The evidence from UK ministers and officials in theForeign Office ( who
are nominally in charge of disarmament
and arms control policy), brazenly justifying British retention of nuclear WMDs,
while excoriating any other states aspiring to
obtain nuclear weapons for their own national defence, is stunningly and
repetitiously hypocritical.
Here are some characteristic extracts cited by the report:
173.The FCO said that “Maintaining and
renewing elements of a State’s nuclear deterrent capability to ensure its
continued safety and reliability, including through replacement and updating of
obsolete elements of the system as they reach the end of their operational
life” was “a necessary aspect of being a responsible nuclear weapon state.”
This was “fully consistent with obligations under the Article 6 of the Nuclear
Non-Proliferation Treaty.”295
186.Ms Price* said that “as a responsible
nuclear-weapons state, as long as we possess weapons we need to maintain them
to make sure that they are in good condition and that we have the right
arsenal for our legitimate deterrent and self-protection defence. We also
need to ensure that anything obsolete is renewed.”319(emphasis
added)*Sarah Price, Head of Counter Proliferation and Arms Control Centre,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office
This
self-serving hypocrisy was rightly and roundly criticized n by several high
status witnesses, as follows
176.Scientists for Global Responsibility said
that “Any and all renewal or nuclear ‘modernisation’ programmes fundamentally
undermine nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation regimes”.302 From
the perspective of Non-Nuclear Weapon States, Mr Kmentt** said that none of the
Nuclear Weapon States had taken “significant steps to move away from their
reliance on nuclear weapons”.303
**Alexander Kmentt, former Director, Department for Disarmament,
Arms Control and Non-Proliferation, Austrian Federal Ministry for Europe,
Integration and Foreign Affairs
188.Ms Fihn***, however, was “disappointed in
the UK’s modernisation programmes of its nuclear weapons”.322 Dr
Ritchie**** said “the fact that we are recapitalising our Trident SSBN
programme and recommitting to nuclear deterrence for another generation,
talking of being a nuclear armed state into the 2070s and 2080s and
revalidating the importance and centrality of nuclear weapons for our security,
cannot but undermine anything that we may do to show that we are taking
short-term to long-term nuclear disarmament seriously.”323
*** Beatrice Fihn, Executive Director,
International Campaign to Abolish Nuclear Weapons (ICAN), winners of the 2016
Nobel Peace Prize; ****Dr Nick Ritchie, Lecturer (International Security),
University of York.
My own submission to the Committee
is not cited at all by the peers, I suspect because it was so uncompromisingly
critical of successive UK Government policy on nuclear weapons of mass
destruction, and many peers still sadly harbor after the 1950s era of
British nuclear missiles ‘with a Union
Jack on the top.’
Here is
an extract of my evidence giving historical context for UK serial non-
compliance with the NPT nuclear disarmament requirements on NPT signatory
states, including its depositary states such as the UK.
“Up to 1968 that was a
national security decision purely the responsibility of the Government of the
day. Post 1968 when the UK signed the NPT, the UK possession and deployment his
was no longer solely a UK national security issue, but an international legal
nuclear disarmament obligation.
Let me demonstrate,
using materials extracted from British Official diplomatic papers I discovered
in the British National Archives the differences between British official
disarmament promises recorded for posterity and contrast those with the
subsequent belligerent nuclear practice of development and deployment
of Polaris and its replacement Trident nuclear WMD systems, in violation
of clear NPT commitments and on-the-record pledges.
A
memorandum prepared by the Foreign Office in advance of the visit to London of
the then Soviet premier, Alexei Kosygin, in February 1967, included the
following final paragraph:
“We assume that the Soviet Union
regard, as we do, the proposed review conference (for the NPT) as being an
adequate assurance to the non-nuclears that the military nuclear powers
are serious about the need for action on nuclear disarmament.”
Nearly
a year later, on 18 January 1968, Fred Mulley MP, the then Labour Minister of
State for Disarmament at the Foreign Office, told the 358th Plenary meeting of the Eighteen Nation
Disarmament Committee (ENDC) - the forerunner to the present day UN
Committee on Disarmament (CD) - in respect of the then proposed Article 6
of the nascent NPT:
“My
own Government have consistently held that the [Nuclear Nonproliferation]
Treaty should and must lead to such [nuclear ]
disarmament.” (emphasis added).
He added:” If it is fair to describe
the danger of proliferation as an obstacle to disarmament, it is equally fair
to say that without some progress in disarmament, the NPT will not last….As I
have made clear in previous speeches my Government accepts the obligation to
participate fully in the negotiations required by Article 6 and it is our
desire that these negotiations should begin as soon as possible
(emphasis added) and should produce speedy and successful results. There is no
excuse now for allowing a long delay to follow the signing of this Treaty, as
happened after the Partial Test Ban Treaty, before further measures can be
agreed and implemented.”
Mr Mulley subsequently wrote a
confidential memorandum to the British Cabinet Defence and Overseas Policy
Committee (OPD(68)6), on 26 January 1968, in which he set out the then policy
position on NPT article 6 (which at this stage in negotiations did not yet
include the clause “at an early date”):
“A number of countries may withhold
their ratification of the Treaty until the nuclear weapon states show they are
taking seriously the obligations which this Article imposes upon them. It
will therefore be essential to follow the Treaty up quickly with further
nuclear disarmament measures (emphasis added) if it is to be
brought into force and remain in force thereafter.”
If we leap forward nearly, nearly forty
years, we can see what the then New Labour Foreign Office ministers thought
about the status of British nuclear disarmament under the NPT.
On 10 March 2007, the then Foreign
Secretary had a Letter to the Editor published in The Times, under the
headline ‘Is Mr Gorbachev’s concern over Trident misplaced’ responding to an
earlier letter published on 8 March, from former Soviet Union President Mikhail
Gorbachev. Inter alia, She wrote:
“[By replacing Trident we will] simply enable
the UK to maintain a deterrent until we can achieve our continuing objective of
a world free of nuclear weapons.”
She later added:
“…We continue to encourage Russia and
the US to make further bilateral [nuclear disarmament] progress. They are still
some way from the point at which the part of the global stockpile that
belongs to the UK (less than 1 percent) would need to be included
in such negotiations.”
A
few weeks later in early May 2007 in Vienna, the then British Disarmament
Ambassador, Foreign Office diplomat l John Duncan presented the UK submission
to the NPT preparatory committee, asserting: "The United Kingdom is
absolutely committed to the principles and practice of multilateral nuclear
disarmament. Our ultimate goal remains unchanged: we will work towards a safer
world free from nuclear weapons - and we stand by our unequivocal undertaking
to accomplish their total elimination."
He
went on to claim that the UK "continues to support the disarmament
obligations set out in Article 6 of the Treaty [NPT] and has an excellent
record in meeting these commitments."
This
was, and remains, a contestable claim, as the Article 6 that the ambassador
invoked requires the nuclear weapons states signed up to the NPT "to
pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to cessation
of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament, and on a
Treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict and effective
international control."
Not
one UK nuclear weapon or warhead had, or has since, been withdrawn from
operational service as a result of multilateral disarmament negotiations in the
50 years of the NPT, as was confirmed in a written reply on 16 May 2007
by the then defence secretary Des Browne MP ( a recent witness before this
committee inquiry as Lord Browne), who told the independent MP Dai Davies
in a written reply: “None of the [nuclear weapons reductions since 1998 ]
have taken place as a result of any separate multilateral disarmament
negotiations.”
And
then, as now, nearly 12 years on, none of Britain's nuclear arsenal features in
any nuclear disarmament negotiations. The only UK nuclear weapons withdrawn
from service over the past five decades are those declared surplus to
requirements by the military, by unilateral decision by Government, so they
represent no reduction in nuclear reliance.
The UK has presented a genuinely
schizophrenic policy on need for retention of nuclear WMDs and aspiration
towards a nuclear weapons-free world for the entire sixty year period since the
NPT was signed on 5 July 1968, with justification for possession and deployment
of nuclear WMDs coming alongside pledges for nuclear disarmament, but
never quite yet.
On 25th June 2007, Margaret Becket MP made a
valedictory speech as British foreign Secretary at the annual Carnegie
Endowment Non Proliferation conference in Washington DC. She told delegates
robustly in her keynote speech:
“What we need is both vision - a
scenario for a world free of nuclear weapons. And action - progressive steps to
reduce warhead numbers and to limit the role of nuclear weapons in security
policy. These two strands are separate but they are mutually reinforcing. Both
are necessary, both at the moment too weak. …. Weak
action on disarmament, weak consensus on proliferation are in none of our
interests…
we need the
international community to be foursquare and united behind the global
non-proliferation regime…. So we have grounds for optimism; but none for
complacency. The successes we have had in the past have not come about by
accident but by applied effort. We will need much more of the same in the
months and years to come. That will mean continued momentum and consensus on
non-proliferation, certainly. But, and this is my main argument today, the
chances of achieving that are greatly increased if we can also point to genuine
commitment and concrete action on nuclear disarmament.(emphasis added)
…After all, we all signed up to the goal of the eventual abolition of
nuclear weapons back in 1968; so what does simply restating that goal achieve
today? More than you might imagine. Because, and I'll be blunt, there are some
who are in danger of losing faith in the possibility of ever reaching that
goal.
When
it comes to building this new impetus for global nuclear disarmament, I want
the UK to be at the forefront of both the thinking and the practical work. To
be, as it were, a ‘disarmament laboratory.’”
Here
are some of the better conclusions by the Lords’ International Relations Committee
167.The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty remains a critical part of
international security. The success of the treaty will remain of central
importance to the UK’s security and to the rules-based international order as a
whole.
169.The presence of nuclear-armed states outside
the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty remains a challenge. The UK should pursue
opportunities to include nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament in its
bilateral discussions with India, Pakistan and Israel.
170.Although nuclear possessor states outside the
Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty are unlikely to disarm in the short term, the
UK should continue to advocate for the universalisation of the treaty.
171.Largely as a result of the worsening security
environment, global progress towards disarmament has stalled. We urge the
Government to set out its view on what the necessary global conditions for
disarmament would be, and use its position in the P5 to encourage progress
under this pillar of the NPT.
263.We also believe however that the increasing
signs of division between Nuclear and Non-Nuclear Weapon States are matters of
concern, and that the dissatisfaction of the Ban Treaty’s proponents with the
status quo on disarmament should be taken seriously. We therefore recommend
that the Government should adopt a less aggressive tone about this treaty and
seek opportunities to work with its supporters towards the aims of Article 6 of
the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, which concerns disarmament.
264.More openness from the UK, as a responsible
nuclear state, on the possible humanitarian impact of nuclear weapons, and a
willingness to engage on developing strategies to manage the consequences of
nuclear weapons use, would be welcome.
The fingering of Israel as an undeclared nuclear WMD state is welcome,
and should certainly be acted upon by British ministers, diplomats and
officials in New York later this month.
However, some conclusions are really inexplicable, including this one:
168.The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty’s
successes—near-universal membership, a considerable reduction in nuclear
stockpiles since the 1980s, and the establishment of an international norm
against new states acquiring nuclear weapons—should be lauded.
None of the reductions of stockpiles of British nuclear warheads
since 1968 were undertaken within the auspices of the NPT, a multilateral
treaty, but were carried out unilaterally.
The UK has persistently
despised and ignored the obligation British officials themselves wrote
into Article 6 of the NPT that all signatory parties, including the UK, should be
engaged in multilateral nuclear disarmament in good faith toward s nuclear
disarmament “at an early date” That was a commitment voluntarily entered into by
the UK fifty one years ago: it has been abrogated ever since
Backstory
Threat of nuclear weapons use has
risen, says Lords Committee
24 April 2019
The
International Relations Committee publishes its report "Rising
nuclear risk, disarmament and the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty"
Background
Just days
before states convene for the 2019 Preparatory Committee of the Nuclear
Non-Proliferation Treaty Review Conference at the UN in New York, the House of
Lords International Relations Committee has called on the Government to address
grave concerns about the deteriorating state of nuclear diplomacy.
Chairman's comments
"We are
now dangerously close to a world without arms control agreements, paving the
way for a new arms race and for increased risk of nuclear weapons use.
Disintegrating relationships between nuclear possessor states, new capabilities
and technologies, mixed with a lack of communication and understanding, mean
that the risk of nuclear weapons being used is greater now than it has been
since the Cold War.
"The 2019
Preparatory Committee for the 2020 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty Review
Conference next week is an opportunity to push for an increase in dialogue and
transparency between the Nuclear Weapon States to show a demonstrable
commitment to disarmament. We urge the Government to take our serious concerns
into consideration, and use the Preparatory Committee to address them."
Conclusions and recommendations
The Committee's
main concerns are that:
- Misunderstanding,
miscalculation or mistakes could lead to the use of nuclear weapons. There
is a lack of understanding between nuclear possessor states on their
respective nuclear doctrines and declaratory policies, for example what
the response would be to a cyber-attack on a country's nuclear command and
control system.
- Reckless
nuclear rhetoric in an era of digital communications could lead to a misunderstanding,
and therefore the use of nuclear weapons.
- Largely as
a result of the worsening security environment, global progress towards
disarmament has stalled. Tensions between Nuclear and Non-Nuclear Weapon
States regarding the pace of disarmament puts pressure on the existing
non-proliferation regime in the run-up to the 2020 NPT Review Conference.
- Global
nuclear non-proliferation efforts have been undermined by the US's
decision to withdraw from the Iran nuclear deal.
- The
collapse of nuclear arms control agreements, such as the
Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty, risks further increasing the
possibility that nuclear weapons could be used.
The Committee
is calling on the Government to:
- Encourage
greater dialogue between all nuclear possessor states about nuclear risk,
to reduce global tensions. In particular the Government and NATO must talk
to Russia about nuclear strategic stability.
- Seek to
reduce tensions between Nuclear and Non-Nuclear Weapon States in advance
of the 2020 NPT Review Conference, including by adopting a less aggressive
tone towards the Ban Treaty and its supporters.
- Continue
efforts to defend and uphold the Iran nuclear deal.
- Use
ongoing discussions in NATO to promote either a revival of the
Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty, or at least, to avoid the
deployment of intermediate-range missiles in Europe.
- Use the
UK's upcoming Chairmanship of the P5 group as an opportunity to discuss
risk reduction and transparency between the Nuclear Weapons States, and to
strengthen the Non-Proliferation Treaty regime, including encouraging the
Nuclear Weapons States to show a demonstrable commitment to disarmament.
Appendix
2: List of Witnesses
Evidence received by the Committee is listed
below in chronological order of oral evidence session and in alphabetical
order. Those witnesses marked with ** gave both oral and written evidence.
Those marked with * gave oral evidence and did not submit any written evidence.
All other witnesses submitted written evidence only.
Oral
evidence in chronological order
|
*
|
Izumi Nakamitsu, Under-Secretary-General and High
Representative for Disarmament Affairs, United Nations
|
|
|
*
|
Sarah Price, Head of Counter Proliferation and Arms Control
Centre, Foreign and Commonwealth Office
|
|
|
*
|
Shatabhisha Shetty, Deputy Director, European Leadership
Network
|
|
|
*
|
Paul Ingram, Executive Director, British American Security
Information Council
|
|
|
**
|
Tom Plant, Director, Proliferation and Nuclear Policy, Royal
United Services Institute
|
|
|
**
|
The Rt Hon Lord Browne of Ladyton, former Secretary of State
for Defence, and Vice-Chair, Nuclear Threat Initiative
|
|
|
**
|
Dr Rebecca Johnson, Executive Director, Acronym Institute for
Disarmament Diplomacy
|
|
|
**
|
Dr Hassan Elbahtimy, Lecturer in Science and Security, King’s
College London
|
|
|
*
|
Andrea Berger, then Senior Research Associate and Senior
Program Manager, James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies
|
|
|
*
|
Sir Simon Gass KCMG CVO, former British Ambassador to Iran and
former Political Director, Foreign and Commonwealth Office
|
|
|
*
|
Rear Admiral John Gower CB OBE, former Assistant Chief of
Defence Staff (Nuclear, Chemical, Biological), Ministry of Defence
|
|
|
*
|
François Heisbourg, Special Adviser, Fondation pour la
recherche stratégique, and Senior Adviser for Europe, International Institute
for Strategic Studies
|
|
|
**
|
Alexander Kmentt, former Director, Department for Disarmament,
Arms Control and Non-Proliferation, Austrian Federal Ministry for Europe,
Integration and Foreign Affairs
|
|
|
**
|
Jessica Cox, Director, Nuclear Policy Directorate, NATO
|
|
|
*
|
Beatrice Fihn, Executive Director, International Campaign to
Abolish Nuclear Weapons (ICAN)
|
|
|
**
|
Dr Nick Ritchie, Lecturer (International Security), University
of York
|
|
|
*
|
Alexandra Bell, Senior Policy Director, Center for Arms
Control and Non-Proliferation
|
|
|
**
|
Dr Oliver Meier, Deputy Head, International Security Division,
German Institute for International Affairs
|
|
|
**
|
Dr Tong Zhao, Fellow, Carnegie-Tsinghua Center for Global
Policy, Beijing
|
|
|
*
|
Dr Anastasia Malygina, Associate Professor, School of International
Relations, St Petersburg University
|
|
|
*
|
Dr Rafael Grossi, Permanent Representative of Argentina to the
International Organisations in Vienna and President-designate of the 2020 NPT
Review Conference
|
|
|
*
|
Bert Koenders, former Minister of Foreign Affairs, Kingdom of
the Netherlands
|
|
|
**
|
The Rt Hon Sir Alan Duncan KCMG MP, Minister of State for
Europe and the Americas, Foreign and Commonwealth Office
|
|
|
Sarah Price, Head of Counter Proliferation and Arms Control
Centre, Foreign and Commonwealth Office
|
|
|
James Franklin, Deputy Director, Defence Nuclear Policy,
Ministry of Defence
|
|
Alphabetical
list of all witnesses
|
|
|
|
Andrey Baklitskiy, Consultant, PIR Centre
|
|
|
Diana Ballestas de Dietrich,
Former Policy and Strategy Officer of the Office of the Executive Secretary
of the Preparatory Commission of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty
Organization
|
|
|
|
|
|
*
|
Alexandra Bell, Senior Policy Director, Center for Arms
Control and Non-Proliferation (QQ 113–120)
|
|
|
*
|
Andrea Berger, then Senior Research Associate and Senior
Program Manager, James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies (QQ 65–76)
|
|
|
British American Security Information Council (BASIC)
|
|
|
**
|
The Rt Hon Lord Browne of Ladyton, former Secretary of State
for Defence, and Vice-Chair, Nuclear Threat Initiative (QQ 49–56)
|
|
|
Dr Lyndon Burford, Postdoctoral Research Associate, Department
of War Studies, Centre for Science and Security Studies (CCSS), King’s
College London
|
|
|
Dr James Cameron Postdoctoral Research Associate, Department
of War Studies, Centre for Science and Security Studies (CCSS), King’s
College London
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Dr Jenny Clegg,
former Senior Lecturer, University of Central Lancashire
|
|
|
Dr Avner Cohen, Professor and Senior Fellow, The Middlebury
Institute of international Studies at Monterey
|
|
|
**
|
Jessica Cox, Director, Nuclear Policy Directorate, NATO (QQ 94–101)
|
|
|
|
|
|
**
|
The Rt Hon Sir Alan Duncan MP, Minister of State for Europe
and the Americas, Foreign and Commonwealth Office (QQ 152–165)
|
|
|
**
|
Dr Hassan Elbahtimy, Lecturer in Science and Security, Centre
for Science and Security Studies (CCSS), King’s College London (QQ 57–64)
|
|
|
|
|
|
Professor Gareth Evans, Chancellor, Australian National
University, and former Australian Minister for Foreign Affairs
|
|
|
Martin Everett, Centre for Science and Security Studies
(CCSS), King’s College London
|
|
|
|
|
|
*
|
Beatrice Fihn, Executive Director, International Campaign to
Abolish Nuclear Weapons (ICAN) (QQ 102–112)
|
|
|
Foreign and Commonwealth Office
|
|
|
James Franklin, Deputy Director of Defence Nuclear Policy,
Ministry of Defence (QQ 152–165)
|
|
|
*
|
Sir Simon Gass KCMG CVO, former British Ambassador to Iran and
former Political Director, Foreign and Commonwealth Office (QQ 65–76)
|
|
|
*
|
Rear Admiral John Gower CB OBE, former Assistant Chief of
Defence Staff (Nuclear, Chemical, Biological), Ministry of Defence (QQ 77–86)
|
|
|
*
|
Dr Rafael Grossi, Permanent Representative of Argentina to the
International Organisations in Vienna and President-designate of the 2020 NPT
Review Conference (QQ 134–143)
|
|
|
|
|
|
*
|
François Heisbourg, Special Adviser, Fondation pour la
recherche stratégique, and Senior Adviser for Europe, International Institute
for Strategic Studies (QQ 87–93)
|
|
|
Dr Christopher Hobbs, Reader in Science and Security, War
Studies Department, Centre for Science and Security Studies (CCSS), King’s
College London
|
|
|
*
|
Paul Ingram, Executive Director, British American Security
Information Council (QQ 27–34)
|
|
|
International Campaign to Abolish Nuclear Weapons
|
|
|
**
|
Dr Rebecca Johnson, Executive Director, Acronym Institute for
Disarmament Diplomacy (QQ 57–64)
|
|
|
Dr Ben Kienzle, Senior Lecturer, Defence Studies Department,
Centre for Science and Security Studies (CCSS), King’s College London
|
|
|
**
|
Alexander Kmentt, former Director, Department for Disarmament,
Arms Control and Non-Proliferation, Austrian Federal Ministry for Europe,
Integration and Foreign Affairs (QQ 87–93)
|
|
|
*
|
Bert Koenders, former Minister of Foreign Affairs, Kingdom of
the Netherlands (QQ 144–151)
|
|
|
Matt Korda, Research Associate, Nuclear Information Project
|
|
|
A. Vinod
Kumar, Associate Fellow, Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses, New
Delhi
|
|
|
Dr Nicola Leveringhaus, Lecturer, War Studies Department, Centre
for Science and Security Studies (CCSS), King’s College London
|
|
|
Dr David Lowry,
Senior International Research Fellow, Institute for Resource and Security
Studies
|
|
|
*
|
Dr Anastasia Malygina, Associate Professor, School of
International Relations, St Petersburg University (QQ 128–133)
|
|
|
|
|
|
**
|
Dr Oliver Meier, Deputy Head, International Security Division,
German Institute for International Affairs (QQ113–120)
|
|
|
|
|
|
Franklin Miller KBE
|
|
|
Dr Adil Sultan Muhammad, Visiting Research Fellow, War Studies
Department, Centre for Science and Security Studies (CCSS), King’s College
London
|
|
|
*
|
Izumi Nakamitsu, Under-Secretary-General and High
Representative for Disarmament Affairs, United Nations (QQ 1–12)
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Andrew Olivo,
PgCert, Nuclear Deterrence, Harvard Extension School, Harvard University
|
|
|
Dr Rishi Paul,
South Asia Analyst, British American Security Information Council
|
|
|
|
|
|
Dr William Perry, former US Secretary of Defense
|
|
|
**
|
Tom Plant, Director, Proliferation and Nuclear Policy, Royal
United Services Institute (QQ 35–48)
|
|
|
Preparatory Commission for the Comprehensive Test-Ban-Treaty
Organisation
|
|
|
*
|
Sarah Price, Head of Counter Proliferation and Arms Control
Centre, Foreign and Commonwealth Office (QQ 13–26) (QQ 152–165)
|
|
|
**
|
Dr Nick Ritchie, Lecturer (International Security), University
of York (QQ 102–112)
|
|
|
Dr Brad Roberts,
former US Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Nuclear and Missile
Defense Policy
|
|
|
Paul Schulte, Honorary Professor, Institute for Conflict,
Cooperation and Security, University of Birmingham
|
|
|
|
|
|
Scottish Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament
|
|
|
*
|
Shatabhisha Shetty, Deputy Director, European Leadership
Network (QQ 27–34)
|
|
|
|
|
|
Dr Sarah Tzinieris, Research Fellow, War Studies Department,
Centre for Science and Security Studies (CCSS), King’s College London
|
|
|
|
|
|
Cristina Varriale, Research Fellow–Proliferation and Nuclear
Policy, Royal United Services Institute
|
|
|
Professor Nicholas J. Wheeler, Director of the Institute for
Conflict, Cooperation and Security, University of Birmingham
|
|
|
|
|
|
**
|
Dr Tong Zhao, Fellow, Carnegie-Tsinghua Center for Global
Policy, Beijing (QQ 121–127)
|
|
Dr
David Lowry, Senior International Research Fellow, Institute for Resource and Security
Studies – Written evidence (NPT0031)
Questions
Nuclear risk
1.
What
is your evaluation of the current level of risk that nuclear weapons, of any
type, could be used?
“For more than sixty
years, good management and good fortune have meant that nuclear arsenals have
not been used. But we cannot rely on history just to repeat itself.”
- Rt Hon Margaret
Beckett MP, when Foreign Secretary, speech in Washington DC, 25 June 2007
Very high, as all
nuclear WMDs are held by Governments such as the UK which mistakenly believe
their possession adds to national security, rather than undermining it. This
creates the conditions for almost certain accidents. Let me give the most
celebrated example of the deadly danger of so-called nuclear deterrence: it is
from the Daily Telegraph obituary on 18 September 2017 of Lieutenant Colonel
Stanislav Petrov, who has been dubbed ‘The Man Who Saved the World.’[1]
“Stanislav
Petrov, a lieutenant colonel in the Soviet Air Defence Forces, was the officer
on duty at the Soviet Union’s early warning centre when
malfunctioning computers signaled the United States had launched
missiles at the country in September 1983.[2]His
decision to ignore warnings is credited with averting Atomic Armageddon. On the night of September 26, 1983, he
was on duty at the Soviet Union’s early warning centre near Moscow when
computers warned that the United States had fired five nuclear missiles at the
country. The 1983 false alarm is perhaps the closest the world has come to
nuclear war"
The
machine indicated the information was of the highest certainty,"
Petrov later recalled. "On the wall big red letters burnt the word:
START. That meant the missile had definitely been fired."
He
had just minutes to decide whether to assess the attack as genuine and inform
the Kremlin that the United States was starting World War Three - or tell his
commanders that the Soviet Union's early warning system was faulty.Guessing
that a genuine American attack would have involved hundreds of missiles, he put
the alarm down to a computer malfunction.
Lt
Col Petrov was vindicated when an internal investigation following the incident
concluded that Soviet satellites had mistaken sunlight reflected on clouds for
rocket engines. The Soviet government’s policy in the event of a US nuclear
attack was to launch an immediate and all-out retaliatory strike in accordance
with the principle of Mutually Assured Destruction.
Although
Petrov was feted by his colleagues and initially praised by superiors for
his actions, he was not rewarded.He later complained that he was scolded by
superiors for failing to complete a routine paperwork during the incident and
had been scapegoated by generals embarrassed by the failure of the early
warning system.”
I
saw the Danish documentary film The Man Who Saved The World that recounted these events at an
international nuclear disarmament conference on the Humanitarian Impact of
Nuclear Weapons organised by the Austrian foreign ministry in December
2014, along with several US nuclear weapons experts. It was chilling experience
for each of us.[3]
For
a very detailed survey of other such incidents, called “Broken Arrows” in
the understated language of nuclear weapons risk experts, see the report
published by the distinguished international affairs London think tank, Chatham
House in April 2014, under the title: ‘Too Close for Comfort: Cases of
Near Nuclear Use and Options for Policy,’ by Dr Patricia Lewis, research
director for international security, and her colleagues Dr Heather Williams, Sasan Aghlani, and
Benoît Pelopidas.[4]
The Nuclear
Non-Proliferation Treaty
2. Ahead of the 2020 Review Conference
of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), what are the biggest challenges
facing global nuclear diplomacy?
In my view the continued blatant
violation by the UK of its legal obligations to be engaged in good faith
negotiations towards nuclear disarmament, as stipulated by Article 6 of the
NPT. The UK is the worst violator because it is a depositary state ( with
the US and Russia, originally the USSR, who have entered into several nuclear
arms control and disarmament negotiations in SALT 1 &2, START, and INF) ),
charged with protecting the interests of signatory members states. China and
France, as later nuclear weapon state signatories to the NPT, are also in
violation, but do not have depositary state status.
Current Defence
Secretary Gavin Williamson told MPs in Defence Questions on 14 January 2019
that “We constantly have discussions right across Government to make sure that
our continuous at-sea nuclear deterrence can be sustained… and will continue to
do so in the long term.. our nuclear deterrent has kept Britain, and also our NATO
partners, safe over 50 years… We have to recognise the need to invest in a
whole spectrum of different capabilities, [including] nuclear deterrence..”.[5]
This contemporary
ministerial assertion in respect of the continuous requirement for British
nuclear weapons could have been cited from defence ministers going back over 67
years.
Up to 1968 that was a
national security decision purely the responsibility of the Government of the
day. Post 1968 when the UK signed the NPT, the UK possession and deployment his
was no longer solely a UK national security issue, but an international legal
nuclear disarmament obligation.
Let me demonstrate,
using materials extracted from British Official diplomatic papers I discovered
in the British National Archives the differences between British official
disarmament promises recorded for posterity and contrast those with the
subsequent belligerent nuclear practice of development and deployment
of Polaris and its replacement Trident nuclear WMD systems, in violation
of clear NPT commitments and on-the-record pledges.
A
memorandum prepared by the Foreign Office in advance of the visit to London of
the then Soviet premier, Alexei Kosygin, in February 1967, included the
following final paragraph:
“We assume that the Soviet Union
regard, as we do, the proposed review conference (for the NPT) as being an
adequate assurance to the non-nuclears that the military nuclear powers
are serious about the need for action on nuclear disarmament.”
Nearly
a year later, on 18 January 1968, Fred Mulley MP, the then Labour Minister of
State for Disarmament at the Foreign Office, told the 358th Plenary meeting of the Eighteen Nation
Disarmament Committee (ENDC) - the forerunner to the present day UN
Committee on Disarmament (CD) - in respect of the then proposed Article 6
of the nascent NPT:
“My
own Government have consistently held that the [Nuclear Nonproliferation]
Treaty should and must lead to such [nuclear ]
disarmament.” (emphasis added).
He added:” If it is fair to describe
the danger of proliferation as an obstacle to disarmament, it is equally fair
to say that without some progress in disarmament, the NPT will not last….As I
have made clear in previous speeches my Government accepts the obligation to
participate fully in the negotiations required by Article 6 and it is our
desire that these negotiations should begin as soon as possible
(emphasis added) and should produce speedy and successful results. There is no
excuse now for allowing a long delay to follow the signing of this Treaty, as
happened after the Partial Test Ban Treaty, before further measures can be
agreed and implemented.”
Mr Mulley subsequently wrote a
confidential memorandum to the British Cabinet Defence and Overseas Policy
Committee (OPD(68)6), on 26 January 1968, in which he set out the then policy
position on NPT article 6 (which at this stage in negotiations did not yet
include the clause “at an early date”):
“A number of countries may withhold
their ratification of the Treaty until the nuclear weapon states show they are
taking seriously the obligations which this Article imposes upon them. It
will therefore be essential to follow the Treaty up quickly with further
nuclear disarmament measures (emphasis added) if it is to be
brought into force and remain in force thereafter.”
If we leap forward nearly, nearly forty
years, we can see what the then New Labour Foreign Office ministers thought
about the status of British nuclear disarmament under the NPT.
On 10 March 2007, the then Foreign
Secretary had a Letter to the Editor published in The Times, under the
headline ‘Is Mr Gorbachev’s concern over Trident misplaced’ responding to an
earlier letter published on 8 March, from former Soviet Union President Mikhail
Gorbachev. Inter alia, She wrote:
“[By replacing Trident we will] simply enable
the UK to maintain a deterrent until we can achieve our continuing objective of
a world free of nuclear weapons.”
She later added:
“…We continue to encourage Russia and
the US to make further bilateral [nuclear disarmament] progress. They are still
some way from the point at which the part of the global stockpile that
belongs to the UK (less than 1 percent) would need to be included
in such negotiations.”
A
few weeks later in early May 2007 in Vienna, the then British Disarmament
Ambassador, Foreign Office diplomat l John Duncan presented the UK submission
to the NPT preparatory committee, asserting: "The United Kingdom is
absolutely committed to the principles and practice of multilateral nuclear
disarmament. Our ultimate goal remains unchanged: we will work towards a safer
world free from nuclear weapons - and we stand by our unequivocal undertaking
to accomplish their total elimination."
He
went on to claim that the UK "continues to support the disarmament
obligations set out in Article 6 of the Treaty [NPT] and has an excellent
record in meeting these commitments."
This
was, and remains, a contestable claim, as the Article 6 that the ambassador
invoked requires the nuclear weapons states signed up to the NPT "to
pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to cessation
of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament, and on a
Treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict and effective
international control."
Not
one UK nuclear weapon or warhead had, or has since, been withdrawn from
operational service as a result of multilateral disarmament negotiations in the
50 years of the NPT, as was confirmed in a written reply on 16 May 2007
by the then defence secretary Des Browne MP ( a recent witness before this
committee inquiry as Lord Browne), who told the independent MP Dai Davies
in a written reply: “None of the [nuclear weapons reductions since 1998 ]
have taken place as a result of any separate multilateral disarmament
negotiations.” [6]
And
then, as now, nearly 12 years on, none of Britain's nuclear arsenal features in
any nuclear disarmament negotiations. The only UK nuclear weapons withdrawn
from service over the past five decades are those declared surplus to
requirements by the military, by unilateral decision by Government, so they
represent no reduction in nuclear reliance.
The UK has presented a genuinely
schizophrenic policy on need for retention of nuclear WMDs and aspiration
towards a nuclear weapons-free world for the entire sixty year period since the
NPT was signed on 5 July 1968, with justification for possession and deployment
of nuclear WMDs coming alongside pledges for nuclear disarmament, but
never quite yet.
On 25th June 2007, Margaret Becket MP made a
valedictory speech as British foreign Secretary at the annual Carnegie
Endowment Non Proliferation conference in Washington DC. She told delegates
robustly in her keynote speech:
“What we need is both vision - a
scenario for a world free of nuclear weapons. And action - progressive steps to
reduce warhead numbers and to limit the role of nuclear weapons in security
policy. These two strands are separate but they are mutually reinforcing. Both
are necessary, both at the moment too weak. …. Weak
action on disarmament, weak consensus on proliferation are in none of our
interests…
we need the
international community to be foursquare and united behind the global
non-proliferation regime…. So we have grounds for optimism; but none for
complacency. The successes we have had in the past have not come about by
accident but by applied effort. We will need much more of the same in the
months and years to come. That will mean continued momentum and consensus on
non-proliferation, certainly. But, and this is my main argument today, the
chances of achieving that are greatly increased if we can also point to genuine
commitment and concrete action on nuclear disarmament.(emphasis added)
…After all, we all signed up to the goal of the eventual abolition of
nuclear weapons back in 1968; so what does simply restating that goal achieve
today? More than you might imagine. Because, and I'll be blunt, there are some
who are in danger of losing faith in the possibility of ever reaching that
goal.
When it comes to building this new
impetus for global nuclear disarmament, I want the UK to be at the forefront of
both the thinking and the practical work. To be, as it were, a
"disarmament laboratory".[7]
I would suggest to the Committee they
might ask their witnesses from the Foreign Office how their former Foreign
Secretary’s vison for nuclear disarmament has been realized across
the subsequent 12 years. My own assessment set out above suggests extreme
“bad faith” by successive administrations with many vague promises of
supporting a nuclear weapons free world, but zero UK nuclear weapons entered
into nuclear disarmament negotiations and a £205 billion Trident nuclear WMD renewal programme underway
a. To what extent do states still view
the NPT as relevant?
I think it was a huge error of the
non-nuclear weapons member states of the NPT to agree under political
pressure to the indefinite extension of the NPT the 1995 NPT review Conference,
because, by so doing they removed the leverage they had to force
compliance by the nuclear weapons states parties to comply with the
exigencies of Article 6 of the NPT.
b. What are the prospects for other
components of the nuclear non-proliferation regime, such as the Comprehensive
Nuclear-Test-Ban-Treaty (CTBT)?
Whilst NWS violate their solemn
obligations under existing multilateral arms control treaties, poor.
c. How important are
these agreements to the wider rules-based international order?
They would be
infinitely improved if the UK, along with the other nuclear weapons
states parties, were abide by their NPT Article 6 obligations, in the
same way that the 190 or so non-nuclear weapons states, such as Iran,
have fully abided by theirs. But if the UK continues to play fast and
loose with rules, only following those it cherry picks as suiting itself, this
will erode, undermine and ultimately destroy the rules based international
security order, as it demonstrates contempt towards such international norms of
compliance.
Here is what Reaching
Critical Will - A programme of the Women’s International League for Peace
and Freedom WILPF) - said in its October 2013 pamphlet, Preventing Collapse
– the NPT and a Ban on Nuclear Weapons, on this question:
“The
promise of the NPT to achieve nuclear disarmament has gone unfulfilled while
new restrictions to guard against proliferation have been imposed.
Nuclear-armed states modernize and maintain their nuclear arsenals in a way
that belies their legal obligations to pursue disarmament.The “step-by-step”
agenda for nuclear disarmament has not achieved interim objectives such as
entry into force of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, negotiations of a fissile
materials cut-off treaty, or full implementation of the 2010 NPT action plan,
let alone the requirement of elimination.Some NPT state parties have engaged in
nuclear-related cooperation with non-state parties, directly or indirectly
facilitating their nuclear weapons programmes.” [8]
d. To what extent does the existence of three nuclear armed states outside the
NPT (India, Israel and Pakistan) destabilise the overall regime?
All three, along with North Korea, are
very dangerous and have significantly undermined their own – and their
regional- security by developing and deploying nuclear weapons.
Here is an extract from the influential
Indian daily newspaper, The Hindustan Times, looking back last year to
twenty years of the nuclear-weapons stand- off between India and Pakistan:
“Two nuclear-armed neighbours outside
the NPT regime, their ties marked by constant strains, couldn’t move beyond the
basics in building mutual confidence on the nuclear issue. The two countries
annually exchange a list of their nuclear installations…”[9]
India has a nuclear doctrine of no first use. Pakistan’s
nuclear doctrine resembles that of the US during the Cold War: if the integrity
of the country is being threatened, it reserves the right to use nuclear
weapons.[10]
The nuclear situation in the sub-Continent
Here is what the India’s
Foreign minister Vijay Gokhale told a forum, the 1st Disarmament and International Security Affairs
Fellowship organised by the Ministry of External Affairs at the Indian Foreign
Services Institute, backed by the United Nations Under Secretary General and
High Representative for Disarmament Izumi Nakamitsu, earlier in January 2019.
“India's nuclear doctrine is based on a
policy of minimum credible deterrence with a posture of
no-first-use and non-use of atomic weapons against non-nuclear weapon states.”
(Emphasis added)
(India's nuclear
doctrine based on policy of minimum credible deterrence: Foreign Secretary
Vijay Gokhale.[11]
It is clear this rational
directly reflects the justification the UK Government persistently uses to
defend maintenance of British nuclear WMDs.
e. What prospects are
there for a Middle East WMD free zone?
The only
nuclear-armed state in the Middle East is Israel. It does not possess its 200
nuclear warheads for national survival or deterrence, but has threatened to use
them against non- nuclear neighbouring states. One such documented incidence
came in the 7-day war in 1967, according to an exclusive report in the New York
Times, which began:
“On the eve of the
Arab-Israeli war, 50 years ago this week, Israeli officials raced to assemble
an atomic device and developed a plan to detonate it atop a mountain in the
Sinai Peninsula as a warning to Egyptian and other Arab forces..”.[12]
Interestingly, on 19
April 2018 the United States Government issued a working paper to
the preparatory committee for the Review Conference of the Nuclear
Non Proliferation Treaty (NPT) currently ongoing in Geneva, entitled
“Establishing regional conditions conducive to a Middle East free of weapons of
mass destruction and delivery systems,”.[13]
This seven page paper
asserts: “Over the course of recent decades, a number
of regional States,
including Iraq, Iran (Islamic Republic of), Libya and the Syrian
Arab Republic, have
all pursued undeclared weapons of mass destruction-related
programs and
activities, in violation of arms control obligation.”
But it omitted to
make mention of Israel, the only nation in the region possessing nuclear
weapons, and which refuses to join the NPT. Such partial politics is very bad
diplomacy.
However, there are
some positive possibilities: Just over ten years ago, Israel took virtually
unreported steps that might achieve the national security
it understandably seeks in the region by divesting itself of its own
nuclear weapons in multilateral regional negotiations.
At the completely
overlooked Paris Summit of Mediterranean countries, held on 13 July 2008, under
the co-presidency of the French Republic and the Arab Republic of Egypt and in
the presence of Israel - which was represented by its then Prime Minister, Ehud
Olmert - the issue of peace within the region were explored in depth, and
the final declaration stated the participants were in favour of:
"regional
security by acting in favour of nuclear, chemical and biological
non-proliferation through adherence to and compliance with a combination of
international and regional nonproliferation regimes and arms control and
disarmament agreements.."
The final document
goes on to say:
"The parties
shall pursue a mutually and effectively verifiable Middle East Zone free of
weapons of mass destruction, nuclear, chemical and biological, and their delivery
systems. Furthermore the parties will consider practical steps to prevent the
proliferation of nuclear, chemical and biological weapons as well as excessive
accumulation of conventional arms; refrain from developing military capacity
beyond their legitimate defence requirements, at the same time reaffirming
their resolve to achieve the same degree of security and mutual confidence with
the lowest possible levels of troops and weaponry and adherence to CCW (the
convention on certain conventional weapons) promote conditions likely to
develop good-neighbourly relations among themselves and support processes aimed
at stability, security"[14]
This declaration was
cited in a speech made by the current leader of the Labour Party, a long
standing advocate of a WMD-free zone in the Middle East, in a debate on the NPT held 11 Nov 2009, which I commend to the
Committee.[15]
The United States
3. To what extent
will the United States’ withdrawal from the Iran nuclear deal, as well as US
efforts to achieve the denuclearisation of the Korean Peninsula, affect the
wider nuclear non-proliferation regime?
The US
Administration’s withdrawal from the multilateral Iran nuclear deal is both bad
diplomacy, in its unilateral renunciation of multilateral treaty which
undermines the US reliability as a partner in all other multilateral treaties
to which it is a signatory party, and is based on demonstrable
deliberately distorted intelligence. It is reported widely that the other
parties to the treaty, and very importantly the International Atomic
Energy Agency, as the agreed verification body of the , that Iran is in
compliance.[16]
Current US National
Security Advisor, Ambassador John Bolton, has resurrected the distortion of
intelligence he has promoted in the past, and was catastrophically misused by
the George W Bush US administration in 2002-3 to justify the invasion of
Iraq, which has led to hug loss of life, destruction of civil society and
economic and political chaos in Iraq ever since. One US-based British
commentator on middle east security issues, Mehdi Hasan, recently wrote
“In March 2015,
Bolton, then a private citizen, wrote an op-ed for the New York Times
headlined, “To Stop Iran’s Bomb, Bomb Iran.” In July 2017, just eight
months prior to joining the Trump administration, Bolton told a gathering of
the cultish Iranian exile group Mujahedin-e-Khalq that “the declared
policy of the United States of America should be the overthrow of the mullahs’
regime in Tehran” and that “before 2019, we here will celebrate in Tehran.”[17]
The initiative taken by Presidents Trump and Kim Jon-un to
meet bilaterally in Singapore on 12 June 2018 to discuss ways of tension
reduction and eventual denuclearisation on the Korean Peninsula is very much to
be welcomed. One experienced, sage US commentator set out a possible –
and sensible - diplomatic agenda “
An early goal should be to reach a common understanding, in
writing, about what denuclearization entails — a crucial detail left out of the Singapore summit joint
statement. A good basis would be the 1992 Joint Declaration on Denuclearization
by North and South Korea.
Next, the United States will want North Korea to solidify
its voluntary nuclear test moratorium by signing the 1996 Comprehensive Test
Ban Treaty and expand on its missile testing halt to include an end to new
ballistic missile production. It also will be crucial to secure a pledge from
North Korea to halt fissile material production. These steps would help ensure
that North Korea cannot expand its arsenal while negotiations continue.
Another early goal should be to secure North Korea’s
commitment to deliver a full declaration of its nuclear infrastructure,
materials, and weapons to be verified later by the International Atomic Energy
Agency (IAEA) using guidelines and techniques established by the IAEA Model
Additional Protocol for nuclear safeguards.
Further, the two sides will need to agree to a process and a
timeline for dismantling North Korea’s stockpile of 10 to 50 nuclear weapons
and securing separated fissile material. This work would likely have to be
supervised by specialists from nuclear-weapon states in cooperation with North
Korean technical experts.”
(“After the Singapore Summit,” Arms Control Today,
July/August 2018, briefing by Daryl G
Kimball,
Executive Director of US Arms Control Association;[18]
Interested parties and other regional
Governments back the initiative, but want wider involvement. For example
“President Trump should refrain from acting on his own, and actively implement
measures to achieve North Korea's denuclearization through team play by the
U.S. government. In doing so, it would be helpful to listen humbly to the
opinions of its allies including Japan.” [19]
My own commentary on
the Singapore summit, pointing out how British nuclear technology helped North
Korea make both plutonium and enriched uranium for its military nuclear
programme.[20]
Nuclear arms control
4. To what extent and
why are existing nuclear arms control agreements being challenged, particularly
the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty (INF) and the New Strategic Arms
Reduction Treaty (New START), and what prospect is there for further such
agreements? What prospects are there of progress in negotiating a Fissile
Material Cut-Off Treaty (FMCT)?
As mentioned in
response to Q3. it is very bad diplomatic practice for a signatory state to
unilaterally abrogate a treaty, even if it gives advance notice of its
intention to do so.[21]
I have always
considered a FMCT an essential component of a suite of arms control and
disarmament agreements required to achieve global nuclear disarmament
Under
a new so-called “voluntary safeguards agreement (VOA) signed on 7 June this
year between the UK and the UN international watchdog, the International
Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), to replace the existing trilateral 1977
agreement between UK-IAEA and the EU nuclear watchdog
body, Euratom, under Brexit arrangements, it includes in its very first
article, the following exclusion:
“The
United Kingdom shall accept the application of safeguards, in accordance with
the terms of this Agreement, on all source or special fissionable material in
facilities or parts thereof within the United Kingdom, subject to exclusions
for national security reasons only, with a view to enabling the Agency to
verify that such material is not, except as provided for in this Agreement,
withdrawn from civil activities.” [22](emphasis
added)
Lest
any member of the Committee thinks this is simply an enabling option, very
unlikely to be implemented, we know from ministerial written answers in the
House of Commons and annual publications by the UK nuclear regulator, the
Office for Nuclear Regulation, under the predecessor trilateral
agreement ( in force from September 1978), which this new treaty replaces,
there have been several hundred occasions when nuclear materials, including
plutonium, has been withdrawn from safeguards cover.
A
written answer to Green Party MP Caroline Lucas on 17 December by foreign
office minister, Sir Alan Duncan, withdrawals year by year since 1999 were as
follows: in 2000 there were 6; in 2001, 18; in 2002, 11; in 2003, 20; in 2004
19; in 2005, 17; in 2006, 16; in 2007, 31; in 2008, 19; in 2009, 15; in 2010,
14; in 2011, 17; in 2012, 19; in 2013, 34; in 2014, 18, in 2015, 29; in 2016,
44 and in 2017 35 withdrawals.[23]
Previous withdrawals since 1978 are recorded in the following document
deposited in the House of Commons library: ‘Withdrawals
from safeguards pursuant to the UK safeguards agreement with the International
Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and Euratom.’ (17 pages), following a written
Parliamentary Question nearly 19 years ago (Official Report, 28 July 2000,
Column 1094W)[24]
In
total nuclear materials have been withdrawn form safeguards and notified to the
IAEA over 600 times in the 40 years life of the trilateral treaty.
The new international treaty that put
this agreement into law was passed unopposed by MPs on 17 December 2017, de
facto legitimising large scale plutonium proliferation with impunity by the UK
Government.[25]
This loophole would
have to be closed in each nuclear weapons state with so-called voluntary
safeguards agreements, or a FMCT would be fatally undermined.
Nuclear modernisation
programmes
5. What effect will
nuclear renewal programmes have on the nuclear non-proliferation and
disarmament regime? To what extent could technological developments—including
in missile capabilities, warhead strength, and verification—undermine existing
non-proliferation and arms control agreements?
It is obvious from
submissions made by non-nuclear weapons states to successive quinquennial NPT
review conferences and their prepcoms that dozens of memme ber states regard
the continued qualitative vertical proliferation by nuclear weapons states
(NWS) parties in direct violation to Article 6 obligations to do the
opposite undermines the normative power of being a signatory state
to control horizontal proliferation. The most clear articulation of this
has come from the delegation of the Islamic Republic of Iran, as a NNWS, whose
criticisms of the vertical proliferation of nuclear WMDs while being excoriated
by the NWSs parties to abide by the NPT is unanswerable. Instead the NWS
provide diversionary frothing hypocrisy, justifying their 60 year violation of
the NPT by attacking state in compliance. It is an ‘Alice in Wonderland’
diplomatic situation that is unsustainable.
“When
I use a word,” Humpty Dumpty said, in rather a scornful tone,
“it means just what I choose it to mean—neither more
nor less.” “The question is,” said Alice, “whether you can make words
mean so many different things.” “The question is,” said Humpty
Dumpty, “which is to be master—that's all.” [26]
As
an example of any number of NPT PreComs, here an extract from an article I
wrote after the 2007 PrepCom in Vienna:
“The committee's chairman, Japan's permanent representative
to the UN missions in Vienna, ambassador Yukiya Amano [who subsequently became
IAEA Director- General] noted in his own factual summary of the two
week's deliberations, that the states parties said "the total elimination
of nuclear weapons was the only guarantee against their use or threat of
use". It was stressed, he said, that the "indefinite extension of the
NPT (as was agreed in 1995) did not imply the indefinite possession of nuclear
weapons"….”
He also noted, with clear inference to the UK Trident
programme, that "concern and disappointment were voiced about plans to
replace or modernise nuclear weapons and their means of delivery or
platform."
A few days after the close of the preparatory committee, on
15 May, US ambassador Gregory Schulte addressed an audience at the University
of Vienna, opening with the uncontestable words: "In one blinding flash, a
nuclear weapon can kill, maim, and destroy on a scale without parallel, sending
political shockwaves and economic dislocation across the globe."
Fingering Iran, he added: "The risk of nuclear weapons
spreading to renegade regimes and transnational terrorists is one of today's
gravest dangers to our United Nations."
Yet the US has currently deployed worldwide 9,938 nuclear
weapons, according to an excellent study, Model Nuclear Inventory,
prepared by a New York-based non-governmental organisation, Reaching Critical
Will, which cleverly donated copies of the inventory to each delegation in
Vienna.”[27]
Iran, meanwhile, had none; and still has none.
As a security and
non-proliferation expert, I find the speeches of UK disarmament ambassadors and
foreign office ministers to these NPT events continually embarrassing an
utterly indefensible.
New technologies
6. To what extent
will technological developments, both directly relating to nuclear weapons and
in the wider defence and security sphere, affect nuclear diplomacy?
The NWS, by
justifying their own possession of nuclear weapons, have attempted to normalize
elite deployment by members of the nuclear weapons club. So we can expect the
periodic unveiling of new and more deadly nuclear weapons by the
nuclear club members, such as Russia atomic Avangard hypersonic maneuverable re-entry
vehicle for ICBMs, as the qualitative nuclear arms race is ratcheted up with
impunity.[28]This
revelation came nine months after Russia’s President Vladimir Putin praised his
nation's growing hypersonic arsenal as "invincible."
On 17 January 2019,
the US Government announced its own purported technology fix to an a perceived
nuclear arms threat problem, rather than turning to diplomacy, in unveiling its
Missile Defense Review Program.[29]The
highly respected think tank, US Arms Control Association, published an
analytical briefing, which opens as follows:
“The
Trump administration’s long-awaited Missile Defense Review… proposes a
significant and costly expansion of the role and scope of U.S. missile
defenses that is likely to exacerbate Russian and Chinese concerns about
the threat to their strategic nuclear deterrents, undermine strategic
stability, and further complicate the prospects for additional nuclear arms
reductions.
Of particular
concern was President Donald Trump’s statement during his remarks at the
Pentagon that the goal of U.S. missile defenses is to “ensure we can detect
and destroy any missile launched against the United States anywhere,
anytime, anyplace.” This would be a costly, unachievable, and destabilizing
departure from longstanding policy and contradicts the text of the review,
which limits U.S. homeland missiles defense to their traditional role of defending
against limited attacks from North Korea or Iran. In addition, the review
proposes “to further thicken defensive capabilities for the U.S. homeland”
with the new Aegis SM-3 Block IIA interceptor, hundreds of which could
eventually be deployed on land and at sea across the globe.
As
Congress scrutinizes the Missile Defense Review, members would do well
to recognize that rushing to fund
an open-ended and unconstrained missile defense buildup is misguided and
would diminish U.S. security.
Congress in 2016
mandated the Pentagon to conduct a broad review of missile defense policy
and strategy...”
It
goes on to state:
“The review reaffirms and, in some
cases accelerates, preexisting Trump administration plans to:
·
try
to destroy enemy missiles before launch (known as “left of launch”),
·
arm
unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) with lasers to zap long-range missiles
during their boost phase,
·
test
the SM-3 Block IIA missile interceptor against an intercontinental
ballistic missile (ICBM)-class target by 2020,
·
expand
the ground-based midcourse defense (GMD) system in Alaska and California
from 44 to 64 interceptors by 2023, and
·
develop
multiple kill vehicles for the ground-based midcourse defense (GMD) system,
and increase the number of Aegis and THAAD interceptors.
Costly and Technically Risky
The United States
has spent hundreds of billions of dollars since the 1950s in an effort
to field effective ballistic missile defenses and has but a limited capability against a small number of
relatively unsophisticated missile threats to show for it. More realism is
needed about the costs and limitations of defense capabilities and the
long-standing obstacles that have prevented them from working as intended…”[30]
|
|
The UK’s hugely
expensive - in financial and diplomatic terms - renewal of Trident is another
indefensible example of atomic escalation
The Treaty on the
Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons
7. If it were to
enter into force, how would the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons
(commonly referred to as the Ban Treaty) affect efforts to prevent the
proliferation of nuclear weapons and bring about disarmament?
The “Nuclear Ban”,
whose originators and promoters - The International Campaign to Abolish Nuclear
Weapons (ICAN) were awarded the 2017 Nobel Peace Prize for their initiative and
its success - is an essential complement to the NPT regime. I would
direct the Committee to read the document published in October 2013 by ICAN’s
partner organization, WILPF, in New York, titled Preventing collapse: the
NPT and a ban on nuclear weapons [31]
I would also
recommend that the Committee consults this report ( also by Reaching
Critical Will, an international disarmament and diplomatic lobby
group, based in New York) on the conference hosted by the Austrian
Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Vienna in December 2014, (which I
attended) that created the diplomatic climate for the Ban Treaty to be
actualized. It is titled: Filling the gap: report on the Vienna conference
on the humanitarian impact of nuclear weapons: a conference report for the
meeting hosted by the government of Austria on 8-9 December 2014 on the
humanitarian impact of nuclear weapons.[32]
I provided a detailed
written submission to the Vienna conference on the humanitarian impact of
nuclear weapons, which may be consulted.[33]
The P5
8. What are the
policies of other P5 countries (China, France, Russia and the United States),
and the UK’s other partners, on the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and on
nuclear weapons more generally? Have these policies changed, and if so, why?
How effective has the P5 process been, and what role will it have in the
future?
The P5 is a
self-appointed, collectively hypocritical atomic elite club, with zero
credibility on non-proliferation, time after time telling NNWS to do as they
say, but not do as they do themselves , ie promote persistent vertical
and qualitative self-proliferation.
I explained this in
an article I wrote four years ago, reproduced below. Sadly, not one word needs
altering today; the same critical argument remains intact.
Tuesday, 10 February 2015
Today the Foreign and
Commonwealth Office opens a new Diplomatic Academy, the first in the FCO’s
history. The FCO media material describes the new venture thus: The “Diplomatic
Academy will be a centre of excellence to help all staff from across government
working on international issues to share expertise and learn from one another.
It will help the organisation extend its networks and to engage with academic
and diplomatic institutions and others. Learning will be accessible and
inspiring, and it will provide a space for challenging conventional thinking.” [34]
By chance, on
Wednesday and Thursday last week, Foreign Office diplomacy was in top gear as
our mandarins hosted a two day high-level meeting at its London conference
venue, Lancaster House, of senior diplomatic representatives of the other four
members of the self-appointed nuclear weapons club on the United Nations
Security Council, the so-called Permanent Five (P5).
This brought to
London Wang Qun, Director General, Department of Arms Control and Disarmament
for China; Hélène Duchêne, Director for Strategic Affairs for France; Rose
Gottemoeller, Under Secretary for Arms Control and International Security for
the United States; and Grigory Berdennikov, Ambassador-at-Large for Russia, to
meet with the FCO’s top disarmament diplomat, Peter Jones, Director for Defence
and International Security, according to a written answer to Labour MP Paul
Flynn on 9 February.[35]
The answer by Foreign
Office minister Tobias Ellwood also said: “The London P5 Conference covered a
wide range of issues relevant to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, encompassing
disarmament, non-proliferation and the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. The
Conference included outreach with a number of non-nuclear weapon states –
Australia, Canada, Mexico, the Netherlands and the United Arab Emirates – as
well as civil society. P5 delegates also visited the Atomic Weapons
Establishment; this was part of our efforts to enhance transparency, but
appropriate measures were put in place to ensure that our national security
interests were protected.)
After their meeting
on 6 February the P5 diplomats issued a joint statement through the Foreign
Office.[36]
Aside from warm words
proclaiming they all supported the 189-nation Nuclear Non Proliferation Treaty
(NPT) and were working to strengthen it at the forthcoming NPT review
conference in New York in April/May ( contemporaneous with the UK General
Election) they asserted “The P5 also considered a wide array of issues related
to and steps towards making progress on all three pillars of the NPT:
disarmament, non-proliferation and the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. In addition,
the P5 had constructive and productive discussions with a number of
non-nuclear-weapon states and civil society representatives.)
Then in a very
interesting passage, considering it is co-signed by Russia, it asserted:
“At their 2015 Conference the P5 restated their belief that the Nuclear
Non-Proliferation Treaty remains the essential cornerstone for the nuclear
non-proliferation regime and the foundation for the pursuit of nuclear
disarmament, and is an essential contribution to international security and
stability.”
It then added: “The
P5 reaffirmed that a step-by-step approach to nuclear disarmament that promotes
international stability, peace and undiminished and increased security for all
remains the only realistic and practical route to achieving a world without
nuclear weapons. To this end, the P5 discussed issues related to
international security and strategic stability and their nuclear doctrines in
order to enhance mutual understanding in these areas…The P5 stressed that
addressing further prospects for nuclear disarmament would require taking into
account all factors that could affect global strategic stability. In doing so
they stressed the importance of engaging in frank and constructive dialogue to
that end.”
For those wishing to
rid the planet of nuclear WMDs, all of this sounds hopeful, until the facts
intervene, revealing all rank and stinking hypocrisy!
Within two days the
press was revealing:
£4.2bn:
the bill for replacing Trident before parliament gives go-ahead
(Sunday
Herald, 8 February)
Scottish–based
investigative journalist Rob Edwards, unveiled that the official public
spending watchdog, the UK National Audit Office, in a new report has revealed
that this £4,200,000,000 (£4.2 billion) is being spent on designing new
submarines, reactors and missile compartments ahead of a long-promised decision
on Trident replacement by MPs in 2016, after this year’s UK general election.
Edwards reported the MoD as saying it has always been transparent about the
costs “whilst protecting our commercial position”.[37]
The
NAO report, Major Projects Report 2014 and the Equipment Plan 2014 to 2024, (with
Appendices and project summary sheets) reveals that the MoD has
underestimated the cost of upgrading the nuclear reactors that power Trident
submarines by £151 million.
The SNP Westminster
leader and defence spokesman, Angus Robertson, retorted “Costs are spiraling
out of control before MPs have even had a chance to vote on renewal. It is
utterly unacceptable that over £4 billion will be blown on replacing Trident
nuclear weapons before parliament actually decides on whether or not to even
give it the go ahead. In no other democracy, at a time of deep austerity and
cuts, would money be spent on committing to such a massive project without
consulting parliamentarians.”
Spending on replacing
Trident before 2016
Future submarines
concept / £198m
Next generation
reactor concept / £305m
Reactor technology
concept / £80m
Missile compartment
concept/ £271m
Future submarines
assessment / £2,000m
Next generation
reactor assessment / £1,171m
Reactor technology
assessment / £148m
Total / £4,173m
Already spent /
£2,068m
Less than a month ago
in a Parliamentary debate on 20 January on the Trident nuclear WMD system,
Defence Secretary Michael Fallon told MPs “we are planning to replace the
current Vanguard submarines—not the Trident missile or the warheads. We are planning
to replace the submarines in the late 2020s, by which time our Vanguard
submarines will be 35 years old.”
He also asserted: “We
are clear that the nuclear deterrent is the only assured way to deter nuclear
threats….” and added “we cannot gamble with our country’s national
security. We have to plan for a major direct nuclear threat to this country, or
to our NATO allies, that might emerge over the 50 years during which the next
generation of submarines will be in service. We already know that there are
substantial nuclear arsenals and that the number of nuclear states has
increased…. This country faces the threat of nuclear blackmail from rogue
states. .. there is simply no alternative to a continuous at-sea deterrent that
can provide the same level of protection and the ability to deter an aggressor.
We know that because successive Governments have looked at the different
options for delivering a deterrent capability. Most recently, the Trident
alternatives review in 2013 demonstrated that no alternative system is as
capable or cost-effective as a Trident-based deterrent.”
Then, amongst this
missile waving nuclear belligerence, he confusing interpolated the following
observation “Let me be clear: we hope never to use nuclear weapons, but to go
on delivering a deterrent effect. However, we also share the vision of a world
that is without nuclear weapons, achieved through multilateral disarmament.” [39]
But it is clear from
the burden of his own argument, he does not believe a word about a nuclear
weapon-free world.
Liberal Democrat
Treasury minister Danny Alexander subsequently told Flynn in a written answer
on 30 January “This Government is committed to maintain a credible and
effective continuous at-sea [nuclear] deterrent.” Two days later, on The Sunday
Politics on BBC One television, Labour shadow Foreign Secretary Douglas
Alexander insisted to programme host Andrew Neil that his party would “not
negotiate over Britain's nuclear deterrent.”[40]
British
nuclear WMD policy is Janus-like, facing towards nuclear disarmament if
discussed by the Foreign office, but towards nuclear re-armament if discussed
by the Ministry of Defence, the Liberal Democrat front bench ministers and the
Labour shadow front bench ministers.
These politicians will all be relieved
that they will be engaged in a belligerent election campaign when the NPT
review conference is underway: otherwise they would have to explain to184
non-nuclear weapons states in New York why they all plan to violate the UK’s
legal requirement under NPT article 6 “ to pursue negotiations in good faith on
effective measures relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early
date and to nuclear disarmament…” by renewing the Trident nuclear WMD system.
The role of the UK
9. How effective a
role has the UK played in global nuclear diplomacy in recent years? How could
the UK more effectively engage on nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament?
What should the UK Government’s priorities be ahead of the 2020 NPT Review
Conference?
The UK has had a very
ineffective – frankly negative - role in global nuclear diplomacy
for fifty years, because it stubbornly refuses to abide by the commitments the
UK signed up to implement “in good faith” when it ratified the
Nuclear Non Proliferation Treaty, the text of which UK diplomats partly
authored. For fifty years the UK has demonstrated on the world stage just about
as much bad faith as any government could possibly show.
In
a House of Commons debate on Trident renewal four years ago, the then UK
Defence Secretary Michael Fallon told Parliament “we also share the vision
of a world that is without nuclear weapons, achieved through multilateral
disarmament.” [41]
Yet
four years on, at Defence questions on 14 January this year, the current
Defence Secretary Gavin Williamson made these statements in his oral answers:
“The Vanguard-class life extension and availability sustainment programmes are
essential to maintaining the United Kingdom’s continuous at-sea deterrence and
are prioritised accordingly…” adding “We constantly have discussions right
across Government to make sure that our continuous at-sea nuclear deterrence
can be sustained. We have been investing in technology and parts to make sure
that the Vanguard class has everything it needs in the future. But what is
critical is the investment we are making… many
Members on both sides of the House who are absolute supporters of the
importance of the continuous at-sea nuclear deterrent and understand how vital
it is to keeping Britain safe…. our
nuclear deterrent has kept Britain, and also our NATO partners, safe over 50
years.”[42]
Moreover,
in a subsequent debate on a confidence motion in the Conservative Government,
on 16 January this year. Cabinet minister Michael Gove, answering the debate do
the Government made the following slightly hysterical remarks, challenging the
Leader of the Official Opposition, Jeremy Corbyn’s personal political stance
against Trident, exclaiming indignantly: “He wants to get rid of our nuclear
deterrent.” As if this was some very bad idea. And added: ” ..no deterrent - no
way can this country ever allow that man to be our Prime Minister and in charge
of our national security.”[43]
The
Government persistently presents a political Janus-like posture on nuclear
weapons: ministers regularly defend their possession as essential for national
and regional security, while simultaneously asserting they believe in
multilateral nuclear disarmament, but never quite yet! It is a literally
incredible posture, deeply damaging for the global nuclear non-proliferation
regime.
My
simple proposal would be for the UK to take the lead – as it honourably did
fifty odd years ago whenth eNPT was being neotiated, as I establishe dath
ebeginnin gof thi ssubmission, - in convening mulitlateral nuclear
disarmamant talks at the United Nations
If
they do not, the non-aligned and other NNWS finally lose patience at he 2020
NPT review conference, leading the final unraveling of fifty years of the
global nuclear non-proliferation regime, the NWS will be 100 per cent
responsible.
Received 18 January 2019
[9] (‘Looking back: 20 years after
Pakistan tested nuclear weapons’ by Jayanth
Jacob;
[24] ‘Withdrawals from safeguards pursuant
to the UK safeguards agreement with the International Atomic Energy Agency
(IAEA) and Euratom.’ (17 pages), following a written Parliamentary Question
nearly 19 years ago (Official Report, 28 July 2000, Column 1094W)
[30] Trump's Dangerous Missile Defense
Buildup, ACA Briefing, Volume 11, Issue 2, January 17, 2019; www.armscontrol.org
[35] answer 223040 https://www.parliament.uk/business/publications/written-questions-answers-statements/written-question/Commons/2015-02-03/223040/
What to look for in the 2019 NPT Preparatory Committee
Dr Rebecca Johnson
|Founder and Director of the Acronym Institute
for Disarmament Diplomacy
The last preparatory committee meeting (PrepCom)
before the 2020 Review Conference (RevCon) of the 1968 Treaty on the
Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) will be held in New York from 29
April to 10 May 2019. In accordance with the decisions taken when the NPT was
indefinitely extended in 1995, the PrepComs are intended to consider
“principles, objectives and ways in order to promote the full implementation of
the Treaty, as well as its universality, and to make recommendations” for the
next RevCon to decide on.
What, then, can we expect from the 2019 PrepCom?
Judging from the 2017 and 2018 meetings, the major challenges for the NPT-based
regime will come from real-world nuclear developments, NPT-related issues that
are freighted with historic and procedural significance (or baggage), and the
proliferation policies of nuclear-armed states. While related, these should not
be conflated.
Tasked especially with reviewing
developments since the 2015 RevCon, the major issues of disagreement will
include:
- How to reinforce the existing legal regime
underpinning the NPT, especially in light of US and Russian nuclear
weapons enhancement programmes and their pending withdrawal from the 1987
Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty;
- The Trump administration’s rejection of the 2015
Joint Comprehensive Programme of Action (JCPOA)
with Iran, and related impacts on non-proliferation;
- The humanitarian-based 2017 Treaty on
the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW aka the Ban Treaty),
negotiated and adopted by two-thirds of the UN General Assembly but
boycotted by the nuclear-armed states and some of their allies;
- Ways to kick-start negotiations on a nuclear
weapon free zone (NWFZ) and/or zone free of all weapons of mass
destruction (WMD) in the Middle East, where progress has stalled despite
high-level commitments in 1995 and 2010;
In addition, expect to see much lip
service but little practical action on:
- Bringing the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT)
into force and ending fissile materials production and stockpiling;
- Nuclear and missile tests by the Democratic
People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK aka North Korea), recent efforts towards
denuclearising the Korean Peninsula, and the importance of ensuring
compliance with all relevant treaties;
- Nuclear safety issues, as well as broader nuclear
energy concerns, as they relate to proliferation and preventing serious
accidents such as Chernobyl and Fukushima;
- Nuclear security provisions and calls for
stronger safeguards and greater uptake of the IAEA’s additional protocol.
Contributing to the pressures, the Treaty has to be
reviewed, taking into account that fifty years since the NPT entered into
force, there are over 14,000 nuclear weapons in the hands of nine nuclear-armed
states, who are either not Treaty parties or else defined in the text as
“nuclear weapon states” (the “NPT5”, who are also “P5” permanent members of the
UN Security Council). The four outside the Treaty are not legally constrained
and, indeed, derive security benefits from the constraints applied to their
neighbours. The NPT5 cloak themselves in their NPT status while justifying
their nuclear enhancement programmes. Both groups are eroding the NPT’s
credibility as an effective mechanism for disarmament and non-proliferation.
The major areas of contention in 2019, as in most NPT
meetings, will centre on nuclear disarmament and the Middle East. In an effort
to provide “an output-focused outlook”, the Chairs of the first two PrepComs –
Netherlands Ambassador Henk Cor van der Kvast and Poland’s Ambassador Adam
Bugajski – have already submitted an “Inter-Chair
Working Paper”. There is much in this that can be broadly supported,
but that won’t necessarily help the Chair of the 2019 PrepCom, Malaysia’s
Ambassador Syed Md Hasrin Syed Hussin. The geostrategic objectives and
relations among nuclear-armed nations and a handful of Middle East governments
will, as in previous meetings, dominate the PrepCom, so we need to look more
carefully at what is being papered over in the Inter-Chair document.
Nuclear Disarmament
In many ways, the most important development since
2015 is the TPNW, which was taken forward by means of a humanitarian
disarmament process launched at the 2010 NPT RevCon and finalised as a “nuclear
ban treaty” through political and diplomatic initiatives that culminated in
negotiations under UN auspices. At the NPT’s 2018 PrepCom, the first after the
TPNW was opened for signature by the UN Secretary-General on 20 September 2017,
an interesting dynamic developed. A few of the nuclear-armed governments and
allies seemed bent on making the TPNW into a central problem for the NPT, while
TPNW signatories such as Austria
and various members
of the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) were at pains to avoid conflict and emphasise
the humanitarian imperative to work on mutually reinforcing approaches for
nuclear disarmament. Caught between strong civil society pressure to join
the TPNW and countervailing pressures to maintain nuclear use arrangements,
Japan hopes to revive “bridge-building”
steps formerly adopted by the 2000 NPT RevCon.
From 2010 to 2017 the humanitarian ban treaty
initiatives were underestimated, and now that the TPNW exists, this sidelining
pattern is being continued by NATO diplomats. When Bugajski presented his draft Chair’s
summary in 2018, one paragraph purported to summarise the many
positive statements about the TPNW in these terms: “A number of states parties
informed about the ratification and status of this treaty. It was asserted that
the TPNW represented an effective measure under Article VI of the NPT by
creating a legally binding prohibition of nuclear weapons. It was stressed that
the TPNW complemented the NPT and was designed to strengthen existing
disarmament and nuclear non-proliferation regimes.”
Although far fewer states opposed the TPNW, the text
and tone of the following paragraph gave their views greater weight and
significance: “Other states parties expressed their opposition to the TPNW,
emphasizing the crucial link between progress on disarmament and the
international security environment. It was asserted that the TPNW would not
contribute to the reduction or limitation of nuclear weapons. These states
noted that the TPNW does not reflect customary international law and thus could
bind only its signatories. Concerns were expressed that the TPNW could create
an alternative and contrary standard to the NPT.”
Though dismayed that Bugajski’s summary was so
dismissive of the TPNW, the majority were conscious of the need to avoid
playing into the hands of those wanting to portray the TPNW as a problem for
the NPT regime. Not wanting to divert attention from the problematic policies
and actions of the nuclear-armed and proliferating states, most TPNW
signatories carefully calibrated their responses to avoid providing ammunition
that might be used to harm either the NPT or TPNW in the future.
Their strategy is to consolidate the TPNW as a
constructive addition to the disarmament and non-proliferation toolkit and
engage in practical consideration of next steps. They are conscious of the need
to keep providing reassurance that the TPNW is a separate but helpful legal
instrument that will strengthen the regime. Amongst themselves, TPNW
signatories are considering how best to develop the legal, technical and
verification frameworks to implement the Ban Treaty’s provisions and accelerate
the elimination of nuclear arsenals. With 70 signatories and 23 ratifications
at time of writing, this treaty is almost halfway to meeting its
entry-into-force requirements. Notably, more NPT member states (122)
participated in negotiations and voted positively to adopt the finalised TPNW
in 2017 than the 105-111 NPT parties registered in the first two NPT PrepComs.
Turning to the positions of the NPT5, we find
Washington rehashing an old concept, “creating the
conditions for nuclear disarmament” (CCND). Spearheaded by
Christopher Ford, US Assistant Secretary for International Security and
Nonproliferation, and now renamed “creating the environment for nuclear
disarmament” (CEND), this academically framed approach seeks to put the onus of
nuclear disarmament and security responsibility mainly on non-nuclear NPT
parties and “some nuclear-weapon states”, while ignoring or justifying the
treaty-undermining and proliferation activities of the United States. Russia’s
defensive response is a new working paper titled “Nuclear
Disarmament” which mainly blames US military-nuclear policies. It
also sideswipes the TPNW, calling it “premature” and insisting that at present
“possession of nuclear weapons is a necessity and the only possible response to
very specific external threats”.
US-Russian exchanges in 2019 may be sharper and more
adversarial than usual. Even it these are mainly posturing, the increased
emphasis on nuclear weapons and threats are contributing to increased risks and
dangers. Both countries are committed to some aspects of nuclear security, but
have even louder vested interests in maintaining and enhancing their nuclear
arsenals. Despite support from France and the UK, it is unlikely that the NPT5
will manage any joint initiatives. Even a lowest common denominator statement
will be a stretch in 2019, unless it is one that has no relevance to real-world
nuclear challenges but serves as a lip-service mechanism with the underlying
purpose of maintaining NPT-based privileges for the nuclear-armed P5.
France and the UK will no doubt continue in their
efforts to undermine the TPNW inside and outside the NPT, but they are
relatively weak players these days. They are expected to elevate their
activities on “disarmament verification”, promote pro-nuclear power activities
to divert NAM criticisms of their nuclear weapons programmes, and extol their
commitment to nuclear security, the CTBT, IAEA, and fissile material cut-off
negotiations.
China may criticise the US more than in recent years.
Though worried that the TPNW will put pressure on its nuclear policies and
arsenal, China tends not to openly criticise the Ban Treaty. As in earlier
PrepComs, China
will emphasise its long-standing no first use posture, security assurances to
non-nuclear states, and commitment to Article IV, evidenced by its abiding
willingness to spread “peaceful purposes” nuclear power plants and technologies
around the world.
WMD-free zone in the Middle East
Developments in the Middle East pose major security
challenges in the real world as well as the NPT context. These are different,
but not unrelated. At the 2018 PrepCom, NAM states
called for a regional Conference in 2020 to launch a process on a WMD free zone
in accordance with the 1995 Resolution on the Middle East. Iran focussed on
procedures, with proposals fora subsidiary body to be established during the
2020 RevCon to discuss Middle East WMD free zone specifics, and a Standing
Committee to take recommendations forward afterwards. Egypt and the League of
Arab States then took the issue to the 2018 UN First Committee, where their
resolution for a Conference achieved agreement and UN General Assembly funding
for a one week Conference to be convened in 2019 by the UN Secretary-General
and three depositary states (Russia, UK and US), with terms of reference
derived from the 1995 Resolution on the Middle East. Moscow supports the
Conference, Washington opposes and London is reportedly on the fence. Arab
League states are saying that the Conference that is expected to go ahead in
November 2019 is compatible with the NAM and Iranian proposals for the 1995
Resolution to be taken forward through NPT procedures.
Expectations for 2019
Looking more broadly, we should anticipate that the
DPRK’s nuclear programme will be much discussed amid calls for Kim Jong-un to
continue to negotiate, denuclearise, rejoin/fully comply with the NPT and
accede to the CTBT. With John Bolton pulling the Trump administration’s strings
on these issues, as he did at the 2005 RevCon, the US will say little or
nothing about the test ban treaty. Washington has in recent months been rife
with rumours that Bolton is advising Trump to “unsign” the CTBT, so the PrepCom
may indicate if this is a serious threat or overheated rumour.
On the subject of the JCPOA and Trump Administration
policies and modernisation, Iran will be active and generally self-righteous
but is unlikely to throw any spanners that might alienate other JCPOA
governments or NAM partners. In addition to Japan, some of the NATO states are
presenting themselves as bridge-builders between the NPT5 and pro-TPNW
non-nuclear parties to the NPT. It will be useful to pay attention to their
talking points, as these have been changing since 2017.
Since 1995, third PrepComs have not been able to
fulfil their formal task to make recommendations to the next RevCon. The 2019
PrepCom Chair is likely to accept this pattern and not push for consensus on
anything but the necessary procedural decisions. The best service this PrepCom
can perform for NPT parties is to act as a warning bell about which issues,
developments and national policies are likely to be most problematic – not only
for the diplomats in the 2020 Review Conference, but (even more importantly)
for preventing proliferation, implementing disarmament and reducing nuclear
risks in the real world.
The opinions articulated above also
do not necessarily reflect the position of the European Leadership Network or
any of its members. The ELN’s aim is to encourage debates that will help
develop Europe’s capacity to address pressing foreign, defence, and security
challenge.
UN Eager to
Advance Commitment to Nuclear Non-Proliferation
InDepthNews,
23 April 2019
By
Jamshed Baruah
NEW YORK
(IDN) – Deeply concerned about the erosion of the disarmament and arms control
framework that reaped significant post-cold-war-era gains, the United Nations
is keen to ensure the continued viability of the landmark Treaty on the
Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT).
With an eye
on the fiftieth anniversary of the Treaty’s entry into force and the
twenty-fifth celebration of its indefinite extension, the 15-nation Security
Council – chaired by Germany’s Foreign Affairs Minister Heiko Maas – convened a
high-level meeting at the UN Headquarters on April 2, 2019.
According to
the Council President for the month of April, Christoph Heusgen, Germany’s
permanent representative, the members of the Security Council – charged with
ensuring international peace and security – reaffirmed their commitment to
advance the goals of the NPT as the “cornerstone of the nuclear non‑proliferation
regime and the foundation for the pursuit of nuclear disarmament and the
peaceful uses of nuclear energy”.
They
concurred that the 2020 NPT Review Conference provided an opportunity for the
NPT States parties to “unambiguously reaffirm” their commitment to the Treaty,
to commemorate its historic achievements and, by further advancing its goals,
strengthen the nuclear disarmament and non‑proliferation regime. They expressed
their "readiness to work together and join efforts to achieve a successful
outcome at the 2020 NPT Review Conference.”.
A close look
at discussions in the Council reveals that a “successful outcome” of
deliberations in 2020 is far from certain. “The NPT has proven remarkably
durable. However, that durability should not be taken for granted,” at a time
when the acquisition of arms is prioritized over the pursuit of diplomacy,
United Nations Under‑Secretary‑General and High Representative for Disarmament Affairs, Izumi
Nakamitsu, told the Security Council in all frankness.
“The
disarmament success of the post-cold war era has come to a halt,” she said, and
the security landscape is being replaced with dangerous rhetoric about the
utility of nuclear weapons and an increased reliance on these weapons in
security doctrines. “The prospect of the use of nuclear weapons is higher than
it has been in generations,” warned Nakamitsu.
However, she
added that whatever new arms control and disarmament approaches in the
twenty-first century might look like, one thing is clear: the NPT will still be
at the centre of our collective security mechanism and it will have to stay
“fit for purpose” across its three pillars — disarmament, non-proliferation and
the peaceful use of nuclear energy. The 2020 Review Conference is a “golden
opportunity” to make headway on all of these goals, and to make sure this
linchpin of international security remains fit for purpose through the next 25
or even 50 years.
Calling a
spade a spade, Germany’s Foreign Affairs Minister Heiko Maas said in the
ensuing discussion that, "for all the successes we have achieved in recent
decades, we mustn't fool ourselves". He pointed out that dismantling
nuclear arsenals has come to a standstill and prospects of actual nuclear
"re-armament" have been raised by the impending loss of the
Intermediate‑Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty.
The 1987
Treaty required the United States and the Soviet Union (now Russian Federation)
to eliminate and permanently forswear all of their nuclear and conventional
ground-launched ballistic and cruise missiles with ranges of 500 to 5,500
kilometres. The Treaty marked the first time the superpowers had agreed to
reduce their nuclear arsenals, eliminate an entire category of nuclear weapons,
and utilize extensive on-site inspections for verification.
While the
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)
is not a party to the NPT, it is entrusted with key verification
responsibilities deriving from the Treaty. Presenting a glimpse of
achievements, IAEA Director General Yukiya Amano said non-proliferation
safeguards are being implemented in 182 countries, including 179 which are
States parties to the NPT. However, key challenges include a steady increase in
the amount of nuclear material and the number of nuclear facilities under IAEA
safeguards, coupled with continuing pressure on the Agency’s regular budget.
Topping its
agenda are the nuclear programmes of Iran and the Democratic People’s Republic
of Korea. Iran continues to fully implement its commitments under the Joint
Comprehensive Plan of Action, and it must continue to do so, said Amano.
Meanwhile, the Agency continues to monitor the Democratic People’s Republic of
Korea’s nuclear programme and evaluate all safeguards-relevant information
available to it. The IAEA could respond within weeks to any request to send
inspectors back to Pyongyang.
In a broader
sense, the Agency helps to improve the health and prosperity of millions of
people by making nuclear science and technology available across many sectors, Amano
continued. Nuclear power can also help address the twin challenges of ensuring
reliable energy supplies and curbing greenhouse‑gas emissions. “Helping
countries to achieve the Sustainable
Development Goals, using relevant nuclear technology, is an
important part of our work,” Amano added.
In the
ensuing discussion, non-permanent Council members such as Côte d’Ivoire and the
Dominican Republic reported benefits reaped from nuclear technologies. Others
highlighted concerns, from terrorists acquiring atomic bombs to the disarmament
machinery’s languishing impasse that continues to hobble negotiations on a
fissile material cut-off treaty and delay the establishment of a
nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East.
Some members
spotlighted a crumbling security landscape exacerbated by concerns such as the
Democratic People’s Republic of Korea’s nuclear programme and the suspension of
disarmament agreements.
Russia’s
permanent representative to the UN, Vassily A. Nebenzia, said that attempts are
being made to undermine universally recognized norms which have worsened an
already complicated situation. The 2020 Review Conference should not be used to
settle political scores, he said.
While Russia
has reduced its nuclear arsenal by more than 85 per cent, his Government
remains greatly concerned about global security, given the unfettered
deployment of United States anti-missile systems, its placement of military
weapons in outer space and its attempts to decrease the defence capabilities of
other countries through unilateral sanctions. This hardly creates an
environment favourable to reducing the nuclear weapons stockpile, he said.
Andrea Lee
Thompson, the U.S. Under Secretary of State for Arms Control and International
Security Affairs, said reaching a consensus at the 2020 Review Conference is
possible if parties avoid using divisions to hold the review process hostage.
“We cannot overlook the fact that the actions of those who are expanding their
nuclear stockpiles have contributed to a deterioration of the global security
environment,” she said, adding that the United States will seek a positive
outcome from the 2020 review process.
China’s
permanent representative to the UN, Ma Zhaoxu, said the NPT review process has
reached a critical state. Unilateralism and double standards in
non-proliferation continue to exist. The international community must uphold
the concept of a shared future, strengthen unity and cooperation, and steer the
2020 review process towards a unified outcome. He urged Russia and United
States to return to talks on their relevant weapons agreements. The
international community must continue to support and uphold multilateralism.
The Minister
for Europe and Foreign Affairs of France, Jean-Yves Le Drian, said that given
tensions and growing energy needs worldwide, preserving the NPT is more central
than ever before. To do so, Kuwait’s Deputy Prime Minister Abah Khalid Al Hamad
Al Sabah said, multilateralism and the principles of the United Nations Charter
remain essential tools.
Many members
underlined the need to maintain the strategic balance between the NPT’s three
pillars of nuclear disarmament, nuclear non-proliferation and access to the
peaceful uses of nuclear energy, in ways that seek to maximize their benefits
for all States parties.
Poland’s
Foreign Affairs Minister Jacek Czaputowicz regretted that of the three pillars
disarmament has produced the least results, adding that efforts remain a “work
in progress, at best”. To change that, delegates from non-nuclear-weapon States
said the instrument is complemented by the legally binding NPT.
Representatives
of Indonesia and South Africa made an impassioned plea also for facilitating
the entry into force of the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW), which
was adopted by the UN General Assembly in July 2017.
Indonesia’s
Foreign Affairs Minister Retno Lestari Priansari Marsudi said the total
elimination of nuclear weapons is the only guarantee to avoid a global
catastrophe. Expressing strong support for all three pillars –
disarmament, non-proliferation and the peaceful use of nuclear energy – she
raised concerns that the disarmament provision is the least implemented. When
non‑nuclear-weapon States give up their rights to such weapons, possessor
States must disarm their arsenals.
“With
great powers, come great responsibilities,” she said, urging nuclear‑weapon
States to set a positive example. In 2020, parties must make every effort,
including political will and flexibility, to avoid a repeat of the failure to
produce an outcome at the 2015 Review Conference.
Also the
entry into force of the TPNW will help advance the aim of totally eliminating
atomic bombs, as enshrined in Article 6 of the Non‑Proliferation Treaty. “The
human species’ survival is dependent on our collective courage to eliminate
nuclear weapons once and for all,” she said.
South
Africa’s permanent representative to the UN, Jerry Matthews Matjila, said that
his Government remains disheartened at the apparent lack of urgency and
seriousness with which nuclear disarmament has been approached in the
Non-Proliferation Treaty context.
“This state
of affairs places the Treaty, as well as its review process, under increasing
pressure and falls far short of expectations,” he said. Measurable progress –
particularly on nuclear disarmament – must therefore be a major determinant in
achieving and in sustaining international peace and security.
Matjila
said, South Africa had clearly demonstrated its commitment towards nuclear
disarmament when it deposited its instrument of ratification on the TPNW on
February 25, 2019, joining 21 other States that have ratified the instrument.
He encouraged States that have not yet done so to follow suit.
South Africa
remains a shining example of a country that went from developing its own
nuclear arsenal to dismantling it and being an outspoken advocate against these
weapons of mass destruction. [IDN-InDepthNews – 23 April 2019]
Photo:
German Foreign Affairs Minister Heiko Maas chairs the Security Council meeting
on Non-proliferation and supporting the Non-proliferation Treaty ahead of the
2020 Review Conference. 02 April 2019. United Nations, New York. Photo #
802676. UN Photo/Eskinder Debebe.
