Monday, 26 January 2015

Fracking's hidden hazard of gender-bender chemicals and radiation risks


Today the influential Environmental Audit Committee published an important report analysis on the environmental impact of fracking. (http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201415/cmselect/cmenvaud/856/85602.htm)


Below are the sections commenting on my own written evidence.

37. Dr David Lowry also raised a concern about endocrine disruptors, noting findings of “higher levels of hormone disrupting activity in water located near fracking wells than in areas without drilling” in the United States.85 In a letter to Dr Lowry the Environment Agency stated that it was “aware of the use of endocrine disrupters in some parts of the USA and the potential link to shale gas fracking there … The Environment Agency will not authorise the use of substances hazardous to groundwater in hydraulic fracturing.”86

85 Dr David Lowry (FRA059)
86 Unpublished letter


 Dr David Lowry raised the concern of radiation risk from radon gas which might be released during fracking, referring to Public Health England’s Review of the Potential Public Health Impacts of Exposure to Chemical and Radioactive Pollutants as a Result of Shale Gas Extraction which concluded that there is “the potential for radon gas to be present in natural gas extracted from UK shale."130 The Geological Society noted concerns relating to mobilisation of natural uranium but stated “we are not aware of any evidence of harm.”131 No Hot Air believed that “refusing to access local resources of natural gas and oil … avoids the significant and proven positive health impacts of lowering air pollution from … coal generation.”132 We discussed concerns relating to endocrine disruptors above (paragraph 37).

130 Dr David Lowry (FRA059)
131 The Geological Society (FRA003) para 9
132 No Hot Air (FRA030) para 2

The Environment Agency set out additional requirements:
For a site that is planning to undertake hydraulic fracturing, the following permits and permissions are likely to be required:
• A permit for the management of extractive waste (also known as ‘mining waste’) will always be required where a new well is being drilled and waste needs to be managed.
• A notice under the Water Resources Act to ‘construct a boring for the purposes of searching for or extracting minerals’. The notice will set out details of the well design and construction.
• A permit for a radioactive substances activity to manage Naturally Occurring Radioactive Materials from a well that is producing oil or gas.


64. The existing regime is complex and whilst we welcome the Environment Agency and Health and Safety Executive’s joint working strategy, Working together to regulate unconventional oil and gas developments,173 it remains to be seen whether this will ensure effective regulatory co-ordination across all the relevant bodies and departments. A joint strategy concerning the regulation of unconventional oil and gas signed by all relevant national and local departments and agencies must be developed and published.


71. There must be clear and accessible public disclosure on the chemicals used in the exploration and production of shale gas, and the risks they potentially pose.
 

 

Written evidence submitted by Dr David Lowry

31 January 2014
There are a number of environmental health impacts the Environmental Audit Committee ought to examine, especially because the issue has been given little attention in the UK fracking debate.
I have set out some details below, along with some supporting articles. This should help ministers develop environmental protection policy re. fracking through being evidence-led, as the Environment Secretary affirmed is the Government  position to the select committee.
On 13 August 2014, a team of experienced research scientists presented the fruit of new research on fracking hazards to the 248th National Meeting of the American Chemical Society (ACS).
Dr William Stringfellow, an environmental engineer at the University of California’s Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory reported his research team – jointly with the University of the Pacific - had scoured databases and reports to compile a list of substances commonly used in fracking, including gelling agents to thicken the fluids, biocides to keep microbes from growing, sand to prop open tiny cracks in the rocks and compounds to prevent pipe corrosion.
His team found (http://www.eurekalert.org/pub_releases/2014-08/acs-anl071614.php)
that most fracking compounds will require treatment before being released to the environment, and also  identified eight substances, including biocides, as being particularly toxic to mammals.
Also, late in 2013, academic researchers at the University of Missouri, released the results of research they  had conducted into the known chemicals used in fracking. Their research paper, Estrogen and Androgen Receptor Activities of Hydraulic Fracturing Chemicals and Surface and Ground Water in a Drilling-Dense Region, published in the journal Endocrinology.( Volume 155 Issue 3 - March 2014 http://press.endocrine.org/doi/abs/10.1210/en.2013-1697), found higher levels of hormone-disrupting ('gender-bender) activity in water located near fracking wells than in areas without drilling.
Endocrine disruptors interfere with the body's endocrine system, which controls numerous body functions with hormones such as the female hormone estrogen and the male hormone androgen. Exposure to endocrine-disrupting chemicals, such as those studied in the MU research, has been linked by other research to cancer, birth defects and infertility.
Dr Susan Nagel, associate professor of obstetrics, gynecology and women's health at the MU School of Medicine, put it starkly: ”More than 700 chemicals are used in the fracking process, and many of them disturb hormone function. With fracking on the rise, populations may face greater health risks from increased endocrine-disrupting chemical exposure."
In addition, there is the radiation risk from radon gas released during fracking.
One conclusion in the report published in March this year by the public health watchdog, Public Health England, in their  Review of the Potential Public Health Impacts of Exposure to Chemical and Radioactive Pollutants as a Result of Shale Gas Extraction, states:"If the natural gas delivery point were to be close to the extraction point with a short transit time, radon present in the natural gas would have little time to decay ... there is therefore, the potential for radon gas to be present in natural gas extracted from UK shale."

Radon is unquestionably the leading cause of lung cancer in non-smokers.

Moreover, Professor, James W. Ring, Winslow Professor of Physics Emeritus, Hamilton College in New York State stresses:
"The radon and natural gas coming from the shale mix together and travel together as the gas is piped to customers. This is a serious health hazard, as radon - being a gas - is breathed into the lungs and lodges there to decay, doing damage to the lungʼs tissue and eventually leading to lung cancer."

Hence there is undoubtedly a risk of radon gas being pumped into citizens' homes as part of the shale gas stream. Unless the gas is stored for up to a month to allow the radon's radioactivity to naturally reduce, this is potentially very dangerous.( a half-life of 3.8 days. Using the general rule of thumb of 10 half-lives to decay to 1/1000 of original concentration, that would be 38 days, or roughly one month, depending on how radioactive it was to start.)

The Radon Council, formed in 1990, is an independent non-profit making self-regulatory body for the radon protection industry. Its formation was welcomed in the Interim Report of the Parliamentary Select Committee on Indoor Pollution, which called upon industry to provide a solution to the radon problem. The first objectives were to identify the “cowboy” operators and dubious training courses then in practice.  Later there followed a first edition of a training manual and an agreed Code of Practice for the industry.
It does not seem ministers have read any of the Radon Council’s literature, so gung-ho are they for fracking!
 
At the end of July the Communities Department published its Revision of building regulation policy on radon. In the impact assessment it explains the reason for the revised regulation is:
“Radon is a naturally occurring radioactive gas linked to lung cancer. Alongside a health and awareness programme and testing and remediation of existing buildings, current Government policy includes targeted intervention through the Building Regulations which requires radon protection in new buildings in areas of elevated radon risk….We intend that the Building Regulations and supporting statutory guidance is clear on current radon risks, and ensures buildings are fitted with proportionate measures to prevent the ingress of radon and thus reduce radon-related lung cancers. ”

 

It later adds “The respective cumulative risks of lung cancer [from radon exposure] affecting people by age 75 years in the UK at 100 and 200 Bq m-3 are 0.42% and 0.47% for non-smokers and 17% and 19% for continuing smokers.”


It also states boldly: “The chosen policy will maintain a targeted regulatory intervention (aligned to the most up-to-date radon maps), to ensure that all buildings in higher-risk areas incorporate appropriate radon measures.”

In light of this clear precautionary approach, it is odd that all ministers seem to be cheerleading for expanded fracking, despite its possible radon risk.

In January 2012 the European Commission Energy Directorate released a 100-page report on ‘Unconventional Gas in Europe,’ primarily assessing the situation in France, Germany, Poland and Sweden. It has a section on environmental liability, but no mention of radon pollution.


Nuclear waste too

In addition, both RWMA in the US and the internationally respected Norwegian environmental consultancy, DNV (Det Norske Veritas have identified radioactive waste contamination as one problem with fracking, arising from contaminated rock cuttings and cores to which have the potential for exposure to radioactivity on health. Risks relating to NORM (naturally occurring radioactive materials) contaminated downhole and surface equipment should also be considered, both suggest.

(Risk Management of Shale Gas Developments and Operations January 2013 DNV-RP-U301; http://www.dnv.com)

The Commission report also records that in Sweden, the handling of radioactive shales requires a permit in accordance with the Radiation Protection Act and the Radiation Protection Ordinance. This is the case when the uranium content exceeds 80 ppm (parts per million), it points out. This permit is granted by the Swedish Radiation Safety Authority. “Non-compliance with the permit can lead to it being revoked and, if done intentionally, the responsible person can be fined or even imprisoned,” it warns.
 

It adds that in Sweden, the possible occurrence of radioactive materials (NORMS), heavy metals or saline brines is taken into account by the permit for the environmentally hazardous activity, required for the disposal of waste water.
 

3 January 2015

Tuesday, 20 January 2015

How the nuclear industry fleeced taxpayers

 
Further to my last Blog entry, I have written up the full story for The Ecologist, below, published on line yesterday.
David
 
Sellafield - how the nuclear industry fleeced taxpayers
Dr David Lowry
The Ecologist, 19th January 2015
 

Last week the consortium holding a £22bn contract to clean up the Sellafield nuclear site was sacked, writes David Lowry. But this is just the end of a long and scandalous tale of corporate profit at taxpayers' expense, and the active collusion of ministers and senior officials in fighting off Parliamentary scrutiny.

"It's an appalling waste of public money. It's like scattering confetti. Time extends and extends. I have looked at this two or three times now and every time I look at it the cost goes up - not in hundreds of millions, but in billions." Margaret Hodge MP, chair of Parliamentary Public Accounts committee
Last 4th November the managing director of Sellafield, the giant nuclear waste processing plant on the Cumbian coast in NW England, issued its report to the six-monthly meeting of the nuclear sites stakeholder group covering the Sellafield plant. 
In bullish tone he opened his introduction, boldly pronouncing: "This time last year, in my first report to WCSSG as Sellafield Ltd's Managing Director, I talked about our new strategy Key to Britain's Energy Future.
"I explained that I wanted a clear strategy, understood by our employees and the local community, to drive improved performance in our nationally important task of cleaning up the Sellafield Site.

"The strategy describes how we will deliver our clean up mission by keeping Sellafield safe and secure, by making demonstrable progress on all of our activities and by providing a return on taxpayers' investment through value for money and socio-economic benefit in our local community.

"Our strategy describes where we want to be, and the Sellafield plan explains how we will get there. We recently launched a companion document, the Excellence Plan which outlines activities that will improve our ability to reach our goal."
Everything in the Sellafield garden is rosy

Rising to his optimistic theme he went on to claim: "Twelve months on and I believe we are beginning to see the strategy deliver improvements in performance and this gives me increasing confidence that we can achieve what we promised to do, on time and to budget ...
"Looking ahead, we will continue to drive for reliable performance, an increasingly challenging task given the age of our plants and infrastructure. This means we need to strive to find innovative solutions to problems.

He concluded by noting: "We are being supported in this through a new collaborative approach with key stakeholders most associated with the delivery at Sellafield. The organisations include Sellafield Ltd, Office of Nuclear Regulation (ONR), the Environment Agency (EA), Nuclear Decommissioning Authority (NDA), Department of Energy and Climate Change, (DECC) and Shareholder Executive ...
"As part of our drive for excellence we have recently completed a programme of nuclear safety culture surveys.  As we achieve more successes over the next number of months alongside the member organisations," he finished off, "we will share this information at future meetings."
 
Two months later - sacked

Barely two months later, on 13 January, Energy Secretary Ed Davey announced in a statement to Parliament that he was sacking Nuclear Management Partners (NMP), the private consortium awarded the £22 billion top tier management contract for Britain's biggest nuclear installation, in early October 2008.
Davey told MPs: "The government agreed last year with the Public Accounts Committee's conclusion that it was a priority to consider what contractual model might best deliver improved performance and value for money at Sellafield.
"In the meantime, we endorsed the Nuclear Decommissioning Authority (NDA)'s decision to roll the current Parent Body Organisation (PBO) contract forward into the second term (from 1 April 2014) to ensure that the progress made in the first five year term could be built upon.
"Sellafield Limited (the Site Licence Company which operates the site under the ownership of the PBO) continues to make progress and is currently on track to deliver against its key performance measures and milestones in 2014/15.

"Despite this progress, the NDA has concluded that a change in model is now the best way forward ... Under the new arrangement, Sellafield Limited will become a subsidiary of the NDA and will continue to be led by a 'world class team', who will be appointed and governed by a newly-constituted Board of the Site Licence Company. "
DECC's nuclear quango the NDA, the owners of Sellafield on behalf of the taxpayer, produced an 8-page so-called 'Stakeholder Briefing' to explain what was going on.
It states, inter alia, that: "This decision is the result of careful consideration and review of various commercial approaches in use where the public and private sector comes together to deliver complex programmes ...
"The review is consistent with the undertaking that NDA gave at the 4 November 2013 and 4 December 2013 Public Accounts Committee Hearings, based on the NAO report 'Assurance of reported savings at Sellafield', HC778, 29 October 2013, that NDA would consider its options in regard to the way the Sellafield site was operated and in particular the use of the PBO (parent body organization) model."
But it is as illuminating as much for what it omits as what it reveals.
 
A scandalous agreement to fleece the taxpayer
How could such a turn-around happen so quickly? As with everything in the nuclear industry, all is not what seems, and there is a complicated backstory to the Sellafield decision, which is startling.
I have worked on this issue with Labour MP Paul Flynn for seven years, and his attempts to make transparent the deal done to give NMP the contract have been met with obstruction - by Government and the nuclear industry at every turn.
In July 2008, Flynn got a sniff that some dodgy dealing was under way by the Department for Business, Enterprise and Regulatory Reform (BERR), then responsible for nuclear energy policy, to award a management contract for Sellafield to a new consortium.
At its crux was the stipulation that all the potentially vast liabilities would be covered by the taxpayer, while all the profits went to the consortium,
To probe this possibility, he asked the Labour minister responsible what recent communications or discussions had taken place with both the NDA and consortium applicants for the Sellafield decommissioning contract on the indemnification of the contract holder against claims arising.
The now late Malcolm Wicks responded: "The Department has been informed by the Nuclear Decommissioning Authority (NDA) that it expects to have to grant an indemnity against uninsurable claims arising from a nuclear incident that fall outside the protections offered by the Nuclear Installations Act and the Paris / Brussels Convention to whichever of the four bidders for the Sellafield contract is successful.

"The NDA is conducting the Sellafield parent body organisation competition under the EU Competitive Dialogue procedure, evaluating the four bids received against agreed evaluation criteria. Within that process bidders were invited to make proposals for a nuclear indemnity under competitive tension against an established framework.
"It would not be viable for any of the bidders to proceed without an indemnity because any fee earning benefits of the contract would be overwhelmed by the potential liabilities. The NDA has assessed that the benefits of engaging a new contractor far outweigh the remote risk that an indemnity might be called upon. The final form of the indemnity will reflect the specific terms proposed by the preferred bidder." (Hansard, 14 July 2008 : Column 76W).
But were MPs bothered?
The cat was out of the Sellafield Boondoggle bag. By 22nd October - after an exchange of letters with both the then chair of the Public Accounts Committee, Tory right winger, Sir Edward Leigh, and The Speaker, over the summer, Flynn tabled an early day motion (EDM 2321) - a kind of Parliamentary kite flying with political wallpaper covering - under the title 'Parliamentary oversight of Sellafield indemnification'. It read:
"That this House notes that when the Government decided to provide indemnification against insurance claims following nuclear accident at the Low-level Waste Repository at Drigg, for the new American management company, the then Minister for Energy published a written statement in Hansard of 27th February 2008 and the associated Minute was placed in the Library to allow 14 sitting days for objections from hon. Members; contrasts this open procedure with the approach adopted for a similar insurance indemnification for the new private sector management company for Sellafield, Nuclear Management Partners, when no written statement was placed before Parliament but instead, the then Minister for Energy wrote on 14th July 2008 to the chairmen of the Committee on Public Accounts and Business, Enterprise and Regulatory Reform Committee, enclosing a copy of the Minute setting out the proposed arrangements and stating that a copy of the Minute would be placed in the Library; further notes that this Minute arrived in the Library on 14th October, more than 75 days after the period for hon. Members to object officially elapsed; believes it is unacceptable for hon. Members to be denied the opportunity to comment on this Minute, the effect of which is to privatise the profits of the Sellafield management contract leaving the potentially multi-billion pound liabilities with taxpayers; declines to give approval to the proposed indemnification arrangements; and calls upon the Government to reopen the period in which hon. Members may signify objections to Government guarantees for which no statutory authority exists."
In so doing, he flagged up a scandal in the making, but few fellow MPs noticed. Flynn asked a clarificatory question to the energy minister, by now Mike O'Brien, (in the newly formed Department for Energy and Climate change, headed by Ed Miliband as Secretary of State).
Specifically, he enquired on what dates between 14th July and 6th October 2008 Ministers or officials of his Department met officials of the NDA to discuss the indemnification of the successful bidder for the PBO chosen to manage Sellafield, and what meetings his Department and its predecessor had had with the European Commission on the compliance with state aid rules of the Government accepting an indemnification for Sellafield.
Mike O'Brien told him: "There were no meetings between 14 July and 6 October 2008 between the NDA and Ministers or officials of BERR about the indemnity for the successful bidder for the Sellafield PBO ... There have been no meetings with the European Commission on this issue. As a normal commercial arrangement involving no subsidy for the new PBO the proposed indemnity does not raise any State aid concerns." (Hansard, 11 Nov 2008: Column 1143-4W.)
'It's all a ludicrous conspiracy theory'
Perhaps ministers believed there were no subsidy concerns, but there were a raft of other very worrying, unresolved concerns. To air these, Flynn secured an unusual Parliamentary debate, held in Westminster Hall on 19 November 2008, under the headline: 'Nuclear Industry Finance' (Hansard, 19 Nov 2008: Column 119WH)
Mr Flynn was dismissed by Mike O'Brien as a conspiracy theorist asserting that "his concoction of conspiracy theory, innuendo and hyperbole has reached new heights in the House", further telling MPs that Flynn had "exaggerated, went way over the top in his condemnations."
Mr Flynn's Labour colleague, Jamie Reed - who then, as now, represented the Copeland constituency, which includes Sellafield - chipped in with the observation that Mr Flynn's exposure was an "incoherent concoction". (Hansard, 19 Nov 2008: Column 125WH)
On 13 th January, after the Sellafield contact cancellation, the prodigal MP Jamie Reed, pronounced to his local paper, The Whitehaven News, that  "If the contract has been terminated, it's the right decision: both inevitable and overdue ... and common sense, operational sense and business sense has now prevailed. The site will move on from this and improve. This decision is in the best interests of the industry, the site workforce and my constituents."
The Ecologist's readers may judge for themselves, now that the current energy secretary has sacked NMP from their £22 billion contract, who was exaggerating - and whether or not Mr Flynn's criticisms were coherent.
Freedom of Information request spills the beans
Just before Christmas in 2008, the NDA delivered to my inbox 140 pages of internal memos, emails and other documentation concerning how the Sellafield contract had been awarded - after a protracted battle over disclosure for many months.
Many of the documents were very heavily censored prior to release with whole pages, and the names of most of the officials involved had been systematically blanked out.
Nonetheless, they included buried in the pages released, the extraordinary revelation that BERR, and the NDA, wanted to go ahead with awarding the deal to NMP, by avoiding Parliamentary scrutiny and circumventing democratic oversight, detailing how the deception of Parliament was to be effected. It was a clear scandal.
The collusion between Government and the NDA on behalf of the private consortium, and manifestly against the public interest of the taxpayer, was revealed on 4th January 2009 in The Independent on Sunday - with my detailed assistance - in an article by Geoffrey Lean, 'Officials plotted Sellafield cover-up: MPs were denied the chance to challenge sweetener to private firm's nuclear deal':
"A rushed timetable was drawn up which involved naming a preferred (PBO) bidder for the contract on 11 July 2008 and signing a transitional agreement on 6 October 2008. But this clashed with the long parliamentary summer recess, which ran from late July to the very day set aside for the signing.

"If the Government were to stick to its speeded-up timetable, the documents say, 'the very earliest date' in which the minute could be laid before Parliament would be 14 July, shortly before the recess began on the 22nd.

"Determined not to slow down the handover, the Government decided to reduce the period in which MPs could object. On 26 March, an official whose name and department has been blanked out emailed the official Nuclear Decommissioning Authority (NDA) to stress the requirement to 'shorten the 14 working parliamentary days that an indemnity would normally need before it can become effective'.
"The official added: 'To get this down to five days, we will need to muster some persuasive arguments and I wondered where you had got to on assembling these.' Two days later he was sent a 'first draft' of the argument including an assertion that the 'vulnerability of Sellafield operations is already seen as a significant safety risk'.
Any time at all for MPs' scrutiny is too long
"But by early June [2008], the idea of giving MPs any time at all to object had been abandoned. Another email to the NDA, from apparently the same blanked-out official, reported a 'conclusion' that a letter should merely be written to Edward Leigh MP, the chairman of the House of Commons Public Accounts Committee, 'rather than go for a shorter notice period to the House'.

Thus a minute 'explaining what has happened' would be laid before MPs only 'when Parliament reconvenes in the autumn', by which time it would be too late to raise objections. On 14 July, the then energy minister Malcolm Wicks duly wrote to Mr Leigh; he did not object and the indemnity went into force before MPs knew about it.
"Other confidential documents, received after two Freedom of Information Act applications, divulge that three local Councils in Somerset asked for £750,000 to fund a planning officer and legal advice from companies that want to build nuclear power stations in their areas, raising questions about conflicts of interest, and that the officially neutral NDA considered coming out in favour of new reactors."
Fast forward to the Coalition's governance of Sellafield: Mr Flynn tabled another EDM, number 1048, two years ago, on 6 February 2013, which included the observation:
"DECC were questioned on the probity of such huge sums being awarded (to NMP) without Parliamentary scrutiny; recalls an earlier EDM 2321 on Parliamentary Oversight of Sellafield Indemnification tabled on 22 October 2008 observed accurately that the agreement would privatise the profits of the Sellafield management contract leaving the potentially multi-billion pound liabilities with taxpayers; acknowledges the subsequent release of internal memoranda and emails between DECC and NDA officials which expose the deliberate cover up from Parliament."
A damning critique hidden from Parliament

In the summer of 2013, I submitted a Freedom of Information Request to the NDA for any internal review they had conducted on the performance of Nuclear Management Partners, who had been controversially been awarded the PBO management contract for Sellafield.
Finally, following the Coalition announcement that the NDA was extending the NMP PBO contract worth several more billions, the Public Accounts committee - now chaired by former Labour minister, Margaret Hodge - announced it would investigate the extended contract.
Then, after initially turning down my FOI request, on appeal, NDA conceded, and sent me a copy late on a Friday afternoon in early November, just before the PAC hearing on the following Monday with the NDA and DECC officials on Sellafield.
After reading the explosive criticisms contained in the internal evaluation by auditor, KPMG I forwarded it to Mrs Hodge, suggesting she might raise it with the PAC witnesses. Here is a transcript of what happened in the opening of the hearing on 4 November, as published the following day:
Q9 Chair (Mrs Hodge): "On the KPMG report, which we only got this morning, my understanding is that that was never shared with the NAO. Why not?"
John Clarke (NDA CEO): "The KPMG report was only completed very recently."
Chair: "No, you had a copy of it in September."
John Clarke: "We had a draft copy of it in September."
Q10 Chair: "Well, we only got it this morning because of a freedom of information request. The final copy has a September date."
John Clarke: "We have spent a considerable period of time redacting what we believe was commercially sensitive information."
Q11 Chair: "That information was absolutely pertinent as to whether or not you took the view on whether to renew the contract. Why was that not shared with the NAO, even in draft form? I do not know whether you want to comment, Amyas."
Amyas Morse, National Audit Office chief executive: "It would have been illuminating, knowing that we were producing a follow-up report. It certainly would have been illuminating to know of the existence of this report. I have carefully checked with my staff. As far as we know, we did not know of its existence, let alone having seen it."
John Clarke: "There was certainly no intent to keep it secret. There was a lot of talk about the fact that we were producing it. It is worth pointing out that KPMG's report assessed the performance of the site over a wide period of time. It was not advising us on the right course of action."
Q12 Chair: "I understand that. The report, which I have only just shared with my colleagues on the Committee, is a terrible indictment of the contract: it says that progress on major projects within legacy ponds and silos, which no doubt we will come to, 'is behind schedule and has exceeded ... cost estimates. It appears this is principally attributable to SL', Sellafield Ltd, 'often as a result of poor project management ... whilst savings have been made, overall schedule progress has not met PP11 targets, which over time risks costing more than efficiency savings generated.'
"On Sellafield Ltd's capability, it says that 'there remain continued deficiencies in project management, supply chain management and resource allocation'. We then go on to leadership, where there has been a 'high turnover of SL executive secondees and a predominantly reactive response to issues.'
"Governance 'does not appear to be effective or unified.' On alignment, 'parties in the PBO model are not aligned in their objectives, with fractures evident in many relationships due to complexity, competing priority and contractual tensions'. Interfaces 'do not deliver', incentives do not work, there is no appetite for risk and there is no stakeholder confidence. I cannot see anything good in that.
John Clarke: "Essentially, the comments about performance fall into three categories. There is the inherent nature of Sellafield itself, with the complexities that it presents. The Major Projects Authority came in to review it recently, and their conclusion was that Sellafield presents unique technological project management and leadership challenges unparalleled anywhere.
"So there is the inherent nature of the beast that is Sellafield. Many of the comments you related there relate to the capability of Sellafield Ltd itself. Sellafield Ltd is the enduring entity, the site licence company, the licence holder and the environmental-"
Chair: "It is wholly owned by NMP."
John Clarke: "Yes it is, for the duration of the contract. But the 10,000 people work for Sellafield Ltd. One of the things we have asked NMP to do-"
Chair: "NMP is responsible."
John Clarke: "We have asked NMP to improve the capability for Sellafield Ltd."
Q13 Chair: "What have you been doing for the last four to five years?"
John Clarke: "I would say that the rate of improvement in that capability has been less than we would have wished. There have been improvements in capability, but not as much as we would have wished for."
DECC Permanent Secretary Stephen Lovegrove told the PAC: "The Department knew of the KPMG report. I did not personally, but officials had sight of it and read it."
Mrs Hodge observed: "It's an appalling waste of public money. It's like scattering confetti. Time extends and extends. I have looked at this two or three times now and every time I look at it the cost goes up - not in hundreds of millions, but in billions."
NMP: contrite all the way to the bank
Indeed so. A month later the NMP bosses themselves were instructed to appear before an enraged PAC. It was a veritable political mauling of the NMP witnesses inside the committee's coliseum.
Tom Zarges, the chair of NMP, backed up again by the hapless NDA boss John Clarke, and Sellafield Ltd's MD Tony Price, told the MPs that he was "humbled and truly sorry" for mistakes made during his firm's five-year tenure at Sellafield, and vowed that they would "not be repeated in the future."
Mrs Hodge observed she was "bewildered" the NDA had recently awarded NMP a five-year extension to run the nuclear site, adding caustically: "Mega-bucks are paid to NMP in fees, yet NMP does nothing [to address issues] other than waiting for the NDA to chivvy you along."
Mr Zarges defensively said: "While we have had achievements, we are not satisfied with these. We are a long way from satisfied ... If we have not learned from these experiences, we are not doing our job."
Meanwhile Mr Clarke conceded that he has been "disappointed with elements of NMP's performance ... The quality of leadership has been less than what we would wish for, and we have been disappointed with elements of performance. But to continue with the contract will provide a better outcome than the alternatives."
Two months later, on 4 February 2014, the PAC published its devastating report 'Managing risk at Sellafield', which inter alia concluded the NMP contract for Sellafield achieved "little improvement" commercially "for extra money spent".
Another conclusion was that "The use of cost reimbursement contracts for Sellafield Limited and its subcontractors means the financial risks are borne by the taxpayer. This contracting approach may be the best option where costs are very uncertain.
"However, as project and programme plans firm up and the lifetime plan becomes more robust, it should be possible to move away from cost reimbursement contracts. The Authority should determine how and when it will have achieved sufficient certainty to expect Sellafield Limited to transfer risk down the supply chain on individual projects and then to reconsider its contracting approach for the site as a whole."
An appalling waste of public money
One re-imbursement was not so much financially huge as extraordinary in its absurdity: an NMP executive claimed £714 taxi fare for a family cat to go to an airport! And was paid (although later it was recovered after a public uproar).
Margaret Hodge proclaimed the contract was an "appalling waste of public money ... The cost of one project soared from £387 million to £729 million in 18 months; another rose from £341 million to £750 million, with completion delayed for six years, in much the same short period."
The most damning conclusion read: "In 2011-12, the Authority paid out £54 million in fees, £17 million for 'reachback' staff and £11 million for executive staff seconded from Nuclear Management Partners. Sellafield Limited also awarded contracts to Nuclear Management Partners' constituent companies worth some £54 million in 2011-12.
"That means, in effect, that those who let contracts awarded their own constituent companies contracts, which raises concerns about fair competition and value. The Authority should ensure all payments are linked to the value delivered and that payments are not made where companies have failed to deliver. It should also routinely provide assurance on the operation of its controls over payments for Nuclear Management Partners' constituent companies."
Tom Zarges nevertheless maintained: "The first term of our contract has been characterised by many successes but also a number of disappointments and areas for improvement. Our job now is to build on our experience of the last five years to safely and reliably deliver our customer's mission, while further accelerating the pace of change and providing value for money to the NDA, Government and the UK tax payer."
An NDA statement insisted that "[we] now have a much better understanding of the issues and complexities that exist at the site and the challenges that lie ahead. Whilst progress has been made on a number of fronts we will require significant improvements during the next contract period.
"We have had extensive discussions with NMP and made clear where these improvements must be made. We will continue to monitor performance closely and remain focused on achieving our goal of safe, effective, value for money decommissioning at Sellafield."
Contract termination 'an operational matter'
A few weeks later, the then energy minister, Michael Fallon, since promoted to Defence Secretary, told Paul Flynn in a written answer:
"The contract review at the first break point, and the decision to continue with the contract into a second five year period, was an operational matter for the NDA. The NDA reached its decision based on a thorough review of performance in the first period of the contract and consideration of all available options.
"The Government endorsed the NDA's decision on the basis that it represents the best way forward at this time, giving NMP the opportunity to build on the progress made in the first five years of its contract for Sellafield Ltd (it has met some 90% of its targets to date and safety at the site has improved), address weaker areas of performance, and make further real progress in this next five year term." (Hansard, 24 Feb 2014 : Column 142W)
On the day Ed Davey announced the big U-turn, by chance Treasury Permanent Secretary, Sir Nicholas Macpherson, appeared before the Parliamentary Public Administration Select Committee inquiry on 'Whitehall: capacity to address future challenges', to be challenged by committee member Paul Flynn, asking:
"Just as a general principle, are you happy for the public purse to take all the risk, as I pointed out as clearly as possible in 2008, and for the private company, a foreign company, to take any profit that will come out?  Is that an abiding effort for the Treasury?"
Sir Nicholas Macpherson answered: "Put in those terms, I would never be happy with any contract like that. Ensuring that risk is borne in the right place is one of the biggest lessons of the financial crisis.  I do not want to get into this individual issue, because I am not sufficiently informed about it."
Meanwhile, John Robertson MP, Labour chair of the All Party Nuclear Power Group (a nuclear cheerleader set-up) said on 16 January, three days after Sellafield management were sacked:
"The industry really has turned Parliament around. We do now have a political House singing from the same hymn sheet on nuclear power. We need to work hard to keep it that way!" 
In so saying, he revealed just how out of touch the pro-nuclear cheer-leaders in Parliament really are.
NMP paid shareholders 145m in dividends
The Sunday Times Business section reported on 18 January that the failed NMP was paid its shareholders £145.1m in dividends during its tenure, starting with a £24.5m payout in 2009-10. The terms of its deal entitled it to £50m a year in fees from the NDA, "dependent on performance".
NMP said last week it was "surprised and disappointed" to be ditched and had improved its performance and saved taxpayers £650m during its tenure. It declined to comment on the dividends.
 
 

Wednesday, 14 January 2015

Sellafield's scandalous mismanagement partnership exposed


Yesterday the media reported the Coalition Government decision to cancel the (mis-) management contract for Sellafield held by Nuclear Management Partners. The Energy Secretary, Ed Davey, astonishingly told MPs in Parliament that NMP "we endorsed the Nuclear Decommissioning Authority’s decision to roll the current Parent Body Organisation (PBO) contract forward into the second term (from 1 April 2014) to ensure that the progress made in the first five year term could be built upon."
(http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201415/cmhansrd/cm150113/debtext/150113-0001.htm#15011346000003).

And former energy minister Michael Fallon, since elevated to Defence Secretary to reflect his acute judgment, told Labour MP Paul Flynn 11 months ago, in response to the question "for what reasons his Department supported the five-year contract award to Nuclear Management Partners to manage the Sellafield site." that  "the decision to continue with the contract into a second five year period, was an operational matter for the NDA. The NDA reached its decision based on a thorough review of performance in the first period of the contract and consideration of all available options. The Government endorsed the NDA's decision on the basis that it represents the best way forward at this time, giving NMP the opportunity to build on the progress made in the first five years of its contract for Sellafield Ltd "
(Hansard,) 24 Feb 2014 : Column 142W)

Nobody told the truth behind this scandalous contract, that has bled the UK taxpayer for the past six years, and was awarded demonstrably corruptly. Below explains what happened.



MPs were denied the chance to challenge sweetener to private firm's nuclear deal


Top civil servants and nuclear administrators colluded to prevent MPs from challenging a massive sweetener to a private business taking over the running of Sellafield, internal documents in the hands of The Independent on Sunday reveal.

The documents, obtained through the Freedom of Information Act, also disclose that the Government pushed through the handover at breakneck speed because it feared that the "unstable management arrangements" of the controversial Cumbrian nuclear complex risked its safety.
Yesterday, a leading Labour MP announced that he would try to get a parliamentary investigation into the revelations in the documents, which run to 140 pages and had been so heavily censored prior to release that many whole pages, and the names of most of the officials involved, have been systematically blanked out. Paul Flynn MP, a member of the House of Commons Public Administration Committee – which examines the performance of the Civil Service – is to ask it to inquire into what he calls "an egregious example of obstruction of parliamentary accountability".
The cover-up arises from the awarding, late in November, of a contract to run the nuclear complex to Nuclear Management Partners, a consortium of US, French and British companies. Although the contract is worth some £22bn, the consortium told ministers that it would walk away from the deal unless it was fully indemnified against the costs of cleaning up an accident at what is one of the world's most hazardous nuclear sites.
Normally, as the documents repeatedly acknowledge, the Government would place a special minute before Parliament if it intended to undertake a liability of more than £250,000. MPs would then have 14 days to raise an objection, which would stop the undertaking going ahead until it had been dealt with. But MPs were not told about the Sellafield indemnity until 75 days after the last moment when they could object, even though it potentially exposes the taxpayer to liabilities running into billions.
The energy minister Mike O'Brien blames a "clerical oversight" for this. But the documents clearly show that the senior civil servants and nuclear administrators had been actively discussing how to limit MPs' chance to object at least since early last year.
The documents have come to light only as a result of persistent pressure from Dr David Lowry, an independent environmental policy and research consultant, who is a member of Nuclear Waste Advisory Associates. The documents make it clear that the Government was determined to hurry through the handover of operations at Sellafield as quickly as possible because of what one of them calls "the current unstable management arrangements overseeing these extremely sensitive sites, and their high hazard inventories". Another adds that this instability "constitutes a genuine risk to health, safety and environmental performance" at the complex.
A rushed timetable was drawn up which involved naming a preferred bidder for the contract on 11 July and signing a transitional agreement on 6 October. But this clashed with the long parliamentary summer recess, which ran from late July to the very day set aside for the signing.
If the Government were to stick to its speeded-up timetable, the documents say, "the very earliest date" in which the minute could be laid before Parliament would be 14 July, shortly before the recess began on the 22nd.
Determined not to slow down the handover, the Government decided to reduce the period in which MPs could object. On 26 March, an official whose name and department has been blanked out emailed the official Nuclear Decommissioning Authority (NDA) to stress the requirement to "shorten the 14 working parliamentary days that an indemnity would normally need before it can become effective".
The official added: "To get this down to five days, we will need to muster some persuasive arguments and I wondered where you had got to on assembling these." Two days later he was sent a "first draft" of the argument including an assertion that the "vulnerability of Sellafield operations is already seen as a significant safety risk".
But by early June, the idea of giving MPs any time at all to object had been abandoned. Another email to the NDA, from apparently the same blanked-out official, reported a "conclusion" that a letter should merely be written to Edward Leigh MP, the chairman of the House of Commons Public Accounts Committee, "rather than go for a shorter notice period to the House".
A minute "explaining what has happened" would be laid before MPs only "when Parliament reconvenes in the autumn", by which time it would be too late to raise objections. On 14 July, the then energy minister Malcolm Wicks duly wrote to Mr Leigh; he did not object and the indemnity went into force before MPs knew about it.
In his letter, Mr Wicks assured Mr Leigh that he was placing a copy of the letter and the minute in "the libraries of the house". In fact this did not happen until 15 October, 75 days after the final date on which MPs could raise an objection. Mr O'Brien, who succeeded Mr Wicks, blamed "a minor error by a junior official", but later conceded that his department had not checked for three months whether the documents had reached the libraries.
Mr Flynn says that he and other MPs had already been raising questions about the indemnity and would have been likely to raise objections, and accuse the Government of trying to push it through "without anyone noticing".


 Early day motion 1048

Main content

Follow this EDM by:

SELLAFIELD MISMANAGEMENT AND NUCLEAR MANAGEMENT PARTNERS

  • Session: 2012-13
  • Date tabled: 06.02.2013
  • Primary sponsor: Flynn, Paul
That this House notes that the Public Accounts Committee states that it is not convinced that taxpayers are getting a good deal from the Nuclear Decommissioning Agency's (NDA) plans; believe that these enormous costs need to be strictly controlled by robust, verified assessments of the sums involved, so that payments are not made which would seem to constitute a reward for failure; recalls that when the contract was awarded in October 2008, Ministers at the Department for Energy and Climate Change (DECC) were questioned on the probity of such huge sums being awarded without Parliamentary scrutiny; recalls EDM 2321 on Parliamentary Oversight of Sellafield Indemnification tabled on 22 October 2008 observed accurately that the agreement would privatise the profits of the Sellafield management contract leaving the potentially multi-billion pound liabilities with taxpayers; acknowledges the subsequent release of internal memoranda and emails between DECC and NDA officials which expose the deliberate cover up from Parliament; and now invites current Ministers at the DECC to explain why Nuclear Management Partners have made such a pig's ear of the task of managing Sellafield safely and within budget.

Early day motion 2321

PARLIAMENTARY OVERSIGHT OF SELLAFIELD INDEMNIFICATION


 

  • Session: 2007-08
  • Date tabled: 22.10.2008
  • Primary sponsor: Flynn, Paul
  • Sponsors:

That this House notes that when the Government decided to provide indemnification against insurance claims following nuclear accident at the Low-level Waste Repository at Drigg, for the new American management company, the then Minister for Energy published a written statement in Hansard of 27th February 2008 and the associated Minute was placed in the Library to allow 14 sitting days for objections from hon. Members; contrasts this open procedure with the approach adopted for a similar insurance indemnification for the new private sector management company for Sellafield, Nuclear Management Partners, when no written statement was placed before Parliament but instead, the then Minister for Energy wrote on 14th July 2008 to the chairmen of the Committee on Public Accounts and Business, Enterprise and Regulatory Reform Committee, enclosing a copy of the Minute setting out the proposed arrangements and stating that a copy of the Minute would be placed in the Library; further notes that this Minute arrived in the Library on 14th October, more than 75 days after the period for hon. Members to object officially elapsed; believes it is unacceptable for hon. Members to be denied the opportunity to comment on this Minute, the effect of which is to privatise the profits of the Sellafield management contract leaving the potentially multi-billion pound liabilities with taxpayers; declines to give approval to the proposed indemnification arrangements; and calls upon the Government to reopen the period in which hon. Members may signify objections to Government guarantees for which no statutory authority exists
 

Friday, 9 January 2015

Slain cartoonists at Charlie Hebdo were allies of anti-nuclear movement

I could not say this better myself.   
Charlie Hebdo not only poked fun at religions and politicians, but  critiqued the stupidity of nuclear weapons and dangers of nuclear power. The media in the UK have overlooked this.                    
We pause to remember those slain at the French satirical news magazine Charlie Hebdo. Several of the cartoonists at Charlie Hebdo were close allies of the French anti-nuclear movement, even providing cartoons to the French anti-nuclear network, "Sortir du nucléaire." Stéphane Charbonnier, its editor in chief, drew many cartoons lampooning the nuclear industry. (One example is pictured below. It reads: "What could one do without nuclear? Live.") Charb, as he was known by his pen name, participated in opposition to both nuclear power and nuclear weapons. He was among the 12 killed.  Another Hebdo staffer, Fabrice Nicolino, who was wounded but we are told will survive, was the author of the brilliant special edition of Charlie Hebdo focusing on nuclear power and called The Nuclear Swindle (cover pictured left). In it, Nicolino, an author and environmental journalist, pointed out that nuclear power is a hold-up, with democracy as the spoils. The assassination of the 12 people at Charlie Hebdo, and the injuring of others, was also an assault on democracy



Charlie hebdo l'Escroquerie Nucléaire Hors série

·         Revue - Charlie hebdo l'Escroquerie Nucléaire Hors série - Actualités et médias - 01/01/2012
http://fabrice-nicolino.com/wp-content/uploads/2012/09/charlie-nucleaire.pdf
 

It is never right to forcibly attack journalists

Today the Guardian published shortened version of a letter to the  editor  I submitted. Below is the full text:

Your trenchant leader against the criminal terrorism committed in Paris (8 January) asserts the “adjectives are simply not there to capture the horror of weapons of war in a civilian office.”
(“The Guardian view on Charlie Hebdo: those guns were trained on free speech,” http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2015/jan/07/guardian-view-charlie-hebdo-guns-trained-free-speech).
Maybe not for the Paris outrage. However, we should not forget NATO - on our behalf  - has twice bombed media headquarters in its invasions of Serbia and Afghanistan respectively.

Your security specialist, Richard Norton-Taylor reported 16 years ago, (“Serb TV station was legitimate target, says Blair,” 24 April 1999, http://www.theguardian.com/world/1999/apr/24/balkans3) that NATO attacked the Serbian State television (RTS) headquarters  in the centre of Belgrade, killing thirteen members of the media, which contradicted an apparent earlier assurance by NATO  that only transmitters would be hit,  was condemned by international journalists' organisations, representing both employers and unions.

The then prime minister Tony Blair and NATO's military spokesman, Air Commodore David Wilby, described RTS as an “entirely legitimate target.” But the then general secretary of the National Union of Journalists described the attack as 'barbarity', adding   “Killing journalists does not stop censorship, it only brings more repression.”

Then in 2001, just before the Northern Alliance marched into Kabul on 12 November, the US airforce, acting for NATO, dropped a 500-pound bomb on the studios of the popular Arab satellite TV station al-Jazeera, also damaging  damaged nearby offices of the BBC and the Associated Press.

By chance, nobody was hurt, as the building was not occupied at the time by any of the 10 al-Jazeera journalists and technicians based there.

It is never right to attack journalists, even if you disagree with the editorial position of their media outlet, print or broadcast. We should uphold this defence of freedom, not apply it selectively.

 

Wednesday, 7 January 2015

Nuclear's carbon footprint

This was sent as a letter to the editor of the New York Times.
Re: “Nuclear: Carbon Free, but Not Free of Unease, “ December 23, (http://www.nytimes.com/2014/12/23/science/nuclear-carbon-free-but-not-free-of-unease-.html)


I agree with assessment of Sharon Squassoni, of the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington, that nuclear power – in the US and abroad - “is going nowhere quickly.”


However, it is misleading, as the headline does - along with subsequent letter from former New Hampshire Senator Judd Gregg (Dec.25
http://www.nytimes.com/2014/12/26/opinion/nuclear-energy-part-of-mix.html ) and article by Matthew L. Wald “E.P.A. Wrestles With Role of Nuclear Plants in Carbon Emission Rules” (Dec. 26)   present nuclear power as “carbon-free.”
 
To assess the nuclear industry's environmental impact, the whole uranium fuel cycle, from exploration, mining, milling, processing and fuel fabrication - as well as final spent nuclear fuel management after the fuel has been burned in the reactor- needs to be evaluated for its carbon emissions.


Thus life-cycle analyses are essential to assess the true impact of the entire processes.


A number of such studies have examined CO2 emissions - commonly expressed as CO2 equivalents per kWh - for different methods of producing electricity. The most comprehensive model has been created by the Öko Institut, (http://www.oeko.de/en/) which advises the German environment ministry, and by Professor Jan Willem Storm Van Leeuwen  and the late Professor  Philip Smith and at the University of Groningen, in the Netherlands.


Both studies conclude that the nuclear fuel cycle can emit relatively large amounts of CO2. The lower the uranium concentration in ore, the more CO2 generated; Using sensible assumptions, Professors Jan Willem Storm Van Leeuwen and the late Professor Philip Smith (www.stormsmith.nl/ ) determined that nuclear generation produced about a third as much CO2 per kWh as conventional mid-sized gas-fired electricity generation.

Monday, 5 January 2015

A robust energy reality‏

 
 
 
I submitted this letter to the FT in response to a tendentious leading comment. (A special thanks is due to former Labour MP Alan Simpson for inspiring the argument by a recent  feature he published http://www.morningstaronline.co.uk/a-2d73-Blinded-by-the-lights#.VKdEMY10yM8)
 
 
Your leader comment “Britain’s energy policy needs to be reviewed”, (
January 2) argues that the Coalition has erred in following Labour’s failure to build new power generation capacity, despite pledging to do so.(
 
You argue that “A better course would see Britain loosen the environmental corset, while investing in science to deliver the sort of technologies that can decarbonise at reasonable cost;” and that “a bigger concern is the framework the government’s reforms have put in place", to replace decommissioned power plants.
This view is energetically myopic. One of the absurd failures of Britain’s first round of electricity capacity market “auctions” held  late last month  (https://www.gov.uk/government/news/the-first-ever-capacity-market-auction-official-results-have-been-released-today)  was that less than 1 per cent of the contracts went into electrical power “demand reduction” measures.
 
Our MPs could easily have changed the nature of the auction by specifying that a certain realistic percentage, say 50 per cent of the contracts, should go into schemes  designed to consume less and save more, but Parliament did not so legislate, mainly due to a distinct lack of imagination by the Labour oppostion front bench Energy and Climate Change team.
A more radical opposition boldly, they could have pressed for a “carbon cap” on where this energy came from, or at least a  minimum proportion that had to come from renewable sources, but because of their illogical support for expensive nuclear power and the indexation of  very high power prices - which your leader rightly criticises -  they did not argue for such commitments.
 
Europe’s economic powerhouse, Germany, led by the economically competent Angela Merkel, has however made such bold energy decisions, phasing out nuclear and switching to a combination of innovative demand-side energy strategies and  renewable energy technologies.
 
Indeed, Dr Eicke Weber director of influential Munich-based Fraunhofer Institute, (http://www.fraunhofer.de/en.html) and a  professor of physics at the University of Freiburg, has just led its latest scientific audit about Germany’s transition plans towards a cleaner/greener energy economy, concluding: “It is economically to our (ie Germany’s) advantage to move as quickly as possible to a system of 80 per cent renewable energy.”
This is far from what your leader dubs as “green posturing.”  It is hard-nosed, economically robust reality.