Coronavirus origins and spread:The role of Wuhan Institute of Virology
Below are articles from official and unofficial sources. I have added information from the United States' equivalent of the Wuhan Institute of Virology for comparison.
There is no question that we do get a lot of news from the
social media networks like Facebook and too often even if an important piece of
news appears in my Facebook page, not many Netizens give some news items any
importance. For instance, a few days ago, my good friend Prof. Gabby Lopez who
is a good Facebook friend of mine showed in his Facebook page a cover of a book
entitled “The Eyes of Darkness,” which is a thriller novel by American writer
Dean Koontz that was released 1981. Now this was a New York Times thriller
written 39 years ago.
Upon further check we learned that the book focuses its
story on a mother who sets out on a quest to find out if her son truly did die
one year ago, or if he was still alive. Like what I said this novel is a
thriller, however on page 333 it said that a Chinese defected carrying a
diskette record of China’s most important and dangerous biological weapon in a
decade. The author wrote, “They call the stuff Wuhan-400 because it was
developed at their RDNA labs outside the City of Wuhan and it was the 400th
visible strain of man-made microgranism created at the research center.
Wait-a-minute… it is talking about the City of Wuhan, the
epicenter of the novel coronavirus now officially known as COVID-19 that has
affected the globe for the past month. But again the author David Koontz wrote
this piece 39 years ago. Let me continue. The author wrote that Wuhan-400 is a
perfect weapon. It afflicts only human beings.” What is even more remarkable is
what the author wrote “In around the year 2020 a severe pneumonia-like illness
will spread throughout the globe attacking the lungs and the bronchial tubes
and resisting all known treatments.”
Truly this book which the Social media networks are only
getting to know at this time is truly remarkable as it was written 39-years ago
when at that time the City of Wuhan isn’t the city that has grown today. What makes this book a prophesy
is the fact that it mentions the Year 2020 when a severe pneumonia-like illness
will spread the globe. For sure no one could have predicted anything that would
be happening to the world 39-years ago.
Mind you when the novel coronavirus was uncovered by late
December 2019 and began spreading its deadly poison, a few Netizens wrote that
this virus could have come from a research lab in China that was testing a
virus for biological warfare. I suspect that this information came from someone
who must have read the book “The Eyes of Darkness” sometime ago. So I started
looking if whether a few people must have written about this book. So I
searched my Google for this.
What I got was a front-page Taiwan News dated Feb.13, 2020
and let me reprint this for our readers;
As the Wuhan virus claims new victims around the world,
Twitter users have pointed out that in the 1981 novel, “The Eyes of the
Darkness,” there is a disease called “Wuhan-400.” The American author, Dean
Koontz’s suspense thrillers have often appeared on The New York Times Best
Seller list.
In chapter 39 of his book, Koontz writes about a virus developed
in military labs near the city of Wuhan by the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) as
a biological weapon, reported Liberty Times. The
scientist leading the Wuhan-400 research is called Li Chen, who defects to the
US with information about China’s most dangerous chemical weapons. Wuhan-400
affects people rather than animals and cannot survive outside the human body or
in environments colder than 30 degrees Celsius. The similarities between
the made-up virus and the Wuhan virus has got Twitter users struggling to
comprehend the improbable coincidence. One big difference: Wuhan-400 has a 100
percent kill-rate, while the Wuhan virus does not.
Some people were skeptical about Koontz’s prediction 39 years
ago, however, pointing out that earlier editions of the book refer to the virus
as Gorki-400, a production of the Soviet Union. In response, several netizens
have posted pictures of the book’s newer editions to explain the name of the
virus was indeed altered, possibly due to the end of the Cold War in 1991,
reported SET News.”
I’m only writing this piece simply because not everyone is
on Facebook and even some Netizens have not known about the existence of this
book. But the fact remains that David Koontz wrote this piece 39-years ago and
wrote that it would happen to the globe in the year 2020 seems like a prophesy
come true. Today the World Health Organization (WHO) has announced that 72,000
people have been affected by the COVID-19 and nearly 1,900 people have already
died including Dr. Li Wen Liang who discovered the virus and died Feb.7th.
Founded in 1956, Wuhan
Institute of Virology (WIV), Chinese Academy of Sciences (CAS), was initially
named as Wuhan Microbiology Laboratory. It was among the earliest national
institutions established after the founding of the New China. In 1961, it
became the South China Institute of Microbiology of CAS, and was redesignated
as Wuhan Microbiology Institute CAS in 1962. In 1970, under the administration
of the Hubei Commission of Science & Technology, it was renamed as
Microbiology Institute of Hubei Province. In June 1978, it was returned to the
administration of CAS, and adopted its current designation.
Through
continuous reorganization and sustained efforts of our researchers, WIV has
remained strong in such research fields as microbiology and virology throughout
its history. Characterized by persistence and diligence, the scientists in WIV
have made great achievements in the studies of virology, applied microbiology
and biotechnology by addressing national strategic demands and cutting-edge
scientific questions. The achievements marked the S&T strengths of WIV in
agricultural and environmental microbiology. In particular, being at the
forefront of basic and applied researches on insect viruses, WIV has made great
achievements in isolation of insect viruses and production of viral
insecticides. For example, WIV developed Helicoverpa
armigeranucleopolyhedrovirus (HearNPV) as the first viral insecticide
registered in China, which has been widely utilized. WIV has also developed
microbiological mosquitocide, contributing much to the control of
disease-transmitting mosquitoes. The commercialized standards and application
of Bacillus thuringiensis won the 2nd Award for National Science and Technology
Progress. Furthermore, WIV developed the first biosensor (Biochemical Oxygen Demand
biosensor for the detection of environmental pollution) in China.
Since 2002, by joining the CAS
Knowledge Innovation Program, WIV has extended its research areas from
agriculture and environment-related fields to medicine-related fields in order
to meet the national strategic demand of public health, national security, and
sustainable agriculture development. From then on, WIV has undergone major
reorganization by means of retaining researches into major disciplines,
recruiting and training innovative talents in new disciplines and developing
appropriate research platforms. Pathogenic study of emerging infectious
diseases has become one of the major research fields. Great achievements have
been made in animal origin studies of Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome
coronavirus (SARS-Cov) and avian influenza viruses.
About WIV
The predecessor
of Wuhan Institute of Virology, Chinese Academy of Sciences was the Wuhan
Institute of Microbiology, prepared to be built in 1956, jointly
established by the famous virologist academician Gao Shangyin and the
famous microbiologist academician Chen Huagui and a batch of older
generation scientists, formally announced to be established in 1958, mainly
engaged in agricultural virus and environmental microbe research. At the
beginning of 1961, Wuhan branch institute and the Guangzhou branch
institute merged to set up the Zhongnan Branch of Chinese Academy of
Sciences, Wuhan Microbiology Research Laboratory was hence renamed as Wuhan
Institute of Microbiology, Chinese Academy of Sciences. In October 1962, it
was again renamed to Wuhan Institute of Microbiology, Chinese Academy of
Sciences. In 1966, the local branch institute of Chinese Academy of
Sciences was cancelled. In 1970, Wuhan Institute of Microbiology, Chinese
Academy of Sciences was placed under the leadership of Hubei Province,
changed its name to Hubei Provincial Institute of Microbiology. In 1978 on
the eve of holding the National Science and Technology Conference, it
returned to the Chinese Academy of Sciences, known as Wuhan Institute of
Virology, Chinese Academy of Sciences.
In the 1980s and
1990s, the Wuhan Institute of Virology has made a series of important
progresses in terms of insect virus, animal virus, molecular virus, virus
classification preservation, environmental microbes, fermentation
microorganisms and microbial sensors. A number of research achievements
have earned national level, Chinese Academy of Sciences and provincial
& ministerial level awards for scientific and technological
advancement.
In 1998, the
Chinese Academy of Sciences launched a pilot project for knowledge
innovation. Wuhan Institute of Virology had been centering on the institute
reform, setting its strategy in the virus, microbe application research and
biological high-tech innovation, and developing a comprehensive supporting
reform implementation plans. In 1999, it successfully passed the
classification and positioning of Chinese Academy of Sciences, was included
in the high-tech research and development base-type research institute. In
2002, it was formally approved into the institute knowledge innovation
project pilot sequence, the work of the entire institute had entered into a
new stage.
In 2003, SARS
virus broke out in our country, the state and the Chinese Academy of
Sciences promoted the prevention and control of newly emerging diseases to
a new strategic height, Wuhan Institute of Virology adjusted the discipline
layout in a timely manner, on the one hand it was to have the advantage
integration for the traditional preponderant disciplines such as insect
virology, aquatic animal virology, biological control, analysis of
biotechnology etc.; on the other hand, through the training and the
introduction of talents, it was to lay out a series of medical
virus-related discipline groups, engaged in the researches of HIV,
influenza virus, hepatitis virus, tumor virus and zoonotic virus and virus
replication and antiviral drugs etc. In 2004, the Chinese and French
governments signed a cooperation agreement on fighting and preventing new
diseases, stressing the active cooperation between China and France in the
construction of high-level biosafety laboratories and the system
construction of biosafety laws and regulations etc. In order to implement
the spirit of Sino-French agreement, in 2005, Wuhan Institute of Virology
undertook the task of building a national biosafety laboratory of Wuhan,
Chinese Academy of Sciences. With nearly 10 years of unremitting efforts,
the laboratory completed the physical facilities in January 2015. In August
2016, it obtained the recognition and authentication certificate for the
critical protection equipment installation and commissioning. After the
completion of the laboratory, it is expected to carry out the scientific
research on the prevention and control of new infectious diseases and
biosafety in order to meet the needs of early warning, detection, research
and biosecurity prevention system for newborn and strong infectious
diseases in China. It is expected to become the prevention & control
research and development center for China’s newly born diseases, virus seed
storage centers and WHO reference laboratory, which shall play a basic,
technical support role in China’s major newborn infectious diseases
prevention and control, effectively improving our defense and resilience
towards biological wars and terrorist attacks, maintaining the
national biosecurity.
The strategic
positioning of Wuhan Institute of Virology is to face the national
population health, sustainable development of agriculture and national
security, look on the international frontier for the research field of
virology, focusing on the researches on newly emerging, outburst
infectious diseases and biosecurity, major viral infectious diseases
etiology and innovative drug for agriculture, environmental microbes and
ecological protection, virus bionic and emerging biotechnology, virus
identification, system classification and bioinformatics and other aspects,
in the construction of high-level biosafety research and technology system,
biological nano-devices, green agricultural technology Integration and application
and other scientific frontiers, it is to make the original innovation
contribution, enhance our emergency responsiveness to new and sudden
infectious diseases, built the Wuhan Institute of Virology into a
comprehensive virology research institution with international advanced
level.
Wuhan Institute
of Virology
is equipped with a general office, scientific research planning office,
organization & personnel department, finance department, graduate
student office , with five functional management departments, logistics
support center, network information center, public technical service center
(including analysis and testing center, experimental animal center, BSL -3
laboratory, isotope room, etc.), Virologica Sinica (English version),
Wuhan National Biosafety Laboratory, State Key Laboratory of Virology and
other support departments.
In the scientific
research layout, there are 37 discipline groups, belonging to the molecular
virology research center, analysis of microbiology and nano biology research
center, microbial virus seed resources and application center, virus
pathology research center, new infectious disease research center which are
5 research centers. It is to build the national high-level biosafety
laboratories, China’s virus preservation center, the State Key Laboratory
of Virology, the national emergency laboratory for outburst public health
event, the national level international cooperation research center and
other five national R & D base. It possesses the key laboratory of Chinese
Academy of Sciences for newly emerging and fulminating infectious disease
pathogen and biosecurity, key Laboratory of agricultural and environmental
microbiology, Chinese Academy of Sciences, Hubei provincial virus and
disease engineering technology research center, Hubei provincial small and
medium enterprises common technology biopesticide R & D promotion
center, Wuhan new infectious disease key laboratories which are five
provincial and ministerial level R & D bases. It has initially shaped a
characteristic platform with level IV biosafety laboratory as the core,
biosafety level III laboratory (BSL / ABSL-3) (Qty.: 2) and biosafety level
II laboratory (BSL-2 / ABSL-2) (Qty.: 17) as the cluster, it can carry out
more than 10 kinds of class I and class II pathogenic experiment
activities, in the research of new infectious disease prevention &
control and biological prevention field, it is to provide strong support
and important guarantee.
Did a 1981 Dean Koontz
thriller predict the coronavirus outbreak? Readers share extracts from novel
which chillingly refers to deadly viral infection named after Wuhan
Koontz novel The Eyes Of
Darkness describes a killer virus named 'Wuhan-400'
The fictional virus was
developed as a bioweapon in Wuhan research lab
Coronavirus first emerged
from the same Chinese city in December 2019
However there are several
big differences between the novel and real life
Koontz
wrote The Eyes Of Darkness in 1981, describing the 'Wuhan-400' virus
Fans
of author Dean Koontz are insisting that a novel he wrote in 1981 predicted the
coronavirus outbreak.
Koontz's
thriller The Eyes Of Darkness describes a killer virus named 'Wuhan-400' after
the Chinese city it originated in — the same city where COVID-19 was first
reported.
Says
one character in the novel: 'They call the stuff 'Wuhan-400' because it was
developed at their RDNA labs outside the city of Wuhan.'
'A
Dean Koontz novel written in 1981 predicted the outbreak of the coronavirus!'
wrote Twitter user Nick Hinton, who first posted a screenshot of the passage
from the novel earlier this month.
Koontz
did not immediately respond to an inquiry from DailyMail.com about the
purported prediction in his novel.
Although
coronavirus was first identified in Wuhan, there is not yet scientific consensus
about how and where it jumped to humans.
Says
one character in the novel: 'They call the stuff 'Wuhan-400' because it was
developed at their RDNA labs outside the city of Wuhan'
Initial
theories suggested that it jumped to humans from exotic animals in a Wuhan 'wet
market.' Others have suggested, so far without proof, that the pathogen
may have escaped from the Wuhan Virology Lab, China's only biosafety-level four
facility.
Other
than the city of origin, however, there is little similarity between the
fictional Wuhan-400 and the real coronavirus.
In
The Eyes Of Darkness, Wuhan-400 is a bioweapon virus that has a fatality rate
of 100 percent within 12 hours.
The
characters explain that the Chinese intended to use it 'to wipe out a city or a
country' without the need for 'expensive decontamination'.
'Wuhan-400
is a perfect weapon. It afflicts only human beings. No other living creature
can carry it. And like syphilis, Wuhan-400 can't survive outside a living human
body for longer than a minute, which means it can't permanently contaminate
objects or entire places the way anthrax and other virulent microorganisms
can,' one character says.
Differences between
Wuhan-400 and coronavirus
Despite
the surface similarity, there are big differences between Koontz's fictional
virus and the real coronavirus:
Coronavirus
however has an estimated mortality rate of just 2 to 3 percent. It can survive
on surfaces for much longer than a minute, possibly hours or days, though
scientists are working now to determine such properties with more precision.
In
the Koontz novel, the Wuhan-400 attacks the brain.
As one character describes it: 'The virus migrates
to the brain stem, and there it begins secreting a toxin that literally eats
away brain tissue like battery acid dissolving cheesecloth. It destroys the
part of the brain that controls all of the body's automatic functions.'
Coronavirus, on the other hand, primarily affects
the respiratory system, in severe cases resulting in pneumonia. The primary
symptoms are fever, coughing, and shortness of breath.
The book also describes a virus that has an
incubation period of just four hours, whereas coronavirus incubates for several
days to two weeks.
Finally, to the disappointment of conspiracy
theorists, it turns out that in the first edition of The Eyes Of Darkness, the
virus was originally called 'Gorki-400', after the Russian city where Koontz
originally wrote the bioweapons lab.
After the Soviet Union fell in 1991, Koontz
apparently changed later editions to make China the villain.
The Institute was founded in 1956 as the
Wuhan Microbiology Laboratory under the Chinese Academy of Sciences (CAS). In 1961, it became the South China Institute of Microbiology, and
in 1962 was renamed to Wuhan Microbiology Institute. In 1970, it became the
Microbiology Institute of Hubei Province when the Hubei Commission of Science and
Technology took over the administration. In June 1978, it was returned to the
CAS and renamed Wuhan Institute of Virology.[2]
In 2015, the National Bio-safety Laboratory
was completed at a cost of 300 million yuan ($44 million) at the Institute in
collaboration with French engineers from Lyon, and was the first biosafety level 4
(BSL–4) laboratory to be built in mainland China.[3][4]
The laboratory took over a decade to complete from its conception in 2003, and
scientists such as U.S. molecular biologist Richard H. Ebright
expressed concern of previous escapes of the SARS virus at Chinese laboratories
in Beijing, and the pace and scale of China's plans for expansion into BSL–4
laboratories.[3]
The Laboratory has strong ties to the Galveston
National Laboratory in the University of Texas.[5] In
2020, Ebright called the Institute a "world-class research institution
that does world-class research in virology and immunology".[5]
In February 2020, the New York Times
reported that a team led by Shi Zhengli at
the Institute were the first to identify, analyze and name the genetic sequence
of the Novel
coronavirus (2019-nCoV), and upload it to public databases for
scientists around the world to understand,[6][7]
and publishing papers in Nature.[8] In
February 2020, the Institute applied for a patent in China for the use of remdesivir,
an experimental drug owned by Gilead Sciences,
which the Institute found inhibited the virus invitro;[9] in
a move which also raised concerns regarding international intellectual property
rights.[10] In
a statement, the Institute said it would not exercise its new Chinese patent
rights "if relevant foreign companies intend to contribute to the
prevention and control of China’s epidemic".[11]
The Institute was rumored as a source for the
2019–20
coronavirus outbreak as a result of allegations of bioweapon research,[12][13]
which was debunked as a conspiracy theory by
The Washington Post in a piece titled: "Experts debunk fringe theory linking China’s
coronavirus to weapons research".[5][12]
The Post cited U.S. experts who explained why the Institute was not suitable
for bioweapon research, that most countries had abandoned bioweapons as
fruitless, and that there was no evidence that the virus was genetically
engineered.[5][12] In
February 2020, The Financial Times reported from virus expert and global lead coronavirus investigator,
Trevor Bradford, who said that "The evidence we have is that the mutations
[in the virus] are completely consistent with natural evolution".[14]
During January and February 2020, the Institute
was subject to further conspiracy theories, and concerns that it was the source
of the outbreak through accidental leakage,[15]
which it publicly refuted.[16]
Members of the Institute's research teams were also subject to various
conspiracy theories,[17][18]
including Shi, who made various public statements defending the Institute.[19]
While Ebright refuted several of conspiracy theories regarding the WIV, he told BBC
China that this did not represent the possibility of the virus being
"completely ruled out" from entering the population due to a
laboratory accident.[15]
Research centers
The Institute contains the following research
centers:[20]
Center for
Emerging Infectious Disease
Chinese
Virus Resources and Bioinformatics Center
Center of
Applied and Environmental Microbiology
Department
of Analytical Biochemistry and Biotechnology
20.^"Administration". Wuhan Institute of Virology, CAS. Archived
from the original on 29 July 2019. Retrieved 26 January 2020.
Posts on social media and even a scientific
paper have suggested the coronavirus that causes COVID-19—seen here in
orange, emerging from a cell—originated in a virology lab in Wuhan, China.
National
Institute of Allergy and Infectious Diseases
Scientists
‘strongly condemn’ rumors and conspiracy theories about origin of coronavirus
outbreak
A group of 27
prominent public health scientists from outside China is pushing back against a
steady stream of stories and even a scientific paper suggesting a laboratory in Wuhan, China, may be the origin of the outbreak
of COVID-19. “The rapid, open, and transparent sharing of data on this outbreak
is now being threatened by rumours and misinformation around its origins,” the
scientists, from nine countries, write in a statement published online by The Lancet yesterday.
The letter does not
criticize any specific assertions about the origin of the outbreak, but many
posts on social media have singled out the Wuhan Institute of Virology for
intense scrutiny because it has a laboratory at the highest security
level—biosafety level 4—and its researchers study coronaviruses from bats, including the one that is closest to SARS-CoV-2, the virus that causes
COVID-19. Speculations have included the possibility that the virus was
bioengineered in the lab or that a lab worker was infected while handling a bat
and then transmitted the disease to others outside the lab. Researchers from
the institute have insisted there is no link between the outbreak and their laboratory.
“We stand together to
strongly condemn conspiracy theories suggesting that COVID-19 does not have a
natural origin,” says The Lancet statement, which praises the work of
Chinese health professionals as “remarkable” and encourages others to sign on as well.
or Tom Cotton
(R–AR) added fuel to controversial assertions on Fox
News earlier this month when he noted that
the lab was “a few miles away” from a seafood market that had a large cluster
of some of the first cases detected. “We don’t have evidence that this disease
originated there but because of China’s duplicity and dishonesty from the
beginning, we need to at least ask the question to see what the evidence says,”
Cotton said, noting that the Chinese government initially turned down the U.S.
government’s offer to send scientists to the country to help clarify questions
about the outbreak.
The authors of The
Lancet statement note that scientists from several countries who have studied SARS-CoV-2 “overwhelmingly conclude that this coronavirus
originated in wildlife,” just like many other viruses that have recently
emerged in humans. “Conspiracy theories do nothing but create fear, rumours,
and prejudice that jeopardise our global collaboration in the fight against
this virus,” the statement says.
Peter Daszak,
president of the EcoHealth Alliance and a cosignatory of the statement,
has collaborated with researchers at the Wuhan institute who study bat
coronaviruses. “We’re in the midst of the social media misinformation age, and
these rumors and conspiracy theories have real consequences, including threats
of violence that have occurred to our colleagues in China,” Daszak, a disease
ecologist, told ScienceInsider. “We have a choice whether to stand
up and support colleagues who are being attacked and threatened daily by
conspiracy theorists or to just turn a blind eye. I’m really proud that
people from nine countries are able to rapidly come to their defense and
show solidarity with people who are, after all, dealing with horrific
conditions in an outbreak.”
Don’t
buy China’s story: The coronavirus may have leaked from a lab
At an emergency meeting in Beijing held last Friday,
Chinese leader Xi Jinping spoke about the need to contain the coronavirus and
set up a system to prevent similar epidemics in the future.
A national system
to control biosecurity risks must be put in place “to protect the people’s
health,” Xi said, because lab safety is a “national security” issue.
Xi didn’t actually
admit that the coronavirus now devastating large swaths of China had escaped
from one of the country’s bioresearch labs. But the very next day, evidence
emerged suggesting that this is exactly what happened, as the Chinese Ministry
of Science and Technology released a new directive titled: “Instructions on
strengthening biosecurity management in microbiology labs that handle advanced
viruses like the novel coronavirus.”
Read that again.
It sure sounds like China has a problem keeping dangerous pathogens in test
tubes where they belong, doesn’t it? And just how many “microbiology labs” are
there in China that handle “advanced viruses like the novel coronavirus”?
It turns out that
in all of China, there is only one. And this one is located in the Chinese city
of Wuhan that just happens to be … the epicenter of the epidemic.
That’s right.
China’s only Level 4 microbiology lab that is equipped to handle deadly
coronaviruses, called the National Biosafety Laboratory, is part of the Wuhan
Institute of Virology.
Enlarge ImageA member of a medical staff checks the temperature of a patient who has
displayed mild symptoms of the coronavirus.AFP via Getty Images
What’s more, the
People’s Liberation Army’s top expert in biological warfare, a Maj. Gen. Chen
Wei, was dispatched to Wuhan at the end of January to help with the effort to
contain the outbreak.
According to the
PLA Daily, Chen has been researching coronaviruses since the SARS outbreak of
2003, as well as Ebola and anthrax. This would not be her first trip to the
Wuhan Institute of Virology, either, since it is one of only two bioweapons
research labs in all of China.
Does that suggest
to you that the novel coronavirus, now known as SARS-CoV-2, may have escaped
from that very lab, and that Chen’s job is to try to put the genie back in the
bottle, as it were? It does to me.
Add to this
China’s history of similar incidents. Even the deadly SARS virus has escaped —
twice — from the Beijing lab where it was (and probably is) being used in
experiments. Both “man-made” epidemics were quickly contained, but neither
would have happened at all if proper safety precautions had been taken.
And then there is
this little-known fact: Some Chinese researchers are in the habit of selling
their laboratory animals to street vendors after they have finished
experimenting on them.
You heard me
right.
Instead of
properly disposing of infected animals by cremation, as the law requires, they
sell them on the side to make a little extra cash. Or, in some cases, a lot of
extra cash. One Beijing researcher, now in jail, made a million dollars selling
his monkeys and rats on the live animal market, where they eventually wound up
in someone’s stomach.
Enlarge ImageMembers of a police sanitation team spray disinfectant as a preventive
measure against the spread of the coronavirus.AFP via Getty Images
Also fueling
suspicions about SARS-CoV-2’s origins is the series of increasingly lame
excuses offered by the Chinese authorities as people began to sicken and die.
They first blamed
a seafood market not far from the Institute of Virology, even though the first
documented cases of Covid-19 (the illness caused by SARS-CoV-2) involved people
who had never set foot there. Then they pointed to snakes, bats and even a cute
little scaly anteater called a pangolin
as the source of the virus.
I don’t buy any of
this. It turns out that snakes don’t carry coronaviruses and that bats aren’t
sold at a seafood market. Neither, for that matter, are pangolins, an
endangered species valued for their scales as much as for their meat.
The evidence
points to SARS-CoV-2 research being carried out at the Wuhan Institute of
Virology. The virus may have been carried out of the lab by an infected worker
or crossed over into humans when they unknowingly dined on a lab animal.
Whatever the vector, Beijing authorities are now clearly scrambling to correct
the serious problems with the way their labs handle deadly pathogens.
China has
unleashed a plague on its own people. It’s too early to say how many in China
and other countries will ultimately die for the failures of their country’s
state-run microbiology labs, but the human cost will be high.
But not to worry.
Xi has assured us that he is controlling biosecurity risks “to protect the
people’s health.” PLA bioweapons experts are in charge.
I doubt the
Chinese people will find that very reassuring. Neither should we.
A Chinese state-owned virology lab in Wuhan,
the epicenter of China’s coronavirus epidemic, is finding it extremely hard to
quell conspiracy theories proliferating around the institution—a sign of the
sharply decreased level of public trust in the government since the outbreak of
the virus.
At the
Wuhan Institute of Virology, a subsidiary of the state-owned research institute the Chinese Academy of Sciences
(CAS), scientists carry out virus research at a lab with the highest level of biological containment available on the mainland. Its
construction was approved in 2003, during China’s last deadly coronavirus
outbreak, SARS, and completed five years ago, according to Nature
journal. The lab came under spotlight in late January, after Chinese
scientists said the virus could have a connection to bats via an intermediary, such as some form of game sold at a seafood market in Wuhan. As the lab
has researchers who study bat-related viruses, it became a target of online
suspicion that coalesced into theories that the virus could have escaped from
the lab, or be a bio-weapon gone wrong.
An unvetted research paper published on Jan.
31 by a group of Indian scientists, in which they claimed similarities between
the nCOV-2019 virus and the HIV virus, appearing to hint at human engineering,
also stirred further controversy surrounding the institute. The paper was later withdrawn by the researchers, who said they “intend to revise it in response to
comments received from the research community.”
Theories suggesting the new virus was
purpose-built or the work of scientists have been emphatically rejected by scientists globally, including 27 prominent public health scientists
from outside China who issued a statement on Wednesday published by medical journal The Lancet. “Scientists from multiple
countries have published and analysed genomes of the causative agent…and they overwhelmingly conclude that this
coronavirus originated in wildlife,” it said.
Some journals, such as Nature, have appended notes to older stories about the Wuhan lab calling the conspiracy theories about
the lab “unverified.”
<img
src="https://cms.qz.com/wp-content/uploads/2020/02/Screen-Shot-2020-02-20-at-11.45.15-PM.png?w=450&h=271&crop=1&strip=all&quality=75"
alt="The journal Nature added a note to a 2017 story on the lab to alert
readers to "unverified theories" about the lab in relation to
the new coronavirus." />
Nature.com/screenshot
The journal Nature added a
note to a 2017 story on the lab to alert readers to “unverified theories” about
the lab in relation to the new coronavirus.
However, the rumors have kept spreading
widely online, to the extent that Shi Zhengli, a lead researcher on bat-related
viruses in the lab, posted on her WeChat account on Feb. 2 that the virus was “a punishment from the nature for
humans’ uncivilized life habits,” and said she “guaranteed with her life” it
was totally unrelated to the lab. But just as Shi’s assurance seemed to have
calmed some down, a notice from the Chinese Ministry of Science and Technology
last Saturday (Feb. 15) started a fresh wave of suspicion towards the lab.
The ministry said in the notice that China should enhance its management of viruses and bioagents at all labs
and research institutes, without any explanation as to why this is being
proposed right now, leaving some to speculate whether this could be a subtle
official acknowledgement of a role played by the lab. The following day, US
senator Tom Cotton appeared on Fox News to say that the virus was not far from the wildlife market where many people were infected in December.
There are a number of reasons why these
theories keep finding many takers—not just among China hawks but among so many
in China. One is, there’s still so much that isn’t known about the virus and
its origins.
“At this stage, no expert can be absolutely
certain about the cause of the outbreak. This uncertainty makes it easier for
some people to think all explanations have equal merit, no matter how fringe
that is for experts with more extensive knowledge in the matter,” explained
assistant professor Masato Kajimoto, who researches misinformation
ecosystems in Asia at the University of Hong Kong’s
journalism school.
After Shi’s statement, the lab too has
stepped out more than once to try quell the theories. The institute first rejected speculation that the first patient to be infected with the virus was a graduate
student who studied at the lab, saying on Sunday (Feb. 16) the student is in
good health. Yesterday (Feb. 19), it issued a strong worded statement (link in Chinese), saying the rumors about it have “hurt the feelings of
its frontline researchers hugely” and “severely interfered” with its task
to study viruses. “We have nothing to hide,” the letter read.
Nonetheless, internet users don’t appear to
be convinced by the assurances from the lab. “What is the truth? The collapse
of trustworthiness of media and government is not only sad for the two parties,
but also for us citizens,” said a user on
Weibo commenting on the rumors. “Some might think the so-called rumors are just
a prophecy ahead of our times,” said another.
Some “rumors” from the early days of the
epidemic after all turned out not to be far from reality. Li Wenliang, a
doctor, had told others about a cluster of cases of viral pneumonia before the
outbreak had been made public, but was summoned by Wuhan police for “spreading
rumors.” He later became infected himself, and his death turned him into a
vivid symbol of the costs of the government’s opacity—prompting an outpouring of anger and grief, and rare public demands for freedom of speech and transparency from the
government.
“With the government’s bungled handling of
the epidemic in Wuhan, and the pain and uncertainty the epidemic and the
efforts to cope with it have produced, public trust has clearly decreased,”
said Professor Dali Yang, a political scientist at University of Chicago via
email. “The death of Dr. Li was a milestone in shared grief in China.”
What now can be done to contain theories of a
rogue lab? Probably not a whole lot, says Kajimoto.
“When the authorities and experts have the
history of not being transparent, whatever they say could sound as if they are
trying to hide something,” said the assistant professor. “In this case,
publicly denying the link between the lab and coronavirus could even be
construed as ‘evidence’ by people who believe in this conspiracy because denial
is the ‘sign’ that the truth is hidden.”
Tripti Lahiri contributed to this post.
Wuhan Virology Lab Deputy Director Again Slams Coronavirus Conspiracies
Trevor Bedford, of the Fred Hutchinson Cancer Research Center in
Seattle, has rubbished rumours circulating on social media that the virus was
created at a government institute
A scientist at the forefront of an international effort to
track the deadly coronavirus outbreak has shot down claims about the disease’s
origins, including that it escaped from a Wuhan laboratory after being
genetically engineered.Trevor Bedford, of the Fred Hutchinson Cancer Research
Center in Seattle, rubbished stories circulating on social media that Covid-19
was created at Wuhan Institute of Virology or elsewhere in China, rumours that
prompted the World Health Organization to warn of an “infodemic” of false news
on the outbreak.“There is no evidence whatsoever of genetic engineering that we
can find,” he said at the American Association for the Advancement of Science
meeting in Seattle. “The evidence we have is that the mutations [in the virus]
are completely consistent with natural evolution.” One source of rumours was a
paper posted by scientists in India claiming that short insertions in the viral
genome had an “uncanny similarity” to HIV. Although the paper was quickly
withdrawn, its allegations live on in social media. The research was “wrong on
many levels,” said Dr Bedford, whose lab studies the evolution of viruses. The
genes it shares with HIV are extremely short sequences naturally shared by
other organisms and “repeated again and again throughout the tree of life.”
He
also disputed claims that Covid-19 might have infected humans from snakes or
even fish. The most likely scenario, based on genetic analysis, was that the
virus was transmitted by a bat to another mammal between 20-70 years ago. This
intermediary animal — not yet identified — passed it on to its first human host
in the city of Wuhan in late November or early December 2019. Dr Bedford is a
leader of the worldwide Nextstrain collaboration that began to analyse Covid-19
genomes when they were released in January by Fudan University and the Chinese
Centre for Disease Control. By now scientists around the world have published
the genetic sequence of virus taken from about 100 patients. They show
mutations taking place at a slow pace as the infection passes from person to
person. Typically the virus in one patient today is different in around five of
the 30,000 biochemical letters of its genetic code, but these are random
changes rather than any sign that it is becoming more virulent or infectious,
Dr Bedford said.
By
comparing virus taken from different patients and knowing its mutation rate, he
and his colleagues can also estimate the total number of cases so far. He said
the result was similar to that produced by more conventional epidemiology. “We
get upwards of 200,000 total infections, which fits with the estimates already
published by Neil Ferguson and colleagues at Imperial College London,” Dr
Bedford said. But he was reluctant to forecast the future course of the
epidemic.The death toll from the virus was on Friday approaching 1,500 with
more than 64,000 case identified, according to Chinese state media. But medical
experts and frontline health workers in China have warned that Beijing is
under-reporting the severity of the outbreak.
The editors of the Journal of Virology are in a privileged
position to observe our field grow and develop. While the rational prediction
of things to come is based on extrapolation of what we know now, we cannot
anticipate the surprises that result from the serendipity of research. The
discoveries emanating from virology in the past 50 years have been simply
astounding, and few of them could have been predicted or even imagined based on
prior knowledge. It is no accident that virologists have played major roles in
the biological revolutions of the last century. Viral gene products engage all
the key nodes of biology, ranging from the atomic to the organismal, and thus
serve as ideal tools to dissect the most intricate life processes. Our joys and
challenges are to identify and understand these biological nodes and
extrapolate from this information how viruses replicate, disseminate, and
sometimes cause disease. We can say with certainty that virology in the 21st
century will continue to prosper. We discuss several general forces driving the
future of our discipline: technology development, public health, information
processing, and, of course, personal curiosity. Perhaps more importantly, to
ensure maximal scientific return we must continue to give imagination and
serendipity a chance.
A HISTORICAL
PERSPECTIVE
Viruses and viral diseases have been at the centers of science,
agriculture, and medicine for millennia, and some of our greatest challenges
and triumphs have involved virology. Smallpox is a prime example: humankind's
greatest killer, which literally changed the course of history during the
European conquest of the New World, is also the only disease ever eradicated
from the globe. This remarkable achievement began with Edward Jenner's scientific
demonstration in 1796 that inoculation with cowpox lesions provided protection
against the far-more-virulent variola major virus. A concerted worldwide
vaccination effort against smallpox led by the World Health Organization
resulted in the eradication of the disease by 1979. The smallpox vaccination
breakthrough was only the first in a series of important investigations and
discoveries inspired by the study of viruses. Tables 1
and 2 list many of these advances and highlight the contributions
of virology and virologists to our understanding of basic cellular functions
and disease mechanisms.
Much of the initial attention of virologists was focused on viruses as
disease-causing agents, and great progress continues to be made in this area.
Many acute viral infections are prevented or controlled in much of the world
through vaccination and other public health measures. As a result, viral
scourges such as measles, poliomyelitis, rabies, and yellow fever are now rare
in the developed world. Numerous effective antiviral drugs are also in
widespread use. We now recognize that a substantial fraction of the world
cancer burden is caused by viral infections, most commonly hepatitis B virus
and human papillomavirus infections, and both can be prevented by vaccination.
All of these advances flowed from basic studies of viral replication,
transmission, and pathogenesis. However, substantial challenges remain. New
viruses periodically emerge and cause great personal and societal tragedy.
AIDS, caused by human immunodeficiency virus type 1 (HIV-1), remains the
defining epidemic of our time, the true cost of which cannot be calculated.
Although the severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS) epidemic was brief,
dengue and West Nile viruses continue to smolder, and Chikungunya virus,
monkeypox virus, and Ebola and other hemorrhagic fever viruses crouch in the
darkness. H5N1 avian influenza virus continues to sporadically infect humans in
Southeast Asia and elsewhere. The emergence of a new influenza pandemic or a
viral bioterrorism attack could have catastrophic consequences on public
health, commerce, and civic discourse.
Viruses also cause serious diseases in plants and livestock. The 2001
epidemic of foot-and-mouth disease in the United Kingdom devastated its beef
industry. Plum pox virus, which has decimated stone fruit trees in
Europe since the early 1900s, has now spread to the United States and Canada.
Viruses have been implicated in a disease that is ravaging our honeybees,
threatening natural pollination cycles and thus much of agriculture.
Beyond their medical and agricultural importance, viruses are great
teachers, and their lessons are not restricted to viral diseases. Viral
replication is strictly dependent on cell structure, metabolism, and
biochemical machinery. As a consequence, viral gene products interact with
crucial regulatory nodes that control cell function, a situation that
facilitates the identification and characterization of these nodes and the
networks they control. Indeed, the roster of important discoveries uncovered by
studies of viral replication and transformation is long: the existence of mRNA
and mRNA processing, including splicing, capping, and polyadenylation;
transcriptional control elements and transcription factors; gene silencing
mechanisms; cellular oncogenes and tumor suppressor proteins; and signal
transduction pathways and tyrosine kinases, to name just a few. The structural
biology revolution, the initially outlandish idea that life processes can be
understood at the chemical and eventually at the atomic level, was championed
by the crystallization of tobacco mosaic virus by Wendell Stanley in the 1930s.
This line of inquiry has produced high-resolution images of the structures of
viral proteins and virus particles themselves, the largest biological
structures known at the atomic level. Molecular biology emerged from studies of
bacterial viruses. Studies of “unconventional viruses” resulted in the
discovery of viroids and prions and the concept of protein-folding diseases.
Viral genomes encode gene products that modulate host defenses,
including the immune response, an elaborate system that evolved in large part
to protect us against invading microorganisms like viruses. Ideally, pathogens
are cleared by immune defenses with minimum damage to the host. However, in the
process, the immune defenses themselves can also cause damage
(immunopathology). Indeed, much of viral clinical disease is immunopathological
in nature, as shown in infections ranging from the common cold to AIDS. Studies
of the interactions between viruses and cells have revealed many aspects of
immunity, including the elucidation of histocompatibility antigen function, intrinsic
cell defense mechanisms such as apoptosis, interferons, and RNA interference,
and sophisticated viral countermeasures to evade or antagonize host immune
responses. In fact, this discipline has been coined “anti-immunology” by some
to highlight the close evolutionary relationship between the vertebrate immune
system and microbial pathogens.
Many technologies employed to study cellular genes were first developed
and perfected by using smaller and more easily manipulated viral genomes,
including restriction enzyme mapping, molecular cloning, and genome sequencing.
Indeed, the field of genetic engineering and the biotechnology industry were
incubated in virology laboratories. Viruses and viral gene products have also
emerged as valuable tools to study many aspects of biology and, potentially, to
treat disease. These tools include reverse transcriptase for the synthesis of
cDNA, viral vectors for gene delivery and protein production, transgenic animal
technology, vaccination, and oncolytic therapy, which attempts to harness the
capacity of some viruses to specifically infect and kill cancer cells. Studies
to determine whether this approach has efficacy in the treatment of human
cancers are under way.
Critical knowledge may also come from unexpected sources. Simple, highly
expressed plant viruses have been developed into model systems to identify host
factors involved in viral replication, translation, and other processes
fundamental to all viruses. Plant viruses are also excellent tools for
biotechnology and nanotechnology. For the latter, virions provide natural
reaction chambers for the precise synthesis of nanoparticles, as well as
digital memory components when complexed with metals.
As briefly outlined in this section, virology played a major role in 20th-century
biology. The numerous Nobel prizes awarded to virologists are one measure of
the impact of virology (Table 2).
In this essay, we highlight some of the areas where virology will continue to
address substantial challenges and provide new and important insights.
TECHNOLOGY
DEVELOPMENT
Until recently, the only microbiota that we could identify in a complex
community (e.g., gut flora or seawater) were those we could cultivate. Research
in the 21st century will allow the identification of new families of organisms
(including viruses) by high-speed sequencing of RNA and DNA. For example, the
technology of “deep sequencing” of mixed populations found in respiratory
secretions and gastrointestinal contents is revealing novel virus families,
both pathogenic and nonpathogenic. Indeed, new polyomaviruses, marine viruses,
and bacteriophages have been identified by using sequence-based techniques
coupled with genomic and metagenomic analyses. Strikingly, some of the viral
proteins revealed by these studies show little genetic similarity to known
viruses, suggesting the existence of a universe of novel viruses awaiting
study.
As technical advances drive the discovery of viral pathogens, we will
obtain a greater understanding of the pathogenesis of “orphan” infectious
diseases, a wider appreciation of zoonotic cycles, and an increased
understanding of how viral infections directly or indirectly cause or modulate
chronic diseases (e.g., autoimmune syndromes, cancers, cardiovascular disease,
and neurological illnesses). This new information will highlight the role of
viruses in emerging infectious diseases, the interface between viral gene
products and host defense mechanisms (cell autonomous defenses as well as
innate and acquired immunity), and the forces that drive patterns of acute and
persistent infections in plants and animals. We may find viruses that occupy
niches equivalent to those of commensal bacteria. Genomic approaches are
currently guiding these new discoveries. When deep sequencing of nucleic acids
in a complex sample is merged with other powerful technologies, including mass
spectrometry, proteomics, optical imaging, and high-throughput screening using
small molecules and short hairpin RNAs (shRNAs), we can be sure that the
discovery pipeline for novel viruses and their antagonists will be full indeed.
In a similar vein, high-throughput sequencing and gene-mapping
techniques, the availability of the genome sequences of humans and other organisms,
and proteomics and metabolomics will provide us with the ability to study host
determinants of viral virulence in ways previously unimagined. The complete
sequencing of mammalian genomes and the development of RNA interference
technology make it practical to systematically test the role of every cellular
gene in a virus infection. The use of such screens in studies of HIV, hepatitis
C virus, and West Nile virus replication has identified hundreds of cellular
genes required for infection. Similarly, whole-genome association studies and
other sorts of genetic analyses will identify additional genes required for
infection, pathogenesis, and transmission in various hosts. The identification
of host genes and pathways that confer susceptibility or resistance to
infection in the context of the whole organism will lead to novel antiviral
therapies and improved viral prevention strategies.
Exciting discoveries notwithstanding, the identification of new viruses
brings a serious challenge. Are these viruses true pathogens or could they
actually have symbiotic relationships with their host organisms? For example,
perhaps infection by these agents stimulates local and systemic immune
responses that protect against or suppress responses that contribute to
pathogenesis by more-virulent microbes. Dissecting these complicated microbial
relationships will undoubtedly yield unanticipated insights about viruses and
their hosts. This work will require careful epidemiological and clinical
studies aided in part by advances in technology.
A systems approach to virology.Instead of studying one gene or gene
product at a time, examining large groups of genes or gene products allows the
identification of fundamental biological networks. By networks, we mean complex
and interconnected intracellular processes that control, for example, gene
expression, organelle biogenesis, and metabolism, as well as networks of
intercellular communication at the tissue, organ, and whole-organism level. The
fundamental premise is that information flows through these networks and
disease arises when these networks are perturbed, causing changes in network
architecture and the dynamics of information flow. Future studies of viral
pathogenesis may be seen in terms of specific viral signatures of network imbalance
that do not affect just one pathway but alter the fundamental homeostatic
balance of a cell, organism, or population. Interactions of viral gene products
with these networks will likely differ in different cell types and tissues.
Technological advances in cell and organ culture will allow the in vitro study
of viral infections under conditions that more precisely mimic the in vivo
environment. This effort will extend our understanding of the interplay of
microbial communities and host cells within an entire organism. Once such an
understanding is achieved, we may be able to better identify cellular genes
associated with disease risk and therefore predict which human or animal hosts
should be vaccinated or prophylaxed.
The technical advances in systems biology will open doors to “systems
microbiology.” Viruses will be increasingly viewed not in isolation with their
cellular or organismal hosts but in the real world of a microbial ecosystem
where a single host is infected with a plethora of microbes, including many
viruses. An understanding of the interactions between a host and several viral
or other microbial agents that simultaneously or sequentially infect it is
likely to be informative in many ways. For example, some viral infections are
associated with atherosclerosis and obesity. However, it is not clear whether
the associated viral infections are causal, serve as essential cofactors, or
are completely irrelevant. Components of the host inflammatory response to an
initial infection, namely cytokines, chemokines, and cells of the innate and
adaptive immune systems, can regulate the outcome of infection by a second
agent, not only by acting on the infected cell but also by influencing
uninfected cells of the same organism. Such interactions can be synergistic or
antagonistic. The degree of susceptibility and the resultant response of a
virus-infected cell to a secondary infection can be modulated by many cellular
factors, such as receptors, antiviral proteins, microRNAs, and
protein-trafficking machinery. A systems microbiology approach will also allow
us to understand immunopathological disease to a greater extent and thereby be
in a position to minimize the untoward effects of an overexuberant immune
response.
We see a robust future for the field of “interactomics,” which we define
as the process by which viral gene products interact with cellular gene
products to affect different phenotypes. This field has flourished in studies
of the oncogenic activity of DNA tumor viruses, but similar interactions surely
underlie much of the cellular response to viral infection. Research on
virus-host interactions and network dynamics will produce new insights into why
some viruses can occasionally enter into new host species to cause new and
unexpected diseases. In fact, the study of how zoonotic viruses become human
pathogens has already become a major focus of 21st century virology.
One of the tenets of systems biology is that networks process
information; the output can vary depending on the action at key nodes of the
network. Therefore, an important use of systems biology is not simply to
collect reams of data but rather to perturb the networks and predict the
changed outcomes. Viral infections provide the opportunity to take a system
from state A (uninfected) to state B (infected) with synchrony and technical
control. This approach to generate and test hypotheses will be a powerful tool
to understand homeostatic control and viral pathogenesis. Just as studies of
viral gene products and their interactions with specific cellular components
have yielded many fundamental insights into individual cellular functions,
virology has much to contribute to our understanding of more-complex
interacting systems.
New and old: coupling new technology with established procedures.With
the advent of such exciting new experimental approaches, will the methods of
traditional virology continue to be necessary? Will the plaque assay go the way
of the Model T? Can we turn off our incubators and freeze down our cell lines?
We think not. Experiments using cell culture, classical biochemistry, animal
models, clinical trials, and population-based analyses will continue to be
essential components of contemporary and future virology research. The new
technologies will not displace their predecessors but join and complement them.
For example, the characterization of new viruses discovered through deep
sequencing will require cultured cells to investigate viral replication biology
and host organisms to investigate viral pathogenesis and disease outcomes. The
causal association of viruses with specific disease phenotypes will require
experimental infections and intervention trials. Thus, the virology toolbox
will be enhanced by technological innovations rather than replaced by them.
PUBLIC NEED: RESEARCH
FUNDING, CRISES AND PUBLIC PERCEPTION, AND ADVOCACY
Support and advocacy for virology research.Our nation's economic
stability is tightly interwoven with its scientific progress. The highest
purpose of science is the search for a greater understanding of the world
around us. In virology, this purpose translates into advances in our
understanding of basic biology and improvements in the health of the flora and
fauna that inhabit our plant. We cannot shy away from the need to educate the
public and our national leaders about the important contributions our field can
make. Engaging our lay colleagues and political leaders at all levels about our
research and its impact will be essential to secure sufficient funding to
support our efforts.
One example is the halt in the last decade of the 20th century to the
enormous progress being made in using RNA interference to protect crops against
infection by highly destructive viruses. The withdrawal of genetic modification
of crops based on unsubstantiated fears has left few alternatives to deal with
potentially devastating losses of crops to viral disease. With the prospect of
worldwide food shortages caused by climate change, decreased investment in
genetic technology has serious implications for human health. These and similar
concerns provide a rich opportunity for the scientific community to advance
ideas in the public domain about new technological developments and
evidence-based risk assessments.
Emerging infections.We will continue to observe new or previously unrecognized
infections in humans, animals, and plants. In humans, such infections will more
often be zoonotic (i.e., the transmission of a virus from wild or domesticated
animals to humans with attendant disease). As we discover new viruses and
relate new and well-known viruses to specific diseases, we can anticipate
public pressure to rapidly develop antivirals and vaccines. Depending on the
sense of urgency, the tendency will be to shift resources to the “threat” of
the day. For example, at the start of the 21st century, we witnessed several
examples of emerging infections followed by exaggerated (but not necessarily
unwarranted) public reactions. The global concern and almost immediate response
of scientists and health officials to the SARS and West Nile virus epidemics
are cases in point. Soon after these events, we saw the spread of Chikungunya
virus to several countries where it was hitherto unknown. What will tomorrow
bring? How will we deal with these new infections? Improved surveillance,
more-rapid reagent sharing and information transfer, more-effective quarantine
procedures, and various public health measures will undoubtedly contribute to
controlling emerging diseases, but increasing attention and resources are
likely to be devoted to maintaining, as well as expanding, the roster of
antivirals and vaccines.
One view is that we should accelerate the development of new antiviral
strategies to protect the public from these emerging infections. To be
effective, antiviral drugs must be safe and potent and must be administered
soon after infection. These requirements constitute substantial impediments to
drug discovery, which has limited the number of antivirals in clinical use for
acute infections relative to antibiotics. Nonetheless, numerous highly effective
antiviral drugs are in widespread use, particularly those against HIV. Advances
in genetics, biochemistry, structural biology, and computational biology
provide a strong platform for the future development of additional antiviral
drugs. Although we must certainly prepare for future threats, antiviral-drug
development should not ignore viruses that currently account for a substantial
burden of disease.
The need for vaccines.Vaccines are among the most cost-effective means
of preventing infectious disease morbidity and mortality. However, recent
progress in vaccine development has been uneven. We saw the introduction of
effective human papillomavirus and rotavirus vaccines yet witnessed many
unsuccessful attempts to develop an HIV vaccine. Why is it that many of our
most successful vaccines were introduced 20 to 50 years ago (e.g., vaccines for
hepatitis B, influenza, measles, mumps, and rubella viruses)? In addition to
HIV, many globally important viruses (e.g., dengue virus, hepatitis C virus,
human cytomegalovirus, and respiratory syncytial virus) still lack vaccines.
There are several challenges to the development of these vaccines. Critical
knowledge gaps must be filled before a “product” can be developed, and funding
decisions must be tailored to these needs. First, we must understand the basic
biology of viral evolution and quasispecies. Second, we need to define what
constitutes a protective immune response. Third, we have to acknowledge the
economics of vaccine development and the risk to the private sector,
recognizing that the necessity of immunizing a healthy naĂŻve population to
prevent a disease will be unacceptable if there are significant
vaccine-associated adverse events.
The challenges for the development of new generations of vaccines are
substantial at the levels of basic biology and efficacy. But even greater
challenges arise in introducing vaccines to the public. Many believe that
children are already “overvaccinated” in infancy. In addition, there is a
growing public perception that vaccines actually cause disease (e.g., autism,
attention deficit disorder, or multiple sclerosis) despite substantial evidence
to the contrary. Few people are well versed in the analysis of large
epidemiologic studies designed to identify low-frequency associations.
Moreover, disproving cause and effect in the face of well-established
unscientific beliefs is a difficult task. Successful vaccine efforts will
require both sound science and forceful public advocacy.
Natural and unnatural events.Concern exists that highly pathogenic
viruses, either in their wild-type state or after genetic manipulation, will be
used to perpetrate acts of terrorism. Presently, the means for wide
dissemination of these infectious agents are not available. Arguably the most
dangerous virus, variola major virus (which causes smallpox), is not accessible
to those wishing to inflict harm, but there are worries that covert stocks of
variola major virus may remain undeclared. There is also much discussion about
whether it is possible to develop “designer viruses” containing virulence
factors from more than a single source. At the present time, it is not possible
to predict the outcome of such genetic engineering approaches. However, viruses
have evolved so precisely that even subtle genetic changes usually result in
attenuation. Therefore, the risks of viral bioterrorism are thought to be low,
but even low-probability, high-impact events can be devastating. There is no
question that virologists and the scientific community in general should be
vigilant to the misuse of scientific information as the field advances.
Indeed, nature is likely to be a much more dangerous terrorist, acting
through zoonoses. Just as the AIDS pandemic was initiated by the transmission
of HIV from nonhuman primates to humans and SARS-coronavirus was transmitted to
humans from bats and civet cats, other viruses are likely to make similar
leaps. Influenza virus does so on a regular basis, with many virologists
predicting that it is only a matter of time before the next highly virulent and
transmissible strain catches humans without preexisting immunity, resulting in
a new pandemic. In 2003, a shipment of rodents from West Africa to the United
States caused an outbreak of monkeypox virus in the Midwestern United States, which
occurred because some of the rodents were subclinically infected with monkeypox
virus. This virus, in turn, infected North American prairie dogs (not
previously known to be hosts), which then transmitted the infection to about
100 people. Fortunately, nobody died during this miniepidemic, but the incident
demonstrates that pathogenic viruses can move rapidly and unexpectedly into new
populations and that Mother Nature is the consummate “bioterrorist.”
Balancing risks of dangerous-pathogen research.Heightened concerns about
potential viral pandemics and bioterrorism have resulted in the construction of
high-containment research facilities and increased scrutiny about the safety of
research on pathogens designated by the CDC or USDA as potential biological
weapons (i.e., “select agents”). This designation mandates strict regulatory
oversight of research that is aimed primarily at reducing the risks of misuse
of these pathogens. However, select-agent designations also dramatically
increase costs and slow the pace of research, discouraging some scientists from
pursuing these studies. For instance, if HIV and SARS-coronavirus had been
designated select agents, then responses to these outbreaks might have been
much slower, perhaps with catastrophic consequences. Thus, attempts to reduce
the risks of performing or misusing infectious-disease research should be
balanced by consideration of the risks of hindering the research required to
protect society against important pathogens. Furthermore, select agents are often
endemic in some areas of the world where they infect humans by natural exposure
and could be obtained by unauthorized individuals without regulatory oversight.
Accordingly, future regulatory decisions about the designation and control of
“select agents” should be based as much as possible on scientific factors and
realistic risk assessments.
High-level containment does provide appropriate protection for the most
dangerous pathogens, with the resurrection of the H1N1 influenza virus that
caused the 1918 pandemic a case in point. This virus was reconstructed in
biosafety level 4 containment facilities by using viral RNA sequences obtained
from human autopsy specimens. The rationale for, and the advisability of,
reconstruction were questioned by some, but results gathered in subsequent
studies substantially enhanced our understanding of influenza pathogenesis and
left us better prepared to anticipate and combat the next influenza pandemic.
Political issues impacting virology: climate change as an example.Among
many issues on the political agenda, climate change captures considerable
attention. Climate science seems an unlikely subject for virologists, but it
may be prudent to think seriously about this topic. Many regard changes in
weather patterns and sea level as the primary effects of global warming.
However, the influence of climate on the ecology of microbial systems may be as
large as, or even larger than, these meteorological effects. Microbial
pathogens unexpectedly gain access to new hosts when natural cycles of
host-pathogen relationships are interrupted or altered. Insect and rodent
vectors, weather, floods, and social interactions are affected by climate and
contribute to the highly interactive cycles of host-pathogen engagement.
Despite more than 100 years of studying microbes, we have minimal knowledge of
the natural microbial world and how microbial communities evolve. Only recently
have we become aware that the oceans are teeming with bacteriophages that
modulate the aquatic bacterial population, thereby affecting the ocean's
chemistry, ecology, and overall well-being.
The effect of climate on microbial communities is not understood.
Indeed, the molecular and cellular biology of microbial communities is only now
being examined in a rigorous way. For example, new methods of sequencing
demonstrate a remarkable diversity of microorganisms in every ecosystem
examined. These findings emphasize the need to predict how climate affects
biological systems. If the temperature rose 1°C on average, major biological
communities would change dramatically as competition for resources removed the
less fit and opened new niches for competitors. We need more research on the
molecular and cellular biology of populations to understand and model the
evolution of interacting communities in nature. Laboratory biology must be
better integrated with field biology: e.g., the techniques of deep sequencing,
proteomics, and metabolomics should be brought to the field. For entrepreneurs,
it is certain that innovative and lucrative technologies will emerge.
TRAINING
VIROLOGISTS FOR THE FUTURE
How can virologists take advantage of all of these new opportunities for
scholarship and application? To address this question, we must consider what
constitutes optimum training for virologists in the 21st century. Tomorrow's
advances will require a combination of small, tightly focused groups and large,
multidisciplinary teams. Traditional teams of basic scientists working with
clinicians will be augmented by mathematicians, physicists, and population
biologists, among others. Integrating new technology advances with classical
epidemiology and clinical approaches will not be a simple pedagogical exercise.
Training the next generation of scientists to be capable of undertaking this
research will require more-diverse course offerings, enhanced training
opportunities, especially involving interdisciplinary collaboration and
computational approaches, and instruction in teamwork. To facilitate
professional advancement, we will need to develop new strategies to recognize
and reward individual contributions to group scientific efforts as team science
becomes more and more prevalent.
Systems biology approaches, large-scale genetic screens, and the
metagenomics of host and viral genes from related viruses present unique
challenges for training. These approaches will produce enormous amounts of
information that will challenge our capacity to integrate it into useful
conceptual frameworks. Imaging technology will reveal the dynamics of
biological interactions at every level yet produce huge sets of data that
strain current systems for information storage and retrieval. Methods to
search, screen, recover, and use this information will provide new avenues for
discovery and require a new generation of virologists with special expertise in
computational methods and information technology.
PERSONAL CURIOSITY
The power of a single mind to identify a problem and solve it is one of
the greatest joys of humanity. No executive, laboratory head, business manager,
or marketing director can dictate discovery. The very meaning of the word is
that we did not know what we would find when we started looking. The process of
discovery follows paths that often seem simple or elegant in retrospect but
almost always reflect individual intellect, personal curiosity, and luck, which
cannot be defined or packaged. Although the world of science is changing in
many ways, the role of the individual scientist in discovery cannot be
underestimated. Another look at Table 2
emphasizes the importance of serendipity as an essential force in discovery.
Someone has to see something no one else did. Many of the investigators who
will make discoveries in the 21st century will do so because they want to
understand how something works, not because something is trendy.
One of the motivating forces for virology research is the concept of the
“model system.” Even with the current unprecedented rate of discovery, we are
unlikely to know everything about every organism. A model system is a
convenient organism that can be analyzed in great depth so that the knowledge
obtained can be applied to other organisms that may not be amenable to study.
What will constitute model systems for the 21st century? Model systems
are often chosen to serve particular problems. For example, very few
virologists study viruses of algae. Who knows, if we start driving cars fueled
by genetically altered algae, it might be good to know more about algal
viruses.
Continuing research should not only focus on conventional viruses but
also enhance our understanding of new classes of subviral infectious agents
such as prions. Prions are infectious misfolded host-derived proteins that can
spread disease or phenotypic traits without carrying their own nucleic acid
genome. A variety of prions have been identified in species ranging from fungi
to mammals, but much remains to be discovered about the diversity, structure,
and impact of these enigmatic agents in biology. Practical diagnostic tests and
treatments must be developed for mammalian prion diseases such as bovine
spongiform encephalopathy and Creutzfeldt-Jacob disease. An additional concern
is the theoretical possibility that a number of common protein-misfolding
diseases such as Alzheimer's disease and other amyloidoses might be
transmissible under some circumstances, due to the prion-like behavior of
misfolded proteins. The extent to which such possibilities are biologically
relevant will be an important area for future investigation.
THE CRYSTAL BALL
These are exciting times for biology. The general trends likely to drive
virology research in the next decade include systems biology of virus-host
interactions, viral ecology and the virosphere, evolution of viruses, and
improved vaccines and therapeutics. Many of these advances will be accelerated
by technologic innovations in high-throughput sequencing, the complete
synthesis of viral genomes, small-molecule and shRNA screens, and the imaging
of cells and whole organisms, in concert with traditional methods used by
virologists. The knowledge, techniques, new ideas, and urgency to learn more
are stronger than ever. The importance of studying the basic biology of
viruses, even those that today may not seem relevant to human, animal, and
plant disease, cannot be overstated. As an example, studies of avian Rous
sarcoma virus led to the discovery of cellular oncogenes and guided the initial
studies of HIV. Nonpathogenic viruses have been widely utilized as gene
transfer and vaccine vectors. Even replication-defective endogenous viruses
have been informative, as they have provided a glimpse into virus-host battles
fought by our distant ancestors. History has proven again and again that
understanding the basic biology of viruses leads to new and often unexpected
insights. We anticipate that studies of viruses will continue to yield
surprising glimpses into the inner workings of their host cells. In fact,
recent research on simian virus 40 (SV40) entry led to the discovery of an
entirely new organelle, the caveosome.
We anticipate a rich future for viral pathogenesis research. Just as
studies of viral infections of single cells have led to astonishing insights
into basic biological processes, we think studies of viral infections of host
organisms will continue to teach us much about physiology in health and
disease. The application of new technologies will allow us to approach with
increasing sophistication complex questions about how viruses invade,
disseminate, target specific tissues, elicit host defenses, and cause disease.
These questions cannot be addressed solely using cell culture but in addition
require animal models, clinical trials, and population-based studies. In this
context, we will likely explore the concept that viruses or viral components
can be harnessed to protect us from other microbial or inflammatory diseases.
In fact, individual “anti-host defense” proteins derived from viral genomes are
currently being tested in clinical trials as novel classes of drugs to treat
diseases associated with systemic inflammation, such as atherosclerosis and
heart disease.
If we could point to one sea change in virology that will affect us all,
it would be that we now function in a cross-disciplinary environment. Just look
at the author list or acknowledgments in the latest papers and note the number
of disciplines that are represented. It is likely that you will see not only
authors with expertise in cell biology, immunology, and chemistry but also
authors who are experts in ecology, computer and information science,
mathematics, and physics, among others. Interdisciplinary research in virology
is essential for future progress. However, “Biology” with a capital “B” is at
the root of all this excitement. Those in other disciplines who do not master
the biology of viruses are likely to provide technical expertise, but they will
not share with virologists the joys of understanding fundamental biology,
making discoveries, and improving the health and well-being of our planet.
↵† Karen L. Beemon, Johns Hopkins University,
Baltimore, MD; Byron W. Caughey, Rocky Mountain Laboratories, Hamilton,
MT; Terence S. Dermody, Vanderbilt University School of Medicine, Nashville,
TN; Michael S. Diamond, Washington University School of Medicine, St.
Louis, MO; Daniel C. DiMaio, Yale University School of Medicine, New
Haven, CT; Robert W. Doms, University of Pennsylvania School of Medicine,
Philadelphia, PA; Donald E. Ganem, University of California, San
Francisco, San Francisco, CA; Harry B. Greenberg, Stanford University
School of Medicine, Stanford, CA; Beatrice H. Hahn, University of Alabama,
Birmingham, AL; Michael J. Imperiale, University of Michigan Medical
School, Ann Arbor, MI; Richard A. Koup, National Institute of Allergy and
Infectious Diseases, Bethesda, MD; Douglas S. Lyles, Wake Forest
University, Winston-Salem, NC; Grant McFadden, University of Florida,
Gainesville, FL; Jay A. Nelson, Oregon Health and Science University,
Beaverton, OR; Peter M. Palese, Mount Sinai School of Medicine, New York,
NY; Stanley Perlman, University of Iowa, Iowa City, IA; Nancy Raab-Traub,
University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill, NC; Susan R. Ross, University
of Pennsylvania, Philadelphia, PA; Rozanne M. Sandri-Goldin, University of
California, Irvine, Irvine, CA; Bert L. Semler, University of California,
Irvine, Irvine, CA; Ganes C. Sen, The Cleveland Clinic Foundation,
Cleveland, OH; Anne Simon, University of Maryland, College Park, MD; and
Ronald Swanstrom, University of North Carolina School of Medicine, Chapel
Hill, NC.
Viruses pose important global public health challenges. Concern is
heightened by population growth and environmental changes, which might
facilitate the transmission of animal viruses into humans. This trend may be
accelerated by global warming. This figure shows the three-dimensional
organization of Rift Valley fever virus (RVFV) revealed by cryoelectron
tomography. RVFV (Bunyaviridae, Phlebovirus) is an emerging human and
veterinary pathogen responsible for recurring epidemics throughout Africa and
the Arabian Peninsula. RVFV has the potential to cause hemorrhagic fever in
humans. Tomographic reconstruction of RVFV vaccine strain MP-12 revealed a
capsid containing 122 capsomeres arranged in an icosahedral lattice with T=12
quasisymmetry. The virus particle is enwrapped with a map of the earth looking
down at the African continent, and the mosquito represents the vector for RVFV.
Frozen-hydrated RVFV MP-12 particles are shown in the foreground. (This figure
first appeared on the cover of the Journal of Virology, November 2008,
vol. 82, no. 21. [See related article on p. 10341.])
Viruses come in all shapes and sizes. Unbiased sequencing efforts have
revealed an astonishing diversity of viruses. Shown here is an image of
negatively stained nucleocapsids of a polydnavirus from the ichneumonid
parasitoid Glypta fumiferanae. Mature virions consist of several
nucleocapsids surrounded by two envelopes; the latter cannot be distinguished
here because of the detergent treatment used to expose the nucleocapsids. Each
nucleocapsid is believed to package more than one and possible many
double-stranded circular DNA molecules, but it remains unclear whether each
nucleocapsid, or virion, contains the full spectrum of more than 100 genome
segments. (Micrograph by Don Stolz.) (This figure first appeared on the cover
of the Journal of Virology, January 2008, vol. 82, no. 2. [See
related article in June 2007, vol. 81, no. 12, p. 6491.])
Whole viral genome sequences have revolutionized our ability to identify
and characterize viral genes and have revealed evolutionary relationships
between viruses. Nudiviruses are proposed to be a new genus of viruses isolated
from different orders of insects, e.g., Orthoptera, Coleoptera, and Lepidoptera.
The complete genome of a nudivirus infecting the cricket Gryllus bimaculatus
suggests a common ancestor of nudiviruses and baculoviruses. Despite their
differing morphology, these viruses share similar genes involved in virus
structure, the infection process, and gene transcription. (The genome map was
drawn using Genevision software; the contribution of G. Rossen, C. Bauser, and
T. Bopp to the artwork is acknowledged.) (This figure first appeared on the
cover of the Journal of Virology, December 2007, vol. 81, no. 23. [See
related article in May 2007, vol. 81, no. 10, p. 5395.])
Numerous technical advances, including the ability to label and
visualize viral genes and gene products, combined with sophisticated imaging
techniques, have yielded unprecedented insights into the details of viral
replication, including the impact of coinfection with more than one virus.
Studies of interactions between viruses in coinfected hosts are likely to
uncover important new strategies for viral commensalism and parasitism. Live
covisualization of competing adeno-associated virus (AAV) and herpes simplex
virus type 1 (HSV-1) DNA replication. Replicating AAV DNA containing lac
operator sequences was visualized by binding of a red fluorescent protein fused
to lac repressor protein (red), while the replication of HSV-1 DNA
containing tetracycline operator sequences was visualized by binding of
enhanced yellow fluorescent protein fused to the tetracycline repressor DNA
binding domain (green). AAV and HSV-1 DNA replication occurred in spatially
separate nuclear compartments, which were often found in juxtaposition. Blue,
Hoechst stain; scale in micrometers. (This figure first appeared on the cover
of the Journal of Virology, May 2007, vol. 81, no. 9. [See related
article on p. 4732.])
Viral-sequence information has revolutionized viral epidemiology,
allowing the spread of an epidemic to be tracked and its evolution through
space and time to be monitored. The transmission history of foot-and-mouth
disease virus (FMDV) can be elucidated from complete genome sequence analysis
of the virus, enabling epidemiological tracing of the virus between infected
premises. The United Kingdom map shows the locations of premises infected
during the 2001 FMDV outbreak. The structure is a representation of FMDV
British field strain (serotype O), showing the alpha-carbon backbone (accession
IFOD), courtesy of Nick Knowles, Institute for Animal Health, Pirbright, United
Kingdom. (This figure first appeared on the cover of the Journal of Virology,
January 2007, vol. 81, no. 1. [See related article in November 2006, vol.
80, no. 22, p. 11274.])
Viruses
inhabit all ecological niches. The isolation and characterization of viruses
from unconventional habitats are providing new views of virus diversity,
evolution, and function. Wherever life is found, so are viruses. The hot and
acidic waters of hot springs, such as those in Yellowstone National Park, are
no exception. Species of the archaeal organism Sulfolobus thrive at high
temperatures and low pH and are host to a number of virus strains, including
the double-stranded DNA virus Sulfolobus turreted icosahedral virus
(STIV). The characterization of STIV particles and virus-encoded proteins is
leading to a better understanding of the origin and evolution of this group of
viruses. (This figure first appeared on the cover of the Journal of Virology,
August 2006, vol. 80, no. 16. [See related article in August 2006, vol. 80,
no. 15, p. 7625.])
USAMRIID employs both military and civilian scientists as well as highly specialized support
personnel, totaling around 800 people. In the 1950s and '60s, USAMRIID and its
predecessor unit pioneered unique, state-of-the-artbiocontainment facilities which it continues to
maintain and upgrade. Investigators at its facilities frequently collaborate with
the Centers
for Disease Control and Prevention, the World Health
Organization, and major biomedical and academic centers worldwide.
USAMRIID's 1983 mission statement mandated that the Institute:
Develops strategies, products, information, procedures and training for medical
defense against biological warfare agents and naturally occurring infectious
agents of military importance that require special containment.
USAMRIID's current mission statement is:
To protect the Warfighter from biological threats and to be prepared to
investigate disease outbreaks or threats to public health.
By U.S. Department of
Defense (DoD) directive, as well as additional U.S. Army guidance,
USAMRIID performs its "biological agent medical defense" research in
support of the needs of the three military services. This mission, and all work
done at USAMRIID, must remain within the spirit and letter of both President Richard Nixon's 1969 and 1970 Executive
Orders renouncing the use of biological and toxin weapons, and the
U.N. Biological
Weapons Convention of 1972.
USAMRIID traces its institutional lineage to the early 1950s, when Lt. Col.
Abram S. Benenson
was appointed as medical liaison officer to the U.S. Army Biological
Warfare Laboratories (BWL) at Camp (later Fort) Detrick to oversee
biomedical defensive problems. Soon thereafter, a joint agreement was signed
and studies on medical defense against biological weapons were conducted
cooperatively by the U.S. Army Chemical
Corps and the Army
Medical Department. These early days saw the beginnings of the
medical volunteer program known as "Project Whitecoat" (1954–1973). USAMRIID's
precursor — the Army Medical Unit
(AMU) — began operations in 1956 under the command of Col. William
D. Tigertt. (One of the AMU's first responsibilities was to oversee
all aspects of Project
CD-22, the exposure of volunteers to aerosols containing a highly
pathogenic strain of Coxiella burnetii, the causal agent of Q fever.)
In 1961, Col. Dan Crozier
assumed command of the AMU. Modern principles of biosafety and biocontainment were pioneered at Fort Detrick
throughout the 1960s by a number of scientists led by Arnold
G. Wedum. Crozier oversaw the planning and construction of the
present USAMRIID laboratory and office building (Building 1425) and its
advanced biocontainment suites,
which is formally known as "The Crozier Building". Ground breaking
came in 1967 (personnel moved in during 1971 and '72). In 1969, the BWL were
formally disestablished and the Institute underwent a formal name change from
the AMU to the "U.S. Army Medical Research Institute of Infectious
Diseases". The Institute's mission did not really change and it received
additional funding and personnel authorizations to hire biomedical and laboratory
scientists who were losing their jobs as a result of the termination of the
United States' offensive BW studies.
By the late 1970s, in addition to the work on Coxiella burnetii and
other rickettsiae, research priorities had expanded to
include the development of vaccines and therapeutics against Argentine,
Korean and
Bolivian
hemorrhagic fevers, Lassa fever and other exotic diseases that could
pose potential BW threats. In 1978, the Institute assisted with humanitarian
efforts in Egypt when a severe outbreak of Rift Valley fever (RVF) occurred there for the
first time. The epidemic caused thousands of human cases and the deaths of
large numbers of livestock. Diagnostics, along with much of the Institute's
stock of RVF vaccine, were sent to help control the outbreak. At this time the
Institute acquired both fixed and transportable BSL-4 containment plastic human
isolators for the hospital care and safe transport of patients suffering from
highly contagious and potentially lethal exotic infections. In 1978, it
established an Aeromedical
Isolation Team (AIT) — a military rapid response team
of doctors, nurses and medics, with worldwide airlift capability, designed to
safely evacuate and manage contagious patients under BSL-4 conditions. A formal
agreement was signed with the Centers for
Disease Control (CDC) at this time stipulating that USAMRIID would
house and treat highly contagious infections in laboratory personnel should any
occur. (After deploying on only four "real world" missions in 32
years, the AIT was ultimately decommissioned in 2010.)
The 1980s saw the establishment of a new program to improve the existing
anthrax vaccine, and to develop new information on the pathophysiology of
weaponized anthrax disease. This came in response to the Sverdlovsk anthrax
leak of 1979. Professional medical opinion differed at this period
as to exactly what constituted a potential BW agent. A case in point was the
establishment in 1980 of a new program focusing on Legionnaire's disease
at the urging of some medical authorities. Almost a year later, a panel of
experts decided that this organism did not have potential as a BW agent and the
program was discontinued. Of greater longevity were the new research programs
initiated at this time to study the trichothecene fungal toxins, marine toxins
and other small molecular weight toxins of microbial origin.
The early 1980s also saw the development at USAMRIID of new diagnostic
methods for several pathogenic organisms such as ELISA
technology and the extensive use of monoclonal antibodies.
The same year saw introduction of a new course, "Medical Defense Against
Biological Agents", designed to familiarize military physicians, nurses
and other medical personnel with the special problems potentially posed by
medical management BW cases. This course, with some changes in format,
continued into the 21st century as the "Medical Management of Chemical and
Biological Casualties Course" (MCBC), still conducted jointly by USAMRIID
and the U.S. Army Medical Research Institute of Chemical Defense
(USAMRICD).
In 1985, the General Maxwell R. Thurman,
then Army Deputy Chief of Staff, reviewed the threat posed to U.S.
servicemembers by biological weapons. Thurman was particularly concerned about
the application of genetic engineering technology to alter conventional
microorganisms and his review resulted in a five-year plan of expansion for
research into medical defensive measures at USAMRIID. The 1985 in-house budget
of 34 M USD was to expand to 45 M the next year and was eventually scheduled to
reach 93.2 M by 1989. (The need for a physical detection system to identify an
aerosol of infectious agent became apparent at this time. Lack of such a
reliable system still represents one of the major technical difficulties in the
field.) Within two years, however, it became apparent that this program of
expansion would not materialize. A new proposed toxin laboratory was never
built. The Army had experienced several budget cuts and these impacted the
funding of the Institute.
By 1988, USAMRIID began to come under close scrutiny by several Congressional
committees. The Senate Subcommittee on Oversight of Government Management,
chaired by Senator Carl Levin, issued a
report quite critical in the DoD's management of biological safety issues in
the CBW programs. Senator John Glenn, Chairman, Committee on
Governmental Affairs asked the Government
Accounting Office (GAO) to investigate the validity of DoD's
Biological Defense Research Program. The GAO issued a critical report
concluding that the Army spent funds on R&D efforts that did not address
validated BW threats and may have duplicated the research efforts of the
Centers for Disease Control and the National
Institutes of Health.
During the period of Desert
Shield and Desert Storm (1990–91)
USAMRIID provided the DoD with expert advice and products (vaccines and drugs)
to ensure an effective medical response if a medical defense were required.
USAMRIID scientists trained and equipped six special laboratory teams for rapid
identification of potential BW agents, which fortunately never appeared.
Following the conflict, USAMRIID physicians and engineers were key members of a
United
Nations Special Commission (UNSCOM) Inspection Team that evaluated
the BW capabilities in Iraq during the 1990s.
In late 2001, USAMRIID became the FBI's
reference lab for forensic evidence related to the bioterror incident known as
"Amerithrax" in which anthrax-laden letters
were sent through the US Postal Service,
killing 5 people and sickening 17 others. The response by USAMRIID as it
interacted with the FBI, HHS, DOJ,
CIA
and the White House are detailed in Richard Preston's 2002 book The Demon in the
Freezer.[3]
An inspection by USAMRMC, conducted seven months after the Amerithrax
incidents, found that Suite B-3 in Building 1425 at the Institute not only was
contaminated with anthrax in three locations but the bacteria had escaped from
secure areas in the building to those that were unprotected. The report stated
that, "safety procedures at the facility and in individual laboratories
were lax and inadequately documented; that safety supervision sometimes was
carried out by junior personnel with inadequate training or survey instruments;
and that exposures of dangerous bacteria at the lab, including anthrax, had not
been adequately reported."[4]
In August 2008, a USAMRIID scientist, Dr. Bruce Ivins, was identified as the lone
Amerithrax culprit by the FBI. Ivins had allegedly expressed homicidal thoughts
and exhibited mental instability before and after the attacks occurred. He had
maintained his security clearance at the Institute, and retained access to
dangerous substances, until mid-July 2008, at the end of which month he
committed suicide.[5] Also in August 2008, Secretary of the ArmyPete Geren ordered the creation of a team of
medical and military experts to review security measures at the Institute. The
team is headed by a two-star general,
and will include representatives from USAMRMC, the Army's Surgeon
General, and Army operations.[6]U.S.
RepresentativesJohn D. Dingell and Bart Stupak have stated that they will lead
investigations into security at the Institute as part of a review of all the
nation's biodefense labs.[7]
Safety policies changed at USAMRIID following an incident in March 2010. A
young microbiologist became trapped in the -30 freezer portion of 'Little
Alaska.' Due do the corroded nature of the freezer door, the woman was trapped
in the life-threatening conditions for over 40 minutes. Thankfully by chance
she was recovered and the incident was labelled only a near miss. USAMRIID
instituted a mandatory '2 man freezer policy' and worked to keep both the
quality of the door and the security in that surrounding area up to a higher
standard.[8]
Groundbreaking occurred in August 2009 for a new, state-of-the-art, 835,000
square feet (78,000 m2) facility at Ft Detrick for USAMRIID. The building, being constructed by
Manhattan Torcon Joint Venture under the supervision of the US Army Corps of
Engineers, is projected for completion and partial occupation by 2015 or '16
and full occupation by 2017. This delay to the project delivery is in part due
to a fire within the BSL4 laboratory area[9]
A metal fence surrounds the Army Medical Research Institute of
Infectious Diseases in Frederick, Md. Earlier this week, a former scientist for
the institute, Bruce Ivins, died in an apparent suicide. Ivins helped
investigate the deadly anthrax attacks in 2001. Mark Wilson/Getty Images
hide caption
toggle caption
Mark Wilson/Getty Images
A metal fence surrounds the Army Medical Research Institute of
Infectious Diseases in Frederick, Md. Earlier this week, a former scientist for
the institute, Bruce Ivins, died in an apparent suicide. Ivins helped
investigate the deadly anthrax attacks in 2001.
Mark Wilson/Getty Images
What Is The
USAMRIID?
The U.S. Army Medical Research Institute for Infectious Diseases was
established by the Office of the Surgeon General of the Army on Jan. 27, 1969,
to develop medical defenses against biological warfare threats. It is located
at Fort Detrick, Md.
The institute's scientists develop vaccines, drugs, diagnostics and
information to protect U.S. service members from biological warfare threats and
endemic diseases. It is the only laboratory within the Defense Department to
study highly hazardous viruses requiring maximum containment.
The institute has helped
to contain deadly diseases, such as Lassa fever, SARS and human
monkeypox, since the 1970s.
Source: U.S. Army Medical Research Institute for Infectious Diseases
Read a chronology of who was infected in the
anthrax attacks and the FBI's pursuit of the culprit.
Fort Detrick, Md., was created in the middle of World War II and became
the center for America's biological warfare efforts. But that role shifted in
1969, the government says, to focus solely on defense against the threat of
biological weapons.
Then called Detrick Air Field, the science and research facility housed
four biological agent production plants.
Anthrax was considered the most important agent. Simulants were tested,
and one bomb was readied for production in 1944. One million bombs were
ordered, though the order was canceled when the war ended in 1945.
During the 1950s, the biological weapons program was among the most
classified within the Pentagon. There was an emphasis on biological agents for
use against enemy forces as well as plants and animals.
The Army says no biological weapons were used during the Korean War,
though such allegations were made by the Chinese and the Koreans.
Growing Protests
One plan at Fort Detrick in the late 1950s was to use the yellow fever
virus against an enemy by releasing infected mosquitoes by airplane or
helicopter. Detrick's labs were capable of producing a half-million mosquitoes
per month, with plans for up to 130 million per month.
And finally, there is a very
interesting Australian TV documentary, well worth viewing:Coronavirus:
How the deadly epidemic sparked a global emergency
Four Corners
(Australia tv)
Published on Feb 24, 2020
It’s likened to a
scene from an apocalypse. Wuhan — a city more populous than London or New York
— placed in ‘lockdown’ following the outbreak of the new and deadly
coronavirus.
No comments:
Post a Comment