A hitherto secret memorandum, dated
7 October 1955, has just been released
by the excellent independent US National
Security archive that demonstrates the concern
held by early atomic advocates over the implications of exporting nuclear
technology and fissile ( explosive) nuclear materials. (https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu//dc.html?doc=6199557-National-Security-Archive-Doc-1-Memorandum-for)
The NSA explainer sets out the context:
During a discussion with Secretary of State John Foster
Dulles on the peaceful uses of atomic energy, Philip Farley mentioned that the
U.S., the Soviet Union, and other countries had been discussing the importance
of controls over nuclear reactor operations and Washington and Moscow’s “common
interest in seeing that other countries did not obtain nuclear weapons.” That
same day, Farley met with Harold Knapp of the Atomic Energy Commission who,
like Farley’s boss, Gerard C. Smith, had been working on a study of controls
over the export of fissionable materials for overseas nuclear reactors.
The next day, Knapp read Smith’s paper and Farley read Knapp’s paper which made the point that the “principle threat to peace” was not so much from the export of fissionable materials but from an effect of the U.S. Atoms for Peace program: the “expanded knowledge of nuclear power reactors and plutonium separation.” That meant that any “reasonably advanced” industrial country could “learn from the open literature how to build a plutonium separation plant capable of separating 20 KG a year for about half-million dollars.” “Accordingly, the threat of weapons capability in other countries like the Netherlands, Israel, Argentina and many others is not remote.”
The next day, Knapp read Smith’s paper and Farley read Knapp’s paper which made the point that the “principle threat to peace” was not so much from the export of fissionable materials but from an effect of the U.S. Atoms for Peace program: the “expanded knowledge of nuclear power reactors and plutonium separation.” That meant that any “reasonably advanced” industrial country could “learn from the open literature how to build a plutonium separation plant capable of separating 20 KG a year for about half-million dollars.” “Accordingly, the threat of weapons capability in other countries like the Netherlands, Israel, Argentina and many others is not remote.”
Doc.01. Memorandum for File by
P[hilip] J. Farley, Office of Special Assistant to Secretary of State for
Atomic Energy, “Control of Peacetime Uses of Nuclear Energy,” 7 October 1955)
Over the next 13 years the US Government, along with its UN
Security Council permanent member partners, the USSR and UK, negotiated nuclear
non-proliferation treaty (NPT), and despite the concerns outlined above, the
NPT text included in it preamble the following backing for the global spread of
nuclear energy and materials:
Affirming the
principle that the benefits of peaceful applications of nuclear technology,
including any
technological by-products which may be derived by nuclear-weapon States from
the development
of nuclear explosive devices, should be available for peaceful purposes to all
Parties to the
Treaty, whether nuclear-weapon or non-nuclear-weapon States,
Convinced that,
in furtherance of this principle, all Parties to the Treaty are entitled to
participate in
the fullest possible exchange of scientific information for, and to contribute
alone
or in
co-operation with other States to, the further development of the applications
of atomic
energy for
peaceful purposes,
It also included in its Articles the following: ARTICLE
IV
1. Nothing in
this Treaty shall be interpreted as affecting the inalienable right of all the
Parties to the
Treaty to develop research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful
purposes without
discrimination and in conformity with Articles I and II of this Treaty.
2. All the
Parties to the Treaty undertake to facilitate, and have the right to
participate in. the
fullest possible
exchange of equipment, materials and scientific and technological information
for the peaceful
uses of nuclear energy. Parties to the Treaty in a position to do so shall also
cooperate
in contributing
alone or together with other States or international organizations to the
further
development of the applications of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes,
especially in
the territories
of non-nuclear-weapon States Party to the Treaty, with due consideration for
the
needs of the
developing areas of the world.
Yesterday (16 July 2019) in the House
of Lords peers debated ( https://hansard.parliament.uk/lords/2019-07-16/debates/EED0083E-F2B2-4F06-A387-16567CC9646D/NuclearWeapons(InternationalRelationsCommitteeReport) a report on nuclear weapons and non- proliferation - Rising nuclear risk, disarmament and the
Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty- (7th Report, HL Paper 338), produced by
the HoL International Relations Committee(https://publications.parliament.uk/pa/ld201719/ldselect/ldintrel/338/33802.htm)
Conservative peer and chairperson of
the Committee, Lord Howell of Guildford (who as David Howell had been Mrs Thatcher’s first Energy
Secretary, responsible for nuclear power policy from 1979 onwards) opened
the debate warning “This report is presented to your Lordships for debate
against a background of a fast deteriorating world arms control environment and
rising nuclear risk. Some have now suggested that the risk of nuclear weapons
being used is at its highest since the Second World War….”
adding
“the enormous technological impact on the nuclear scene is perhaps the
newest and most unnerving danger. The committee was warned clearly about the
vulnerabilities to nuclear command and control systems from cyberattacks. If
cyberattacks can now knock out early warnings, simulate fake attacks or
compromise delivery systems, the entire doctrine of nuclear deterrence is
undermined.”
In conclusion, he stressed “without the
general determination between nations to co-operate closely, even with those
who oppose and frustrate in other areas, the slide away from international
rules towards international anarchy is certain, with nations putting their own
narrow and short-term interests first, often driven by populist political
appeal and force. From there, the step to nuclear deployment, accidental or
intentional, unforeseen or sudden, at tactical or strategic level, is now
perilously close. We can and must, at all costs, avoid and forestall. I beg to
move.
Labour’s Lord Browne of Ladyton (a former Defence Secretary)
– and currently a vice-chairman of the international arms control lobby group, the Nuclear Threat Initiative, argued
that “ the NPT regime is coming under increasing threat. There are several
reasons for this, including: lack of progress on disarmament; increasing risk
of nuclear weapons use, proliferation, and terrorism; and deepening divisions
among the international community on the role of nuclear deterrence, the vision
of nuclear disarmament, and the steps required to prevent nuclear weapons use.
Two of the most significant drivers contributing to this negative political
context are: the growing divide between the recognised nuclear weapon states
under the NPT and the non-nuclear weapon states —as the evidence heard by the
committee made clear, the ban treaty is a direct result of these divisions—and
the mounting frustration felt by many countries; and the deteriorated political
relationship among the nuclear weapon states.”
Liberla Democrat, Lord Purvis of Tweed observed:
“It was striking that the Government’s
response [to the report] seemed to recognise that cyber and hybrid threats
create greater uncertainty, but they have not indicated that that, combined
with the political and rhetorical instability, is a greater threat to world peace—and
the two are combined… The Government imply that we secure political leverage to
our advantage with this £50 billion expenditure on [Trident nuclear WMD] renewal—equivalent
to the entire Foreign and Commonwealth Office budget for 50 years, and
representing less than 1% of all global nuclear capability. The Government
state that they are still committed to a nuclear weapon-free world, and that
the retention of those weapons gives us a political capability, but they do not
state what political conditions they are seeking to achieve to bring this
about, nor how they intend to secure them. The argument also follows that we
secure a voice with this political tool by retaining our independent nuclear
capability, but this has not always been the case either.
It was interesting to read the Cabinet
papers from the period between the early 1960s and the signing of the NPT. Both
the Macmillan and Wilson Governments argued for a NATO nuclear force. In 1963,
Macmillan and Kennedy agreed in principle,
“to use their best endeavours to
develop a NATO Nuclear Force … and a new component may be introduced in the
shape of internationally-owned and internationally-manned surface ships or
submarines armed with Polaris missiles”.
The Wilson Government continued with
this and formally proposed the establishing of an “Atlantic Nuclear Force”,
including a “mixed-manned element” which,
“would allow the non-nuclear countries
to take part in a meaningful way”.
The Cabinet conclusion of 26 March 1965
went further, proposing a single European vote on doctrine and deployment,
“if the major nations of Europe achieve
full political unity, in such a way as to enable the European vote to be cast
as one. The European unit exercising a single European vote would have the same
veto rights as individual Governments taking part in the Force”.
Therefore, pre-NPT, there was a vibrant
debate in government and in Parliament, including in this House, about the
Government’s ability to have both a combined deterrent approach and a combined
doctrine with our European partners.
Therefore, if the Government’s position
today is markedly different from that, which it clearly is—that our ownership
of nuclear weapons is purely political, that it is imperative that it is
independent, and that it is not concerned with warfighting—we are justified in
asking how active their commitment is to disarmament. We will discover this in
the periodic review, but there was little optimism among our witnesses that it
will contain radical proposals. As the noble Lord, Lord Browne, indicated, the
impetus proposed by the 2010 review will need to be restored. Even that seems
unlikely.
Given the committee’s assessment that
the security environment is now more uncertain and unstable, it is imperative
that the Government put their full weight behind pillar 1 of the three pillars
of the 2010 NPT review conference action plan on disarmament. Action 3 refers
to,
“implementing the unequivocal
undertaking by the nuclear-weapon States to accomplish the total elimination of
their nuclear arsenals … through unilateral, bilateral, regional and
multilateral measures”.
The Cross Bench peer, Lord Hannay of Chiswick – a former UK
Ambassador to the United Nations - stressed
“…we need now to give a much higher priority to nuclear diplomacy, strategic
stability and arms control than we have done for the last 30 years, is surely
perfectly obvious. It is, however, far from clear that the Governments of the
two main possessor states, the US and Russia—or indeed our own Government—have
reached that conclusion, and, more importantly still, that they are prepared to
act upon it. If I may be allowed a brief digression, it is not even clear that
the basic facts on nuclear diplomacy are appreciated at the higher levels of
our own Government. Yesterday in Brussels, the Foreign Secretary told the
press:
“We are totally committed to keeping
the Middle East denuclearised”.
However, even if Israel does not admit
to its undoubted possession of nuclear weapons, the hard fact is that the
Middle East has not been “denuclearised” for many decades. Finding some way of
moving towards a Middle East zone free of weapons of mass destruction is going
to be a key issue at next year’s NPT review conference, at which the UK, as one
of the three NPT depositary states, needs to use as imaginative and
constructive an approach as possible. I wonder whether either of the two
aspirants to be Prime Minister know any better than the right honourable Jeremy
Hunt revealed yesterday: I rather doubt it.”
[Indeed, when asked by Baroness Tonge,
now independent, former Liberal Democrat peer, 24 June 2019 “what assessment
they have made of the report by the Stockholm International Peace Research
Institute (SIPRI) SIPRI Yearbook 2019, Armaments, Disarmaments and
International Security, published on 17 June, which claims that Israel has
between 80 and 90 nuclear
warheads? (HL16619) foreign affairs minister Lord Ahmad of
Wimbledon answered on 4 July saying that: “Israel has not declared a
nuclear weapons programme,”
which is nearly true, but misses the point (In a December 2006 interview, Israeli Prime Minister
Ehud Olmert stated that Iran aspires "to
have a nuclear weapon as America, France, Israel and Russia. https://www.ynetnews.com/articles/0,7340,L-3338783,00.html;
“It’s Official: The Pentagon Finally
Admitted That Israel Has Nuclear Weapons Too,” The Nation March 15, 2015; https://www.thenation.com/article/its-official-pentagon-finally-admitted-israel-has-nuclear-weapons-too/;
]
“To other conclusions of our report the
Government’s response seems less satisfactory. The insistence—several times
repeated, I may say—that the UK has gone as far as it could on nuclear
disarmament is rather odd, because the report at no point suggested that we
should do so. Defensive reactions like that will not be a very useful guide to
policy in the newly risky period we are living through. If we really are a
responsible possessor state, as the Government proclaim us to be, and I
recognise that that is a reasonable aspiration, then we will have to have some
imaginative diplomacy. Both parts of the Government’s response—simply
dismissing out of hand any consideration of no first use or of clearer negative
security assurances to non-nuclear weapon states—seem to me to be distinctly
unimaginative. The Government’s attachment to what they call “constructive
ambiguity” over the circumstances in which we might use nuclear weapons is
deeply unconvincing, in my view.”
Another Conservative peer, Baroness Anelay of St Johns recalled “My generation grew up during the
Cold War. We were keenly aware of the risk of the use of nuclear weapons. I
still remember clearly the development of the Cuban missile crisis in October
1962 and its impact on the view of civil society, and on our view, as
schoolchildren, about the risk of nuclear war. The confrontation between the US
and Soviet Russia followed the US discovery of Soviet deployment of nuclear-capable
ballistic missiles in Cuba with a range that could hit most of continental USA.
The minimal attention paid by the media
and civil society to the risk of nuclear conflagration over the past few
decades could be considered proof of the success of the negotiation of the
Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, which entered into force in
1970. That treaty approaches its 50th anniversary next year. More countries
have adhered to the NPT than to any other arms limitation or disarmament agreement
—a testament to the treaty’s significance. It has its successes: it has
near-universal membership; it has established an international norm against new
states acquiring nuclear weapons; and there has been a considerable reduction
in nuclear stockpiles since the 1980s…the treaty remains a critical part of
international security. As has been mentioned, it is often seen to be based on
a central bargain of three pillars: that non-nuclear weapon states agree never
to acquire nuclear weapons but that, in exchange, the NPT nuclear weapon states
agree to share the benefits of peaceful nuclear technology and to pursue
nuclear disarmament aimed at the ultimate elimination of their nuclear
arsenals. I therefore welcome the Government’s response to paragraph 96 of our
report, where they now clarify that they remain,
“committed to implementing all three
pillars”.
She closed asserting: “Preparations for
a successful 2020 [NPT] RevCon [Review conference] are vital for our future
security. It is not just our diplomatic reputation that is at stake but our
global security. …Complacency about nuclear risk is the greatest risk to our
global safety. There is an old saying: “a watched pot never boils”. It is time
for everyone internationally, parliaments, Governments, media and civil society
to watch the nuclear pot with increased care. It cannot be allowed to boil.
A Green Party peer, Baroness Jones of Moulsecoomb ( who made the declaration that she is a vice-president
of the London Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament) opened by observing in her view
“the world is now almost out of control. We are not taking into account just
how powerful these weapons are; they are weapons of terror, and their use is
the greatest crime against humanity…” adding “One day, I hope, foreign policy
based on mass murder and the inevitable extinction of humanity will be viewed
as the most barbaric and depraved idea ever conceived.”
She continued “…we live in dangerous
times globally. We have a President in the White House on Twitter, engaged in
toilet diplomacy of a kind which can escalate tensions and move global markets
in an instant. All the while, his military attaché is just a few metres away
with nuclear codes that could be used by mistake or by miscalculation. …There
is also the unequal way in which the West treats emerging nuclear powers,
casting a blind eye to the nuclear weapons of Israel, India and Pakistan while
taking a hard-line stance against Iran and North Korea. All the while, the
non-nuclear countries which signed up to the nuclear non-proliferation treaty
must feel cheated that the nuclear countries are not holding up their end of
the bargain to progressively disband their nuclear arsenals. Instead, we are
renewing Trident and expanding nuclear arsenals.”
.., the Foreign Secretary should take a
leadership role in this area and represent the UK in international negotiations
on nuclear disarmament.... No serious contender for public office, let alone
the Prime Minister, should try to make a political point out of their
willingness to initiate a nuclear war and murder millions of innocent
civilians. We must strive towards a nuclear-free world where the capability to
kill every human being on earth in a matter of moments is consigned to the dystopian
nightmares where it belongs.”
Lord Grocott, another rLabour peer said:
“…it is inevitable that debates of this sort will be pretty sombre in tone,
because this is an extremely sombre—if not deadly serious—subject….
.
First, to state the opposite, there has
not been a complete absence of nuclear proliferation. The number of nuclear
states has almost doubled, from five to nine, during the time of the treaty.
The four nuclear states who are outside the NPT have a fraction of the number
of warheads held by NPT nuclear states, but they are significant none the
less. We list them in our report. It is estimated that Pakistan has 140 to 150
nuclear warheads; India has 130 to 140; Israel has 80; and North Korea 10 to 20.
Of course, North Korea is a special case for all sorts of reasons that I cannot
possibly go into, but are the other nuclear states outside the ambit of the NPT
now in the “impossible to resolve” category—“We can’t do anything about it, so
let’s not even try”—or is there a medium or longer than medium-term strategy to
try to bring all the states of the United Nations within the ambit of the
treaty?
Then there is the question of the
proposed Middle East nuclear-free zone. It was as long ago as 1995 that the review
conference of that year stated that the development of nuclear-free zones, of
which I have mentioned a number, should be encouraged as a matter of priority,
and specifically mentioned the importance of establishing one in the Middle
East. Since then, progress has been glacial. Last year, however, a UN
resolution called for a conference on a weapons of mass destruction-free zone
in the Middle East to be held in 2019. In our report, we state that the UK
should continue to support work towards such a conference and should encourage
Israel to participate. I am afraid that the Government in their reply say that
the UK remains committed to the 1995 NPT resolution—of which, incidentally, we
were co-sponsors —but they remain undecided about whether to participate in the
forthcoming UN conference, giving a long list of difficulties.
Of course there are difficulties. This
is the most dangerous region in the world, with current or recent wars in Iraq,
Syria and Yemen, not to mention Iran and the JCPOA. But to say that we may well
not attend a UN conference to try to reduce the risk of weapons of mass
destruction being deployed in this most dangerous of regions seems
inexplicable, ..”
Another Labour peer, Lord Collins of Highbury, observed that the blog by Aidan Liddle, the
[UK] ambassador and permanent representative to the Conference on Disarmament
[has a] clear message is that many countries want to see more progress on
disarmament, and another thing he referred to was the establishment of a zone
free of weapons of mass destruction in the Middle East, mandated by the 1995
conference,” adding that Lord Hannay highlighted that the Government said in
their response that they remain committed to the establishment in the Middle
East of a zone free of nuclear and all other weapons of mass destruction and
their delivery systems. What are the Government doing about that? What is their
strategy? We need to know more about it.
Answering as a stand-in for the
unavoidably absent minister Lord Ahmed, Conservative Baroness Goldie said that the NPT “has
been at the heart of global efforts to prevent nuclear proliferation and
encourage nuclear disarmament efforts for nearly 50 years. It has
overwhelmingly delivered on its objectives and we should celebrate its success.”
She then pointedly remarked to Baroness
Jones of Moulsecoomb that while “I may not support her view on unilateral
disarmament, but I respect and see the passion with which she holds it.”
Remarkably, Goldie immediately wh en
ton to assert “The NPT has provided the framework and confidence for a
significant reduction in nuclear weapons following the end of the Cold War. The
UK has provided a good exemplar, significantly reducing its nuclear weapon stockpile
since the Cold War peak.”
All of this was, in practice, done unilaterally, as no British nuclear weapons
have vet been entered into multilateral nuclear
disarmament negotiations under the auspices of Article 6 of the NPT, which
reads:
Each of the
Parties to the Treaty undertakes to pursue negotiations in good faith on
effective measures relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early
date and to nuclear disarmament, and on a treaty on general and complete
disarmament under strict and effective international control.
Finally, the minister extolled how the treaty
“extended the benefits of the peaceful uses of nuclear energy around the globe “adding “I am grateful to the noble Lord, Lord
Grocott, for his recognition of these virtues.”
If only the minister had read that warning made in the 1955 memo!
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