Thursday, 15 February 2018

Atomic alarmism over Iran

Letter to the Times:
 
The article by Colonel Richard Kemp ("Failure to Support Israel against Iran could end in war, " Thunderer, 12 February 2018; https://www.thetimes.co.uk/article/failure-to-support-israel-against-iran-could-end-in-war-35wdwsh82)  was extremely alarmist. With the views he expresses, claiming to be based on "years studying secret intelligence" I am pleased he is a former, not currently serving, head of international terrorism at the Cabinet Office.

He makes the ludicrous assertion that the Iran Nuclear Deal - otherwise known as the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPoA) - has  "paved the way to [Iran becoming] a nuclear-armed state," when he knows it was very carefully crafted by  its collective partners the P5+1 (China, France, Germany, Russia, the United Kingdom, and the United States, along with the European Union), to achieve precisely the opposite outcome.

Many thoughtful and well-connected security research institutes in Washington DC and beyond, such as The [US]Arms Control Association and Penn Biden Center for Diplomacy at the University of Pennsylvania strongly support this agreement. In an ACA briefing published on Jan 9th, Kelsey Davenport ACA director for nonproliferation policy concludes after detailed analysis:"Without question, the nuclear deal with Iran has effectively removed the existential threat of an Iranian nuclear weapons program and significantly scaled back the country’s nuclear activities."

Meanwhile, Col Kemp assert this diplomatic deal as "flawed," but provided no information on why  he comes to this conclusion. But the British Government, for whom he used to work until 2006, holds a very different opinion of the Iran atomic accord.

For instance, Lord Ahmad of Wimbledon, a Foreign Office minister, told peers in a written answer on 19 Oct 2017:



"The Foreign Secretary [has]  set out that the JCPoA is the only diplomatic means to neutralise the nuclear threat from Iran and that it is working. This message is being delivered to the US at all levels of Government." ( HL1705)




Foreign Secretary Boris Johnson re-affirmed this in Foreign and Commonwealth Questions in the House of Common on  9 January this year (Official Report, column 160), when he said: "the Iran nuclear deal is valid, represents a considerable diplomatic achievement and should be safeguarded." (https://hansard.parliament.uk/commons/2018-01-09/debates/BF5910AC-3D14-4AEB-9F9E-837387C83DAF/Iran)


Col Kemp should  publicly make clear why he holds diametrically opposite views, or stop dangerously scaremongering

Friday, 9 February 2018

Nuclear's unquantifiably huge future liabilities waiting for the taxpayer to cough up


 On 7 February, the British Government (Treasury) released 754 page document – excitingly entitled “Central Government Supply Estimates 2017-18” - detailing changes to planned public expenditure since last Autumn’s Budget 2017.

At pages 162-64 you can find the Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy (BEIS) extra expenditure requests and clarification of perceived liabilities. These include several covering the privately-owned commercial nuclear industry sector. Below are the sections on nuclear, and the most common  read-out message is how often the  liabilities for which the taxpayer is expected to  take long term financial responsibility are described as  “unquantifiable.” That is accurate, but what is omitted is the numbers are – based on accumulated experience to date, likely to be astronomically huge.

This worryingly unacceptable situation,- whereby one  industry (nuclear) of the electricity generating sector is being  promised a massive  future bailout from its liabilities- really should be examined in detail by our elected Parliamentarians and  peers in several  relevant committees and in the Estimates Debate on the floor of the Commons.

At House of Commons Business Questions on 8 February the following exchange took place between Pete Wishart SNP shadow House business spokesperson and Andrea Leadsom, the Leader of the House of Commons (ie government business manager who organises Parliamentary allocation of time for debates etc)

Wishart: “When we return, we will have our new estimates debates. For the first time in recent political history, we will actually debate estimates on estimates day. What a novelty that will be!”

Leadsom: “I share his delight at estimates being debated and being announced in the future business…”


It is essential MPs do their job properly and forensically financially scrutinise the implications of these 2018 Estimates of future expenditure.

Key  extracts from Estimates

Part III: Note K - Contingent Liabilities Nature of liability £'000 –

Hinkley Point C Funded Decommissioning Programme (FDP) and Waste Transfer Contracts (WTCs):- The contract with NNB Generation Company Limited (NNB) to build Hinkley Point C (HPC) nuclear power plant includes a Contract for Difference between NNB and the Low Carbon Contracts Company, an FDP and associated FDP documents including WTCs between NNB and the core Department. The FDP and related documents including WTCs require NNB to make prudent provision for their waste and decommissioning liabilities. To meet their liabilities, the operator must set up a fund with an independent governance framework and will pay into it so that it is on track to fund the liabilities that arise from decommissioning and waste management. The fund will report annually to the Secretary of State and a full review will be conducted every 5 years to ensure that the fund is on track to meet all its liabilities. If it is off track, the operator will be required to take corrective action. These liabilities are strictly the operator’s responsibility and the probability of taxpayers picking up these liabilities is remote.

(REALLY??!!-DL)

Alongside the FDP, the Government has entered into 2 WTCs. These set out terms on which the Government will take title to and liability for the spent fuel and intermediate level waste (ILW) from the site after decommissioning in order to dispose of the waste safely. The WTCs have generally been prepared in line with the Government’s published waste transfer pricing methodology. Although the WTCs provide a default price based on today’s best estimate, they allow the waste transfer price to be set after a specified later date. The final price agreed is subject to a cap, but the likelihood of the future costs exceeding the agreed cap is considered remote. Unquantifiable –

Nuclear: the Core Department has a range of civil nuclear liabilities arising through its association with the United Kingdom Atomic Energy Authority and British Nuclear Fuels Limited as well as ensuring that the Government complies with its obligations under the various international nuclear agreements and treaties. The amount and timing of this overarching liability is not quantifiable. Unquantifiable –

Nuclear Liabilities Fund (NLF) - A constructive obligation was created in 2002 when the Government undertook to underwrite the Nuclear Liabilities Fund in respect of uncontracted and decommissioning liabilities of British Energy (now EDF Energy Nuclear Generation Limited (EDFE)) to the extent that the assets of the Fund fall short. The undiscounted estimated liabilities of £19.9 billion (2015-16 £19.7 billion) have a present value of £32.8 billion (2015-16 £33 billion) using the prescribed discount rate from HM Treasury of negative 0.8% (2015-16 negative 0.8%). The value of the Fund is £9.4 billion (2015-16 £9.2 billion) and is likely to increase in the future from investment returns. It is hard to quantify the extent to which the net position of the Fund might represent a contingent liability or asset given the high level of uncertainty relating to estimation of cash outflows and investment returns over a future period exceeding 100 years. In view of changes to actual and expected interest rates and expected rates of inflation experienced during the course of the year, the Trustees are currently reviewing the Fund’s asset allocation to help ensure sufficient funding to meet expected liabilities. On this basis, the Department believes it would not be appropriate to consider this as either a contingent liability or asset. Unquantifiable –

The NDA has non-quantifiable contingent liabilities arising from indemnities given as part of the contracts for the management of the nuclear site license companies. These indemnities are in respect of the uninsurable residual risk that courts in a country which is not party to the Paris and Brussels Conventions on third–party liability in the field of nuclear energy may accept jurisdiction to determine liability in the event of a nuclear incident. Indemnities are in place in respect of Magnox, LLWR and Dounreay as set out in the relevant Parent Body Agreements. In addition, indemnities are provided to the previous PBO’s of Magnox and Sellafield covering the periods of their ownership. These are not treated as contingent liabilities within the meaning of IAS 37 since the possibility of a transfer of economic benefit in settlement is considered too remote. Unquantifiable

The Secretary of State Investor Agreement (SOSIA) provides protections in certain scenarios where the Hinkley Point C Nuclear plant is shut shown for reasons that are political, or due to certain changes in insurance arrangements or certain changes in law. Payments under the SOSIA would be expected in the first instance to be made using funds from the Supplier Obligation but in certain circumstances they could also come direct from the Secretary of State relying on spending powers granted under the relevant Appropriation Act or, if payments were to be made over a period longer than 2 years, seeking a new spending power at the time. The payments could be up to around £22bn excluding non-decommissioning operational costs that may be incurred after any shutdown. However, the liability to make payments under the SOSIA is almost entirely within the control of HM Government.

Reprocessing and staff commitments: STFC is responsible for Institut Laue-Langevin (ILL) staff-related commitments and costs associated with reprocessing fuel elements. £16,000 –

Tuesday, 6 February 2018

Atomic woes

Letter sent to the Financial Times:

Your energy editor Andrew Ward’s Big Read  (“Nuclear’s Hazard,” February 5; https://www.ft.com/content/8307c266-066b-11e8-9650-9c0ad2d7c5b5) contains series of contentious assertions from the author and nuclear sector advocates.
Let me challenge just three.

 

The new UK chief executive of French reactor vendor, EDF Energy, the Italian Simone Rossi, (who has 14 years working experience with EDF) is reported as suggesting that “experience from previous projects will allow EDF to build another  [nuclear] power station […] at Sizewell in Suffolk, eastern England, with 20 per cent  lower  costs than Hinkley [C nuclear plant]

 

The problem with Mr Rossi’s view is history ( which he experienced first-hand inside EDF) demonstrates the opposite experience, with the very nuclear-experienced EDF demonstrating  almost uniquely in  large-scale industrial construction,  a ‘negative learning curve ” ie matters get worse, not better, with experience, in its nuclear fleet.

 

Professor Arnulf Grubler, of the International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis in Laxenburg, Austria, (where he is currently Programme Director of  Transitions To New Technologies), has exposed this disastrous situation in his detailed assessment ‘The costs of the French nuclear scale-up: A case of negative learning by doing’, published in the internationally respected journal Energy Policy, in September 2010 (Volume 38, Issue 9, Pages 5174-5188)


The paper reviews the history and the economics of the French PWR programme. Drawing on largely unknown public records, the paper reveals that even this most extensive nuclear scale-up by a most experienced owner/operator, was characterized by a substantial “escalation of real-term construction costs.”

Secondly, it is misleading to suggest that “nuclear power plants  typically have an average utilization rate above 90 per cent”  without pointing out what happens when a significant accident occurs.

After the economically catastrophic Fukushima nuclear accident in Japan in March 2011, the entire Japanese nuclear fleet of 54 reactors was closed down for four years, with a load factor of zero, becoming a hugely expensive collective stranded asset. Only five reactors have restarted to date, with the first two back online in August and October 2015.


Finally, it should be pointed out that Calder Hall, the nuclear plant at Sellafield, was not, as Mr Ward writes, “the first commercial reactor.”

Calder Hall’s four Magnox reactors were not built or designed primarily to industrially generate electricity. Here is what the UK Atomic Energy Authority official historian, Kenneth Jay, wrote about Calder Hall, in his short book of the same name, published to coincide with the opening of the plant by Queen Elizabeth in October 1956. [He referred to] “major plants built for military purposes, such as Calder Hall.” (p.88) Earlier, he wrote: “… The plant has been designed as a dual-purpose plant, to produce plutonium for military purposes as well as electric power.” (p.80).(emphasis added)

Accuracy is important in this highly charged  strategic energy investment policy. decision.

Tuesday, 30 January 2018

Government nuclear waste plan will bring 'Mobile Chernobyl' risk to Britain


 

Five years ago today Cumbria County Council, representing several Lake District and coastal communities, blocked Government attempts to develop a subterranean geologic repository for long-lived radioactive waste (GDF) (http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-england-cumbria-21253673

Last week  specialist energy and environmental correspondents  reported on the latest attempts by ministers to resurrect this process, with a new 897 page public consultation, Working with communities: implementing geological disposal.(https://www.gov.uk/government/consultations/working-with-communities-implementing-geological-disposal)

They all reported, ministers have now decided backing “communities” with  significant multi-million pound financial incentives/compensation is the new approach.

In the consultation document, energy minister Richard Harrington writes: “We believe the best way to select a site for a geological disposal facility is in partnership with communities.”

He adds “Building and operating a geological disposal facility is a multi-billion pound, intergenerational, national infrastructure project, which is likely to bring substantial benefits to its host community, with skilled jobs for hundreds of people over many decade.”

The document asserts its purpose “is to gather views on how communities should be engaged and represented…”

The Government commits itself to the following policy: “The final decision to site a geological disposal facility in a community will not be taken until there has been a test of public support that demonstrates clear community support for development at a specific site.”

The Government concept is to first identify a relevant‘ Search Area’ with some local support, and then back a ‘Host Community.’


The consultation insists that there will be all the usual opportunities for the public to have a say in the process through planning, safety, security and environmental permitting processes.

It is clear from the way the consultation that the government hasa very narrow concept of community, essentially the very close  area surrounding the planned GDF entrance

The one minor concession that there are wider ‘affected’ communities from such a 100 plus year development comes at Paragraph 4.7, which makes clear that transport links/routes, from the geological disposal facility site to the nearest port, railhead or primary road network (i.e. as far as where minor roads meet the nearest ‘A’ roads used for transport on a regional or county level’ will be considered relevant.

At footnote number 26 to the document adds: In selecting a site, the ‘delivery body’ would give consideration to existing transport infrastructure, suitable transport modes and routes, and appropriate mitigation measures to minimise any adverse impacts on a community.  

But the hundreds of miles of ‘affected communities along road and rail routes from radioactive waste stores, to any centralized repository, are being ignored.

Why does the Government believe  people living in these communities with  multiple loads of radioactive materials coming past where they live for many decades do not deserve significant financial compensation too?

In the US critics call this process, with some justification, “mobile Chernobyls’.
(https://www.nirs.org/why-we-call-it-mobile-chernobyl/)
 

Thursday, 25 January 2018

The Atomic Ostrich policy: UK ignores Swedish landmark court decision in backing flawed radioactive waste technology

A path-breaking decision was taken by the Swedish independent Environmental Court on Tuesday this week to reject arguments advanced by the Swedish nuclear waste industry and Swedish nuclear regulator  in favour of the plans to bury long-lived high-activity  radioactive waste underground, in support  of independent  scientific criticism  by the Swedish umbrella  group, MKG, representing five major environmental groups.

My observations are included in an article I reproduce  below. Meanwhile, today the UK Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy department has released 890 pages of  consultation documents on developing nuclear waste repository, which includes advocacy of the very  packaging  technology using copper, rejected two days earlier in Sweden, where the technology ( called KBS3)  has been developed!
Details of the  UK Government consultation are also pasted below

It is the Ostrich posture: as Professor Andrew Blowers quotes evocatively in his  magisterial book 'The Legacy of Nuclear Power' (Routledge, 2017) of the French nuclear industry on the Cotentin Peninsula, where La Hague (France's Sellafield) is located:
"The Cotentin is like an ostrich. It puts its head in the sand. It doesn't see the hunter, but the hunter blasts its backside with his gun!"


 




08

Image: MKG/David Smythe

The Swedish Environmental Court says no to the power industry’s Nuclear Waste Company SKB’s license application for a final repository for spent nuclear fuel in Forsmark, Sweden. This is a huge triumph for safety and environment – and for the Swedish NGO Office for Nuclear Waste Review (MKG), the Swedish Society for Nature Conservation (SSNC), and critical scientists who have been presenting risks of the malfunction of the selected method. Now it is up to the Swedish government to make the final decision. ~ MKG  Read more here

“This is both an amazing decision and very important decision. The Swedish Environmental  Court has concluded that the scientific argument and evidence presented by an umbrella group ( Göteborg -based MKG) representing a wide range of environmental organisations had more credibility  than the evidence of the Swedish nuclear regulator and Swedish Nuclear Fuel and Waste company (SKB).
The UK nuclear waste disposal/ storage implementer, the Government-owned RWML, meanwhile is intent on obtaining under licence the SKB containment technology called KBS3 rejected as unacceptable by the Environmental court in the country of its development! Prudence might expect a ministerial re-think, but there again, this  is the semidetached UK from where  am writing.
Congratulations must go to Johan Swahn and his MKG team for demonstrating robust truthful science is more valuable than distorted science as presented by the so called independent Swedish nuclear regulator. This pronouncement in Stockholm this morning will reverberate across Europe sending shock waves into the nuclear waste establishment; as it should.”

Dr David Lowry

Dr David Lowry is a research consultant with specialist knowledge of UK and EU nuclear and environment policy.

The KBS-3 concept has been adopted by the UK for high level nuclear waste and spent fuel and this short slide show by Professor David Smythe summarises why it does not work.
 

The Swedish Environmental Court’s NO to the final repository for spent nuclear fuel: a major victory for safety



The Swedish Environmental Court says no to the power industry’s Nuclear Waste Company SKB’s license application for a final repository for spent nuclear fuel in Forsmark, Sweden. This is a huge triumph for safety and environment – and for the Swedish NGO Office for Nuclear Waste Review (MKG), the Swedish Society for Nature Conservation (SSNC), and critical scientists who have been presenting risks of the malfunction of the selected method. Now it is up to the Swedish government to make the final decision.
“This is a triumph for us. From now on, the work on evaluating safer disposal solutions will continue. The decision that will be made concerns waste that will be hazardous for thousands of years. Several independent researchers have criticized both the applied method and the selected site. There is a solid documentation as base for the Environmental Court’s decision. It is hard to believe the Swedish Government’s conclusions will be any different from that of the Court’s” says Johan Swahn, Director at MKG and Chair of NTW Radioactive Waste Management Working Group. 
This article is an extract of the full article of MKG.
Article by Johan Swahn published on 12/12/2017 on the on-going licensing process in the Swedish Environnemental Court for the proposed final repository at the Forsmark NPP.

 
 

 

Policy paper
Documents
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/676402/thumbnail_Final_NPS_Consultation_Document.pdf.png
PDF, 549KB, 34 pages
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Implementing geological disposal: land use planning
The 2014 White Paper committed to bringing Geological Disposal Facilities within the definition of nationally significant infrastructure projects (NSIPs) and then to produce a draft National Policy Statement (NPS)
Published 25 January 2018
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Published 25 January 2018
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