Trinity Site Obelisk
Mushroom cloud seconds after
detonation of the Gadget.
Two
days before the 75th anniversary of Trinity, the first ever test of nuclear
weapons, 180 activists, academics and authors joined a Bulletin [of the Atomic Scientists ] Global Webinar
featuring William J. Perry, former US Secretary of
Defense and Chair of the Bulletin Board of Sponsors, and Tom Collina, Policy Director,
Ploughshares Fund, in a conversation led by Kennette Benedict, the Bulletin's senior
advisor, to discuss Perry and Collina’s
new book, The Button.
Trinity was the code name of the first detonation of a nuclear device. It was conducted by the United States Army
at 5:29 a.m. on July 16, 1945, as part of the Manhattan Project. The test was conducted in the Jornada del Muerto
desert about 35 miles (56 km) southeast of Socorro, New Mexico,
on what was then the USAAF Alamogordo Bombing and Gunnery Range, now part of White Sands Missile
Range. The only structures originally in the vicinity were the McDonald Ranch House
and its ancillary buildings, which scientists used as a laboratory for testing
bomb components. A base camp was constructed, and there were 425 people present
on the weekend of the test.
The code name "Trinity" was assigned by J. Robert Oppenheimer,
the director of the Los Alamos Laboratory,
inspired by the poetry of John Donne. The test was
of an implosion-design
plutonium device, informally nicknamed "The
Gadget", of the same design as the Fat Man bomb later detonated
over Nagasaki, Japan, on August 9, 1945. The complexity of the
design required a major effort from the Los Alamos Laboratory, and concerns
about whether it would work led to a decision to conduct the first nuclear test.
The test was planned and directed by Kenneth Bainbridge.
Fears of a fizzle
led to the construction of a steel containment vessel called Jumbo that could
contain the plutonium, allowing it to be recovered, but Jumbo was not used. A
rehearsal was held on May 7, 1945, in which 108 short tons (96 long tons;
98 t) of high explosive spiked with radioactive isotopes were detonated.
The Gadget's detonation released the explosive energy of about 22 kilotons of TNT (92 TJ).
Observers included Vannevar Bush, James Chadwick, James Conant, Thomas Farrell,
Enrico Fermi, Richard Feynman, Leslie Groves, Robert Oppenheimer, Geoffrey Taylor, Richard Tolman and John von Neumann.
The test site
was declared a National Historic
Landmark district in 1965, and listed on the National
Register of Historic Places the following year.
After the short presentations by Secretary Perry and Tom Collina, the Bulletin threw the webinar open to questions. Only 10 questions received a reply- mine on Israel and Iran was nor one of them!. I have compiled them all below. They make interesting reading.
From Dr David Lowry:
06:40 PM
If the international community is going to set a
normative prohibition on the obtaining of nuclear weapons by nation states, do
Tom and Secretary Perry regard it as equitable that successive US Governments
demand Iran never be allowed to have nuclear weapons, but never challenge
Israel ( 15 minutes ballistic missile flight time from Tehran) to transparently
remove its nuclear weapons?
From Terry Rankin, Orlando FL USA to Everyone: 06:32 PM
It's a travesty that precious time continues to be wasted
on this insanity while we keep the pedal to the metal on the anthropogenic mass
extinction level event already unfolding around us. One factor that hasn't been
raised in this discussion is the sheer profitability of an arms race which is
quite likely to be the primary driver -- not partisan politics, but rather the
bad faith of fascist capitalist corporatocracy, as intellectuals of such
caliber as Noam Chomsky and Sheldon Wolin have tried to bring to the world's
attention. The danger we live with isn't polity -- it's rapacious capitalism
and the indentured scientism that keeps that juggernaut on course for the
extinction of humankind.
From Bob Swan:
06:32 PM
Vital discussion.
Pleased to be participating as a citizen of Lawrence, Kansas. In the 1980s, inspired by the filming of The Day After, we became involved in
citizen diplomacy. Our citizens
organized the largest and most widely covered citizen events in the 1980s. We are hoping to begin this essential work
again, supporting a new truly sane nuclear policy.
From Dana Rahbar-Daniels:
06:32 PM
Yes facts are difficult to construct as well. That is one
of the key lessons of historical narratives rendered.
From Bob Swan:
06:32 PM
From DianaMackiewicz:
06:33 PM
I teach high school technology, science, cold war, WMDs
and what would be a "good" fundamental thing to teach adolescents on
this subject? Some of them are very
interested.
From Leslie Sussan (she) 06:33 PM
To hear what the aftermath of a real (comparatively
small) atomic bomb visit https://hiroshima-choosinglife.com/
From John Miksad- USA :
06:35 PM
Aren’t we still (and consistently for 75 years) being
told by our government and most of the media to be afraid of Russia because
Russians are evil (I would add we get the same story about North Koreans,
Iranians, and the Chinese). This is a major impediment to getting fellow citizens
to support reducing defense and nukes…
From Dana Rahbar-Daniels:
06:35 PM
Frank Von Hippel’s Chapter on “the Science Advisor’s
dilemma” is so helpful toward understanding the development of policies.
From Robert Gould:
06:37 PM
The historical record is clear that, as with New Start,
every major victory on such treaties was accompanied by either the
proliferation of new weapons systems (bombs and delivery systems) or weapons
modernization programs. So at time when
COVID has provided an unprecedented opportunity to look at our budget
priorities re: health care, climate, etc., shouldn’t y’all be advocating for an
end to the current nuclear weapons modernization program, the massive military
budget within which this is housed, and to advocate for the US to join, and
urge all other nuclear weapons states to join the Treaty to Prohibit Nuclear
Weapons, beyond your more limited calls for “No First Use,” modifying sole
Presidential authority?
From Halley Posner/Bulletin of the Atomic
Scientists: 06:39 PM
We love Dr. Perry’s granddaughter’s podcast “At the
Brink” which can be found here https://atthebrink.org/
From David Drake PSR:
06:40 PM
Back from the Brink is a national perhaps international
campaign to work towards the eventual worldwide elimination of nuclear
weapons. Recently in Des Moines Iowa our
Mayor Frank Cownie signed a proclamation claiming the day as The Day to Prevent
Nuclear War and supporting BftB - I hope
many of the rest of you will pursue this kind of campaign in your own
community/country - thank you all for the work you do
From Linda Cataldo Modica to Everyone: 06:42 PM
This is Linda Modica from Atomic Appalachia — East TN
which is the home of the bomb (Oak Ridge) and the sole manufacturer of Navy
nuclear fuel (Erwin). The issue of
disarmament is the reason I am involved in the Poor People’s Campaign. The PPC’s Moral Budget is how we move the
money. Join us!
From Halley Posner/Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists to
Everyone: 06:43 PM
Read what Rachel Bronson, Bulletin president and CEO has
to say about spending too much on nuclear weapons and the implications of
social injustices here: https://thebulletin.org/2020/06/what-the-protests-tell-us-invest-in-social-equity-not-nuclear-weapons/
From Soo Kim:
06:45 PM
This is a good book for middle & high school
students. Author, Kathleen Burkinshaw’s award-winning, historical fiction, The
Last Cherry Blossom (Sky Pony Press, 2016), is about a young
girl and her family living in Hiroshima during the last year of WWII. It is
based on events in her mother’s life and it’s through her 12-year-old eyes that
readers witness the horror of the world’s first atomic bomb. The Last Cherry
Blossom is also written with information on the culture, mindset, and daily
life during WWII before the atomic bomb-something that has rarely been touched
on before. http://kathleenburkinshaw.com/
From Diana Mackiewicz :
06:46 PM
Thank you Soo Kim, I have been to Hiroshima and the
literature surrounding the bombs is amazing.
I have not read this one that you suggested
From Mary Olson USA -- Appalachia: 06:45 PM
“Sole authority” in contrast to ”self-determination”. To
me this is the key factor of the new Treaty
on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons--supporting the rights of nations to
declare themselves nuclear-free---with an invite to ALL to join them. Self -determination.
Our children support this idea... https://www.icanw.org/the_treaty
From Linda Cataldo Modica: 06:46 PM
Yes, defund the Pentagon’s nuclear budget. But DOE’s nuclear budget also needs to be
moved to dismantling the current stockpile.
.From Dana Rahbar-Daniels: 06:48 PM
My! everyone has such a large library. Very cool
We need to work on diplomacy given that our signaling
confuses some countries.
From John Hallam:
06:56 PM
Once more that URL for the 30 June webinar by Abolition 2000:
100
Seconds to Midnight - Abolition 2000 Webinar on Nuclear Risk Reduction.
http://www.abolition2000.org/event/100-seconds-to-midnight-what-does-this-mean-what-can-we-do/
From Ian Ralls UK:
06:56 PM
In the UK, discussions on the replacement for our/the USA's
Trident missile system/submarines are intimately linked to the discussions on
the role civilian nuclear power should play in the UK's electricity generation.
Civilian nuclear power is neccessary to ensure a continued supply of both
material and, perhaps more importantly, skilled personnel to manufacture and
maintain nuclear materials/weapons. Civilian nuclear power also provides a
useful disguise for the vast sums of money spent on nuclear weapons.
From John Hallam:
06:57 PM
Yeah, but do the Russians really have ‘escalate to
de-escalate’ in any more sense than the US does?
From Halley Posner/Bulletin of the Atomic
Scientists: 06:58 PM
Tune in for our next global webinar with nuclear policy
expert Scott Sagan on August 3 at 10:00am Central, just 3 days before the
75th Anniversary of the dropping of the atomic bomb on Hiroshima.
From David Graubert:
06:58 PM
What is the response to anti-disarmament proponents and
advocates from countries like North Korea or Iran who might argue that nuclear
capabilities reduce conventional war aggression?
From Dana Rahbar-Daniels:
06:58 PM
Has there been anyone in State Dept who has maintained a
continuous dialogue with India and Pakistan? This is a very difficult challenge
given the biases that have developed toward both countries.
From Greg C., New Mexico USA: 07:00 PM
Los Alamos Study Group says that we are at an interesting
juncture with nuclear weapons development. Somehow, we seem committed to
produce plutonium pits at Los Alamos National
Laboratory first – I think by 2030 it’s supposed to be 30 per year – before
the Savannah River site in South Carolina is brought online. I think this is
due to political maneuvering.
The
study group says that LANL cannot develop Pu pit capability without greatly
expanding its facilities and especially without developing housing for new
workers – which is a real problem here. (Lack of water,for one thing.) They
need space in Santa Fe and other nearby communities; therefore there is an
opportunity to block expansion at the local level.
And if
we can get a requirement for a site-wide environmental impact survey, that
might stop production at LANL – because LANL will never pass such an
“inspection”.
What do
you think?
From John Walsh:
07:00 PM
William Perry’s approach - emphasizing steps short of
total abolition of nuclear weapons. Most
important as he says is ridding the world of Launch on Warning. We do
not have time to wait for total abolition because we stand on the edge of the
precipice, teetering there at every second.
From Diana Mackiewicz:
07:01 PM
Manual of Survival by Kate Brown at MIT, is a good read about nuclear radiation
and dire effects on food, etc....result of Chernobyl.
From Jonathan Granoff to Everyone: 07:01 PM
Tom, excellent big tent encouragement
From Guillaume Serina USA to Everyone: 07:01 PM
Thank you so much for this forum.
From Rainer Hauser to Everyone: 07:01 PM
Thank you. Salud para todos.
The Atomic Titanic:
an excerpt from “The Button”
By William J. Perry,
Tom Z. Collina,
June 19, 2020
“The Button:
The New Nuclear Arms Race and Presidential Power from Truman to Trump,” will be
published this month by BenBella Books.
The story of
nuclear weapons will have an ending, and it is up to us what that ending will
be. Will it be the end of nuclear weapons, or will it be the end of us?
—Beatrice
Fihn, accepting the 2017 Nobel Peace Prize
The RMS
Titanic was steaming through the North Atlantic from Southampton to New
York on April 15, 1912, when the impossible happened. The unsinkable ship
struck an iceberg and sank, killing more than 1,500 people. It was one of
history’s deadliest peacetime marine disasters.
Until the
moment of impact, all was fine. In fact, the false impression that the ship was
“unsinkable” may have caused overconfidence among the crew that led them to
take greater risks than they otherwise would have.
Similarly,
the fact that we have lived with nuclear weapons for seventy-five years has
lulled us into a false complacency. To those who say, “We have had nukes this
long and all is well, so what’s the problem?” we say, “The extreme dangers are
there, lurking just beneath the surface, and you don’t even see them. Look
closer and you will.”
“So, we’re
almost like passengers on the Titanic,” former California Governor Jerry Brown said in 2019. “Not seeing the
iceberg up ahead but enjoying the elegant dining and the music. The business of
everyday politics blinds people to the risk. We’re playing Russian roulette
with humanity. And the danger and the probability [are] mounting that there
will be some nuclear incident that will kill millions, if not initiating
exchanges that will kill billions.”
We agree with
Governor Brown. US nuclear policy is a disaster waiting to happen, and it could
be only a matter of time until our luck runs out. The Cold War is over, and we
have had thirty years to rethink US nuclear policy. Yet through the
administrations of George H.W. Bush, Bill Clinton, George W. Bush, Barack
Obama, and now Donald Trump, we have failed to learn the correct lessons from
the Cold War. Each president sought to rearrange the deck chairs on the Titanic,
but none set a new course away from the icebergs.
===
Unlike all
other instruments of war, nuclear weapons are the president’s weapons. Only the
commander in chief can authorize their use. With this authority comes the
responsibility for presidents to take the lead on transforming nuclear policy
so these weapons are never used again.
And unlike
all other nations, the United States bears the greatest global responsibility
to lead the world away from the bomb. America brought the bomb into the world
and has in the past been the global leader in efforts to control it. The United
States must once again take up the essential cause of nuclear disarmament.
Whoever is
elected in 2020, the next president of the United States will have a unique
opportunity to reshape US nuclear policy. The seventy-fifth anniversary of the
bomb and the fiftieth anniversary of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT)
will shine a bright light on our current policies that are broken and badly in
need of repair.
As we have
seen in these pages, the defining error of US nuclear policy is that it is
focused on the wrong threat. We are preparing for a first strike from Russia
that is very unlikely; what is not so unlikely is that we will blunder into a
nuclear war. Yet by preparing for the surprise first strike, we actually make
the blunder more likely. Our misguided policies like sole authority, first use,
and launch on warning are extremely dangerous, particularly when combined with
the old dangers of false alarms, the new dangers of cyber threats, and the
ever-present dangers of an unstable president—even if that instability is
temporary as a result of medication or over-drinking.
Meanwhile,
instead of fixing these glaring problems, the United States is doubling down on
them by spending more than a trillion dollars to rebuild its nuclear arsenal as
if the Cold War had never ended. We could increase our security while at the
same time saving hundreds of billions of dollars by shifting to a policy of
second-strike retaliation and phasing out the weapons that are most prone to be
used first and quickly, such as ICBMs.
In addition,
the United States and Russia are rushing into a nuclear arms race that neither
side can win. Washington and Moscow are tearing down the arms control
structures that served them so well over the last fifty years. It is vital to our
security that these structures be preserved, and that we continue the process
of reducing nuclear arsenals. But we cannot get there unless we address missile
defense, the third rail of nuclear arms control.
As the Cold
War neared its end, Reagan and Gorbachev came to realize that the vast nuclear
arsenals we had were not necessary for our security and in fact posed
existential dangers to both countries. They began to reverse the nuclear
buildup, even discussing the total elimination of nuclear weapons. Perhaps the
greatest legacy of those two leaders was their oft-stated judgment: “A nuclear
war cannot be won and must never be fought.”
That
assertion is an excellent starting point for crafting a new nuclear policy: one
that recognizes that neither Moscow nor Washington will initiate an unprovoked
nuclear attack on the other; that greatly lowers the danger of nuclear war by a
technical or political miscalculation; that significantly reduces the number of
nuclear weapons; and in which no nation uses nuclear weapons to threaten
another nation. All nuclear‑armed states should move quickly to ensure their
security without nuclear weapons and, in time, eliminate their nuclear
stockpiles.
The United
States needs to learn the right lessons from the Cold War—the real danger is
that we could accidentally bring on a nuclear catastrophe. We need to change
gears and design a nuclear force and policies to minimize this danger. This
will save money, prevent a new arms race, and make us all safer.
Significant
changes in US nuclear policy will not happen without broad public awareness and
support. The issue of presidential sole authority—who has his or her finger on
the button—has become the most resonant nuclear policy issue in forty years,
since the nuclear freeze movement in the 1980s.
We are all on
the atomic Titanic, and the ship is headed for a hidden iceberg. To
steer away from disaster, the United States must make major changes to its
nuclear policies.
Top ten
recommendations
Here are our
top ten recommendations for a safer world:
1. End
presidential sole nuclear authority. Retire the “football.”
The US
Constitution gives Congress the sole authority to declare war. Certainly, using
nuclear weapons to attack another country would be the ultimate expression of
waging war, so that authority lies with Congress. During the Cold War, policies
evolved that effectively set aside the Constitution by giving to the president
the sole authority to launch nuclear weapons. We no longer live in a world—if
we ever did—where one person should have the absolute power to end life on
earth.
Presidential
sole authority was first adopted to place the decision to use the bomb firmly
in the hands of civilians, which we fully support. But there is no need to
limit this authority to just one civilian. In the case of first use, we support
current legislation to require a declaration of war by Congress that
specifically authorizes a nuclear attack before the president can use nuclear
weapons. First use should require the shared authority of the legislative and
executive branches.
In the case
of retaliation to a nuclear attack, sole authority may be justified, but only
after such an attack has been confirmed by actual detonations (in other words,
launch on warning would be prohibited; see below). At this point, the nation
would be in a state of war, and the president would have the authority to
launch nuclear weapons without seeking the approval of Congress. Even in that
case, we believe that the president should try to consult with senior advisors before
launching a nuclear retaliation.
Thus, sole
presidential authority should be allowed only in retaliation to a confirmed
nuclear attack on the United States (or an ally covered by our extended
deterrent). As such, there would be no need for the president to launch nuclear
weapons quickly, within minutes. There would be time for a measured response.
If a nuclear attack appears to be underway against the United States, the
president, rather than worrying about launch options, should use these precious
minutes to get to a secure location to establish communications with civilian
and military advisors. There would no longer be a need for a military aide to
follow the president, 24‑7, with the emergency satchel. It is time to retire
the football.
2. Prohibit
launch on warning.
As discussed,
launching nuclear weapons on warning of attack but before the attack can be
unambiguously confirmed is just too dangerous to be contemplated. There is
simply no realistic scenario that justifies a decision to launch nuclear
weapons within minutes given the inherent dangers of doing so. Given the
tremendous consequences of the decision (the fate of the world) and the mind‑crunching
time pressure (ten minutes or less) to make such a decision, it is not worth
the risk. In addition, the president would likely be working with incomplete
information (Kennedy, Cuban Missile Crisis); could be under the influence of
alcohol (Nixon); could be responding to a false alarm caused by equipment
malfunction (Carter); or could have a predisposition to act impulsively on what
could be a false alarm caused by a cyberattack (Trump).
Simply put,
the stakes are far too high for the United States to ever launch nuclear
weapons unless we are absolutely sure that we are under nuclear attack. Once an
attack is confirmed, the United States would still have a survivable
second-strike force based on submarines at sea. We should never rush into
nuclear war, even in retaliation.
3. Prohibit
first use.
Given US
conventional superiority, we believe that no rational president would use
nuclear weapons first, in any scenario, and thus US threats to do so are not
credible. Against a nuclear-armed state like Russia, first use would be suicide
in the face of assured retaliation. Against a nonnuclear state, first use would
start a race among such states to go nuclear, make the United States into an
international outcast, and go against fifty years of US nonproliferation
policy. How can we possibly convince other states that they do not need nuclear
weapons if the United States itself says it needs them for nonnuclear threats?
We would be stepping back in time to a nuclear wild west.
Nuclear
weapons serve no practical military purpose other than to deter their use by
others. The United States can deter and respond to other threats (biological,
chemical, and conventional) with its unmatched conventional arsenal. In the
past, some US allies have urged the US to retain a first-use policy. US allies
need to be reassured that a policy of no first use does not undermine
Washington’s commitment to their security.
The United
States can make a policy of no first use more credible by adjusting its nuclear
forces accordingly. ICBMs have no role other than as first-strike weapons (they
would not survive a first strike by Russia) and should be phased out. Until
then, ICBMs should be taken off alert in a verifiable way, such as storing warheads
separately from missiles. The US strategic bomber fleet is already de‑alerted,
with bombs stored in bunkers. Washington and Moscow could work together to
develop ways to reduce the first-strike threat from submarines at sea by, for
example, limiting their deployment areas away from each other’s coasts.
Finally, a
credible US no-first-use policy could encourage Russia to follow suit and back
away from its hair-trigger launch status. The danger of Moscow blundering into
nuclear war because of its first-use and high-alert policies is probably even
greater than in the United States. Thus, it is in the US national security
interest to do what it can to nudge Russia away from first use and into a
second-strike-only posture.
We support
current legislation that would make it US policy to not use nuclear weapons
first. This would supplement legislation to limit presidential sole authority—a
“belt and suspenders” approach to prohibiting first use. A no-first-use policy
could also be achieved by executive order.
4. Retire
all ICBMs and scale back the nuclear rebuild.
Retiring
ICBMs would solve a number of problems for US nuclear policy. It would reduce
the pressure to launch on warning and “use them or lose them”; make US
no-first-use policy more credible; and save hundreds of billions of dollars
that could be redirected to higher-priority projects.
Without first
use, ICBMs would have no legitimate purpose. Most of them would be destroyed by
a Russian first strike and would be unnecessary in any other scenario. The ICBMs
are simply not needed for an effective response, which would be carried out by
submarine-based weapons. ICBMs are not worth keeping as a “nuclear sponge,” as
this only increases the nuclear danger to the US Upper Midwest and surrounding
states. Drawing a nuclear attack to the United States rather than away from it
makes no sense.
US plans to
spend about $150 billion to build a new generation of ICBMs are not only a
waste of taxpayer money, but deploying those weapons would make us less safe.
The ICBMs are, at best, extra insurance that we do not need; at worst, they are
a nuclear catastrophe waiting to happen.
The ICBMs are
part of a larger effort to spend about $2 trillion on rebuilding and
maintaining the US nuclear arsenal over the next thirty years. This effort is
excessive. The United States should build only the weapons it needs for
second-strike deterrence and should not go beyond that for obvious reasons: the
weapons are expensive and dangerous.
The US
nuclear-armed submarine force alone is sufficient for assured deterrence and
will be so for the foreseeable future. But as technology advances, we have to
recognize the possibility of new threats to submarines, especially cyberattacks
and detection by swarms of drones. The new submarine program should put a
special emphasis on improvements to deal with these potential threats, ensuring
the survivability of the force for decades to come.
In the
context of no ICBMs, we believe that a fleet of ten new nuclear-armed
submarines would be more than adequate to meet our country’s deterrent needs.
The firepower on board just five or six survivable submarines would be enough
to destroy the vital elements of state control, power, and wealth in Russia,
China, and North Korea. In fact, just one boat can carry enough nuclear weapons
to place two thermonuclear warheads on each of Russia’s fifty largest cities.
The Trump
administration is fielding new “low-yield” nuclear warheads on Trident
submarine-based missiles. These dangerous weapons are a bad solution to a nonexistent
problem. The United States can deter the unlikely Russian use of its low-yield
bombs with its current arsenal. There are no “gaps” in the US deterrent force,
and there can be no doubt in Russia’s mind that the United States is serious
about maintaining an unambiguously strong nuclear deterrent.
Trump’s
program calls for development of a new bomber, the B-21, with improved stealth
capability. We support that program because it is a useful addition to our
conventional forces and because it provides backup should the submarines ever
suffer a temporary problem that raises a question about their capability. This
is not likely, but the bomber force is an insurance policy for that
contingency.
Moving from
first use to second-use assured retaliation means that the command and control
system can shift from quick launch options to providing more decision time for
the president. We do not need weapons on high alert and the ability to launch
on warning of attack. But we do need a survivable system that protects the
president and his or her ability to issue orders under the most stressful
conditions imaginable.
The United
States should prioritize command and control modernization over rebuilding its
nuclear weapons. The president should not feel rushed into a launch decision,
and we should seek to extend the time frame well beyond an attack. This would
better allow the president to reassess the post-attack situation and prudently
direct the operations of surviving forces.
As the United
States plans for the future of the nuclear arsenal, we can move to a smaller
but more secure second-strike force whose sole purpose is to deter nuclear
attack. We do not need to spend hundreds of billions more in a dangerous and
futile attempt to “prevail” in a nuclear conflict.
By phasing
out ICBMs and building fewer new submarines and bombers, we estimate that the
United States could save at least $300 billion ($10 billion per year) and still
field a formidable deterrent force.
5. Save
New START and go farther.
The New START
Treaty, negotiated by the Obama administration and signed by the United States
and Russia in 2010, is the last major agreement still in force limiting nuclear
arms, and it expires in February 2021. It can be renewed for five years, but
only if Washington and Moscow agree. President Trump may do nothing or oppose
extension. In that case, a new president who takes office in January 2021 would
have just weeks to pick up the pieces.
President
Trump should resist efforts to complicate New START extension. Yes, Russia is developing
new nuclear weapons not covered by the treaty, and yes, China is not in the
treaty at all. Options to address these issues can be explored for a follow-on
agreement but will simply take too long to consider by early 2021. In fact, we
believe that the proposal to include these issues in the New START extension is
simply a spoiling effort by those opposed to New START.
Abandoning
New START would be a tragic error that would throw gasoline on the arms race
fire. New START has served the United States well, and there are no indications
of Russian violations. It deserves to be renewed. It limits the number of
nuclear weapons that Russia can aim at the United States, and it gives
Washington confidence that Moscow will not expand its arsenal quickly. Without
New START, those assurances disappear. New START is also the vehicle for the
last remaining dialogue we have with Russia on nuclear weapons. Indeed, one of
the most important reasons for strategic arms treaties is to maintain a
continuing dialogue on these issues that affect the survivability of both of
our countries.
However, it
would be a mistake for Congress to allow the Trump administration to hold the
treaty hostage and, as ransom, demand support for the administration’s
excessive nuclear modernization program. As much as we want New START extended,
this is a price not worth paying.
Even if New
START is extended, it cannot be the end of the arms control road. Both Moscow
and Washington would still retain enough nuclear firepower to destroy the world
for themselves and everyone else. We must continue to drive numbers down so
that if nuclear war does break out, it does not result in the end of
civilization. Climate science tells us that a hundred or more high-yield
nuclear warheads detonated on large cities could so damage the climate as to
cause a major deterioration of life on Earth. We cannot consider the arms
reduction process truly successful until it brings the numbers down to this
level and below.
After New
START, President Obama had planned to negotiate a follow-on treaty with Russia
to reduce deployed strategic nuclear forces by one-third, or down to about a
thousand warheads. This could serve as the starting point of renewed talks with
Moscow.
As part of
this effort, presidents Trump and Vladimir Putin should announce a joint
declaration reaffirming that a nuclear war cannot be won and must never be
fought. This would renew the 1985 Reagan-Gorbachev statement that Americans and
Russians received positively as the beginning of an effort to reduce risk and
improve mutual security. A joint statement today would clearly communicate that
despite current tensions, leaders of the two countries possessing more than 90
percent of the world’s nuclear weapons recognize their responsibility to work
together to prevent a global catastrophe. This could also lead other nuclear
states to take further steps to reduce nuclear risk. The timing of such a
statement would also signal Washington and Moscow’s commitment to build on past
progress toward disarmament.
We fully
understand that US-Russian relations are at a historic low and that building
political support for new negotiations will be challenging. But the importance
of reducing global nuclear dangers should be clear to all and transcend
political calculations on nonnuclear issues. Whatever their other areas of
disagreement, leaders in Washington and Moscow should always be willing to talk
about avoiding nuclear war.
6. Limit
strategic missile defenses.
It will be
next to impossible to continue with significant arsenal reductions without real
limits on strategic missile defenses. As long as Russia sees US missile
defenses as a threat to its ability to retaliate after a US first strike,
Moscow will refuse to negotiate major new arms reductions without limits on US
defenses. And as long as the US Congress remains under the mistaken belief that
these systems can be made to work effectively, it will refuse to limit national
defenses.
After
spending well over $300 billion on strategic missile defense programs since
1983, the more Washington spends to deploy missile interceptors and develop
space weapons, the more Moscow will resist reducing its nuclear forces and the
more Beijing will build up. This will put an inevitable brake on how far we can
get in the reduction of nuclear weapons. Russia and China are also concerned
about US regional missile defenses, such as US sea- and land-based interceptors
in Europe, Japan, and South Korea.
One way to
address this problem is to seek to convince the US Congress that long-range
missile defenses are not as effective as represented. A main reason why
Congress is under the delusion that US interceptors are effective is that they
have not been tested against realistic threats. The George W. Bush
administration deployed a deeply flawed system, and it has regrettably won
bipartisan support. But we should not expand it or add to it in any way until
those systems have been run through independent, realistic tests, including
real-world countermeasures. We do not believe that the US strategic missile
defense system will pass such realistic tests. We should not continue to spend
billions on systems that are not effective and that lead us to a false sense of
security.
We are making
strong statements about missile defense, but the future of the US program need
not be based on our negative assessments. We also need independent
technological assessments. Congress should fund an independent organization to
review the numerous proposed anti-missile technologies. A 1987 report by the
American Physical Society (APS) on the feasibility of directed energy weapons
helped scale back the SDI program. A similar study by APS on current
anti-missile systems would be a boost to congressional oversight and public
understanding of these complex technologies.
Ultimately,
Washington and Moscow will need binding limits on long-range missile
interceptors, as existed in the ABM Treaty until it was abandoned by the George
W. Bush administration in 2002. It is hard to imagine securing Moscow’s support
for further arsenal reductions without such binding limits.
7. Don’t
wait for treaties.
As much as we
support the use of legally binding treaties to secure limitations on nuclear
weapons and missile interceptors, unfortunately, we can no longer count on this
approach to succeed. The Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) was rejected in
1999 by a Republican Senate even though it would clearly serve US interests.
The New START Treaty barely made it through a Democratic Senate and did so only
after the Obama administration promised it would rebuild nuclear forces and not
allow limitations on missile defenses. Meanwhile, Republican presidents, who
have a long history of supporting arms control, have now turned against it. As
a result, there may be no way to get future arms control treaties through the
Senate.
The sad
reality is, for the foreseeable future, we cannot count on the US Senate to
produce 67 votes for arms control measures, even if those measures are clearly
serving US national security interests.
But these
issues are too important to sit by and wait for a change in the composition of
the Senate. If political support in the Senate does not exist for prudent
agreements on arms reductions, the next president should pursue them through
executive agreements and other means that do not require ratification by the
Senate. This is far from ideal but still better than nothing.
It is true
that political agreements may be more vulnerable to being reversed by the next
president, as shown by Trump’s withdrawal from Obama’s nuclear deal with Iran.
But it is also true that presidents can just as easily withdraw from treaties,
as Trump did with the INF Treaty and Bush did with the ABM Treaty. Treaties are
not our only path to progress, and if partisan politics make treaties
impossible, then we must pursue other means.
8. Engage
diplomatically with North Korea and Iran.
The next
president should seek to use diplomacy to contain nuclear programs in North
Korea and Iran. Such efforts are essential to restraining regional arms races
as well as for allowing truly deep reductions in US and Russian forces. There
are no viable military solutions to either situation, and such actions should
be avoided.
On Iran, the
next US president should reenter the Iran nuclear agreement negotiated by
Tehran and the United States, Russia, China, and the European Union. According
to international inspectors, Tehran was complying with the 2015 Joint
Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) when the Trump administration withdrew
from the agreement in 2018. Trump’s ill-advised action has only served to set back
the goal of preventing Iran from developing nuclear weapons. The next president
should seek to rejoin the JCPOA and begin to rebuild good relations with Tehran
toward the possibility of negotiating a follow-on agreement to extend
international limits into the future.
North Korea,
by contrast, already has nuclear weapons and poses an even tougher diplomatic
challenge. We support President Trump’s effort to engage directly with North
Korean leader Kim Jong-un, but so far the administration has not demonstrated
that it has a viable negotiating strategy. Rather than asking the North to
surrender its nuclear arsenal at the start of a diplomatic process, the United
States should seek to build a fundamentally new relationship with Pyongyang
such that North Korea no longer fears unprovoked military action by the United
States, and South Korea no longer fears unprovoked military action by North
Korea. Such a transformed relationship will take time and patience.
The Nuclear
Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) will mark its fiftieth anniversary in summer
2020. The treaty and its 190 member-states play an important role in stopping
the spread of the bomb to additional countries. The great majority of the
states without nuclear weapons support the UN treaty to eliminate the bomb and
are frustrated that the United States and Russia have not made more progress on
nuclear disarmament and are, in fact, abandoning arms reduction treaties and
rebuilding their nuclear forces. In this regard, Moscow and Washington could
build much-needed support for the NPT process by extending New START and
working to bring the CTBT into force.
9. Bring
the bomb into the new mass movement.
As we saw in
chapter 9, even if a new president is committed to transforming US nuclear
policy, once in office, she or he will face tremendous political headwinds and
institutional resistance to change. To overcome these barriers, a new president
will need to come into office with a clear plan of action that can be
implemented quickly, and put the right staff in the most influential positions
to enact that policy.
As in the
case of President Obama, once the election is over, there will still be a need
for pressure from outside organizations and American voters. There should be a
powerful outside constituency to remind the president of promises made and that
there will be a political cost if progress is not achieved.
Public
education is essential (and is the reason we wrote this book). But we know this
is just the beginning. There should also be tweets, op-eds, articles, podcasts,
speeches, conferences, YouTube videos, TV shows, documentaries, and mainstream
movies. The goal is to change the way the public and popular culture view
nuclear weapons. The weapons need to be seen not as an asset, but as a
liability—indeed, an existential danger.
The Nuclear
Freeze campaign peaked thirty-eight years ago with a million people protesting
the arms race in 1982 in New York City’s Central Park. We do not have a similar
movement today, but we do have a transformed mass movement that was born soon
after the election of President Trump. This popular uprising is focused on
women’s rights, immigration, justice, democracy, war prevention, gun control,
and the environment; it could also focus on nuclear disarmament.
We need to
bring the bomb into the new mass movement. Highly effective organizations like
Indivisible, MoveOn, and others are leading the way. We stand ready to help
however we can.
10. Elect
a committed president.
Finally, it
all comes down to electing a president who cares about avoiding nuclear war and
changing US nuclear policy. This policy must change from the top, and only the
president can drive that process. Nothing will change unless the president
wants it to change. American voters need to educate themselves on what the
presidential candidates think about nuclear weapons and what the candidates
will do if elected. So, we ask all of you who are eligible to vote in the 2020
US presidential election and thereafter: please vote as if your life depends on
it.
Today, with
the Cold War thirty years behind us, the United States still has massive
nuclear forces deployed to respond immediately to a surprise attack, and the
president has unchecked authority to start a nuclear war. US nuclear policy is
stuck in a time warp, essentially unchanged since the 1950s.
The framers
of the Constitution could not have foreseen the challenges that would be posed
by the atomic age, but they did understand the dangers of an unchecked
president. The bomb and how we manage it have caused great damage to American
democracy and security by undermining congressional authority and bestowing
superhuman powers to the commander in chief.
There is no
justifiable need to give any president the unilateral power to end the world
within minutes. As the bomb turns seventy-five, there is no better way to
reduce the danger of nuclear catastrophe than by getting rid of the nuclear
button.
We wrote this
book with the hope that by reframing how we think about the bomb’s past, we
could help change the bomb’s future. But that ultimately depends on you, the
reader. The public must get more actively involved if we expect our national
leaders to push for a new nuclear policy. We know this is possible, because we
have seen it happen before. The United States and Russia ended the first
nuclear arms race because of public pressure. The UN approved a global ban on
nuclear weapons because of public pressure. And we will end sole authority,
stop a new arms race, and build a safer world in the same way.
Today,
nuclear weapons pose the underappreciated danger to the very existence of our
civilization. No one of us alone can alter that reality, but together we can
act to give this vital issue the time and attention it rightly deserves.
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