UK continued nuclear WMD hypocrisy laid bare

Today the House of Lords International Relations Committee timely reports (https://publications.parliament.uk/pa/ld201719/ldselect/ldintrel/338/33806.htm#_idTextAnchor040) on its Inquiry into nuclear proliferation risks as the next preparatory committee (prepcom) for the Nuclear Non Proliferation Treaty (NPT) is approaching at the UN in New York, starting on 29 April, running to 10 May.

The evidence from UK ministers and officials in theForeign Office ( who are nominally in charge of  disarmament and arms control policy), brazenly justifying British retention of nuclear WMDs, while excoriating any other states aspiring to  obtain nuclear weapons for their own national defence, is stunningly and repetitiously hypocritical.

Here are some characteristic extracts cited by the report:

173.The FCO said that “Maintaining and renewing elements of a State’s nuclear deterrent capability to ensure its continued safety and reliability, including through replacement and updating of obsolete elements of the system as they reach the end of their operational life” was “a necessary aspect of being a responsible nuclear weapon state.” This was “fully consistent with obligations under the Article 6 of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty.”295

186.Ms Price* said that “as a responsible nuclear-weapons state, as long as we possess weapons we need to maintain them to make sure that they are in good condition and that we have the right arsenal for our legitimate deterrent and self-protection defence. We also need to ensure that anything obsolete is renewed.”319(emphasis added)*Sarah Price, Head of Counter Proliferation and Arms Control Centre, Foreign and Commonwealth Office

This self-serving hypocrisy was rightly and roundly criticized n by several high status witnesses, as follows

176.Scientists for Global Responsibility said that “Any and all renewal or nuclear ‘modernisation’ programmes fundamentally undermine nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation regimes”.302 From the perspective of Non-Nuclear Weapon States, Mr Kmentt** said that none of the Nuclear Weapon States had taken “significant steps to move away from their reliance on nuclear weapons”.303

**Alexander Kmentt, former Director, Department for Disarmament, Arms Control and Non-Proliferation, Austrian Federal Ministry for Europe, Integration and Foreign Affairs

188.Ms Fihn***, however, was “disappointed in the UK’s modernisation programmes of its nuclear weapons”.322 Dr Ritchie**** said “the fact that we are recapitalising our Trident SSBN programme and recommitting to nuclear deterrence for another generation, talking of being a nuclear armed state into the 2070s and 2080s and revalidating the importance and centrality of nuclear weapons for our security, cannot but undermine anything that we may do to show that we are taking short-term to long-term nuclear disarmament seriously.”323

*** Beatrice Fihn, Executive Director, International Campaign to Abolish Nuclear Weapons (ICAN), winners of the 2016 Nobel Peace Prize; ****Dr Nick Ritchie, Lecturer (International Security), University of York.

My own submission to the Committee is not cited at all by the peers, I suspect because it was so uncompromisingly critical of successive UK Government policy on nuclear weapons of mass destruction, and many peers still sadly harbor after the 1950s era of British  nuclear missiles ‘with a Union Jack on the top.’

Here is an extract of my evidence giving historical context for UK serial non- compliance with the NPT nuclear disarmament requirements on NPT signatory states, including its depositary states such as the UK.

“Up to 1968 that was a national security decision purely the responsibility of the Government of the day. Post 1968 when the UK signed the NPT, the UK possession and deployment his was no longer solely a UK national security issue, but an international legal nuclear disarmament obligation.

 

Let me demonstrate, using materials extracted from British Official diplomatic papers I discovered in the British National Archives  the differences between British official disarmament promises recorded for posterity and contrast those with the subsequent belligerent nuclear practice  of development and deployment of  Polaris and its replacement Trident nuclear WMD systems, in violation of clear NPT commitments and on-the-record pledges. 

A memorandum prepared by the Foreign Office in advance of the visit to London of the then Soviet premier, Alexei Kosygin, in February 1967, included the following final paragraph:

“We assume that the Soviet Union regard, as we do, the proposed review conference (for the NPT) as being an adequate assurance  to the non-nuclears that the military nuclear powers are serious about the need for action on nuclear disarmament.”

Nearly a year later, on 18 January 1968, Fred Mulley MP, the then Labour Minister of State for Disarmament at the Foreign Office, told the 358^th Plenary meeting of the Eighteen Nation Disarmament Committee  (ENDC) - the forerunner to the present day UN Committee on Disarmament (CD) -  in respect of the then proposed Article 6 of the nascent NPT:

“My own Government have consistently held that the  [Nuclear Nonproliferation] Treaty should and must lead to  such [nuclear ] disarmament.” (emphasis added).

He added:” If it is fair to describe the danger of proliferation as an obstacle to disarmament, it is equally fair to say that without some progress in disarmament, the NPT will not last….As I have made clear in previous speeches my Government accepts the obligation to participate fully in the negotiations required by Article 6 and it is our desire that these negotiations should begin as soon as possible (emphasis added) and should produce speedy and successful results. There is no excuse now for allowing a long delay to follow the signing of this Treaty, as happened after the Partial Test Ban Treaty, before further measures can be agreed and implemented.”

 

Mr Mulley subsequently wrote a confidential memorandum to the British Cabinet Defence and Overseas Policy Committee (OPD(68)6), on 26 January 1968, in which he set out the then policy position on NPT article 6 (which at this stage in negotiations did not yet include the clause “at an early date”):

“A number of countries may withhold their ratification of the Treaty until the nuclear weapon states show they are taking seriously the obligations which this Article imposes upon them. It will therefore be essential to follow the Treaty up quickly with further nuclear disarmament measures  (emphasis added) if it is to be brought into force and remain in force thereafter.”

 

If we leap forward nearly, nearly forty years, we can see what the then New Labour Foreign Office ministers thought about the status of British nuclear disarmament under the NPT.

 

On 10 March 2007, the then Foreign Secretary had a Letter to the Editor published in The Times, under the headline ‘Is Mr Gorbachev’s concern over Trident misplaced’ responding to an earlier letter published on 8 March, from former Soviet Union President Mikhail Gorbachev. Inter alia, She wrote:

“[By replacing Trident we will] simply enable the UK to maintain a deterrent until we can achieve our continuing objective of a world free of nuclear weapons.”

She later added:

“…We continue to encourage Russia and the US to make further bilateral [nuclear disarmament] progress. They are still some way from the point at which the part of the global stockpile that  belongs to the UK (less than 1 percent) would need to be  included  in such negotiations.”

 

A few weeks later in early May 2007 in Vienna, the then British Disarmament Ambassador, Foreign Office diplomat l John Duncan presented the UK submission to the NPT preparatory committee, asserting: "The United Kingdom is absolutely committed to the principles and practice of multilateral nuclear disarmament. Our ultimate goal remains unchanged: we will work towards a safer world free from nuclear weapons - and we stand by our unequivocal undertaking to accomplish their total elimination."

He went on to claim that the UK "continues to support the disarmament obligations set out in Article 6 of the Treaty [NPT] and has an excellent record in meeting these commitments."

This was, and remains, a contestable claim, as the Article 6 that the ambassador invoked requires the nuclear weapons states signed up to the NPT "to pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament, and on a Treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control."

Not one UK nuclear weapon or warhead had, or has since,  been withdrawn from operational service as a result of multilateral disarmament negotiations in the 50 years of the NPT, as was confirmed in a written reply on  16 May 2007 by the then defence secretary Des Browne MP ( a recent witness before this committee inquiry as Lord Browne), who told  the independent MP Dai Davies in a written reply:  “None of the [nuclear weapons reductions since 1998 ] have taken place as a result of any separate multilateral disarmament negotiations.”

And then, as now, nearly 12 years on, none of Britain's nuclear arsenal features in any nuclear disarmament negotiations. The only UK nuclear weapons withdrawn from service over the past five decades are those declared surplus to requirements by the military, by unilateral decision by Government, so they represent no reduction in nuclear reliance.

The UK  has presented a genuinely schizophrenic policy on need for retention of nuclear WMDs and aspiration towards a nuclear weapons-free world for the entire sixty year period since the NPT was signed on 5 July 1968, with justification for possession and deployment of  nuclear WMDs coming alongside pledges for nuclear disarmament, but never  quite yet.

 

On 25^th June 2007, Margaret Becket MP made a valedictory speech as British foreign Secretary at the annual Carnegie Endowment Non Proliferation conference in Washington DC. She told delegates robustly in her keynote speech:

“What we need is both vision - a scenario for a world free of nuclear weapons. And action - progressive steps to reduce warhead numbers and to limit the role of nuclear weapons in security policy. These two strands are separate but they are mutually reinforcing. Both are necessary, both at the moment too weak. …. Weak action on disarmament, weak consensus on proliferation are in none of our interests… we need the international community to be foursquare and united behind the global non-proliferation regime…. So we have grounds for optimism; but none for complacency. The successes we have had in the past have not come about by accident but by applied effort. We will need much more of the same in the months and years to come. That will mean continued momentum and consensus on non-proliferation, certainly. But, and this is my main argument today, the chances of achieving that are greatly increased if we can also point to genuine commitment and concrete action on nuclear disarmament.(emphasis added) …After all, we all signed up to the goal of the eventual abolition of nuclear weapons back in 1968; so what does simply restating that goal achieve today? More than you might imagine. Because, and I'll be blunt, there are some who are in danger of losing faith in the possibility of ever reaching that goal.

When it comes to building this new impetus for global nuclear disarmament, I want the UK to be at the forefront of both the thinking and the practical work. To be, as it were, a ‘disarmament laboratory.’”

Here are some of the better conclusions by the Lords’ International Relations Committee

167.The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty remains a critical part of international security. The success of the treaty will remain of central importance to the UK’s security and to the rules-based international order as a whole.

169.The presence of nuclear-armed states outside the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty remains a challenge. The UK should pursue opportunities to include nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament in its bilateral discussions with India, Pakistan and Israel.

170.Although nuclear possessor states outside the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty are unlikely to disarm in the short term, the UK should continue to advocate for the universalisation of the treaty.

171.Largely as a result of the worsening security environment, global progress towards disarmament has stalled. We urge the Government to set out its view on what the necessary global conditions for disarmament would be, and use its position in the P5 to encourage progress under this pillar of the NPT.

263.We also believe however that the increasing signs of division between Nuclear and Non-Nuclear Weapon States are matters of concern, and that the dissatisfaction of the Ban Treaty’s proponents with the status quo on disarmament should be taken seriously. We therefore recommend that the Government should adopt a less aggressive tone about this treaty and seek opportunities to work with its supporters towards the aims of Article 6 of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, which concerns disarmament.

264.More openness from the UK, as a responsible nuclear state, on the possible humanitarian impact of nuclear weapons, and a willingness to engage on developing strategies to manage the consequences of nuclear weapons use, would be welcome.

The fingering of Israel as an undeclared nuclear WMD state is welcome, and should certainly be acted upon by British ministers, diplomats and officials in New York later this month.

However, some conclusions are really inexplicable, including this one:

168.The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty’s successes—near-universal membership, a considerable reduction in nuclear stockpiles since the 1980s, and the establishment of an international norm against new states acquiring nuclear weapons—should be lauded.

None of the reductions of stockpiles of British nuclear warheads since 1968 were undertaken within the auspices of the NPT, a multilateral treaty, but were carried out unilaterally.

The UK has persistently  despised and ignored the obligation British officials themselves wrote into Article 6 of the NPT that all signatory parties, including the UK, should be engaged in multilateral nuclear disarmament in good faith toward s nuclear disarmament “at an early date” That was a commitment voluntarily entered into by the UK fifty one years ago: it has been abrogated ever since

 

 

 

Backstory

Threat of nuclear weapons use has risen, says Lords Committee

https://www.parliament.uk/business/committees/committees-a-z/lords-select/international-relations-committee/news-parliament-2017/rising-nuclear-risk-disarmament-and-the-nuclear-non-proliferation-treaty-report-published/

24 April 2019

The International Relations  Committee publishes its report "Rising nuclear risk, disarmament and the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty"

• Report: Rising nuclear risk, disarmament and the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (HTML)
• Report: Rising nuclear risk, disarmament and the Nuclear Nin-Proliferation Treaty (PDF)
• Inquiry: Then Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and disarmament

Background

Just days before states convene for the 2019 Preparatory Committee of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty Review Conference at the UN in New York, the House of Lords International Relations Committee has called on the Government to address grave concerns about the deteriorating state of nuclear diplomacy.

Chairman's comments

Commenting on the report, the Chairman of the Committee, Lord Howell of Guildford said:

"We are now dangerously close to a world without arms control agreements, paving the way for a new arms race and for increased risk of nuclear weapons use. Disintegrating relationships between nuclear possessor states, new capabilities and technologies, mixed with a lack of communication and understanding, mean that the risk of nuclear weapons being used is greater now than it has been since the Cold War.

"The 2019 Preparatory Committee for the 2020 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty Review Conference next week is an opportunity to push for an increase in dialogue and transparency between the Nuclear Weapon States to show a demonstrable commitment to disarmament. We urge the Government to take our serious concerns into consideration, and use the Preparatory Committee to address them."

Conclusions and recommendations

The Committee's main concerns are that:

• Misunderstanding, miscalculation or mistakes could lead to the use of nuclear weapons. There is a lack of understanding between nuclear possessor states on their respective nuclear doctrines and declaratory policies, for example what the response would be to a cyber-attack on a country's nuclear command and control system.
• Reckless nuclear rhetoric in an era of digital communications could lead to a misunderstanding, and therefore the use of nuclear weapons.
• Largely as a result of the worsening security environment, global progress towards disarmament has stalled. Tensions between Nuclear and Non-Nuclear Weapon States regarding the pace of disarmament puts pressure on the existing non-proliferation regime in the run-up to the 2020 NPT Review Conference.
• Global nuclear non-proliferation efforts have been undermined by the US's decision to withdraw from the Iran nuclear deal.
• The collapse of nuclear arms control agreements, such as the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty, risks further increasing the possibility that nuclear weapons could be used.

The Committee is calling on the Government to:

• Encourage greater dialogue between all nuclear possessor states about nuclear risk, to reduce global tensions. In particular the Government and NATO must talk to Russia about nuclear strategic stability.
• Seek to reduce tensions between Nuclear and Non-Nuclear Weapon States in advance of the 2020 NPT Review Conference, including by adopting a less aggressive tone towards the Ban Treaty and its supporters.
• Continue efforts to defend and uphold the Iran nuclear deal.
• Use ongoing discussions in NATO to promote either a revival of the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty, or at least, to avoid the deployment of intermediate-range missiles in Europe.
• Use the UK's upcoming Chairmanship of the P5 group as an opportunity to discuss risk reduction and transparency between the Nuclear Weapons States, and to strengthen the Non-Proliferation Treaty regime, including encouraging the Nuclear Weapons States to show a demonstrable commitment to disarmament.

 

Appendix 2: List of Witnesses

Evidence is published at www.parliament.uk/intl-relations and available for inspection at the Parliamentary Archives (020 7219 3074).

Evidence received by the Committee is listed below in chronological order of oral evidence session and in alphabetical order. Those witnesses marked with ** gave both oral and written evidence. Those marked with * gave oral evidence and did not submit any written evidence. All other witnesses submitted written evidence only.

Oral evidence in chronological order

*	Izumi Nakamitsu, Under-Secretary-General and High Representative for Disarmament Affairs, United Nations	QQ 1–12
*	Sarah Price, Head of Counter Proliferation and Arms Control Centre, Foreign and Commonwealth Office	QQ 13–26
*	Shatabhisha Shetty, Deputy Director, European Leadership Network	QQ 27–34
*	Paul Ingram, Executive Director, British American Security Information Council	QQ 27–34
**	Tom Plant, Director, Proliferation and Nuclear Policy, Royal United Services Institute	QQ 35–48
**	The Rt Hon Lord Browne of Ladyton, former Secretary of State for Defence, and Vice-Chair, Nuclear Threat Initiative	QQ 49–56
**	Dr Rebecca Johnson, Executive Director, Acronym Institute for Disarmament Diplomacy	QQ 57–64
**	Dr Hassan Elbahtimy, Lecturer in Science and Security, King’s College London	QQ 57–64
*	Andrea Berger, then Senior Research Associate and Senior Program Manager, James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies	QQ 65–76
*	Sir Simon Gass KCMG CVO, former British Ambassador to Iran and former Political Director, Foreign and Commonwealth Office	QQ 65–76
*	Rear Admiral John Gower CB OBE, former Assistant Chief of Defence Staff (Nuclear, Chemical, Biological), Ministry of Defence	QQ 77–86
*	François Heisbourg, Special Adviser, Fondation pour la recherche stratégique, and Senior Adviser for Europe, International Institute for Strategic Studies	QQ 87–93
**	Alexander Kmentt, former Director, Department for Disarmament, Arms Control and Non-Proliferation, Austrian Federal Ministry for Europe, Integration and Foreign Affairs	QQ 87–93
**	Jessica Cox, Director, Nuclear Policy Directorate, NATO	QQ 94–101
*	Beatrice Fihn, Executive Director, International Campaign to Abolish Nuclear Weapons (ICAN)	QQ 102–112
**	Dr Nick Ritchie, Lecturer (International Security), University of York	QQ 102–112
*	Alexandra Bell, Senior Policy Director, Center for Arms Control and Non-Proliferation	QQ 113–120
**	Dr Oliver Meier, Deputy Head, International Security Division, German Institute for International Affairs	QQ 113–120
**	Dr Tong Zhao, Fellow, Carnegie-Tsinghua Center for Global Policy, Beijing	QQ 121–127
*	Dr Anastasia Malygina, Associate Professor, School of International Relations, St Petersburg University	QQ 128–133
*	Dr Rafael Grossi, Permanent Representative of Argentina to the International Organisations in Vienna and President-designate of the 2020 NPT Review Conference	QQ 134–143
*	Bert Koenders, former Minister of Foreign Affairs, Kingdom of the Netherlands	QQ 144–151
**	The Rt Hon Sir Alan Duncan KCMG MP, Minister of State for Europe and the Americas, Foreign and Commonwealth Office	QQ 152–165
	Sarah Price, Head of Counter Proliferation and Arms Control Centre, Foreign and Commonwealth Office	QQ 152–165
	James Franklin, Deputy Director, Defence Nuclear Policy, Ministry of Defence	QQ 152–165

Alphabetical list of all witnesses

	Article 36	NPT0025
	Andrey Baklitskiy, Consultant, PIR Centre	NPT0046
	Diana Ballestas de Dietrich, Former Policy and Strategy Officer of the Office of the Executive Secretary of the Preparatory Commission of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization	NPT0027
	The Baptist Union of Great Britain, the Church of Scotland, the Methodist Church in Britain and the United Reformed Church	NPT0013
*	Alexandra Bell, Senior Policy Director, Center for Arms Control and Non-Proliferation (QQ 113–120)
*	Andrea Berger, then Senior Research Associate and Senior Program Manager, James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies (QQ 65–76)
	British American Security Information Council (BASIC)	NPT0020
**	The Rt Hon Lord Browne of Ladyton, former Secretary of State for Defence, and Vice-Chair, Nuclear Threat Initiative (QQ 49–56)	NPT0044
	Dr Lyndon Burford, Postdoctoral Research Associate, Department of War Studies, Centre for Science and Security Studies (CCSS), King’s College London	NPT0032 NPT0043
	Dr James Cameron Postdoctoral Research Associate, Department of War Studies, Centre for Science and Security Studies (CCSS), King’s College London	NPT0032
	Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament	NPT0022
	CBW Events	NPT0026
	Christian Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament	NPT0011
	Dr Jenny Clegg, former Senior Lecturer, University of Central Lancashire	NPT0021
	Dr Avner Cohen, Professor and Senior Fellow, The Middlebury Institute of international Studies at Monterey	NPT0048
**	Jessica Cox, Director, Nuclear Policy Directorate, NATO (QQ 94–101)	NPT0039
	Mr Brian Drummond	NPT0008
**	The Rt Hon Sir Alan Duncan MP, Minister of State for Europe and the Americas, Foreign and Commonwealth Office (QQ 152–165)	NPT0040 NPT0050
**	Dr Hassan Elbahtimy, Lecturer in Science and Security, Centre for Science and Security Studies (CCSS), King’s College London (QQ 57–64)	NPT0032
	Christopher Evans, PhD Candidate, University of Reading School of Law	NPT0006
	Professor Gareth Evans, Chancellor, Australian National University, and former Australian Minister for Foreign Affairs	NPT0036
	Martin Everett, Centre for Science and Security Studies (CCSS), King’s College London	NPT0032
	Executive Committee of British Pugwash	NPT0003
*	Beatrice Fihn, Executive Director, International Campaign to Abolish Nuclear Weapons (ICAN) (QQ 102–112)
	Foreign and Commonwealth Office	NPT0035
	James Franklin, Deputy Director of Defence Nuclear Policy, Ministry of Defence (QQ 152–165)
*	Sir Simon Gass KCMG CVO, former British Ambassador to Iran and former Political Director, Foreign and Commonwealth Office (QQ 65–76)
*	Rear Admiral John Gower CB OBE, former Assistant Chief of Defence Staff (Nuclear, Chemical, Biological), Ministry of Defence (QQ 77–86)
*	Dr Rafael Grossi, Permanent Representative of Argentina to the International Organisations in Vienna and President-designate of the 2020 NPT Review Conference (QQ 134–143)
	Harvard Law School’s International Human Rights Clinic	NPT0009
*	François Heisbourg, Special Adviser, Fondation pour la recherche stratégique, and Senior Adviser for Europe, International Institute for Strategic Studies (QQ 87–93)
	Dr Christopher Hobbs, Reader in Science and Security, War Studies Department, Centre for Science and Security Studies (CCSS), King’s College London	NPT00032
*	Paul Ingram, Executive Director, British American Security Information Council (QQ 27–34)
	International Campaign to Abolish Nuclear Weapons	NPT00022
**	Dr Rebecca Johnson, Executive Director, Acronym Institute for Disarmament Diplomacy (QQ 57–64)	NPT0034
	Dr Ben Kienzle, Senior Lecturer, Defence Studies Department, Centre for Science and Security Studies (CCSS), King’s College London	NPT0032
**	Alexander Kmentt, former Director, Department for Disarmament, Arms Control and Non-Proliferation, Austrian Federal Ministry for Europe, Integration and Foreign Affairs (QQ 87–93)	NPT0047
*	Bert Koenders, former Minister of Foreign Affairs, Kingdom of the Netherlands (QQ 144–151)
	Matt Korda, Research Associate, Nuclear Information Project	NPT0041
	A. Vinod Kumar, Associate Fellow, Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses, New Delhi	NPT0015
	Dr Nicola Leveringhaus, Lecturer, War Studies Department, Centre for Science and Security Studies (CCSS), King’s College London	NPT0032
	Dr David Lowry, Senior International Research Fellow, Institute for Resource and Security Studies	NPT0031
*	Dr Anastasia Malygina, Associate Professor, School of International Relations, St Petersburg University (QQ 128–133)
	Medact	NPT0014
**	Dr Oliver Meier, Deputy Head, International Security Division, German Institute for International Affairs (QQ113–120)	NPT0045
	Baroness Susan Miller, Co-President, Parliamentarians for Nuclear Non Proliferation and Disarmament	NPT0001
	Franklin Miller KBE	NPT0042
	Dr Adil Sultan Muhammad, Visiting Research Fellow, War Studies Department, Centre for Science and Security Studies (CCSS), King’s College London	NPT0032
*	Izumi Nakamitsu, Under-Secretary-General and High Representative for Disarmament Affairs, United Nations (QQ 1–12)
	Northern Friends Peace Board	NPT0019
	Nuclear Free Local Authorities	NPT0002
	Andrew Olivo, PgCert, Nuclear Deterrence, Harvard Extension School, Harvard University	NPT00016
	Dr Rishi Paul, South Asia Analyst, British American Security Information Council	NPT0024
	PAX	NPT0018
	Dr William Perry, former US Secretary of Defense	NPT0033
**	Tom Plant, Director, Proliferation and Nuclear Policy, Royal United Services Institute (QQ 35–48)	NPT00037
	Preparatory Commission for the Comprehensive Test-Ban-Treaty Organisation	NPT0049
*	Sarah Price, Head of Counter Proliferation and Arms Control Centre, Foreign and Commonwealth Office (QQ 13–26) (QQ 152–165)
**	Dr Nick Ritchie, Lecturer (International Security), University of York (QQ 102–112)	NPT0010
	Dr Brad Roberts, former US Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Nuclear and Missile Defense Policy	NPT0029
	Paul Schulte, Honorary Professor, Institute for Conflict, Cooperation and Security, University of Birmingham	NPT0030
	Scientists for Global Responsibility	NPT0017
	Scottish Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament	NPT0004
*	Shatabhisha Shetty, Deputy Director, European Leadership Network (QQ 27–34)
	Trident Ploughshares	NPT0005
	Dr Sarah Tzinieris, Research Fellow, War Studies Department, Centre for Science and Security Studies (CCSS), King’s College London	NPT0032
	United Nations Association-UK	NPT0028
	Cristina Varriale, Research Fellow–Proliferation and Nuclear Policy, Royal United Services Institute	NPT0037
	Professor Nicholas J. Wheeler, Director of the Institute for Conflict, Cooperation and Security, University of Birmingham	NPT0030
	Women’s International League for Peace and Freedom UK	NPT0023
**	Dr Tong Zhao, Fellow, Carnegie-Tsinghua Center for Global Policy, Beijing (QQ 121–127)	NPT0038

 

Dr David Lowry, Senior International Research Fellow, Institute for Resource and Security Studies – Written evidence (NPT0031)

 

Questions

Nuclear risk

1.            What is your evaluation of the current level of risk that nuclear weapons, of any type, could be used?

“For more than sixty years, good management and good fortune have meant that nuclear arsenals have not been used. But we cannot rely on history just to repeat itself.”

- Rt Hon Margaret Beckett MP, when Foreign Secretary, speech in Washington DC, 25 June 2007

 

Very high, as all nuclear WMDs are held by Governments such as the UK which mistakenly believe their possession adds to national security, rather than undermining it. This creates the conditions for almost certain accidents. Let me give the most celebrated example of the deadly danger of so-called nuclear deterrence: it is from the Daily Telegraph obituary on 18 September 2017 of Lieutenant Colonel Stanislav Petrov, who has been dubbed ‘The Man Who Saved the World.’[1]

“Stanislav Petrov, a lieutenant colonel in the Soviet Air Defence Forces, was the officer on duty at the Soviet Union’s early warning centre when malfunctioning computers signaled the United States had launched missiles at the country in September 1983.[2]His decision to ignore warnings is credited with averting Atomic Armageddon. On the night of September 26, 1983, he was on duty at the Soviet Union’s early warning centre near Moscow when computers warned that the United States had fired five nuclear missiles at the country. The 1983 false alarm is perhaps the closest the world has come to nuclear war"

The machine indicated the information was of the highest certainty," Petrov later recalled. "On the wall big red letters burnt the word: START. That meant the missile had definitely been fired."

He had just minutes to decide whether to assess the attack as genuine and inform the Kremlin that the United States was starting World War Three - or tell his commanders that the Soviet Union's early warning system was faulty.Guessing that a genuine American attack would have involved hundreds of missiles, he put the alarm down to a computer malfunction.

Lt Col Petrov was vindicated when an internal investigation following the incident concluded that Soviet satellites had mistaken sunlight reflected on clouds for rocket engines. The Soviet government’s policy in the event of a US nuclear attack was to launch an immediate and all-out retaliatory strike in accordance with the principle of Mutually Assured Destruction. 

Although Petrov was feted by his colleagues and initially praised by superiors for his actions, he was not rewarded.He later complained that he was scolded by superiors for failing to complete a routine paperwork during the incident and had been scapegoated by generals embarrassed by the failure of the early warning system.”

I saw the Danish documentary film The Man Who Saved The World that recounted these events at an international nuclear disarmament conference on the Humanitarian Impact of Nuclear Weapons organised by the Austrian foreign ministry in December 2014, along with several US nuclear weapons experts. It was chilling experience for each of us.[3]

For a very detailed survey of other such  incidents, called “Broken Arrows” in the understated language of nuclear weapons risk experts, see the report published by the distinguished international affairs London think tank, Chatham House in April 2014, under the title: ‘Too Close for Comfort: Cases of Near Nuclear Use and Options for Policy,’ by Dr Patricia Lewis, research director for international security, and her colleagues Dr Heather Williams, Sasan Aghlani, and
Benoît Pelopidas.[4]

 

 

The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty

2. Ahead of the 2020 Review Conference of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), what are the biggest challenges facing global nuclear diplomacy?

In my view the continued blatant violation by the UK of its legal obligations to be engaged in good faith negotiations towards nuclear disarmament, as stipulated by Article 6 of the NPT. The UK is the worst violator because it is a depositary state ( with  the US and Russia, originally the USSR, who have entered into several nuclear arms control and disarmament negotiations in SALT 1 &2, START, and INF) ), charged with protecting the interests of signatory members states. China and France, as later nuclear weapon state signatories to the NPT, are also in violation, but do not have depositary state status.

Current Defence Secretary Gavin Williamson told MPs in Defence Questions on 14 January 2019 that “We constantly have discussions right across Government to make sure that our continuous at-sea nuclear deterrence can be sustained… and will continue to do so in the long term.. our nuclear deterrent has kept Britain, and also our NATO partners, safe over 50 years… We have to recognise the need to invest in a whole spectrum of different capabilities, [including] nuclear deterrence..”.[5]

 

This contemporary ministerial assertion in respect of the continuous requirement for British nuclear weapons could have been cited from defence ministers going back over 67 years.

 

Up to 1968 that was a national security decision purely the responsibility of the Government of the day. Post 1968 when the UK signed the NPT, the UK possession and deployment his was no longer solely a UK national security issue, but an international legal nuclear disarmament obligation.

 

Let me demonstrate, using materials extracted from British Official diplomatic papers I discovered in the British National Archives  the differences between British official disarmament promises recorded for posterity and contrast those with the subsequent belligerent nuclear practice  of development and deployment of  Polaris and its replacement Trident nuclear WMD systems, in violation of clear NPT commitments and on-the-record pledges. 

A memorandum prepared by the Foreign Office in advance of the visit to London of the then Soviet premier, Alexei Kosygin, in February 1967, included the following final paragraph:

“We assume that the Soviet Union regard, as we do, the proposed review conference (for the NPT) as being an adequate assurance  to the non-nuclears that the military nuclear powers are serious about the need for action on nuclear disarmament.”

Nearly a year later, on 18 January 1968, Fred Mulley MP, the then Labour Minister of State for Disarmament at the Foreign Office, told the 358^th Plenary meeting of the Eighteen Nation Disarmament Committee  (ENDC) - the forerunner to the present day UN Committee on Disarmament (CD) -  in respect of the then proposed Article 6 of the nascent NPT:

“My own Government have consistently held that the  [Nuclear Nonproliferation] Treaty should and must lead to  such [nuclear ] disarmament.” (emphasis added).

He added:” If it is fair to describe the danger of proliferation as an obstacle to disarmament, it is equally fair to say that without some progress in disarmament, the NPT will not last….As I have made clear in previous speeches my Government accepts the obligation to participate fully in the negotiations required by Article 6 and it is our desire that these negotiations should begin as soon as possible (emphasis added) and should produce speedy and successful results. There is no excuse now for allowing a long delay to follow the signing of this Treaty, as happened after the Partial Test Ban Treaty, before further measures can be agreed and implemented.”

 

Mr Mulley subsequently wrote a confidential memorandum to the British Cabinet Defence and Overseas Policy Committee (OPD(68)6), on 26 January 1968, in which he set out the then policy position on NPT article 6 (which at this stage in negotiations did not yet include the clause “at an early date”):

“A number of countries may withhold their ratification of the Treaty until the nuclear weapon states show they are taking seriously the obligations which this Article imposes upon them. It will therefore be essential to follow the Treaty up quickly with further nuclear disarmament measures  (emphasis added) if it is to be brought into force and remain in force thereafter.”

 

If we leap forward nearly, nearly forty years, we can see what the then New Labour Foreign Office ministers thought about the status of British nuclear disarmament under the NPT.

 

On 10 March 2007, the then Foreign Secretary had a Letter to the Editor published in The Times, under the headline ‘Is Mr Gorbachev’s concern over Trident misplaced’ responding to an earlier letter published on 8 March, from former Soviet Union President Mikhail Gorbachev. Inter alia, She wrote:

“[By replacing Trident we will] simply enable the UK to maintain a deterrent until we can achieve our continuing objective of a world free of nuclear weapons.”

She later added:

“…We continue to encourage Russia and the US to make further bilateral [nuclear disarmament] progress. They are still some way from the point at which the part of the global stockpile that  belongs to the UK (less than 1 percent) would need to be  included  in such negotiations.”

 

A few weeks later in early May 2007 in Vienna, the then British Disarmament Ambassador, Foreign Office diplomat l John Duncan presented the UK submission to the NPT preparatory committee, asserting: "The United Kingdom is absolutely committed to the principles and practice of multilateral nuclear disarmament. Our ultimate goal remains unchanged: we will work towards a safer world free from nuclear weapons - and we stand by our unequivocal undertaking to accomplish their total elimination."

He went on to claim that the UK "continues to support the disarmament obligations set out in Article 6 of the Treaty [NPT] and has an excellent record in meeting these commitments."

This was, and remains, a contestable claim, as the Article 6 that the ambassador invoked requires the nuclear weapons states signed up to the NPT "to pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament, and on a Treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control."

Not one UK nuclear weapon or warhead had, or has since,  been withdrawn from operational service as a result of multilateral disarmament negotiations in the 50 years of the NPT, as was confirmed in a written reply on  16 May 2007 by the then defence secretary Des Browne MP ( a recent witness before this committee inquiry as Lord Browne), who told  the independent MP Dai Davies in a written reply:  “None of the [nuclear weapons reductions since 1998 ] have taken place as a result of any separate multilateral disarmament negotiations.” [6]

And then, as now, nearly 12 years on, none of Britain's nuclear arsenal features in any nuclear disarmament negotiations. The only UK nuclear weapons withdrawn from service over the past five decades are those declared surplus to requirements by the military, by unilateral decision by Government, so they represent no reduction in nuclear reliance.

The UK  has presented a genuinely schizophrenic policy on need for retention of nuclear WMDs and aspiration towards a nuclear weapons-free world for the entire sixty year period since the NPT was signed on 5 July 1968, with justification for possession and deployment of  nuclear WMDs coming alongside pledges for nuclear disarmament, but never  quite yet.

 

On 25^th June 2007, Margaret Becket MP made a valedictory speech as British foreign Secretary at the annual Carnegie Endowment Non Proliferation conference in Washington DC. She told delegates robustly in her keynote speech:

“What we need is both vision - a scenario for a world free of nuclear weapons. And action - progressive steps to reduce warhead numbers and to limit the role of nuclear weapons in security policy. These two strands are separate but they are mutually reinforcing. Both are necessary, both at the moment too weak. …. Weak action on disarmament, weak consensus on proliferation are in none of our interests… we need the international community to be foursquare and united behind the global non-proliferation regime…. So we have grounds for optimism; but none for complacency. The successes we have had in the past have not come about by accident but by applied effort. We will need much more of the same in the months and years to come. That will mean continued momentum and consensus on non-proliferation, certainly. But, and this is my main argument today, the chances of achieving that are greatly increased if we can also point to genuine commitment and concrete action on nuclear disarmament.(emphasis added) …After all, we all signed up to the goal of the eventual abolition of nuclear weapons back in 1968; so what does simply restating that goal achieve today? More than you might imagine. Because, and I'll be blunt, there are some who are in danger of losing faith in the possibility of ever reaching that goal.

When it comes to building this new impetus for global nuclear disarmament, I want the UK to be at the forefront of both the thinking and the practical work. To be, as it were, a "disarmament laboratory".[7]

 

I would suggest to the Committee they might ask their witnesses from the Foreign Office how their former Foreign Secretary’s vison for nuclear disarmament  has been realized across the  subsequent 12 years. My own assessment set out above suggests extreme “bad faith” by successive administrations with many vague promises of supporting a nuclear weapons free world, but zero UK nuclear weapons entered into nuclear disarmament negotiations and a £205 billion Trident nuclear WMD renewal programme underway

 

a. To what extent do states still view the NPT as relevant?

I think it was a huge error of the non-nuclear weapons member states of the NPT to agree under  political pressure to the indefinite extension of the NPT the 1995 NPT review Conference, because, by so doing they  removed the leverage they had to  force compliance by the nuclear weapons states parties to  comply with the exigencies of Article 6 of the NPT.

b. What are the prospects for other components of the nuclear non-proliferation regime, such as the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban-Treaty (CTBT)?

Whilst NWS violate their solemn obligations under existing multilateral arms control treaties, poor.

 

c. How important are these agreements to the wider rules-based international order?

 

They would be  infinitely improved if the UK, along with the other nuclear  weapons states parties, were abide by their  NPT Article 6 obligations, in the same way that the 190 or so  non-nuclear weapons states, such as Iran, have fully abided by theirs. But if the UK continues to play fast and  loose with rules, only following those it cherry picks as suiting itself, this will erode, undermine and ultimately  destroy the  rules based international security order, as it demonstrates contempt towards such international norms of compliance.

 

Here is what Reaching Critical Will -  A programme of the Women’s International League for Peace and Freedom WILPF) - said in its October 2013 pamphlet, Preventing Collapse – the NPT and a Ban on Nuclear Weapons,  on this question:

 

“The promise of the NPT to achieve nuclear disarma­ment has gone unfulfilled while new restrictions to guard against proliferation have been imposed. Nuclear-armed states modernize and maintain their nuclear arsenals in a way that belies their legal obli­gations to pursue disarmament.The “step-by-step” agenda for nuclear disarmament has not achieved interim objectives such as entry into force of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, negotiations of a fis­sile materials cut-off treaty, or full implementation of the 2010 NPT action plan, let alone the requirement of elimination.Some NPT state parties have engaged in nuclear-related cooperation with non-state parties, directly or indirectly facilitating their nuclear weapons programmes.” [8]

 

 

         d. To what extent does the existence of three nuclear armed states outside the NPT (India, Israel and Pakistan) destabilise the overall regime?

 

All three, along with North Korea, are very dangerous and have significantly undermined their own – and their regional- security by developing and deploying nuclear weapons.

 

Here is an extract from the influential Indian daily newspaper, The Hindustan Times, looking back last year to twenty years of the nuclear-weapons stand- off between India and Pakistan:

“Two nuclear-armed neighbours outside the NPT regime, their ties marked by constant strains, couldn’t move beyond the basics in building mutual confidence on the nuclear issue. The two countries annually exchange a list of their nuclear installations…”[9]

India has a nuclear doctrine of no first use. Pakistan’s nuclear doctrine resembles that of the US during the Cold War: if the integrity of the country is being threatened, it reserves the right to use nuclear weapons.[10]

 

The nuclear situation in the sub-Continent

Here is what the India’s Foreign minister Vijay Gokhale told a forum, the 1st Disarmament and International Security Affairs Fellowship organised by the Ministry of External Affairs at the Indian Foreign Services Institute, backed by the United Nations Under Secretary General and High Representative for Disarmament Izumi Nakamitsu, earlier in January 2019.

“India's nuclear doctrine is based on a policy of minimum credible deterrence with a posture of no-first-use and non-use of atomic weapons against non-nuclear weapon states.” (Emphasis added)
(India's nuclear doctrine based on policy of minimum credible deterrence: Foreign Secretary Vijay Gokhale.[11]

It is clear this rational directly reflects the justification the UK Government persistently uses to defend maintenance of British nuclear WMDs.

 

 

 

e. What prospects are there for a Middle East WMD free zone?

 

The only nuclear-armed state in the Middle East is Israel. It does not possess its 200 nuclear warheads for national survival or deterrence, but has threatened to use them against non- nuclear neighbouring states. One such documented incidence came in the 7-day war in 1967, according to an exclusive report in the New York Times, which began:

 

“On the eve of the Arab-Israeli war, 50 years ago this week, Israeli officials raced to assemble an atomic device and developed a plan to detonate it atop a mountain in the Sinai Peninsula as a warning to Egyptian and other Arab forces..”.[12]

 

 

Interestingly, on 19 April 2018  the United States Government issued a working  paper to the preparatory  committee for the  Review Conference of the Nuclear Non Proliferation Treaty (NPT) currently ongoing in Geneva,  entitled “Establishing regional conditions conducive to a Middle East free of weapons of mass destruction and delivery systems,”.[13]

 

This seven page paper asserts: “Over the course of recent decades, a number

of regional States, including Iraq, Iran (Islamic Republic of), Libya and the Syrian

Arab Republic, have all pursued undeclared weapons of mass destruction-related

programs and activities, in violation of arms control obligation.”

 

But it omitted to make mention of Israel, the only nation in the region possessing nuclear weapons, and which refuses to join the NPT. Such partial politics is very bad diplomacy.

 

However, there are some positive possibilities: Just over ten years ago, Israel took virtually unreported steps that might achieve the national security it understandably seeks in the region by divesting itself of its own nuclear weapons in multilateral regional negotiations.

 
At the completely overlooked Paris Summit of Mediterranean countries, held on 13 July 2008, under the co-presidency of the French Republic and the Arab Republic of Egypt and in the presence of Israel - which was represented by its then Prime Minister, Ehud Olmert -  the issue of peace within the region were explored in depth, and the final declaration stated the participants were  in favour of:

"regional security by acting in favour of nuclear, chemical and biological non-proliferation through adherence to and compliance with a combination of international and regional nonproliferation regimes and arms control and disarmament agreements.."
 
The final document goes on to say:
"The parties shall pursue a mutually and effectively verifiable Middle East Zone free of weapons of mass destruction, nuclear, chemical and biological, and their delivery systems. Furthermore the parties will consider practical steps to prevent the proliferation of nuclear, chemical and biological weapons as well as excessive accumulation of conventional arms; refrain from developing military capacity beyond their legitimate defence requirements, at the same time reaffirming their resolve to achieve the same degree of security and mutual confidence with the lowest possible levels of troops and weaponry and adherence to CCW (the convention on certain conventional weapons) promote conditions likely to develop good-neighbourly relations among themselves and support processes aimed at stability, security"[14]

 

This declaration was cited in a speech made by the current leader of the Labour Party, a long standing advocate of a WMD-free zone in the Middle East,  in a debate on the NPT  held 11 Nov 2009, which I commend to the Committee.[15]

 

The United States

3. To what extent will the United States’ withdrawal from the Iran nuclear deal, as well as US efforts to achieve the denuclearisation of the Korean Peninsula, affect the wider nuclear non-proliferation regime?

 

The US Administration’s withdrawal from the multilateral Iran nuclear deal is both bad diplomacy, in its unilateral renunciation of multilateral treaty which undermines the US reliability as a partner in all other multilateral treaties to which it is a signatory party,  and is based on demonstrable deliberately distorted intelligence. It is reported widely that the other parties to the treaty, and very importantly  the International Atomic Energy Agency, as the agreed verification body of the , that Iran is in compliance.[16]

 

Current US National Security Advisor, Ambassador John Bolton, has resurrected the distortion of intelligence he has promoted in the past, and was catastrophically misused by the George W Bush US administration in 2002-3 to justify the invasion of  Iraq, which has led to hug loss of life, destruction of civil society and economic and political chaos in Iraq ever since. One US-based British commentator on middle  east security issues, Mehdi Hasan, recently wrote

“In March 2015, Bolton, then a private citizen, wrote an op-ed for the New York Times headlined, “To Stop Iran’s Bomb, Bomb Iran.” In July 2017, just eight months prior to joining the Trump administration, Bolton told a gathering of the cultish Iranian exile group Mujahedin-e-Khalq that “the declared policy of the United States of America should be the overthrow of the mullahs’ regime in Tehran” and that “before 2019, we here will celebrate in Tehran.”[17]

 

The initiative taken by Presidents Trump and Kim Jon-un to meet bilaterally in Singapore on 12 June 2018 to discuss ways of tension reduction and eventual denuclearisation on the Korean Peninsula is very much to be welcomed. One experienced, sage  US commentator set out a possible – and sensible - diplomatic agenda “

An early goal should be to reach a common understanding, in writing, about what denuclearization entails — a crucial detail left out of the Singapore summit joint statement. A good basis would be the 1992 Joint Declaration on Denuclearization by North and South Korea.

Next, the United States will want North Korea to solidify its voluntary nuclear test moratorium by signing the 1996 Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty and expand on its missile testing halt to include an end to new ballistic missile production. It also will be crucial to secure a pledge from North Korea to halt fissile material production. These steps would help ensure that North Korea cannot expand its arsenal while negotiations continue.

Another early goal should be to secure North Korea’s commitment to deliver a full declaration of its nuclear infrastructure, materials, and weapons to be verified later by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) using guidelines and techniques established by the IAEA Model Additional Protocol for nuclear safeguards.

Further, the two sides will need to agree to a process and a timeline for dismantling North Korea’s stockpile of 10 to 50 nuclear weapons and securing separated fissile material. This work would likely have to be supervised by specialists from nuclear-weapon states in cooperation with North Korean technical experts.”

(“After the Singapore Summit,” Arms Control Today, July/August 2018, briefing by Daryl G Kimball, Executive Director of US Arms Control Association;[18]

Interested parties and other regional Governments back the initiative, but want wider involvement. For example “President Trump should refrain from acting on his own, and actively implement measures to achieve North Korea's denuclearization through team play by the U.S. government. In doing so, it would be helpful to listen humbly to the opinions of its allies including Japan.” [19]

My own commentary on the Singapore summit, pointing out how British nuclear technology helped North Korea make both plutonium and enriched uranium for its military nuclear programme.[20]

 

 

 

 

 

 

Nuclear arms control

4. To what extent and why are existing nuclear arms control agreements being challenged, particularly the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty (INF) and the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (New START), and what prospect is there for further such agreements? What prospects are there of progress in negotiating a Fissile Material Cut-Off Treaty (FMCT)?

 

As mentioned in response to Q3. it is very bad diplomatic practice for a signatory state to unilaterally abrogate a treaty, even if it gives advance notice of its intention to do so.[21]

 

I have always considered a FMCT an essential component of a suite of  arms control and disarmament agreements required to  achieve global nuclear disarmament

 

Under a new so-called “voluntary safeguards agreement (VOA) signed on 7 June this year between the UK and the UN international  watchdog, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), to replace the existing trilateral 1977 agreement  between UK-IAEA and the EU  nuclear watchdog  body, Euratom, under Brexit arrangements, it includes in its very first article, the following exclusion:

 

“The United Kingdom shall accept the application of safeguards, in accordance with the terms of this Agreement, on all source or special fissionable material in facilities or parts thereof within the United Kingdom, subject to exclusions for national security reasons only, with a view to enabling the Agency to verify that such material is not, except as provided for in this Agreement, withdrawn from civil activities.” [22](emphasis added)

 

Lest any member of the Committee thinks this is simply an enabling option, very unlikely to be implemented, we know from ministerial written answers in the House of Commons and annual publications by the UK nuclear regulator, the Office for Nuclear Regulation, under the predecessor trilateral agreement ( in force from September 1978), which this new treaty replaces, there have been several hundred occasions when nuclear materials, including plutonium, has been withdrawn from safeguards cover.

 

A written answer to Green Party MP Caroline Lucas  on 17 December by foreign office minister, Sir Alan Duncan, withdrawals year by year since 1999 were as follows: in 2000 there were 6; in 2001, 18; in 2002, 11; in 2003, 20; in 2004 19; in 2005, 17; in 2006, 16; in 2007, 31; in 2008, 19; in 2009, 15; in 2010, 14; in 2011, 17; in 2012, 19; in 2013, 34; in 2014, 18, in 2015, 29; in 2016, 44 and in 2017  35 withdrawals.[23] Previous withdrawals since 1978 are recorded in the following document deposited in the House of Commons library: ‘Withdrawals from safeguards pursuant to the UK safeguards agreement with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and Euratom.’ (17 pages), following a written Parliamentary Question nearly 19 years ago (Official Report, 28 July 2000, Column 1094W)[24]

 

In total nuclear materials have been withdrawn form safeguards and notified to the IAEA over 600 times in the 40 years life of the trilateral treaty.

 

The new international treaty that put this agreement into law was passed unopposed by MPs on 17 December 2017, de facto legitimising large scale plutonium proliferation with impunity by the UK Government.[25]

This loophole would have to be closed in each nuclear weapons state with  so-called voluntary safeguards agreements, or a FMCT would be fatally undermined.

 

Nuclear modernisation programmes

5. What effect will nuclear renewal programmes have on the nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament regime? To what extent could technological developments—including in missile capabilities, warhead strength, and verification—undermine existing non-proliferation and arms control agreements?

 

It is obvious from submissions made by non-nuclear weapons states to successive quinquennial NPT review conferences and their prepcoms that dozens of memme ber states regard the continued qualitative vertical proliferation by nuclear weapons states (NWS) parties in direct violation to Article 6  obligations to do the opposite undermines the normative  power of  being a signatory state to control  horizontal proliferation. The most clear articulation of this has come from the delegation of the Islamic Republic of Iran, as a NNWS, whose criticisms of the vertical proliferation of nuclear WMDs while being excoriated by the NWSs parties to abide by the NPT is unanswerable. Instead the NWS provide diversionary frothing hypocrisy, justifying their 60 year violation of the NPT by attacking state in compliance. It is an ‘Alice in Wonderland’ diplomatic situation that is unsustainable.  

 

“When I use a word,” Humpty Dumpty said, in rather a scornful tone, “it means just what I choose it to mean—neither more nor less.” “The question is,” said Alice, “whether you can make words mean so many different things.” “The question is,” said Humpty Dumpty, “which is to be master—that's all.” [26]

 

As an example of any number of NPT PreComs, here an extract from an article I wrote  after the 2007 PrepCom in Vienna:

 

“The committee's chairman, Japan's permanent representative to the UN missions in Vienna, ambassador Yukiya Amano [who subsequently became IAEA Director- General]  noted in his own factual summary of the two week's deliberations, that the states parties said "the total elimination of nuclear weapons was the only guarantee against their use or threat of use". It was stressed, he said, that the "indefinite extension of the NPT (as was agreed in 1995) did not imply the indefinite possession of nuclear weapons"….”

He also noted, with clear inference to the UK Trident programme, that "concern and disappointment were voiced about plans to replace or modernise nuclear weapons and their means of delivery or platform."

A few days after the close of the preparatory committee, on 15 May, US ambassador Gregory Schulte addressed an audience at the University of Vienna, opening with the uncontestable words: "In one blinding flash, a nuclear weapon can kill, maim, and destroy on a scale without parallel, sending political shockwaves and economic dislocation across the globe."

Fingering Iran, he added: "The risk of nuclear weapons spreading to renegade regimes and transnational terrorists is one of today's gravest dangers to our United Nations."

Yet the US has currently deployed worldwide 9,938 nuclear weapons, according to an excellent study, Model Nuclear Inventory, prepared by a New York-based non-governmental organisation, Reaching Critical Will, which cleverly donated copies of the inventory to each delegation in Vienna.”[27]

 

Iran, meanwhile, had none; and still has none.

 

As a security and non-proliferation expert, I find the speeches of UK disarmament ambassadors and foreign office ministers to these NPT events continually embarrassing an utterly indefensible.

 

New technologies

6. To what extent will technological developments, both directly relating to nuclear weapons and in the wider defence and security sphere, affect nuclear diplomacy?

 

The NWS, by justifying their own possession of nuclear weapons, have attempted to normalize elite deployment by members of the nuclear weapons club. So we can expect the periodic  unveiling of new and more  deadly nuclear weapons by the nuclear club members, such as Russia atomic Avangard hypersonic maneuverable re-entry vehicle for ICBMs, as the qualitative nuclear arms race is ratcheted up with impunity.[28]This revelation came nine months after Russia’s President Vladimir Putin praised his nation's growing hypersonic arsenal as "invincible."

 

On 17 January 2019, the US Government announced its own purported technology fix to an a perceived nuclear arms threat problem, rather than turning to diplomacy, in unveiling its Missile Defense Review Program.[29]The highly respected think tank, US Arms Control Association, published an analytical briefing, which opens as follows:

 

“The Trump administration’s long-awaited Missile Defense Review… proposes a significant and costly expansion of the role and scope of U.S. missile defenses that is likely to exacerbate Russian and Chinese concerns about the threat to their strategic nuclear deterrents, undermine strategic stability, and further complicate the prospects for additional nuclear arms reductions.   Of particular concern was President Donald Trump’s statement during his remarks at the Pentagon that the goal of U.S. missile defenses is to “ensure we can detect and destroy any missile launched against the United States anywhere, anytime, anyplace.” This would be a costly, unachievable, and destabilizing departure from longstanding policy and contradicts the text of the review, which limits U.S. homeland missiles defense to their traditional role of defending against limited attacks from North Korea or Iran. In addition, the review proposes “to further thicken defensive capabilities for the U.S. homeland” with the new Aegis SM-3 Block IIA interceptor, hundreds of which could eventually be deployed on land and at sea across the globe.   As Congress scrutinizes the Missile Defense Review, members would do well to recognize that rushing to fund an open-ended and unconstrained missile defense buildup is misguided and would diminish U.S. security.   Congress in 2016 mandated the Pentagon to conduct a broad review of missile defense policy and strategy...” It goes on to state: “The review reaffirms and, in some cases accelerates, preexisting Trump administration plans to: ·   try to destroy enemy missiles before launch (known as “left of launch”), ·   arm unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) with lasers to zap long-range missiles during their boost phase, ·   test the SM-3 Block IIA missile interceptor against an intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM)-class target by 2020, ·   expand the ground-based midcourse defense (GMD) system in Alaska and California from 44 to 64 interceptors by 2023, and ·   develop multiple kill vehicles for the ground-based midcourse defense (GMD) system, and increase the number of Aegis and THAAD interceptors.     Costly and Technically Risky The United States has spent hundreds of billions of dollars since the 1950s in an effort to field effective ballistic missile defenses and has but a limited capability against a small number of relatively unsophisticated missile threats to show for it. More realism is needed about the costs and limitations of defense capabilities and the long-standing obstacles that have prevented them from working as intended…”[30]

The UK’s hugely expensive - in financial and diplomatic terms - renewal of Trident is another indefensible example of atomic escalation

 

 

 

 

The Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons

7. If it were to enter into force, how would the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (commonly referred to as the Ban Treaty) affect efforts to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons and bring about disarmament?

 

The “Nuclear Ban”, whose originators and promoters - The International Campaign to Abolish Nuclear Weapons (ICAN) were awarded the 2017 Nobel Peace Prize for their initiative and its success -  is an essential complement to the NPT regime. I would direct the Committee to read the document published in October 2013 by ICAN’s partner organization, WILPF, in New York, titled Preventing collapse: the NPT and a ban on nuclear weapons [31]

 

I would also recommend that the Committee consults this report ( also by Reaching Critical Will, an international disarmament and diplomatic lobby group,  based in New York) on the conference hosted by the Austrian Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Vienna in December 2014,  (which I attended)  that created the diplomatic climate for the Ban Treaty to be actualized. It is titled: Filling the gap: report on the Vienna conference on the humanitarian impact of nuclear weapons: a conference report for the meeting hosted by the government of Austria on 8-9 December 2014 on the humanitarian impact of nuclear weapons.[32]

 

I provided a detailed written submission to the Vienna conference on the humanitarian impact of nuclear weapons, which may be consulted.[33]

 

 

The P5

8. What are the policies of other P5 countries (China, France, Russia and the United States), and the UK’s other partners, on the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and on nuclear weapons more generally? Have these policies changed, and if so, why? How effective has the P5 process been, and what role will it have in the future?

 

The P5 is a self-appointed, collectively hypocritical atomic elite club, with zero credibility on non-proliferation, time after time telling NNWS to do as they say, but not do as they do themselves , ie  promote persistent vertical and qualitative  self-proliferation.

I explained this in an article I wrote four years ago, reproduced below. Sadly, not one word needs altering today; the same critical argument remains intact.

 

Tuesday, 10 February 2015

The two faces of the UK over nuclear WMDs

 

Today the Foreign and Commonwealth Office opens a new Diplomatic Academy, the first in the FCO’s history. The FCO media material describes the new venture thus: The “Diplomatic Academy will be a centre of excellence to help all staff from across government working on international issues to share expertise and learn from one another. It will help the organisation extend its networks and to engage with academic and diplomatic institutions and others. Learning will be accessible and inspiring, and it will provide a space for challenging conventional thinking.” [34]

 

By chance, on Wednesday and Thursday last week, Foreign Office diplomacy was in top gear as our mandarins hosted a two day high-level meeting at its London conference venue, Lancaster House, of senior diplomatic representatives of the other four members of the self-appointed nuclear weapons club on the United Nations Security Council, the so-called Permanent Five (P5).

This brought to London Wang Qun, Director General, Department of Arms Control and Disarmament for China; Hélène Duchêne, Director for Strategic Affairs for France; Rose Gottemoeller, Under Secretary for Arms Control and International Security for the United States; and Grigory Berdennikov, Ambassador-at-Large for Russia, to meet with the FCO’s top disarmament diplomat, Peter Jones, Director for Defence and International Security, according to a written answer to Labour MP Paul Flynn on 9 February.[35]
The answer by Foreign Office minister Tobias Ellwood also said: “The London P5 Conference covered a wide range of issues relevant to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, encompassing disarmament, non-proliferation and the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. The Conference included outreach with a number of non-nuclear weapon states – Australia, Canada, Mexico, the Netherlands and the United Arab Emirates – as well as civil society. P5 delegates also visited the Atomic Weapons Establishment; this was part of our efforts to enhance transparency, but appropriate measures were put in place to ensure that our national security interests were protected.)

After their meeting on 6 February the P5 diplomats issued a joint statement through the Foreign Office.[36]

Aside from warm words proclaiming they all supported the 189-nation Nuclear Non Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and were working to strengthen it at the forthcoming NPT review conference in New York in April/May ( contemporaneous with the UK General Election) they asserted “The P5 also considered a wide array of issues related to and steps towards making progress on all three pillars of the NPT: disarmament, non-proliferation and the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. In addition, the P5 had constructive and productive discussions with a number of non-nuclear-weapon states and civil society representatives.)

Then in a very interesting passage, considering it is co-signed by Russia, it asserted:  “At their 2015 Conference the P5 restated their belief that the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty remains the essential cornerstone for the nuclear non-proliferation regime and the foundation for the pursuit of nuclear disarmament, and is an essential contribution to international security and stability.”

It then added: “The P5 reaffirmed that a step-by-step approach to nuclear disarmament that promotes international stability, peace and undiminished and increased security for all remains the only realistic and practical route to achieving a world without nuclear weapons. To this end, the P5 discussed issues related to international security and strategic stability and their nuclear doctrines in order to enhance mutual understanding in these areas…The P5 stressed that addressing further prospects for nuclear disarmament would require taking into account all factors that could affect global strategic stability. In doing so they stressed the importance of engaging in frank and constructive dialogue to that end.”

For those wishing to rid the planet of nuclear WMDs, all of this sounds hopeful, until the facts intervene, revealing all rank and stinking hypocrisy!

 

Within two days the press was revealing:

 

£4.2bn: the bill for replacing Trident before parliament gives go-ahead

 

(Sunday Herald, 8 February)

 

 

Scottish–based investigative journalist Rob Edwards, unveiled that the official public spending watchdog, the UK National Audit Office, in a new report has revealed that this £4,200,000,000 (£4.2 billion) is being spent on designing new submarines, reactors and missile compartments ahead of a long-promised decision on Trident replacement by MPs in 2016, after this year’s UK general election. Edwards reported the MoD as saying it has always been transparent about the costs “whilst protecting our commercial position”.[37]

 

The NAO report, Major Projects Report 2014 and the Equipment Plan 2014 to 2024, (with Appendices and project summary sheets) reveals that the MoD has underestimated the cost of upgrading the nuclear reactors that power Trident submarines by £151 million.

 

The SNP Westminster leader and defence spokesman, Angus Robertson, retorted “Costs are spiraling out of control before MPs have even had a chance to vote on renewal. It is utterly unacceptable that over £4 billion will be blown on replacing Trident nuclear weapons before parliament actually decides on whether or not to even give it the go ahead. In no other democracy, at a time of deep austerity and cuts, would money be spent on committing to such a massive project without consulting parliamentarians.”

 

Spending on replacing Trident before 2016

 

Future submarines concept / £198m
Next generation reactor concept / £305m
Reactor technology concept / £80m
Missile compartment concept/ £271m
Future submarines assessment / £2,000m
Next generation reactor assessment / £1,171m
Reactor technology assessment / £148m
Total / £4,173m
Already spent / £2,068m

 

source: National Audit Office, January 2015.[38]

 

 

Less than a month ago in a Parliamentary debate on 20 January on the Trident nuclear WMD system, Defence Secretary Michael Fallon told MPs “we are planning to replace the current Vanguard submarines—not the Trident missile or the warheads. We are planning to replace the submarines in the late 2020s, by which time our Vanguard submarines will be 35 years old.”

 

He also asserted: “We are clear that the nuclear deterrent is the only assured way to deter nuclear threats….”  and  added “we cannot gamble with our country’s national security. We have to plan for a major direct nuclear threat to this country, or to our NATO allies, that might emerge over the 50 years during which the next generation of submarines will be in service. We already know that there are substantial nuclear arsenals and that the number of nuclear states has increased…. This country faces the threat of nuclear blackmail from rogue states. .. there is simply no alternative to a continuous at-sea deterrent that can provide the same level of protection and the ability to deter an aggressor. We know that because successive Governments have looked at the different options for delivering a deterrent capability. Most recently, the Trident alternatives review in 2013 demonstrated that no alternative system is as capable or cost-effective as a Trident-based deterrent.”

 

Then, amongst this missile waving nuclear belligerence, he confusing interpolated the following observation “Let me be clear: we hope never to use nuclear weapons, but to go on delivering a deterrent effect. However, we also share the vision of a world that is without nuclear weapons, achieved through multilateral disarmament.” [39]

 

But it is clear from the burden of his own argument, he does not believe a word about a nuclear weapon-free world.

Liberal Democrat Treasury minister Danny Alexander subsequently told Flynn in a written answer on 30 January “This Government is committed to maintain a credible and effective continuous at-sea [nuclear] deterrent.” Two days later, on The Sunday Politics on BBC One television, Labour shadow Foreign Secretary Douglas Alexander insisted to programme host Andrew Neil that his party would “not negotiate over Britain's nuclear deterrent.”[40]

British nuclear WMD policy is Janus-like, facing towards nuclear disarmament if  discussed by the Foreign office, but towards nuclear re-armament if discussed by the Ministry of Defence, the Liberal Democrat front bench ministers and the Labour shadow front bench ministers.

 

These politicians will all be relieved that they will be engaged in a belligerent election campaign  when the NPT review conference is underway: otherwise they would have to explain to184 non-nuclear weapons states in New York why they all plan to violate the UK’s legal requirement under NPT article 6 “ to pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament…” by renewing the Trident nuclear WMD system.

 

 

The role of the UK

9. How effective a role has the UK played in global nuclear diplomacy in recent years? How could the UK more effectively engage on nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament? What should the UK Government’s priorities be ahead of the 2020 NPT Review Conference?

 

The UK has had a very ineffective – frankly negative -  role  in global nuclear diplomacy for fifty years, because it stubbornly refuses to abide by the commitments the UK signed up to implement  “in good faith” when it ratified the  Nuclear Non Proliferation Treaty, the text of which  UK diplomats partly authored. For fifty years the UK has demonstrated on the world stage just about as much bad faith as any government could possibly show.

 

In a House of Commons debate on Trident renewal four years ago, the then UK Defence Secretary Michael Fallon told Parliament “we also share the vision of a world that is without nuclear weapons, achieved through multilateral disarmament.” [41]

Yet four years on, at Defence questions on 14 January this year, the current Defence Secretary Gavin Williamson made these statements in his oral answers: “The Vanguard-class life extension and availability sustainment programmes are essential to maintaining the United Kingdom’s continuous at-sea deterrence and are prioritised accordingly…” adding “We constantly have discussions right across Government to make sure that our continuous at-sea nuclear deterrence can be sustained. We have been investing in technology and parts to make sure that the Vanguard class has everything it needs in the future. But what is critical is the investment we are making… many Members on both sides of the House who are absolute supporters of the importance of the continuous at-sea nuclear deterrent and understand how vital it is to keeping Britain safe…. our nuclear deterrent has kept Britain, and also our NATO partners, safe over 50 years.”[42]

Moreover, in a subsequent debate on a confidence motion in the Conservative Government, on 16 January this year. Cabinet minister Michael Gove, answering the debate do the Government made the following slightly hysterical remarks, challenging the Leader of the Official Opposition, Jeremy Corbyn’s personal political stance against Trident, exclaiming indignantly: “He wants to get rid of our nuclear deterrent.” As if this was some very bad idea. And added: ” ..no deterrent - no way can this country ever allow that man to be our Prime Minister and in charge of our national security.”[43]

The Government persistently presents a political Janus-like posture on nuclear weapons: ministers regularly defend their possession as essential for national and regional security, while simultaneously asserting they believe in multilateral nuclear disarmament, but never quite yet! It is a literally incredible posture, deeply damaging for the global nuclear non-proliferation regime.

 

My simple proposal would be for the UK to take the lead – as it honourably did fifty odd years ago whenth eNPT was being  neotiated, as I establishe dath ebeginnin gof thi ssubmission, -  in convening mulitlateral nuclear disarmamant talks at the United Nations

If they do not, the non-aligned and other NNWS finally lose patience at he 2020 NPT review conference, leading the final unraveling of fifty years of the global nuclear non-proliferation regime, the NWS will be 100 per cent responsible.

 

Received 18 January 2019

 

 

---

[1] https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2017/09/18/man-saved-world-dies-77/

[2] https://www.telegraph.co.uk/films/0/stanislav-petrov-true-story-grumpy-russian-singlehandedly-stopped/

[3] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/The_Man_Who_Saved_the_World

https://www.bmeia.gv.at/en/european-foreign-policy/disarmament/weapons-of-mass-destruction/nuclear-weapons/vienna-conference-on-the-humanitarian-impact-of-nuclear-weapons/

[4] https://www.chathamhouse.org/publications/papers/view/199200

[5] https://hansard.parliament.uk/commons/2019-01-14/debates/B155F4FA-6BB4-40FF-B8A5-F3E3F96E7BC1/Vanguard-ClassLifeExtensionProgramme).

[6] Hansard, column 820w https://publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200607/cmhansrd/cm070516/text/70516w0015.htm#07051686000187

[7] https://carnegieendowment.org/2007/06/25/keynote-address-world-free-of-nuclear-weapons-event-1004

[8] http://reachingcriticalwill.org/images/documents/Publications/npt-ban.pdf)

[9] (‘Looking back: 20 years after Pakistan tested nuclear weapons’ by Jayanth Jacob;

[10] Hindustan Times, New Delhi,  May 13, 2018; https://www.hindustantimes.com/india-news/looking-back-20-years-after-pakistan-tested-nuclear-weapons/story-Wsttq0QGhcUFYYEan38sCP.html)

[11] MoneyControl (India), 15 January 2019; https://www.moneycontrol.com/news/india/indias-nuclear-doctrine-based-on-policy-of-minimum-credible-deterrence-foreign-secretary-vijay-gokhale-3391391.html)

[12] Last Secret’ of 1967 War: Israel’s Doomsday Plan for Nuclear Display, “ New York Times, June 3, 2017; https://www.nytimes.com/2017/06/03/world/middleeast/1967-arab-israeli-war-nuclear-warning.html)

[13] http://reachingcriticalwill.org/images/documents/Disarmament-fora/npt/prepcom18/documents/WP33.pdf).

[14] http://www.consilium.europa.eu/ueDocs/cms_Data/docs/pressData/en/er/101847.pdf

[15] Official Report,  Column 93WH; https://publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200809/cmhansrd/cm091111/halltext/91111h0004.htm ),

[16] IAEA Board Report: Verification and monitoring in the Islamic Republic of Iran in light of United Nations Security Council resolution 2231 (2015), 12 November 2018; www.iaea.org/sites/default/files/18/11/gov2018-47.pdf

[17] https://www.nytimes.com/2015/03/26/opinion/to-stop-irans-bomb-bomb-iran.html

https://theintercept.com/2018/03/23/heres-john-bolton-promising-regime-change-iran-end-2018/

https://theintercept.com/2017/07/07/mek-iran-rajavi-cult-saudi-gingrich-terrorists-trump/

John Bolton Wants to Bomb Iran — and He May Get What He Wants,” The Intercept, 15 January 2019; https://theintercept.com/2019/01/15/john-bolton-wants-to-bomb-iran-and-he-may-get-what-he-wants/;

“Pentagon Officials Fear Bolton’s Actions Increase Risk of Clash With Iran,” New York Times, 13 January 2019; https://www.nytimes.com/2019/01/13/us/politics/bolton-iran-pentagon.html;

“White House sought options to strike Iran,” Wall Street Journal, 13 January 2019; https://www.wsj.com/articles/white-house-sought-options-to-strike-iran-11547375404)

[18] https://www.armscontrol.org/act/2018-07/focus/after-singapore-summit

[19] Editorial: Japan should complain to US about stalled N. Korean denuclearization,’ Mainichi (Japan), 28 August 2018; https://mainichi.jp/english/articles/20180828/p2a/00m/0na/023000c

[20] Trumping past Presidents in dealing with Korea? 12 June 2018; http://drdavidlowry.blogspot.com/2018/06/trumping-past-presidents-in-dealing.html; and ‘How Britain helped North Korean nuclear weapons programme,’ 6 January 2016; https://drdavidlowry.blogspot.com/2016/01/how-britain-helped-north-korean-nuclear.html)

 

[21] Renew Nuclear Arms Control, Don’t Destroy It. By Andrew Lichterman and John Burroughs. http://www.ipsnews.net/2019/01/renew-nuclear-arms-control-dont-destroy/
Parliamentary action to preserve the Intermediate Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty. http://www.pnnd.org/article/parliamentary-action-preserve-intermediate-nuclear-forces-inf-treaty
Who lost the INF Treaty? by Pavel Podvig https://thebulletin.org/2018/10/who-lost-the-inf-treaty/

[22] https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/ms-no132018-ukiaea-agreement-for-application-of-safeguards-in-connection-with-treaty-on-the-non-proliferation-of-nuclear-weapons

[23] https://www.parliament.uk/business/publications/written-questions-answers-statements/written-question/Commons/2018-12-07/200104/

[24] ‘Withdrawals from safeguards pursuant to the UK safeguards agreement with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and Euratom.’ (17 pages), following a written Parliamentary Question nearly 19 years ago (Official Report, 28 July 2000, Column 1094W)

[25] Nuclear Safeguards (Fissionable Material and Relevant International Agreements) (EU Exit) Regulations 2018; http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukdsi/2018/9780111175569/pdfs/ukdsi_9780111175569_en.pdf

[26] From ‘Alice Through the Looking-Glass,’ Lewis Carroll (1872; https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Humpty_Dumpty)

[27] http://www.reachingcriticalwill.org/about/pubs/Inventory/inventory.pdf

“Nuclear Wrangling,” The Guardian, 17 May 2007; https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2007/may/17/attheendoflast

[28] “The Kremlin says it conducted another successful test of a hypersonic weapon,” CNBC, 26 December 2018; https://www.cnbc.com/2018/12/26/the-kremlin-says-it-conducted-another-successful-test-of-a-hypersonic-weapon.htm

[29] https://media.defense.gov/2019/Jan/17/2002080666/-1/-1/1/2019-MISSILE-DEFENSE-REVIEW.PDF

[30] Trump's Dangerous Missile Defense Buildup, ACA Briefing,   Volume 11, Issue 2, January 17, 2019; www.armscontrol.org

[31] Women’s International League for Peace and Freedom Preventing collapse: the NPT and a ban on nuclear weapons http://www.reachingcriticalwill.org/images/documents/Publications/npt-ban.pdf

[32] http://www.reachingcriticalwill.org/images/documents/Disarmament-fora/vienna-2014/filling-the-gap.pdf

[33]https://www.bmeia.gv.at/fileadmin/user_upload/Zentrale/Aussenpolitik/Abruestung/HINW14/Statements/HINW14_Statement_David_Lowry.pdf

[34] https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/opening-of-new-diplomatic-academy

[35] answer 223040 https://www.parliament.uk/business/publications/written-questions-answers-statements/written-question/Commons/2015-02-03/223040/

[36] (https://www.gov.uk/government/news/joint-statement-from-the-nuclear-weapon-states-at-the-london-p5-conference)

[37] (http://www.robedwards.com/2015/02/42bn-the-bill-for-replacing-trident-before-parliament-gives-go-ahead.html)

 

[38] http://www.nao.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2015/01/Major-projects-report-2014-appendices-and-project-summary-sheets.pdf

[39] http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201415/cmhansrd/cm150120/debtext/150120-0001.htm#15012040000001)

[40]http://www.heraldscotland.com/politics/scottish-politics/labour-will-not-negotiate-over-britains-nuclear-deterrent-alexander-tells.117453403

[41] Hansard, 20 January 2015, column 105, www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201415/cmhansrd/cm150120/debtext/150120-0002.htm

[42] https://hansard.parliament.uk/commons/2019-01-14/debates/B155F4FA-6BB4-40FF-B8A5-F3E3F96E7BC1/Vanguard-ClassLifeExtensionProgramme

 

What to look for in the 2019 NPT Preparatory Committee

https://www.europeanleadershipnetwork.org/commentary/what-to-look-for-in-the-2019-npt-preparatory-committee/

Dr Rebecca Johnson |Founder and Director of the Acronym Institute for Disarmament Diplomacy

 

Arms Control NPT Nuclear Arms Control nuclear ban treaty Nuclear Disarmament Nuclear Security Nuclear Weapons Global Security

The last preparatory committee meeting (PrepCom) before the 2020 Review Conference (RevCon) of the 1968 Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) will be held in New York from 29 April to 10 May 2019. In accordance with the decisions taken when the NPT was indefinitely extended in 1995, the PrepComs are intended to consider “principles, objectives and ways in order to promote the full implementation of the Treaty, as well as its universality, and to make recommendations” for the next RevCon to decide on.

What, then, can we expect from the 2019 PrepCom? Judging from the 2017 and 2018 meetings, the major challenges for the NPT-based regime will come from real-world nuclear developments, NPT-related issues that are freighted with historic and procedural significance (or baggage), and the proliferation policies of nuclear-armed states. While related, these should not be conflated.

Tasked especially with reviewing developments since the 2015 RevCon, the major issues of disagreement will include:

• How to reinforce the existing legal regime underpinning the NPT, especially in light of US and Russian nuclear weapons enhancement programmes and their pending withdrawal from the 1987 Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty;
• The Trump administration’s rejection of the 2015 Joint Comprehensive Programme of Action (JCPOA) with Iran, and related impacts on non-proliferation;
• The humanitarian-based 2017 Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW aka the Ban Treaty), negotiated and adopted by two-thirds of the UN General Assembly but boycotted by the nuclear-armed states and some of their allies;
• Ways to kick-start negotiations on a nuclear weapon free zone (NWFZ) and/or zone free of all weapons of mass destruction (WMD) in the Middle East, where progress has stalled despite high-level commitments in 1995 and 2010;

In addition, expect to see much lip service but little practical action on:

• Bringing the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) into force and ending fissile materials production and stockpiling;
• Nuclear and missile tests by the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK aka North Korea), recent efforts towards denuclearising the Korean Peninsula, and the importance of ensuring compliance with all relevant treaties;
• Nuclear safety issues, as well as broader nuclear energy concerns, as they relate to proliferation and preventing serious accidents such as Chernobyl and Fukushima;
• Nuclear security provisions and calls for stronger safeguards and greater uptake of the IAEA’s additional protocol.

Contributing to the pressures, the Treaty has to be reviewed, taking into account that fifty years since the NPT entered into force, there are over 14,000 nuclear weapons in the hands of nine nuclear-armed states, who are either not Treaty parties or else defined in the text as “nuclear weapon states” (the “NPT5”, who are also “P5” permanent members of the UN Security Council). The four outside the Treaty are not legally constrained and, indeed, derive security benefits from the constraints applied to their neighbours. The NPT5 cloak themselves in their NPT status while justifying their nuclear enhancement programmes. Both groups are eroding the NPT’s credibility as an effective mechanism for disarmament and non-proliferation.

The major areas of contention in 2019, as in most NPT meetings, will centre on nuclear disarmament and the Middle East. In an effort to provide “an output-focused outlook”, the Chairs of the first two PrepComs – Netherlands Ambassador Henk Cor van der Kvast and Poland’s Ambassador Adam Bugajski – have already submitted an “Inter-Chair Working Paper”. There is much in this that can be broadly supported, but that won’t necessarily help the Chair of the 2019 PrepCom, Malaysia’s Ambassador Syed Md Hasrin Syed Hussin. The geostrategic objectives and relations among nuclear-armed nations and a handful of Middle East governments will, as in previous meetings, dominate the PrepCom, so we need to look more carefully at what is being papered over in the Inter-Chair document.

 

Nuclear Disarmament

In many ways, the most important development since 2015 is the TPNW, which was taken forward by means of a humanitarian disarmament process launched at the 2010 NPT RevCon and finalised as a “nuclear ban treaty” through political and diplomatic initiatives that culminated in negotiations under UN auspices. At the NPT’s 2018 PrepCom, the first after the TPNW was opened for signature by the UN Secretary-General on 20 September 2017, an interesting dynamic developed. A few of the nuclear-armed governments and allies seemed bent on making the TPNW into a central problem for the NPT, while TPNW signatories such as Austria and various members of the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) were at pains to avoid conflict and emphasise the humanitarian imperative to work on mutually reinforcing approaches for nuclear disarmament.  Caught between strong civil society pressure to join the TPNW and countervailing pressures to maintain nuclear use arrangements, Japan hopes to revive “bridge-building” steps formerly adopted by the 2000 NPT RevCon.

From 2010 to 2017 the humanitarian ban treaty initiatives were underestimated, and now that the TPNW exists, this sidelining pattern is being continued by NATO diplomats. When Bugajski presented his draft Chair’s summary in 2018, one paragraph purported to summarise the many positive statements about the TPNW in these terms: “A number of states parties informed about the ratification and status of this treaty. It was asserted that the TPNW represented an effective measure under Article VI of the NPT by creating a legally binding prohibition of nuclear weapons. It was stressed that the TPNW complemented the NPT and was designed to strengthen existing disarmament and nuclear non-proliferation regimes.”

Although far fewer states opposed the TPNW, the text and tone of the following paragraph gave their views greater weight and significance: “Other states parties expressed their opposition to the TPNW, emphasizing the crucial link between progress on disarmament and the international security environment. It was asserted that the TPNW would not contribute to the reduction or limitation of nuclear weapons. These states noted that the TPNW does not reflect customary international law and thus could bind only its signatories. Concerns were expressed that the TPNW could create an alternative and contrary standard to the NPT.”

Though dismayed that Bugajski’s summary was so dismissive of the TPNW, the majority were conscious of the need to avoid playing into the hands of those wanting to portray the TPNW as a problem for the NPT regime. Not wanting to divert attention from the problematic policies and actions of the nuclear-armed and proliferating states, most TPNW signatories carefully calibrated their responses to avoid providing ammunition that might be used to harm either the NPT or TPNW in the future.

Their strategy is to consolidate the TPNW as a constructive addition to the disarmament and non-proliferation toolkit and engage in practical consideration of next steps. They are conscious of the need to keep providing reassurance that the TPNW is a separate but helpful legal instrument that will strengthen the regime. Amongst themselves, TPNW signatories are considering how best to develop the legal, technical and verification frameworks to implement the Ban Treaty’s provisions and accelerate the elimination of nuclear arsenals. With 70 signatories and 23 ratifications at time of writing, this treaty is almost halfway to meeting its entry-into-force requirements. Notably, more NPT member states (122) participated in negotiations and voted positively to adopt the finalised TPNW in 2017 than the 105-111 NPT parties registered in the first two NPT PrepComs.

Turning to the positions of the NPT5, we find Washington rehashing an old concept, “creating the conditions for nuclear disarmament” (CCND). Spearheaded by Christopher Ford, US Assistant Secretary for International Security and Nonproliferation, and now renamed “creating the environment for nuclear disarmament” (CEND), this academically framed approach seeks to put the onus of nuclear disarmament and security responsibility mainly on non-nuclear NPT parties and “some nuclear-weapon states”, while ignoring or justifying the treaty-undermining and proliferation activities of the United States. Russia’s defensive response is a new working paper titled “Nuclear Disarmament” which mainly blames US military-nuclear policies. It also sideswipes the TPNW, calling it “premature” and insisting that at present “possession of nuclear weapons is a necessity and the only possible response to very specific external threats”.

US-Russian exchanges in 2019 may be sharper and more adversarial than usual. Even it these are mainly posturing, the increased emphasis on nuclear weapons and threats are contributing to increased risks and dangers. Both countries are committed to some aspects of nuclear security, but have even louder vested interests in maintaining and enhancing their nuclear arsenals. Despite support from France and the UK, it is unlikely that the NPT5 will manage any joint initiatives. Even a lowest common denominator statement will be a stretch in 2019, unless it is one that has no relevance to real-world nuclear challenges but serves as a lip-service mechanism with the underlying purpose of maintaining NPT-based privileges for the nuclear-armed P5.

France and the UK will no doubt continue in their efforts to undermine the TPNW inside and outside the NPT, but they are relatively weak players these days. They are expected to elevate their activities on “disarmament verification”, promote pro-nuclear power activities to divert NAM criticisms of their nuclear weapons programmes, and extol their commitment to nuclear security, the CTBT, IAEA, and fissile material cut-off negotiations.

China may criticise the US more than in recent years. Though worried that the TPNW will put pressure on its nuclear policies and arsenal, China tends not to openly criticise the Ban Treaty. As in earlier PrepComs, China will emphasise its long-standing no first use posture, security assurances to non-nuclear states, and commitment to Article IV, evidenced by its abiding willingness to spread “peaceful purposes” nuclear power plants and technologies around the world.

 

WMD-free zone in the Middle East

Developments in the Middle East pose major security challenges in the real world as well as the NPT context. These are different, but not unrelated. At the 2018 PrepCom, NAM states called for a regional Conference in 2020 to launch a process on a WMD free zone in accordance with the 1995 Resolution on the Middle East. Iran focussed on procedures, with proposals fora subsidiary body to be established during the 2020 RevCon to discuss Middle East WMD free zone specifics, and a Standing Committee to take recommendations forward afterwards. Egypt and the League of Arab States then took the issue to the 2018 UN First Committee, where their resolution for a Conference achieved agreement and UN General Assembly funding for a one week Conference to be convened in 2019 by the UN Secretary-General and three depositary states (Russia, UK and US), with terms of reference derived from the 1995 Resolution on the Middle East. Moscow supports the Conference, Washington opposes and London is reportedly on the fence. Arab League states are saying that the Conference that is expected to go ahead in November 2019 is compatible with the NAM and Iranian proposals for the 1995 Resolution to be taken forward through NPT procedures.

 

Expectations for 2019

Looking more broadly, we should anticipate that the DPRK’s nuclear programme will be much discussed amid calls for Kim Jong-un to continue to negotiate, denuclearise, rejoin/fully comply with the NPT and accede to the CTBT. With John Bolton pulling the Trump administration’s strings on these issues, as he did at the 2005 RevCon, the US will say little or nothing about the test ban treaty. Washington has in recent months been rife with rumours that Bolton is advising Trump to “unsign” the CTBT, so the PrepCom may indicate if this is a serious threat or overheated rumour.

On the subject of the JCPOA and Trump Administration policies and modernisation, Iran will be active and generally self-righteous but is unlikely to throw any spanners that might alienate other JCPOA governments or NAM partners. In addition to Japan, some of the NATO states are presenting themselves as bridge-builders between the NPT5 and pro-TPNW non-nuclear parties to the NPT. It will be useful to pay attention to their talking points, as these have been changing since 2017.

Since 1995, third PrepComs have not been able to fulfil their formal task to make recommendations to the next RevCon. The 2019 PrepCom Chair is likely to accept this pattern and not push for consensus on anything but the necessary procedural decisions. The best service this PrepCom can perform for NPT parties is to act as a warning bell about which issues, developments and national policies are likely to be most problematic – not only for the diplomats in the 2020 Review Conference, but (even more importantly) for preventing proliferation, implementing disarmament and reducing nuclear risks in the real world.

 

The opinions articulated above also do not necessarily reflect the position of the European Leadership Network or any of its members. The ELN’s aim is to encourage debates that will help develop Europe’s capacity to address pressing foreign, defence, and security challenge.

UN Eager to Advance Commitment to Nuclear Non-Proliferation

InDepthNews, 23 April 2019

https://www.indepthnews.net/index.php/armaments/nuclear-weapons/2639-un-eager-to-advance-commitment-to-nuclear-non-proliferation

 

By Jamshed Baruah

 

NEW YORK (IDN) – Deeply concerned about the erosion of the disarmament and arms control framework that reaped significant post-cold-war-era gains, the United Nations is keen to ensure the continued viability of the landmark Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT).

With an eye on the fiftieth anniversary of the Treaty’s entry into force and the twenty-fifth celebration of its indefinite extension, the 15-nation Security Council – chaired by Germany’s Foreign Affairs Minister Heiko Maas – convened a high-level meeting at the UN Headquarters on April 2, 2019.

According to the Council President for the month of April, Christoph Heusgen, Germany’s permanent representative, the members of the Security Council – charged with ensuring international peace and security – reaffirmed their commitment to advance the goals of the NPT as the “cornerstone of the nuclear non‑proliferation regime and the foundation for the pursuit of nuclear disarmament and the peaceful uses of nuclear energy”.

They concurred that the 2020 NPT Review Conference provided an opportunity for the NPT States parties ‎to “unambiguously reaffirm” their commitment to the Treaty, to commemorate its historic achievements and, by further advancing its goals, strengthen the nuclear disarmament and non‑proliferation regime. They expressed their "readiness to work together and join efforts to achieve a successful outcome at the 2020 NPT Review Conference.”.

A close look at discussions in the Council reveals that a “successful outcome” of deliberations in 2020 is far from certain. “The NPT has proven remarkably durable. However, that durability should not be taken for granted,” at a time when the acquisition of arms is prioritized over the pursuit of diplomacy, United Nations Under‑Secretary‑General and High Representative for Disarmament Affairs, Izumi Nakamitsu, told the Security Council in all frankness.

“The disarmament success of the post-cold war era has come to a halt,” she said, and the security landscape is being replaced with dangerous rhetoric about the utility of nuclear weapons and an increased reliance on these weapons in security doctrines. “The prospect of the use of nuclear weapons is higher than it has been in generations,” warned Nakamitsu.

However, she added that whatever new arms control and disarmament approaches in the twenty-first century might look like, one thing is clear: the NPT will still be at the centre of our collective security mechanism and it will have to stay “fit for purpose” across its three pillars — disarmament, non-proliferation and the peaceful use of nuclear energy. The 2020 Review Conference is a “golden opportunity” to make headway on all of these goals, and to make sure this linchpin of international security remains fit for purpose through the next 25 or even 50 years.

Calling a spade a spade, Germany’s Foreign Affairs Minister Heiko Maas said in the ensuing discussion that, "for all the successes we have achieved in recent decades, we mustn't fool ourselves". He pointed out that dismantling nuclear arsenals has come to a standstill and prospects of actual nuclear "re-armament" have been raised by the impending loss of the Intermediate‑Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty.

The 1987 Treaty required the United States and the Soviet Union (now Russian Federation) to eliminate and permanently forswear all of their nuclear and conventional ground-launched ballistic and cruise missiles with ranges of 500 to 5,500 kilometres. The Treaty marked the first time the superpowers had agreed to reduce their nuclear arsenals, eliminate an entire category of nuclear weapons, and utilize extensive on-site inspections for verification.

While the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) is not a party to the NPT, it is entrusted with key verification responsibilities deriving from the Treaty. Presenting a glimpse of achievements, IAEA Director General Yukiya Amano said non-proliferation safeguards are being implemented in 182 countries, including 179 which are States parties to the NPT. However, key challenges include a steady increase in the amount of nuclear material and the number of nuclear facilities under IAEA safeguards, coupled with continuing pressure on the Agency’s regular budget.

Topping its agenda are the nuclear programmes of Iran and the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea. Iran continues to fully implement its commitments under the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, and it must continue to do so, said Amano. Meanwhile, the Agency continues to monitor the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea’s nuclear programme and evaluate all safeguards-relevant information available to it. The IAEA could respond within weeks to any request to send inspectors back to Pyongyang.

In a broader sense, the Agency helps to improve the health and prosperity of millions of people by making nuclear science and technology available across many sectors, Amano continued. Nuclear power can also help address the twin challenges of ensuring reliable energy supplies and curbing greenhouse‑gas emissions. “Helping countries to achieve the Sustainable Development Goals, using relevant nuclear technology, is an important part of our work,” Amano added.

In the ensuing discussion, non-permanent Council members such as Côte d’Ivoire and the Dominican Republic reported benefits reaped from nuclear technologies. Others highlighted concerns, from terrorists acquiring atomic bombs to the disarmament machinery’s languishing impasse that continues to hobble negotiations on a fissile material cut-off treaty and delay the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East.

Some members spotlighted a crumbling security landscape exacerbated by concerns such as the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea’s nuclear programme and the suspension of disarmament agreements.

Russia’s permanent representative to the UN, Vassily A. Nebenzia, said that attempts are being made to undermine universally recognized norms which have worsened an already complicated situation. The 2020 Review Conference should not be used to settle political scores, he said.

While Russia has reduced its nuclear arsenal by more than 85 per cent, his Government remains greatly concerned about global security, given the unfettered deployment of United States anti-missile systems, its placement of military weapons in outer space and its attempts to decrease the defence capabilities of other countries through unilateral sanctions. This hardly creates an environment favourable to reducing the nuclear weapons stockpile, he said.

Andrea Lee Thompson, the U.S. Under Secretary of State for Arms Control and International Security Affairs, said reaching a consensus at the 2020 Review Conference is possible if parties avoid using divisions to hold the review process hostage. “We cannot overlook the fact that the actions of those who are expanding their nuclear stockpiles have contributed to a deterioration of the global security environment,” she said, adding that the United States will seek a positive outcome from the 2020 review process.

China’s permanent representative to the UN, Ma Zhaoxu, said the NPT review process has reached a critical state. Unilateralism and double standards in non-proliferation continue to exist. The international community must uphold the concept of a shared future, strengthen unity and cooperation, and steer the 2020 review process towards a unified outcome. He urged Russia and United States to return to talks on their relevant weapons agreements. The international community must continue to support and uphold multilateralism.

The Minister for Europe and Foreign Affairs of France, Jean-Yves Le Drian, said that given tensions and growing energy needs worldwide, preserving the NPT is more central than ever before. To do so, Kuwait’s Deputy Prime Minister Abah Khalid Al Hamad Al Sabah said, multilateralism and the principles of the United Nations Charter remain essential tools.

Many members underlined the need to maintain the strategic balance between the NPT’s three pillars of nuclear disarmament, nuclear non-proliferation and access to the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, in ways that seek to maximize their benefits for all States parties.

Poland’s Foreign Affairs Minister Jacek Czaputowicz regretted that of the three pillars disarmament has produced the least results, adding that efforts remain a “work in progress, at best”. To change that, delegates from non-nuclear-weapon States said the instrument is complemented by the legally binding NPT.

Representatives of Indonesia and South Africa made an impassioned plea also for facilitating the entry into force of the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW), which was adopted by the UN General Assembly in July 2017.

Indonesia’s Foreign Affairs Minister Retno Lestari Priansari Marsudi said the total elimination of nuclear weapons is the only guarantee to avoid a global catastrophe.  Expressing strong support for all three pillars – disarmament, non-proliferation and the peaceful use of nuclear energy – she raised concerns that the disarmament provision is the least implemented. When non‑nuclear-weapon States give up their rights to such weapons, possessor States must disarm their arsenals.

 “With great powers, come great responsibilities,” she said, urging nuclear‑weapon States to set a positive example. In 2020, parties must make every effort, including political will and flexibility, to avoid a repeat of the failure to produce an outcome at the 2015 Review Conference.

Also the entry into force of the TPNW will help advance the aim of totally eliminating atomic bombs, as enshrined in Article 6 of the Non‑Proliferation Treaty. “The human species’ survival is dependent on our collective courage to eliminate nuclear weapons once and for all,” she said.

South Africa’s permanent representative to the UN, Jerry Matthews Matjila, said that his Government remains disheartened at the apparent lack of urgency and seriousness with which nuclear disarmament has been approached in the Non-Proliferation Treaty context.

“This state of affairs places the Treaty, as well as its review process, under increasing pressure and falls far short of expectations,” he said. Measurable progress – particularly on nuclear disarmament – must therefore be a major determinant in achieving and in sustaining international peace and security.

Matjila said, South Africa had clearly demonstrated its commitment towards nuclear disarmament when it deposited its instrument of ratification on the TPNW on February 25, 2019, joining 21 other States that have ratified the instrument. He encouraged States that have not yet done so to follow suit.

South Africa remains a shining example of a country that went from developing its own nuclear arsenal to dismantling it and being an outspoken advocate against these weapons of mass destruction. [IDN-InDepthNews – 23 April 2019]

Photo: German Foreign Affairs Minister Heiko Maas chairs the Security Council meeting on Non-proliferation and supporting the Non-proliferation Treaty ahead of the 2020 Review Conference. 02 April 2019. United Nations, New York. Photo # 802676. UN Photo/Eskinder Debebe.

IDN is flagship agency of the International Press Syndicate.