How UK universities and nuclear power companies got into bed with the Chinese nuclear military establishment

On Sunday, the Mail on Sunday ran three pages of sensationalist revelations on British universities’ military relations with China. Under a strapline reading “China in the Dock”, the MoS banner headline over its investigation read “MI6 fears over universities’ links with Beijing goons.” They were reporting the essential findings of a new 115-page research report published yesterday by a conservative London-based think tank, CIVITAS, titled “Inadvertently Arming China? The Chinese military complex and its potential exploitation of scientific research at UK universities” (Inadvertently Arming China?: The Chinese military complex and its potential exploitation of scientific research at UK universities: 8 February 2021; https://www.civitas.org.uk/publications/inadvertently-arming-china/) Civitas argues that there is a “pervasive presence of Chinese military-linked conglomerates and universities in the sponsorship of high-technology research centres in many leading UK universities.” It media release records “In many cases, these UK universities are unintentionally generating research that is sponsored by and may be of use to China’s military conglomerates, including those with activities in the production of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMDs), including intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) as well as hypersonic missiles, in which China is involved in a new arms race and seeks ‘massively destabilising’ weaponry.” Much of this research is entirely based at UK universities, Civitas says, while other research outputs include cooperation with researchers in China, often at the military-linked universities or companies sponsoring the UK research centre. Many of the research projects will have a civilian use, and, the report asserts “UK-based researchers will be unaware of a possible dual use that might lead to a contribution to China’s military industries” The report’s authors are Dr Radomir Tylecote, Director of the Defence and Security for Democracy (DSD) Unit at Civitas. He is also Research Director of the Free Speech Union and a Fellow of the Institute of Economic Affairs. He has a PhD from Imperial College London and an MPhil in Chinese Studies from the University of Cambridge. Robert Clark is a Defence Fellow at the Henry Jackson Society (another conservative think-take, named after the former, whose research interests include defence technologies, alliance-building and the Transatlantic partnership, and authoritarian threats to the global order. He served in the British Army for nine years - including in Iraq and Afghanistan - and has an MA in International Conflict Studies from King's College London. The report finds that at least 15 UK universities have “productive research relationships” with Chinese military-linked manufacturers and universities, and reveals that much of the research at the university centres and laboratories is also being sponsored by the UK taxpayer through research councils, Innovate UK, and the Royal Society. The authors argue that this trend should be seen in the context of China’s stated aim to equal the US military by 2027; and to use advanced military technology to leapfrog the US by 2049, the centenary of the founding of the People’s Republic of China (PRC). This report analyses the relationships that at least 15 UK universities have established with 22 Chinese military-linked universities as well as weapons suppliers or other military-linked companies. Many of these Chinese universities are deemed “very high risk” by the Australian Strategic Policy Institute (ASPI). The authors find that “The methods by which the UK monitors and controls Chinese involvement in UK university research are, we suggest, inadequate.” The report spells out “a picture of strategic incoherence” suggesting that “China is demonstrating rapid technological-military development and growing force-projection capabilities.” To risk financing and enabling these developments suggests a lack of strategic coordination, the authors conclude. “This points to the need for a strategic reassessment for new rules for scientific research with PRC universities and companies, some of which should be applied directly to the UK’s research councils and universities, while some may require legislation.Other rules are needed for scientific research in wider potentially sensitive scientific fields generally and in universities in particular.” The authors also suggest the UK set up a new government organisation similar to the Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States (CFIUS), whose role would include monitoring and assessment of university sponsorship. Those measures should form part of an urgent reassessment of the security implications of the so-called ‘Golden Era’ policies towards China and the strategic assumptions that underpinned them. The authors explain the context of Chinese military expansionism and civil-military fusion thus: “Beijing has recently declared that China aims for the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) to be on a par with the US military by 2027. This would have deep and far-reaching consequences for security for the UK, other democracies, and UK allies. The rapid technological development of the PLA should also be set against the wider background of the increasingly hawkish strategy of and strategic thinkers around President Xi Jinping, as well as the authoritarian entrenchment of the state in China. Scholars have described Xi’s adherence to the concept of the ‘100-year marathon’, a strategic attempt to become a global hegemony by 2049, the centenary of the founding of the People’s Republic of China (PRC). 1 Research and development in next-generation military technology should be understood in this strategic context. Since the late 1990s, defectors have referred to new military technologies under development by the PLA for use ‘beyond Taiwan’. The aim, discussed by senior Chinese military figures, is to use advanced military technologies to leapfrog the United States in particular.2 This includes the capacity to launch devastating pre-emptive strikes or counterattacks aimed at destabilising enemy forces’ radar systems, orbital satellites, and command and control systems, including through the possible use of unconventional weapons and electronic warfare. This is underway amidst apparent ongoing confusion in British strategic thinking. While UK taxpayers fund research at universities that risks contributing to the development of China’s military, the UK’s R&D spending on its own defence is anaemic: Volkswagen alone spends more on R&D than the entire UK defence sector. Driving the Chinese growth in military technology is the mandated integration and joint development of military and civilian technology sectors, or ‘civil-military fusion’ , which Beijing hopes will give the PLA a leading edge in adapting emerging technologies in order to utilise them for military purposes, across technological fields. This means it is especially difficult to know that research for an apparently civilian business unit of a military-linked Chinese conglomerate, or for an apparently civilian-oriented department of a military- backed university, will not ultimately be put to military use. China has a long history of weapons proliferation to unstable, authoritarian regimes that systematically abuse human rights, a challenge which may be growing. China has supplied military materiel to the Syrian regime throughout the Syrian civil war; it has routinely supplied Burma with materiel including FN-6 surface-to-air missiles,4 107mm surface-to surface rockets,JF-17 aircraft, armoured vehicles, and possibly drones. In Afghanistan, Chinese weapons consistently make their way to the Taliban, including surface-to-air missiles and anti-aircraft guns. Chinese entities and companies are believed to have been involved in nuclear proliferation to Pakistan, Iran and North Korea. China’s military force-projection capacity is growing, and its military committing more resources to researching highly-destabilising materiel, such as directed-energy weapons and hypersonic missiles. China’s development of a surveillance state is already leading to systematic human rights abuses. The findings of this report do not detract from the value of the international scientific collaboration in which British universities participate and frequently lead, including with Chinese nationals, and should not be used to cast suspicion on Chinese researchers in the UK. However, that the Chinese military is liable to exploit some of the scientific research at UK universities that we describe, research which is often also sponsored by the UK taxpayer, demonstrates a lack of strategic coordination that is against the British national interest.” One Chinese research collaboration is with Cranfield University at Shrivenham, which is the home to Cranfield Defence and Security, a secure military site whose partners include the Atomic Weapons Establishment (AWE). A researcher at Cranfield’s Centre for Electronic Warfare, Information and Cyber (CEWIC) has a Chinese-funded project developing automated camera surveillance of people showing physical symptoms of stress. An expert in 12 Ibid. 18 Electro-Optics, he is a visiting professor at Nanchang HangKong University, where optoelectrics is a designated area of military research. Surrey University, based in Guildford, has partnered with the China Academy of Space Technology (CAST), a subsidiary of CASC, to develop 5G technology. Its parent company is a major part of China’s nuclear weapons programme. This formal relationship appeared after Max Lu became Vice Chancellor at Surrey. When she was Prime Minister, Theresa May subsequently appointed Lu to the Council for Science and Technology; he also sits on the boards of UKRI, the National Physical Laboratory and Universities UK, giving him considerable potential influence over UK research funding. Investigation at King’s College London has drawn attention to two pieces of Imperial College London research that it states will “certainly be of interest for military aircraft designers, as well as in civilian applications. These were ‘Structural Integrity Assessment of Additive Manufactured Products’ and ‘Impact testing of laminated glass and composites’, which used a high velocity gun system ‘relevant for nuclear weapons development’. Meanwhile, Imperial College told the Civitas researchers “We do not conduct any classified research.” Dr Xianwen Ran of the Chinese National University of Defense Technology (NUDT ) is described as a “productive researcher” with a professor who the University of Cambridge states is a Bye-Fellow of Gonville and Caius – a constituent college of the University of Cambridge – but not an employee of the University itself. Dr Ran recent papers (not in cooperation with the professor at Gonville and Caius) include: In December 2019, A method to optimize the electron spectrum for simulating thermo-mechanical response to x-ray radiation (‘The X-ray pulse originating from high altitude nuclear detonation (HAND) is mainly soft X-ray and its intensity is high enough [to] lead to severe thermo-mechanical deformation of unpenetrated material… It is possible to simulate [this] using the optimized electron spectrums. (https://www.researchgate.net/publication/338205287_A_Method_to_Optimize_the_Electron_Spectrum_for_ Simulating_Thermo-Mechanical_Response_to_X-ray_Radiation). The Bye-Fellow who is Ran’s research partner in separate fields is an “Associate member of the Cavendish Laboratory “, and a “Research Fellow at Imperial College London”, and is a “Distinguished Visiting Professor of NUDT” (his CV lists this position as having been from 2014 to 2017, however, at the time of writing, his online profile states that this continues). He remains a High-Level Foreign Talent, a position awarded by Beijing (this ‘comes with a long-term visa’), having been awarded membership of the so-called ‘1000-Talents plan’ in 2015. He remains a Distinguished Visiting Professor of China’s Central South University (he states that at CSU he carries out ‘research with engineers on better transportation systems and vehicles’). Before 1996, he was also a Fellow at the US defense research and development base at Los Alamos National Laboratory, run by the US Government’s Department of Energy. The 1000-Talents Plan exists to bring scientific expertise and knowledge to China, primarily by returning Chinese nationals: ‘The US Department of Energy… has been heavily targeted to this end… According to one report, “so many scientists from Los Alamos have returned to Chinese universities and research institutes that people have dubbed them the ‘Los Alamos club’”, according to Stephen Chen in ‘America’s hidden role in Chinese weapons research’, South China Morning Post, 29 March 2017. Another project sees Glasgow University having established a joint college with a major military-backed PRC university whose collaborations include with a Chinese nuclear warhead manufacturer, the Chinese Academy of Engineering Physics. One area that the authors do not highlight is the intended collaboration between nuclear weapons builder, China General Nuclear (CGN), on a giant nuclear power plant at Bradwell in Essex, called Bradwell B, modelled on the Chinese reactor design Hualong-1. There are clearly security–related issues raised by using a contractor-designer –financier- operator company, CGN, from China, which is intimately involved in its nuclear weapons programme, in a so-called commercial nuclear power plant development in the UK. There is an intriguing background to this UK-China nuclear collaboration. Nick Timothy, ex British Prime Minister Theresa May’s former joint chief of staff, was an open critic of David Cameron’s “golden era” relations with Beijing, who raised his concerns saying Chinese investment in sensitive sectors created security concerns. (”UK decision to delay Hinkley Point plant catches China by surprise,” The Guardian 30-31July 2016) He highlighted this potential problem originally in autumn 2015 on a Conservative web site blog( “The Government is selling our national security to China; 20 October 2015; (www.conservativehome.com/thecolumnists/2015/10/nick-timothy-the-government-is-selling-our-national-security-to-china.html) But the nuclear security problem is not at all theoretical. On 13 July 2016, in a coruscating critique of the ballooning costs and unreliability of UK nuclear power, the national financial watchdog, the National Audit Office issued report Nuclear power in the UK, (HC 511 SESSION 2016-17), in which it include the following observation in a section headed The challenges of nuclear power at para 2.11 “There are specific challenges in ensuring that nuclear power is on an equal footing in the market with other low-carbon technologies: Nuclear power plants have very high upfront costs and take a long time to build. Costs have increased in recent years given the extra safety considerations following the Fukushima disaster and increasing terrorist threats(emphasis added) ( https://www.nao.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2016/07/Nuclear-power-in-the-UK.pdf) A week earlier, on 7 July 2016, to no media attention at all, the official UK nuclear safety and security regulator, the Office for Nuclear Regulation, published its annual progress report. In a section headed Civil Nuclear Security (pages 37-38) it revealed : “ Overall, the civil nuclear sector met its security obligations. There are areas where the duty holder’s security arrangements did not fully meet regulatory expectations. (emphasis added) (http://www.onr.org.uk/documents/2016/annual-report-2015-16.pdf) ONR has since declined to elaborate what the problem is, on security grounds. However, in late July 2016, Mrs May’s former department, the Home Office, issued a report CONTEST, UK strategy for countering terrorism: annual report for 2015 with a section included on Resilience of Critical Infrastructure. Paragraph 2.57 of this report - which must have been prepared and signed off while Mrs May was still in charge of the Home Office - states: “We assess all risks to our Critical National Infrastructure, from flooding to cyberattack to terrorism, and work with operators to enhance our infrastructure security. We are reviewing infrastructure policing to ensure that the UK has the right capability to protect our national infrastructure and address national threats: which include nuclear power plants. (https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/539684/55469_Cm_9310_PRINT_v0.11.pdf) In Europe too, the nuclear terrorist spectre has been regularly raised by Europol, the EU’s Dutch-based counter- terror agency. In its 2016 annual report - issued on 20 July 2016 - it revealed under the chapter headed Chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear (CBRN) substances: “Nuclear power plants and nuclear weapon facilities in the EU also remain potential targets for terrorists.” (https://www.europol.europa.eu/content/211-terrorist-attacks-carried-out-eu-member-states-2015-new-europol-report-reveals) So what on earth was going on to provoke Mrs May, an incoming British Prime Minister, to start questioning a newly-established industrial partnership between the UK and China on nuclear technology, cultivated in the previous two years by her predecessor, David Cameron, and his Chancellor George Osborne ( who May sacked immediately on coming into office)? Nick Timothy wrote the following on on the ConservativeHome web site in October 2015, when he was still working for a conservative think tank: “Security experts – reportedly inside as well as outside government – are worried that the Chinese could use their role to build weaknesses into computer systems which will allow them to shut down Britain’s energy production at will. For those who believe that such an eventuality is unlikely, the Chinese National Nuclear Corporation – one of the state-owned companies involved in the plans for the British nuclear plants - says on its website that it is responsible not just for “increasing the value of state assets and developing the society” but the “building of national defence.” MI5 believes that “the intelligence services of…China…continue to work against UK interests at home and abroad.’” ( http://www.conservativehome.com/thecolumnists/2015/10/nick-timothy-the-government-is-selling-our-national-security-to-china.html) Ironically, at the beginning of September 2016, the United States Chamber of Commerce issued 116 page report on threats to international free trade in information technology, highlighting the role played by China’s national security laws to exclude US ( and others’) companies from selling into the Chinese market. The report notes: “While globalization of the ICT sector has been one of the most powerful drivers of global economic welfare during the past several decades, a number of factors—particularly at the policy level—are now threatening to slow or even reverse that trend. In particular, some national governments, by intentionally or unintentionally defining security concerns in an overly broad manner, are applying intense pressure on the ICT sector to localize rather than globalize. Such pressures are manifesting in laws and regulations that expressly require the indigenization of R&D, manufacturing, and/or assembly of products or localization of data, or that otherwise effectively preference products and services that localize assembly, source code development and storage, or the storage of data.” (Preventing Deglobalization, 1 September 2016 https://www.uschamber.com/sites/default/files/documents/files/preventing_deglobalization_1.pdf) The report states on national security threats: “The Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress (“NPC”) passed the country’s most comprehensive piece of national security legislation in July 2015, a sweeping National Security Law that establishes an expansive framework on security and that describes in broad terms how the country’s leadership understands its security interests. The new law’s breadth is evident in its assertion that China’s security interests extend far beyond its physical borders, even into the depths of the oceans, the Arctic, outer space, and, of course, cyberspace.102 It describes national security as encompassing political security, military security, social and cultural security, ecological security, agricultural security, and much more…… At the end of December 2015, the NPC Standing Committee enacted a Counter-Terrorism Law, which went into effect on January 1, 2016. Drafts of the law were originally released in November 2014 and February 2015 and attracted significant controversy. The Counter-Terrorism Law reinforces the government’s broad powers to investigate and prevent incidents of terrorism, and requires citizens and companies to assist and cooperate with the government in dealing with such matters. It also imposes new obligations on companies in certain sectors. Non-compliance or non-cooperation can lead to significant penalties, including fines on companies and criminal charges or detention for responsible individuals.” Writing in the The Wall Street Journal on 7 September 2016, Andrew Browne observed:” China plays by its own rules nowadays…. It bullies Washington’s regional friends and allies.. China is using national-security laws and other means to exclude U.S. technology companies from swaths of its vast market..” (“China’s Subtle War Against U.S. Dignity”; http://www.wsj.com/articles/chinas-subtle-war-against-u-s-dignity-1473151399) In light of the Chinese Government’s own stated security concerns and enacted law, it is worthwhile recalling how China abused s other states’ own security laws with its extensive overseas spying apparatus. A month earlier, the press extensively reported on an industrial espionage case involving a Chinese nuclear engineer. One report explained “In a 17-page indictment, the US government said nuclear engineer Allen Ho, employed by the China General Nuclear Power Company, and the company itself had unlawfully conspired to develop nuclear material in China without US approval and ‘with the intent to secure an advantage to the People’s Republic of China’”. (“Nuclear espionage charge for China firm with one-third stake in UK's Hinkley Point,” Guardian, 11 August 2016; https://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2016/aug/11/nuclear-espionage-charge-for-china-firm-with-one-third-stake-in-hinkley-point) Two months earlier, the US Justice Department had issued a press release, which recorded in part: “Kan Chen, 26, of Ningbo, China, in Zhejiang Province, was sentenced to 30 months in prison and three years of supervised release for conspiring to violate the Arms Export Control Act and International Traffic in Arms Regulations; attempting to violate the Arms Export Control Act and International Traffic in Arms Regulations; and violating the International Emergency Economic Powers Act. On June 16, 2015, Chen was arrested by HSI agents on the Northern Mariana Island of Saipan following an eight-month long investigation into his illegal conduct and has remained in custody. He pleaded guilty to the offenses listed above on March 2, 2016. “The United States will simply never know the true harm of Chen’s conduct because the end users of the rifle scopes and other technology are unknown,” said U.S. Attorney Oberly. “No matter their nationality, those individuals who seek to profit by illegally exporting sensitive U.S. military technology will be prosecuted. It is important that we take all necessary steps to prevent our military technology and equipment from being exported and possibly used against our service members and our allies overseas.” (“Chinese National sentenced to 30 months in prison for smuggling high tech US military hardware to China,” : June 29, 2016; https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/chinese-national-sentenced-30-months-prison-smuggling-high-tech-us-military-hardware-china But this is not a recent phenomenon: 21 years ago, the New York Times revealed under the headline “China Stole Nuclear Secrets For Bombs, U.S. Aides Say”, ( 6 March 1999; http://www.nytimes.com/1999/03/06/world/breach-los-alamos-special-report-china-stole-nuclear-secrets-for-bombs-us-aides.html) that “Working with nuclear secrets stolen from an American Government laboratory, China has made a leap in the development of nuclear weapons: the miniaturization of its bombs, according to Administration officials.” The New York Times published a detailed update on 26 September 2000, stating in part: “On March 6, 1999, The New York Times reported that Government investigators believed China had accelerated its nuclear weapons program with the aid of stolen American secrets. The article said the Federal Bureau of Investigation had focused its suspicions on a Chinese-American scientist at the Los Alamos National Laboratory. Two days later, the government announced that it had fired a Los Alamos scientist for ''serious security violations.'' Officials identified the man as Wen Ho Lee. Dr. Lee was indicted nine months later on charges that he had transferred huge amounts of restricted information to an easily accessible computer. Justice Department prosecutors persuaded a judge to hold him in solitary confinement without bail, saying his release would pose a grave threat to the nuclear balance. This month the Justice Department settled for a guilty plea to a single count of mishandling secret information. The judge accused prosecutors of having misled him on the national security threat and having provided inaccurate testimony. Dr. Lee was released on the condition that he cooperate with the authorities to explain why he downloaded the weapons data and what he did with it.” The story was followed up by the Guardian’s sister Sunday paper, The Observer, ran a detailed revelation headlined: "China steals US nuclear secrets,” 7 March 1999) with a follow up in August 1999 (“China Crisis, 22 August 1999; https://www.theguardian.com/theobserver/1999/aug/22/life1.lifemagazine2) In between times, the London Evening Standard ran a front page revelation from Washington on 25 May 1999 headlined “China’s army of spies in U.S.”- which unveiled China controlled several thousand ‘front companies’: “The 700-page [Congressional committee] document describes a massive and voracious theft of American know-how in addition to the recently well-publicised espionage that succeeded in stealing nuclear secrets from a supposedly secure weapons laboratory run by the US Energy Department. President Clinton has falsely claimed he was not told about the spying. The report discloses that China uses an extensive network of small and large businesses operated by Chinese nationals in the US to penetrate civilian technology centres. There may be more than 3,000 such firms, mainly concentrated in California and Massachusetts, which are connected to the Chinese espionage apparatus. China requires, as normal practice, that many of the thousands of students, tourists and other Chinese visitors to the US seek out information that might be used for military purposes. Christopher Cox, chairman of the committee which issued the report, says Chinese espionage has been going on for two decades, and continues.” Contemporary concerns over China undermining nuclear security thus have a detailed history. Regulating Nuclear Security The UK nuclear regulator, the Office for Nuclear Regulation (ONR), says it has “carefully considered the information” in Generic Design Assessment (GDA) – ‘Step 1 Entry Readiness Evidence Pack’ - and “judge that it is sufficient to demonstrate that GNS is ready to commence step 1 of GDA. GNS have put in place arrangements that should help ensure an effective and efficient start to a GDA of the UK HPR1000 reactor design and is committing resources consistent with our expectations. We therefore judge that the project appears viable and warrants the deployment of regulatory resource.” HOW DID ONR REACH ITS CONCLUSION OF READINESS? In the ONR document ‘New nuclear reactors: Generic Design Assessment Guidance to Requesting Parties’ (http://www.onr.org.uk/new-reactors/ngn03.pdf) [ONR-GDA-GD-001 Revision 3, dated September 2016], it states the following in an extract on Security documentation Security Assessment Principles (SyAPs) *SyAPs and associated supporting TAGs – as published in March 2017 - replace the National Objectives, Requirements and Model Standards. These will form the basis of ONR judgement of the GSR (Generic Security Report) Taking account of overseas regulator assessments 167 If a reactor design has been subject to assessment by nuclear regulators in other countries, ONR sees great value in being able to draw on such experience, as well as sharing its own experiences. This is an extension of the normal information exchanges that take place between national nuclear regulators through bilateral arrangements and via organisations such as the IAEA, the International Nuclear Regulators Association (INRA), and the Nuclear Energy Agency (NEA) of the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), in particular through its Committee on Nuclear Regulatory Activities (CNRA). In addition, ONR is participating in the work of the Multinational Design Evaluation Program (MDEP – see www.oecd‐nea.org/mdep) WHAT EXPERIENCE HAVE INRA AND NEA OF SECURING NUCLEAR SECURITY INFORMATION FROM CHINESE NUCLEAR COMPANIES? 168 Throughout the GDA process ONR will seek to take advantage of information arising from regulatory assessments of the design undertaken in other countries. ONR assesses on a sampling basis and therefore the availability of information from assessments carried out elsewhere may enable ONR to concentrate its attention on areas of the design specific to Great Britain. 169 However, it should be noted that it is the responsibility of the RP (= Requesting Party, ie CGN) to demonstrate the safety and security of its design, including highlighting and directing ONR to previous outputs and assessments of regulators in other countries, not for ONR to seek out and assemble information from such sources. 170 IAEA guidance states that even if a similar design has been authorised in another member state, the national regulatory body should still perform its own independent review and assessment (Ref. 17, paragraph 3.37; 17 Review and Assessment of Nuclear Facilities by the Regulatory Body. GS‐G‐1.2 IAEA 2002; www‐pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/Pub1128_scr.pdf). The Convention on Nuclear Safety, to which the UK is a signatory, states that each country must undertake safety assessment of its own nuclear facilities and make its own regulatory decisions about the safety of those facilities. In line with these international expectations, ONR therefore undertakes its own assessment of the generic safety case and comes to its own judgements. 171 ONR will not necessarily accept that a matter it judges to be of regulatory concern can be considered to be resolved simply because an overseas regulator has considered a similar issue and agreed its resolution. ONR may, as it considers necessary, test the robustness of such claims. ONR's position on this international context is given in Ref. 18.( 18 New nuclear power stations: Safety assessment in an international context June 2008. www.onr.org.uk/new‐reactors/ngn05.pdf) ANNEXES Summary • This report draws attention to the little-analysed but pervasive presence of Chinese military-linked conglomerates and universities in the sponsorship of high-technology research centres in many leading UK universities. • In many cases, these UK universities are unintentionally generating research that is sponsored by and may be of use to China’s military conglomerates, including those with activities in the production of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMDs), including intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) as well as hypersonic missiles, in which China is involved in a new arms race and seeks ‘massively destabilising’ weaponry. • Much of this research is entirely based at UK universities, while other research outputs include cooperation with researchers in China, often at the military-linked universities or companies sponsoring the UK research centre. • Many of the research projects will have a civilian use, and UK-based researchers will be unaware of a possible dual use that might lead to a contribution to China’s military industries. • This report illustrates how 15 of the 24 Russell Group universities and many other UK academic bodies have productive research relationships with Chinese military-linked manufacturers and universities. Much of the research at the university centres and laboratories is also being sponsored by the UK taxpayer through research councils, Innovate UK, and the Royal Society. • This should be seen in the context of China’s stated aim to equal the US military by 2027; and to use advanced military technology to leapfrog the US by 2049, the centenary of the founding of the People’s Republic of China (PRC). • Beijing’s strategy of ‘civil-military fusion’ means an integration of military and civilian industry and technology intended to give the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) a leading edge in adapting emerging technologies. We suggest that the existence of this strategy makes any claim to be able to reliably cooperate only with the civil branches of Chinese military-linked companies and universities less credible. • This report analyses the relationships that at least 15 UK universities have established with 22 Chinese military-linked universities as well as weapons suppliers or other military-linked companies. Many of these Chinese universities are deemed ‘Very High Risk’ by the Australian Strategic Policy Institute (ASPI). • This report includes statements from the UK institutions analysed: we are determined to be as fair to them as possible, and, provided they responded to our enquiries, the position of each is represented. We have also told those institutions we did not hear from that we will update the online version of this report, if and when they contact us. • Again in the interests of accuracy and fairness, we state here that a number of UK institutions took issue with our analyses. We have duly included their comments and reiterate that even so, in our view there remains the danger that research, which is carried out in good faith, may be co-opted and exploited by the Chinese military. 3 • We also wish to make clear that none of the academics, researchers, or other s staff whose research at UK universities or centres is discussed in this report are accused of knowingly assisting the development of the Chinese military, of knowingly transferring information to that end, or of committing any breach of their university regulations. Nor are they accused of any other wrongdoing, or breach of national security, or any criminal offence. • Sponsorship of high-technology research in UK universities covers areas such as: ▪ Metals and alloys; ▪ Aerospace physics and hypersonic technology; ▪ Ceramics, piezoelectrics and rare earths; ▪ Drones and radars; ▪ Shipbuilding; ▪ Data science, AI, and facial recognition; and ▪ Robotics (land, sea and space). Conclusions China has a long history of weapons sales to regimes that carry out grievous human rights abuses including Iran, Syria, Burma and North Korea. In addition, China’s development of a surveillance state is already leading to systematic human rights abuses, with its treatment of the Uighur minority described as genocide. The methods by which the UK monitors and controls Chinese involvement in UK university research are, we suggest, inadequate. The companies sponsoring UK-based research centres include China’s largest weapons manufacturers, including producers of strike fighter engines, ICBMs, nuclear warheads, stealth aircraft, military drones, tanks, military-use metals and materials, and navy ships. At its simplest, for the UK government and taxpayer to fund and assist the technological development and possibly the force-projection capabilities of the military of the People’s Republic of China is not in the British national interest. This is a picture of ‘strategic incoherence’. China is demonstrating rapid technologicalmilitary development and growing force-projection capabilities. To risk financing and enabling these developments suggests a lack of strategic coordination. This points to the need for a strategic reassessment for new rules for scientific research with PRC universities and companies, some of which should be applied directly to the UK’s research councils and universities, while some may require legislation. Other rules are needed for scientific research in wider potentially sensitive scientific fields generally and in universities in particular. Almost 200 academics from more than a dozen British universities could face jail amid probe over fears they inadvertently helped China develop weapons of mass destruction • Academics, from 20 universities, suspected of breaching Export Control Order • Law is designed to prevent sensitive intellectual property going to hostile states • The law carries a maximum 10 year prison sentence for those who breach it By JAMES ROBINSON FOR MAILONLINE and IAN BIRRELL and GLEN OWEN MAILONLINE: 13:12, 8 February 2021 https://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-9236123/Almost-200-academics-British-universities-face-jail-sending-information-China.html A group of almost 200 British academics from more than a dozen UK universities could face jail, as officials probe whether they may have unwittingly helped the Chinese government build weapons of mass destruction. Officials are investigating the academics amid suspicion they may have breached laws designed to protect national security and human rights. The academics, who are from 20 UK universities, including some of the most prestigious in the country, are suspected of breaching the Export Control Order 2008. The law carries a maximum 10 year prison sentence for those who breach it. It is intended to prevent intellectual property in highly sensitive fields - including military and security - from being sent to hostile states. Pioneering technology on aircraft, missile design and cyberweapons may have been sent to China, according to the Times. Officials are preparing to send around 200 enforcement notices to those suspected of breaching the rules, the reports add, though this has since been denied by a Government source. Meanwhile, a source told the Times: 'We could be seeing dozens of academics in courts before long. +7 • A group of almost 200 British academics from more than a dozen universities could face jail, as officials probe whether they may have unwittingly helped the Chinese government build weapons of mass destruction. Pictured: Library image showing A Dongfeng-41 intercontinental strategic nuclear missiles group formation +7 • Officials at HMRC (pictured: The HMRC Headquarters in London) are investigating the academics amid suspicion they may have breached laws designed to protect national security and human rights 'If even 10 per cent lead to successful prosecutions, we'd be looking at around 20 academics going to jail for helping the Chinese build super-weapons.' Boris Johnson's senior aide in conflict of interest row over China's new embassy A top aide to Boris Johnson has been caught up in a conflict of interest row over claims he helped broker a deal for China's new embassy on behalf of the Government while being paid by two of the companies involved. Lord Udny-Lister helped the Foreign Office lead talks with China over its £255million deal to buy Royal Mint Court - near to the Tower of London. But while working on the talks, which took place between 2017 and 2018, the-then Sir Edward Lister also worked for two of the companies involved in the deal, according to the Sunday Times. Lord Lister, 71, who is now Mr Johnson's chief strategy adviser in Downing Street, worked as a paid consultant for American commercial real estate giant CBRE. The company were hired by China to identify and buy a site for its new embassy. He was also a paid adviser to London property firm Delancey, who owned the Royal Mint Court, while the talks were in place, according to the Sunday Times. Both companies told the paper Lord Udny-Lister took no direct part in the negotiations. A spokesperson for CBRE told MailOnline: 'Sir Edward Lister did not have any involvement with CBRE on the Royal Mint Court transaction. 'He was employed as consultant with CBRE between October 2016 and December 2017.' A Government spokesperson told MailOnline: 'Sir Eddie Lister undertook this work as a Non-Executive Director of the FCO at the request of the government. There was no conflict of interest.' A Government spokesperson today told MailOnline: 'Exporters of military goods and those engaged in the transfer of military technology specified in the Export Control Order 2008 - including universities and academics - require a licence to export or transfer from the UK. 'It is their responsibility to comply with the regulations.' It comes as the Mail on Sunday revealed how the academics could be hit by 'enforcement notices' - imposed by Her Majesty's Revenue and Customs - over alleged breaches of export controls in their dealings with Beijing. It is understood the security services fear some academics have been sharing pioneering British technology could be facilitating the dictatorial Communist government's repression of minorities and dissidents. The MoS has agreed not to identify the universities at the centre of the inquiry on the grounds of national security. The security service investigation, led by HMRC, was launched amid growing concern in Downing Street that academics were engaged in a 'new gold rush' to strike deals with the Chinese over cutting-edge scientific breakthroughs. 'Exporters of military goods and those engaged in transfer of military technology specified in the Export Control Order 2008 – including universities and academics – require a licence to export or transfer from the UK,' said a Government spokesman. 'It is their responsibility to comply with the regulations.' Last week, Manchester University cancelled an agreement with a Chinese military technology company after being warned that it supplied technology platforms and apps used by Beijing's security forces in mass surveillance of Uighur Muslims. The university said it was unaware of China Electronics Technology Corporation's alleged role in the persecution of Uighurs until receiving a letter pointing out the links from the Commons foreign affairs select committee. Tom Tugendhat, chairman of the committee, writes in today's MoS that 'some in Britain's universities have lost their moral bearings and are not promoting academic freedom, but undermining our strategic interests.' The Tory MP argues that Britain is making a mistake to open up universities too much. 'We are handing over the secrets that will help an often-hostile country become the greatest military power of the 21st Century.' The Government investigation came after a report by the Henry Jackson Society last October criticised the Government for failing to prosecute any academics for export control violations. +7 • The study by think tank Civitas accuses 14 of the 24 top universities in the UK of having ties with Chinese weapons conglomerates and military-linked research centres involved in nuclear weapons schemes and developing futuristic technology. Pictured: A hyper-sonic test missile is launched by the US Navy +7 • Chinese troops take part in marching drills ahead of an October 1 military parade to celebrate the 70th anniversary of the founding of the People's Republic of China at a camp on the outskirts of Beijing, China, in 2019 Terrifying missiles so high-tech it's almost impossible to stop them HYPERSONICS China is spending huge sums to create hypersonic missiles that will go so fast (up to twenty times the speed of sound) that military chiefs believe they will be invulnerable to any form of defence. Indeed, some analysts fear that human capability to respond to such lethal weapons will be inadequate and that the only way to protect against them would be to rely on artificial intelligence and computer systems. Travelling several miles a second as they deliver surprise attacks within minutes of being launched, they have been described as a 'game-changer' for warfare. Although America, too, has such Star Wars-style weapons in development, General John E. Hyten, commander of US Strategic Command, told a Senate committee three years ago: 'We don't have any defence that could deny the employment of such a weapon against us.' Such missiles, capable of carrying nuclear warheads, would deliver precision attacks on people, vehicles and buildings. To test such weapons, the Beijing government said three years ago it was building a wind tunnel that simulated conditions up to 25 times the speed of sound. And a contractor has said it has carried out a six-minute test flight for a hypersonic missile. The complexities of developing hypersonics – using sophisticated sensors, guidance systems and innovative propulsion methods – have been compared to building the atomic bomb. GRAPHENE This is a revolutionary material with enormous defence and manufacturing potential. One atom thick and the thinnest and lightest material known to man, it conducts heat, absorbs light, stretches and is 200 times stronger than steel. It was invented by researchers in 2004 at Manchester University – with China's President Xi Jinping having made an official visit to their lab. Among its military applications are as coatings on ballistic missiles, wiring in hypersonic vehicles exposed to high temperatures, camouflage of vehicles and body armour for troops. Chinese reports suggest that the Z-10 attack helicopter – a rival to Boeing's Apache – has been equipped with graphene armour developed at the Beijing Institute of Aeronautical Materials. The institute has ties to three universities in Britain, where it collaborates on two centres specialising in research into the use of graphene in the aerospace industry. Chinese media have reported plans to use graphene coatings on military installations on artificial islands built in the South China Sea, an area where Beijing has controversially deployed Jin-class ballistic missile submarines armed with nuclear missiles. SPY TECHNOLOGY One of the most sinister recent trends in China has been the creation of a surveillance state that seeks to control 1.4 billion citizens through a constant watch over their movements, thoughts and words. People are tracked via a massive network of street cameras, facial recognition technologies, biometric data, official records, artificial intelligence and monitoring of online activities as mundane as things like shopping and takeaway food ordering habits. The most extreme example is in the Western province of Xinjiang, where Uighurs and other Muslim minorities are under 24/7 surveillance. Much of the network was developed by the state-owned China Electronics Technology Group Corporation, which supports work at four Chinese universities with ties to seven British universities. CHINESE UNIVERSITIES As part of President Xi's bid for China's global supremacy, he has employed a so-called 'military-civil fusion' strategy that involves universities playing a central role in maximising the country's military power. China's constitution also stipulates that all new technologies, even if developed by the private sector, must, by law, be shared with the People's Liberation Army. A key research institution is the National University of Defense Technology, in Hunan, which is controlled by the military and specialises in hypersonics, drones, supercomputers, radar and navigation systems. It has links with eight British universities, including a formal collaboration with one world-renowned seat of learning. Eight other UK universities have ties with the Beijing University of Aeronautics and Astronautics, which spends 60 per cent of its research budget on defence activities. Another important centre is the Harbin Institute of Technology. It has a joint research lab with the nation's leading ballistic missile manufacturer and has links with three British universities. DRONE SWARMS The Beijing government is developing swarms of 'suicide' drones to hover in the sky as they locate their target – while communicating with each other and co-ordinating their movements without any human input. This marks the next era of robotic warfare, with autonomous weapons replacing current drones that have to be pre-programmed or are remote-controlled. The United States and Israel are also working on such technology, while Britain, too, tested a swarm of 20 drones last month with sorties from RAF Spadeadam in Cumbria. The advanced technology uses computer algorithms – often modelled on biological studies of insects and fish – to create self-navigating drone squadrons. NUCLEAR WEAPONS In total, China is estimated to have 350 nuclear warheads, including 204 on operational long-range missiles fired from landbased launchers, 48 on submarines and 20 'gravity bombs' to be dropped from aircraft. A recent Pentagon report warned that, in its bid to catch up with Russia and the US, Beijing plans to double its nuclear arsenal over the next decade as part of President Xi's drive towards global dominance. Many of these weapons are being developed by China Aerospace Science and Technology Corporation, a massive state-owned conglomerate that has links with at least five UK universities. Independently, a report released tomorrow will expose the astonishing extent of collaboration taking place between British universities and Chinese academic centres, many with deep research links to the People's Liberation Army. The study by think tank Civitas accuses 14 of the 24 top universities in the UK of having ties with Chinese weapons conglomerates and military-linked research centres involved in nuclear weapons schemes and developing futuristic technology. It suggests scientific discoveries by our universities risk boosting China's drive for military supremacy by assisting its development of hypersonic missiles, radar jamming systems, robotics, spacecraft and stealth vehicles. British taxpayers are paying for research that might unintentionally help China's military soon attain a potentially dominant position,' said Radomir Tylecote, the study's lead author and a former Treasury official. 'This is strategically incoherent – especially when UK spending on research for its own military needs is so anaemic.' Civitas reveals the China Electronics Technology Corporation – which has admitted its purpose is to 'leverage' civilian electronic systems for the benefit of China's armed forces – backs work at four military-linked universities in the People's Republic with ties to seven British universities. The giant firm is seen as one of the main architects of Beijing's sinister surveillance state. The think tank report – entitled 'Arming China? The Chinese military complex and its potential exploitation of scientific research at UK universities' – examines the relationships that 20 UK universities have with 29 military-linked universities and nine military-tied firms, which include some of the country's biggest arms suppliers. A dozen of the Chinese universities have been deemed 'very high risk' by the Australian Strategic Policy Institute, while another ten are termed 'high risk'. Civitas, which stresses that all the British universities have benevolent intentions, turns the spotlight on some of the country's most famous academic institutions as concerns grow over China's increasing belligerence. The universities all insist their work is for wider benefit to society, that many research results are openly published in scientific literature and that they make strenuous efforts to comply with all rules designed to protect security and intellectual property. Cambridge University, the Civitas report says, has co-operated with the National University of Defense Technology, a military-run research institution that has been sanctioned by the US. Beijing has boasted this collaboration will 'greatly raise the nation's power in the fields of national defence, communications and… high precision navigation'. A Cambridge spokesman told the MoS: 'All of the university's research is subject to ethics governance and export control regulations.' Imperial College, another world-leading British scientific centre, has three research units sponsored by major Chinese weapons manufacturers. 'Science is a global endeavour, and we are proud to work with our peers in academia and industry all over the world,' said a spokesman. Civitas accuses Manchester University of having provided 'China's main nuclear missile conglomerate with a UK taxpayer-funded research centre'. A subsidiary of this firm – under US sanctions – also funds a unit at Strathclyde University, which plays a leading role in British space research. Manchester also co-operates with Chinese funders to exploit graphene, the revolutionary new material that won two of its researchers the Nobel Prize and is seen as having huge military potential given its immense strength and flexibility. Both Manchester and Strathclyde insist they work closely with relevant authorities to ensure they are fully compliant with all policies and export protocols. Queen Mary University of London has established a 'collaborative partnership' with China's Northwestern Polytechnical University (NPU), praising the 'particular strengths in aerospace and marine engineering' of a university that describes itself as 'devoted to improving and serving the national defence science and technology industry'. NPU has at least 13 defence laboratories into areas such as jet propulsion, space technology and torpedo guidance. 'We are proud of our transnational educational and research partnership with NPU,' said a Queen Mary spokesman, adding it followed 'rigorous procedures' regarding security and ethics. Southampton, according to the Civitas report, has links with Harbin Engineering University that were praised for helping the Chinese institution build a 'world class' position in naval architecture. It plays a key role in China's ambitions to build the world's biggest and best-equipped navy. A Southampton spokesman said their collaborations had 'potential to create wide-ranging societal benefits', adding that they followed Government advice and the Harbin partnership simply replicated their undergraduate studies. Harbin is also one of 15 Chinese civilian universities that have been implicated in cyber-attacks, illegal exports or espionage operations. China has a long history of weapons sales to some of the world's most repressive regimes such as Iran, Myanmar and North Korea. Lianchao Han, a former Chinese government official and now leading pro-democracy activist, said Beijing had long seen academic exchange programmes as a way to modernise its military through exploitation of open Western research institutions. 'China has invented all kinds of programs from inviting Western professors to lecture in the country through to hiring them for consulting work and funding joint research projects between universities. These schemes enable it to acquire dual-use technologies for both civilian and military gain and build a formidable army. Sadly, most Western universities and research institutions are shortsighted and still fail to see China's strategic intent.' British universities have looked increasingly to China as a source of income, having more Chinese students than any other country, paying £1.7 billion a year in tuition fees, and for research funding as they developed a network of academic links in both nations. Yet concerns have grown over such ties since hardline President Xi Jinping took power in 2013. He has ramped up nationalist rhetoric, spent massively on armed forces, silenced dissidents, unleashed genocide in Xinjiang and showed far more foreign policy aggression – as seen with China's brutal crackdown in Hong Kong. Many leading Chinese universities have long been linked to the military, whether through their own research labs or via funding from conglomerates – often state-owned – that dominate the country's weapons industry. These ties have been strengthened under Xi through a policy called 'military-civil fusion' designed to maximise military power. This includes a constitutional obligation for all new technologies to be shared with the 2,250,000-strong People's Liberation Army. China's Communist leadership is intent on matching US military might within six years – and then use advanced technology to win the battle for global supremacy by 2049, centenary of the founding of the People's Republic of China. +7 • The Beijing government is developing swarms of 'suicide' drones (file image) to hover in the sky as they locate their target – while communicating with each other and co-ordinating their movements without any human input The Civitas report calls for a register of Chinese firms and institutions with military ties that should be barred from supporting research in Britain, an audit of university sponsorship policies and a new agency to monitor academic relationships. One British defence contractor, who has removed all Chinese-made parts from his firm's products as a precaution in case of conflict, said he thought some universities might be missing the key point of rules designed to stop misuse of technology. 'People fall into the trap of arguing that they only designed the product for civilian use, neglecting the fact that the regulations say 'can be' used for military purposes.' TOM TUGENDHAT: Our academics are prostrating themselves to a Chinese regime guilty of genocide By Tom Tugendhat for Mail on Sunday China's ambassador to Britain, Liu Xiaoming, recently bade farewell to this country in characteristic style. Dwelling on golden memories of his time here, he recalled his 'humble part' in President Xi Jinping's state visit in 2015 and New Year's Eve parties on the banks of the Thames. He also mentioned the happy days when he was awarded honorary degrees in ceremonies at the Universities of Huddersfield and Nottingham. The details were telling. What had the Chinese ambassador done to merit these garlands? Here was a man who represented a country accused of genocide by our closest ally, the United States; whose state broadcaster has been refused a licence to disseminate propaganda in the UK; and whose companies are connected to an army that targets our innovations. He was certainly no natural friend to Britain. Sickening details of the persecution of Uighur Muslims – involving concentration camps, torture, sterilisation, brainwashing and rape – have been emerging for years. Yet Beijing's ambassador to Britain would blithely argue – albeit unconvincingly – that video footage allegedly showing vast numbers of blindfolded, shackled and shaven-headed Uighurs waiting to be led on to trains, was an everyday prisoner transfer. The next minute, he'd be given the red-carpet treatment by British universities. +7 • China's ambassador to Britain, Liu Xiaoming, recently bade farewell to this country in characteristic style Huddersfield University gave him an honorary doctorate in 2019 when a new Confucius Institute there opened, 'in partnership with the East China University of Science and Technology in Shanghai'. The focus of this tie-up was 'innovation in science and technology'. Meanwhile, His Excellency became an honorary Doctor of Law from Nottingham, urging his young audience to 'consolidate the China-UK Golden Era' and to 'handle differences with wisdom'. Such snapshots – and the murky web of financial deals they hint at – look increasingly like a sham. Why have Britain's universities been prostrating themselves so enthusiastically to the Chinese state that denies freedom of thought? The ugly truth is that some of our universities, a fundamental part of the UK's innovation-based economy, have been motivated by a mixture of naivety and greed. Among the most prestigious institutions in the UK are some which have been topping up their income with sponsorship from Chinese military and tech firms which, it should not need saying, have aims that run fully counter to our own. And these universities have been doing this while in receipt of billions in British taxpayer cash. The Commons foreign affairs committee, which I chair, has noted that despite 100,000 Chinese students at British universities, there has been precious little debate about China's influence on campuses, despite evidence that it is undermining academic freedom and closing down free debate on subjects such as Tibet and Taiwan. Even Universities UK, which represents our 140 universities, has warned of 'misappropriation of research output, including the seizing of research data and intellectual property'. Has UK-based research been used in the repression of minorities and democracy activists in China? I fear it is all but certain our universities have, perhaps only in part, become enablers in the crushing of dissent. +7 • Huddersfield University (pictured) gave him an honorary doctorate in 2019 when a new Confucius Institute there opened, 'in partnership with the East China University of Science and Technology in Shanghai' Three examples stand out from new research by Civitas. There are Cambridge's ties to China's National University of Defense Technology – an organisation sanctioned by the US over nuclear missile development. Also, Imperial College's research units, sponsored by Chinese weapons suppliers, including the Aviation Industry Corporation of China, which is designing the latest generation of stealth fighters. Finally, there are the Scottish centres, one of which is researching radar jamming with a military-linked laboratory in China. Make no mistake: these are some of the best universities not just in Britain, but in the world. They are at the cutting edge of research and attract the world's brightest students and teaching. Universities should collaborate with the private sector in research. For example, millions of us will benefit from the partnership between Oxford and AstraZeneca to produce a vaccine for Covid-19. But in the race to stay ahead, it is obvious some in Britain's universities have lost their moral bearings and are not promoting academic freedom, but undermining our strategic interests. In opening the doors of our universities to China, we are bargaining away our competitive advantage – and, for a price, handing over the secrets that will help an often-hostile country become the greatest military power of the 21st Century. University leaders must recognise that the great hope of the past two decades – that China was steadily opening up politically as its economy became more competitive – has been dashed. A Maoist personality cult has been established around President Xi, with his personal 'thought' inserted into China's constitution, to be studied by all. He has allowed what Foreign Secretary Dominic Raab has called a 'grievous attack on Hong Kong's rights and freedoms' by ordering the mass arrest of politicians and activists. Freedom is being crushed so blatantly that the UK is giving many of Hong Kong's residents – all British passport-holders – the right to live and work here. Universities need to wake up to these abuses. The Government must introduce rules that govern the research British higher education institutions carry out with Chinese involvement, sponsorship or support. Particular attention must be paid to science and technology, where it is clear our competitive advantage is being handed to a strategic adversary. It seems Xi has learned from Lenin – the capitalist really will sell you the rope you use to hang him. Or in our case, design it.

Nuclear daylight RABery

Letter sent to the Daily Express newspaper: The Daily Express is to be congratulated on launching its important new Green Britain Revolution campaign (front page and inside, 8 February 2021; https://www.express.co.uk/news/nature/1394652/Green-Britain-campaign-daily-express-pollution-wildlife-nature-boris-johnson). One issue overlooked is nuclear, which ministers are promoting on the spurious grounds that it saves carbon dioxide emissions. Nuclear power plants use uranium as a fuel. This has to be mined, processed at site called milling (usually very far away from the UK), transported thousands of miles, enriched ( to make it more energy "potent") fabricated into fuel, and after irradiation in a reactor, actively stored at the reactor site to let the very hot fuel cool down, then transported to a long term storage site, conditioned, made into a radioactive waste package, and stored for a very long-time or disposed of in a giant underground series of interconnected caverns, called a repository. At each point in this production and use chain, very significant quantities of carbon dioxide is emitted in the industrial processing. To describe this as "zero -carbon" is both an abuse of the term and the intelligence of British voters and Express readers. Ministers are on record as suggesting the may “invest” tens of £billions taxpayers money in the Wylfa Newydd, a nuclear project in North Wales abandoned by Japanese company Hitachi last month because it was far too expensive (at £25 billion) or Sizewell C in Suffolk, where the French Government company EDF (Electricité de France) is pressuring the UK government to agree to a so-called Regulated Asset Base (RAB) method of funding, which means the people who pay for the electricity first pay out the £ billions investment money up front, thus taking all the risk, while EDF earns all the profits! Green entrepreneur Dale Vince is right that the big climate conference (COP26 ) in Glasgow in November will be an excellent opportunity for the UK to showcase British green energy technology. Nuclear is not one of them!

Climate confusion in UK Government

Letter submitted to The Times newspaper: The headline over your environment editor’s article on the House of Commons’ Public Accounts Committee (PAC) report (Feb3) on Achieving government’s long-term environmental goals read "Defra ‘lacks clout to lead on climate’.” This was misleading. The PAC did not say what your headline writer placed in inverted commas; they have compressed an actual quote for convenience. What the PAC actually wrote was: “The Department for Environment, Food & Rural Affairs (Defra) has the policy responsibility for the environment, but not the clout to hold other departments to account or manage trade-offs between policy areas.” (paragraph 2, page 5)(https://committees.parliament.uk/publications/4513/documents/45674/default/). Defra is not the lead government department on climate change: this is the Department for Business, Energy and industrial Strategy (BEIS), although with the recent creation of the stand-alone President of the Conference of Parties (COP26) for the UN Convention on Climate Change, in the person of former Business secretary Alok Sharma, currently embedded within the Cabinet Office, it may be argued there are three departments – each underwritten by the Treasury - now taking forward UK climate policy.

Saving Planet Earth from Catastrophe

Last evening I participated in an international webinar hosted by the University of Victoria, British Columbia, Canada, with the most prominent public intellectual on the planet, Professor emeritus Noam Chomsky of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), now resident in sunny Arizona. At 92, he still has an acutely spritely mind, and a laser-like ability to analyze the great global issues of the day. In the webinar, titled “The Fate of the Human Experiment”- in a series banner- headlined “Values for a New World”, Chomsky veered between extreme pessimism in analysis (“It IS time to panic! We are in deep trouble”) and optimism in his proffered solutions ( Academics need to educate people on their own and global history). Chomsky present a world facing security and ecological catastrophe, due to the twin threats of nuclear weapons and climate change. He warned critical voices were in danger of being “drowned in silence.” Humankind has created a new Age: the Anthropocene, which brings with it the capacity to destroy humanity, and along with it most life on Earth. Chomsky warned there is no “plan B’ for humankind. Arguing we have driven ourselves ever closer to the “irreversible tipping point”, Chomsky referred to the recently update ‘Atomic Doomsday Clock’ of the international Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists whose hands have moved ever closer to the catastrophic midnight hour, as the most recent warning to pay heed..( https://thebulletin.org/doomsday-clock/current-time/) By chance, earlier in the same day, a huge 606-page door stopper of a report, the Independent Review on the Economics of Biodiversity led by Professor Sir Partha Dasgupta of Cambridge University, was issued by the UK Treasury. The Guardian newspaper headed its report Economics' failure over destruction of nature presents ‘extreme risks’ New measures of success needed to avoid catastrophic breakdown, landmark review finds (https://www.theguardian.com/environment/2021/feb/02/economics-failure-over-destruction-of-nature-presents-extreme-risks) Treasury Exchequer Secretary Kemi Badenoch said in a written statement publishing the report (https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/final-report-the-economics-of-biodiversity-the-dasgupta-review) that the Government “welcomes its publication as a strong example of UK thought leadership on an important environmental issue with clear – but often overlooked – economic consequences. The government will examine the Review’s findings and respond formally in due course. (Statement UIN HCWS752, 2 February 2021; https://questions-statements.parliament.uk/written-statements/detail/2021-02-02/hcws752) The Treasury media release – under its headline “Nature is a blind spot in economics that we ignore at our peril, says Dasgupta Review” - said powerfully: “A fundamental change in how we think about and approach economics is needed if we are to reverse biodiversity loss and protect and enhance our prosperity,” (https://www.gov.uk/government/news/nature-is-a-blind-spot-in-economics-that-we-ignore-at-our-peril-says-dasgupta-review) The review, it said, “presents the first comprehensive economic framework of its kind for biodiversity. It calls for urgent and transformative change in how we think, act and measure economic success to protect and enhance our prosperity and the natural world, “ adding “Grounded in a deep understanding of ecosystem processes and how they are affected by economic activity, the new framework presented by the Dasgupta Review – which was commissioned by Treasury - sets out the ways in which we should account for nature in economics and decision-making.” Its author, Professor Dasgupta, observed: “Truly sustainable economic growth and development means recognising that our long-term prosperity relies on rebalancing our demand of nature’s goods and services with its capacity to supply them. It also means accounting fully for the impact of our interactions with Nature across all levels of society. COVID-19 has shown us what can happen when we don’t do this. Nature is our home. Good economics demands we manage it better.” Globally respected environmental film maker, Sir David Attenborough, said: “The survival of the natural world depends on maintaining its complexity, its biodiversity. Putting things right requires a universal understanding of how these complex systems work. That applies to economics too.This comprehensive and immensely important report shows us how by bringing economics and ecology face to face, we can help to save the natural world and in doing so save ourselves.The Review argues that nature is our most precious asset and that significant declines in biodiversity are undermining the productivity, resilience and adaptability of nature. This in turn has put our economies, livelihoods and well-being at risk. The Review finds that humanity has collectively mis-managed its global portfolio of assets, meaning the demands on nature far exceed its capacity to supply the goods and services we all rely on.” The UK Prime Minister Boris Johnson added: “As co-host of COP26 and president of this year’s G7, we are going to make sure the natural world stays right at the top of the global agenda.” Kemi Badenoch also said: “Protecting and enhancing our natural assets, and the biodiversity that underpins them, is crucial to achieving a sustainable, resilient economy. That is why the UK is already investing more than £600 million in nature-based climate solutions, such as tree planting and peatland restoration.” UK Environment Secretary, George Eustice pitched in asserting: “If we want to realise the aspiration set out in Professor Dasgupta’s landmark Review to rebalance humanity’s relationship with nature, then we need policies that will both protect and enhance the supply of our natural assets.” The Treasury media release asserts that: The Review makes clear that urgent and transformative action taken now would be significantly less costly than delay and will require change on three broad fronts: • Humanity must ensure its demands on nature do not exceed its sustainable supply and must increase the global supply of natural assets relative to their current level. For example, expanding and improving management of Protected Areas; increasing investment in Nature-based Solutions; and deploying policies that discourage damaging forms of consumption and production. • We should adopt different metrics for economic success and move towards an inclusive measure of wealth that accounts for the benefits from investing in natural assets and helps to make clear the trade-offs between investments in different assets. Introducing natural capital into national accounting systems is a critical step. • We must transform our institutions and systems – particularly finance and education – to enable these changes and sustain them for future generations. For example, by increasing public and private financial flows that enhance our natural assets and decrease those that degrade them; and by empowering citizens to make informed choices and demand change, including by firmly establishing the natural world in education policy. The UK Government commissioned Professor Dasgupta to lead an independent, global Review - supported by an Advisory Panel, drawn from academia, public policy and the private sector - on the Economics of Biodiversity in Spring 2019, and an interim report was issued in April 2020. Guardian journalists, economics editor, Larry Elliott, and environment editor, Damian Carrington, wrote on 2 February that “ The world is being put at “extreme risk” by the failure of economics to take account of the rapid depletion of the natural world and needs to find new measures of success to avoid a catastrophic breakdown, a landmark review has concluded.” They pointed out that a similar Treasury-sponsored review in 2006 by (Lord) Nicholas Stern, a professor of economics athe London School of Economics, is credited with transforming economic understanding of the climate crisis. The Dasgupta review said that two UN conferences this year – on biodiversity and climate change – provided opportunities for the international community to rethink an approach that has seen a 40% plunge in the stocks of natural capital per head between 1992 and 2014. TheGuardian reported that “Humanity’s impact on the natural world is stark, with animal populations having dropped by an average of 68% since 1970 and forest destruction continuing at pace – some scientists think a sixth mass extinction of life is under way and accelerating. Today, just 4% of the world’s mammals are wild, hugely outweighed by humans and their livestock.” The Dasgupta review urged the world’s governments to come up with a different form of national accounting from GDP and use one that includes the depletion of natural resources. It would like to see an understanding of nature given as prominent a place in education as the “three Rs”, to end people’s distance from nature. Dasgupta also called for new supranational institutions to protect global public goods such as the rainforests and oceans. Poorer countries should be paid to protect ecosystems, while charges for the use of non-territorial waters should be levied to prevent overfishing. The report said almost all governments were exacerbating the biodiversity crisis by paying people more to exploit nature than to protect it. A conservative estimate of the global cost of subsidies that damage nature was about $4tn-$6tn (£2.9-£4.4tn) a year, it said. “Humanity faces an urgent choice. Continuing down our current path presents extreme risks and uncertainty for our economies.” the review said. “The Dasgupta review shows we are running down our natural capital fast, and we will pay the price,” said Lord Stern, adding . “Reversing these trends requires action now, and as the review stresses, to do so would be significantly less costly than delay. Crucially, it would [also] help us to reduce poverty.” Prof Bob Watson, who led the UN assessment, said: “The most important thing is that the Dasgupta review was commissioned by the UK Treasury ministry, not the environment department. Hopefully this will mean that finance ministries around the world will acknowledge that the loss of nature is an economic issue, not simply an environmental issue.” Jennifer Morris, head of the Nature Conservancy, said: “In the same way the Stern review proved transformational in raising awareness of climate risk for business and financial markets, the Dasgupta review is likely to represent a watershed moment for how we value the contributions made by nature across nearly every aspect of our lives.” In a further analysis, Carrington wrote (“Economics of biodiversity review: what are the recommendations?https://www.theguardian.com/environment/2021/feb/02/economics-of-biodiversity-review-what-are-the-recommendations): “Biodiversity is declining faster than at any time in human history and the review aims to create a new economic framework, grounded in ecology, that enables humanity to live on Earth sustainably. ”Our economies, livelihoods and wellbeing all depend on our most precious asset: nature. We are part of nature, not separate from it.” These are the opening lines of the Dasgupta landmark review of the economics of biodiversity. Dasgupta highlights that most governments pay people more to exploit nature than to protect it and that destructive farming subsidies cause damage costed at $4tn-$6tn (£2.9tn-£4.4tn) per year. Humanity’s growing population must also be tackled, Dasguptas stresses, saying: “Addressing the shortfall [in women’s access to education and family planning] is essential, even if the effects may not be apparent in the short-term.” It is less costly to conserve nature than to restore it, so expanding and improving protected areas also has an essential role to play, according to the review. For ecosystems that provide global benefits, such as the Amazon forest, nations should be paid to protect them, the review says. For ecosystems outside national boundaries, such as the high seas, those who exploit them should pay for their use. Nina Seega, at the University of Cambridge’s Institute for Sustainability Leadership, said: “The review’s focus on completely rewiring mainstream economic and financial models is key to moving the nature debate on to the agenda of governments, financial regulators and individual financial firms. It is especially pertinent to take the opportunity presented by the Covid-19 crisis to align the underpinnings of our economic and financial system with a sustainable future.” The Dasgupta review concludes: “To detach nature from economic reasoning is to imply that we consider ourselves to be external to nature. The fault is not in economics; it lies in the way we have chosen to practise it. Transformative change is possible – we and our descendants deserve nothing less.” Meanwhile, the British Government in a classic example of a lack of joined-up thinking, butressed by total diplomatic hypocrisy, has continued to defend its support for possession and deployment of nuclear weapons of mass destruction, demonstrating perfectly the argument made by Chomsky . As it happens, on Monday, the UK Defence Secretary Ben Wallace MP, was answering oral defence questions in the House of Commons on Monday afternoon (1 February 2021) . Two Scottish National Party (SNP) MPs Patricia Gibson (North Ayrshire and Arran) and Patrick Grady (Glasgow North) asked “What recent assessment he has made of the effectiveness of the treaty on the prohibition of nuclear weapons? (https://hansard.parliament.uk/commons/2021-02-01/debates/EACF13DF-2887-4466-80DA-C5D406342276/OralAnswersToQuestions) Mr Wallace responded saying predicably: “The Government have been clear that we will not sign the treaty on the prohibition of nuclear weapons….” Ms Gibson retorted: “The Secretary of State will be aware of the deep disappointment and frustration felt across Scotland and much of the UK because the UK Government did not join 85 other countries and sign up to the treaty on the prohibition of nuclear weapons on 22 January. Can he explain why the UK has failed to support this treaty, and how this is consistent with its strategic objectives and obligations under article VI of the nuclear non-proliferation treaty to make attempts in good faith to move towards the eventual abolition of nuclear weapons programmes? Defence secretary Wallace, ducked the question, asserting: “The Government did not sign up to it because we do not think it is an effective way of dealing with this. We do think that the nuclear non-proliferation treaty is a more effective way of reducing both the spread and, indeed, the number of nuclear weapons on the planet, and that is why we favour gradual multilateral disarmament negotiated through a step-by-step approach.” Grady pointed out that: “It seems as if global Britain is running in the opposite direction of global consensus on this issue. Rather than just hoping that nuclear weapons will never be used and working for some eventual point in the future when they might be eradicated, why will the Government not take the bold steps of signing this treaty and, for that matter, removing Trident from the shores of this country?” Mr Wallace responded with a highly fatuous ramble, saying: “It may have missed the hon. Gentleman’s attention that other countries, those much less democratic and with much less regard for human rights, are working in the other direction and developing nuclear weapons. One reason we felt that nuclear weapons are important to the United Kingdom, when other regimes such as, potentially, North Korea and others develop them, is as a deterrent. We will continue to believe that, and seek ways to reduce nuclear holdings around the world in a multilateral, not a unilateral way. If I think that some of those adversaries care about some of those countries having nuclear weapons or not, the world might be slightly different, but it is not. We should be careful and protect our friends. We are a provider of a nuclear deterrent for NATO and for Europe. That has kept the peace for 50 years, despite some very aggressive nuclear powers.” For a much more nuanced, honest and expert assessment, I recommend reading the new 36-page research paper written by Steven Hill, an Associate Senior Policy Fellow at the Institute of Security and Global Affairs, Leiden University, released last week by international think tank, Chatham House, titled: NATO and the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons ( 29 JANUARY 2021) ISBN: 978 1 78413 441 9 (https://www.chathamhouse.org/2021/01/nato-and-treaty-prohibition-nuclear-weapons) Hill has recently completed a six-year term in office as the chief legal counsel to NATO secretaries general Jens Stoltenberg and Anders Fogh Rasmussen. His paper asks: What does the entry into force of the TPNW mean for NATO and its member states? Background: The Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW) entered into force on 22 January 2021. As part of a project examining NATO obligations and how they interact with nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament law and policy, this paper focuses on what the entry into force of the TPNW should mean for members of the NATO Alliance. NATO has long maintained a strong unified position in opposition to the new treaty, meaning that under current circumstances it is unlikely that any NATO member will join the TPNW. But the reality for NATO, its members and partners is that the TPNW is now here to stay. There is a risk that if the Alliance maintains an intense focus on opposing the TPNW, this may obscure NATO’s broader long-standing commitment to global nuclear disarmament, and may undermine the potential for NATO and supporters of the TPNW to work together to advance the common goal of nuclear disarmament. Contents • Summary • 01 Introduction • 02 NATO nuclear policy • 03 NATO’s concerns about the TPNW⌄ o Background: TPNW negotiations and approval at the UN o Concerns set out in the NAC statements o Other potential NATO concerns • 04 The TPNW and customary international law • 05 NATO’s ADN policy • 06 Conclusions • About the author • Acknowledgments Summary • The Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW) entered into force on 22 January 2021. The treaty had been opened for signature at United Nations Headquarters in New York on 20 September 2017, and the threshold of 50 deposits of instruments of ratification, required for the TPNW to enter effect, was reached on 24 October 2020. • As part of a project on understanding NATO obligations and how they interact with nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament law and policy, this paper focuses on what the entry into force of the TPNW should mean for the 30 NATO member states (Allies). NATO has maintained a strong unified position in opposition to the TPNW. Several NATO partner countries have joined the treaty; others have decided not to join, often citing the potential effect on their security and ongoing cooperation with NATO as grounds for this decision. • The reality is that the TPNW will now be here to stay. Even if the prospect of a NATO Ally becoming a party to the TPNW may be currently assessed as unrealistic, a too intense focus on opposing the TPNW may obscure NATO’s broader long-standing commitment to global nuclear disarmament. • Having set out the basic principles of NATO’s nuclear policy, and its delicate balance between nuclear disarmament and deterrence, this paper asks a number of critical questions in the context of the entry into force of the TPNW. What are the core arguments that NATO Allies have advanced against the TPNW? Do these arguments hold weight in response to various criticisms that have been levelled them against? Can the TPNW create customary international law? If so, is the ‘persistent objector’ strategy adopted by NATO Allies an effective one? And what can NATO now do to strengthen its support for arms control, disarmament and non-proliferation? • The paper concludes with recommendations as to how NATO can position itself on these issues in the future. It also suggests that TPNW supporters could do more to engage NATO and like-minded states on ways to advance the common goal of nuclear disarmament. Hill concludes: “The current state of the debate on the TPNW is highly polarized. Given the nature of Allies’ objections to the TPNW, it is unlikely that NATO will change its position as expressed in the 2017 and 2020 NAC (North Atlantic Council, the political arm of NATO) statements. There is a strong feeling that TPNW supporters in civil society focus their energies on democratic countries and do not focus on other states that are exacerbating the current threat environment. TPNW supporters make good-faith arguments that often feature sophisticated legal interpretations aimed at addressing NATO’s concerns. However, these arguments are likely to remain unpersuasive in so far as they focus on legally available options and ignore political realities. It would be unfortunate if the current spirit of polarization around the TPNW were to have a negative impact on the overall propensity for cooperation – which is clearly needed by the international community.” ANNEXES: Independent report Final Report - The Economics of Biodiversity: The Dasgupta Review Final Report of the Independent Review on the Economics of Biodiversity led by Professor Sir Partha Dasgupta. Published 2 February 2021 From: HM Treasury Documents The Economics of Biodiversity: The Dasgupta Review – Full Report PDF, 26.8MB, 606 pages The Economics of Biodiversity: The Dasgupta Review – Abridged Version PDF, 8.43MB, 103 pages The Economics of Biodiversity: The Dasgupta Review – Headline Messages PDF, 1.84MB, 10 pages The Economics of Biodiversity: The Dasgupta Review – Reactions HTML The Economics of Biodiversity: The Dasgupta Review – Reactions PDF, 143KB, 18 pages This file may not be suitable for users of assistive technology. Request an accessible format. If you use assistive technology (such as a screen reader) and need a version of this document in a more accessible format, please email digital.communications@hmtreasury.gov.uk. Please tell us what format you need. It will help us if you say what assistive technology you use. Details The Dasgupta Review is an independent, global review on the Economics of Biodiversity led by Professor Sir Partha Dasgupta (Frank Ramsey Professor Emeritus, University of Cambridge). The Review was commissioned in 2019 by HM Treasury and has been supported by an Advisory Panel drawn from public policy, science, economics, finance and business. The Review calls for changes in how we think, act and measure economic success to protect and enhance our prosperity and the natural world. Grounded in a deep understanding of ecosystem processes and how they are affected by economic activity, the new framework presented by the Review sets out how we should account for Nature in economics and decision-making. The final Review comprises the Full Report, an Abridged Version and the Headline Messages. Final Report documents (above). Press Notice including external reactions to the Review: • The Economics of Biodiversity: The Dasgupta Review – Press Notice • The Economics of Biodiversity: The Dasgupta Review – Reactions (document above) General enquiries and feedback should be directed to the Independent Review team biodiversityreview@hmtreasury.gov.uk Our economies, livelihoods and well-being all depend on our most precious asset: Nature. We are part of Nature, not separate from it. We rely on Nature to provide us with food, water and shelter; regulate our climate and disease; maintain nutrient cycles and oxygen production; and provide us with spiritual fulfilment and opportunities for recreation and recuperation, which can enhance our health and well-being. We also use the planet as a sink for our waste products, such as carbon dioxide, plastics and other forms of waste, including pollution. Nature is therefore an asset, just as produced capital (roads, buildings and factories) and human capital (health, knowledge and skills) are assets. Like education and health, however, Nature is more than an economic good: many value its very existence and recognise its intrinsic worth too. Biodiversity enables Nature to be productive, resilient and adaptable. Just as diversity within a portfolio of financial assets reduces risk and uncertainty, so diversity within a portfolio of natural assets increases Nature’s resilience to shocks, reducing the risks to Nature’s services. Reduce biodiversity, and Nature and humanity suffer. We have collectively failed to engage with Nature sustainably, to the extent that our demands far exceed its capacity to supply us with the goods and services we all rely on. We are all asset managers. Individuals, businesses, governments and international organisations all manage assets through our spending and investment decisions. Collectively, however, we have failed to manage our global portfolio of assets sustainably. Estimates show that between 1992 and 2014, produced capital per person doubled, and human capital per person increased by about 13% globally; but the stock of natural capital per person declined by nearly 40%. Accumulating produced and human capital at the expense of natural capital is what economic growth and development has come to mean for many people. In other words, while humanity has prospered immensely in recent decades, the ways in which we have achieved such prosperity means that it has come at a devastating cost to Nature. Estimates of our total impact on Nature suggest that we would require 1.6 Earths to maintain the world’s current living standards. The Review calls the imbalance between our demands and Nature’s supply the ‘Impact Inequality’. Those demands are affected by the size and composition of our individual demands, the size of the human population, and the efficiency with which we both convert Nature’s services to meet our demands and return our waste back into Nature. Nature’s supply is affected by the ‘stock’ of natural assets and its ability to regenerate. Our unsustainable engagement with Nature is endangering the prosperity of current and future generations. Biodiversity is declining faster than at any time in human history. Current extinction rates, for example, are around 100 to 1,000 times higher than the baseline rate, and they are increasing. Such declines are undermining Nature’s productivity, resilience and adaptability, and are in turn fuelling extreme risk and uncertainty for our economies and well-being. The devastating impacts of COVID-19 and other emerging infectious diseases – of which land-use change and species exploitation are major drivers – could prove to be just the tip of the iceberg if we continue on our current path. Many ecosystems, from tropical forests to coral reefs, have already been degraded beyond repair, or are at imminent risk of ‘tipping points’. These tipping points could have catastrophic 2 The Economics of Biodiversity: The Dasgupta Review – Headline Messages consequences for our economies and well-being; and it is costly and difficult, if not impossible, to coax an ecosystem back to health once it has tipped into a new state. Low income countries, whose economies are more reliant than high income countries on Nature’s goods and services from within their own borders, stand to lose the most. Reversing these trends requires action now. To do so would be significantly less costly than delay, and would help us to achieve wider societal goals, including addressing climate change (itself a major driver of biodiversity loss) and alleviating poverty. At the heart of the problem lies deep-rooted, widespread institutional failure. Nature’s worth to society – the true value of the various goods and services it provides – is not reflected in market prices because much of it is open to all at no monetary charge. These pricing distortions have led us to invest relatively more in other assets, such as produced capital, and underinvest in our natural assets. Moreover, aspects of Nature are mobile; some are invisible, such as in the soils; and many are silent. These features mean that the effects of many of our actions on ourselves and others – including our descendants – are hard to trace and go unaccounted for, giving rise to widespread ‘externalities’ and making it hard for markets to function well. But this is not simply a market failure: it is a broader institutional failure too. Many of our institutions have proved unfit to manage the externalities. Governments almost everywhere exacerbate the problem by paying people more to exploit Nature than to protect it, and to prioritise unsustainable economic activities. A conservative estimate of the total cost globally of subsidies that damage Nature is around US$4 to 6 trillion per year. And we lack the institutional arrangements needed to protect global public goods, such as the ocean or the world’s rainforests. The 15th Conference of the Parties to the Convention on Biological Diversity (COP15) and the 26th Conference of the Parties to the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (COP26) provide important opportunities to set a new, ambitious direction for the coming decade, and establish the right environment to deliver on commitments made and the institutional arrangements needed to ensure those commitments are met. The solution starts with understanding and accepting a simple truth: our economies are embedded within Nature, not external to it. While most models of economic growth and development recognise that Nature is capable only of producing a finite flow of goods and services, the focus has been to show that technological progress can, in principle, overcome that exhaustibility. This is to imagine that, ultimately, humanity is ‘external’ to Nature. The Review develops the economics of biodiversity on the understanding that we – and our economies – are ‘embedded’ within Nature, not external to it. The Review’s approach is based firmly in what we know from ecology about how ecosystems function, and how they are affected by economic activity, including the extraction of natural resources for our production and consumption, and the waste we produce through these activities, which ultimately damages ecosystems and undermines their ability to provide the services on which we rely. This approach helps us to understand that the human economy is bounded and reshapes our understanding of what constitutes truly sustainable economic growth and development: accounting fully for the impact of our interactions with Nature and rebalancing our demand with Nature’s capacity to supply. The Economics of Biodiversity: The Dasgupta Review – Headline Messages 3 We need to change how we think, act and measure success. Humanity faces an urgent choice. Continuing down our current path – where our demands on Nature far exceed its capacity to supply – presents extreme risks and uncertainty for our economies. Sustainable economic growth and development requires us to take a different path, where our engagements with Nature are not only sustainable, but also enhance our collective wealth and well-being and that of our descendants. Choosing a sustainable path will require transformative change, underpinned by levels of ambition, coordination and political will akin to, or even greater than, those of the Marshall Plan. The change required should be geared towards three broad transitions. (i) Ensure that our demands on Nature do not exceed its supply, and that we increase Nature’s supply relative to its current level. Food production is the most significant driver of terrestrial biodiversity loss. As the global population grows, the enormous problem of producing sufficient food in a sustainable manner will only intensify. Technological innovations and sustainable food production systems can decrease the sector’s contribution to climate change, land-use change and ocean degradation; reduce environmentally damaging inputs and waste; improve production system resilience, through methods such as precision agriculture, integrated pest management and molecular breeding techniques; and are likely to have a positive economic impact, including the creation of jobs. Demand for energy is a major contributor to climate change and resulting biodiversity loss. Decarbonising our energy systems is a necessary part of balancing demand and supply. But if we are to avoid exceeding the limits of what Nature can provide on a sustainable basis while meeting the needs of the human population, we cannot rely on technology alone: consumption and production patterns will need to be fundamentally restructured. Breaking the links between damaging forms of consumption and production and Nature can be accelerated through a range of policies that change prices and behavioural norms, for example enforcing standards for re-use, recycling and sharing, and aligning environmental objectives along entire global supply chains. Growing human populations have significant implications for our demands on Nature, including for future patterns of global consumption. Fertility choices are influenced not only by individual preferences, they are also shaped by the choices of others. As well as improving women’s access to finance, information and education, support for community-based family planning programmes can shift preferences and behaviour, and accelerate the demographic transition. There has been significant underinvestment in such programmes. Addressing that shortfall, even if the effects may not be apparent in the short-term, is essential. Conserving and restoring our natural assets will sustain and enhance their supply. It is less costly to conserve Nature than to restore it once damaged or degraded, all else being equal. In the face of significant risk and uncertainty about the consequences of degrading ecosystems, in many cases there is a strong economic rationale for quantity restrictions over pricing mechanisms. Expanding and improving the management of Protected Areas therefore has an essential role to play. Multi-functional landscapes and seascapes that provide ecosystem goods and services, and protect and enhance biodiversity, are also important. Large-scale and widespread investment in Nature-based Solutions would help us to address biodiversity loss and significantly contribute to climate change mitigation and adaptation, not to mention wider economic benefits, including creating jobs. As part of fiscal stimulus packages in the wake of COVID-19, investment in natural capital has the potential for quick returns. Moreover, natural capital forms the bulk of wealth in low income countries, and those on low incomes tend to rely more directly on Nature. And so conserving and restoring our natural assets also contributes to alleviating poverty. 4 The Economics of Biodiversity: The Dasgupta Review – Headline Messages (ii) Change our measures of economic success to guide us on a more sustainable path. Nature needs to enter economic and finance decision-making in the same way buildings, machines, roads and skills do. To do so ultimately requires changing our measures of economic success. As a measure of economic activity, Gross Domestic Product (GDP) is needed for short-run macroeconomic analysis and management. However, GDP does not account for the depreciation of assets, including the natural environment. As our primary measure of economic success, it therefore encourages us to pursue unsustainable economic growth and development. The Review demonstrates that in order to judge whether economic development is sustainable, an inclusive measure of wealth is needed. By measuring our wealth in terms of all assets, including natural assets, ‘inclusive wealth’ provides a clear and coherent measure that corresponds directly with the well-being of current and future generations. This approach accounts for the benefits from investing in natural assets and illuminates the trade-offs and interactions between investments in different assets. Introducing natural capital into national accounting systems would be a critical step towards making inclusive wealth our measure of progress. Frameworks for natural capital accounting and assessment exist and are at different stages of development, and while significant problems of design and measurement remain, this should not deter governments and businesses from supporting and embracing them. Increased investment in physical accounts and valuation would improve the quality of natural capital accounts. Standardisation of data and modelling approaches, and technical support, would make it easier to embed natural capital accounting in national economic accounts, and, above all, use the information to improve decision-making at scale around the world. (iii) Transform our institutions and systems – in particular our finance and education systems – to enable these changes and sustain them for future generations. Information required for managing ecosystems is asymmetrically distributed: much is uniquely understood and best managed by local communities, but important perspectives are also held among national governments, international organisations and along global supply chains. Institutional arrangements that enable sustainable engagement with ecosystems are ‘polycentric’. They pool knowledge and perspectives among and across different levels – global, regional, national and local – and from different organisations, communities and individuals. In doing so, they enable relevant information to flow, and allow for collaborative planning, participation and coordination. Ecosystems that are global public goods raise problems, the solutions for which transcend national seats of governance. The Review points to the need for supra-national institutional arrangements. There are two broad classes of cases to consider. For those ecosystems (biomes, more accurately) that are located within national boundaries (for example, tropical rainforests), a system of payments to nations for protecting the ecosystems on which we all rely should be explored. For ecosystems that lie outside national boundaries (for example, the oceans beyond exclusive economic zones), imposing charges, or rents, for their use (for example, ocean traffic and ocean fisheries) and prohibiting their use in ecologically sensitive areas should be instituted. It may even be that the revenue generated from the latter system of international governance is able to pay for the former system of international governance. Enabling the changes we need will also require collective and sustained action to transform the systems that underpin our engagements with Nature, above all our financial and education systems. Our global financial system is critical to supporting a more sustainable engagement The Economics of Biodiversity: The Dasgupta Review – Headline Messages 5 with Nature. Financial flows devoted to enhancing our natural assets are small and are dwarfed by subsidies and other financial flows that harm these assets. We need a financial system that channels financial investments – public and private – towards economic activities that enhance our stock of natural assets and encourage sustainable consumption and production activities. Governments, central banks, international financial institutions and private financial institutions all have a role to play. Financial actors can also help us manage and mitigate the risks and uncertainty that result from our unsustainable engagement with Nature. Businesses and financial institutions can do this by accounting for dependencies and impacts on Nature in their activities; and through the measurement and disclosure, not only of climate-related financial risks but Nature-related financial risks too. And central banks and financial regulators can support increased understanding by assessing the systemic extent of Nature-related financial risks. What is ultimately required is a set of global standards underpinned by credible, decision-grade data, which businesses and financial institutions can use to fully integrate Nature-related considerations into their decision-making, and assess and disclose their use of, and impact on, Nature. However, relying on institutions alone to curb our excesses will not be enough. The discipline to draw on Nature sustainably must, ultimately, be provided by us as individuals. But societal change – particularly growing urbanisation – has meant that many people have grown distant from Nature. Interventions to enable people to understand and connect with Nature would not only improve our health and well-being, but also help empower citizens to make informed choices and demand the change that is needed; for example by insisting that financiers invest our money sustainably and that firms disclose environmental conditions along their supply chains, and even boycotting products that do not meet certain standards. Establishing the natural world in education policy is therefore essential. The development and design of environmental education programmes can help to achieve tangible impact, for example by focusing on local issues, and collaborating with scientists and community organisations. Transformative change is possible – we and our descendants deserve nothing less. At their core, the problems we face today are no different from those our ancestors faced: how to find a balance between what humanity takes from Nature and what we leave behind for our descendants. While our ancestors were incapable of affecting the Earth system as a whole, we are doing just that. The transformative change needed in choosing the sustainable path requires the sustained commitment of actors at all levels. It also involves hard choices. Standard economic models view our choices as self-centred. There is growing evidence, however, that our preferences are affected by the choices of others – they are ‘socially embedded’. Since we look to others when acting, the necessary changes are not only possible, but are likely to be less costly and less difficult than often imagined. The success stories from around the world highlighted throughout the Review show us what is possible. They also demonstrate that the same ingenuity that has led us to make demands on Nature that are so large, so damaging and over such a short period, can be redeployed to bring about transformative change, perhaps even in just as short a time. We and our descendants deserve nothing less. The Economics of Biodiversity: Advisory Panel An expert Advisory Panel has been established and held its inaugural meeting to support the independent global review on The Economics of Biodiversity HM Treasury 19 September 2019 https://www.gov.uk/government/news/the-economics-of-biodiversity-advisory-panel An expert Advisory Panel has been established to support the independent global review on The Economics of Biodiversity, led by Professor Sir Partha Dasgupta. The Panel held its inaugural meeting at HM Treasury on Monday 16 September. The Advisory Panel, made up of leading individuals from public policy, science, economics, finance and business, will provide expert insight and challenge to support Professor Sir Partha Dasgupta deliver the Review’s objectives. The Panel members are: • Inger Andersen - Executive Director, United Nations Environment Programme • Juan Pablo Bonilla - Manager of the Climate Change and Sustainable Development Sector, Inter-American Development Bank • Sir Ian Cheshire - former Chair, Barclays Bank UK PLC • Dominic Christian - Global Chairman for Reinsurance Solutions, Aon • Kemi Badenoch MP (Panel Chair) - Exchequer Secretary to the Treasury • Sir Roger Gifford - Chairman of the Green Finance Institute • Professor Cameron Hepburn - Professor of Environmental Economics, Oxford Martin School • Professor Justin Lin - Director of New Structural Economics, National School of Development, Peking University • Professor Georgina Mace - Professor of Biodiversity and Ecosystems, University College London • Professor Henrietta Moore - Director of the Institute for Global Prosperity and Chair in Culture, Philosophy and Design, University College London • Professor Cosmas Ochieng - Global Director, Governance Centre, World Resources Institute and formerly Director, Africa Natural Resource Centre, African Development Bank African Development Bank • David Hill* - Director General for Environment, Rural and Marine, Department for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs • Dame Fiona Reynolds - Master of Emmanuel College, Cambridge University • Charles Roxburgh* - Second Permanent Secretary, HM Treasury • Lord Nicholas Stern - Professor Economics and Government, and Chair of the Grantham Research Institute on Climate Change and the Environment, London School of Economics • Kristian Teleki - Director of Sustainable Ocean Institute, World Resources Institute • Professor Sir Robert Watson - Director of Strategic Development, Tyndall Centre for Climate Change Research, University of East Anglia • Kate Wylie - Global Vice President of Sustainability, Mars *Ex Officio In addition, Sir David Attenborough has agreed to act as an Ambassador for the Review. Background In Spring 2019, HM Treasury asked Professor Sir Partha Dasgupta to lead an independent global review on the Economics of Biodiversity. The Review will aim to (i) assess the economic benefits of biodiversity globally; (ii) assess the economic costs and risks of biodiversity loss; and (iii) identify a range of actions that can simultaneously enhance biodiversity and deliver economic prosperity. The Review will be based on a thorough consideration of robust, relevant, up-to-date evidence and a Call for Evidence was launched on 14 August 2019. The Call for Evidence will run until 6 November 2019. Responses to any, or all, of the questions can be sent to: biodiversityreview@hmtreasury.gov.uk. The Review will report to the Prime Minister, the Chancellor and the Secretary of State for the Environment, Food and Rural Affairs, ahead of the 15th Conference of the Parties to the Convention on Biological Diversity taking place in October 2020 in China. NATO and the Nuclear Weapons Ban Treaty: Options for the Biden Administration https://www.justsecurity.org/74366/nato-and-the-nuclear-weapons-ban-treaty-options-for-the-biden-administration/ by Kjølv Egeland Just Security, January 28, 2021 The Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW) entered into force on Jan. 22. While supporters such as U.N. Secretary-General António Guterres have praised this development as an important milestone in the struggle against the bomb, critics like the Trump Pentagon have argued that the treaty could undermine the unity and security of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). But whether the TPNW becomes a problem for NATO is entirely up to the allies. As always with the Atlantic alliance, much will depend on the United States. Excluding the option of America itself joining the TPNW, the Biden administration is left with two alternative strategies. The first would be to continue to resist and make an issue of the treaty, raising the dickens to deter allies from signing. The second would be to kill the TPNW’s supposed negative externalities with kindness, accepting the treaty’s emergence while seeking to make the best of it. What is the TPNW and Why Does It Matter to NATO? The TPNW was adopted by 122 states in July 2017 and prohibits any development, possession, and use of nuclear arms. Promoted by a transnational coalition of states and NGOs, the treaty is designed to give institutional weight to the vision of a world without nuclear weapons and, by extension, to build pressure for disarmament over the long term. Unsurprisingly, the nuclear-armed states and many of their allies have been skeptical of the treaty, arguing that it might delegitimize the policy of nuclear deterrence or foster “polarization” in the international community. While NATO officially supports the goal of nuclear disarmament, none of the allies have so far joined the agreement. This could easily change over the next few years, however, as a number of political parties and electoral coalitions in NATO member states appear determined to capitalize on strong public support for ratification. NATO has referred to itself as a “nuclear alliance” since 2010, but the uniquely nuclear aspects of allied cooperation are in practice limited to the deployment of a combined 150 U.S. B61 nuclear gravity bombs to Belgium, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, and Turkey, participation in the annual nuclear drill “Steadfast Noon” by the five nuclear hosts mentioned above and two or three others, a few relatively equivocal paragraphs in NATO’s policy documents, and infrequent, choreographed “consultations” on allied nuclear policy in the NATO Nuclear Planning Group and its subsidiary organs. Three members – Britain, France, and the United States – have their own nuclear arsenals. Each nation’s head of government enjoys “sole authority” over their country’s nuclear arms. Now they must decide what to do about the TPNW. With the United States remaining the dominant force in NATO, the diplomatic strategy of the Biden administration will be of particular importance. Option 1: Raising the Stakes Broadly corresponding to the general approach adopted by the Trump administration following the 2017 adoption of the Treaty, the strategy of raising the stakes would involve publically threatening allies and partners considering signature with various political and diplomatic reprisals (as Team Trump did with Sweden), to raise concern about verification arrangements and the TPNW’s alleged undermining of other disarmament instruments, and to frame the new agreement as “dangerous,” “destabilizing,” and “incompatible with NATO strategy.” This tack might help delay what some have described as the long-term “inevitability” of a NATO member joining the treaty – several allies are already under increasing domestic pressure to sign – but at a substantial risk. Indeed, the strategy has at least three significant downsides. First, the repeated harping on purported negative externalities associated with the TPNW risks fostering self-fulfilling prophecies. After all, publically claiming that allied support for the TPNW will inexorably “undercut security in Europe,” “weaken NATO,” or generate exploitable “divisions in the alliance” is tantamount to sowing doubt about the United States’ willingness to come to the aid of allies that have joined the TPNW, thus emboldening adversaries and potential aggressors. Taking a stance perceived to be unnecessarily hawkish or hostile to nuclear disarmament and the TPNW could also serve to turn public opinion against NATO and the United States, thereby fostering the very division the opponents of the TPNW say they are determined to prevent. Second, a strategy of opposition draws attention not only to the TPNW itself but also to America’s de facto opposition to what has effectively been a declared ambition of successive U.S. governments, namely a reduction in the salience of nuclear weapons and a strengthening of the norms constraining nuclear arms. Effectively declaring that a general security guarantee is insufficient – that the NATO security umbrella must be overtly “nuclear” – also sends a troubling signal to other states: to be secure in the twenty-first century, you either need your own nuclear arsenal or an express nuclear security guarantee from an ally with a large and flexible nuclear force. Third, the persistent promulgation of a series of technical objections to the TPNW that former IAEA director Hans Blix has described as vicarious and “strained” weakens Washington’s credibility and ability to lead on other issues. In summary, raising the stakes around potential allied support for the TPNW is no doubt tempting as a means of dissuading allies from joining, yet it has detrimental impacts on other goals and inescapably increases the agony if or when the gamble fails. Option 2: Playing It Cool The alternative strategy – playing it cool – would invite Team Biden to reverse the Trump administration’s overt campaign against the TPNW, ceasing attempts at persuading others not to sign and playing down the alleged negative externalities associated with the agreement. While this strategy would be fully compatible with proclaiming that the United States itself will not sign the treaty for the foreseeable future, and that America will retain a “safe, secure and effective arsenal to deter any adversary,” the U.S. government would under this approach make it clear, tacitly or explicitly, that it will not punish or withdraw the general NATO security guarantee from allies that decide to join the TPNW. To do so, U.S. officials would simply make clear the United States’ enduring commitment to the security of each of its allies and to Article V of the NATO pact – irrespective of individual allies’ position on the legality of cluster munitions, landmines, nuclear arms, or other specific means of war. This approach might hasten the process of at least some non-nuclear allies joining the treaty – some appear to have refrained from signing primarily due to concerns about U.S. reprisals – but would effectively do away with the prospect of the TPNW undermining meaningful military cooperation in NATO, undercutting security, or becoming a wedge between the allies. After all, whether the security guarantee is sapped or military exercises are cancelled is largely up to the United States. Most TPNW-supporters in countries such as Germany, Norway, and Spain are eager to adhere in a way that involves as little disturbance to existing military and alliance arrangements as possible. For example, the Norwegian Liberal, Christian Democratic, and Center parties all combine explicit support for Norwegian signature of the TPNW with enthusiastic approval of NATO and the U.S. alliance, including through longstanding backing of Norwegian contributions to allied operations in Afghanistan and elsewhere. Few TPNW supporters in U.S.-allied countries are looking to cease participation in intelligence sharing, military drills, or joint military operations. It’s important to note that, legally, such cooperative activities are compatible with ratification of the TPNW. As emphasized in the Oxford Commentary on The Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons, the agreement does not proscribe membership in alliances with nuclear-armed states or participation in joint drills or operations with such states so long as the state party in question stops short of actively “assisting” or “encouraging” the use or possession of nuclear arms. Why Option 2 is the Better Path Support for the TPNW is hardly radical or contrary to support for transatlantic cooperation. A number of former leaders in U.S.-allied nations have come out in favor of the TPNW, including two former NATO secretaries general. Former U.S. Secretary of Defense Bill Perry supports the agreement. According to former U.S. official Lawrence Korb, “If Reagan was still alive, he would be taking a leadership role, along with Pope Francis, in trying to get other nations, especially those with nuclear weapons to ratify the TPNW.” The TPNW could even have some benefits for the United States over the long term. The overall aim of the states and organizations backing the TPNW is to weaken the prestige value of nuclear weapons and to over time build pressure for nuclear disarmament through the stigmatization of nuclear arms. On the one hand, such normative entrepreneurship could be interpreted as a long-term challenge to America’s strategic autonomy and, ultimately, the credibility of U.S. central deterrence. Evidently, any deterrent threat loses its credibility if its enactment is rendered unacceptable. On the other hand, the United States has repeatedly promised to reduce its reliance on nuclear weapons and to seek their eventual elimination. Owing to America’s conventional military superiority, a lower salience of nuclear weapons in global affairs would, all other things being equal, favor the United States. Permitting non-nuclear allies to join the TPNW could also be of considerable value to those in a Biden administration who are eager to promote measures of nuclear restraint such as decreased funding for certain elements of the ongoing nuclear modernization effort, U.S.–Russian negotiations on further nuclear reductions, the phasing out of land-based ICBMs, or a shift to a no-first use or “sole purpose” nuclear posture. At present, the central argument against all of this is that America’s allies would never accept it. Indeed, virtually all observers, including industry-aligned hawks, accept that the United States does not need a first-use policy or enormous nuclear arsenal for its own national defense. These instruments are necessary, so goes the argument, to “reassure” unspecified “allies and partners.” Non-nuclear allies joining the TPNW would help take the sting out of this often-overegged sales pitch. One more question remains: Would the TPNW effectively outlaw extended nuclear deterrence? While the TPNW does not prohibit the individual or collective use of force by conventional means, parties to the TPNW would be prevented from explicitly calling on the United States or other allies to use nuclear weapons on their behalf, for example in a conflict involving Russia. Yet ever since the 1950s, when the Soviet Union developed long-range nuclear forces capable of doing immeasurable damage to the United States, it has been widely acknowledged that, unless America’s own vital national interests or survival were at stake, no U.S. president would authorize use of nuclear arms against Russia. As former national security advisor and Secretary of State Henry Kissinger reportedly put it, “great powers do not commit suicide for their allies.” U.S. threats to use nuclear weapons in response to minor conflicts or conventional aggression in Europe are therefore not believable and consequently of little value as deterrents. To the extent that extended nuclear deterrence has any credibility at all, this credibility resides, first, in the prospect that a U.S. president might on their own terms come to the conclusion that any use of a nuclear weapon by another state would warrant a nuclear response and, second, in the possibility that initially local conflicts could escalate to a point where America became fully invested. Yet U.S. allies’ ratification of the TPNW would not legally foreclose American use of nuclear weapons in either of these scenarios; adherence to the TPNW by Norway, Germany, or Spain would not prevent discretionary use of such weapons by the United States. Shifting from an explicit “nuclear umbrella” to an unspecified “security umbrella” would arguably have little if any impact on NATO’s overall defense posture. Everyone – including those in the Kremlin – would know that the United States possesses nuclear weapons and that America might use them if its perceived national interests so dictated. It would, however, strip proponents of nuclear primacy and increased spending on nuclear weapons of access to the lazy yet potent argument that any step towards nuclear restraint would be incompatible with NATO’s status as a “nuclear alliance.” Basing NATO’s security on an unspecified, general security guarantee would also have historical precedent: In NATO’s early history, between 1949 and 1954, Denmark refused to allow explicit references to NATO use of atomic weapons in the alliance’s strategic documents. Conclusion As long as allies stay silent, the most conservative forces in and around NATO and the U.S. military-industrial complex will continue to have free reigns to present America’s “allies and partners” as a monolithic bloc of countries that oppose no-first use and are desperate for the United States to spend hundreds of billions of dollars on new ICBMs, new “low-yield” nuclear weapons, new ground-launched intermediate-range forces, and new nuclear-tipped cruise missiles deliverable from the air and sea. In fact, for many TPNW supporters in U.S.-allied nations, the disinclination to have one’s country used as a rhetorical bludgeon in the service of nuclear vested interests is precisely one of the reasons for supporting the TPNW. If a progressive U.S. agenda on nuclear weapons is to succeed, it needs allies, partners, and civil society outriders to push the envelope. Those eager to support such an agenda must help shift the political center ground, expand the scope of political action, and allow Joe Biden to continue being a moderate. IMAGE: Anti-nuclear activists of ICAN (International Campaign to Abolish Nuclear Weapons) and other peace initiatives stage a protest with 51 flags of countries that ratified the UN Treaty to Ban Nuclear Weapons and a nabber reading “Nuclear weapons are forbidden! More than 50 states joined. Germany didn’t”, in front of the Chancellery in Berlin, on January 22, 2021. The UN Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons came into force on January 22, 2021. (Photo by TOBIAS SCHWARZ/AFP via Getty Images)