Thursday, 13 October 2016

Nuclear warhead transport hazards have got worse

Letter sent to The Western Mail:


Your chief political correspondent, Martin Shipton, does the people of Wales a service in exposing the secret transport of military nuclear materials through or over  many Welsh council areas.(Nuclear weapons material passes through or over 13 council areas in Wales: Politicians are demanding the Ministry of Defence explains why (13 October)[ http://www.walesonline.co.uk/news/politics/nuclear-weapons-material-passes-through-12010995]

In fact concern over such transports in the UK  have been raised in Parliament  by Welsh and other MPs for a quarter of a century.

For example, former Plaid MP Cynog Dafis – for whom I then did some specialist research - was told in a series of replies by the Ministry of Defence in May 1993:

“The Public Information for Radiation Emergencies Regulations 1992 require that prior information be supplied to members of the public who are likely to be in an area in which they are liable to be affected by a reasonably foreseeable radiation emergency. In the case of nuclear weapon transport, the likelihood of an accident affecting any individual member of the public is so extremely remote that prior supply of information is not required. “(Radiation Warnings, Hansard, 20 May 1993)

Earlier in the same month, the MOD refused to reveal the “secret emergency plans dealing with nuclear weapon transport accidents” (Hansard,  Nuclear Weapons Transport, 6 May 1993

A month earlier, the MOD told Nigel Jones M: “ Regular exercises of varying scale are sponsored by the Ministry of Defence to enable departmental and other staffs to practise the response to a nuclear transport accident,” adding  “Local civil police forces are always notified at least 24 hours in advance of nuclear weapon convoy movements through their area of responsibility. It is the accepted practice nationally that the civil police will co-ordinate the response of the other emergency services to all serious incidents and they would fulfil this same role in the event of an accident involving a nuclear weapon convoy.(Nuclear Weapons, Hansard,  1 April 1993)


A new report, “Nukes of Hazard” on these important safety  and security matters, demonstrating how the dangers have increased since these MPs raised questions in Parliament,  has just been released by the UK chapter of the International Campaign to Abolish Nuclear Weapons (ICAN), and may be accessed via this web site: http://nukesofhazard.co.uk/

Wednesday, 12 October 2016

Have all 'remain' MPs been asleep over Brexit threat to Parliamentary democracy?


Conservative brexiteer, Stephen Phillips MP, made an interesting argument  in support of Parliamentary accountability of Brexit (“Gagging parliament on Brexit is a breach of our constitution,” 12 October, https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2016/oct/11/we-voted-brexit-keep-parliament-sovereign-wont-be-gagged )
In parliament on Monday and Wednesday many MPs – Mr Philips, Nick Clegg (LibDem), Andrew Tyrie (Tory), and Ed Miliband (Labour), to name but a few- stood up and demanded Parliament have its rightful say on the terms of the UK’s exit from the EU, especially as one of the key arguments put forward by the Brexiteers was to  restore sovereignty of the British Parliament to make decisions.
One week after the Brexit referendum, at the end of June, Green Party leader Caroline Lucas MP tabled the following Early Day Motion calling for this very thing:

“That this House believes the next steps arising from the outcome of the EU referendum must be subject to proper parliamentary scrutiny and therefore that the Government should not submit its declaration to the European Council invoking Article 50 of the Lisbon Treaty unless and until the full proposals it intends to submit to the Commission to activate the process of withdrawal from the EU are debated in full and voted upon by Parliament” ( EDM 269; http://www.parliament.uk/edm/2016-17/269)
Yet only 18 MPs backed theEDM, but none of those complaining this week did. I wonder why not.

Wednesday, 5 October 2016

Trident: money trees sprouting everywhere

On Monday I heard the Chancellor Philip Hammond at the Conservative party conference poke fun at Jeremy Corbyn - and his shadow Treasury team - suggesting he is spending time watering his 'money tree' to pay for the infrastructure investments Labour outlined last week in their own conference in Liverpool.


Your exclusive front page story on Wednesday (Daily Mirror, 5 Oct) complained that the MOD plans to use  French steel  for the massively expensive Trident  nuclear powered and nuclear armed submarine, announced on Tuesday by Defence Secretary, Michael Fallon, who added Labour have "just re-elected a Leader who wants to scrap our nuclear weapons."( http://blogs.spectator.co.uk/2016/10/full-text-michael-fallons-tory-party-conference-speech/)

I wonder what tree Mr Hammond is watering to pay for the £205,000,000,000 ( £205 billion) cost of replacing the Trident nuclear WMD system the Conservative Government is determined to do. Mr Corbyn, meanwhile, is against spending a penny on the mass murder system.


The trades unions complaining about the outsourcing of the steel contract to France should be campaigning for British steel to be used in new renewable energy technologies like wave and tidal turbines, plus  offshore wind power generation, not backing such a huge amounts of taxpayers' money being squandered on a deadly new weapon of mass destruction.






Tuesday, 27 September 2016

You cannot be simultaneously for and against Trident WMD renewal

I never thought I would agree with US Presidential candidate, Republican Donald Trump, and disagree with a shadow minister in Jeremy Corbyn’s shadow cabinet, but on Monday I did, on nuclear WMDs.
Trump said in the Presidential debate in New York on Monday  “I agree with her [Hillary Clinton] on one thing. The single greatest problem the world has is nuclear armament, nuclear weapons.” (New York Times, 27 September 2016; http://www.nytimes.com/2016/09/27/us/politics/transcript-debate.html)
Meanwhile, Labour shadow defence secretary, Clive Lewis, controversially said at the Labour Party conference on the same day: “I am clear our party has a policy for Trident renewal.”(Labour defence chief accepts nukes policy: CND dismayed at continued Trident support, " Morning Star, September 27; http://www.morningstaronline.co.uk/a-2655-Labour-defence-chief-accepts-nukes-policy#.V-pWN-QVCM8)
Later,  on BBC’s  Newsnight John McDonnell put forward the nonsensical justification that Labour could have a policy in favour of renewing Trident, while he as shadow Chancellor and Jeremy Corbyn as leader, could continue to oppose it.
That is untenable, as the leader of the Labour Party cannot campaign in a general election against something included in his party’s manifesto for the  election.
The issue cannot be “parked" as Lewis and McDonnell have intimated to various media; it has to be decided.
Publishing the review of Trident, security and defence issues, to which many Labour members contributed in good faith in the spring, would be a good start.

Monday, 26 September 2016

Fracking and cancer


On the day the Labour shadow energy secretary Dr Barry Gardiner announced at Labour's annual conference in Liverpool that Labour would ban fracking if returned to government, I sent this letter to The Times:
Your environment editor reports that the Advertising Standards Authority has adjudicated that Friends of the Earth (FoE) has “failed to substantiate claims that fracking could cause cancer.” (“Fracking scare stories condemned by watchdog,” September 26;

)
This is true, but does not mean fracking does not cause cancer. FOE made claims, rebutted by the ASA, that “studies show that 25 per cent of fracking chemicals could cause cancer.” But the cancer concern remain because of radon in the natural gas inevitably released by the hydraulic fracturing (“fracking”) process.

The heath watchdog, Public Health England, warned in a report published three years ago “If the natural gas delivery point were to be close to the extraction point with a short transit time, radon present in the natural gas would have little time to decay … there is therefore the potential for radon gas to be present in natural gas extracted from UK shale.”

(‘Shale gas extraction: review of the potential public health impacts of exposures to chemical and radioactive pollutants,’ 30 October 2013; https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/shale-gas-extraction-review-of-the-potential-public-health-impacts-of-exposures-to-chemical-and-radioactive-pollutants-draft-for-comment)

This is confirmed by research published in the United States by the Johns Hopkins Bloomberg School of Public Health that found levels of radon in Pennsylvania homes – where 42 percent of readings surpass what the U.S. government considers safe – have been on the rise since 2004, around the time that the fracking industry began drilling natural gas wells in the state. (‘Increased Levels of Radon in Pennsylvania Homes Correspond to Onset of Fracking’, April 9, 2015; www.jhsph.edu/news/news-releases/2015/increased-levels-of-radon-in-pennsylvania-homes-correspond-to-onset-of-fracking.html)

Radon is unquestionably the leading cause of lung cancer in non-smokers.  A report produced by the UK Health Protection Agency in 2009, ‘Radon and Public Health:’ Report of an independent Advisory Group on Ionising Radiation (Docs RCE 11, HPA 2009: www.hpa.org.uk) states:
“Radon is a naturally occurring colourless and odourless radioactive gas that can seep out of the ground and build up in houses, buildings, and indoor workplaces. Epidemiological studies have established that exposure to radon is a cause of lung cancer, with a linear dose-response relationship. Exposure to radon is now recognised as the second largest cause of lung cancer in the UK after smoking and analysis for the Health Protection Agency indicates that about 1100 UK deaths from lung cancer each year are caused by exposure to radon (most caused jointly by radon and smoking.” (emphasis added)
 
 
 
 
 
 

 
 
 




 
 
 
 
 


 
 
 
 
 

Saturday, 17 September 2016

Dr Clark's confusion over Hinkley C

One of the most disturbing aspects of the Hinkley C decision is the cabinet minister responsible for delivering the project, business, energy and industrial strategy secretary Dr Greg Clark – in office only since 14 July this year- is demonstrably ignorant of his own department’s brief and policies.
His 1992 doctorate from the London School of Economics (LSE), which  also attended,  is entitled, The effectiveness of incentive payment systems: an empirical test of individualism as a boundary condition.

As someone whose own 1986 doctorate was entitled Nuclear Powers, on how nuclear reactor choices were made 1955-1979, and who has worked on nuclear energy policy ever since 1980,including three years on Dr Clark’s predcessor, (now Sir) Ed Davey’s Geological Disposal Implementation Board for radioactive waste (2012-14), let me challenge some of his more egregious errors in his statement to Parliament  on Hinkley C on 15 September.
( http://hansard.parliament.uk/commons/2016-09-15/debates/16091527000002/HinkleyPointC)

In his statement he asserted: “Unlike in the past, the long-term decommissioning costs for the plant will be provided for explicitly as part of the funded decommissioning programme, and at a level that has been assessed independently as prudent and conservative.”

This is both misleading and inaccurate.

I have been involved for over seven years in the development of the complex process (including consultation round tables, consultation documents and discussion for a run by Government) determining how future radioactive waste costs wil lbe paid.
 
The bottom line is a cap on costs for nuclear plant owner/operators  has been agreed, so if the costs go above the agreed cap, and are not covered bythe extra insuranc epremium paid by the company,  unfortunate future taxpayers will have to meet the extra costs. Dr Clark surely should know this; as should his special advisors.
He also told Labour  MP Ben Bradshaw “. [Hinkley C] is a good deal that will secure 7% of our energy into the future. “

This is totally inaccurate: if Hinkley C  works to plan - a big if -  it will provide around 7% of the national electricity demand, equivalent to about 1.5% of total energy demand. Dr Clark thus significantly over inflates the project’s importance.

It is just as disappointing that shadow energy secretary, Dr Barry Gardiner- a philosopher and insurance expert  by background -  acted as a cheerleader for Hinkley C , not an opponent ( which is actually Labour policy), in responding to Dr Clark in Parliament.

 

Monday, 12 September 2016

China’s insecure history of nuclear spying


Some time later this month the prime minister will make a decision on whether the  alleged security concerns raised over Chinese investment in, and technological development of, the planned Hinkley C and Bradwell B new nuclear plants respectively.

We know her chief policy advisor, Nick Timothy wrote on the Conservative Home web site last October, when working for a conservative think tank:

“Security experts – reportedly inside as well as outside government – are worried that the Chinese could use their role to build weaknesses into computer systems which will allow them to shut down Britain’s energy production at will. For those who believe that such an eventuality is unlikely, the Chinese National Nuclear Corporation – one of the state-owned companies involved in the plans for the British nuclear plants - says on its website that it is responsible not just for “increasing the value of state assets and developing the society” but the “building of national defence.” MI5 believes that “the intelligence services of…China…continue to work against UK interests at home and abroad.’” (“The Government is selling our national security to China“, 20 October 2015; http://www.conservativehome.com/thecolumnists/2015/10/nick-timothy-the-government-is-selling-our-national-security-to-china.html)

Ironically, at the beginning of the month, the United States Chamber of Commerce issued 116 page report on threats to international free trade in information technology, highlighting the role played by China’s national security laws to exclude US ( and others’)  companies from selling into the Chinese market. The report notes:

 

 “While globalization of the ICT sector has been one of the most powerful drivers of global economic welfare during the past several decades, a number of factors—particularly at the policy level—are now threatening to slow or even reverse that trend.

In particular, some national governments, by intentionally or unintentionally defining security concerns in an overly broad manner, are applying intense pressure on the ICT sector to localize rather than globalize. Such pressures are manifesting in laws and regulations that expressly require the indigenization of R&D, manufacturing, and/or assembly of products or localization of data, or that otherwise effectively preference products and services that localize assembly, source code development and storage, or the storage of data.”  Preventing Deglobalization, 1 September 2016 https://www.uschamber.com/sites/default/files/documents/files/preventing_deglobalization_1.pdf

 

The report states on national security threats: “The Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress (“NPC”) passed the country’s most comprehensive piece of national security legislation in July 2015, a sweeping National Security Law that establishes an expansive framework on security and that describes in broad terms how the country’s leadership understands its security interests.

The new law’s breadth is evident in its assertion that China’s security interests extend far beyond its physical borders, even into the depths of the oceans, the Arctic, outer space, and, of course, cyberspace.102 It describes national security as encompassing political security, military security, social and cultural security, ecological security, agricultural security, and much more……

At the end of December 2015, the NPC Standing Committee enacted a Counter-Terrorism Law, which went into effect on January 1, 2016. Drafts of the law wereoriginally released in November 2014 and February 2015 and attracted significant controversy. The Counter-Terrorism Law reinforces the government’s broad powers to investigate and prevent incidents of terrorism, and requires citizens and companies to assist and cooperate with the government in dealing with such matters. It also imposes new obligations on companies in certain sectors. Non-compliance or non-cooperation can lead to significant penalties, including fines on companies and criminal charges or detention for responsible individuals.”

Writing in the The Wall Street Journal on 7 September, Andrew Browne observed:” China plays by its own rules nowadays…. It bullies Washington’s regional friends and allies.. China is using national-security laws and other means to exclude U.S. technology companies from swaths of its vast market..” (“China’s Subtle War Against U.S. Dignity”; http://www.wsj.com/articles/chinas-subtle-war-against-u-s-dignity-1473151399

In light of the Chinese Government’s own stated security concerns and enacted law, it is worthwhile recalling how China abused s other states’ own security laws with its extensive overseas spying apparatus.

A month ago the press extensively reported on an industrial espionage case involving  a Chinese nuclear engineer. One report explained “In a 17-page indictment, the US government said nuclear engineer Allen Ho, employed by the China General Nuclear Power Company, and the company itself had unlawfully conspired to develop nuclear material in China without US approval and ‘with the intent to secure an advantage to the People’s Republic of China’”. (“Nuclear espionage charge for China firm with one-third stake in UK's Hinkley Point,” Guardian, 11 August 2016; https://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2016/aug/11/nuclear-espionage-charge-for-china-firm-with-one-third-stake-in-hinkley-point)

Two months ago the US Justice Department issueda press release, which recorded in part”

“Kan Chen, 26, of Ningbo, China, in Zhejiang Province, was sentenced to 30 months in prison and three years of supervised release for conspiring to violate the Arms Export Control Act and International Traffic in Arms Regulations; attempting to violate the Arms Export Control Act and International Traffic in Arms Regulations; and violating the International Emergency Economic Powers Act.

On June 16, 2015, Chen was arrested by HSI agents on the Northern Mariana Island of Saipan following an eight-month long investigation into his illegal conduct and has remained in custody.  He pleaded guilty to the offenses listed above on March 2, 2016.

“The United States will simply never know the true harm of Chen’s conduct because the end users of the rifle scopes and other technology are unknown,” said U.S. Attorney Oberly.  “No matter their nationality, those individuals who seek to profit by illegally exporting sensitive U.S. military technology will be prosecuted.  It is important that we take all necessary steps to prevent our military technology and equipment from being exported and possibly used against our service members and our allies overseas.”

(“Chinese National sentenced to 30 months in prison for smuggling high tech US military hardware to China,” :  June 29, 2016; https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/chinese-national-sentenced-30-months-prison-smuggling-high-tech-us-military-hardware-china

But this is not a recent phenomenon: Seventeen years ago, the New York Times revealed under the headline “China Stole Nuclear Secrets For Bombs, U.S. Aides Say”, ( 6 March 1999; http://www.nytimes.com/1999/03/06/world/breach-los-alamos-special-report-china-stole-nuclear-secrets-for-bombs-us-aides.html) that “Working with nuclear secrets stolen from an American Government laboratory, China has made a leap in the development of nuclear weapons: the miniaturization of its bombs, according to Administration officials.”

The New York Times published a detailed update on September 26, 2000, stating in part:

“On March 6, 1999, The New York Times reported that Government investigators believed China had accelerated its nuclear weapons program with the aid of stolen American secrets. The article said the Federal Bureau of Investigation had focused its suspicions on a Chinese-American scientist at the Los Alamos National Laboratory. Two days later, the government announced that it had fired a Los Alamos scientist for ''serious security violations.'' Officials identified the man as Wen Ho Lee. Dr. Lee was indicted nine months later on charges that he had transferred huge amounts of restricted information to an easily accessible computer. Justice Department prosecutors persuaded a judge to hold him in solitary confinement without bail, saying his release would pose a grave threat to the nuclear balance. This month the Justice Department settled for a guilty plea to a single count of mishandling secret information. The judge accused prosecutors of having misled him on the national security threat and having provided inaccurate testimony. Dr. Lee was released on the condition that he cooperate with the authorities to explain why he downloaded the weapons data and what he did with it.”

The story was followed up by the Guardian’s sister Sunday paper, The Observer, ran a detailed revelation headlined: "China steals US nuclear secrets,” 7 March 1999) with a follow up in August 1999 (“China Crisis, 22 August 1999; https://www.theguardian.com/theobserver/1999/aug/22/life1.lifemagazine2)

In between, the London Evening Standard ran a front page revelation from Washington on 25 May that year “China’s army of spies in U.S.”- which unveiled China controlled several thousand ‘front companies’: “The 700-page [Congressional committee] document describes a massive and voracious theft of American know-how in addition to the recently well-publicised espionage that succeeded in stealing nuclear secrets from a supposedly secure weapons laboratory run by the US Energy Department. President Clinton has falsely claimed he was not told about the spying.

The report discloses that China uses an extensive network of small and large businesses operated by Chinese nationals in the US to penetrate civilian technology centres. There may be more than 3,000 such firms, mainly concentrated in California and Massachusetts, which are connected to the Chinese espionage apparatus.

China requires, as normal practice, that many of the thousands of students, tourists and other Chinese visitors to the US seek out information that might be used for military purposes. Christopher Cox, chairman of the committee which issued the report, says Chinese espionage has been going on for two decades, and continues.”

Today’s concerns over China undermining nuclear security thus have a detailed history