Your report on Indian prime minister Modi’s deal-making with the UK Government in London ("High security and Cameron’s praise for former persona non grata Modi,” 13 November, http://www.theguardian.com/politics/2015/nov/12/david-cameron-narendra-modi-india-prime-minister-uk-visit) overlooks one very important dimension of the deals. Modi announced in his joint press conference with David Cameron "Today we have signed a civil nuclear deal. This is a sign of our mutual trust in each other."(http://www.ndtv.com/india-news/pm-narendra-modi-davd-cameron-address-media-highlights-1242804)
Mr Cameron added “ we are now discussing the future partnership between Britain and India, both of us backed by our countries for this parliament to work together to strengthen the partnership that we have.”( https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/joint-press-conference-david-cameron-and-prime-minister-narendra-modi)
The text of the bilateral trade agreement reports in just one paragraph out of 22 the essence of this nuclear deal as follows:
“The two Prime Ministers welcomed the successful conclusion of negotiations on a bilateral Civil Nuclear Co-operation Agreement providing a framework for further co-operation, and announced the signing of a MoU between the UK and the Indian Department for Atomic Energy to encourage joint training and experience sharing on Civil Nuclear with the Indian Global Centre for Nuclear Energy Partnership.” (https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/uk-india-joint-statement-on-energy-and-climate-change)
This deal follows on from an earlier arrangement 5 years ago fixed by Lord Mandelson when he was Labour’s business secretary. Earlier, in November 2008, the UK government lifted its ban on nuclear-related exports to India, following the decision by the so-called Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) to allow the transfer of 'trigger list' – ie militarily related items to India for peaceful purposes.
UK policy since 2002 had been to refuse all licence applications for the transfer of items which could potentially have nuclear uses to India because of that country's status as a non-signatory of the Nuclear non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT).
UK policy since 2002 had been to refuse all licence applications for the transfer of items which could potentially have nuclear uses to India because of that country's status as a non-signatory of the Nuclear non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT).
Until then, items, which appear on the NSG's "trigger list", could only be transferred to a country with full non-proliferation safeguards to ensure that they are indeed used for peaceful purposes. However, after India finalised a wide-ranging safeguards agreement with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) earlier in 2008, the NSG subsequently decided to permit such items to be transferred to India.
India’s prime minister is directly in charge of his country’s Department of Atomic Energy and the Department of Space respectively, demonstrating their strategic importance in India (http://www.webindia123.com/government/cabinet.htm)
When the US administration lifted export controls with India to permit its own atomic accord in autumn of 2008, it caused a furore in Congress. The Economist reported: “Like Pakistan and Israel, India has stayed outside the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), building nuclear weapons instead. Under NSG rules, none of the three should be entitled to import either civilian or military nuclear technology and materials.” (“When nuclear sheriffs quarrel, The Economist, 30 October 2008; http://www.economist.com/node/12516611)
Why have we heard not a peep from any MPs over this dangerous deal with a rogue nuclear state?
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