Tuesday, 9 February 2021
How UK universities and nuclear power companies got into bed with the Chinese nuclear military establishment
On Sunday, the Mail on Sunday ran three pages of sensationalist revelations on British universities’ military relations with China. Under a strapline reading “China in the Dock”, the MoS banner headline over its investigation read “MI6 fears over universities’ links with Beijing goons.” They were reporting the essential findings of a new 115-page research report published yesterday by a conservative London-based think tank, CIVITAS, titled “Inadvertently Arming China? The Chinese military complex and its potential exploitation of scientific research at UK universities” (Inadvertently Arming China?: The Chinese military complex and its potential exploitation of scientific research at UK universities: 8 February 2021; https://www.civitas.org.uk/publications/inadvertently-arming-china/) Civitas argues that there is a “pervasive presence of Chinese military-linked conglomerates and universities in the sponsorship of high-technology research centres in many leading UK universities.” It media release records “In many cases, these UK universities are unintentionally generating research that is sponsored by and may be of use to China’s military conglomerates, including those with activities in the production of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMDs), including intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) as well as hypersonic missiles, in which China is involved in a new arms race and seeks ‘massively destabilising’ weaponry.” Much of this research is entirely based at UK universities, Civitas says, while other research outputs include cooperation with researchers in China, often at the military-linked universities or companies sponsoring the UK research centre. Many of the research projects will have a civilian use, and, the report asserts “UK-based researchers will be unaware of a possible dual use that might lead to a contribution to China’s military industries” The report’s authors are Dr Radomir Tylecote, Director of the Defence and Security for Democracy (DSD) Unit at Civitas. He is also Research Director of the Free Speech Union and a Fellow of the Institute of Economic Affairs. He has a PhD from Imperial College London and an MPhil in Chinese Studies from the University of Cambridge. Robert Clark is a Defence Fellow at the Henry Jackson Society (another conservative think-take, named after the former, whose research interests include defence technologies, alliance-building and the Transatlantic partnership, and authoritarian threats to the global order. He served in the British Army for nine years - including in Iraq and Afghanistan - and has an MA in International Conflict Studies from King's College London. The report finds that at least 15 UK universities have “productive research relationships” with Chinese military-linked manufacturers and universities, and reveals that much of the research at the university centres and laboratories is also being sponsored by the UK taxpayer through research councils, Innovate UK, and the Royal Society. The authors argue that this trend should be seen in the context of China’s stated aim to equal the US military by 2027; and to use advanced military technology to leapfrog the US by 2049, the centenary of the founding of the People’s Republic of China (PRC). This report analyses the relationships that at least 15 UK universities have established with 22 Chinese military-linked universities as well as weapons suppliers or other military-linked companies. Many of these Chinese universities are deemed “very high risk” by the Australian Strategic Policy Institute (ASPI). The authors find that “The methods by which the UK monitors and controls Chinese involvement in UK university research are, we suggest, inadequate.” The report spells out “a picture of strategic incoherence” suggesting that “China is demonstrating rapid technological-military development and growing force-projection capabilities.” To risk financing and enabling these developments suggests a lack of strategic coordination, the authors conclude. “This points to the need for a strategic reassessment for new rules for scientific research with PRC universities and companies, some of which should be applied directly to the UK’s research councils and universities, while some may require legislation.Other rules are needed for scientific research in wider potentially sensitive scientific fields generally and in universities in particular.” The authors also suggest the UK set up a new government organisation similar to the Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States (CFIUS), whose role would include monitoring and assessment of university sponsorship. Those measures should form part of an urgent reassessment of the security implications of the so-called ‘Golden Era’ policies towards China and the strategic assumptions that underpinned them. The authors explain the context of Chinese military expansionism and civil-military fusion thus: “Beijing has recently declared that China aims for the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) to be on a par with the US military by 2027. This would have deep and far-reaching consequences for security for the UK, other democracies, and UK allies. The rapid technological development of the PLA should also be set against the wider background of the increasingly hawkish strategy of and strategic thinkers around President Xi Jinping, as well as the authoritarian entrenchment of the state in China. Scholars have described Xi’s adherence to the concept of the ‘100-year marathon’, a strategic attempt to become a global hegemony by 2049, the centenary of the founding of the People’s Republic of China (PRC). 1 Research and development in next-generation military technology should be understood in this strategic context. Since the late 1990s, defectors have referred to new military technologies under development by the PLA for use ‘beyond Taiwan’. The aim, discussed by senior Chinese military figures, is to use advanced military technologies to leapfrog the United States in particular.2 This includes the capacity to launch devastating pre-emptive strikes or counterattacks aimed at destabilising enemy forces’ radar systems, orbital satellites, and command and control systems, including through the possible use of unconventional weapons and electronic warfare. This is underway amidst apparent ongoing confusion in British strategic thinking. While UK taxpayers fund research at universities that risks contributing to the development of China’s military, the UK’s R&D spending on its own defence is anaemic: Volkswagen alone spends more on R&D than the entire UK defence sector. Driving the Chinese growth in military technology is the mandated integration and joint development of military and civilian technology sectors, or ‘civil-military fusion’ , which Beijing hopes will give the PLA a leading edge in adapting emerging technologies in order to utilise them for military purposes, across technological fields. This means it is especially difficult to know that research for an apparently civilian business unit of a military-linked Chinese conglomerate, or for an apparently civilian-oriented department of a military- backed university, will not ultimately be put to military use. China has a long history of weapons proliferation to unstable, authoritarian regimes that systematically abuse human rights, a challenge which may be growing. China has supplied military materiel to the Syrian regime throughout the Syrian civil war; it has routinely supplied Burma with materiel including FN-6 surface-to-air missiles,4 107mm surface-to surface rockets,JF-17 aircraft, armoured vehicles, and possibly drones. In Afghanistan, Chinese weapons consistently make their way to the Taliban, including surface-to-air missiles and anti-aircraft guns. Chinese entities and companies are believed to have been involved in nuclear proliferation to Pakistan, Iran and North Korea. China’s military force-projection capacity is growing, and its military committing more resources to researching highly-destabilising materiel, such as directed-energy weapons and hypersonic missiles. China’s development of a surveillance state is already leading to systematic human rights abuses. The findings of this report do not detract from the value of the international scientific collaboration in which British universities participate and frequently lead, including with Chinese nationals, and should not be used to cast suspicion on Chinese researchers in the UK. However, that the Chinese military is liable to exploit some of the scientific research at UK universities that we describe, research which is often also sponsored by the UK taxpayer, demonstrates a lack of strategic coordination that is against the British national interest.” One Chinese research collaboration is with Cranfield University at Shrivenham, which is the home to Cranfield Defence and Security, a secure military site whose partners include the Atomic Weapons Establishment (AWE). A researcher at Cranfield’s Centre for Electronic Warfare, Information and Cyber (CEWIC) has a Chinese-funded project developing automated camera surveillance of people showing physical symptoms of stress. An expert in 12 Ibid. 18 Electro-Optics, he is a visiting professor at Nanchang HangKong University, where optoelectrics is a designated area of military research. Surrey University, based in Guildford, has partnered with the China Academy of Space Technology (CAST), a subsidiary of CASC, to develop 5G technology. Its parent company is a major part of China’s nuclear weapons programme. This formal relationship appeared after Max Lu became Vice Chancellor at Surrey. When she was Prime Minister, Theresa May subsequently appointed Lu to the Council for Science and Technology; he also sits on the boards of UKRI, the National Physical Laboratory and Universities UK, giving him considerable potential influence over UK research funding. Investigation at King’s College London has drawn attention to two pieces of Imperial College London research that it states will “certainly be of interest for military aircraft designers, as well as in civilian applications. These were ‘Structural Integrity Assessment of Additive Manufactured Products’ and ‘Impact testing of laminated glass and composites’, which used a high velocity gun system ‘relevant for nuclear weapons development’. Meanwhile, Imperial College told the Civitas researchers “We do not conduct any classified research.” Dr Xianwen Ran of the Chinese National University of Defense Technology (NUDT ) is described as a “productive researcher” with a professor who the University of Cambridge states is a Bye-Fellow of Gonville and Caius – a constituent college of the University of Cambridge – but not an employee of the University itself. Dr Ran recent papers (not in cooperation with the professor at Gonville and Caius) include: In December 2019, A method to optimize the electron spectrum for simulating thermo-mechanical response to x-ray radiation (‘The X-ray pulse originating from high altitude nuclear detonation (HAND) is mainly soft X-ray and its intensity is high enough [to] lead to severe thermo-mechanical deformation of unpenetrated material… It is possible to simulate [this] using the optimized electron spectrums. (https://www.researchgate.net/publication/338205287_A_Method_to_Optimize_the_Electron_Spectrum_for_ Simulating_Thermo-Mechanical_Response_to_X-ray_Radiation). The Bye-Fellow who is Ran’s research partner in separate fields is an “Associate member of the Cavendish Laboratory “, and a “Research Fellow at Imperial College London”, and is a “Distinguished Visiting Professor of NUDT” (his CV lists this position as having been from 2014 to 2017, however, at the time of writing, his online profile states that this continues). He remains a High-Level Foreign Talent, a position awarded by Beijing (this ‘comes with a long-term visa’), having been awarded membership of the so-called ‘1000-Talents plan’ in 2015. He remains a Distinguished Visiting Professor of China’s Central South University (he states that at CSU he carries out ‘research with engineers on better transportation systems and vehicles’). Before 1996, he was also a Fellow at the US defense research and development base at Los Alamos National Laboratory, run by the US Government’s Department of Energy. The 1000-Talents Plan exists to bring scientific expertise and knowledge to China, primarily by returning Chinese nationals: ‘The US Department of Energy… has been heavily targeted to this end… According to one report, “so many scientists from Los Alamos have returned to Chinese universities and research institutes that people have dubbed them the ‘Los Alamos club’”, according to Stephen Chen in ‘America’s hidden role in Chinese weapons research’, South China Morning Post, 29 March 2017. Another project sees Glasgow University having established a joint college with a major military-backed PRC university whose collaborations include with a Chinese nuclear warhead manufacturer, the Chinese Academy of Engineering Physics. One area that the authors do not highlight is the intended collaboration between nuclear weapons builder, China General Nuclear (CGN), on a giant nuclear power plant at Bradwell in Essex, called Bradwell B, modelled on the Chinese reactor design Hualong-1. There are clearly security–related issues raised by using a contractor-designer –financier- operator company, CGN, from China, which is intimately involved in its nuclear weapons programme, in a so-called commercial nuclear power plant development in the UK. There is an intriguing background to this UK-China nuclear collaboration. Nick Timothy, ex British Prime Minister Theresa May’s former joint chief of staff, was an open critic of David Cameron’s “golden era” relations with Beijing, who raised his concerns saying Chinese investment in sensitive sectors created security concerns. (”UK decision to delay Hinkley Point plant catches China by surprise,” The Guardian 30-31July 2016) He highlighted this potential problem originally in autumn 2015 on a Conservative web site blog( “The Government is selling our national security to China; 20 October 2015; (www.conservativehome.com/thecolumnists/2015/10/nick-timothy-the-government-is-selling-our-national-security-to-china.html) But the nuclear security problem is not at all theoretical. On 13 July 2016, in a coruscating critique of the ballooning costs and unreliability of UK nuclear power, the national financial watchdog, the National Audit Office issued report Nuclear power in the UK, (HC 511 SESSION 2016-17), in which it include the following observation in a section headed The challenges of nuclear power at para 2.11 “There are specific challenges in ensuring that nuclear power is on an equal footing in the market with other low-carbon technologies: Nuclear power plants have very high upfront costs and take a long time to build. Costs have increased in recent years given the extra safety considerations following the Fukushima disaster and increasing terrorist threats(emphasis added) ( https://www.nao.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2016/07/Nuclear-power-in-the-UK.pdf) A week earlier, on 7 July 2016, to no media attention at all, the official UK nuclear safety and security regulator, the Office for Nuclear Regulation, published its annual progress report. In a section headed Civil Nuclear Security (pages 37-38) it revealed : “ Overall, the civil nuclear sector met its security obligations. There are areas where the duty holder’s security arrangements did not fully meet regulatory expectations. (emphasis added) (http://www.onr.org.uk/documents/2016/annual-report-2015-16.pdf) ONR has since declined to elaborate what the problem is, on security grounds. However, in late July 2016, Mrs May’s former department, the Home Office, issued a report CONTEST, UK strategy for countering terrorism: annual report for 2015 with a section included on Resilience of Critical Infrastructure. Paragraph 2.57 of this report - which must have been prepared and signed off while Mrs May was still in charge of the Home Office - states: “We assess all risks to our Critical National Infrastructure, from flooding to cyberattack to terrorism, and work with operators to enhance our infrastructure security. We are reviewing infrastructure policing to ensure that the UK has the right capability to protect our national infrastructure and address national threats: which include nuclear power plants. (https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/539684/55469_Cm_9310_PRINT_v0.11.pdf) In Europe too, the nuclear terrorist spectre has been regularly raised by Europol, the EU’s Dutch-based counter- terror agency. In its 2016 annual report - issued on 20 July 2016 - it revealed under the chapter headed Chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear (CBRN) substances: “Nuclear power plants and nuclear weapon facilities in the EU also remain potential targets for terrorists.” (https://www.europol.europa.eu/content/211-terrorist-attacks-carried-out-eu-member-states-2015-new-europol-report-reveals) So what on earth was going on to provoke Mrs May, an incoming British Prime Minister, to start questioning a newly-established industrial partnership between the UK and China on nuclear technology, cultivated in the previous two years by her predecessor, David Cameron, and his Chancellor George Osborne ( who May sacked immediately on coming into office)? Nick Timothy wrote the following on on the ConservativeHome web site in October 2015, when he was still working for a conservative think tank: “Security experts – reportedly inside as well as outside government – are worried that the Chinese could use their role to build weaknesses into computer systems which will allow them to shut down Britain’s energy production at will. For those who believe that such an eventuality is unlikely, the Chinese National Nuclear Corporation – one of the state-owned companies involved in the plans for the British nuclear plants - says on its website that it is responsible not just for “increasing the value of state assets and developing the society” but the “building of national defence.” MI5 believes that “the intelligence services of…China…continue to work against UK interests at home and abroad.’” ( http://www.conservativehome.com/thecolumnists/2015/10/nick-timothy-the-government-is-selling-our-national-security-to-china.html) Ironically, at the beginning of September 2016, the United States Chamber of Commerce issued 116 page report on threats to international free trade in information technology, highlighting the role played by China’s national security laws to exclude US ( and others’) companies from selling into the Chinese market. The report notes: “While globalization of the ICT sector has been one of the most powerful drivers of global economic welfare during the past several decades, a number of factors—particularly at the policy level—are now threatening to slow or even reverse that trend. In particular, some national governments, by intentionally or unintentionally defining security concerns in an overly broad manner, are applying intense pressure on the ICT sector to localize rather than globalize. Such pressures are manifesting in laws and regulations that expressly require the indigenization of R&D, manufacturing, and/or assembly of products or localization of data, or that otherwise effectively preference products and services that localize assembly, source code development and storage, or the storage of data.” (Preventing Deglobalization, 1 September 2016 https://www.uschamber.com/sites/default/files/documents/files/preventing_deglobalization_1.pdf) The report states on national security threats: “The Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress (“NPC”) passed the country’s most comprehensive piece of national security legislation in July 2015, a sweeping National Security Law that establishes an expansive framework on security and that describes in broad terms how the country’s leadership understands its security interests. The new law’s breadth is evident in its assertion that China’s security interests extend far beyond its physical borders, even into the depths of the oceans, the Arctic, outer space, and, of course, cyberspace.102 It describes national security as encompassing political security, military security, social and cultural security, ecological security, agricultural security, and much more…… At the end of December 2015, the NPC Standing Committee enacted a Counter-Terrorism Law, which went into effect on January 1, 2016. Drafts of the law were originally released in November 2014 and February 2015 and attracted significant controversy. The Counter-Terrorism Law reinforces the government’s broad powers to investigate and prevent incidents of terrorism, and requires citizens and companies to assist and cooperate with the government in dealing with such matters. It also imposes new obligations on companies in certain sectors. Non-compliance or non-cooperation can lead to significant penalties, including fines on companies and criminal charges or detention for responsible individuals.” Writing in the The Wall Street Journal on 7 September 2016, Andrew Browne observed:” China plays by its own rules nowadays…. It bullies Washington’s regional friends and allies.. China is using national-security laws and other means to exclude U.S. technology companies from swaths of its vast market..” (“China’s Subtle War Against U.S. Dignity”; http://www.wsj.com/articles/chinas-subtle-war-against-u-s-dignity-1473151399) In light of the Chinese Government’s own stated security concerns and enacted law, it is worthwhile recalling how China abused s other states’ own security laws with its extensive overseas spying apparatus. A month earlier, the press extensively reported on an industrial espionage case involving a Chinese nuclear engineer. One report explained “In a 17-page indictment, the US government said nuclear engineer Allen Ho, employed by the China General Nuclear Power Company, and the company itself had unlawfully conspired to develop nuclear material in China without US approval and ‘with the intent to secure an advantage to the People’s Republic of China’”. (“Nuclear espionage charge for China firm with one-third stake in UK's Hinkley Point,” Guardian, 11 August 2016; https://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2016/aug/11/nuclear-espionage-charge-for-china-firm-with-one-third-stake-in-hinkley-point) Two months earlier, the US Justice Department had issued a press release, which recorded in part: “Kan Chen, 26, of Ningbo, China, in Zhejiang Province, was sentenced to 30 months in prison and three years of supervised release for conspiring to violate the Arms Export Control Act and International Traffic in Arms Regulations; attempting to violate the Arms Export Control Act and International Traffic in Arms Regulations; and violating the International Emergency Economic Powers Act. On June 16, 2015, Chen was arrested by HSI agents on the Northern Mariana Island of Saipan following an eight-month long investigation into his illegal conduct and has remained in custody. He pleaded guilty to the offenses listed above on March 2, 2016. “The United States will simply never know the true harm of Chen’s conduct because the end users of the rifle scopes and other technology are unknown,” said U.S. Attorney Oberly. “No matter their nationality, those individuals who seek to profit by illegally exporting sensitive U.S. military technology will be prosecuted. It is important that we take all necessary steps to prevent our military technology and equipment from being exported and possibly used against our service members and our allies overseas.” (“Chinese National sentenced to 30 months in prison for smuggling high tech US military hardware to China,” : June 29, 2016; https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/chinese-national-sentenced-30-months-prison-smuggling-high-tech-us-military-hardware-china But this is not a recent phenomenon: 21 years ago, the New York Times revealed under the headline “China Stole Nuclear Secrets For Bombs, U.S. Aides Say”, ( 6 March 1999; http://www.nytimes.com/1999/03/06/world/breach-los-alamos-special-report-china-stole-nuclear-secrets-for-bombs-us-aides.html) that “Working with nuclear secrets stolen from an American Government laboratory, China has made a leap in the development of nuclear weapons: the miniaturization of its bombs, according to Administration officials.” The New York Times published a detailed update on 26 September 2000, stating in part: “On March 6, 1999, The New York Times reported that Government investigators believed China had accelerated its nuclear weapons program with the aid of stolen American secrets. The article said the Federal Bureau of Investigation had focused its suspicions on a Chinese-American scientist at the Los Alamos National Laboratory. Two days later, the government announced that it had fired a Los Alamos scientist for ''serious security violations.'' Officials identified the man as Wen Ho Lee. Dr. Lee was indicted nine months later on charges that he had transferred huge amounts of restricted information to an easily accessible computer. Justice Department prosecutors persuaded a judge to hold him in solitary confinement without bail, saying his release would pose a grave threat to the nuclear balance. This month the Justice Department settled for a guilty plea to a single count of mishandling secret information. The judge accused prosecutors of having misled him on the national security threat and having provided inaccurate testimony. Dr. Lee was released on the condition that he cooperate with the authorities to explain why he downloaded the weapons data and what he did with it.” The story was followed up by the Guardian’s sister Sunday paper, The Observer, ran a detailed revelation headlined: "China steals US nuclear secrets,” 7 March 1999) with a follow up in August 1999 (“China Crisis, 22 August 1999; https://www.theguardian.com/theobserver/1999/aug/22/life1.lifemagazine2) In between times, the London Evening Standard ran a front page revelation from Washington on 25 May 1999 headlined “China’s army of spies in U.S.”- which unveiled China controlled several thousand ‘front companies’: “The 700-page [Congressional committee] document describes a massive and voracious theft of American know-how in addition to the recently well-publicised espionage that succeeded in stealing nuclear secrets from a supposedly secure weapons laboratory run by the US Energy Department. President Clinton has falsely claimed he was not told about the spying. The report discloses that China uses an extensive network of small and large businesses operated by Chinese nationals in the US to penetrate civilian technology centres. There may be more than 3,000 such firms, mainly concentrated in California and Massachusetts, which are connected to the Chinese espionage apparatus. China requires, as normal practice, that many of the thousands of students, tourists and other Chinese visitors to the US seek out information that might be used for military purposes. Christopher Cox, chairman of the committee which issued the report, says Chinese espionage has been going on for two decades, and continues.” Contemporary concerns over China undermining nuclear security thus have a detailed history. Regulating Nuclear Security The UK nuclear regulator, the Office for Nuclear Regulation (ONR), says it has “carefully considered the information” in Generic Design Assessment (GDA) – ‘Step 1 Entry Readiness Evidence Pack’ - and “judge that it is sufficient to demonstrate that GNS is ready to commence step 1 of GDA. GNS have put in place arrangements that should help ensure an effective and efficient start to a GDA of the UK HPR1000 reactor design and is committing resources consistent with our expectations. We therefore judge that the project appears viable and warrants the deployment of regulatory resource.” HOW DID ONR REACH ITS CONCLUSION OF READINESS? In the ONR document ‘New nuclear reactors: Generic Design Assessment Guidance to Requesting Parties’ (http://www.onr.org.uk/new-reactors/ngn03.pdf) [ONR-GDA-GD-001 Revision 3, dated September 2016], it states the following in an extract on Security documentation Security Assessment Principles (SyAPs) *SyAPs and associated supporting TAGs – as published in March 2017 - replace the National Objectives, Requirements and Model Standards. These will form the basis of ONR judgement of the GSR (Generic Security Report) Taking account of overseas regulator assessments 167 If a reactor design has been subject to assessment by nuclear regulators in other countries, ONR sees great value in being able to draw on such experience, as well as sharing its own experiences. This is an extension of the normal information exchanges that take place between national nuclear regulators through bilateral arrangements and via organisations such as the IAEA, the International Nuclear Regulators Association (INRA), and the Nuclear Energy Agency (NEA) of the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), in particular through its Committee on Nuclear Regulatory Activities (CNRA). In addition, ONR is participating in the work of the Multinational Design Evaluation Program (MDEP – see www.oecd‐nea.org/mdep) WHAT EXPERIENCE HAVE INRA AND NEA OF SECURING NUCLEAR SECURITY INFORMATION FROM CHINESE NUCLEAR COMPANIES? 168 Throughout the GDA process ONR will seek to take advantage of information arising from regulatory assessments of the design undertaken in other countries. ONR assesses on a sampling basis and therefore the availability of information from assessments carried out elsewhere may enable ONR to concentrate its attention on areas of the design specific to Great Britain. 169 However, it should be noted that it is the responsibility of the RP (= Requesting Party, ie CGN) to demonstrate the safety and security of its design, including highlighting and directing ONR to previous outputs and assessments of regulators in other countries, not for ONR to seek out and assemble information from such sources. 170 IAEA guidance states that even if a similar design has been authorised in another member state, the national regulatory body should still perform its own independent review and assessment (Ref. 17, paragraph 3.37; 17 Review and Assessment of Nuclear Facilities by the Regulatory Body. GS‐G‐1.2 IAEA 2002; www‐pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/Pub1128_scr.pdf). The Convention on Nuclear Safety, to which the UK is a signatory, states that each country must undertake safety assessment of its own nuclear facilities and make its own regulatory decisions about the safety of those facilities. In line with these international expectations, ONR therefore undertakes its own assessment of the generic safety case and comes to its own judgements. 171 ONR will not necessarily accept that a matter it judges to be of regulatory concern can be considered to be resolved simply because an overseas regulator has considered a similar issue and agreed its resolution. ONR may, as it considers necessary, test the robustness of such claims. ONR's position on this international context is given in Ref. 18.( 18 New nuclear power stations: Safety assessment in an international context June 2008. www.onr.org.uk/new‐reactors/ngn05.pdf) ANNEXES Summary • This report draws attention to the little-analysed but pervasive presence of Chinese military-linked conglomerates and universities in the sponsorship of high-technology research centres in many leading UK universities. • In many cases, these UK universities are unintentionally generating research that is sponsored by and may be of use to China’s military conglomerates, including those with activities in the production of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMDs), including intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) as well as hypersonic missiles, in which China is involved in a new arms race and seeks ‘massively destabilising’ weaponry. • Much of this research is entirely based at UK universities, while other research outputs include cooperation with researchers in China, often at the military-linked universities or companies sponsoring the UK research centre. • Many of the research projects will have a civilian use, and UK-based researchers will be unaware of a possible dual use that might lead to a contribution to China’s military industries. • This report illustrates how 15 of the 24 Russell Group universities and many other UK academic bodies have productive research relationships with Chinese military-linked manufacturers and universities. Much of the research at the university centres and laboratories is also being sponsored by the UK taxpayer through research councils, Innovate UK, and the Royal Society. • This should be seen in the context of China’s stated aim to equal the US military by 2027; and to use advanced military technology to leapfrog the US by 2049, the centenary of the founding of the People’s Republic of China (PRC). • Beijing’s strategy of ‘civil-military fusion’ means an integration of military and civilian industry and technology intended to give the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) a leading edge in adapting emerging technologies. We suggest that the existence of this strategy makes any claim to be able to reliably cooperate only with the civil branches of Chinese military-linked companies and universities less credible. • This report analyses the relationships that at least 15 UK universities have established with 22 Chinese military-linked universities as well as weapons suppliers or other military-linked companies. Many of these Chinese universities are deemed ‘Very High Risk’ by the Australian Strategic Policy Institute (ASPI). • This report includes statements from the UK institutions analysed: we are determined to be as fair to them as possible, and, provided they responded to our enquiries, the position of each is represented. We have also told those institutions we did not hear from that we will update the online version of this report, if and when they contact us. • Again in the interests of accuracy and fairness, we state here that a number of UK institutions took issue with our analyses. We have duly included their comments and reiterate that even so, in our view there remains the danger that research, which is carried out in good faith, may be co-opted and exploited by the Chinese military. 3 • We also wish to make clear that none of the academics, researchers, or other s staff whose research at UK universities or centres is discussed in this report are accused of knowingly assisting the development of the Chinese military, of knowingly transferring information to that end, or of committing any breach of their university regulations. Nor are they accused of any other wrongdoing, or breach of national security, or any criminal offence. • Sponsorship of high-technology research in UK universities covers areas such as: ▪ Metals and alloys; ▪ Aerospace physics and hypersonic technology; ▪ Ceramics, piezoelectrics and rare earths; ▪ Drones and radars; ▪ Shipbuilding; ▪ Data science, AI, and facial recognition; and ▪ Robotics (land, sea and space). Conclusions China has a long history of weapons sales to regimes that carry out grievous human rights abuses including Iran, Syria, Burma and North Korea. In addition, China’s development of a surveillance state is already leading to systematic human rights abuses, with its treatment of the Uighur minority described as genocide. The methods by which the UK monitors and controls Chinese involvement in UK university research are, we suggest, inadequate. The companies sponsoring UK-based research centres include China’s largest weapons manufacturers, including producers of strike fighter engines, ICBMs, nuclear warheads, stealth aircraft, military drones, tanks, military-use metals and materials, and navy ships. At its simplest, for the UK government and taxpayer to fund and assist the technological development and possibly the force-projection capabilities of the military of the People’s Republic of China is not in the British national interest. This is a picture of ‘strategic incoherence’. China is demonstrating rapid technologicalmilitary development and growing force-projection capabilities. To risk financing and enabling these developments suggests a lack of strategic coordination. This points to the need for a strategic reassessment for new rules for scientific research with PRC universities and companies, some of which should be applied directly to the UK’s research councils and universities, while some may require legislation. Other rules are needed for scientific research in wider potentially sensitive scientific fields generally and in universities in particular. Almost 200 academics from more than a dozen British universities could face jail amid probe over fears they inadvertently helped China develop weapons of mass destruction • Academics, from 20 universities, suspected of breaching Export Control Order • Law is designed to prevent sensitive intellectual property going to hostile states • The law carries a maximum 10 year prison sentence for those who breach it By JAMES ROBINSON FOR MAILONLINE and IAN BIRRELL and GLEN OWEN MAILONLINE: 13:12, 8 February 2021 https://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-9236123/Almost-200-academics-British-universities-face-jail-sending-information-China.html A group of almost 200 British academics from more than a dozen UK universities could face jail, as officials probe whether they may have unwittingly helped the Chinese government build weapons of mass destruction. Officials are investigating the academics amid suspicion they may have breached laws designed to protect national security and human rights. The academics, who are from 20 UK universities, including some of the most prestigious in the country, are suspected of breaching the Export Control Order 2008. The law carries a maximum 10 year prison sentence for those who breach it. It is intended to prevent intellectual property in highly sensitive fields - including military and security - from being sent to hostile states. Pioneering technology on aircraft, missile design and cyberweapons may have been sent to China, according to the Times. Officials are preparing to send around 200 enforcement notices to those suspected of breaching the rules, the reports add, though this has since been denied by a Government source. Meanwhile, a source told the Times: 'We could be seeing dozens of academics in courts before long. +7 • A group of almost 200 British academics from more than a dozen universities could face jail, as officials probe whether they may have unwittingly helped the Chinese government build weapons of mass destruction. Pictured: Library image showing A Dongfeng-41 intercontinental strategic nuclear missiles group formation +7 • Officials at HMRC (pictured: The HMRC Headquarters in London) are investigating the academics amid suspicion they may have breached laws designed to protect national security and human rights 'If even 10 per cent lead to successful prosecutions, we'd be looking at around 20 academics going to jail for helping the Chinese build super-weapons.' Boris Johnson's senior aide in conflict of interest row over China's new embassy A top aide to Boris Johnson has been caught up in a conflict of interest row over claims he helped broker a deal for China's new embassy on behalf of the Government while being paid by two of the companies involved. Lord Udny-Lister helped the Foreign Office lead talks with China over its £255million deal to buy Royal Mint Court - near to the Tower of London. But while working on the talks, which took place between 2017 and 2018, the-then Sir Edward Lister also worked for two of the companies involved in the deal, according to the Sunday Times. Lord Lister, 71, who is now Mr Johnson's chief strategy adviser in Downing Street, worked as a paid consultant for American commercial real estate giant CBRE. The company were hired by China to identify and buy a site for its new embassy. He was also a paid adviser to London property firm Delancey, who owned the Royal Mint Court, while the talks were in place, according to the Sunday Times. Both companies told the paper Lord Udny-Lister took no direct part in the negotiations. A spokesperson for CBRE told MailOnline: 'Sir Edward Lister did not have any involvement with CBRE on the Royal Mint Court transaction. 'He was employed as consultant with CBRE between October 2016 and December 2017.' A Government spokesperson told MailOnline: 'Sir Eddie Lister undertook this work as a Non-Executive Director of the FCO at the request of the government. There was no conflict of interest.' A Government spokesperson today told MailOnline: 'Exporters of military goods and those engaged in the transfer of military technology specified in the Export Control Order 2008 - including universities and academics - require a licence to export or transfer from the UK. 'It is their responsibility to comply with the regulations.' It comes as the Mail on Sunday revealed how the academics could be hit by 'enforcement notices' - imposed by Her Majesty's Revenue and Customs - over alleged breaches of export controls in their dealings with Beijing. It is understood the security services fear some academics have been sharing pioneering British technology could be facilitating the dictatorial Communist government's repression of minorities and dissidents. The MoS has agreed not to identify the universities at the centre of the inquiry on the grounds of national security. The security service investigation, led by HMRC, was launched amid growing concern in Downing Street that academics were engaged in a 'new gold rush' to strike deals with the Chinese over cutting-edge scientific breakthroughs. 'Exporters of military goods and those engaged in transfer of military technology specified in the Export Control Order 2008 – including universities and academics – require a licence to export or transfer from the UK,' said a Government spokesman. 'It is their responsibility to comply with the regulations.' Last week, Manchester University cancelled an agreement with a Chinese military technology company after being warned that it supplied technology platforms and apps used by Beijing's security forces in mass surveillance of Uighur Muslims. The university said it was unaware of China Electronics Technology Corporation's alleged role in the persecution of Uighurs until receiving a letter pointing out the links from the Commons foreign affairs select committee. Tom Tugendhat, chairman of the committee, writes in today's MoS that 'some in Britain's universities have lost their moral bearings and are not promoting academic freedom, but undermining our strategic interests.' The Tory MP argues that Britain is making a mistake to open up universities too much. 'We are handing over the secrets that will help an often-hostile country become the greatest military power of the 21st Century.' The Government investigation came after a report by the Henry Jackson Society last October criticised the Government for failing to prosecute any academics for export control violations. +7 • The study by think tank Civitas accuses 14 of the 24 top universities in the UK of having ties with Chinese weapons conglomerates and military-linked research centres involved in nuclear weapons schemes and developing futuristic technology. Pictured: A hyper-sonic test missile is launched by the US Navy +7 • Chinese troops take part in marching drills ahead of an October 1 military parade to celebrate the 70th anniversary of the founding of the People's Republic of China at a camp on the outskirts of Beijing, China, in 2019 Terrifying missiles so high-tech it's almost impossible to stop them HYPERSONICS China is spending huge sums to create hypersonic missiles that will go so fast (up to twenty times the speed of sound) that military chiefs believe they will be invulnerable to any form of defence. Indeed, some analysts fear that human capability to respond to such lethal weapons will be inadequate and that the only way to protect against them would be to rely on artificial intelligence and computer systems. Travelling several miles a second as they deliver surprise attacks within minutes of being launched, they have been described as a 'game-changer' for warfare. Although America, too, has such Star Wars-style weapons in development, General John E. Hyten, commander of US Strategic Command, told a Senate committee three years ago: 'We don't have any defence that could deny the employment of such a weapon against us.' Such missiles, capable of carrying nuclear warheads, would deliver precision attacks on people, vehicles and buildings. To test such weapons, the Beijing government said three years ago it was building a wind tunnel that simulated conditions up to 25 times the speed of sound. And a contractor has said it has carried out a six-minute test flight for a hypersonic missile. The complexities of developing hypersonics – using sophisticated sensors, guidance systems and innovative propulsion methods – have been compared to building the atomic bomb. GRAPHENE This is a revolutionary material with enormous defence and manufacturing potential. One atom thick and the thinnest and lightest material known to man, it conducts heat, absorbs light, stretches and is 200 times stronger than steel. It was invented by researchers in 2004 at Manchester University – with China's President Xi Jinping having made an official visit to their lab. Among its military applications are as coatings on ballistic missiles, wiring in hypersonic vehicles exposed to high temperatures, camouflage of vehicles and body armour for troops. Chinese reports suggest that the Z-10 attack helicopter – a rival to Boeing's Apache – has been equipped with graphene armour developed at the Beijing Institute of Aeronautical Materials. The institute has ties to three universities in Britain, where it collaborates on two centres specialising in research into the use of graphene in the aerospace industry. Chinese media have reported plans to use graphene coatings on military installations on artificial islands built in the South China Sea, an area where Beijing has controversially deployed Jin-class ballistic missile submarines armed with nuclear missiles. SPY TECHNOLOGY One of the most sinister recent trends in China has been the creation of a surveillance state that seeks to control 1.4 billion citizens through a constant watch over their movements, thoughts and words. People are tracked via a massive network of street cameras, facial recognition technologies, biometric data, official records, artificial intelligence and monitoring of online activities as mundane as things like shopping and takeaway food ordering habits. The most extreme example is in the Western province of Xinjiang, where Uighurs and other Muslim minorities are under 24/7 surveillance. Much of the network was developed by the state-owned China Electronics Technology Group Corporation, which supports work at four Chinese universities with ties to seven British universities. CHINESE UNIVERSITIES As part of President Xi's bid for China's global supremacy, he has employed a so-called 'military-civil fusion' strategy that involves universities playing a central role in maximising the country's military power. China's constitution also stipulates that all new technologies, even if developed by the private sector, must, by law, be shared with the People's Liberation Army. A key research institution is the National University of Defense Technology, in Hunan, which is controlled by the military and specialises in hypersonics, drones, supercomputers, radar and navigation systems. It has links with eight British universities, including a formal collaboration with one world-renowned seat of learning. Eight other UK universities have ties with the Beijing University of Aeronautics and Astronautics, which spends 60 per cent of its research budget on defence activities. Another important centre is the Harbin Institute of Technology. It has a joint research lab with the nation's leading ballistic missile manufacturer and has links with three British universities. DRONE SWARMS The Beijing government is developing swarms of 'suicide' drones to hover in the sky as they locate their target – while communicating with each other and co-ordinating their movements without any human input. This marks the next era of robotic warfare, with autonomous weapons replacing current drones that have to be pre-programmed or are remote-controlled. The United States and Israel are also working on such technology, while Britain, too, tested a swarm of 20 drones last month with sorties from RAF Spadeadam in Cumbria. The advanced technology uses computer algorithms – often modelled on biological studies of insects and fish – to create self-navigating drone squadrons. NUCLEAR WEAPONS In total, China is estimated to have 350 nuclear warheads, including 204 on operational long-range missiles fired from landbased launchers, 48 on submarines and 20 'gravity bombs' to be dropped from aircraft. A recent Pentagon report warned that, in its bid to catch up with Russia and the US, Beijing plans to double its nuclear arsenal over the next decade as part of President Xi's drive towards global dominance. Many of these weapons are being developed by China Aerospace Science and Technology Corporation, a massive state-owned conglomerate that has links with at least five UK universities. Independently, a report released tomorrow will expose the astonishing extent of collaboration taking place between British universities and Chinese academic centres, many with deep research links to the People's Liberation Army. The study by think tank Civitas accuses 14 of the 24 top universities in the UK of having ties with Chinese weapons conglomerates and military-linked research centres involved in nuclear weapons schemes and developing futuristic technology. It suggests scientific discoveries by our universities risk boosting China's drive for military supremacy by assisting its development of hypersonic missiles, radar jamming systems, robotics, spacecraft and stealth vehicles. British taxpayers are paying for research that might unintentionally help China's military soon attain a potentially dominant position,' said Radomir Tylecote, the study's lead author and a former Treasury official. 'This is strategically incoherent – especially when UK spending on research for its own military needs is so anaemic.' Civitas reveals the China Electronics Technology Corporation – which has admitted its purpose is to 'leverage' civilian electronic systems for the benefit of China's armed forces – backs work at four military-linked universities in the People's Republic with ties to seven British universities. The giant firm is seen as one of the main architects of Beijing's sinister surveillance state. The think tank report – entitled 'Arming China? The Chinese military complex and its potential exploitation of scientific research at UK universities' – examines the relationships that 20 UK universities have with 29 military-linked universities and nine military-tied firms, which include some of the country's biggest arms suppliers. A dozen of the Chinese universities have been deemed 'very high risk' by the Australian Strategic Policy Institute, while another ten are termed 'high risk'. Civitas, which stresses that all the British universities have benevolent intentions, turns the spotlight on some of the country's most famous academic institutions as concerns grow over China's increasing belligerence. The universities all insist their work is for wider benefit to society, that many research results are openly published in scientific literature and that they make strenuous efforts to comply with all rules designed to protect security and intellectual property. Cambridge University, the Civitas report says, has co-operated with the National University of Defense Technology, a military-run research institution that has been sanctioned by the US. Beijing has boasted this collaboration will 'greatly raise the nation's power in the fields of national defence, communications and… high precision navigation'. A Cambridge spokesman told the MoS: 'All of the university's research is subject to ethics governance and export control regulations.' Imperial College, another world-leading British scientific centre, has three research units sponsored by major Chinese weapons manufacturers. 'Science is a global endeavour, and we are proud to work with our peers in academia and industry all over the world,' said a spokesman. Civitas accuses Manchester University of having provided 'China's main nuclear missile conglomerate with a UK taxpayer-funded research centre'. A subsidiary of this firm – under US sanctions – also funds a unit at Strathclyde University, which plays a leading role in British space research. Manchester also co-operates with Chinese funders to exploit graphene, the revolutionary new material that won two of its researchers the Nobel Prize and is seen as having huge military potential given its immense strength and flexibility. Both Manchester and Strathclyde insist they work closely with relevant authorities to ensure they are fully compliant with all policies and export protocols. Queen Mary University of London has established a 'collaborative partnership' with China's Northwestern Polytechnical University (NPU), praising the 'particular strengths in aerospace and marine engineering' of a university that describes itself as 'devoted to improving and serving the national defence science and technology industry'. NPU has at least 13 defence laboratories into areas such as jet propulsion, space technology and torpedo guidance. 'We are proud of our transnational educational and research partnership with NPU,' said a Queen Mary spokesman, adding it followed 'rigorous procedures' regarding security and ethics. Southampton, according to the Civitas report, has links with Harbin Engineering University that were praised for helping the Chinese institution build a 'world class' position in naval architecture. It plays a key role in China's ambitions to build the world's biggest and best-equipped navy. A Southampton spokesman said their collaborations had 'potential to create wide-ranging societal benefits', adding that they followed Government advice and the Harbin partnership simply replicated their undergraduate studies. Harbin is also one of 15 Chinese civilian universities that have been implicated in cyber-attacks, illegal exports or espionage operations. China has a long history of weapons sales to some of the world's most repressive regimes such as Iran, Myanmar and North Korea. Lianchao Han, a former Chinese government official and now leading pro-democracy activist, said Beijing had long seen academic exchange programmes as a way to modernise its military through exploitation of open Western research institutions. 'China has invented all kinds of programs from inviting Western professors to lecture in the country through to hiring them for consulting work and funding joint research projects between universities. These schemes enable it to acquire dual-use technologies for both civilian and military gain and build a formidable army. Sadly, most Western universities and research institutions are shortsighted and still fail to see China's strategic intent.' British universities have looked increasingly to China as a source of income, having more Chinese students than any other country, paying £1.7 billion a year in tuition fees, and for research funding as they developed a network of academic links in both nations. Yet concerns have grown over such ties since hardline President Xi Jinping took power in 2013. He has ramped up nationalist rhetoric, spent massively on armed forces, silenced dissidents, unleashed genocide in Xinjiang and showed far more foreign policy aggression – as seen with China's brutal crackdown in Hong Kong. Many leading Chinese universities have long been linked to the military, whether through their own research labs or via funding from conglomerates – often state-owned – that dominate the country's weapons industry. These ties have been strengthened under Xi through a policy called 'military-civil fusion' designed to maximise military power. This includes a constitutional obligation for all new technologies to be shared with the 2,250,000-strong People's Liberation Army. China's Communist leadership is intent on matching US military might within six years – and then use advanced technology to win the battle for global supremacy by 2049, centenary of the founding of the People's Republic of China. +7 • The Beijing government is developing swarms of 'suicide' drones (file image) to hover in the sky as they locate their target – while communicating with each other and co-ordinating their movements without any human input The Civitas report calls for a register of Chinese firms and institutions with military ties that should be barred from supporting research in Britain, an audit of university sponsorship policies and a new agency to monitor academic relationships. One British defence contractor, who has removed all Chinese-made parts from his firm's products as a precaution in case of conflict, said he thought some universities might be missing the key point of rules designed to stop misuse of technology. 'People fall into the trap of arguing that they only designed the product for civilian use, neglecting the fact that the regulations say 'can be' used for military purposes.' TOM TUGENDHAT: Our academics are prostrating themselves to a Chinese regime guilty of genocide By Tom Tugendhat for Mail on Sunday China's ambassador to Britain, Liu Xiaoming, recently bade farewell to this country in characteristic style. Dwelling on golden memories of his time here, he recalled his 'humble part' in President Xi Jinping's state visit in 2015 and New Year's Eve parties on the banks of the Thames. He also mentioned the happy days when he was awarded honorary degrees in ceremonies at the Universities of Huddersfield and Nottingham. The details were telling. What had the Chinese ambassador done to merit these garlands? Here was a man who represented a country accused of genocide by our closest ally, the United States; whose state broadcaster has been refused a licence to disseminate propaganda in the UK; and whose companies are connected to an army that targets our innovations. He was certainly no natural friend to Britain. Sickening details of the persecution of Uighur Muslims – involving concentration camps, torture, sterilisation, brainwashing and rape – have been emerging for years. Yet Beijing's ambassador to Britain would blithely argue – albeit unconvincingly – that video footage allegedly showing vast numbers of blindfolded, shackled and shaven-headed Uighurs waiting to be led on to trains, was an everyday prisoner transfer. The next minute, he'd be given the red-carpet treatment by British universities. +7 • China's ambassador to Britain, Liu Xiaoming, recently bade farewell to this country in characteristic style Huddersfield University gave him an honorary doctorate in 2019 when a new Confucius Institute there opened, 'in partnership with the East China University of Science and Technology in Shanghai'. The focus of this tie-up was 'innovation in science and technology'. Meanwhile, His Excellency became an honorary Doctor of Law from Nottingham, urging his young audience to 'consolidate the China-UK Golden Era' and to 'handle differences with wisdom'. Such snapshots – and the murky web of financial deals they hint at – look increasingly like a sham. Why have Britain's universities been prostrating themselves so enthusiastically to the Chinese state that denies freedom of thought? The ugly truth is that some of our universities, a fundamental part of the UK's innovation-based economy, have been motivated by a mixture of naivety and greed. Among the most prestigious institutions in the UK are some which have been topping up their income with sponsorship from Chinese military and tech firms which, it should not need saying, have aims that run fully counter to our own. And these universities have been doing this while in receipt of billions in British taxpayer cash. The Commons foreign affairs committee, which I chair, has noted that despite 100,000 Chinese students at British universities, there has been precious little debate about China's influence on campuses, despite evidence that it is undermining academic freedom and closing down free debate on subjects such as Tibet and Taiwan. Even Universities UK, which represents our 140 universities, has warned of 'misappropriation of research output, including the seizing of research data and intellectual property'. Has UK-based research been used in the repression of minorities and democracy activists in China? I fear it is all but certain our universities have, perhaps only in part, become enablers in the crushing of dissent. +7 • Huddersfield University (pictured) gave him an honorary doctorate in 2019 when a new Confucius Institute there opened, 'in partnership with the East China University of Science and Technology in Shanghai' Three examples stand out from new research by Civitas. There are Cambridge's ties to China's National University of Defense Technology – an organisation sanctioned by the US over nuclear missile development. Also, Imperial College's research units, sponsored by Chinese weapons suppliers, including the Aviation Industry Corporation of China, which is designing the latest generation of stealth fighters. Finally, there are the Scottish centres, one of which is researching radar jamming with a military-linked laboratory in China. Make no mistake: these are some of the best universities not just in Britain, but in the world. They are at the cutting edge of research and attract the world's brightest students and teaching. Universities should collaborate with the private sector in research. For example, millions of us will benefit from the partnership between Oxford and AstraZeneca to produce a vaccine for Covid-19. But in the race to stay ahead, it is obvious some in Britain's universities have lost their moral bearings and are not promoting academic freedom, but undermining our strategic interests. In opening the doors of our universities to China, we are bargaining away our competitive advantage – and, for a price, handing over the secrets that will help an often-hostile country become the greatest military power of the 21st Century. University leaders must recognise that the great hope of the past two decades – that China was steadily opening up politically as its economy became more competitive – has been dashed. A Maoist personality cult has been established around President Xi, with his personal 'thought' inserted into China's constitution, to be studied by all. He has allowed what Foreign Secretary Dominic Raab has called a 'grievous attack on Hong Kong's rights and freedoms' by ordering the mass arrest of politicians and activists. Freedom is being crushed so blatantly that the UK is giving many of Hong Kong's residents – all British passport-holders – the right to live and work here. Universities need to wake up to these abuses. The Government must introduce rules that govern the research British higher education institutions carry out with Chinese involvement, sponsorship or support. Particular attention must be paid to science and technology, where it is clear our competitive advantage is being handed to a strategic adversary. It seems Xi has learned from Lenin – the capitalist really will sell you the rope you use to hang him. Or in our case, design it.