On Friday last week (29th March) in
Liverpool I attended my first meeting as an appointed expert on the Independent
Advisory Panel for the UK Chief Nuclear Inspector of the UK nuclear regulator, the
Office for Nuclear Regulation (ONR). (http://news.onr.org.uk/2019/04/chief-nuclear-inspectors-independent-advisory-panel/)
IAP members have been invited to nominate issues or
themes to be considered at the next meeting in the autumn, and I came away
thinking nuclear security - and how it can be discussed meaningfully with
politicians and the public - is an important and under-addressed matter that the
IAP could engage.
No sooner had I started to think how best this might
be considered than ONR’s United States equivalent, the US Nuclear Regulatory
Commission, came under fire from another US Governmental body - the Government
Accountability Office – in a hard-hitting, and frankly very disturbing report,
on how a radioactive ‘dirty bomb’ (or as it is more technically calleda
Radiation Dispersal Device [RDD])could
be made from materials secreted out of US commercial nuclear facilities (‘Combating
Nuclear Terrorism: NRC Needs to Take Additional Actions to Ensure the Security
of High-Risk Radioactive Material,’ https://www.gao.gov/mobile/products/GAO-19-468)
This is GAO’s own
description of why they undertook the study:
“NRC is responsible for
regulating the security of radioactive material in the U.S. Failure to secure
this material could result in an RDD causing socioeconomic damage. The
Consolidated and Further Continuing Appropriations Act, 2015 (Public Law
113-235) includes a provision for GAO to review NRC’s security requirements for
high-risk radioactive material. This report examines, among other things, (1)
the extent to which radioactive security experts agreed that NRC’s assessment
of risk includes all relevant criteria, and (2) NRC’s 2016 evaluation of its
security requirements for high-risk radioactive material. GAO reviewed NRC
policies and procedures, worked with the National Academies of Sciences to
convene a meeting with 18 experts in radioactive security, and reviewed 3
recent Sandia studies. GAO used the views of security experts to define high
risk, and they generally agreed that high risk includes both larger and some
smaller quantities of radioactive materials”.
What GAO Found
The
report records:
The
18 experts at a meeting GAO convened with the National Academies of Sciences
generally agreed that the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) assessment of
risks of radioactive material does not include all relevant criteria. NRC
limits its criteria to prompt fatalities and deterministic health effects from
radiation, which, according to the experts and recent studies, are unlikely to
result from a radiological dispersal device (RDD). Two studies from Sandia
National Laboratories (Sandia) measuring consequences of RDDs, released in 2017
and 2018, found that there would be no immediate fatalities from radiation. The
experts at the meeting generally agreed that socioeconomic effects (e.g.,
relocations and clean-up costs) and fatalities that could result from
evacuations are the most relevant criteria for evaluating the risks of
radioactive material. The two Sandia studies found that a large RDD could cause
about $30 billion in damage and 1,500 fatalities from the evacuation, and a
considerably smaller RDD could cause $24 billion in damage and 800 fatalities
from the evacuation. By considering socioeconomic impacts and fatalities
resulting from evacuations in its criteria, NRC would have better assurance it
was considering the more likely and more significant consequences of an RDD.
NRC’s
2016 report evaluating its security requirements for high-risk radioactive
material, required by Public Law 113-235, considered only the security of
larger quantities of such material and not smaller quantities. Experts who attended
GAO’s meeting stated, and two 2018 Sandia studies agree, that if smaller
quantities of certain radioactive material were used in an RDD, the impacts
would be comparable to an RDD with a considerably larger amount of such
material. For example, a 2018 study from Sandia found that malicious use of
certain radioactive materials in smaller quantities could cause significant
socioeconomic consequences. By requiring additional security measures for these
smaller quantities of high-risk material, NRC can have better assurance that
its security requirements are sufficient to secure all high-risk radioactive
material from theft and use in an RDD.”
GAO Recommended three
key actions:
“GAO is making three recommendations
to NRC, including that it consider socioeconomic consequences and fatalities
from evacuations as criteria for determining security measures and require
additional security measures for smaller quantities of high-risk material.
NRC “generally
disagreed” with the recommendations, stating that GAO’s evidence “does not
provide a sufficient basis for recommended changes.”
But GAO
observed it “continues to believe these recommendations are important.
I think the
UK ONR now needs to either undertake, or
commission - as a matter of urgency - a similar study to the one recently released by the GAO in the US.
BACKSTORY
[UK]Chief
Nuclear Inspector’s Independent Advisory Panel
ONR, 4 April 2019
Our work is wide-ranging and technically complex and
we’re committed to engaging with nuclear topic experts to ensure that we have
access to relevant information to inform our regulatory strategies and
approaches.
In 2016, we introduced the Chief Nuclear Inspector’s
Independent Advisory Panel (IAP) to provide independent advice to ONR on
nuclear matters.
The IAP is now well established and meets twice a
year, bringing together experts from across the nuclear industry, academic
community, government departments and other regulators who contribute to
informed debate and provide advice on relevant topics. Their discussions range
from regulatory strategies and policy to implications of developments in new
nuclear technologies and the regulation of innovation, and we’re always
interested to hear their views.
To increase diversity of views and strengthen ONR’s
openness and transparency, the panel recently welcomed two new members from the
Non-Government Organisations (NGO) community.
Peter Burt and Dr David Lowry joined the 15-strong
panel at the latest meeting on 29 March in Liverpool, where they contributed to
discussions on ONR’s organisation effectiveness indicators, challenges of
supply chain regulation and some of our strategic improvement projects.
Appointed for three years, both members bring a wealth
of new experiences, skills and views to the panel’s vitally important
discussions. They have a broad understanding of the nuclear industry and the
hazards it presents, along with knowledge of the current and future nuclear
landscape, strengthening the panel to ensure that we have a range of opinions
and a high level of intelligence.
Mark Foy, Chief Nuclear Inspector for ONR said; “The panel helps us to maintain our approach to seeking independent advice and guidance to help inform our future regulatory strategy and approaches.
“We are committed to being an open and transparent
regulator so inviting representatives from the NGO community on to the panel
was the natural thing to do. I’m pleased that both David and Peter have joined
the panel, it is clear from the first meeting that they will bring a wealth of
knowledge and experience and I look forward to their further contributions.”
U.S. nuclear regulators do not recognize real
danger of dirty bombs, watchdog says
Besides killing
people with radiation, a dirty bomb would spread panic, prompt evacuations,
require cleanup and undermine the economy, says a new report.
Officials in
protective gear check for signs of radiation on children who are from the
evacuation area near the Fukushima Daini nuclear plant in Koriyama on March 13,
2011.Kim Kyung-Hoon /
April 4, 2019,
4:00 PM GDT
By Dan De Luce
WASHINGTON — The Nuclear Regulatory
Commission is failing to recognize the full range of dangers posed by a
potential dirty bomb attack and needs to take more action to secure high-risk
radioactive material, according to a government watchdog report released
Thursday.
In assessing the possible effect of a radioactive dirty bomb
detonated in an American city, the U.S. nuclear regulator has only focused on
the possible health effects caused by the spread of radiation, the Government
Accountability Office report said. But the NRC has not taken into account the
potential consequences of a panic-driven evacuation and costly decontamination
effort, according to the report.
"NRC's regulatory approach in many
ways is based on the idea that a dirty bomb would not be a
high consequence event," said David Trimble, director of the National
Resources and Environment office at the GAO.
"Their view of what the risk is is
very circumscribed, it's very narrow."
A dirty bomb uses a conventional explosive
combined with radioactive material to spread radiation over a wider area, and some terrorist groups have sought to
construct such a device over the years.
Rather than deaths or harm caused by
radiation, the most significant impact of a radioactive dirty bomb would be its
disruptive effect, by spreading panic, prompting evacuations, requiring cleanup
work and undermining economic activity, said the report, citing experts convened
by the National Academy of Sciences as well as other studies.
A chaotic evacuation could cause more
deaths than any radiation released in an attack, and the results of the
disruption and contamination could cause billions of dollars in damage, the
report said.
The spent fuel pool at Entergy Pilgrim
Nuclear Power Station in Plymouth, Mass., on Oct. 22, 2015.Craig F. Walker /
Boston Globe via Getty Images file
"Few deaths would occur due to the
radioactive nature of the event," the report said. "However,
significant social and economic impacts could result from public panic,
decontamination costs, and the denial of access to infrastructure and property
for extended periods of time."
The report cited the 2011 meltdown of the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear plant after an
earthquake and subsequent tsunami, saying more people died from the evacuation
process than from radiation releases or the effects of the natural disasters.
The NRC's staff operates under guidelines
that require it to only evaluate the risk of a dirty bomb based on immediate
deaths and other health effects of the radiation released.
"If you're using that as a criteria
to regulate, you're kind of missing the boat," Trimble said.
A worker decontaminates steel drums
containing yellowcake uranium to ensure safe shipment at UR Energy's Lost Creek
uranium production facility in Sweetwater County, Wyo., on Dec. 9, 2013.Alan
Rogers / Star-Tribune via AP file
The GAO also urged the nuclear agency to
take additional measures to safeguard smaller quantities of high-risk
radioactive material, arguing that even smaller amounts could still have major
consequences in a dirty bomb incident.
The Nuclear Regulatory Commission
disagreed with most of the report's findings, saying the GAO's view was based
on unlikely scenarios and selected opinions from experts.
"The security and appropriate control
of radioactive materials is a top priority for the NRC," the agency said
in a response to the GAO, which was included in an appendix to the report.
The GAO report was based in part on a
meeting of 18 experts across a range of fields arranged with the NRC and the
National Academies of Sciences. But in its letter, the NRC said the GAO had
relied on "selected aspects of the panel discussion to form the primary
basis for its recommendations" and referred to "statements of one or
two panel members to draw overarching conclusions."
April 16, 201804:55
The nuclear regulator disagreed with the
report's reference to the Fukushima example on evacuations, arguing it was no
equivalent to a possible dirty bomb scenario. In Fukushima, the nuclear power
plant meltdown was accompanied by an earthquake and tsunami, which complicated
evacuation efforts, the NRC said.
The NRC also rejected a GAO recommendation
to bolster security measures for certain quantities of a radioactive material,
americium-241, stored in close proximity, saying it had already taken
sufficient steps.
The NRC said it seeks "to balance the
need for the protection of radioactive materials with their availability for
beneficial uses in the medical, academic, and industrial environments."
The Nuclear Regulatory Commission has come
under frequent criticism over the decades from lawmakers,
environmental and watchdog groups that it is overly deferential to the nuclear
industry. The NRC's supporters have rejected the criticism as an attempt to
tarnish nuclear power as a viable energy source.
Over the past decade, the GAO has
previously taken the NRC to task for how it oversees security measures for
radioactive material. The NRC accepted the findings in those audits and took
action to tighten rules for organizations licensed to use radioactive materials
for commercial, medical or research purposes.
Dan De Luce
Dan De Luce is a reporter for the NBC
News Investigative Unit.
Combating Nuclear Terrorism:
NRC Needs to Take Additional Actions to Ensure the Security of High-Risk Radioactive Material
NRC Needs to Take Additional Actions to Ensure the Security of High-Risk Radioactive Material
GAO-19-468, Publicly
Released: Apr 4, 2019.
Fast Facts
In the hands of
terrorists, radioactive material could be used for a dirty bomb. The Nuclear
Regulatory Commission considers the health risks from short-term radiation
exposure when determining how to safeguard radioactive material.
But experts told us factors
such as deaths during an evacuation and the cost of environmental cleanup
should also be considered.
We recommended,
among other things, that the NRC consider these additional factors in
determining security measures for radioactive material.
Potential Consequences of
a Radiological Dispersal Device or Dirty Bomb
Graphic showing the
dispersal cloud of a hypothetical dirty bomb.
Multimedia
PODCAST:
The Nuclear Regulatory Commission and Security Risks
Highlights
The 18
experts at a meeting GAO convened with the National Academies of Sciences
generally agreed that the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) assessment of
risks of radioactive material does not include all relevant criteria. NRC
limits its criteria to prompt fatalities and deterministic health effects from
radiation, which, according to the experts and recent studies, are unlikely to
result from a radiological dispersal device (RDD). Two studies from Sandia
National Laboratories (Sandia) measuring consequences of RDDs, released in 2017
and 2018, found that there would be no immediate fatalities from radiation. The
experts at the meeting generally agreed that socioeconomic effects (e.g., relocations
and clean-up costs) and fatalities that could result from evacuations are the
most relevant criteria for evaluating the risks of radioactive material. The
two Sandia studies found that a large RDD could cause about $30 billion in
damage and 1,500 fatalities from the evacuation, and a considerably smaller RDD
could cause $24 billion in damage and 800 fatalities from the evacuation. By
considering socioeconomic impacts and fatalities resulting from evacuations in
its criteria, NRC would have better assurance it was considering the more
likely and more significant consequences of an RDD.
NRC's
2016 report evaluating its security requirements for high-risk radioactive
material, required by Public Law 113-235, considered only the security of
larger quantities of such material and not smaller quantities. Experts who
attended GAO's meeting stated, and two 2018 Sandia studies agree, that if
smaller quantities of certain radioactive material were used in an RDD, the
impacts would be comparable to an RDD with a considerably larger amount of such
material. For example, a 2018 study from Sandia found that malicious use of
certain radioactive materials in smaller quantities could cause significant
socioeconomic consequences. By requiring additional security measures for these
smaller quantities of high-risk material, NRC can have better assurance that
its security requirements are sufficient to secure all high-risk radioactive
material from theft and use in an RDD.
Example
of a Radiological Dispersal Device (RDD)
Why GAO Did This Study
NRC is
responsible for regulating the security of radioactive material in the U.S.
Failure to secure this material could result in an RDD causing socioeconomic damage.
The Consolidated and Further Continuing Appropriations Act, 2015 (Public Law
113-235) includes a provision for GAO to review NRC's security requirements for
high-risk radioactive material. This report examines, among other things, (1)
the extent to which radioactive security experts agreed that NRC's assessment
of risk includes all relevant criteria, and (2) NRC's 2016 evaluation of its
security requirements for high-risk radioactive material. GAO reviewed NRC
policies and procedures, worked with the National Academies of Sciences to
convene a meeting with 18 experts in radioactive security, and reviewed 3
recent Sandia studies. GAO used the views of security experts to define high
risk, and they generally agreed that high risk includes both larger and some
smaller quantities of radioactive materials.
What GAO Recommends
GAO is
making three recommendations to NRC, including that it consider socioeconomic
consequences and fatalities from evacuations as criteria for determining
security measures and require additional security measures for smaller
quantities of high-risk material. NRC generally disagreed with the
recommendations, stating that GAO's evidence does not provide a sufficient
basis for recommended changes. GAO continues to believe these recommendations
are important.
For more
information, contact David Trimble at (202) 512-3841 or trimbled@gao.gov.
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