greater confidence that their rights are being
protected, even as our intelligence and law enforcement agencies maintain the
tools they need to keep us safe. And I recognize that there are
additional issues that require further debate. For example, some who
participated in our review, as well as some members of Congress, would like to
see more sweeping reforms to the use of national security letters so that we
have to go to a judge each time before issuing these requests. Here, I
have concerns that we should not set a standard for terrorism investigations
that is higher than those involved in investigating an ordinary crime.
But I agree that greater oversight on the use of these letters may be
appropriate, and I’m prepared to work with Congress on this issue.
There are also those who would like to
see different changes to the FISA Court than the ones I’ve proposed. On
all these issues, I am open to working with Congress to ensure that we build a
broad consensus for how to move forward, and I’m confident that we can shape an
approach that meets our security needs while upholding the civil liberties of
every American.
Let me now turn to the separate set of
concerns that have been raised overseas, and focus on America’s approach to
intelligence collection abroad. As I’ve indicated, the United States has
unique responsibilities when it comes to intelligence collection. Our
capabilities help protect not only our nation, but our friends and our allies,
as well. But our efforts will only be effective if ordinary citizens in
other countries have confidence that the United States respects their privacy,
too. And the leaders of our close friends and allies deserve to know that
if I want to know what they think about an issue, I’ll pick up the phone and call
them, rather than turning to surveillance. In other words, just as we
balance security and privacy at home, our global leadership demands that we
balance our security requirements against our need to maintain the trust and
cooperation among people and leaders around the world.
For that reason, the new presidential
directive that I’ve issued today will clearly prescribe what we do, and do not
do, when it comes to our overseas surveillance. To begin with, the
directive makes clear that the United States only uses signals intelligence for
legitimate national security purposes, and not for the purpose of
indiscriminately reviewing the emails or phone calls of ordinary folks.
I’ve also made it clear that the United States does not collect intelligence to
suppress criticism or dissent, nor do we collect intelligence to disadvantage
people on the basis of their ethnicity, or race, or gender, or sexual
orientation, or religious beliefs. We do not collect intelligence to
provide a competitive advantage to U.S. companies or U.S. commercial sectors.
And in terms of our bulk collection of
signals intelligence, U.S. intelligence agencies will only use such data to
meet specific security requirements: counterintelligence,
counterterrorism, counter-proliferation, cybersecurity, force protection for
our troops and our allies, and combating transnational crime, including
sanctions evasion.
In this directive, I have taken the
unprecedented step of extending certain protections that we have for the
American people to people overseas. I’ve directed the DNI, in
consultation with the Attorney General, to develop these safeguards, which will
limit the duration that we can hold personal information, while also
restricting the use of this information.
The bottom line is that people around
the world, regardless of their nationality, should know that the United States
is not spying on ordinary people who don’t threaten our national security, and
that we take their privacy concerns into account in our policies and
procedures. This applies to foreign leaders as well. Given the
understandable attention that this issue has received, I have made clear to the
intelligence community that unless there is a compelling national security
purpose, we will not monitor the communications of heads of state and
government of our close friends and allies. And I’ve instructed my
national security team, as well as the intelligence community, to work with
foreign counterparts to deepen our coordination and cooperation in ways that
rebuild trust going forward.
Now let me be clear: Our
intelligence agencies will continue to gather information about the intentions
of governments -- as opposed to ordinary citizens -- around the world, in the
same way that the intelligence services of every other nation does. We
will not apologize simply because our services may be more effective. But
heads of state and government with whom we work closely, and on whose
cooperation we depend, should feel confident that we are treating them as real
partners. And the changes I’ve ordered do just that.
Finally, to make sure that we follow
through on all these reforms, I am making some important changes to how our
government is organized. The State Department will designate a senior
officer to coordinate our diplomacy on issues related to technology and signals
intelligence. We will appoint a senior official at the White House to
implement the new privacy safeguards that I have announced today. I will
devote the resources to centralize and improve the process we use to handle foreign
requests for legal assistance, keeping our high standards for privacy while
helping foreign partners fight crime and terrorism.
I have also asked my counselor, John
Podesta, to lead a comprehensive review of big data and privacy. And this
group will consist of government officials who, along with the President’s
Council of Advisors on Science and Technology, will reach out to privacy
experts, technologists and business leaders, and look how the challenges
inherent in big data are being confronted by both the public and private
sectors; whether we can forge international norms on how to manage this data;
and how we can continue to promote the free flow of information in ways that
are consistent with both privacy and security.
For ultimately, what’s at stake in this
debate goes far beyond a few months of headlines, or passing tensions in our
foreign policy. When you cut through the noise, what’s really at stake is
how we remain true to who we are in a world that is remaking itself at dizzying
speed. Whether it’s the ability of individuals to communicate ideas; to
access information that would have once filled every great library in every
country in the world; or to forge bonds with people on other sides of the
globe, technology is remaking what is possible for individuals, and for
institutions, and for the international order. So while the reforms that
I have announced will point us in a new direction, I am mindful that more work
will be needed in the future.
One thing I’m certain of: This
debate will make us stronger. And I also know that in this time of
change, the United States of America will have to lead. It may seem
sometimes that America is being held to a different standard. And I'll
admit the readiness of some to assume the worst motives by our government can
be frustrating. No one expects China to have an open debate about their
surveillance programs, or Russia to take privacy concerns of citizens in other
places into account. But let’s remember: We are held to a different
standard precisely because we have been at the forefront of defending personal
privacy and human dignity.
As the nation that developed the
Internet, the world expects us to ensure that the digital revolution works as a
tool for individual empowerment, not government control. Having faced
down the dangers of totalitarianism and fascism and communism, the world
expects us to stand up for the principle that every person has the right to
think and write and form relationships freely -- because individual freedom is
the wellspring of human progress.
Those values make us who we are.
And because of the strength of our own democracy, we should not shy away from
high expectations. For more than two centuries, our Constitution has
weathered every type of change because we have been willing to defend it, and
because we have been willing to question the actions that have been taken in
its defense. Today is no different. I believe we can meet high
expectations. Together, let us chart a way forward that secures the life
of our nation while preserving the liberties that make our nation worth
fighting for.
Thank you. God bless you.
May God bless the United States of America. (Applause.)
END
11:57 A.M. EST
