Background
The Cabinet Office, Department for International
Development, Foreign and Commonwealth Office, Home Office, Ministry of Defence as well as other
departments are working together on the NSS and SDSR. This review will look at
the full range of threats that we face; it will examine the capabilities we
need to counter them; and help us judge how to resource those capabilities.
As part of this
work, we are engaging with a range of audiences, including Parliament,
academics, industry, think tanks, Allies and partners, non-governmental
organisations and the public. This is why we have developed an online form
giving members of the public the opportunity to contribute ideas and
suggestions on defence and security matters which will be used to inform the
work we are doing.
Response
1.Changed security threats
I want in my submission to
concentrate on two areas - subtitled
“Wider Security”* - of the 2010 Strategic Defence and Security Review,
itself titled 'Securing Britain in an Age of Uncertainty'.
[see ANNEX1
for the text of this section]
In my view the significant future security threat to the
UK, and our European neighbours, will be the massive social dislocation that
will be caused globally by serious climate change, enforcing mass migration
from the hotter regions around the equator, northwards and southwards.
This will require a huge transfer of resources, of the
order of many £ tens of billions, in the public purse into
the International development (overseas aid) and environmental budgets, to bolster sustainable development
strategies in conjunction with our EU neighbours, and richer nations around the
world, including the oil rich states, whose own petro-wealth accumulation has
exacerbated the climate change problems by providing fossil fuel energy
resources to worlds markets, thus delaying the onset of truly sustainable
energy strategies, led by renewable energies and energy efficiency.
The current annual UK defence budget for 2015-16 is £33,600,000,000
(£33.6 billion), with a further £11.4 billion in defence R&D, foreign military
and economic aid and civil defence.
The current UK
annual International Development budget is
£10.328 billion. The
Department for international Development (DfID) states that its:
“Programmes cover a range of countries or regions, in the annual
resources and results cycle. This establishes an aid framework allocation,
approved by the Secretary of State, which provides divisions within DFID with a
firm budget for the current year and indicative budgets for future years.
Table A.1 sets out
DFID’s actual programme resource outturn for 2014–15, and plans for 2015–16 are
represented. These plans may be subject to revision as, by its nature, the
Department’s work is dynamic. The precise way in which DFID spends will reflect
changing demands and the speed at which different projects are implemented and
new projects developed, while at the same time protecting ministerial spending
commitments.
Some 2015–16
allocations to specific programmes such as the ebola crisis were still to be
made at the time of preparing this report.
Front
line delivery represents operating costs associated with DFID staff who are
directly responsible for implementing aid programmes and are predominantly
based overseas. Front line delivery, while forming part of DFID’s total
operating costs, is contained within DFID’s programme budget allocation.”
It is clear
from the unfolding refugee crisis across Europe, arising from people fleeing
war and economic dislocation respectively in Syria, Iraq, Afghanistan, and from
Africa, (mainly sub-Saharan Africa and Libya), this budget it totally
inadequate for the demands upon it. Predicted future climate change will
increase manifold the refugee crisis, and increase significantly the demands on
resources to deal t with both the causes and courses of the global refugee
crisis
Meanwhile the
annual Budget for the Department for the Environment, Food and Rural Affairs
(DEFRA) is £2.866 billion, the most significant proportion of which is
allocated to UK agricultural support.
A relatively paltry amount is spent annually
on combatting/mitigating climate change in so-called ‘developing countries’, as
the recent Parliamentary answer pasted below demonstrates.
(Stafford)
Asked
on: 04 September 2015
Department
for International Development
Developing
Countries: Climate Change
Commons
To
ask the Secretary of State for International Development, how much the
Government spent on climate finance for (a) mitigation and (b) adaptation to
developing countries in each year between 2009 and 2015.
A
Answered
on: 11 September 2015
UK Government support to
help people both adapt to the impacts of climate change, and to mitigate its
future impacts, is delivered in an integrated way through a range of
programmes. Tracking spend on adaptation and mitigation only began in 2011 when
the International Climate Fund (ICF) was established. Since 2011/12 approximate
funding has been as follows:
Adaptation
2011/12 - £136m
2012/13 – £212m
2013/14 – £228m
Mitigation
2011/12 – £199m
2012/13 - £272m
2013/14 - £418m
Data for 2014/15 and 2015/16 will be published once available.
Adaptation
2011/12 - £136m
2012/13 – £212m
2013/14 – £228m
Mitigation
2011/12 – £199m
2012/13 - £272m
2013/14 - £418m
Data for 2014/15 and 2015/16 will be published once available.
This figures will require very significant increases, as the climate change threat, and consequent migration increase, becomes more manifest year on year. DFID and DEFRA should future proof their projected budgets taking this extreme predictable future into account.
2. Military hardware
The 2010 SDSR stated at section 3.6:
“As a responsible nuclear weapon state and party to the NPT, the UK also remains committed to the long term goal of a world without nuclear weapons. We will continue to work to control proliferation and to make progress on multilateral disarmament, to build trust and confidence between nuclear and non-nuclear weapon states, and to take tangible steps towards a safer and more stable world where countries with nuclear weapons feel able to relinquish them.”
The full section on what the SDSR calls “The Deterrent” – what I prefer to name more accurately Britain’s nuclear weapons of mass destruction – is pasted below at Annex 2.
In this part of my response, I want to argue that continue deployment of Trident WMDs undermines current security; and any plans to replace the nuclear WMD system will undermine our future security capacities, as the immensely expansive system would re-direct investment resources from other military hardware projects that should be given urgent priority.
Current Government judgement is there is no direct military threat to the UK, and no future military threat envisioned which could be combatted by use of Trident nuclear WMDs. In a policy non-sequitur, ministers then try to justify investing up to £100 billion over a projected lifetime in a replacement for Trident nuclear WMDs, by postulating amorphous, possible future threats which could demand Trident nuclear WMDs deployment.
This is surely self-serving and far-fetched fantasy.
Actually, the current defence secretary has
told Parliament, in a debate on Trident on 20 January this year: “we share the vision of a world that is without nuclear
weapons, achieved through multilateral disarmament."
(http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201415/cmhansrd/cm150120/debtext/150120-0001.htm#15012040000001)
(http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201415/cmhansrd/cm150120/debtext/150120-0001.htm#15012040000001)
Shortly after, in February, the Foreign Office hosted a high-level meeting in London of the nuclear weapons policy chiefs of the five nuclear weapons powers that comprise the permanent five (P5) members of the US Security Council – UK, US, Russia, France and China- to discuss steps towards nuclear disarmament, and their collective final statement included the following:
“The P5 reaffirmed that a step-by-step approach to nuclear disarmament that promotes international stability, peace and undiminished and increased security for all remains the only realistic and practical route to achieving a world without nuclear weapons.”
(Joint statement from the
Nuclear-Weapon States at the London P5 Conference, 6 February 2015, https://www.gov.uk/government/news/joint-statement-from-the-nuclear-weapon-states-at-the-london-p5-conference).
More recently, foreign office minister Tobias Ellwood said in a statement the "Government retains a commitment to a world without nuclear weapons following the end of the month-long review conference of the Nuclear non-proliferation treaty (NPT) in New York (Foreign Office Press, release 23 May).
More recently, foreign office minister Tobias Ellwood said in a statement the "Government retains a commitment to a world without nuclear weapons following the end of the month-long review conference of the Nuclear non-proliferation treaty (NPT) in New York (Foreign Office Press, release 23 May).
My view is instead of
spending the massive £100
billion on nuclear re-armament, some of this should be set aside for
implementation of the nuclear disarmament, in an environmentally safe and
secure fashion, of which the ministers and officials cited above have spoken
this year.
The remaining money currently earmarked for the replacement of the Trident nuclear WMD system should be re-allocated to building dual purpose surface ships for the Royal Navy and rescue helicopters, with aim of providing state-of-the-art floating platforms for assisting populations threatened by climate change and local war, with medical equipment and capacity to be reconfigurrd for emergency evacuation.
The rest of the saved resource from not replacing the Trident nuclear WMD should be re-allocated to the Foreign Office for enhanced diplomacy, and increase in ‘soft power’- for which the UK diplomatic corps has a deserved high global reputation
Dr David Lowry, Stoneleigh, Surrey, 13 September 2015
drdavidlowry@hotmail.com
ANNEX 1
Wider
Security
4.1 The National Security Risk Assessment set out a wide range of
risks. The National Security Council has enabled the Government to ensure that
all parts of government are integrated in dealing with security issues.
4.2 The Risk Assessment
identified wider security risks we should give greatest priority to, based upon
their relative likelihood and impact. These include three of the four Tier One
risks (terrorism, cyber security and civil emergencies in the form of natural
hazards or accidents) as well as other important issues:
A. Terrorism
B. Instability and conflict overseas
C. Cyber security
D. Civil emergencies
E. Energy security
F. Organised crime
G. Border security
H. Counter proliferation and arms control.
4.3 In the following
sections, we set out how we will put in place the adaptable approach to
implementing our new set of National Security Tasks and Planning Guidelines
(see Part One) to tackle these risks. In each case, we focus on the specific changes the Government will be introducing, and how these can be achieved
within the available resources.
A. Terrorism
4.A.1 Terrorism is a Tier
One risk in the National Security Risk Assessment. The most significant
terrorist threat to the UK and its interests overseas comes from the Al Qaeda
senior leadership based in the border areas of Afghanistan and Pakistan, and
their affiliates and supporters. The current threat to the UK from
international terrorism is judged to be Severe, meaning that an attack in this
country is highly likely. The threat is becoming more diverse as groups
affiliated to and inspired by Al Qaeda develop more autonomy in directing
operations. As such we are likely to see a more unpredictable picture in the
future, potentially with more frequent, albeit less sophisticated attacks.
4.A.2 The threat from
residual terrorism linked to Northern Ireland is a growing concern. There is a
calculated campaign of violence from small dissident republican groups. Despite
continuing political progress, their activities have increased in the last 18
months and the security situation is unlikely to improve in the short term.
There have been 37 attacks this year, compared with 22 in all of 2009. The
ongoing recruitment of experienced terrorists and a younger generation will
contribute to a continued high level of threat in Northern Ireland, as well as
in Great Britain where the threat level was recently raised from Moderate to
Substantial, meaning that an attack is a strong possibility.
4.A.3 While we cannot
eliminate terrorism, we can reduce the risk to the UK and our interests
overseas. The National Security Tasks and Guidelines in Part One set out an
approach that tackles terrorism at every stage and integrates our domestic and
overseas work: pursuing terrorists through assessed intelligence,
investigations and disruptions in the UK and overseas; preventing people from becoming
terrorists; and protecting critical national infrastructure and crowded places.
In the event of an attack we can ensure we are prepared by having robust crisis
management measures in place.
4.A.4 Following a rigorous
analysis of our current approach, this section sets out the specific changes we
will make to our counter-terrorism work. We will continue to give high priority
to counterterrorism compared to other areas of national security, and public
policy more generally. We will therefore ensure that our key counter-terrorism
capabilities are maintained and in some areas enhanced. We will:
•
continue to prioritise the
counter-terrorism elements of policing. We will maintain core capabilities in
counter-terrorism policing which are crucial to countering the threat from
terrorism, while introducing efficiency savings. These efficiency savings will
be achieved by greater prioritisation of policing efforts, the reorganisation
of headquarters and wider police reform. The Home Office has worked closely with
the police to ensure that resources can be adapted to changing demands and,
where appropriate, to identify areas for savings;
•
continue to invest in a range of
covert intelligence capabilities to enable us to identify, investigate and
disrupt terrorist activity at the earliest possible stage. The intelligence
community will work together to achieve this, including the Security Service
leading investigations in the UK, the Secret Intelligence Service (SIS) using
its global network to provide insights into terrorist activity overseas and the
Government Communications Headquarters (GCHQ) bringing its technical and
analytical capabilities to bear;
•
deliver a safe and secure
Olympic and Paralympic Games in 2012. We have been able to identify some
efficiency savings that will ensure that this programme is as cost-effective as
possible;
•
continue to support the devolved
institutions of Northern Ireland, which are endorsed by the people of Northern
Ireland. Alongside our objective for wider social, economic and political
progress in Northern Ireland we will pursue and develop a strategy to tackle
the threat from terrorism. We will work with the devolved administration and
the Irish Government to defeat the terrorists who threaten stability and
prosperity. We will publish any changes to the threat assessment in the
interests of transparency and to encourage vigilance.
4.A.5 We have identified
areas in which we need to adapt our strategy for countering international
terrorism (CONTEST) in order that our approach is proportionate, focussed and
effective. We will:
•
review our most sensitive and
controversial counter-terrorism and security powers and, where possible and
consistent with protecting the public, provide a correction in favour of
liberty. This is being undertaken as part of a broader programme of work to
enhance our civil liberties. We expect to amend some of the powers which have
been developed since 9/11 where doing so will make them more effective and less
intrusive;
•
reform the
counter-radicalisation workstream of the CONTEST strategy. We will review this
area, with a view to separating it much more clearly than before from general
communities policy. The Department for Communities and Local Government will
work to encourage a more integrated society, separate from CONTEST, while the
Office for Security and Counter-Terrorism (based in the Home Office) will be
responsible for a more focussed Prevent Strategy. The Foreign and Commonwealth
Office (FCO) will continue to focus on counter-ideology and
counter-radicalisation overseas, in regions that pose the greatest threat to
the UK;
•
enhance the firearms
capabilities of police armed response units this year, and support their work
with specialist military units to
•
increase the
effectiveness of the response in the event of a terrorist firearms attack in
the UK. We will train a greater number of police officers to be able to respond
to an attack, enhance training for existing firearms officers, increase the
number of armed response vehicles and introduce measures to improve joint
working between police, fire and ambulance services to deal with the particular
challenges of evacuating casualties during a firearms incident;
•
put in place new
measures to reduce the vulnerability of the UK to terrorist use of new kinds of
unconventional materials. We will do this through improved protection and
preparedness measures, including the deployment of improved detection
capabilities and investment in medical counter-measures;
•
introduce a
programme to preserve the ability of the security, intelligence and law
enforcement agencies to obtain communication data and to intercept
communications within the appropriate legal framework. This programme is
required to keep up with changing technology and to maintain capabilities that
are vital to the work these agencies do to protect the public. Communications
data provides evidence in court to secure convictions of those engaged in
activities that cause serious harm. It has played a role in every major
Security Service counterterrorism operation and in 95% of all serious
organised crime investigations. We will legislate to put in place the necessary
regulations and safeguards to ensure that our response to this technology
challenge is compatible with the Government’s approach to information storage
and civil liberties.
B. Instability and
conflict overseas
4.B.1 Recent
experience has shown that instability and conflict overseas can pose risks to
the UK, including by creating environments in which terrorists and organised
crime groups can recruit for, plan and direct their global operations. Groups
operating in countries like Somalia and Yemen represent a direct and growing
terrorist threat to the UK; criminal gangs use West Africa for smuggling goods
into the UK; and conflicts overseas disrupt our trade and energy supplies. A
lack of effective government, weak security and poverty can all cause
instability and will be exacerbated in the future by competition for resources,
growing populations and climate change.
4.B.2 A key principle of
our adaptable approach (set out in Part One) is to tackle threats at source. We
must focus on those fragile and conflict-affected countries where the risks are
high, our interests are most at stake and where we know we can have an impact.
To help bring enduring stability to such countries, we will increase
significantly our support to conflict prevention and poverty reduction. We will
deliver this support through an integrated approach that brings together our diplomatic, development, defence and
intelligence resources. Specifically, we will:
•
provide clearer
direction with a greater focus on results through the new Building Stability
Overseas Strategy to be published in spring 2011;
•
enhance the UK’s
system of early warning for countries at risk of instability to ensure that our
response is timely, appropriate and informed by the UK national interest;
•
increase Official
Development Assistance (ODA) to 0.7% of Gross National Income (GNI) by 2013.
The main objective of ODA is, and will continue to be, the economic development
and welfare of developing countries, with all UK ODA remaining fully consistent
with OECD rules. By using 30% of ODA to support fragile and conflict-affected
states and tackle the drivers of instability we will help some of the poorest
countries in the world address the root causes of their problems, build more
responsible and accountable governments and strengthen security and justice
overseas;
•
direct more
non-operational defence engagement overseas towards conflict prevention,
security sector reform and capability building in priority countries, including
through: establishing new training teams; running joint exercises; attaching
senior civilian policy advisers to foreign defence
The Deterrent 3.1 The National Security Tasks and
Planning Guidelines set out the need for a minimum effective nuclear deterrent
as the ultimate means to deter the most extreme threats. In parallel with the
Strategic Defence and Security Review we have conducted a review of our nuclear
declaratory policy, and scrutinised Trident replacement to ensure value for
money, including the scope for further reductions in the scale of our
nuclear weapons capability. The conclusions are set out below.
The Strategic Context: 3.2 No state currently has both the
intent and the capability to threaten the independence or integrity of the UK.
But we cannot dismiss the possibility that a major direct nuclear threat to the
UK might re-emerge – a state’s intent in relation to the use or threat of use
of its capabilities could change relatively quickly, and while we will continue
to work internationally to enhance mutual trust and security, we cannot rule
out a major shift in the international security situation which would put us
under grave threat.
3.3 Despite the success of the
Treaty on the Non Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) over the last 40 years
in limiting the number of states with nuclear capabilities, large arsenals
remain and the risk of nuclear proliferation continues. We cannot discount the
possibility that the number of states armed with nuclear weapons might
increase. Equally there is a risk that some countries might in future seek to
sponsor nuclear terrorism. We must not allow such states to threaten our
national security or to deter us and the international community from taking
the action required to maintain regional and global
security.
3.4 It is also important to
recognise that the UK’s nuclear deterrent supports collective security through
NATO for the Euro-Atlantic area; nuclear deterrence plays an important part in
NATO’s overall strategy and the UK’s nuclear forces make a substantial
contribution.
Nuclear weapons policy
3.5 At the beginning of this
Parliament, the Foreign Secretary announced a review of our nuclear declaratory
policy to ensure that it is appropriate to the political and security context
in 2010 and beyond. The UK has long been clear that we would only consider
using our nuclear weapons in extreme circumstances of self defence, including
the defence of our NATO Allies, and we remain deliberately ambiguous about
precisely when, how and at what scale we would contemplate their use.
3.6 As a responsible nuclear weapon
state and party to the NPT, the UK also remains committed to the long term goal
of a world without nuclear weapons. We will continue to work to control
proliferation and to make progress on multilateral disarmament, to build trust
and confidence between nuclear and non-nuclear weapon states, and to take
tangible steps towards a safer and more stable world where countries with
nuclear weapons feel able to relinquish them.
3.7 We are now able to give an
assurance that the UK will not use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against
non-nuclear weapon states parties to the NPT. In giving this assurance, we
emphasise the need for universal adherence to and compliance with the NPT, and
note that this
assurance
would not apply to any state in material breach of those non-proliferation
obligations. We also note that while there is currently no direct threat to the
UK or its vital interests from states developing capabilities in other weapons
of mass destruction, for example chemical and biological, we reserve the right
to review this assurance if the future threat, development and proliferation of
these weapons make it necessary.
Value for money
3.8 In December 2006, the previous
Government published The Future of the United Kingdom’s Nuclear Deterrent White
Paper (Cm6994). In March 2007 Parliament voted to retain a minimum nuclear
deterrent based on the current Trident missile delivery system. Under the
previous Government, work started on a programme to replace the current
Vanguard class submarines when they leave service in the late 2020s. In May
this year the Coalition programme for government stated that ‘we will maintain
Britain’s nuclear deterrent, and have agreed that the renewal of Trident will
be scrutinised to ensure value for money. Liberal Democrats will continue to
make the case for alternatives’. The value for money review has now been
completed.
3.9 The Government will maintain a
continuous submarine-based deterrent and begin the work of replacing its
existing submarines. We will therefore proceed with the renewal of Trident and
the submarine replacement programme, incorporating the savings and changes set
out below. The first investment decision (Initial Gate) will be approved, and
the next phase of the project commenced, by the end of this year.
3.10 The review has concluded that
the overall cost of the submarine and warhead replacement programmes and
associated infrastructure remains within the £20 billion cost estimate foreseen
in 2006 at 2006 prices. To drive value for money we will:
•
defer decisions on a replacement
to the current warhead
•
reduce the cost of the
replacement submarine missile compartment
•
extend the life of the current
Vanguard class submarines and re-profile the programme to build replacement
submarines
•
consequently, take the second
investment decision (Main Gate) finalising the detailed acquisition plans,
design and number of submarines around 2016
•
work with British industry to
improve efficiency and optimise to expected demand its capacity to build and
support submarines.
As a result of our reassessment
of the minimum necessary requirements for credible deterrence we will:
•
reduce the number of warheads
onboard each submarine from 48 to 40
•
reduce our requirement for
operationally available warheads from fewer than 160 to no more than 120
•
reduce our overall nuclear weapon
stockpile to no more than 180
•
reduce the number of operational
missiles on each submarine.
The overall impact of the
changes identified by the value for money review will be to reduce costs by
£3.2 billion, saving approximately £1.2 billion and deferring spending of up to
£2 billion from the next 10 years; we expect some of the deferred spend ultimately
to be translated into real savings in later years. These savings do not alter
in any way the nature and credibility of the nuclear deterrent, including
maintenance of Continuous At Sea Deterrence. Further detail is set out below.
Scale
3.11 The Government has
concluded that we can meet the minimum requirement of an effective and credible
level of deterrence with a smaller nuclear weapons capability. We will
therefore cut the maximum number of nuclear warheads onboard each deployed
submarine from 48 to 40. Together with improved stockpile management, that will
reduce our requirement for operationally available warheads from fewer than 160
to no more than 120. We will also reduce the number of operational missiles on
the Vanguard class
submarines
to no more than eight. These changes will start to take effect over the next
few years. This will enable us to reduce our overall nuclear warhead stockpile
ceiling from not more than 225 to not more than 180 by the mid 2020s.
Replacement warheads
3.12 Since 2006, work has been
progressing in order to determine the optimum life of the existing warhead
stockpile and the range of replacement options. Under the 1958 UK-US Agreement
for Cooperation on the Uses of Atomic Energy for Mutual Defence Purposes (the
‘Mutual Defence Agreement’) we have agreed on the future of the Trident D5
delivery system and determined that a replacement warhead is not required until
at least the late 2030s. Decisions on replacing the warhead will not therefore
be required in this Parliament. This will defer £500 million of spending from
the next 10 years. We have also reached agreement with the US over the size of
the missile tubes in the new submarines; this has enabled us to reduce the cost
of the submarine missile compartment by up to £250 million.
Submarines
3.13 We
have reviewed the scope to extend the life of the existing Vanguard class
submarines and have concluded that, with sufficient investment, we can safely
operate them into the late 2020s and early 2030s. This affords us the
opportunity to adjust the build programme of the replacement submarines to
match, reducing cost in the short-term with the aim of delivering the first new
submarine in 2028. Later this year detailed design work on the new class of
submarines will begin. This will provide the information needed in order to
determine whether maintaining continuous at sea deterrence would require four
submarines, or a fleet of only three. A decision on submarine numbers would be
required at the Main Gate point of our acquisition programme, around 2016.
3.14 We have also determined that the
next generation of submarines can be configured with only eight operational
missile tubes, rather than the 16 on the current Vanguard class. Together with
the US, we will now proceed with a common design for the missile compartment
that provides that capacity.
Industry and infrastructure
3.15 The value for money work has
also examined the organisations and infrastructure that support our deterrent
to ensure that they are as efficient as possible. We have identified a number
of areas where spending can be reduced and in some cases deferred in order to
minimise expenditure. As a result, we have agreed to defer and potentially to
remove over £1 billion of future spending on infrastructure over the next 10
years.
3.16
Across the whole of the nuclear
defence programme we will be working closely with our industrial suppliers to
improve commercial arrangements and efficiency. Under this Submarine Enterprise
Performance Programme we expect to deliver substantial savings of at least £900
million over the next 10 years.
The national security strategy - a strong Britain
in an age of uncertainty
First
published: 18 October 2010
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